KODIKUNNIL SURESH @ J. MONIANversusN.S. SAJI KUMAR, ETC. ETC.

                        [2011] 7 S.C.R. 640


A              KODIKUNNIL SURESH @ J. MONIAN
                                  v.
                   N.S. SAJI KUMAR, ETC. ETC.
                (Civil Appeal Nos.6391-93 of 2010)
                           MAY 12, 2011
8
           [ALTAMAS KABIR AND A.K. PATNAIK, JJ.]

        Representation of People Act, 1951: s.100(1)(a) -
  Election of appellant to the House of People from the
C Mavelikkara Parliamentary Constituency reserved for the
  Scheduled Castes - Challenged on the ground that the
  appellant was a Christian and not a Scheduled Caste and
  therefore, not qualified to be chosen to fill a seat in the House
  of People u/s.4(a) of the Act - High Court declared his
o election void u/s.100(1)(a) of the Act - On appeal, held: The
  father of the appellant originally was a member of the
  Cheramar caste which was admittedly a Scheduled Caste in
  the State of Kera/a - His father due to poverty had availed
  various reliefs from Christian Missionaries and was known as
E 'Joseph' - On conversion to Christianity, the father of the
  appellant ceased to be a member of the Cheramar caste -
  However in 1978, appellant underwent an expiatory ceremony
  and reconverted himself to Hinduism and was thereafter
  accepted as a member of Cheramar caste - Evidence clearly
F showed tha( the appellant had not only unequivocally
  expressed the intention of reconverting to Hinduism in 1978,
  but also conducted himself since 1978 in a manner true to
  the faith of Hindu religion by marrying a Hindu in accordance
  with the ceremonies of the Hindu religion and had been
G visiting Hindu temples for worship of different idols and had
  in fact abjured the Christian religion - Appellant had
  reconverted to Hinduism in 1978 after fully realizing the
  religious significance and social consequences of his
  decision to reconvert to Hinduism - Therefore conversion of
  appellant at the age of 16 years was not invalid conversion
H                                640
  KODIKUNNIL SURESH@ J. MONIAN v. N.S. SAJI               641
              KUMAR, ETC. ETC.

to Hinduism -Appellant was actively working for the upliftment A
of the Cheramar community and was accepted and admitted
into the fold of Hindu Cheramar Community by its members
who were Cheramar Hindus - In four earlier elections,
appellant got elected from the Adoor Parliamentary
Constituency reserved for Scheduled Caste - All these B
circumstances clearly established that the appellant after his
reconversion to Hinduism in 1978 was accepted by the
members of the Cheramar caste - Accordingly his election
was not void u/ss.100 (1)(a) and 100 (1)(d)(i) of the Act.

     Evidence Act, 1872: ss.3, 35 - Applicability of provisions C
of the Act to the Representation of People Act, 1951 -
Discussed - Representation of People Act, 1951 - s.87.

    The appellant was elected to the House of People
from the Mavelikkara Parliamentary Constituency                   D
reserved for the Scheduled Castes. The election of the
appellant was challenged by two voters and a defeated
candidate of the said Constituency on the ground that the
appellant was a Christian and under the Constitution
(Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950 only a Hindu can be a              E
Scheduled Caste and not being a Scheduled Caste, he
was not qualified to be chosen to fill a seat in the House
of People under Section 4(a) of the Representation of
People Act, .1951 and, therefore, his election was void
under Section 100(1)(a) of the Act. The defence of the            F
appellant was that his parents were Hindus and only due
to poverty, they had availed various reliefs from Christian
Missionaries and that is why his father was known as
'Joseph' by the Christian Missionaries. His further cas~
was that in 1978, he had undergone an expiatory
                                                                  G.
ceremony and had reconverted himself to Hinduism and
was thereafter accepted as a member of Cheramar caste.
The High Court declared the election of the appellant void
under Sections 100 (1)(a) and 100 (1)(d)(i) of the Act. It held
that the appellant was born to Christian parents and that         H
    642      SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [2011] 7 S.C.R.


