Holding

The selection was invalid due to a reasonable likelihood of bias arising from the candidates' close relationships with committee members, and the non‑joinder did not constitute fatal prejudice, so the orders cancelling the appointments were set aside.

Summary

The case concerned the selection and appointment of ten Shiksha Karmi Grade‑III candidates who were close relatives of members of the selection committee. The Collector cancelled their appointments on the ground of bias under Section 40(c) and Section 100 of the Madhya Pradesh Panchayat Raj Act, but the appellants were not impleaded as parties in the original appeal. The appellants argued that the non‑joinder violated the audi alteram partem rule and that the bias rule was not applicable. The Supreme Court held that the relationship created a reasonable likelihood of bias, rendering the selection vitiated, and that the failure to implead the appellants did not cause prejudice sufficient to sustain the cancellation. Consequently, the orders setting aside the appointments were set aside and the appellants were allowed to retain their posts.

Issues considered

Whether the non‑joinder of the selected candidates before the Collector violated the principles of natural justice (audi alteram partem).
Whether any such violation caused prejudice to the appellants.
Whether the violation of natural justice at the first instance can be cured by subsequent revisional or appellate proceedings.
Whether the presence of close familial relationships between candidates and selection‑committee members created a reasonable likelihood of bias sufficient to invalidate the selection.
Whether the appointments of the appellants should be restored.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. Article 136, s. Article 226
Madhya Pradesh Panchayat (Appeal and Revision) Ruless. Rule 12, s. Rule 3, s. Rule 5, s. Rule 5(1)(b), s. Rule 9
Madhya Pradesh Panchayat Raj Avam Gram Swaraj Adhiniyam, 1993s. Section 100, s. Section 40(c)
Madhya Pradesh Panchayat Shiksha Karmis (Recruitment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1997s. Rule 12, s. Rule 2, s. Rule 5

Subjects

selectionappointmentbiasrule against biasnatural justiceaudi alteram partemnon‑impleadmentprejudiceservice lawPanchayat Raj ActSection 40(c)Section 100recusaladministrative lawArticle 136Article 226

Judgment

[2024] 4 S.C.R. 151 : 2024 INSC 264

Krishnadatt Awasthy
v.
State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.
(Civil Appeal No. 4806 of 2011)
04 April 2024
[J.K. Maheshwari* and K.V. Viswanathan,* JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
Matter pertains to the selection and appointment of appellants and
four others to the post of Shiksha Karmi Grade wherein the selection
process, if vitiated by bias, candidates being close relatives of the
members of selection committee and non-joinder of parties in the
initial appeal, if violative of the natural justice.

Headnotes
Service law – Selection and appointment – Selection process,
if vitiated by bias, the candidates being close relatives of
the members of selection committee – Non-joinder of parties
in the initial appeal, if violative of the natural justice – Post
of Shiksha Karmi Grade – Selection and appointment of
249 candidates including ten appellants and four other
candidates, who were close relatives of the members of
selection committee – Challenged to, before the Collector,
by one of the aspirant – Only officers ex-officio impleaded
as parties and not the appellants and the members of the
selection committee – Cancellation of selection of appellants
and four others since the members of the selection committee
being their relatives gave them benefit thus, selection process
vitiated – Said order upheld in Revision – Writ petition
thereagainst, dismissed by the Single Judge of the High Court
holding that the appellants were afforded ample opportunity
of hearing thus, not joining them as party at the first instance
before the Collector, should not prejudice them and plea of
violation of principle of natural justice not justified – Division
Bench also dismissed the appeal – Interference with:
Held: (per Maheshwari, J.) ‘Rule against bias’ proved as
reasonable likelihood of bias was fully established irrefutably –
* Author
Ed. Note: Hon’ble Mr. Justice J.K. Maheshwari and Hon’ble Mr. Justice K. V. Viswanathan pronounced
separate Judgments. In view of divergent views, vide a common order, it was inter alia directed that
the matter be placed before Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India for constitution of a larger Bench.
152 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

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Without showing prejudice mere non-joinder even at initial stage
does not violate the natural justice doctrine – Action of appellants
of not controverting their relationship with the parties and not
demonstrating the manner in which they have been prejudiced
before the revisional authority and the Single Judge and Division
Bench of High Court, their representation before the Collector
would not have improved their case or compelled the Collector to
arrive at a different finding – Plea of non-impleadment is a useless
formality and the court should not entangle itself in procedural
complexities – In view of the principle of prejudice, the judgment
passed by the Single Judge as confirmed in writ appeal reaffirming
the judgment of the Collector and Commissioner, setting aside
the selection of the appellants does not suffer from any infirmity,
warranting interference of this Court – Held: (per Viswanathan,
J.) When an unsuccessful candidate challenged the selection
process, where the specific grievance was against 14 candidates
under the category of relatives and the overall figure was 249, at
least the candidates against whom specific allegations were made
and who were identified ought to have been given notices and
made a party – Courts below makes no reference to resolution
providing for recusal of committee members who had their close
relatives appearing for the interview – Furthermore, the principle
of prejudice not applicable since there was a complete denial
of opportunity – Breach of principles of natural justice in the
proceedings before the Collector at the original stage did not
stand cured on account of the proceedings before the revisional
authority – Given a chance before the Collector perhaps the
appellants would have met each and every objection of the sole
complainant – For the failure of complainant and the Collector,
the appellants cannot be made to pay – By virtue of interim
orders, the appellants are discharging their duties for the past
twenty five years, thus, not in the interest of justice to remand the
matter for a fresh enquiry – Impugned judgment of the Division
Bench set aside – Madhya Pradesh Panchayat (Appeal and
Revision) Rules, 1995 – Madhya Pradesh Panchayat Raj Avam
Gram Swaraj Adhiniyam, 1993 – Madhya Pradesh Panchayat
Shiksha Karmis (Recruitment and Conditions of Service) Rules,
1997 [Paras 35, 43, 46, 60, 66, 75-77] – Per Court: In view of
the divergent views, issuance of directions to the Registry to
place the matter before Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India for
constitution of a larger Bench.
[2024] 4 S.C.R. 153

Krishnadatt Awasthy v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.

Case Law Cited

In the Judgment of J.K. Maheshwari, J.
State Bank of Patiala and others v. S.K. Sharma [1996]
3 SCR 972 : (1996) 3 SCC 364; State of Uttar Pradesh
v. Sudhir Kumar Singh & Ors. [2020] 13 SCR 571 :
(2020) SCC Online SC 847 – relied on.
Javid Rasool Bhat & Ors. v. State of Jammu and Kashmir
& Ors. [1984] 2 SCR 582 : (1984) 2 SCC 631 – held
inapplicable.
A.K. Kraipak and others v. Union of India and others
[1970] 1 SCR 457 : (1969) 2 SCC 262; J. Mohapatra &
Co. & Anr. v. State of Orissa & Anr. [1985] 1 SCR 322 :
(1984) 4 SCC 103; Ashok Kumar Yadav & Ors. v. State
of Haryana & Ors. [1985] Supp. 1 SCR 657 : (1985) 4
SCC 417; Kirti Deshmankar v. Union of India & Ors.
[1990] Supp. 1 SCR 355 : (1991) 1 SCC 104; Gurdip
Singh v. State of Punjab & Ors. (1997) 10 SCC 641;
Utkal University v. Nrusingha Charan Sarangi [1999]
1 SCR 19 : (1999) 2 SCC 193; G.N. Nayak v. Goa
University [2002] 1 SCR 636 : (2002) 2 SCC 712; Govt.
Of T.N. v. Munuswamy Mudaliar and Anr. (1988) Supp
SCC 651 : AIR (1988) SC 2232; Bihar State Mineral
Development Corporation v. Encon Builders (I) (P)
Ltd. [2003] Supp. 2 SCR 812 : (2003) 7 SCC 418; S.
Parthasarathi v. State of Andhra Pradesh [1974] 1 SCR
697 : (1974) 3 SCC 459; Dr. G. Sarana v. University
of Lucknow and others [1977] 1 SCR 64 : (1976) 3
SCC 585; Sk. Golap and others v. Bhuban Chandra
Panda and others (1990) SCC Online Cal 264; Kumaon
Mandal Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Girja Shankar Pant and
others [2000] Supp. 4 SCR 248: (2001) 1 SCC 182;
Ashok Kumar Sonkar v. Union of India & Ors. [2007]
3 SCR 95 : (2007) 4 SCC 54; H.P. Transport Corpn.
v. K.C. Rahi [2008] 3 SCR 97 : (2008) 11 SCC 502;
Jankinath Sarangi v. State of Orissa (1969) 3 SCC 392;
M/s. Escorts Farms (Ramgarh) Ltd. v. Commissioner
Kumaon Division Nainital U.P. & Ors. [2004] 2 SCR
543 : (2004) 4 SCC 281; Canara Bank v. Debasis Das
[2003] 2 SCR 968 : (2003) 4 SCC 557 – referred to.
154 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

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R v. Rand (1866) LR 1 QB 230; R v. Sussex JJ ex
parte McCarthy (1924) 1 KB 256; R v. Camborne JJ ex
parte Pearce (1955) 1 QB 41; Metropolitan Properties
Co. (FGC) Ltd. v. Lannon (1969) 1 QB 577; Hannam
v. Bradford Corporation (1970) 2 All ER 690; R v.
Gough (1993) AC 646; Ridge v. Baldwin (1964) AC
40; Russell v. Duke of Norfolk (1949) 1 AII ER 109
(CA) – referred to.

In the Judgment of K.V. Viswanathan, J.
State Bank of Patiala and others v. S.K. Sharma [1996]
3 SCR 972 : (1996) 3 SCC 364 – held inapplicable.
Shri Farid Ahmed Abdul Samad and Another v. The
Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad and
Another [1977] 1 SCR 71 : (1976) 3 SCC 719; Institute of
Chartered Accountants of India v. L.K. Ratna and Others
[1986] 3 SCR 1049 : (1986) 4 SCC 537; United Planters
Association of Southern India v. K.G. Sangameswaran
and Another [1997] 2 SCR 756 : (1997) 4 SCC 741;
Jayantilal Ratanchand Shah v. Reserve Bank of India
and Others [1996] 4 Suppl. SCR 443 : (1996) 9 SCC
650 – relied on.
A.K. Kraipak and Others v. Union of India and Others
[1970] 1 SCR 457 : (1969) 2 SCC 262; Daffodills
Pharmaceuticals Limited and Another v. State of Uttar
Pradesh and Another [2019] 15 SCR 125 : (2019) INSC
1366 : (2020) 18 SCC 550; Javid Rasool Bhat and Others
v. State of Jammu and Kashmir and Others [1984] 2
SCR 582 : (1984) 2 SCC 631; Chairman State Bank of
India and Another v. M.J. James [2021] 7 SCR 373 :
(2022) 2 SCC 301 : 2021 INSC 732; Kirti Deshmankar v.
Union of India & Ors. [1990] Supp. 1 SCR 355 : (1991)
1 SCC 104; J. Mohapatra & Co. & Anr. v. State of Orissa
& Anr. [1985] 1 SCR 322 : (1984) 4 SCC 103; Ashok
Kumar Yadav & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Ors. [1985]
Supp. 1 SCR 657 : (1985) 4 SCC 417; J.S. Yadav v.
State of Uttar Pradesh and Another [2011] 5 SCR 460 :
(2011) 6 SCC 570; Prabodh Verma and Others v. State
of Uttar Pradesh and 34 Others [1985] 1 SCR 216 :
(1984) 4 SCC 251; Ranjan Kumar and Others v. State
[2024] 4 S.C.R. 155

Krishnadatt Awasthy v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.

of Bihar and Others (2014) 16 SCC 187 : 2014 INSC
276; Union of India and Others v. G. Chakradhar (2002)
5 SCC 146; Abhishek Kumar Singh v. G. Pattanaik and
Others [2021] 5 SCR 305 : (2021) 7 SCC 613 : 2021
INSC 305; Charan Lal Sahu v. Union of India [1989]
Suppl. 2 SCR 597 : (1990) 1 SCC 613; S.L. Kapoor v.
Jag Mohan and Others [1981] 1 SCR 746 : (1980) 4 SCC
379; The State of Uttar Pradesh v. Mohammad Nooh
[1958] 1 SCR 595; Olga Tellis and Others v. Bombay
Municipal Corporation and Others [1985] Supp. 2 SCR
51 : (1985) 3 SCC 545; The Chairman Board of Mining
Examination and Chief Inspector of Mines and Another
v. Ramjee [1977] 2 SCR 904 : (1977) 2 SCC 256; B.N.
Nagarajan and Ors. v. State of Mysore and Ors. [1966]
3 SCR 682; Jaswant Singh Nerwal v. State of Punjab
and Others [1991] 1 SCR 411 : (1991) Supp 1 SCC
313; M.C. Mehta v. Union of India [1999] 3 SCR 1173 :
(1999) 6 SCC 237; Aligarh Muslim University and Others
v. Mansoor Ali Khan [2000] Supp. 2 SCR 684 : (2000)
7 SCC 529 – referred to.
John v. Rees and Others [1969] 2 All ER 274; Ridge
v. Baldwin (1964) AC 40; Leary v. National Union of
Vehicle Builders [1970] 2 All ER 713; Ferd Dawson
Calvin v. John Henry Brownlow Carr & Ors. (1979) 2
WLR 755; Lloyd and Others v. McMahon [1987] 1 AC
625 – referred to.

List of Acts
Madhya Pradesh Panchayat (Appeal and Revision) Rules, 1995;
Madhya Pradesh Panchayat Raj Avam Gram Swaraj Adhiniyam,
1993; Madhya Pradesh Panchayat Shiksha Karmis (Recruitment
and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1997; Constitution of India.

List of Keywords
Selection; Appointment; Selection process; Bias; Members of
selection committee; Non-joinder of parties; Natural justice;
Shiksha Karmi Grade-III in Janpad Panchayat; Officers ex-officio;
Non-impleadment as parties; Opportunity of hearing; Violation
of principle of natural justice; Reasonable likelihood of bias;
Rule against bias; Violation of audi alteram partem; Procedural
complexities; Unsuccessful candidate; Notices; Definition of
156 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

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relative; Recusal of committee members; Principle of prejudice;
Judicial review proceedings; Review of the decision-making
process; Interim orders; Divergent views; Constitution of a larger
Bench.

Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.4806 of 2011
From the Judgment and Order dated 15.12.2008 of the High Court
of M.P at Jabalpur in WA No. 892 of 2008
With
Civil Appeal Nos. 4807, 4808, 4809 of 2011
Appearances for Parties
Neeraj Shekhar, Ashutosh Thakur, Dr. Sumit Kumar, Advs. for the
Appellant.
Mrinal Gopal Elker, Shashwat Parihar, Avadhesh Kumar Singh,
Rajender Kumar Singh, Ms. Suvarna Singh, Sanjay Kumar Visen,
Advs. for the Respondents.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment
J.K. Maheshwari J.
1. After perusal of the judgment and view expressed by esteemed
brother Justice K.V. Viswanathan, in the facts of this case, I am
not in a position to agree with the reasoning and conclusions as
drawn by him, for which detailed reasons supporting my view is in
succeeding paragraphs.
2. As per the facts of the case, the controversy in the present case
revolves around selection and appointment for the post of Shiksha
Karmi Grade-III in Janpad Panchayat Gaurihar, District Chhatarpur
in the State of Madhya Pradesh which relates back to the year
1998. The appellants who are ten (10) in number and four (4) other
candidates, in total fourteen (14) candidates who were close relatives
of the members of selection committee, had been placed in the final
selection list of 249 Shiksha Karmi Grade-III. For ready reference
the appellants and their relations are described in a tabular form as
under: -
[2024] 4 S.C.R. 157

Krishnadatt Awasthy v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.

Sl. Candidate Committee Relationship
No. Member
1. Krishnadatt Awasthy Pushpa Dvivedi Maternal
(Chairman) Nephew
2. Shyama Dvivedi Pushpa Dvivedi Sister-in-law
(Chairman) (Nanad)
3. Prabha Dvivedi Pushpa Dvivedi Sister-in-law
(Chairman) (Devrani)
4. Rekha Avasthi Pushpa Dvivedi Niece
(Chairman)
5. Prabhesh Kumari Pushpa Dvivedi Niece
(Chairman)
6. Devendra Awasthi Pushpa Dvivedi Nephew
(Chairman) (Sister’s son)
7. Sumer Singh Swami Singh Son
(Member)
8. Ramrani Singh Swami Singh Daughter in law
(Member)
9. Gita Rawat Pushpa Dvivedi Sister
(Chairman)
10. Rita Dwivedi Pushpa Dvivedi Sister of Vibha
(Chairman) who is Devrani
of Chairman
Thus, from the table above, the relationship of appellants with the
members of the selection committee is apparent and un-disputed.
3. It is not inapposite to mention that at the previous stage of selection,
after preparation of the select list of Shiksha Karmi Grade-III by
Janpad Panchayat, Gaurihar, the same was challenged by one
Kunwar Vijay Bahadur Singh Bundela by filing an appeal before
the Collector, District Chhatarpur, who vide order dated 31.08.1998
quashed the selection list and remitted the matter for fresh selection.
Pursuant to the directions, fresh selection was conducted and the
final selection list consisting of 249 candidates including the names
of appellants and four others was published on 16.09.1998. As per
the said select list appointment orders were issued on 17.09.1998
appointing the candidates including the present appellants. Being
158 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

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aggrieved by the selection and appointment of the appellants who
were near relatives of members of the selection committee and
non-selection of Smt. Archana Mishra who was an aspirant, filed an
appeal before the Collector, District Chhatarpur on various grounds
including the allegations as quoted in paragraph 14 of the order
passed by esteemed brother. It is not in dispute that the present
appellants were not impleaded as parties in the appeal before the
Collector, though Chief Executive Officer Janpad Panchayat, Block
Development Education Officer and the President of the Education
Committee were arrayed as parties.
4. On issuing notice in the said appeal, the counter affidavit was filed
by the Chief Executive Officer, Janpad Panchayat, attaching the
certificate given by the Sarpanch of the Panchayat acknowledging the
relationship of the selected/appointed candidates with the members of
selection committee. As per the material placed, the findings recorded
by the Collector are relevant, which is reproduced as under: -
“3. ……So far as the question of selection of the relatives
of the members of Select Committee is concerned, it is
proved that the members of the Committee have selected
their relatives and the same is against the principles of
law. The facts given in the appeal have been admitted by
the Respondent Janpad Panchayat in its Reply that the
Committee President Smt. Pushpa Dvivedi’s sister-in-law
(Nanad) Shyama Dvivedi daughter of Shiv Dass Dvivedi,
her sister-in-law (Devrani) Vibha Dvivedi wife of Kailash
Dvivedi, two sisters of the Devrani (Vibha Dvivedi) of the
Committee President namely Kum. Rashmi Dvivedi and
Km. Rita Dvivedi have been appointed at Serial No. 9 and
4 of the Select List. The certificate of Sarpanch has been
attached by the Respondent as evidence in this regard.
The Respondent has also admitted that Devender Kumar
Avasthi son of Brij Bhushan Avasthi, Rekha Awasthi,
daughter of Brij Bhushan Awasthi, Pravesh Kumar,
daughter of Brij Bhushan Awasthi are also the maternal
niece of the Chairman of the Selection Committee. Their
Selection No. is 176 and 30 respectively. Chief Executive
Officer has also stated in his reply that Summer Singh,
son of other member Swami Singh Sengar, daughter
in law Ram Rani, wife of Rudra Pratap Singh, nephew
[2024] 4 S.C.R. 159

Krishnadatt Awasthy v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.

Rajesh Singh Chauhan, son Som Prakash Singh have
also been selected. Facts which have been admitted by
the Chief Executive Officer in his reply, they are reliable.
Chief Executive Officer has admitted in his reply Exh.-A
that selection of Badri Prasad, son of Bhagwat Prasad has
been made. He has been allocated 9 marks for experience,
but the Experience Certificate is not found enclosed with
his application. It is also proved from the reply submitted
by District Panchayat that selection of Shri Krishan Dutt
Awasthi, son of Sita Ram Awasthi has been made at No.
64. He is also the maternal nephew of the Chairman and
at Appointment Order No. 90 selection of Geeta Rawat,
- Ganga Prasad Rawat has been made. She is the real
sister of Chairperson. Committee of District Panchayat
has made the selection of his relatives in contravention
of various Sections of MP Panchayat Raj Act. It has been
restricted in Section 40(C) of Panchayat Raj Act that any
of the office bearers shall not cause financial gain to his
relatives. As per Section 40(C), act of any of the office
bearers of Panchayat to get job for his any relative in
Panchayat through his direct or indirect influence or to
act to cause financial benefit to any of his relatives like
carrying out of any work of the Panchayat through any
kind of contract shall amount to gross negligence towards
duties under the above Section and in such circumstances,
if it is done, then office bearers of the Panchayat could
be terminated. In Section 100 of the Act, acquisition of
any interest by any member office bearer or employee
directly or indirectly in any contract or any employment
made is strictly prohibited. In the present case, members
of the Committee of the District Panchayat have made the
selection of their relatives in order to cause benefit to them
in the entire selection procedure, which is contrary to the
principles settled by the law. Any person cannot be the
judge for himself. There is a principle of natural justice that
judge should see all persons with same eye. Selection of
the relatives of the members by the members has definitely
caused the discrimination with other members. In such
circumstances, selection of the relatives of the District
Panchayat is not lawful, which is liable to be cancelled…
160 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

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As per the facts given in the case like respondents have
admitted in the above paras that selection of the relatives
of the members has been made in illegal manner, selection
of these relatives is cancelled and the appointment so
made is terminated.”
(emphasis supplied)
From the above observation it can be safely perceived that the
members of the selection committee appointed the appellants who
were their relatives and had given benefit to them which is arbitrary
and discriminatory therefore vitiated.
5. The appellants assailed the said order of Collector by filing revision
under Section 5 of the Madhya Pradesh Panchayat (Appeal and
Revision) Rules, 1995 (hereinafter referred to as “A&R Rules”).
It was submitted that quashment of their appointment by the
Collector without joining them and affording an opportunity is
in violation of the Principle of Natural Justice. The appellants in
the memo of revision had not denied their relationships with the
members of the selection committee and only averred that “it
is the wrong allegation that the appointments of the petitioners
have been cancelled by the Collector, Chhatarpur on the charge
of being relatives.”
6. The revisional authority (Commissioner Revenue) dismissed the
revision vide order dated 14.03.2000, in para (6) of the order it was
observed that the selection of the appellants is contrary to Section
40(C) of the Madhya Pradesh Panchayat Raj Avam Gram Swaraj
Adhiniyam, 1993 (hereafter referred to as ‘Adhiniyam’). The plea
of non-joinder and not affording an opportunity of hearing was not
found appealing because the relationship of the appellants with the
members of the selection committee, gave undue favour to them
and the same was not denied. The revisional authority was of the
opinion that in the facts and circumstances of the case, not joining the
appellants did not prejudice them. Further, the violation of principle
of bias attracts in this case which vitiates the selection. However, in
absence of any prejudice, decision of the Collector is not required
to be altered with.
7. Aggrieved by the order of revisional authority, appellants filed a writ
petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India before the High
[2024] 4 S.C.R. 161

Krishnadatt Awasthy v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.

Court. Learned Single Judge with intent to afford an opportunity
allowed the appellants herein to inspect the records of selection
through their counsel, as spelt out in paragraph 13 of the order of
Single Judge which is reproduced as under: -
“13. During the course of hearing of this petition, as ordered
earlier the Chief Executive Officer of the Janpad Panchayat
was present with the original records of selection. Shri
M.L. Choubey, learned counsel for the petitioners, was
granted permission to inspect the records he inspected the
records on 29.07.2008. The records have been perused
by this Court and is returned back to Shri Shailesh Mishra
after perusal.”
Later, learned Single Judge formulated following three
questions: -
(i) “The first question would be as to whether the appeal
was maintainable before the Collector under Rule 3;
(ii) The second question is as to what is the effect of
cancellation of the appointment of the petitioners,
ordered without hearing them and without impleading
them as parties; and,
(iii) The third and final question would be as to whether the
Collector and Commissioner were right in interfering
with the selection of the petitioners for the reasons
indicated by them in the impugned order i.e… the
presence of the relatives as members of the selection
committee in which petitioners had participated”
8. Question No. (i) relating to maintainability of appeal was answered
against the appellants. The said question is not of much relevance
at this stage, thus, in my view it is not required to be dealt with in
detail. Further, the Learned Single Judge dealt questions no. (ii)
and (iii) in detail as they relate to non-joinder of the appellants and
affording them an opportunity of hearing and presence of relatives of
appellants in the selection committee. The said question had been
answered in paragraphs 20, 21, 22 and 23 of the order. In my view
para 20 of the order of learned Single Judge is the foundational
discussion on the issues therefore it is relevant and reproduced
as under: -
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“20. Item No.3 of Rule 2 deals with Shiksha Karmi - Grade
III, the educational qualification is Higher Secondary
Certificate Examination passed, and the Selection
Committee is to consist of: (i) Chairperson, Standing
Committee of Education of Janpad Panchayat; (ii) Chief
Executive Officer, Janpad Panchayat; (iii) Block Education
Officer (Member Secretary); (iv) Two specialists in the
subject to be nominated by the Standing Committee for
Education of whom one shall be woman; and, (v) All
members of the Standing Committee of Education of
whom at least one belongs to the Scheduled Castes,
Scheduled Tribes or OBC. In the present case, there is
no dispute that the Selection Committee was constituted
as per the aforesaid provision, but presence of two
members in the Selection Committee is to be taken
note of. The President of the selection Committee is one
Smt. Pushpa Dwivedi. She is Chairman of the Education
Committee and she has participated in the process of
selection of various candidates. Another member of the
Selection Committee was one Shri Swami Singh, who is
a Member of the Janpad Panchayat and has participated
in the process of selection as a Member of the Education
Committee. It is found by the Collector and the finding of
the Collector is affirmed by the Commissioner to the extent
that petitioner No.1 Smt. Shyama Dwivedi is the sister-
in-law of the President of the Selection Committee Smt.
Pushpa Dwivedi. According to the finding recorded Smt.
Pushpa Dwivedi’s sister-in-law (Nanand) Smt. Shyama
Dwivedi; her Devrani Smt. Vibha Dwivedi; two sisters
Rashmi Dwivedi and Rita Dwivedi have been appointed.
Apart from these persons, her nephew Devendra Awasthi
and her two nieces Ku. Rekha Awasthi and Ku. Prabhesh
Kumari have been appointed. That apart, it is found that
Smt. Gita Rawat, petitioner No.8, is also sister of Smt.
Pushpa Dwivedi. From the aforesaid facts, it is clear that
eight members of the family belonging to the President
Smt. Pushpa Dwivedi have been selected for appointment
on the post in question. Apart from the aforesaid eight
persons petitioner Smt. Ramrani Singh is found to be
[2024] 4 S.C.R. 163

Krishnadatt Awasthy v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.

daughter-in-law of Shri Swami Singh, who was Member of
the Committee; Shri Sumer Singh, petitioner No.6, is found
to be son of Shri Swami Singh and one of his nephew
Shri Rajesh Singh has also been found to be appointed.
Finding in this regard is recorded by the Collector and
the Commissioner on the basis of the statement made
by the Chief Executive Officer. The order-sheets dated
4.6.2002 and 24.6.2002 indicates that petitioners were
directed to file affidavits to show as to whether this is
a correct fact or not. The order-sheet dated 24.6.2002
indicates that time was sought by learned counsel for
the petitioners to file specific affidavit of the petitioners
denying their relationship with Members of the Selection
Committee or office bearers of the Janpad Panchayat.
Even though in pursuance to the aforesaid order, affidavits
have been filed, but in these affidavits the facts are
not denied and during the course of hearing Shri M.L.
Choubey fairly admitted that petitioners are related to Smt.
Pushpa Dwivedi and Shri Swami Singh, as recorded by
the Collector and the Commissioner and he accepts the
same, that being so, the finding recorded by the Collector
and the Commissioner to the effect that all the petitioners
are very closely related either to the President of the
Committee, or its Member is a correct finding. According
to the Collector and the Commissioner, the Panchayat
Raj Adhiniyam prohibits grant of any undue benefit by
Members and office bearers of the Panchayat to any of
its relatives or family members. Finding recorded is that
in this case some benefit has been granted.”
(emphasis supplied)
9. Paragraphs 21, 22 and 23 have already been reproduced by
esteemed brother in para 27 in his judgment. Discernibly, in para
21 thereto the arguments regarding presence of the members of the
selection committee do not materially affect the selection process
was raised by the appellants, which is answered in paragraphs 22
and 23. As reflected from paragraph 22, it drew the inference that
one of the appellants had obtained less marks in higher secondary
examination but she was accorded higher marks in oral interview
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and experience category, and included in her merit. While dealing
with the case of other candidates observed they secured less marks
in higher secondary in comparison to wait listed candidates and
granted more marks in oral interview due to which, they found place
in the selection list. In scrutiny of facts and the record learned Single
Judge was of the opinion that the appellants herein received less
marks in higher secondary whereas many persons whose names
appearing in wait list received 78% to 79% marks and they were
given less than three marks in oral interview, therefore, they have
not been given place in selection list. In paragraph 23 of the order,
the Learned Single Judge further dealt with the individual cases of
the appellants and concluded that the appellants whose relatives
were the members of the selection committee found favour in their
appointment, therefore, due to bias such appointments stood vitiated.
Applying the said analogy, the arguments of appellant(s) were not
found convincing enough to interfere with the orders of the Collector
and Commissioner in exercise of scope of Article 226 to warrant
interference by the High Court.
10. On analysing the order of the learned Single Judge in detail it is quite
vivid that despite affording due opportunity to controvert the factum of
relationship with the members of the selection committee and other
fact findings, they have not refuted those allegations disputing their
relationship. The record of the selection was produced before the
Learned Single Judge bench and it was inspected by the advocate
of the appellant(s) but they were not in a position to deny such facts
and allegations. Accordingly, it was observed that the selection of
the appellants who were relatives of the members of the selection
committee, is not as per the spirit of Section 40 and 100 of the
Adhiniyam which prohibits the office bearers to use any undue benefit
to any of its relative and family members. Learned Single Judge
applying the principles enunciated in the judgment of the A.K. Kraipak
and others Vs. Union of India and others; (1969) 2 SCC 262 and
evaluating the facts refused to exercise the jurisdiction under Article
226 of the Constitution of India. In the light of the judgment of the
State Bank of Patiala and others Vs. S.K. Sharma 1996 (3) SCC
364 learned Single Judge observed that appellants have afforded
ample opportunity of hearing therefore not joining them party at the
first instance before the Collector, should not prejudice them and the
plea of violation of principle of natural justice is not justified.
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11. The appellants challenged the order of the learned Single Judge
in Writ Appeal before the Division Bench which was dismissed
by the impugned judgement and the same is under challenge
before us. In the impugned judgement, it is said that relationship
of appellants with the members of selection committee has not
been denied. Analysing the findings of paras 21 to 23 of learned
Single Judge, it is seen how the relatives of the members of the
selection committee were given higher marks in interview though
they were having less marks in higher secondary and in the
category of experience with the other wait-listed candidates who
were given less marks in interview with an intent to push down
the meritorious candidates in the merit list The Division Bench
referring the judgments of A.K. Karipak (supra), J. Mohapatra &
Co. & Anr. Vs. State of Orissa & Anr.; (1984) 4 SCC 103, Ashok
Kumar Yadav & Ors. Vs. State of Haryana & Ors.; (1985) 4 SCC
417, Kirti Deshmankar Vs. Union of India & Ors.; (1991) 1 SCC
104, Gurdip Singh Vs. State of Punjab & Ors.; (1997) 10 SCC
641, Utkal University Vs. Nrusingha Charan Sarangi; (1999) 2
SCC 193, G.N. Nayak Vs. Goa University; (2002) 2 SCC 712,
Govt. of T.N. Vs. Munuswamy Mudaliar and Anr.; 1988 Supp
SCC 651: AIR 1988 SC 2232, Bihar State Mineral Development
Corporation Vs. Encon Builders (I) (P) Ltd.; (2003) 7 SCC 418
and in paragraph 23 observed as under: -
“The present factual matrix is to be tested on the aforesaid
enunciation of law. We have reproduced the analysis
made by the learned Single Judge. He has categorically
recorded that the relatives of the members of the selection
committee have been selected. The submission of the
learned counsel for the appellants is that if the marks
awarded by the interested persons are excluded then
also they would be selected. The said submission, if we
are permitted to say so, is a justification from hind sight.
The result manifests itself. In the case at hand, it does
not require Solomon’s wisdom that bias is in stricto sensu
as from a reasonable mind could be thought. As we have
referred to the authorities above, bias is a state of mind
at work. Quite apart from above, when the degree of
relationship is in quite proximity, bias is to be inferred and
the authorities below have inferred the same and after
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detailed discussion, the learned Single Judge has given
the stamp of approval to the same.”
(emphasis supplied)
12. In the backdrop of the above factual matrix, as analysed and
recorded, the Division Bench did not find any fault in the findings
of two quasi-judicial authorities and learned Single Judge. While
dismissing the appeal and refusing to entertain the plea of violation
of principle of natural justice, it was observed that since the selected
candidates were relatives of the office bearers of the committee, the
possibility of reasonable likelihood of bias cannot be obliterated. Once
the possibility of likelihood of bias kicks in, the selection process
stands vitiated. It is said that in absence of any demonstrable
prejudice to the appellants, their appointment cannot be approved.
On the plea of not joining them as party before the Collector, the
Division Bench observed in paragraph 11 as thus:
“11. The second aspect is whether the orders passed by
the Collector and the Commissioner should have been
quashed by the learned Single Judge as the appellants
who had been visited with adverse civil consequence
were not arrayed as parties before the Collector. It is
urged by the learned counsel for the appellants that in
view of the law laid down in Inderpreet Singh Kahlon
(supra) and M/s Laksmi Precision Screws Limited
(supa), no person should be visited with an adverse
civil consequence without affording him a reasonable
opportunity of hearing. There cannot be any cavil on
the aforesaid proposition. The learned Single Judge has
placed reliance on the decision rendered in State Bank
of Patiala and Others v. V.K. Sharma, (1996) 3 SCC
364 to come to hold that unless prejudice is caused
due to non-granting of hearing, the orders should not be
mechanically interfered with. It is worth noting that the
appellants had preferred the revision. They participated
in the hearing before the revisional authority in all
aspects. The Commissioner had called for the entire
selection proceeding and other documents on record
were available to the petitioners therein. There was due
deliberation in respect of the defence put forth by the
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Krishnadatt Awasthy v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.