A   when the appellant undertook the expiatory ceremony in
    1978 to convert himself to Hinduism, he had not attained
    the age of discretion as he was under 18 years of age. It
    further held that though the appellant married a Hindu
    and he professed Hindu religion, there was no
B   acceptable evidence to prove· that the appellant was
    accepted as a member of the Cheramar Caste after his
    re-conversion to Hinduism. Relying on the decisions of
    the Suprem~ Court that without acceptance by the
    Scheduled Caste community after re-conversion, the
c   reconvert does not get back to his original caste, the High
    Court held that the appellant after his re-conversion did
    not become a member of the Cheramar Caste and,
    therefore, he was not qualified to contest from the
    Mavelikkara reserved constituency and his nomination
    was improperly accepted and, therefore, his election was
0
    void. The instant appeals were filed challenging the order
    of the High Court.

          Allowing the appeals, the Court

E      HELD: 1.1. Sub-section (2) of Section 87 of the
  Representation of People Act, 1951 states that the
  provisions of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 shall, subject
  to the provisions of this Act, be deemed to apply in all
  respects to the trial of an election petition. Section 3 of
F the Indian Evidence Act states that a fact is said to be
  proved when, after considering the matters before it, the
  Court either believes it to exist, or considers its existence
  so probable that a prudent man ought, under the
  circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the
G supposition that it exists. Section 35 of the Indian
  Evidence Act states that an entry in any public or other
  official book, register or record, stating a fact in issue or
  relevant fact, and made by a public servant in the
  discharge of his official duty, or by any other person in
  performance of a duty specially enjoined by the law of the
H
      KODIKUNNIL SURESH @ J. MONIAN v. N.S. SAJI          643
                  KUMAR, ETC. ETC.

    country in which such book, register or record is kept, is A
    itself a relevant fact. [Para 8) (657-C-G)
        P.C. Purushotham Reddiar v. S. Perumal (1972) 1 SCC
1
    9: 1972 (2) SCR 646; Birad Mall Singhvi v. Anand Purohit
    1988 (supp.) SCC 604 - referred to.                      B
     1.2. Exhibit P-9 was part of the School Admission
Register of the Government Higher Secondary School
and was proved through its Head Mistress. This
document indicated that the name of the father of the
appellant was 'Joseph' which was a Christian name and            C
the religion of the appellant was Christian. Exhibit P-10
was part of the Admission Register of Laxmi Vilasom High
School proved through its Head Master (PW-6). This
document showed that the appellant was admitted to this
School on 05.05.1975 into Standard VIII and his name was         D
entered as Monian J. (Joseph) and mother's name was
shown as Thakkamma T. and religion of the appellant was
shown as Christian. Exhibit P-4 was his School Leaving
Certificate issued by the Head Master in which the name
of the appellant was shown as Monian J. (Joseph) and             E
his religion was shown as Christian, In the affidavit filed
before the High Court, the appellant had stated that in
Exhibit P9, his father's name was Joseph as his father
was called 'Jos.eph' by Christian Missionaries because
his father was visiting Christian.Missionaries to avail help     F
and actually name of his father was Kunjan and he
continued to be, a Hindµ a_nd his alleged conversion was
only nominal. The appellant explained in his cross-
examination that when he was admitted in the .School for
the first time, his father had gone for work and his friend      G
Thomas had taken him to School and his name was
shown by Thomas as Joseph as his father was called by
the Missionaries as 'Joseph',. The residents of a village
have familiarity with the religion of the co-villagers and the
information furnished by them has probative value and            H
    644      SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2011] 7 S.C.R.


~   can be considered by the Court. Thomas, who was a
    friend of the father of the appellant, obviously must be
    familiar with the religion of the father of the appellant as
    well as of the appellant during his childhood. The entry
    in Ext. P-9 with regard to the Christian name of the father
s1 of the appellant and the Christian religion of the appellant
    was admittedly made on the basis of the information of
    Thomas. The entry in Ext. P-9 regarding the religion of the
    appellant having been made on the information of
    Thomas in 1967 during the childhood of the appellant
  c several decades before the appellant contested the
    election must be taken to be a very relevant circumstance
    of great probative value for coming to the conclusion that
    the appellant was a Christian during his childhood. The
    entries in Ext. P-10 also indicated the religion of the
  0 appellant as Christian. The entry relating to the religion
    of the appellant could have been corrected by the
    mother of the appellant shown in Ext.P-10 as his parent
    if the entry was not correct. The entries in the School
    Leaving Certificate (Exhibit P-4) issued in 1978 were on
  E the basis of information in Exhibit P-10 and these also
    indicated that the appellant was a Christian. This entry
    relating to the religion of the appellant could also have
    been corrected by his mother in 1978 if his religion was
    not Christian. In Exhibit R-10, a certificate issued by the
    Kerala Hindu Mission on 25.05.1978 with regard to the
  F conversion of the appellant to Hinduism, the appellant
    was described as a Cheramar Ctiristian upto the age of
    16 years. If he was not a Christian till the age of 16 years,
    question -of his conversion to Hindu religion in 1978
    would not have arisen. On consideration of all these facts
  G and circumstances, the High Court was right in coming
    to the conclusion that the fact that the appellant was born
    to Christian parents was not seriously disputed by the
    appellant. [Paras 7-9] [656-A-H; 657-A; 658-C·H; 659·A·D]

H         Oesh Raj v. Bodh Raj (2008) 2 SCC 186: 2007 (12)
  KODIKUNNIL SURESH @ J. MONIAN v. N.S. SAJI         645
              KUMAR, ETC. ETC.

SCR 757 - relied on.                                       A
    M. Chandra v. M. Thangamuthu 2010 (9) SCALE 145 -
held inapplicable.
     2. ·It is on the facts of each case that the Court has
to decide whether the child had attained sufficient B
maturity to understand the religious significance and the
social consequences of his decision to 'reconvert to the
Hindu religion .. The evidence of the appellant (RW-1 ),
President of the Kerala Hindu Mission (RW-3) and the
Certificate issued by the Kerala Hindu Mission on C
25.05.1978 (Ext. R-10) clearly established that the
appellant had on his own volition decided to reconvert
to Hinduism. Ext. R-10 was followed by the Gazette
Notification (Ext. R-9). These two documents were clear
proof of the declaration of the intention of the appellant 0
to reconvert himself to Hinduism from Christianity. This
declaration of intention of the appellant was also
accompanied by conduct unequivocally expressing that
the appellant has in fact reconverted himself to Hinduism.
The appellant also produced before the High Court a E
certificate of marriage which was marked as Ext. R-14. In
Ext. R-14, the date of marriage of the appellant was
shown as 30.06.1994 and the name of the appellant was
shown as Kodikunnil Suresh and the wife of the appellant
was shown as Bindu Sekhar. The appellant had stated F
in his affidavit before the High Court that Bindu was a
member of Scheduled Caste and was a Hindu and that
during the marriage there was tying of Tahali and that he
garlanded the bride in the marriage ceremony and his
wife also garlanded him. He also stated that there was G
exchange of rings and he gave pudava to her and .the
form of the marriage was that of the Cheramar
community. He further stated in the affidavit that he
worshipped. Dharma Sastha in Sabarimala and that h'e
also goes for worship to Pazhavangadi Ganapathi
                                                            H
    646     SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [2011] 7 S.C.R.