revisionists. That apart, the learned Single Judge had
called for the parties. In view of the aforesaid, we are of
the considered opinion that though it was imperative on
the part of appellants to implead the affected parties, yet
as the affected parties had been given full opportunity
from all aspects by the revisional forum as well as by
the learned Single Judge, we do not think it apt and
apposite to quash the order and remand the matter to
the Collector to re-adjudicate singularly on the ground
that the appellants herein should have been impleaded
as a parties and that the matter should be reheard. The
said exercise in the peculiar facts and circumstance so
the case is unwarranted.”
(emphasis supplied)
13. In view of the foregoing, it is clear that while challenging the selection
and appointment of the appellant before the Collector, they were
not the party. However, in revision they challenged the said and
afforded the opportunity but their contentions did not find favour
with revisional authority. As per the findings recorded and also by
Learned Single Judge, it is clear that the appellants were relatives
of the members of the selection committee which is not permissible
as per the spirit of Sections 40 and 100 of the Adhiniyam. The
Division Bench confirmed those findings holding that in the facts
of the case, reasonable likelihood of bias cannot be ruled out. It
was also held that at initial stage the appellants were required to
be joined as parties before the Collector but because they have
been given due opportunity by the revisional authority, before
learned Single Judge, it has not caused any prejudice. Looking to
the uncontroverted facts only their non-joinder before the Collector
would not vitiate the order impugned.
14. In the above factual background, it is required to be appreciated
that whether due to non-joining the appellants before the Collector
violates the principle of natural justice ? Consequently, whether
the findings recorded against the appellants by two quasi-judicial
authorities, writ court and the writ appellate court is liable to be
interfered with in this appeal?
15. For appreciating the said issue, it is necessary to refer Sections 40
and 100 of the Adhiniyam, which are reproduced as thus: -
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“40. Removal of office-bearers of Panchayat- (1) The State
Government or the prescribed authority may after such
enquiry as it may deem fit to make at any time, remove
an office-bearer-
(a) if he has been guilty of misconduct in the discharge
of his duties; or
(b) if his continuance in office is undesirable in the
interest of the public:
Provided that no person shall be removed unless he has
been given an opportunity to show cause why he should
not be removed from his office.
Explanation- For the purpose of this sub-section
“Misconduct” shall include-
(a) any action adversely affecting,-
(i) the sovereignty, unity and integrity of India; or
(ii) the harmony and the spirit of common
brotherhood amongst all the people of State
transcending religious, linguistic, regional, caste
or sectional diversities; or
(iii) the dignity of women; or
(b) gross negligence in the discharge of the duties
under this Act;
[(c) the use of position or influence directly or indirectly to
secure employment for any relative in the Panchayat
or any action for extending any pecuniary benefits
to any relative, such as giving out any type of lease,
getting any work done through them in the Panchayat
by an office-bearer of Panchayat.
Explanation. – For the purpose of this clause, the expression
“relative” shall mean father, mother, brother, sister, husband,
wife, son, daughter, mother-in-law, father-in-law, brother-in-
law, sister-in-law, son-in-law or daughter-in-law:]”
“100. Penalty for acquisition by a member, office bearer
or servant of interest in contract. - If a member or office
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bearer or servant of Panchayat knowingly acquires,
directly or indirectly any personal share or interest in
any contract or employment, with, by or on behalf of a
Panchayat without the sanction of or permission of the
prescribed authority he shall be deemed lo have committed
an offense under Section 168 of the Indian Penal Code,
1860 (XLV of 1860).”
16. On perusal of the said provision, the intention of the legislators is
lucid that a person can be removed from the office mainly on two
instances, firstly, if they are guilty of misconduct and secondly,
their continuation in office is undesirable in public interest. The
provision further attempts to enlist the events which typically fall
within the definition of misconduct. Clause (c) of the first explanation
to Section 40 encompasses use of position by direct or indirect
influence to secure employment for the relatives and extending
any pecuniary benefits to them as misconduct. Upon perusal, it is
irrefutably inferred that functioning of the Panchayat must be free
from influence in selection and appointment and no undue benefit
should be given to relatives in employment or any other pecuniary
benefit. Otherwise contravention of this provision attracts removal
of the office bearers. Further, it is apparent from the Explanation
to clause (c), that the term ‘relative’ encompasses father, mother,
brother, sister, husband, wife, son, daughter, mother-in-law father-
in-law brother-in-law of the office bearer and such relationships
are implied to be falling within the category of ‘prohibited degree
of relationship’ in the matter of employment or to grant pecuniary
benefit. Thus, it is explicit that relatives of elected office bearers,
if secures an employment by the process where the office bearers
were actively participating and controlling the process, it gives cause
for removal of such office bearers.
17. As per factual matrix of the instant case, out of 14 candidates
whose selection was set aside, 7 fall within the prohibited degree
of relationships and others can be said to be in near relation.
Though in the present case we are not concerned with the removal
of office bearers, nonetheless, we should not lose track of the fact
that the conduct of the office bearers in giving undue benefits to
their near relatives in an orchestrated manner to deprive other
candidates of the opportunities despite them securing more marks
in qualifying higher secondary examination, by and large amounts
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to ‘misconduct’ under the law. Upon challenge, the selection and
appointment of successful candidates who were alleged to be in
relationships with the office bearers has been set aside by the
orders of the authorities and the High Court on the ground that
the presence of reasonable likelihood of bias vitiates the selection
process and consequently the appointment. Further, the plea of
their non-joinder at initial stage was not found favour by both, the
authorities and the High Court, by stating that since the candidates
have been afforded sufficient opportunity however, their non-joinder
before Collector would not be detrimental to the principle of natural
justice. At this juncture it is imperative to address the question that
when the selection and appointment is made in blatant violation of
the principle(s) of natural justice what effect would it have on the
selection of such candidates?
18. In the case at hand, the appellants countered the findings of
Collector, Commissioner, learned Single Judge and the Division
Bench on the ground of violation of audi alteram partem. It was
contended that their appointment was cancelled without joining
them at in initial proceedings before the Collector. The principle of
natural justice does not solely depend on audi alteram partem. It
needs to be prefaced by an action of the administrative or quasi-
judicial authorities and the courts of common law jurisdiction in
India to invalidate the orders based on rule of principle doctrine.
The principle of natural justice emphasises the basic values which
a common man cherishes throughout. The said principle is based
on rules relating to fairness, reasonableness, equity and justice,
good faith, and good conscience. It gives assurance of justice with
the intent to develop confidence in the justice delivery process. The
English law recognized two facets of natural justice “nemo debet
esse judex in propia causa” which means no one can be a judge in
his own cause and “audi alteram partem” means no one should be
condemned unheard. The preceding principle emphasises about the
decision-making authority and the latter emphasises a procedure to
be adopted in decision making, however, the deciding authority must
be impartial and without bias, therefore, the element of the bias in
the mind of the authority is an essential facet and the initial step
to observe the principle of natural justice. The preceding principle
emphasises that a man should not be a judge in his own cause.
Thus as per the first requirement, the person who is involved in
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the process including a judge should be impartial and neutral and
must be free from bias.
19. In the English judgement of R Vs. Rand, (1866) LR 1 QB 230,
Blackburn, J observed thus “…Wherever there is a real likelihood
that the judge would, from kindred or any other cause, have a bias
in favour of one of the parties, it would be very wrong in him to act;
and we are not to be understood to say, that where there is a real
bias of this sort this Court would not interfere;..”
20. In another English judgment R Vs. Sussex JJ, ex parte McCarthy
(1924) 1 KB 256, the King’s Bench quashed the conviction on the
ground of bias. Lord Hewart, CJ posed the question as thus: -
“… The question therefore is not whether in this case the
deputy clerk made any observation or offered any criticism
which he might not properly have made or offered; the
question is whether he was so related to the case in its
civil aspect as to be unfit to act as clerk to the justices
in the criminal matter.”
and answered as under: -
“… The answer to that question depends not upon what
actually was done but upon what might appear to be done.
Nothing is to be done which creates even a suspicion that
there has been an improper interference with the course
of justice. Speaking for myself, I accept the statements
contained in the Justices’ affidavit, but they show very
clearly that the deputy clerk was connected with the
case in a capacity which made it right that he should
scrupulously abstain from referring to the matter in any
way, although he retired with the Justices; in other words,
his one position was such that he could not, if he had
been required to do so, discharge the duties which his
other position involved. His twofold position was a manifest
contradiction. In those circumstances I am satisfied that
this conviction must be quashed, unless it can be shown
that the applicant or his solicitor was aware of the point
that might be taken, refrained from taking it, and took
his chance of an acquittal on the facts, and then, on a
conviction being recorded, decided to take the point.
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21. In the case of R Vs. Camborne JJ, ex parte Pearce, (1955) 1 QB
41 the QB observed that
‘real likelihood was the proper test and that a real likelihood
of bias had to be made to appear not only from the
materials in fact ascertained by the party complaining,
but from such further facts as he might readily have
ascertained and easily verified in the course of his inquiries’
The question arose before the QB was
“… ‘What interest in a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding
does the law regard as sufficient to incapacitate a person
from adjudicating or assisting in adjudicating on it upon
the ground of bias or appearance of bias?”
After discussing various judgements, it was held that –
“In the judgment of this Court the right test is that
prescribed by Blackburn, J., namely, that to disqualify a
person from acting in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity
upon the ground of interest (other than pecuniary or
proprietary) in the subject-matter of the proceeding, a real
likelihood of bias must be shown. This Court is further
of opinion that a real likelihood of bias must be made to
appear not only from the materials in fact ascertained by
the party complaining, but from such further facts as he
might readily have ascertained and easily verified in the
course of his inquiries.”
In the present case, for example, the facts relied on in
the applicant’s statement under RSC Order 59 Rule 3(2),
might create a more sinister impression than the full
facts as found by this Court, all or most of which would
have been available to the applicant had he pursued his
inquiries upon learning that Mr Thomas was a member of
the Cornwall County Council, and none of these further
facts was disputed at the hearing of this motion.
The frequency with which allegations of bias have come
before the courts in recent times seems to indicate that
Lord Hewart’s reminder in Sussex JJ case [(1924) 1
KB 256: 1923 All ER Rep 233] that it is of fundamental
importance that justice should not only be done, but
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should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done’
is being urged as a warrant for quashing convictions or
invalidating orders upon quite unsubstantial grounds and,
indeed, in some cases upon the flimsiest pretexts of bias.
Whilst endorsing and fully maintaining the integrity of
the principle reasserted by Lord Hewart, this Court feels
that the continued citation of it in cases to which it is not
applicable may lead to the erroneous impression that it
is more important that justice should appear to be done
than that it should in fact be done.”
22. In the case of Metropolitan Properties Co. (FGC) Ltd. Vs. Lannon,
(1969) 1 QB 577, Lord Denning observed and held as thus: -
“the principle evolved by Lord Hewart, CJ that ‘justice
should not only be done, but manifestly and undoubtedly
be seen to be done’. In considering whether there was
‘real likelihood’ of bias, Court does not look at the mind
of the decision-maker himself. “The Court looks at the
impression which would be given to other people. Even
if, he was as impartial as could be, nevertheless, if right-
minded persons would think that, in the circumstances,
there was a ‘real likelihood’ of bias on his part, then he
should not sit. And if he does sit, his decision cannot stand.”
“There must be circumstances from which a reasonable
man would think it likely or probable that the justice, or
chairman, as the case may be, would, or did, favour
one side at the expense of the other. The Court will not
enquire whether he did, in fact, favour one side unfairly.
Suffice it that reasonable people might think that he did.”
The said test was explained in the case of Hannam Vs. Bradford
Corporation, (1970) 2 All ER 690 as thus: -
“If a reasonable person who has no knowledge of the
matter beyond knowledge of the relationship which
subsists between some members of the tribunal and one
of the parties would think that there might well be bias and
there is in his opinion a real likelihood of bias. Of course,
someone else with inside knowledge of the characters of
the members in question might say “Although things don’t
look very well, in fact there is no real likelihood of bias.”
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That, however, would be beside the point, because the
question is not whether the tribunal will in fact be biased,
but whether a reasonable man with no inside knowledge
might well think that it might be biased.”
23. In another English judgment R Vs. Gough, 1993 AC 646, the question
came before the House of Lords which used the expression ‘real
danger’ of bias while applying the test of reasonable likelihood of
bias. The Court emphasised the term “possibility of bias” rather than
“probability of bias” and held as under: -
“… In my opinion, if, in the circumstances of the case
(as ascertained by the court), it appears that there was
a real likelihood, in the sense of a real possibility, of bias
on the part of a justice or other member of an inferior
tribunal, justice requires that the decision should not be
allowed to stand. I am by no means persuaded that, in
its original form, the real likelihood test required that any
more rigorous criterion should be applied. Furthermore,
the test as so stated gives sufficient effect, in cases of
apparent bias, to the principle that justice must manifestly
be seen to be done, and it is unnecessary, in my opinion,
to have recourse to a test based on mere suspicion, or
even reasonable suspicion, for that purpose.”
“In conclusion, I wish to express my understanding of the
law as follows. I think it possible, and desirable, that the
same test should be applicable in all cases of apparent
bias, whether concerned with Justices or members of
other inferior tribunals, or with jurors, or with arbitrators.
Likewise, I consider that, in cases concerned with jurors,
the same test should be applied by a Judge to whose
attention the possibility of bias on the part of a juror has
been drawn in the course of a trial, and by the court of
appeal when it considers such a question on appeal.
Furthermore, I think it unnecessary, in formulating the
appropriate test, to require that the court should look at the
matter through the eyes of a reasonable man, because the
court in cases such as these personifies the reasonable
man; and in any event the court has first to ascertain
the relevant circumstances from the available evidence,
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knowledge of which would not necessarily be available
to an observer in court at the relevant time. Finally, for
the avoidance of doubt, I prefer to state the test in terms
of real danger rather than real likelihood, to ensure that
the court is thinking in terms of possibility rather than
probability of bias. Accordingly, having ascertained the
relevant circumstances, the court should ask itself whether,
having regard to those circumstances, there was a real
danger of bias on the part of the relevant member of the
tribunal in question, in the sense that he might unfairly
regard (or have unfairly regarded) with favour, or disfavour,
the case of a party to the issue under consideration by
him….”
24. The above said English principles having been adopted by the
Indian Courts, the Constitutional Bench in the celebrated judgment
of A.K. Kraipak and others (supra) held as thus:
“…..The real question is not whether he was biased. It is
difficult to prove the state of mind of a person. Therefore
what we have to see is whether there is reasonable
ground for believing that he was likely to have been
biased. We agree with the learned Attorney General that
a mere suspicion of bias is not sufficient. There must be a
reasonable likelihood of bias. In deciding the question of
bias we have to take into consideration human probabilities
and ordinary course of human conduct.”
(emphasis supplied)
25. Further, in the case of S. Parthasarathi Vs. State of Andhra
Pradesh; (1974) 3 SCC 459 while drawing distinction of bias, “real
likelihood” and “reasonable suspicion”, the Court expanded the
scope of bias. The relevant paragraphs of the said judgment are
reproduced as under: -
“13. ……We are of the opinion that the cumulative effect
of the circumstances stated above was sufficient to create
in the mind of a reasonable man the impression that there
was a real likelihood of bias in the inquiring officer. There
must be a “real likelihood” of bias and that means there
must be a substantial possibility of bias. The Court will
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have to judge of the matter as a reasonable man would
judge of any matter in the conduct of his own business
(see R. v. Sunderland, JJ.) [(1901) 2 KB 357 at 373]
14. The test of likelihood of bias which has been applied
in a number of cases is based on the “reasonable
apprehension” of a reasonable man fully cognizant of the
facts. The courts have quashed decisions on the strength
of the reasonable suspicion of the party aggrieved without
having made any finding that a real likelihood of bias in
fact existed (see R. v. Huggins [(1895) 1 QB 563] ; R. v.
Sussex, JJ., ex. p. McCarthy [(1924) 1 KB 256] ; Cottle
v. Cottle [(1939) 2 All ER 535] ; R. v. Abingdon, JJ. ex.
p. Cousins [(1964) 108 SJ 840] .) But in R. v. Camborne,
JJ. ex. p Pearce [(1955) 1 QB 41 at 51] the Court, after
a review of the relevant cases held that real likelihood of
bias was the proper test and that a real likelihood of bias
had to be made to appear not only from the materials in
fact ascertained by the party complaining, but from such
further facts as he might readily have ascertained and
easily verified in the course of his inquiries.
XXX XXX XXX
16. The tests of “real likelihood” and “reasonable
suspicion” are really inconsistent with each other.
We think that the reviewing authority must make a
determination on the basis of the whole evidence before
it, whether a reasonable man would in the circumstances
infer that there is real likelihood of bias. The Court must
look at the impression which other people have. This
follows from the principle that justice must not only be
done but seen to be done. If right minded persons would
think that there is real likelihood of bias on the part of
an inquiring officer, he must not conduct the enquiry;
nevertheless, there must be a real likelihood of bias.
Surmise or conjecture would not be enough. There
must exist circumstances from which reasonable men
would think it probable or likely that the inquiring officer
will be prejudiced against the delinquent. The Court
will not inquire whether he was really prejudiced. If a
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reasonable man would think on the basis of the existing
circumstances that he is likely to be prejudiced, that is
sufficient to quash the decision...”
26. This Court while emphasising upon bias in the case of Dr. G. Sarana
Vs. University of Lucknow and others; (1976) 3 SCC 585 held
that what has to be seen is whether there is a reasonable ground
for believing that he was likely to have been biased. In deciding the
question of bias, human probabilities and ordinary course of human
conduct have to be taken into consideration. In case, the member
of the group or board may be in a position to influence the other,
then his bias is likely to operate in a subtle manner.
27. In the case of J. Mohapatra & Co. & Anr. (supra), this Court
emphasised that the doctrine of necessity applies not only to judicial
matters but also to quasi-judicial and administrative matters. While
reiterating the principle of bias, it has been held that doctrine of
necessity cannot be invoked because the members of the committee
were appointed by a Government Resolution and some of them
were appointed because they were holding official position. Such
members, by virtue of the orders or statutes were made a part of
the selection committee, are required to inform their position to the
Government, however, without taking such recourse they cannot
take a plea to apply the doctrine of bias.
28. This Court in another Constitution Bench case of Ashok Kumar
Yadav & Ors. (supra) has reaffirmed the principle of bias holding
that if a selection committee is constituted for the purpose of
selecting candidates on merits and one of the members of the
selection committee is closely related to a candidate appearing for
the selection, it would not be enough for such member merely to
withdraw from participation in the interview of the candidate and
ask the authorities to nominate another person in his place on the
selection committee, because otherwise all the selections made
would be vitiated on account of reasonable likelihood of bias affecting
the process of selection.
29. In the case of Sk. Golap and others Vs. Bhuban Chandra Panda
and others; 1990 SCC Online Cal 264, while dealing with the issue
of likelihood of bias, applying the principle “justice should not only
be done but it should be seen to have been done” the Court held
as under: -
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“7. ……We have no hesitation in believing also that he had
no personal contact with the writ petitioners who were his
erst-while clients since the previous writ petition was not
decided in the recent past. These considerations do not,
however, detract from the validity of the legal objection
raised on behalf of the appellants. It is not necessary
for the appellants to establish that the learned single
Judge actually had a bias and that the said bias was the
cause of the adverse verdict. The test to be applied in
such cases is not whether in fact a bias has affected the
judgment but whether there was a real likelihood of bias.
The answer depends not upon what actually was done
but upon what might appear to be done. Justice must be
rooted in confidence; and confidence is destroyed when
right minded people may have reason to go away thinking:
“the Judge might have been biased.”
30. Similarly, in the case of Kirti Deshmankar (supra) this Court re-
emphasised that if the mother-in-law of the selected candidate was
interested in the admission of her daughter-in-law, her presence
in the meeting of the council vitiates the selection and it was not
necessary to categorically establish the bias. The Court observed that
if in the selection process it is shown that there was a reasonable
likelihood of bias, it is sufficient to set aside the such selection.
31. This Court in the case of G.N. Nayak (supra) again emphasising
the element of impartiality in the mind of judicial, quasi-judicial or
administrative body held as thus: -
“33. Bias may be generally defined as partiality or
preference. It is true that any person or authority required to
act in a judicial or quasi-judicial matter must act impartially.
“If however, ‘bias’ and ‘partiality’ be defined to mean the
total absence of preconceptions in the mind of the Judge,
then no one has ever had a fair trial and no one ever will.
The human mind, even at infancy, is no blank piece of
paper. We are born with predispositions and the processes
of education, formal and informal, create attitudes which
precede reasoning in particular instances and which,
therefore, by definition, are prejudices.” [ Per Frank, J.
in Linahan, Re, (1943) 138 F 2d 650, 652]
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Krishnadatt Awasthy v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.

34. It is not every kind of bias which in law is taken to vitiate
an act. It must be a prejudice which is not founded on
reason, and actuated by self-interest — whether pecuniary
or personal. Because of this element of personal interest,
bias is also seen as an extension of the principles of natural
justice that no man should be a judge in his own cause.
Being a state of mind, a bias is sometimes impossible
to determine. Therefore, the courts have evolved the
principle that it is sufficient for a litigant to successfully
impugn an action by establishing a reasonable possibility
of bias or proving circumstances from which the operation
of influences affecting a fair assessment of the merits of
the case can be inferred”.
32. The case of Gurdip Singh (supra) is a case of similar nature as
on hand, in paragraph 3 of the said case, this Court has observed
as thus:
“3. …..It has been established beyond doubt that the
father of Respondent 3 being the Secretary of the
Managing Committee of the school participated in the
selection of his daughter, Respondent 3 and later on
confirmation was given about such selection in favour of
Respondent 3 where Respondent 3 by virtue of improper
selection also constituted as one of the members of the
Managing Committee giving confirmation. In the aforesaid
circumstances, we set aside the selection of Respondent
3 as the Headmistress of the said school.”
33. On the other side, learned counsel for the appellants has heavily
placed reliance on the judgment of Javid Rasool Bhat & Ors.
Vs. State of Jammu and Kashmir & Ors.; (1984) 2 SCC 631 to
contend that in absence of any allegation of mala fide, it would
not be right to set aside the selection merely because one of the
candidates happened to be related to a member of the selection
committee who abstained from participating in the interview of
that candidate. The case of Javid Rasool Bhat (supra) is based
on a written and oral test wherein the member of the selection
committee for oral test was unaware of the marks obtained by the
candidate in the written examination. The father of the candidate
who was on the interview panel had left the premise at the time of
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interview. Thus, the Court found that there was no bias. While in
the present case, as per the procedure prescribed and discussed,
the members of selection committee were aware, how many marks
have been obtained by individual candidates in qualifying exam and
also in experience category and by shortage of how many marks
they may be out from the merit list of selection. The members were
aware that their relatives would appear for interview, therefore, they
themselves passed a resolution on 01.08.2003 prior to starting the
process of selection and decided to abstain from the interview of
those particular candidates. Having knowledge of the fact that their
relatives are appearing and even without intimating the same to
the higher authorities for change of selection committee, they had
participated in the process of selection and about 5% relatives got
selected and appointed by such an act. Therefore, in my opinion
the judgment of Javid Rasool Bhat (supra) is disqualifiable on
facts and is of no help to the appellants.
34. As ascertained from the discussion above, whether in a particular
case, principles of natural justice have been contravened or not is
a matter for the courts to decide from case to case. However, even
with all its vagueness and flexibility, its two elements have generally
been accepted, viz, (i) that the body in question should be free from
bias, and (ii) that it should hear the person affected before it decides
the matter. The first principle denotes that the adjudicator should be
disinterested and unbiased; the prosecutor himself should not be
a judge; the judge should be a neutral and disinterested person; a
person should not be a judge in his own cause; a person interested
in one of the parties to the dispute should not, even formally, take
part in the adjudicatory proceedings. The basis of this principle is
that justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and
undoubtedly be seen to be done. According to Lannon (Supra), the
actual existence of bias is not necessary. The test is “reasonable
likelihood of bias”, if a reasonable man would think on the basis of
the existing circumstances that he is likely to be prejudiced, that is
sufficient to quash the decision. Mere apprehension of bias is not
enough and there must be cogent evidence available on record
to come to the conclusion. In my view the said Doctrine has been
adopted in pith and substance by Indian Courts.
35. As per the judgment of Ridge Vs. Baldwin; 1964 AC 40, it is said
that the doctrine of natural justice is not only to secure justice but
[2024] 4 S.C.R. 181