A Temple. RW-4, who was a voter of Adoor Parliamentary
  Constituency and who had been the Head Master of the
  Kulthupuzha Government High School and the Deputy
  Director of Education, Kollam, was examined before the
  High Court and he stated that he was invited for the
B marriage of the appellant and the marriage was performed
  following the ceremonies of Hindu religion. Nothing was
  brought out in the cross-examination of the appellant for
  the Court not to rely on his evidence that he has been
  visiting the temples for worship. Consideration of the
c evidence led before the High Court clearly showed that
  the appellant had not only unequivocally expressed the
  intention of reconverting to Hinduism in 1978, but also
  conducted himself since 1978 in a manner true to the faith
  of Hindu religion by marrying a Hindu in accordance with
  the ceremonies of the Hindu religion and had been
D visiting Hindu temples for worship of different idols and
  had in fact abjured the Christian religion. In other words,
  the appellant had reconverted to Hinduism in 1978 after
  fully realizing the religious significance and social
  consequences of his d.ecision to reconvert to Hinduism.
E The High Court, therefore, was not right in holding that
  the conversion of the appellant under Ext. R-9 and R-10
  at the age of 16 years was not a valid conversion to
  Hinduism. [Paras 12, 13) [662-C-D; 663-E-H; 664-A-H; 665-
  A-C]
F
        3. A dominant factor to determine the revival of the
  caste of a convert from Christianity to his old religion
  would be that in cases of election to the State Assemblies
  or the Parliament where under the Presidential Order a
G particular constituency is re~erved for a member of the
  scheduled caste or tribe and the electorate gives a
  majority verdict in his favour, then this would be
  c;loubtless proof positive of the fact that his community
  has accepted him back to his old fold and this would
H result in a revival of the original caste to which the
  KODIKUNNIL SURESH@ J. MONIAN v. N.S. SAJI             647
              KUMAR, ETC. ETC.
 candidate belonged. The father of the appellant originally     A
 was a member of the Cheramar caste which was
 admittedly a Scheduled Caste in the State of Kerala. On
 conversion· to Christianity, the father of the appellant had
 ceased to be a member of the Cheramar caste. This was
 because on conversion to Christianity, a person ceases         B
.to belong to his original caste. In 1978 the appellant
 reconverted into Hinduism and continued to be a Hindu
 thereafter. The appellant has stated in his affidavit
 (examination-in-chief) before the High Court that in 1979
 he was actively working for the upliftment of the              C
 Cheramar community and the Kerala Cheramar Sangham
 issued a certificate which stated that being a descendant
 of Scheduled Caste convert and by the conversion, the
 appellant was accepted and admitted into the fold of
 Hindu Cheramar Community by its members who were
 Cheramar Hindus and by this fact he has become a               0
 member of Cheramar Community which is recognized as
 a Scheduled Caste. Thts certificate dated 25.10.1979 was
 issued ten years prior to 1989 when the appellant for the
 first time contested from the Adoor Parliamentary
 Constituency reserved for the Scheduled Caste. In the          E
 years 1989, 1991, 1996 and 1999, the appellant contested
 and got elected from the Adoor Parliamentary
 Constituency reserved for Scheduled Caste. In between,
 in the year 1994, the appellant got married to Bindu and
  his affidavit (examination-in-chief) before the High Court    F
 stated that the marriage was performed in accordance
 with the form of Cheramar community. All these
 circumstances clearly established that the appellant after
 his reconversion to Hinduism in 1978 was accepted by
 the members of the Cheramar caste. [Paras 19, 20] [669-        G
 G-H; 670-A-G]
    4. The Cheramar community and the Pulayan
community appear to be two distinct castes as per Entry
54 in Part VIII of the Schedule to the Constitution             H
    648     SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2011] 7 S.C.R.