Krishnadatt Awasthy v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.

to prevent the miscarriage of justice. Such doctrine was held to
be incapable of exact definition but what a reasonable man would
regard as a fair procedure in particular circumstances would amount
to prevent the miscarriage of justice. In the case of Russell Vs.
Duke of Norfolk; (1949) 1 AII ER 109 (CA), As Tucker, L.J. has
expounded when the principles of natural justice are required to be
seen, everything will depend on the actual facts of the case. He
observed as thus: -
“The requirements of natural justice must depend on the
circumstances of the case, the nature of the inquiry, the
rules under which the tribunal is acting, the subject-matter
that is being dealt with and so forth.”
36. On reverting to the facts of the present case and as observed in
the table in Para 2 of this judgement, five of the present appellants
fall within the prohibited degree of relatives as prescribed in the
explanation of Section 40 of the Adhiniyam, while the remaining
five have near relationships with the Committee members. It is
also to observe that their relationships have not been denied by
the present appellants at any juncture of this litigation. The process
of selection is the same in which some of the appellants having
prohibited degree of relationship and near relationship. To apply the
test of reasonable likelihood of bias, the relationship of candidates
with the office bearers is material which may have relevance when
an action for removal of the office bearer is required. But by such
an act substantial likelihood of bias in selection of relatives by the
members of the Committee cannot be ruled out from the mind of
a reasonable man as expressed by Lord Denning in the case of
Metropolitan Properties Co. (FGC) Ltd. (supra). Additionally,
the observation of the learned Single Judge in paragraphs 17, 21,
22 and 23 of his judgement demonstrate the orchestrated manner
in which bias has vitiated the selection process. In my view, it is
sufficient to plant the seed of likelihood of bias in the mind of a
reasonable man, thus, the test of reasonable likelihood of bias as
propounded in the abovementioned judgements is satisfied if tested
on the anvil of the facts of the present case.
37. In the present case, in my considered opinion, the findings recorded
by the two quasi-judicial authorities, writ court and writ appellate
court are based on the analysis of reasonable likelihood of bias
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which rightly stirs bias in the mind of a common man who could
not get selected because the appellants have relations with the
members of the selection committee. The detailed analysis of
irregularities has been explained by the learned Single Judge and
has been re-affirmed by the Division Bench. In my view the said
stamp of approval should not be disturbed by this Court in exercise
of jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.
38. Appellants have also vehemently contended that they have not been
afforded an opportunity to be heard at the first stage before the
collector, thus, non-adhesion to the principle of natural justice vitiates
the process. At this stage, it is also crucial to mention that Indian Courts
time and again have reiterated that principles of natural justice are
neither treated with absolute rigidity nor as imprisoned in a straitjacket.
It has many facets. Sometimes, this doctrine is applied in a broad
way, sometimes in a limited or narrow. Applicability and requirements
of natural justice depend upon the facts and circumstances of the
case and it is not possible to lay down rigid rules as to when the
principles of natural justice are to apply; nor as to their scope and
extent. Everything depends on the facts and circumstances.
39. In the case of Kumaon Mandal Vikas Nigam Ltd. Vs. Girja Shankar
Pant and others; (2001) 1 SCC 182, this Court on refinement of
principles of natural justice observed in paragraph 2 as thus: -
“2. While it is true that over the years there has been a
steady refinement as regards this particular doctrine, but
no attempt has been made and if we may say so, cannot
be made to define the doctrine in a specific manner or
method. Strait-jacket formula cannot be made applicable
but compliance with the doctrine is solely dependent upon
the facts and circumstances of each case. The totality of
the situation ought to be taken note of and if on examination
of such totality, it comes to light that the executive action
suffers from the vice of non-compliance with the doctrine,
the law courts in that event ought to set right the wrong
inflicted upon the person concerned and to do so would
be a plain exercise of judicial power. As a matter of fact
the doctrine is now termed as a synonym of fairness in
the concept of justice and stands as the most-accepted
methodology of a governmental action.”
[2024] 4 S.C.R. 183

Krishnadatt Awasthy v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.

In view of the above, due to steady refinement as regards to the
doctrine of natural justice, there cannot be any straitjacket formula to
apply. The doctrine will now be termed as a synonym of fairness in
the concept of justice and stand as the most-accepted methodology
for a governmental action.
40. This Court in the case of Ashok Kumar Sonkar Vs. Union of India
& Ors.; (2007) 4 SCC 54 while dealing with the principle of natural
justice doctrine observed that it is well settled that the said doctrine
cannot be put in any straitjacket formula. It may not be applied in
each case unless prejudice is shown. It is not necessary where it
would be a futile exercise. The similar observations have been made
by this Court in the case of H.P. Transport Corpn. v. K.C. Rahi,
(2008) 11 SCC 502. In the said case, this Court in paragraphs 7
and 8 has observed as thus: -
“7. The principle of natural justice cannot be put in a
straitjacket formula. Its application depends upon the
facts and circumstances of each case. To sustain a
complaint of non-compliance with the principle of
natural justice, one must establish that he has been
prejudiced thereby for non-compliance with principle
of natural justice.
8. In the instant case we have been taken through various
documents and also from the representation dated 19-
10-1993 filed by the respondent himself it would clearly
show that he knew that a departmental enquiry was
initiated against him yet he chose not to participate in the
enquiry proceedings at his own risk. In such event plea
of principle of natural justice is deemed to have been
waived and he is estopped from raising the question
of non-compliance with principles of natural justice.
In the representation submitted by him on 19-10-1993
the subject itself reads “Departmental Enquiries”. It is
stated at the Bar that the respondent is a law graduate,
therefore, he cannot take a plea of ignorance of law.
Ignorance of law is no excuse much less by a person
who is a law graduate himself.”
41. The theory of prejudice had further been considered by this Court in
the case of Jankinath Sarangi Vs. State of Orissa; (1969) 3 SCC
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392, this Court while dealing with the facts of the case observed
as thus: -
“5. …..If anything had happened the earth would have
swollen rather than contracted by reason of rain and the
pits would have become bigger and not smaller. Anyway
the questions which were put to the witnesses were
recorded and sent to the Chief Engineer and his replies
were received. No doubt the replies were not put in the
hands of the appellant but he saw them at the time when
he was making the representations and curiously enough
he used those replies in his defence. In other words, they
were not collected behind his back and could be used to
his advantage and he had an opportunity of so using them
in his defence. We do not think that any prejudice was
caused to the appellant in this case by not examining the
two retired Superintending Engineers whom he had cited
or any one of them. The case was a simple one whether
the measurement book had been properly checked. The
pleas about rain and floods were utterly useless and the
Chief Engineer’s elucidated replies were not against the
appellant. In these circumstances a fetish of the principles
of natural justice is not necessary to be made. We do not
think that a case is made out that the principles of natural
justice are violated.”
42. In my considered opinion, the principle of law laid down on prejudice
in the case of S.K. Sharma (supra) duly applies in the facts of this
case in such a scenario. In the said case in paragraph 33, the Court
summarises the principle emerging on discussion of the issue of
violation of the doctrine of natural justice. The relevant paragraph
of the seven principles are reproduced as thus: -
“33. We may summarise the principles emerging from the
above discussion. (These are by no means intended to be
exhaustive and are evolved keeping in view the context of
disciplinary enquiries and orders of punishment imposed
by an employer upon the employee):
(1) An order passed imposing a punishment on an
employee consequent upon a disciplinary/departmental
enquiry in violation of the rules/regulations/statutory
[2024] 4 S.C.R. 185

Krishnadatt Awasthy v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.

provisions governing such enquiries should not be
set aside automatically. The Court or the Tribunal
should enquire whether (a) the provision violated is
of a substantive nature or (b) whether it is procedural
in character.
(2) A substantive provision has normally to be complied
with as explained hereinbefore and the theory of
substantial compliance or the test of prejudice would
not be applicable in such a case.
(3) In the case of violation of a procedural provision, the
position is this: procedural provisions are generally
meant for affording a reasonable and adequate
opportunity to the delinquent officer/employee.
They are, generally speaking, conceived in his
interest. Violation of any and every procedural
provision cannot be said to automatically vitiate
the enquiry held or order passed. Except cases
falling under — “no notice”, “no opportunity” and “no
hearing” categories, the complaint of violation of
procedural provision should be examined from
the point of view of prejudice, viz., whether
such violation has prejudiced the delinquent
officer/employee in defending himself properly
and effectively. If it is found that he has been so
prejudiced, appropriate orders have to be made to
repair and remedy the prejudice including setting
aside the enquiry and/or the order of punishment.
If no prejudice is established to have resulted
therefrom, it is obvious, no interference is called
for. In this connection, it may be remembered that
there may be certain procedural provisions which
are of a fundamental character, whose violation is
by itself proof of prejudice. The Court may not insist
on proof of prejudice in such cases. As explained
in the body of the judgment, take a case where
there is a provision expressly providing that after
the evidence of the employer/government is over,
the employee shall be given an opportunity to lead
defence in his evidence, and in a given case, the
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enquiry officer does not give that opportunity in spite
of the delinquent officer/employee asking for it. The
prejudice is self-evident. No proof of prejudice as
such need be called for in such a case. To repeat,
the test is one of prejudice, i.e., whether the person
has received a fair hearing considering all things.
Now, this very aspect can also be looked at from the
point of view of directory and mandatory provisions,
if one is so inclined. The principle stated under (4)
hereinbelow is only another way of looking at the
same aspect as is dealt with herein and not a different
or distinct principle.
(4) (a) In the case of a procedural provision which is not
of a mandatory character, the complaint of violation
has to be examined from the standpoint of substantial
compliance. Be that as it may, the order passed in
violation of such a provision can be set aside only
where such violation has occasioned prejudice to
the delinquent employee.
(b) In the case of violation of a procedural provision,
which is of a mandatory character, it has to be
ascertained whether the provision is conceived in
the interest of the person proceeded against or in
public interest. If it is found to be the former, then
it must be seen whether the delinquent officer has
waived the said requirement, either expressly or by
his conduct. If he is found to have waived it, then
the order of punishment cannot be set aside on the
ground of the said violation. If, on the other hand, it
is found that the delinquent officer/employee has not
waived it or that the provision could not be waived
by him, then the Court or Tribunal should make
appropriate directions (include the setting aside of the
order of punishment), keeping in mind the approach
adopted by the Constitution Bench in B. Karunakar
[(1993) 4 SCC 727 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 1184 : (1993)
25 ATC 704] . The ultimate test is always the same,
viz., test of prejudice or the test of fair hearing, as
it may be called.
[2024] 4 S.C.R. 187

Krishnadatt Awasthy v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.

(5) Where the enquiry is not governed by any rules/
regulations/statutory provisions and the only
obligation is to observe the principles of natural justice
— or, for that matter, wherever such principles are
held to be implied by the very nature and impact of
the order/action — the Court or the Tribunal should
make a distinction between a total violation of natural
justice (rule of audi alteram partem) and violation of
a facet of the said rule, as explained in the body of
the judgment. In other words, a distinction must be
made between “no opportunity” and no adequate
opportunity, i.e., between “no notice”/“no hearing” and
“no fair hearing”. (a) In the case of former, the order
passed would undoubtedly be invalid (one may call
it ‘void’ or a nullity if one chooses to). In such cases,
normally, liberty will be reserved for the Authority to
take proceedings afresh according to law, i.e., in
accordance with the said rule (audi alteram partem).
(b) But in the latter case, the effect of violation (of
a facet of the rule of audi alteram partem) has to
be examined from the standpoint of prejudice; in
other words, what the Court or Tribunal has to see
is whether in the totality of the circumstances, the
delinquent officer/employee did or did not have a
fair hearing and the orders to be made shall depend
upon the answer to the said query. [It is made clear
that this principle (No. 5) does not apply in the case
of rule against bias, the test in which behalf are laid
down elsewhere.]
(6) While applying the rule of audi alteram partem
(the primary principle of natural justice) the Court/
Tribunal/Authority must always bear in mind the
ultimate and overriding objective underlying
the said rule, viz., to ensure a fair hearing and
to ensure that there is no failure of justice. It is
this objective which should guide them in applying
the rule to varying situations that arise before them.
(7) There may be situations where the interests of
State or public interest may call for a curtailing of
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the rule of audi alteram partem. In such situations,
the Court may have to balance public/State interest
with the requirement of natural justice and arrive at
an appropriate decision.”
After going through the facts of this case as discussed above, the
present case falls within the ambit of the principle laid down in
paragraph 33 (3) and (6), of the above case.
43. In the recent decision this Court in State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. Sudhir
Kumar Singh & Ors.; 2020 SCC Online SC 847, in paragraph 39
explaining the principle of natural justice and prejudice theory has
been made which is reproduced as thus: -
"(1) Natural justice is a flexible tool in the hands of the
judiciary to reach out in fit cases to remedy injustice.
The breach of the audi alteram partem rule cannot
by itself, without more, lead to the conclusion
that prejudice is thereby caused.
(2) Where procedural and/or substantive provisions
of law embody the principles of natural justice,
their infraction per se does not lead to invalidity
of the orders passed. Here again, prejudice must
be caused to the litigant, except in the case of a
mandatory provision of law which is conceived not
only in individual interest, but also in public interest.
(3) No prejudice is caused to the person complaining of
the breach of natural justice where such person
does not dispute the case against him or it. This
can happen by reason of estoppel, acquiescence,
waiver and by way of non-challenge or non-denial
or admission of facts, in cases in which the Court
finds on facts that no real prejudice can therefore
be said to have been caused to the person
complaining of the breach of natural justice.
(4) In cases where facts can be stated to be admitted
or indisputable, and only one conclusion is
possible, the Court does not pass futile orders of
setting aside or remand when there is, in fact, no
prejudice caused. This conclusion must be drawn
[2024] 4 S.C.R. 189

Krishnadatt Awasthy v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.

by the Court on an appraisal of the facts of a case,
and not by the authority who denies natural justice
to a person.
(5) The “prejudice” exception must be more than
a mere apprehension or even a reasonable
suspicion of a litigant. It should exist as a matter
of fact, or be based upon a definite inference
of likelihood of prejudice flowing from the non-
observance of natural justice.”
In view of the foregoing, it is clear that the doctrine of natural justice
would not apply as a straitjacket formula, violation of one limb of
natural justice that is audi altrem partem can be accepted when the
prejudice has been shown to be caused. A person who alleges the
breach of the principle of natural justice is required to dispute the
case against him in order to establish prejudice. In the cases where
facts are not in dispute, the courts ought to refrain from passing
order of remand. Lastly, the exception of prejudice must be more
than the reasonable suspicion and should exist as strongly as a
matter of fact.
44. In the narration of the facts as discussed above, it is clear that the
appellants have emphasized on their non-joinder at the initial stage
before the Collector. A bare perusal of the order passed by the
Collector reflects that it is based on the counter-affidavit filed by the
Janpad Panchayat whereby it is established that the appellants were
related to the members of the selection committee. Subsequently,
the collector held the process to be vitiated by bias by applying the
test of reasonable likelihood of bias. Once again, upon challenge
being made by the appellants before the revisional authority, their
relationship with the members of the selection committee was not
disputed yet violation of doctrine of audi altrem partem was alleged
merely due to non-joinder. After hearing them, the plea of non-
impleadment did not find force before the revisional authority and
the challenge did not succeed. Aggrieved appellants moved a writ
petition before the High Court where ample opportunity was given by
learned Single Judge and they were allowed to inspect the records.
Thus, an opportunity to controvert the findings of the Collector and
the Commissioner and factual narration thereof was duly afforded.
After sufficient opportunities given by the Ld. Single Judge, the
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appellants neither denied their relationship with the members of
the selection committee nor demonstrated that how the findings
are perverse or contrary to record, causing any prejudice to them.
45. In the sequel of above factual narration, first limb of natural justice
that is ‘rule against bias’ was proved as reasonable likelihood of
bias was fully established irrefutably. The violation of another limb
i.e. audi alteram partem, which is procedural, has been prayed
by the appellants on the pretext of their non-joinder at the initial
stage; in my opinion, without showing prejudice mere non-joinder
even at initial stage does not violate the natural justice doctrine in
the case at hand.
46. As discussed, time and again, Indian Courts have emphasized
that procedural formalities can be dispensed with when facts are
admitted and undisputed and no apparent prejudice is caused to
the parties from the alleged non-compliance of the procedure. The
Courts have propounded ‘useless formality’ theory which revolves
around the idea that in cases where there are admitted or undisputed
facts, procedures and formalities may lose their relevance or serve
no meaningful purpose, since the outcome may be no different in
the absence thereof. This Court in M/s. Escorts Farms (Ramgarh)
Ltd. v. Commissioner, Kumaon Division, Nainital, U.P. & Ors.
2004 (4) SCC 281 observed that “rules of natural justice are to be
followed for doing substantial justice and not for completing a mere
ritual of hearing without possibility of any change in the decision of
the case on merits”.
47. This Court in the case of Canara Bank v. Debasis Das, (2003)
4 SCC 557 where order of removal was passed against charged
employee as he could not produce his written brief within the time
as provided, the order of removal was passed without considering
his written brief. Upon preferring statutory appeal, though the
employee filed written brief yet he could not convince the appellate
authority and it was dismissed. While exercising writ jurisdiction,
the Learned Single Judge Bench allowed the writ petition on the
ground of violation of natural justice which was confirmed by Learned
Division Bench of the High Court. This Court while exercising its
jurisdiction under Art. 136 quashed the order of the Learned Single
Judge and the Division Bench based on the finding of violation of
natural justice.
[2024] 4 S.C.R. 191

Krishnadatt Awasthy v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.