A    (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950. From the written
    statements of the appellant and from his evidence,
     however, it appears that the appellant entertained a belief
    that the Cheramar caste and the Pulayan caste are one
    and the same caste. Perhaps, because of this belief he
B   married Bindu who belonged to the Pulayan caste. The
    fact, however, remained that the appellant had declared
    himself to be belonging to the Cheramar caste in his
    nomination form and there was no declaration by him
    that he belonged to the Pulayan caste. The Returning
c   Officer relying on the certificate Ext. P-2 issued by the
    Tehsildar, Nedumangad came to the conclusion that the
    appellant belonged to Cheramar caste and had
    accordingly accepted his nomination. The said findings
    of the Returning Officer would show that he was of the
    view that the distinction between Hindu Cheramar and
0
    Hindu Pulaya was very thin and the local usage had
    confused even the experts and that both were Scheduled
    Castes and the areas which required a thorough enquiry
    by experts and examination of witnesses on both sides
    were also required which he was not supposed to do so
E   as the Returning Officer. The evidence would further
    show that ultimately the Returning Officer relied on the
    certificate of Tehsildar, Nedumangad, according to which
    the appellant belonged to the Hindu Cheramar caste and
    decided that the appellant was competent to contest the
F   election from the reserved constituency and accordingly
    accepted his nomination. The appellant was required to
    plead and lead evidence that he was a member of the
    Cheramar caste and after his reconversion he was
    accepted by the members of the Cheramar caste. So long
G   as he has pleaded and adduced reliable evidence to
    show that he was originally a member of the Cheramar
    caste and after his conversion has been accepted back
    as a member of the Cheramar caste, the court cannot
    throw out his case only on the ground that he, like the
H   Returning Officer, did not know the thin distinction
  KODIKUNNIL SURESH @ J. MONIAN v. N.S. SAJI            649
              KUMAR, ETC. ETC.

between the Cheramat and Pulayan castes. The findings          A
of the High Court, therefore, that there was no acceptable
evidence to prove that the appellant was accepted as a
member of the Cheramar caste after his reconversion to
Hinduism was contrary to the evidence on record. [Para
21] [670-G-H; 671-A-H; 672-A-E].                               B

    C. M. Arumugam v. S. Rajgopal and others (1976) 1 SCC
863: 1976 (3) SCR 82; Satrucharla Vijaya Rama Raju v.
Nimmaka Jaya Raju and others (2006) 1 SCC 212: 2005 (4)
Suppl. SCR 821 - held inapplicable.
                                                               c
     5. The case of the appellant was that in four earlier
elections the voters of a constituency reserved for
Scheduled Castes have elected him from the
constituency and this conduct of the voters show that the
members of the Scheduled Castes have accepted him              D
back to the fold of his original cast, namely, the Cheramar
community. The fact that the appellant has been. elected
four times from the Adoor Parliamentary Constituency
reserved for the Scheduled Caste is a very strong
circumstance to establish that he has been accepted by         E
the members of his caste after his reconversion to
Hinduism. The appellant was qualified under Section 4(a)
of the Act to be chosen to fill the seat in the House of
People from Mavelikkara Parliamentary Constituency
reserved for the Scheduled Castes and that his                 F
nomination was not improperly accepted by the
Returning Officer and accordingly his election was not
void under Section 100 (1)(a) and 100 (1)(d)(i) of the Act.
[Paras 22, 23) [673-A-F]

    Ajit Datt v Ethel Walters & Ors. AIR 2001 Allahabad 109;   G
Aravamudha Iyengar v. Ramaswami Bhattar & Anr. AIR 1952
Madras 245; Kai/ash Sonkar v. Smt. Maya Devi (1984) 2
SCC 91: 1984 (2) SCR 176; S. Anbalagan v. B. Devarajan
& Ors. (1984) 2 SCC 112: 1984 (1) SCR 973; S. Nazeer
                                                               H
    650    SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [2011] 7 S.C.R.


A Ahmed v. State Bank of Mysore & Ors. (2007) 11 SCC 75:
  2007 (1) SCR 843; Perumal Nadar (dead) by LRs. v.
  Ponnuswami 1970 (1) SCC 605: 1971 (1) SCR 49;
  Chatturbhuj Vithaldas Jasani v. Moreshwar Parashram & Ors.
  (1954) SCR 817; S. Rajagopal v. C.M. Armugam & Ors. 1969
B (1) SCR 254 - referred to.
                       Case Law Reference:
     2010 (9) SCALE 145        held inapplicable Para 5
     1972 (2) SCR 646          referred to        Para 6
c
     1988 (supp.) sec 604      referred to        Para 8
     2007 (12) SCR 757         relied on          Para 8
     AIR 1952 Madras 245       referred to        Para 9,
D                                                 11, 12
     1984 (2) SCR 176          referred to        Para 9,
                                               11,12,14,19
     1984 (1) SCR 973          referred to        Para 9,
E                                                 14, 19
     2007 (1) SCR 843          referred to        Para 11
     1971 (1) SCR 49           referred to        Para 11
     (1954) SCR 817            referred to        Para 12
F
     1976 (3) SCR 82           held inapplicable Para 15,
                                                 17,18,22
     2005 (4) SUPPL. SCR 821 held inapplicable Para 15,
                                               22
G
     1969 (1) SCR 254          referred to        Para 16,
                                                  17,18,20
      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos.
H 6391-6393 of 2010.
  KODIKUNNIL SURESH @ J. MONIAN v. N.S. SAJI                651
              KUMAR, ETC. ETC.

    From the Judgment & Order dated 26.7.2010 of the High          A
Court of Kerala in E.P. Nos. 3 of 2009 and 8 of 2009.

    P.P. Rao, Abhimanyu Bhandari, Anubhav Singhvi, $.
Udaya Kumar Sagar Bina Madhavan, Vinita Sasidharan,
Pankaj Singh, Vincent De Paul Apeksha S., Purushottam              B
Sharma Tripathi, Filza Moonis, Utsav Sidhu (for Lawyer's Knit
& Co) for the Appellant.

    V. Giri, K. Rajeev, Mohammed Sadique, B.V. Deepak, C.
Rajendran, A. Raghunath for the Respondents.
                                                                   c
    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

     A. K. PATNAIK, J. 1. This is an appeal under Section
116A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (for short
'the Act') against the common order dated 26.07.2010 of the
Kerala High Court in Election Petition Nos. 3 of 2009, 7 of 2009   D
and 8 of 2009 declaring the election of the appellant to the
House of People from the Mavelikkara Parliamentary
Constituency· reserved for the Scheduled Castes void under
Section 100 (1)(a) and (d) (i) of the Act.
                                                                   E
     2. The facts very briefly are that No.16 Mavelikkara
Parliamentary Constituency is reserved for the Scheduled
Castes. Section 4(a) of the Act provides that a person shall not
be qualified to be chosen to fill a seat in the House of the
People unless in the case of a seat reserved for the Scheduled     F
Castes in any State, he is a member of any of the Scheduled
Castes, whether of that State or of any other State and is an
elector for any Parliamentary Constituency. For elections to the
Mavelikkara reserved constituency in the year 2009, the
appellant filed his nominations before the Returning Officer on    G
23.03.2009 declaring in the nomination papers that he belongs
to the Hindu Cheramar Caste and filed alongwith the
nomination papers a caste certificate dated 12.03.2009 issued
by the Tehsildar, Nedumangad that the Caste Cheramar has
been declared as a Scheduled Caste in relation to. the State       H
    652     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2011] 7 S.C.R.


A of Kerala in Entry 54 in Part VIII of the Schedule to the
  Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order. 1950. Objections were
  filed before the Returning Officer contending that the appellant
  was not a member of the Scheduled Caste and instead he was
  a Christian. The Returning Officer after examining the
B nomination papers of the appellant rejected the objections and
  accepted the nomination papers of the appellant under Section
  36 of the Act. Polling in the constituency took place on
  16.04.2009 and after counting, the result of the election was
  declared on 16.05.2009. The appellant secured 3,97,211 votes
c and the appellant was declared elected by a margin of 48,048
  votes over the defeated candidate who secured 3,49, 163 votes.