12. Residual and crucial question that remains to be
adjudicated is whether principles of natural justice have
been violated; and if so, to what extent any prejudice
has been caused. It may be noted at this juncture that
in some cases it has been observed that where grant of
opportunity in terms of principles of natural justice does
not improve the situation, “useless formality theory” can
be pressed into service.
23. As was observed by this Court we need not go into
“useless formality theory” in detail; in view of the fact
that no prejudice has been shown. As is rightly pointed
out by learned counsel for the appellants, unless failure
of justice is occasioned or that it would not be in public
interest to dismiss a petition on the fact situation of
a case, this Court may refuse to exercise the said
jurisdiction (see Gadde Venkateswara Rao v. Govt. of
A.P. [AIR 1966 SC 828] ). It is to be noted that legal
formulations cannot be divorced from the fact situation
of the case.
48. Circling back to the facts of the instant case, when the hindsight a
reasonable man looks at the action of appellants of not controverting
their relationship with the parties and not demonstrating the manner
in which they have been prejudiced before the revisional authority
and Learned Single Judge Bench and Learned Division Bench of
High Court, one would not be hesitant to hold that their representation
before the collector would not have improved their case or compelled
the collector to arrive at a different finding. Hence, in such a scenario,
the plea of non-impleadment is a useless formality and the court
should not entangle itself in procedural complexities.
49. In view of the principle of prejudice as carved out in the aforesaid
judicial precedents and in the facts of this case, in my considered view
the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge as confirmed in writ
appeal reaffirming the judgment of the Collector and Commissioner,
setting aside the selection of the appellants does not suffer from
any infirmity, warranting the scope of interference of this Court in
exercise of power under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.
Accordingly, the appeals filed by the appellants stand dismissed
affirming the order(s) impugned.
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K.V. Viswanathan, J.
1. Important questions in administrative law arise for consideration in
these appeals. These are four Civil Appeals. They are filed in all by
ten individuals. Together they call in question the judgment dated
15.12.2008 of the Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at
Jabalpur in Writ Appeal Nos. 892 of 2008, 896 of 2008, 879 of 2008
and 878 of 2008. The appointments of the appellants as Shiksha
Karmis-Grade III in the Janpad Panchyat, Gaurihar stands set aside
by the proceedings before the Courts below. Aggrieved, they are
before this Court.
Relevant facts:
2. The Madhya Pradesh Panchayat Shiksha Karmis (Recruitment and
Conditions of Service) Rules, 1997 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the
Recruitment Rules’) were framed in exercise of the powers conferred
by sub-section (2) of Section 53, sub-section (1) of Section 70 read
with sub-section (1) of Section 95 of the Madhya Pradesh Panchayat
Raj Adhiniyam, 1993.
3. Under Rule 2(h), a “Shiksha Karmi” means the person appointed
by Zila Panchayat or Janpad Panchayat, as the case may be, for
teaching in the schools under their control.
4. Rule 5 prescribes the Methods of Selection and Recruitment. It
provides for two modes of selection, namely, by direct recruitment
and by promotion.
5. Under Rule 5(8), the Selection Committee for direct recruitment was
statutorily prescribed and was to consist of members as specified in
Schedule II and was to be constituted by the Zila Panchayat or the
Janpad Panchayat. Under Schedule II for Siksha Karmi Grade III,
the Selection Committee was to consist of the following:-
1. Chairperson, Standing Committee of Education of Janpad
Panchayat;
2. Chief Executive Officer, Janpad Panchayat;
3. Block Education Officer (Member Secretary);
4. Two specialist in the subject to be nominated by the Standing
Committee for Education of whom one shall be woman; and
[2024] 4 S.C.R. 193

Krishnadatt Awasthy v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.

5. All members from the Standing Committee of whom atleast one
belongs to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes or OBC, in case
there is no SC/ST/OBC member in the Standing Committee then
the same shall be nominated from the General Body.
6. Under sub-rule (9) of Rule 5, the Committee was to assess the
candidates called for interview and award marks as follows:-
a) 60% marks for marks obtained in the qualifying examination
as prescribed;
b) 25% marks for teaching experience;
c) 15% marks for oral test which may include i) communication
skills in local dialect ii) knowledge of local environment iii)
general knowledge iv) training and teaching aptitude and v)
any other test which the Selection Committee may deem fit.
7. Under Rule 12, Appeal against the order passed under the recruitment
rules may be made as per the provisions of the Adhiniyam. Rule 12
of the rules reads as under:-
“12. Appeal.- Appeal against the order passed under these
rules may be made as per provision of the Adhiniyam.”
8. Independently, there is the Madhya Pradesh Panchayats (Appeal and
Revision) Rules, 1995 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the A&R Rules’).
9. Under Rule 3 of the A&R Rules, the appeal was to lie in the case
of an order passed by the Janpad Panchayat to the Collector of
the District.
10. Rules 5 and 9, which are important are extracted hereinbelow:
“5. Revision. - (1) (a) The State Government, the
Commissioner, the Director of Panchayat, the Collector
may on its/his own motion or on the application by any
party, at any time for the purpose of satisfying itself/himself
as to the legality or propriety of any order passed by or
as to the regularity of the proceeding of, the authority
subordinate to it/him call for and examine the record of
any case pending before, or disposed of by, such authority
and may pass such order in reference thereto as it/he
may think fit :
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Provided that it/he shall not vary or reverse any order
unless notice has been served on the parties interested
and opportunity given to them for being heard:
Provided further that no application for revision shall be
entertained against an order appealable under the Act.
(b) An application for revision by any party shall only be
entertained if it is on the point of law and not on facts.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-rule (1),-
(i) Where proceedings in respect of any case have
been commenced by the State Government under
sub-rule (1), no action shall be taken by other Officer
mentioned in the said sub-rule in respect thereof; and
(ii) Where proceedings in respect of any such case have
been commenced by the Officer mentioned in sub-rule
(1), the State Government may either refrain from
taking any action under this rule in respect of such
case until the final disposal of such proceeding by
such officer or may withdraw such proceeding and
pass such order as it may deem fit.
9. Power of appellate or revisional authority.- The
appellate or revisional authority after giving an opportunity
to parties to be heard and after such further enquiry, if
any, as it may deem necessary subject to the provisions
of the Act and the rules made thereunder, may confirm,
vary or set aside the order or decision appealed against.”
These are the important rules for the disposal of this case.
Resolution for recusal – during Interview:
11. The Standing Committee of the Janpad Panchayat, before the
recruitment process, on 01.08.1998, passed a resolution whereunder
it was resolved that members of the selection committee whose
close relatives are candidates will not participate in the proceedings/
deliberations and the two marks available to them for allotment to
the candidate will be allotted to the Chief Executive Officer.
12. It was also resolved that if any close relative of any member, officer
or subject expert appears for interview, then the marks to be given
[2024] 4 S.C.R. 195

Krishnadatt Awasthy v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.

by that member, officer or subject expert should be given by the
Chief Executive Officer and that member, officer or subject expert
shall not be present at the venue of interview. The relevant part of
the resolution is extracted hereinbelow:-
“(C) Letter No. 423/S.T.98 dated 26.07.1998 of the
Collector, Chhatarpur was read over by Chief Executive
Officer, in which it has been mentioned that at the time of
recruitment of teachers those members and officers also
take part in the interview whose close relatives are the
candidates due to which the entire selection process is
likely to be affected. Therefore, the directions are given to
immediately examine whether any candidate is the close
relative of the member of the Committee in the interview.
If any near relative of the member or the officer is the
candidate, then such member or officer should not be
present on the date of interview and any impartial person
should be kept in his place. The Committee unanimously
decided that if any close relative of any member, officer or
subject expert appears for interview then the marks to be
given by that member, officer or subject specialist should
be given by Chief Executive Officer and that member,
officer or subject expert shall not be present at the venue
of interview. This resolution has been passed unanimously.”
(Emphasis supplied)
Appointment of the appellants:
13. The Janpad Panchayat, Gaurihar, after conducting the process of
selection by direct recruitment, published the select list on 16.09.1998
and 249 candidates were notified for appointment. Orders of
appointment were issued on 17.09.1998. The appellants joined duties
and started discharging their functions. This is an undisputed fact.
Proceedings by R-4 – without impleading the appellants:
14. On 29.09.1998, Archana Mishra (R-4), who did not qualify, filed an
Appeal (though called an appeal it is in the nature of an original
proceeding challenging the selection) to the Collector, Chhatarpur.
Only three people ex-officio, were made the respondents, namely,
i) The Chief Executive Officer, Janpad Panchayat, Gaurihar; ii)
Block Development Education Officer, Janpad Panchayat, Gaurihar
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and iii) the President, Education Committee, Development Block
Gaurihar. The appointed candidates were not impleaded. What is
of importance to note is in para 9 of the memo of appeal, few of the
selected candidates were named and the appointments challenged.
Archana Mishra (R-4), inspite of having knowledge did not implead
them. Para 9 is extracted hereunder:-
“9. That the nepotism has been adopted during the
selection process by violating the principles of natural
justice by misusing the post by the President of the
Select Committee and other members by appointing their
relatives, for example the candidates who have been
selected at Serial No. 56 and 57 of the Selection List
are Shyama Dvivedi daughter of Shiv Dass Dvivedi who
is the sister-in-law (Nanad) of Educational Committee’s
President Smt. Pushpa Dvivedi and her sister-in-law
(Devrani) Smt. Vibha Dvivedi wife of Kailash Dvivedi,
her nephew (sister’s son) Devender Kumar Avasthi and
her niece (sister’s daughter) Rekha Avasthi daughter of
Bran Bhushan Avasthi. In the same way, by misusing his
post, the member of the Committee namely Swami Singh
Senger has got selected his son Shamsher Singh (112),
his daughter-in-law Ramrani wife of Rudra Pratap Singh
(195), nephews Rajesh Singh Chauhan and Om Prakash
Singh Chauhan and the Member Shri Harsh Vardhan
Tripathi has got selected his real nephew Ravinder Singh
son of Shri Jitender Singh Tripathi.”
It will be clear that at least five of the appellants were named in the
body of the appeal memo. This is set out to show that the present
was not a case where the selected candidates remained unidentified.
Even the members of the Committee against whom certain allegations
were made were not impleaded by Respondent No.4. The following
grievances were set out in the Appeal: a) The selection of candidates
in the interview and the process of selection was very clumsy; b) There
were a lot of irregularities and instances of corruption committed by
the Selection Committee; c) Nepotism was adopted by the President
of the Selection Committee and other members by violating the
principles of natural justice and misusing their posts; and d) Some
instances were set out to indicate how few selected candidates were
the relatives of the members of the Selection Committee.
[2024] 4 S.C.R. 197

Krishnadatt Awasthy v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.

Order of the Collector:
15. By an order of 02.06.1999, the Collector allowed the Appeal even
in the absence of the appointed candidates being made parties.
He set aside the selection of 14 candidates (including the selection
and appointment of the 10 appellants herein). Concerning the
marks awarded to the appellant – Archana Mishra, it was, however,
held by the Collector that marks for experience were given by the
Committee and that she was also interviewed. As such, it was held
that it was not possible to consider the determination of marks in
the interview, since it was the discretion of the Committee to give
the marks.
16. However, on the question of selection of the relatives of the members
of the Selection Committee, it was held that members of the Selection
Committee have selected their relatives. It was also held that these
facts had been admitted by the Janpad Panchayat in its reply. It was
held that evidence of relationship was certified by the Sarpanch,
whose certificate was attached as evidence by the respondent. It
was held that as far as the Committee President was concerned,
the Committee President’s husband’s sister, husband’s brother’s
wife, nieces (2), nephews (2), sister, sister-in-law’s sister (2) were
alleged to have been appointed. It was also found that in the reply to
the Chief Executive Officer it has been mentioned that the Standing
Committee Member Swamy Singh’s sons and daughter-in-law and
nephew; and one son of Bhagwat Prasad had been selected. In all,
14 individuals including the 10 appellants by name, figured in the
order of the Collector in para 3.
17. The Collector found that under Section 40(c) of the Panchayat Raj
Act, any of the Office Bearers shall not cause financial gains to their
relatives. It was also found that under Section 100 of the Panchayat
Raj Act, acquisition by any member, office bearer or employee of
any interest directly or indirectly in any contract or employment was
strictly prohibited.
18. The Collector held that there was no necessity to summon the
relatives since it was proved that the appointment of the relatives
was contrary to the procedure. It was also held that since the ex-
officio respondents have admitted about the selection of the relatives,
the selection of the 14 candidates, including the 10 appellants, was
cancelled and their appointments were terminated.
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19. It is important to notice at this stage itself, Section 40(c) and Section
100 of the M.P. Panchayat Raj Avam Gram Swaraj Adhiniyam, 1993,
which reads as under:-
“40 (c) the use of position or influence directly or indirectly
to secure employment for any relative in the Panchayat
or any action for extending any pecuniary benefits to any
relative, such as giving out any type of lease, getting any
work done through them in the Panchayat by an office-
bearer of Panchayat.
Explanation.-For the purpose of this clause, the expression
‘relative’ shall mean father, mother, brother, sister, husband,
wife, son, daughter, mother-in-law, father-in-law, brother-
in-law, sister-in-law, son-in-law or daughter-in-law :
100. Penalty for acquisition by a member, office bearer
or servant of interest in contract. - If a member or office
bearer or servant of Panchayat knowingly acquires, directly
or indirectly any personal share or interest in any contract
or employment, with, by or on behalf of a Panchayat without
the sanction of or permission of the prescribed authority
he shall be deemed to have committed an offense under
Section 168 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (XLV of 1860)”
20. Under the explanation to Section 40(c), nieces, nephews, sister-in-
law’s sister are not covered under the definition of relative. Of the
fourteen candidates, whose appointments were set aside, without
making them parties, several fall outside the definition of relative
even going by the case of the Complainant. Of the total 14, seven
fell outside the definition. Of the ten before us, five fall in the category
outside the definition of relative. Since the appointed candidates
were not made parties, these facts could not be brought to notice.
Revision before the Commissioner:-
21. On a revision being filed by the appellants, an interim order staying
the execution of the order of 02.06.1999 was made on 25.06.1999.
The interim order was also given effect to. The appellants were posted
back to their respective positions. In the revision, the appellants
canvassed the ground of the violation of principles of natural justice.
Before the revisional authority, the appellants specifically contended
[2024] 4 S.C.R. 199

Krishnadatt Awasthy v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.

that they were appointed in accordance with law based on the merit
list and that there was no irregularity. They disputed the allegation that
they were appointed on account of the fact that they were relatives.
However, the Commissioner rejected the argument holding that, if
selection has been made in violation of the scheme, then the same can
be cancelled without giving an opportunity. The Revisional Authority
failed to notice that the entire selection had not been cancelled and
only the selection of the 14 appointees including the 10 appellants
had been cancelled. Ultimately, the revision was dismissed by an
order of the Commissioner dated 14.03.2000. Since the order of the
Commissioner in revision proceedings is crucial, the operative part
is extracted hereinbelow:-
“6. (sic) On going through the record received for
consideration on the arguments of both the parties, I
have found that while examining the selection process,
the Collector, Chhatarpur has clearly mentioned in his
order dated 02.06.1999 that the members of the Selection
Committee have selected their relatives. The respondent
Janpad Panchayat has admitted that the Committee
President Smt. Pushpa Dvivedi’s sister-in-law (Nanad)
Shyama Dvivedi, her daughter Shiv Dass Dvivedi, her
sister-in-law (Devrani) Smt. Vibha, two real sisters of her
sister-in-law namely Kumari Rashmi Dvivedi and Kumari
Rita Dvivedi have been selected at Serial No. 9 and 4 of
the Select List. The Respondent has also admitted that
Devender Kumar Avasthi son of Brij Bhushan Avasthi is
the nephew (sister’s son) of President and Rekha Avasthi
daughter Brij Bhushan Avasthi, Pravesh Kumari daughter
of Brij Bhushan Avasthi are also the nieces (sister’s
daughters) of the President who have been selected
at Serial No. 176 and 30 of the Select List. The Chief
Executive Officer has also mentioned in his reply that
another Member Swami Singh Senger’s son Sumer Singh,
daughter-in-law Raamrani wife of Rudra Pratap Singh,
nephew Rajesh Singh Chauhan son of Som Prakash
Singh have also been selected. 9 marks on the basis of
experience have been given to the selected candidate
Badri Prasad son of Bhagwat Prasad but the Experience
Certificate has not been attached with his application. Shri
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Krishan Dutt Avasthi son of Sita Ram Avasthi, who has
been selected at Serial No. 64, is the nephew (sister’s son)
of President and Gita Rawat (selected at Serial No. 190 of
the appointment order) is the real sister of the President.
In this way, after the above examination, holding of the
Collector, Chhatarpur that the Select Committee of the
Janpad Panchayat has selected their relatives contrary
to the provisions of section 40-C of Madhya Pradesh
Panchayat Raj Act and the selection rules, is. completely
justified in view of the facts. So far as the plea of the
Revisionists that the information and the opportunity of
hearing was not given to the Revisionists in the appeal by
the Collector, Chhatarpur nor they have been joined in the
present appeal, therefore, the order dated 2.6.1999 is liable
to be set aside, I am not agreed to this argument. (sic) In
this regard, the Hon’ble High Court has clearly established
in “Hira Lal Patel Versus Chief Executive Officer, Janpad
Panchayat, Sargarh” reported in 1998 Volume-2 M.P.W.N.
39 that if the selection has not been made in accordance
to the scheme then the same can be cancelled without
giving the opportunity of hearing.
It clearly appears from the above facts of the case that
selection of the petitioners has been made contrary to
the provisions of Madhya Pradesh Panchayat Raj Act,
1993 and principles prescribed for the selection. In the
above situation, the order dated 02.06.1999 passed by
the Collector, Chhatarpur is not liable to be interfered….”
Writ Petitions in the High Court:
22. The appointed candidates totaling eleven (including the ten appellants
herein) filed Writ Petition No. 2522 of 2000 before the High Court
of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur. On 03.03.2000, in the writ petition
filed, an order directing maintenance of status quo was made. The
writ petition came to be dismissed by the learned Single Judge on
31.07.2008. Before the learned Single Judge, grounds of violations
of natural justice were argued. Apart from that, one of the other main
grounds argued was that the role played by the relatives has not
been examined and that it was not established whether the selection
was influenced by their participation.
[2024] 4 S.C.R. 201

Krishnadatt Awasthy v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.