         3. The election of the appellant was challenged by two
    voters of the Mavelikkara Parliamentary Constituency in
    Election Petition Nos. 3 of 2009 and 8 of 2009 and by the
D   defeated candidate in Election Petition No. 7 of 2009. The
    ground of challenge in Election Petition Nos. 3 of 2009 and 8
    of 2009 was that the appellant was a Christian and under the
    Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950 only a Hindu can
    be a Scheduled Caste and not being a Scheduled Caste, he
E   was not qualified to be chosen to fill a seat in the House of the
    People under Section 4{a) of the Act and accordingly his
    election was void under Section 100 (1) (a) of the Act. In
    Election Petition No. 7 of 2009 filed by the defeated candidate,
    besides the aforesaid grounds, an additional ground was taken
F   that the nomination of the appellant was improperly accepted
    and that the election of the appellant was void under Section
    100(1 )(d)(i) of the Act, inasmuch as the result of the election
    so far as it concerned the returned candidate had been
    materially affected by the improper acceptance of the
G   nomination of the appellant. The appellant pleaded in his written
    statements filed in the three cases that his father and mother
    were both Hindus, but due to their poverty they had availed
    various reliefs from Christian Missionaries and that is why his
    father was known as Joseph. His further case was that in 1978
H   he had undergone an expiatory ceremony and had reconverted
  KODIKUNNIL SURESH @ J. MONIAN v. N.S. SAJI                  653
      KUMAR, ETC. ETC. [A.K. PATNAIK, J.]

himself to Hinduism and had also been accepted as a member           A
of the Cheramar caste and he was therefore qualified. to
contest the eleGtion from the Mavelikkara Parliamentary
Constituency reserved for Scheduled Castes. The High Court
framed issues in the three cases, examined witnesses and
admitted documents and on consideration of the oral testimony        B
and documentary evidence declared the election of the
appellant void under Sections 100 (1)(a) and 100 (1)(d)(i) of
the Act by the impugned order.

     4. The findings recorded by the High Court in the               C
impugned order are that the appellant was born to Christian
parents and due to conversion to Christianity the parents of the
appellant had lost their caste because Christianity did not admit
any differentiation on the basis of castes. The High Court further
held that when the appellant undertook the expiatory ceremony
in 1978 to convert himself to Hinduism, he had not attained the      D
age of discretion as he was under 18 years of age. The High
Court, however, held that though the appellant married a Hindu
and he professed Hindu religion from the time of his admission
in the law college at Thiruvananthapuram, there was no
acceptable evidence to prove that the appellant was accepted         E
as a member of the Cheramar Caste after his re-conversion
to Hinduism. Relying on the decisions of this Court that without
acceptance by the Scheduled Caste community after re-
conversion, the reconvert does not get back to his original
caste, held that the appellant after his re-conversion did not       F
become a member of the Cheramar Caste and hence he was
not qualified to contest from the Mavelikkara reserved
constituency and his nomination was improperly accepted and
his election was void.
                                                                     G
     5. Mr. P. P. Rao, learned counsel for the appellant,
submitted that although the appellant pleaded in his written
statements and led evidence to show that his father Kunjan and
his mother Thankamma were Hindus, the High Court
unfortunately has observed in the impugned order that the fact       H
    654     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2011] 7 S.C.R.


A that his father was converted to Christian religion was not
  seriously disputed at the time of recording the evidence. He
  submitted that in his written statements filed in the three cases
  the appellant has denied that his parents were Christian and
  has explained that.his father came to be called as 'Joseph' by
B the Christian Missionaries to whom his father went for help. He
  submitted that the name of the mother of the appellant was
  Thankamma, which is not a Christian name. The case of the
  appellant was that his parents continued to profess and practice
  Hinduism. He submitted that in Ajit Datt v Ethel Walters & Ors.
c [AIR 2001 Allahabad 109] the Allahabad High Court has taken
  the view that without baptism there can be no conversion. He
  submitted that no documentary evidence had been produced
  by the respondents to establish that the father of the appellant
  was baptised and inducted into the Christian religion. He
  argued that no clergyman or pastor or Christian priest or any
0
  person from a Church has been examined to establish that the
  father of the appellant was converted to Christian religion by
  baptism. He referred to the evidence of PW-1 N.S. Saji Kumar,
  the petitioner in Election Petition No.3 of 2009, to show that
  he had no knowledge about the family of the appellant at all and
E had not made any inquiry to find out the religion of the father of
  the appellant. He also referred to the evidence of PW-2 P.K.
  Padmakaran, the petitioner in Election Petition No.8 of 2009,
  to show that he had not gone to Church to find out whether the
  father of the appellant was Christian and all that he has said in
F his evidence is that the appellant was born as a Christian. He·
  submitted that similarly PW-3 K. Prakash Babu, the Chief
  Election Agent of the defeated candidate, has merely stated
  in his evidence that when the appellant was born, his father was
  a Christian. He submitted that the entire case of the three
G Election Petitioners appears to be based on the entries in the
  School Admission Register (Exhibit P-9) in which the religion
  of the appellant is mentioned as Christian, but the said entries
  were made on the basis of the information furnished by
  Thomas, who did not really know that the religion of the father
H of the appellant was Hinduism and not Christianity. He cited M.
 KODIKUNNIL SURESH @ J. MONIAN v. N.S. SAJI                   655
     KUMAR, ETC. ETC. [A.K. PATNAIK, J.]