23. It was pointed out that pursuant to the resolution passed before the
selection by the Standing Committee on 01.08.1998, the relatives
concerned had left the process of selection during the interview of
the candidates who were their relatives. It was also pointed out that
the marks to be given by the relatives were, as per the resolution,
allotted to the Chief Executive Officer, who gave the marks. As such,
it was argued that there was no reason to set aside the selection
merely because there were relatives in the Selection Committee
since they had recused when the case of the relatives came up. Yet
another ground about the maintainability of the appeal was raised.
Since that was not pressed before us, that is not being elaborated
herein.
Reasons of the learned Single Judge:
24. The learned Single Judge permitted inspection of the records to
the counsel for the appellants. The learned Single Judge held that
the argument of violation of natural justice was to be tested on the
touchstone of actual prejudice. It was held by the learned Single
Judge that when action or orders are challenged on the ground of
non-grant of hearing, mechanical interference is not to be resorted
to. The learned Single Judge held that the prejudice caused due
to non-grant of hearing and the fact of the prejudice on the final
outcome ought to be established.
25. The learned Single Judge noticed that wherever statutes contemplate
a hearing, hearing ought to be given. However, the learned Single
Judge overlooked the specific provision in Rule 9 of the A&R Rules
which applied to the present case. The learned Single Judge relied
on the judgment of State Bank of Patiala and Others vs. S.K.
Sharma, (1996) 3 SCC 364 and held that the order setting aside
the appointment could not be quashed on the grounds of violation
of natural justice. The learned Single Judge also held that the
proceedings did not stop with the Collector; that the matter travelled
to the Commissioner where full opportunity of hearing was granted.
The learned Single Judge held that the Commissioner decided the
revision afresh on merits after hearing each and every objection of
the appellants. Here again, the learned Single Judge completely
overlooked Rule 5(1)(b) of the A&R Rules which clearly stipulated
that an application for revision by any party shall be entertained only
on point of law and not on facts.
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26. The learned Single Judge further held that, during the course of
hearing in the writ petition, entire documents were made available.
It was held that the petitioners were not able to demonstrate as to
what prejudice was caused by non-grant of hearing by the Collector.
27. Dealing with the argument that the presence of the relatives did not
influence the selection, it was held:
“21. It is not in dispute that Smt. Pushpa Dwivedi and Shri
Swami Singh were Members of the Selection Committee
and they participated in the process of selection. However,
the resolution and other documents only indicate that
when relatives of Smt. Pushpa Dwivedi appeared for
the interview, she left the interview board and the two
marks available with her for allotment to the candidate
were allotted by the Chief Executive Officer. Similarly,
when relatives of Shri Swami Singh appeared for the
interview, he is said to have left the proceedings and the
two marks available with him were allotted by the Chief
Executive Officer. On this ground, it was emphasized by
Shri M.L. Choubey that the presence of relatives was of
no consequence and it has not materially affected the
process of selection. This aspect requires consideration.
22. As already indicated hereinabove under the statutory
rules, out of l00 marks to be allotted 60% marks is based
on the educational qualification. 25% marks is to be
allotted by the Members of the Committee on the basis
of experience and various other factors and thereafter
15% marks is to be allotted for oral interview. Records
indicate that in the Selection Committee there were about
10 Members and out of these Members, two marks each
were to be allotted by Smt. Pushpa Dwivedi, Shri Swami
Singh, Smt. Rajrani Shukla - Member, Shri Bhurelal
Khangar - Member, Shri Harshvardhan Singh, another
Member. Thereafter, one mark each were to be allotted
by Shri Ramdeo Patel, representative of MLA; Shri C.L.
Maravi, Chief Executive Officer; Shri K.S. Chauhan - Block
Education Officer; Ku. Meera Vishwakarma - Subject
Expert; and, Shri A.P. Ahirwar, another Subject Expert. In
this manner 15 marks were allotted. If the allotment made
[2024] 4 S.C.R. 203

Krishnadatt Awasthy v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.

of marks under various category is taken note of and if it
is compared with the marks allotted to some of the wait-
listed candidates certain disparities can be apparently seen.
Petitioner Smt. Shyama Dwivedi had obtained 50% in the
Higher Secondary Certificate Examination. Accordingly,
she has been allotted 30% marks for qualification. In the
oral interview, she is allotted 11.10 marks. After adding
the marks for experience she has received 58.10 marks.
Compared to this is the case of Shri Yogendra Nigam, Shri
Yogendra Soni, Shri Shivsharan, Shri Dinesh Kumar and
Shri Satyendra Kumar. All these persons have received
more than 75% marks in the Higher Secondary Certificate
Examination and, therefore, they have received very high
marks approximately between 46-47% for educational
qualification, but by giving them only 3 marks in the
interview their overall total percentage is kept around 50
and they are eliminated from the process of selection. In this
manner, some benefit is granted to each of the petitioners.
That apart, petitioner Smt. Vibha Dwivedi has received 57%
marks in the Higher Secondary Certificate Examination;
petitioners Devendra Awasthy and Krishnadutt Awasthi
have received 55% and 69% marks; whereas petitioner
Sumer Singh son of Shri Swami Singh has received 53%
marks, accordingly their percentage for the qualifying
examination is very less compared to other wait-listed
candidates. These persons have been allotted 12.25,
8.95 and 15 marks in the interview and their overall mark
is made over 55, so as to bring them within the zone of
consideration. It is, therefore, apparent from a scrutiny of
these results that most of the petitioners have received
very less marks in the qualifying examination i.e. Higher
Secondary Certificate Examination, whereas many persons
whose name appear in the wait-list have received 78%
and 79% marks in the qualifying examination, but they are
allotted very low marks in the interview and experience, in
some cases even less than 3 marks is allotted in the oral
interview, as a result their selection is adversely effected.
This is the reason why the Collector and the Commissioner
thought it appropriate to interfere in the matter.
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23- Petitioner No.6 Sumer Singh is son of Shri Swami
Singh, a Member of the Selection Committee, and he has
been allotted full 15 marks i.e. 100% marks have been
allotted by each of the Committee Members. It is found
that in this manner benefit in some way or the other is
extended to each of the petitioners and this is the reason
why the Collector and the Commissioner interfered in
the matter. It is further found that one Badri Prasad,
son of Bhagwat Prasad has been appointed and he has
been given 9 marks for the experience, but in his file no
experience certificate is available. It is found that petitioner
Gita Rawat is the real sister of Smt. Pushpa Dwivedi and
she has been selected after giving her high marks in the
oral interview, even though she has only received 55%
marks in the qualifying examination i.e. Higher Secondary.
It is clear from a perusal of the records that eight close
relatives of Smt. Pushpa Dwivedi, President of the Selection
Committee, and Shri Swami Singh, a Member of the
Selection Committee, have been appointed. The relatives
selected are either sons, daughter, sisters, sister-in-law of
the Members and after appreciating all these factors, the
Collector and the Commissioner found that the selection
of these close relatives are vitiated.”
28. Thereafter, the learned Single Judge held that there was no case
warranting interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India
and dismissed the writ petition. The learned Single Judge also relied
on the judgment of this Court in A.K. Kraipak and Others vs. Union
of India and Others, (1969) 2 SCC 262.
Appeal to the Division Bench:
29. The matter was carried in appeal to the Division Bench. Before the
Division Bench, the arguments on violation of natural justice and the
correctness of the procedure adopted by the Selection Committee
were canvassed. It was reiterated by the appellants that no case
of the Selection Committee members influencing the selection of
their relatives has been made out. The Division Bench cites the
Single Judge’s reliance on S.K. Sharma (supra) to hold that unless
prejudice is caused due to non-grant of hearing, the order ought not
to be mechanically interfered with. The following crucial findings of
the Division Bench are important:
[2024] 4 S.C.R. 205

Krishnadatt Awasthy v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.

“…. In view of the aforesaid, we are of the considered
opinion that though it was imperative on the part of
appellants to implead the affected parties, yet as the
affected parties had been given full opportunity from all
aspects by the revisional forum as well as by the learned
single Judge, we do not think it apt and apposite to quash
the order and remand the matter to the Collector to re-
adjudicate singularly on the ground that the appellants
herein should have been impleaded as parties and that the
matter should be reheard. The said exercise in the peculiar
facts and circumstances of the case is unwarranted.”
30. Ultimately, the Division Bench though held that it was imperative
on the part of Respondent No.4 to implead the affected parties,
however, since the affected parties had been given full opportunity
before the revisional authority and the learned Single Judge,
thought it fit not to interfere. Thereafter, it examined the issue as to
whether the selection was vitiated because of the participation of
the relatives. On this aspect, it extracted the findings of the learned
Single Judge and after relying on A.K. Kraipak (supra) and other
cases in the context of bias upheld the order of the learned Single
Judge. It appears that even during the pendency of the writ appeal,
the appellants continued to work.
Appeal in this Court:
31. Challenging the order of the Division Bench dated 15.12.2008,
special leave petitions were filed and on 19.01.2009, while issuing
notice, this Court granted status quo in the matter. Thereafter, leave
was granted on 12.05.2011 and the ad-interim orders granted earlier
were made absolute till the disposal of the appeals.
Contentions of the parties:-
32. Before us, Mr. Neeraj Shekhar, learned counsel for the appellants
has reiterated the contentions raised in the courts below on the
issue of violation of natural justice and also about the factum of
the committee members not influencing the selection. Reliance is
placed on Daffodills Pharmaceuticals Limited and Another vs.
State of Uttar Pradesh and Another, 2019:INSC:1366 = (2020) 18
SCC 550 and Javid Rasool Bhat and Others vs. State of Jammu
and Kashmir and Others, (1984) 2 SCC 631. Learned counsel for
206 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

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the appellants has also sought to distinguish A.K. Kraipak (supra)
and S. K. Sharma (supra). He also relied upon Chairman, State
Bank of India and Another vs. M.J. James, 2021:INSC:732 =
(2022) 2 SCC 301 to highlight the distinction between cases of
“no opportunity at all” and “adequate opportunity”. Ultimately, it is
pleaded that the appellants have been working for the last 25 years
and that one of the appellants has, in fact, retired while others are
on the verge of retirement. A chart has been filed to show that some
of the appellants have received lesser marks than the complainant
as well as the parties who seek to implead themselves here, which
is set out hereinbelow.
Chart Indicating Marks of Interview-
S. NAME OF THE MARKS 60% OF MARKS ON MARKS TOTAL
NO APPLICANT OBTAINED MARKS EXPERIENCE OBTAINED IN
IN % OBTAINED INTERVIEW
(INTERMEDI-
ATE)

488 KRISHNA DUTT 69.72 41.77 9(ONE YEAR) 8.95 59.72
AWASTHY
S/O SITA RAM
AWASTHY
2098 REKHA 63 37.80 17(TWO 4.35 59.15
AWASTHY YEAR)
D/O BRIJ
BHUSHAN
AWASTHY
49 SMT. RAM RANT 58.80 35.28 17(TWO 7.35 59.65
SINGH SENGAR YEAR)
D/O SHRI RUDRA
PRATAP SINGH
1231 PRAWESH 58.62 35.17 17(TWO 4.95 57.12
KUMARI YEAR)
D/O BRIJ
BHUHAN
AWASTHY
1587 SMT. SHYAMA 50 30 17(TWO 11.10 58.10
DIWEDI YEAR)
D/O SHIV DAS
DWIVEDI
1588 SMT. VIBHA 57.25 34.35 17(TWO 5.40 56.75
DIWEDI YEAR)
D/O KAILASH
DWIVEDI
[2024] 4 S.C.R. 207

Krishnadatt Awasthy v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.

1228 RITA DIWEDI 68.00 40.80 9(ONE YEAR) 8.4 58.20
D/O J.P. DIWEDI

332 SUMMER SINGH 53.33 31.99 17(TWO 15 63.99
S/O SWAMI YEAR)
SINGH

1590 GITA RAWAT 55.12 33.00 17(TWO 5.30 55.30
D/O GANGA PD. YEAR)
RAWAT

2099 DEVENDRA 55 33.00 17(TWO 12.25 62.25
AWASTHY YEAR)

1230 RASHMI DWIVEDI 73.55 44.13 9(ONE YEAR) 4.40 57.53
D/O J.P DWIVEDI

Charts showing marks obtained by the Respondent No. 4
(Complainant) -
S. NAME OF THE MARKS 60% OF MARKS ON MARKS TOTAL
NO APPLICANT OBTAINED MARKS EXPERIENCE OBTAINED IN
IN % OBTAINED INTERVIEW
(INTERMEDI-
ATE)

524 ARCHANA 47.75 28.65 17(TWO 4.65 50.30
MISHRA YEAR)

Charts showing marks obtained by the Applicants (Impleadment) –
S. NAME OF THE MARKS 60% OF MARKS ON MARKS TOTAL
NO APPLICANT OBTAINED MARKS EXPERIENCE OBTAINED IN
IN % OBTAINED INTERVIEW
(INTERMEDI-
ATE)

124 RAM SAKHA 46.25 27.75 17(TWO 13.60 58.35
S/O RAM MILHAN YEAR)
HARDENIA
538 ANIL KUMAR 60 36 9(ONE YEAR) 13.70 58.70
S/O VIPIN BIHARI
227 SAJID HUSSAIN 72.62 43.57 --- 15 58.57
S/O JAMUED
HUSSAIN
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33. We have also heard Ms. Mrinal Gopal Elker, learned counsel for the
respondent-State of M.P. and Mr. Avadhesh Kumar Singh, learned
counsel for respondent No. 4 – Archana Mishra and the parties
who have filed applications for impleadment. Though no formal
orders of impleadment were made, arguments were heard on the
application. They contend that the orders of the Collector, revisional
authority, learned Single Judge and the Division Bench warranted
no interference. They relied on S.K. Sharma (supra) and reiterated
the aspect of there being no prejudice due to the non-compliance of
the principles of natural justice. They highlighted the fact that even
though the appellants received less marks in the basic qualifying
examination, they have obtained higher marks in the interview; that
relatives have come to be appointed; that there was reasonable
likelihood of bias and that the relatives of committee members
have obtained higher marks during the interview. They also relied
on Section 40(c) and Section 100 of the M.P. Panchayat Raj Avam
Gram Swaraj Adhiniyam. They relied on the judgments of this Court
on the aspect of bias and likelihood of bias, among them being, Dr.
(Mrs.) Kirti Deshmankar vs. Union of India and Others, (1991) 1
SCC 104, J. Mohapatra and Co. and Another vs. State of Orissa
and Another, (1984) 4 SCC 103, Ashok Kumar Yadav and Others
vs. State of Haryana and Others, (1985) 4 SCC 417, A.K. Kraipak
(supra) and Reference under Article 317(1) of the Constitution
of India, In Re (2009) 1 SCC 337. They prayed for the dismissal
of the appeals. The intervenors have also filed written statements
supporting the State and reiterating the submissions that natural
justice did not cause any prejudice.
Questions for consideration:
34. On the above factual background, the following questions arise for
consideration:-
i) Were the principles of natural justice violated, during the conduct
of the proceedings before the Collector under Rule 3 of the
A&R Rules, 1995 read with Rule 12 of the Recruitment Rules?
ii) If indeed there was a violation of the audi alteram partem rule,
would the appellants still fail for want of demonstration of any
prejudice being caused to them?
iii) Further, if indeed there was violation of the audi alteram partem
rule before the Collector, did the violation stand cured on
[2024] 4 S.C.R. 209

Krishnadatt Awasthy v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.

account of the availment of the revisional proceedings before
the higher authority?
iv) On facts, are the appellants entitled to a declaration of the
invalidity of the orders setting aside their appointments to the
post of Shiksha Karmi Grade-III?
Question Nos. 1 & 2:
i) Were the principles of natural justice violated, during the
conduct of the proceedings before the Collector under
Rule 3 of the A&R Rules, 1995 read with Rule 12 of the
Recruitment Rules?
ii) If indeed there was a violation of the audi alteram partem
rule, would the appellants still fail for want of demonstration
of any prejudice being caused to them?
35. It is an undisputed factual position that the appellants, after a
process of selection, were appointed as Shiksha Karmi Grade-III
in the Panchayat and orders of appointments were issued to them
on 17.09.1998. It is also undisputed that the appellants joined the
post and started discharging their duties. This being the undisputed
factual position, when Archana Mishra (R-4) challenged the selection
and the consequential appointment, there was an obligation on
her part, under Rule 9, to implead the selected candidates whose
selection she was expressly challenging. At least at the stage when
the Collector identified all the 14 names, Rule 9 of the A&R Rules,
ought to have been complied with and notices ought to have been
issued giving an opportunity to the selected candidates to set out
their version and thereafter hold such enquiry as the Collector may
deem necessary. This was also not done. This is all the more when
only the appointment of the 14 candidates of the 249 appointees/
candidates were set aside on the ground that they were relatives
and it was not a case of setting aside of the entire selection. It is
well settled that in service matters when an unsuccessful candidate
challenges the selection process, in a case like the present where
the specific grievance was against 14 candidates under the category
of relatives and when the overall figure was only 249, at least the
candidates against whom specific allegations were made and who
were identified ought to have been given notices and made a party.
This Court has, even in cases where the selected candidates were
too large, unlike in the present case, held that even while adjudicating
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the writ petitions at least some of the selected candidates ought
to be impleaded even it is in a representative capacity. It has also
been held that in service jurisprudence, if an unsuccessful candidate
challenges the selection process the selected candidates ought to
be impleaded. [See J.S. Yadav vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and
Another, (2011) 6 SCC 570 (para 31) and Prabodh Verma and
Others vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, (1984) 4 SCC 251
(para 28) and Ranjan Kumar and Others vs. State of Bihar and
Others, 2014:INSC:276 = (2014) 16 SCC 187 (paras 4,5,8,9 & 13)]
This is not a case where the allegation was that the mischief was
so widespread and all pervasive affecting the result of the selection
in a manner as to make it difficult to sift the grain from the chaff.
It could not be said and it is not even the case of the State that it
was not possible to segregate the allegedly tainted candidates from
the untainted candidates. [See Union of India and Others vs. G.
Chakradhar, (2002) 5 SCC 146 (paras 7 & 8), Abhishek Kumar
Singh vs. G. Pattanaik and Others, 2021:INSC:305 = (2021) 7
SCC 613 (para 72).
36. From time immemorial, the importance of the audi alteram partem
rule has been emphasized and re-emphasized in several judicial
pronouncements. Two of them are set out to highlight the underlying
rationale. Chief Justice Sabyasachi Mukharji in Charan Lal Sahu
vs. Union of India, (1990) 1 SCC 613 felicitously described its
importance:-
“124. … It is true that not giving notice, was not proper
because principles of natural justice are fundamental in
the constitutional set up of this country. No man or no
man’s right should be affected without an opportunity to
ventilate his views. We are also conscious that justice is a
psychological yearning, in which men seek acceptance of
their viewpoint by having an opportunity of vindication of
their viewpoint before the forum or the authority enjoined
or obliged to take a decision affecting their right….”
[Emphasis supplied]
The above passage very much echoes what Lord Megarry said in
John vs. Rees and Others, [1969] 2 All E.R. 274 at 309 FG:-
“It may be that there are some who would decry the
importance which the courts attach to the observance of
[2024] 4 S.C.R. 211

Krishnadatt Awasthy v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.

the rules of natural justice. “When something is obvious,”
they may say, “why force everybody to go through the
tiresome waste of time involved in framing charges and
giving an opportunity to be heard? The result is obvious
from the start.” Those who take this view do not, I think,
do themselves justice. As everybody who has anything to
do with the law well knows, the path of the law is strewn
with examples of open and shut cases which, somehow,
were not; of unanswerable charges which, in the event,
were completely answered; of inexplicable conduct which
was fully explained; of fixed and unalterable determinations
that, by discussion, suffered a change. Nor are those with
any knowledge of human nature who pause to think for a
moment likely to underestimate the feelings of resentment
of those who find that a decision against them has been
made without their being afforded any opportunity to
influence the course of events.”
[Emphasis supplied]
37. This Court has held that the principles of natural justice reinforce
the maxim that justice should not only be done but should be seen
to be done. It has been held that non-observance of natural justice
is itself prejudice to any individual. [S.L. Kapoor vs. Jag Mohan
and Others, (1980) 4 SCC 379]. It has been held that the principle
that no one can be inflicted with an adverse order without being
afforded a minimum opportunity of hearing was a constant lode
star that has lit the judicial horizon of this country. [See Daffodills
Pharmaceuticals Limited and Another (supra)]. Even the Division
Bench, in the impugned order, recognizes the fact that it was
imperative to implead affected parties though ultimately it rested
the case on certain exceptions which did not apply. This aspect
has been elaborated hereinbelow.
38. In the light of the specific rule namely, Rule 9 of the A&R Rules,
there was no escape from the fact that the affected parties, like the
appellants, ought to have been impleaded by the Collector. Even de
hors Rule 9, if civil consequences are to result to a party, opportunity
ought to be given.
39. One of the two reasons given to justify the violation of the audi alteram
partem rule is the finding that prejudice caused due to non-grant
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of hearing has not been established. Reference has been made to
S.K. Sharma (supra) to justify this conclusion.
40. It is time to have a closer look at the facts in S.K. Sharma (supra)
to understand as to in what circumstances that exception was carved
out. The grievance raised by the delinquent employee in S.K. Sharma
(supra) was not that there was total absence of notice. The grievance
was that a set of nine documents including the statements of three
individuals was not supplied to him. The delinquent was advised to
peruse, examine and take notes of the said documents/statements
half an hour before the commencement of the enquiry proceedings.
It was admitted that the list of documents/statements was supplied.
This Court found that though the copies of the statements were not
supplied, the delinquent was permitted to peruse the same more
than three days prior to the examination of the witnesses. In that
background, the Court examined the question whether under the
circumstances there was substantial compliance of the clause in the
regulations, providing for supply of copies of statements, not later
than three days before the commencement of the examination by
the witness before the enquiring authority. It was expressly noticed
in the judgment that the records of the case did not disclose that
the delinquent had protested about denial of adequate opportunity
to cross-examine.
41. In fact, S.K. Sharma’s case (supra), after noticing the leading case
of Ridge vs. Baldwin, 1964 AC 40 expressly records that where there
is total violation of principles of natural justice, the violation would
be of a fundamental nature. S.K. Sharma’s case (supra) explicitly
records that “a distinction ought to be made between violation of the
principle of natural justice, audi alteram partem, as such and violation
of a facet of the said principle. In other words, distinction between
“no notice”/“no hearing” and “no adequate hearing” or to put it in
different words, “no opportunity” and “no adequate opportunity”, was
highlighted. The principle in S.K. Sharma’s case (supra) about the
distinction between “no opportunity” and “no adequate opportunity”
has also been followed in M.J. James (supra).
42. Unlike in S.K. Sharma’s case (supra) on which both the learned
Single Judge and the Division Bench have relied upon to non-suit
the appellants, the present is a case of no notice and no hearing in
breach of an express rule.
[2024] 4 S.C.R. 213

Krishnadatt Awasthy v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.

43. In the present case, before the Collector, only the Complainant –
Archana Mishra and the ex-officio respondents were arrayed as
parties. Allegations directly on the conduct of the appellants and the
committee members were traded thick and fast. The order of the
Collector and the Revisional Authority, in fact, makes no reference
either to the definition of relative in the explanation to Section 40(c)
or to the resolution providing for recusal of committee members who
had their near relations appearing for the interview. The categories
excluded from the definition of relatives are also not noticed. Based
on inferences drawn from the records produced by the ex-officio
respondents, conclusive findings were recorded by the Collector and
the appointments of the appellants and four others were set aside.
The order of the revisional authority is a reiteration of the order of
the Collector. These have been endorsed in the judgment of the
learned Single Judge and the Division Bench.
44. As this Court observed in Charan Lal Sahu (supra), justice is a
psychological yearning in which individuals seek acceptance of
their viewpoint by having an opportunity, before their rights are
affected. Lord Megarry in John vs. Rees and Others (supra) rightly
emphasized the feeling of resentment to those who find that decision
against them has been made behind their back. Those are telling
observations.
45. The material that worms into the record behind the back of a party does
have a tendency to condition the minds of the reviewing authorities.
Very often, it may happen that the said one-sided version smuggled in
stealthily, may cloud their mind and make them oblivious to the plight
of the party who is denied audi alteram partem. Strong convictions
then get mollified; the initial sense of outrage gets dampened and
the feeling of unfairness that engulfed one at the commencement
of the proceeding may slowly wither away. The opposing parties
to justify the breach may then hunt for a rule from the basket of
exceptions to the principles of audi alteram partem and offer it, to
lend a veneer of legitimacy to the order originally made in violation
of the principles of natural justice. All this may seduce the mind and
propel it to condone the total denial of opportunity. A conscious effort
needs to be made to steer clear of that trap.
46. The principle of prejudice as set out in S.K. Sharma’s case (supra)
had absolutely no application to the present case as the present was
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a case of complete denial of opportunity. The exception was wrongly
invoked and misapplied to the facts of the present case.
Question No.3
Does the violation at the original stage of the principles of natural
justice stand cured by the revisional proceeding?:-
47. The second reason given by the learned Single Judge and affirmed
by the Division Bench was that the appellants had full opportunity
before the revisional authority and the High Court. The relevant
finding from the judgment of the learned Single Judge is extracted
hereinbelow:-
“17. Even though when the appeal was filed by respondent
Smt. Archana Mishra before the Collector, petitioners were
never heard and the Collector passed the order without
hearing the petitioners, the matter did not end there.
Petitioners availed of the opportunity of filing a revision
before the Commissioner. When the matter travelled to the
Commissioner in this manner, full opportunity of hearing
was granted to the petitioners and the entire selection
record and other documents, which formed the basis
for passing of the order by the Collector, were available
before the Commissioner, petitioners had access to the
same and Commissioner decided the revision afresh on
merits after considering each and every objection of the
petitioners. Thereafter, during the course of hearing in this
petition also, the entire selection proceedings and other
documents were available on record and the petitioners
were given full opportunity to demonstrate before this Court
that their selection was proper or that the finding with regard
to their relatives participating in the selection process is
an incorrect or improper finding. Petitioners admitted that
their relatives had participated in the selection, but only
argued that their presence did not influence their selection.
This is a matter which can be looked into on the basis
of the material available on record and during the course
of hearing of this petition, the petitioners were not in a
position to demonstrate as to what was the prejudice
caused for non-grant of hearing by the Collector. Even
if no hearing was granted before the Collector, but when
[2024] 4 S.C.R. 215

Krishnadatt Awasthy v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.

full opportunity of hearing was granted and was availed of
by the petitioners before the Commissioner in the revision
and when the Commissioner had passed the order after so
hearing the petitioners, merely because petitioners were
not impleaded as party in the proceedings held before
the Collector it cannot be said that the entire action of
the appellate authority and the revisional authority stands
vitiated on this ground. This is a case where petitioners
had ample opportunity of putting up their defence and
objections before the Commissioner and the Commissioner
having appreciated the dispute on merits after hearing
the petitioners, this court is not inclined to interfere in the
matter merely on the technical ground of non-grant of
opportunity. It has to be held that non-grant of opportunity
during the proceedings held before the Collector does not
vitiate the action taken against the petitioners as they were
given full and reasonable opportunity by the Commissioner
before passing the order and petitioners having availed
of the same, cannot have any grievance on this count.
Accordingly, the second ground of attack also fails being
unsustainable.”
The above finding for a start overlooks Rule 5(1)(b) and the body
of case law that are relevant.
48. The question about whether at all the breach of natural justice can
be cured at the appellate stage and if so in what circumstances
has vexed the courts for the last several decades. In England, it
was Lord Megarry who spoke first in Leary vs. National Union of
Vehicle Builders, [1970] 2 All ER 713. The learned Judge had no
doubt in his mind when he proclaimed, “As a general rule, at all
events, I hold that a failure of natural justice in the trial body cannot
be cured by a sufficiency of natural justice in an appellate body.”
This remained the legal position till Ferd Dawson Calvin vs. John
Henry Brownlow Carr & Ors., (1979) 2 WLR 755 came on the
horizon. Lord Wilberforce, speaking for the Privy Council felt that
the principle elucidated by Lord Megarry was too broadly stated.
The Privy Council held:
“It remains to apply the principles above stated to the
facts of the present case. In the first place, their Lordships
216 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

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are clearly of the view that the proceedings before the
Committee were in the nature of an appeal, not by way
of an invocation, or use, of whatever original jurisdiction
the Committee may have had. The nature of the appeal
is laid down by Section 32 of the Australian Jockey Club
Act 1873, and by the Rules. Under the Act, the appeal is
to be in the nature of a re-hearing - a technical expression
which does little more than entitle the Committee to
review the facts as at the date when the appeal is heard
(see Builders Licensing Board (N.S.W.) v. Sperway
Constructions (Sydney) Pty. Ltd. (1976) 51 A.L.J.R. 260,
261, per Mason J.), not one which automatically insulates
their findings from those of the Stewards. The decision is
to be “ upon the real merits and justice of the case “ -- an
injunction to avoid technicalities and the slavish following
of precedents but not one which entitles the Committee to
brush aside defective or improper proceedings before the
Stewards. The section is then required to be construed
as supplemental to and not in derogation of or limited by
the Rules of Racing. This brings the matter of disputes
and discipline clearly into the consensual field. The Rules
of Racing (Local Rules 70-74) allow the Committee to
take account of evidence already taken and of additional
evidence, and confer wide powers as to the disposal of
appeals.”
49. The issue was again grappled with by the House of Lords in Lloyd and
Others vs. McMahon, [1987] 1 AC 625 which ultimately gravitated
to the view that the answer to the question would depend on the
particular statutory provision providing for the higher remedy. Lord
Bridge of Harvich stated the following in his judgment:
“…This is because the question arising in the instant case
must be answered by considering the particular statutory
provisions here applicable which establish an adjudicatory
system in many respects quite unlike any that has come
under examination in any of the decided cases to which we
were referred. We are concerned with a point of statutory
construction and nothing else.”
In their Lordships opinion:
[2024] 4 S.C.R. 217

Krishnadatt Awasthy v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.

“…But I cannot see any reason why it should be necessary
to seek leave to invoke the supervisory jurisdiction of
the court when any party aggrieved by the certificate
is entitled as of right to invoke the much more ample
appellate jurisdiction which the statute confers. It is the
very amplitude of the jurisdiction which, to my mind, is
all- important. Whether the auditor has decided to certify
or not to certify, the court is empowered to confirm or
quash the decision, to vary the decision if a certificate
has been issued by the auditor, and in any case to give
any certificate which the auditor could have given. The
language describing the court’s powers could not possibly
be any wider. Procedurally there is nothing either in the
statute or in the relevant rules of court to limit in any way
the evidence which may be put before the court on either
side….”
50. Applying this test in Lloyd (supra), the answer in the present case
is simple. Rule 5(1)(b) of the A&R Rules does not provide an ample
review or a full-fledged enquiry at the revisional stage. The revision
was to be entertained only if it is on the point of law and not on
facts. The discussion, however, on this issue would not be complete
unless a survey of the judgments of this Court is done.
51. The seeds for this thought-process was sown by Chief Justice S.R.
Das in The State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Mohammad Nooh, 1958
SCR 595. In fact, Justice Jeevan Reddy noticed this judgment in
S.K. Sharma’s case (supra). Chief Justice Das speaking for the
majority in the Constitution Bench held as follows:-
“On the authorities referred to above it appears to us that
there may conceivably be cases-and the instant case is
in point-where the error, irregularity or illegality touching
jurisdiction or procedure committed by an inferior court or
tribunal of first instance is so patent and loudly obtrusive
that it leaves on its decision an indelible stamp of infirmity
or vice which cannot be obliterated or cured on appeal
or revision. If an inferior court or tribunal of first instance
acts wholly without jurisdiction or patently in excess of
jurisdiction or manifestly conducts the proceedings before it
in a manner which is contrary to the rules of natural justice
218 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

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and all accepted rules of procedure and which offends the
superior court’s sense of fair play the superior court may,
we think, quite properly exercise its power to issue the
prerogative writ of certiorari to correct the error of the court
or tribunal of first instance, even if an appeal to another
inferior court or tribunal was available and recourse was
not had to it or if recourse was had to it, it confirmed
what ex facie was a nullity for reasons aforementioned.
This would be so all the more if the tribunals holding the
original trial and the tribunals hearing the appeal or revision
were merely departmental tribunals composed of persons
belonging to the departmental hierarchy without adequate
legal training and background and whose glaring lapses
occasionally come to our notice. The superior court will
ordinarily decline to interfere by issuing certiorari and all we
say is that in a proper case of the kind mentioned above
it has the power to do so and may and should exercise
it. We say no more than that.”
52. In Shri Farid Ahmed Abdul Samad and Another vs. The Municipal
Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad and Another, (1976) 3 SCC
719, an attempt was made to cover up the breach of the audi alteram
partem rule by seeking refuge under the principle that proceedings in
the higher body would cure the breach in the original body. Justice
P.K. Goswami, speaking for a three-Judge Bench, rebuffed it and
echoed sentiments similar to the one expressed in Lloyd (supra)
in the following words:-
“22. We should make it clear that provision for appeal is
not a complete substitute for a personal hearing which
is provided for under Section 5A of the Land Acquisition
Act. This will be evident from a perusal of Clause 3 of
Schedule B itself. The character of the appeal contemplated
under Clause 3(ii) of Schedule B is only with regard to the
examination of the following aspects:
(1) whether the order or approval of the plan is within the
powers of the Bombay Act, and
(2) whether the interests of the appellant have been
substantially prejudiced by any requirement of this Act not
having been complied with.
[2024] 4 S.C.R. 219

Krishnadatt Awasthy v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.

The appeal is confined under Clause 3 of Schedule B
to the examination of only the twin aspects referred to
above. There is no provision for entertainment of any other
relevant objection to the acquisition of land. For example a
person whose land is acquired may object to the suitability
of the land for the particular purpose acquired. He may
again show that he will be at an equal disadvantage if his
land and house have to be acquired in order to provide
accommodation for the poorer people as he himself belongs
to the same class of the indigent. He may further show
that there is a good alternative land available and can be
acquired without causing inconvenience to the occupants
of the houses whose lands and houses are sought to be
acquired. There may be other relevant objections which a
person may be entitled to take before the Commissioner
when the whole matter is at large. The Commissioner will
be in a better position to examine those objections and
consider their weight from all aspects and may even visit
the locality before submitting his report to the Standing
Committee with his suggestions. For this purpose also a
personal hearing is necessary. The appeal court under the
Schedule B to the Bombay Act, on the other hand, is not
required under Clause 3 to entertain all kinds of objections
and it may even refuse to consider the objections mentioned
earlier in view of the truncated scope of the hearing under
Clause 3(ii) as noted above. We are, therefore, unable to
accept the submission that the appeal provided for under
Schedule B is a complete substitute for a right to personal
hearing and as such by necessary implication ousts the
applicability of Section 5A of the Land Acquisition Act.”
53. In Institute of Chartered Accountants of India vs. L.K. Ratna
and Others, (1986) 4 SCC 537, Justice R.S. Pathak (as the learned
Chief Justice then was) negated a valiant attempt by the counsel for
the appellant to cling on to the appellate proceeding as a panacea
for the violation of audi alteram partem at the original stage. His
Lordship aligned with the Leary line of reasoning.
“17. It is then urged by learned counsel for the appellant
that the provision of an appeal under Section 22-A of the
Act is a complete safeguard against any insufficiency in
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the original proceeding before the Council, and it is not
mandatory that the member should be heard by the Council
before it proceeds to record its finding. Section 22-A of
the Act entitles a member to prefer an appeal to the High
Court against an order of the Council imposing a penalty
under Section 21(4) of the Act. It is pointed out that no
limitation has been imposed on the scope of the appeal,
and that an appellant is entitled to urge before the High
Court every ground which was available to him before
the Council. Any insufficiency, it is said, can be cured by
resort to such appeal. Learned counsel apparently has
in mind the view taken in some cases that an appeal
provides an adequate remedy for a defect in procedure
during the original proceeding. Some of those cases as
mentioned in Sir William Wade’s erudite and classic work
on “Administrative Law” 5th edn. But as that learned author
observes (at p. 487), “in principle there ought to be an
observance of natural justice equally at both stages”, and
If natural justice is violated at the first stage, the right of
appeal is not so much a true right of appeal as a corrected
initial hearing: instead of fair trial followed by appeal, the
procedure is reduced to unfair trial followed by fair trial.
And he makes reference to the observations of Megarry,
J. in Leary v. National Union of Vehicle Builders. Treating
with another aspect of the point, that learned Judge said:
If one accepts the contention that a defect of natural justice
in the trial body can be cured by the presence of natural
justice in the appellate body, this has the result of depriving
the member of his right of appeal from the expelling body.
If the rules and the law combine to give the member the
right to a fair trial and the right of appeal, why should he be
told that he ought to be satisfied with an unjust trial and a
fair appeal? Even if the appeal is treated as a hearing de
novo, the member is being stripped of his right to appeal
to another body from the effective decision to expel him.
I cannot think that natural justice is satisfied by a process
whereby an unfair trial, though not resulting in a valid
expulsion, will nevertheless have the effect of depriving
[2024] 4 S.C.R. 221

Krishnadatt Awasthy v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.

the member of his right of appeal when a valid decision
to expel him is subsequently made. Such a deprivation
would be a powerful result to be achieved by what in law
is a mere nullity; and it is no mere triviality that might be
justified on the ground that natural justice does not mean
perfect justice. As a general rule, at all events, I hold that
a failure of natural justice in the trial body cannot be cured
by a sufficiency of natural justice in an appellate body.
The view taken by Megarry, J. was followed by the
Ontario High Court in Canada in Re Cardinal and Board of
Commissioners of Police of City of Cornwall. The Supreme
Court of New Zealand was similarly inclined in Wislang v.
Medical Practitioners Disciplinary Committee, and so was
the Court of Appeal of New Zealand in Reid v. Rowley”.
54. The learned Judge (Pathak, J.) followed up the above principle by
setting out an approach to cases, which repays study. It was held:
“18. But perhaps another way of looking at the matter
lies in examining the consequences of the initial order as
soon as it is passed. There are cases where an order may
cause serious injury as soon as it is made, an injury not
capable of being entirely erased when the error is corrected
on subsequent appeal. For instance, as in the present
case, where a member of a highly respected an publicly
trusted profession is found guilty of misconduct and suffers
penalty, the damage to his professional reputation can be
immediate and far-reaching. “Not all the King’s horses
and all the King’s men” can ever salvage the situation
completely, notwithstanding the widest scope provided to
an appeal. To many a man, his professional reputation
is his most valuable possession. It affects his standing
and dignity among his fellow members in the profession,
and guarantees the esteem of his clientele. It is often the
carefully garnered fruit of a long period of scrupulous,
conscientious and diligent industry. It is the portrait of his
professional honour. In a world said to be notorious for
its blase attitude towards the noble values of an earlier
generation, a man’s professional reputation is still his most
sensitive pride. In such a case, after the blow suffered by
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the initial decision, it is difficult to contemplate complete
restitution through an appellate decision. Such a case is
unlike an action for money or recovery of property, where
the execution of the trial decree may be stayed pending
appeal, or a successful appeal may result in refund of
the money or restitution of the property, with appropriate
compensation by way of interest or mesne profits for
the period of deprivation. And, therefore, it seems to us,
there is manifest need to ensure that there is no breach
of fundamental procedure in the original proceeding, and
to avoid treating an appeal as an overall substitute for the
original proceeding.”
55. L.K. Ratna’s case (supra) was distinguished in United Planters
Association of Southern India vs. K.G. Sangameswaran and
Another, (1997) 4 SCC 741. That was a case where the jurisdiction
of the Appellate Authority to record evidence and to come to its own
conclusion on the questions involved was very wide. The appellate
provision provided that even if the evidence is recorded in the
domestic enquiry and the order of dismissal is passed thereafter, it
would still be open to the appellate authority to record evidence. In
those state of affairs, this Court, in para 18, 27 and 28 of the said
judgment, has held as under:-
“18. From a perusal of the provisions quoted above, it will
be seen that the jurisdiction of the Appellate Authority to
record evidence and to come to its own conclusion on the
questions involved in the appeal is very wide. Even if the
evidence is recorded in the domestic enquiry and the order
of dismissal is passed thereafter, it will still be open to the
Appellate Authority to record, if need be, such evidence
as may be produced by the parties. Conversely, also if the
domestic enquiry is ex parte or no evidence was recorded
during those proceedings, the Appellate Authority would
still be justified in taking additional evidence to enable it
to come to its own conclusions on the articles of charges
framed against the delinquent officer.
27. The learned counsel, in support of his arguments
that the defect is not curable has placed reliance on the
decision of this Court in Institute of Chartered Accountants
[2024] 4 S.C.R. 223

Krishnadatt Awasthy v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.

of India v. L. K. Ratna. It was, no doubt, laid down in
this case that a post-decisional hearing cannot be an
effective substitute of pre-decisional hearing and that if
an opportunity of hearing is not given before a decision
is taken at the initial stage, it would result in serious
prejudice, inasmuch as if such an opportunity is provided
at the appellate stage, the person is deprived of his right
of appeal to another body. There may be cases where
opportunity of hearing is excluded by a particular service
or statutory rule. In Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel, pre-
decisional hearing stood excluded by the second proviso to
Article 311(2) of the Constitution and, therefore, the Court
took the view that though there was no prior opportunity
to a government servant to defend himself against the
charges made against him, he got an opportunity to plead
in an appeal filed by him that the charges for which he was
removed from service were not true. Principles of natural
justice in such a case will have to be held to have been
sufficiently complied with. In Maneka Gandhi v. Union of
India and in Liberty Oil Mills v. Union of India an opportunity
of making a representation after the decision was taken,
was held to be sufficient compliance. All depends on facts
of each case.
28. In the instant case, the appellant has contended
that the respondent did not participate in the domestic
enquiry in spite of an opportunity of hearing having been
provided to him. He was also offered the inspection of the
documents, but he did not avail of that opportunity. He
himself invoked the jurisdiction of the Appellate Authority
and the order of dismissal passed against him was set
aside on the ground that the appellant did not hold any
domestic enquiry. It has already been seen above that the
Appellate Authority has full jurisdiction to record evidence
to enable it to come to its own conclusion on the guilt of
the employee concerned. Since the Appellate Authority has
to come to its own conclusion on the basis of the evidence
recorded by it, irrespective of the findings recorded in the
domestic enquiry, the rule laid down in Ratna case will
not strictly apply and the opportunity of hearing which is
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being provided to the respondent at the appellate stage will
sufficiently meet his demands for a just and proper enquiry.
[emphasis supplied]
56. In Jayantilal Ratanchand Shah vs. Reserve Bank of India and
Others, (1996) 9 SCC 650, A Constitution Bench of this Court held
that opportunity even if assumed to be denied at the original stage,
no grievance could be raised as the appellate authority gave such
an opportunity:
“16. In impugning the order of the Currency Officer of the
Bank it was submitted on behalf of the petitioner that no
opportunity of being heard was given to the Society so as
to enable it to explain the reasons for delay in submitting
the declaration form. Even if we proceed on the assumption
that such an opportunity of personal hearing was imperative
to comply with the rules of natural justice the petitioner
cannot raise any grievance on that score for the appellate
authority gave them such an opportunity before dismissing
their appeal. This apart, as noticed earlier, the appellate
authority has given detailed reasons for its inability to
accept the explanation of the Society for not filing the
declaration in time….”
The provision providing for appeal in Section 8(3) of the
High Denomination Bank Notes (Demonetisation) Act,
1978 reads as under:-
“8(3). Any person aggrieved by the refusal of the Reserve
Bank to pay the value of the notes under sub-section (2)
may prefer an appeal to the Central Government within
fourteen days of the communication of such refusal to him.”
57. Three other cases need only a brief mention. In Olga Tellis and
Others vs. Bombay Municipal Corporation and Others, (1985) 3
SCC 545, (Para 51) Chief Justice Y.V. Chandrachud found that no
opportunity was given to the petitioners. However, it was observed
that hearing in ample measure was given by this Court. Ultimately,
the case was found to be covered by the exception carved out in
S.L. Kapur (supra) and writ was denied since on admitted and
indisputable facts only one conclusion was possible. It was held that
Court should not issue futile writs. For the issue under consideration,
[2024] 4 S.C.R. 225

Krishnadatt Awasthy v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.

this is really not an authority. Equally so, in Charan Lal Sahu (supra),
the Court expressly recorded that on the facts and circumstances
of that case, since sufficient opportunity was available when the
review application was heard on notice, no further opportunity was
necessary. The Court recorded that it could not be said that injustice
was done and further recorded that “to do a great right” after all it is
permissible sometimes “to do a little wrong”. That case concerned a
challenge to the validity of the Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster (Processing
of Claims) Act, 1985.
58. In The Chairman, Board of Mining Examination and Chief
Inspector of Mines and Another vs. Ramjee, (1977) 2 SCC 256
cited by the learned counsel for the private respondents in the written
submissions again does not directly deal with this issue. There the
issue was about the interpretation of Regulation 26 of the Coal Mines
Regulations, which read as under:-
“26. Suspension of an Overman’s Sirdar’s, Engine
driver’s, shot firer’s or Gas-testing Certificate- (1) If, in
the opinion of the Regional Inspector, a person to whom
an Overman’s, Sirdar’s, Engine-driver’s, Shot-firer’s or
Gas-testing Certificate has been granted is incompetent
or is guilty of negligence or misconduct in the performance
of his duties, the Regional Inspector may, after giving
the person an opportunity to give a written explanation,
suspend his certificate by an order in writing.
(2) Where the Regional Inspector has suspended a
certificate under sub-regulation (1) he shall within a week
of such suspension report the fact to the Board together
with all connected papers including the explanation if any
received from the person concerned.
(3) The Board may, after such inquiry as it thinks fit, either
confirm or modify or reduce the period of suspension of
the certificates, or cancel the certificate.”
In this case, the delinquent handed over an explosive to an unskilled
hand resulting in injury to an employee. The Regional Inspector of
Mines immediately enquired and on the delinquent’s virtual admission
found the incident to be true. The Regional Inspector gave an
opportunity for explanation and, after considering the materials before
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him, forwarded the papers to the Chairman with a recommendation
for cancellation of the certificate under Regulation 26. The Board
had an explanation (styled appeal) from the delinquent and also
recommendation by the Regional Inspector for cancellation of the
certificate. The Regional Inspector had not suspended the delinquent
but had merely held an enquiry and made a recommendation for
cancellation of the certificate. One of the delinquent’s argument in
this Court was that since the Regional Inspector did not suspend the
respondent’s certificate, the Board had no jurisdiction and that the
Regional Inspector had no power to recommend, but only to report
and that the recommendation influenced the Board. It was further
argued that the Board should have given a fresh opportunity to be
heard before cancellation. The argument was repelled by holding that
the difference between suspension plus report and recommendatory
report was a distinction without a difference. It was also held that
the delinquent had filed an appeal against the report of the Regional
Inspector to the Chairman of the Board. He was heard in compliance
with the Regulation 26.
In conclusion, Justice Krishna Iyer held the following:-
“15. These general observations must be tested on the
concrete facts of each case and every miniscule violation
does not spell illegality. If the totality of circumstances
satisfies the Court that the party visited with adverse
order has not suffered from denial of reasonable
opportunity the Court will decline to be punctilious or
fanatical as if the rules of natural justice were sacred
scriptures.”
Not only was that a case where the Regional Inspector
held an enquiry, additionally, the Board also heard the
delinquent. That was not a case on the issue under
consideration here. This case also is of little assistance
to the respondents.
59. The principles deducible are as follows:-
i) audi alteram partem as a facet of natural justice wherever
applicable at the original stage ought to be strictly complied with.
ii) In cases where the jurisdiction of the appellate/revisional/higher
body is circumscribed like in Farid (supra) and in the case at
[2024] 4 S.C.R. 227

Krishnadatt Awasthy v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.

hand, courts ought to reject the argument that the hearing before
the appellate/revisional/ higher body, has cured the breach of
the audi alterm partem rule at the original stage.
iii) Ordinarily, violation of the audi alteram partem rule, at the
original stage, will not be curable in appeal/revision. However,
if the jurisdiction of the appellate/revisional/higher body is
comprehensive as found in Jayantilal Ratan Chand (supra)
and Sangameswaran (supra), the Courts may be justified
in concluding on the given facts, that the breach of the audi
alteram partem rule, in the original stage, has stood redressed
due to the scope and sweep of the higher proceeding. However,
it will be purely within the discretionary power of the court
depending on the facts of the case. This, in turn, will depend
on the court being satisfied that the fair opportunity given by
the higher body has ensured complete justice. Even in cases
where the appellate jurisdiction/jurisdiction of the higher body
is comprehensive as found in the provisions of the Jayantilal
Ratan Chand (supra) and Sangameswaran (supra), there
may be circumstances where the court may find that the
violation does not stand cured. If, on a given set of facts, the
court is of the opinion that ample opportunity has not been
forthcoming and complete justice has not been done, the court
in its discretion, will be justified in concluding that the violation
of the principles of natural justice does not stand cured. In
exercising the discretion, the court will be justified in factoring
in the circumstances as the one set out in para 18 of L.K.
Ratna (supra).
60. Applying the above principles, it is found that the present case is
covered by proposition (ii) above. The revisional power is severely
circumscribed by Rule 5(1)(b) of the A& R Rules and is confined to
points of law.
61. In view of that, on facts, it is held that the breach of principles of
natural justice in the proceedings before the Collector did not stand
cured on account of the proceedings before the revisional authority.
Equally so, judicial review proceedings being a review of the decision-
making process and not being a merits review, such proceedings
also cannot be a cure for the violation of the audi alteram partem
rule before the fact-finding authority.
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Question No.4
To what relief the appellants are entitled to?
62. As would be clear from the sequence of facts set out above, the
appellants were appointed as Shiksha Karmi Grade-III and they
joined their duties in September, 1998. Of all the candidates who
appeared, only one of them - Archana Mishra (R-4) took up the matter
in challenge and filed proceedings before the Collector under Rule
3 of the A&R Rules read with Section 12 of the Recruitment Rules.
Before the Collector, she impleaded only the Officers ex-officio. Even
though allegations of mala fide and favouritism in the markings during
interview were made neither the members of the Committee in their
individual capacity nor the selected and appointed candidates, like the
appellants were made parties. A reading of the order of the Collector
and the revisional authority, discloses that, the resolution passed by
the Standing Committee of the Panchayat on 01.08.1998 providing
for recusal of the committee members from the statutory committee
and for re-allocation of marks by vesting it in the Chief Executive
Officer, was not even discussed in the orders. It is difficult to speculate,
what the response of the Collector and the revisional authority would
have been, if they were posted of the recusal resolution. Neither in
the order of the Collector nor in the order of the revisional authority
is the definition of relative as available in explanation 40(c) of the
M.P. Adhiniyam set out or discussed. Admittedly, seven out of the
14 candidates did not come within the definition of ‘relative’, under
the explanation to Section 40(c).
63. Learned counsel for the appellants here have, citing the resolution
of 01.08.1998, contended that adequate precautions like recusal and
absence from the venue was taken. Learned counsel contends that
there is no material to show that the committee members influenced
the selection process. Even the Collector, it is pointed out, has
recorded in the order that it was not possible for the Collector to
consider the determination of the marks of interview since it was the
discretion of the committee. Even after so holding, the Collector set
aside the appointments only of the appellants merely on the basis
that there was an admission by the Chief Executive Officer, impleaded
ex-officio, about the factum of some candidates being related to the
committee members. While the Collector and the revisional authority
only put it on the factum of some candidates being related, without
[2024] 4 S.C.R. 229

Krishnadatt Awasthy v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.

examining the definition of relative, the learned Single Judge drew
some inferences additionally based on the qualifying marks and the
marks awarded in the interview.
64. It will be of interest to notice that in B.N. Nagarajan and Ors. Vs.
State of Mysore and Ors., [1966] 3 SCR 682, a similar inference
drawn only on the basis of the low qualifying marks was not favourably
looked at by this Court. This Court held:-
“… For example, it was alleged in para 15 that one Shri
D.C. Channe Gowda who is the son-in-law of the Second
Member of the Public Service Commission, Shri Appajappa,
was an ordinary B. E. Graduate with only 49.8% marks.
But even if he had only 49.8% of the marks, this is not
conclusive to show that he should not have been selected
because the whole object of interviewing candidates is to
judge their eligibility or suitability apart from the standard
displayed by them in the written examination. We are
unable to hold that on these facts any mala fides or
collateral object has been proved.”
65. What is also of concern is that the resolution of recusal, even though
specifically argued before the learned Single Judge, has been
brushed aside only because of the inferences drawn based on the
marks. There was gross violation of the principles of natural justice
at the original stage and on facts it is held that the violation did not
get cured at the revisional stage.
66. Neither the learned Single Judge nor the Division Bench have
examined the legal effect of the resolution dated 01.08.1998 providing
for recusal. Learned counsel for the appellants has placed reliance on
the judgment in Javid Rasool Bhatt (supra) which also distinguishes
the judgment in A.K. Kraipak (supra). Learned Counsel relies on
the following paragraph in Javid Rasool Bhatt (supra).
“14. Great reliance was placed by the learned counsel on
A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India on the question of natural
justice. We do not think that the case is of any assistance to
the petitioners. It was a case where one of the persons, who
sat as member of the Selection Board, was himself one of
the persons to be considered for selection. He participated
in the deliberations of the Selection Board when the
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claims of his rivals were considered. He participated in the
decisions relating to the orders of preference and seniority.
He participated at every stage in the deliberations of the
Selection Board and at every stage there was a conflict
between his interest and duty. The Court had no hesitation
in coming to the conclusion that there was a reasonable
likelihood of bias and therefore, there was a violation of
the principles of natural justice. In the case before us,
the principal of the Medical College, Srinagar, dissociated
himself from the written test and did not participate in the
proceedings when his daughter was interviewed. When
the other candidates were interviewed, he did not know
the marks obtained either by his daughter or by any of the
candidates. There was no occasion to suspect his bona
fides even remotely. There was not even a suspicion of
bias, leave alone a reasonable likelihood of bias. There
was no violation of the principles of natural justice.”
67. It is also seen that Javid Rasool Bhatt (supra) finds express mention
and approval in Ashok Kumar Yadav (supra) [Para 18].
“18……The procedure adopted by the Selection Committee
and the member concerned was in accord with the quite
well-known and generally accepted procedure adopted
by the Public Service Commissions everywhere. It is
not unusual for candidates related to members of the
Service Commission or other Selection Committee to seek
employment. Whenever such a situation arises, the practice
generally is for the member concerned to excuse himself
when the particular candidate is interviewed. We notice
that such a situation had also been noticed by this Court
in the case of Nagarajan v. State of Mysore where it was
pointed out that in the absence of mala fides, it would not
be right to set aside the selection merely because one of
the candidates happened to be related to a member of the
Selection Committee who had abstained from participating
in the interview of that candidate. Nothing unusual was
done by the present Selection Committee. The girl’s
father was not present when she was interviewed. She
was one among several hundred candidates. The marks
obtained by her in the written test were not even known
[2024] 4 S.C.R. 231

Krishnadatt Awasthy v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.

when she was interviewed…. In the case before us, the
Principal of the Medical College, Srinagar, dissociated
himself from the written test and did not participate in the
proceedings when his daughter was interviewed. When
the other candidates were interviewed, he did not know
the marks obtained either by his daughter or by any of the
candidates. There was no occasion to suspect his bona
fides even remotely. There was not even a suspicion of
bias, leave alone a reasonable likelihood of bias. There
was no violation of the principles of natural justice.
We wholly endorse these observations.”
(emphasis supplied)
68. Equally so, in Jaswant Singh Nerwal vs. State of Punjab and
Others, 1991 Supp (1) SCC 313 distinguishing A.K. Kraipak (supra),
this Court reiterated the finding in Javid Rasool Bhatt (supra) and
B.N. Nagarajan (supra).
69. Learned counsel for the appellants rightly argued that in Javid
Rasool Bhatt (supra), while the Chairman of the J&K Public Service
Commission was the Chairman of the Selection Committee, the other
two members were the Principal of the two government medical
colleges in Srinagar and Jammu, respectively. As contended by the
learned counsel for the appellants, even to a case other than a Public
Service Commission the principle of recusal has been recognized and
that judgment in Javid Rasool Bhatt (supra) has been endorsed
in Ashok Kumar Yadav (supra).
70. In the present case, it was a statutory committee framed under the
Recruitment Rules and to ensure a fair selection, recusal resolution
was passed by the standing committee before the selection. J.
Mohapatra (supra) recognizes the distinction between committees
constituted under administrative measures and committees under
statutory rules or regulations, while explaining the ease with which
composition in cases of non-statutory committees could be changed.
71. Learned counsel drew attention to the chart (set out in para 32 above)
to demonstrate that, in some instances, the marks obtained by the
Complainant - Archana Mishra and the parties seeking impleadment
in the interview, were more than the marks secured by some of
the appellants. Had an opportunity being given to them before the
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Collector they would have demonstrated these facts, to dispel the
argument of bias and favouritism, contends the learned counsel.
72. Learned counsel for the State and the parties seeking impleadment
have vehemently countered these submissions. They contended
first that the principle of Ashok Kumar Yadav (supra) can only
apply to Public Service Commissions. They relied on Reference
under Article 317(1) of the Constitution of India, In Re (2009) 1
SCC 337 to reinforce this point. This contention overlooks the fact
that Javid Rasool Bhatt (supra) affirmed in Ashok Kumar Yadav
(supra) was not a case of Public Service Commission. It is only that
the Chairman of the Public Service Commission was the Chairman
of the selection committee with the other two Members in that case
being the Members of the two Government Medical Colleges in
Srinagar and Jammu respectively. Moreover, in the present case, the
Committee is a statutory Committee set up under the Recruitment
Rules of 1997. This aspect is independent of the point of breach of
natural justice at the original stage.
73. Learned counsel for the State and the private respondents contends
that the selection and appointment is vitiated on the ground of bias
and likelihood of bias irrespective of recusal of the relative members in
the committee. The judgment of Dr. (Mrs.) Kirti Deshmankar (supra)
cited by them was a case where the mother-in-law of the candidate
did not recuse. Equally so, in the case of J. Mohapatra (supra)
there was no recusal. The judgment of A.K. Kraipak (supra) cited
by them also stands distinguished in Javid Rasool Bhatt (supra),
Ashok Kumar Yadav (supra) and in Jaswant Singh Nerwal (supra)
for the reasons rightly stated therein.
74. This is not a case where from the facts, only one admitted or
indisputable factual position emerges, warranting denial of the
issuance of the writ. This Court, following the limited exception
carved out by Chinnappa Reddy, J. in S.L.Kapur (supra) has held
that since Courts do not issue futile writs, in cases where on admitted
or indisputable facts only one conclusion is possible, then writs will
not follow. This is, even if there was violation of principles of natural
justice. This principle has been followed in M.C. Mehta vs. Union
of India, (1999) 6 SCC 237 and Aligarh Muslim University and
Others vs. Mansoor Ali Khan, (2000) 7 SCC 529. These cases
have no application whatsoever to the facts of the present case. This
[2024] 4 S.C.R. 233

Krishnadatt Awasthy v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.

is not such a case. In this case, it could not be said that only one
admitted or indisputable factual position is possible. Hence issue of
a writ will not be futile.
75. Given a chance before the Collector perhaps the appellants would
have met each and every objection of the sole Complainant-Archana
Mishra (R-4). Perhaps they may have not. One does not know.
Respondent No.4 ought to have impleaded the candidates who
were selected and appointed, including the appellants, before the
Collector. Even if she failed, the Collector ought to have given an
opportunity to implead, with a stern direction that failure to implead
would result in a dismissal. This is all the more so in the teeth of
Rule 9 of the A&R Rules. For the failure of Respondent No.4 and
the Collector, the appellants cannot be made to pay.
76. Approaching the home stretch, one question still remains:- Whether
at this distance of time should the matter be remitted back to the
Collector for a fresh enquiry? The selection is of the year 1998. By
virtue of interim orders through out, the appellants have functioned in
office and are discharging their duties for the past more than twenty
five years. One of them has even superannuated. At this distance
of time, it will not be in the interest of justice to remand the matter
for a fresh enquiry.
77. In view of the above, the appeals are allowed. The judgment of the
Division Bench of the High Court passed in the writ appeals are
set aside. The result would be that the appeal filed by Respondent
No.4 Archana Mishra before the Collector, Chhatarpur, would stand
dismissed. The appellants would be entitled to continue in service,
deeming their appointments as valid and would be entitled to all
service benefits. No order as to costs.

Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain Result of the case:
Matter to be placed before
Hon’ble CJI for constitution
of larger Bench.