Chandra v. M. Thangamuthu [2010 (9) SCALE 145] in which              A
this Court has held that the burden of proving that the returned
candidate was a Christian and did not belong to a Scheduled
Caste as per the Presidential Order is on the election petitioner.
He also cited an unreported decision of this Court delivered
on 30.04.2009 in Ranjana v. State of Maharashtra by which            B
the case was remanded to the High Court as there was no
evidence to establish that the parents of the returned candidate
had converted to Christianity before the returned candidate was
born.

      6. Mr. K. K. Venugopal, learned counsel appearing for the C
respondent in Civil Appeal No.6392 of 2010, on the other hand,
submitted that there was sufficient evidence before the High
Court to establish that the parents of the appellant were ·
Christian. In this connection, he referred to Exhibits P4, pg and
P10 to show that the religion of the appellant was Christianity D
and not Hinduism as per his school records and School
Leaving Certificate. He submitted that the documents Exhibits
P4, pg and P10 once admitted and marked as Exhibits, the
contents of these Exhibits are also admitted in evidence. He
cited the decision of this Court in P. C. Purushotham Reddiar E
v. S. Perumal [(1972) 1 SCC g] for the proposition that once
a document is properly admitted, the contents of that document
 are also admitted in evidence though those contents may not
be conclusive evidence. Mr. Venugopal submitted that if the
 case of the appellant was that the entry in the School Admission F
 Register (Exhibit P-g) relating to the religion of the appellant
was made by Thomas who did not actually know the religiol)
of the father of the appellant, the appellant should have
examined Thomas in support of his case, but the appellant has
not examined Thomas in course of trial. He submitted that G
finding of the High Court that the appellant was born to Christian
parents was, therefore, correct. Mr. V. Giri, learned counsel for
the respondent in Civil Appeal No.6391 of 2010, and Mr. C.
Rajendran, learned counsel for the respondent in Civil Appeal
No.6393 of 2010, adopted the arguments of Mr. Venugopal.           H
    656      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2011] 7 S.C.R.


A         7.We may now look at the evidence on record. Exhibit P-
    g is part of the School Admission Register of the Government
    Higher Secondary School and has been proved through its
    Head Mistress. Exhibit p_g indicates that the name of the father
    of the appellant was 'Joseph' which was a Christian name and
B   the religion of the appellant was Christian and he was admitted
    to the School on 07.06.1 g67. The School had standards I to
    VII and the appellant left the School on 05.05.1 g75, Exhibit P-
    10 is part of the Admission Register of Laxmi Vilasom High
    School, Pothencode, proved through its Head Master (PW-6).
c   Exhibit P-10 shows that the appellant was admitted to this
    School on 05.05.1g75 into Standard VIII and his name was
    entered as Monian J. (Joseph) and mother's name was shown
    as Thakkamma T. and religion of the appellant was shown as
    Christian. The appellant left the School on 28.02.1 g10. Exhibit
    P-4 is his School Leaving Certificate issued by the Head
0
    Master, Laxmi Vilasom High School, Pothencode, in which the
    name of the appellant has been shown as Monian J. (Joseph)
    and his religion has been shown as Christian and the mother
    of the appellant is shown as Thakkamma T. This School
    Leaving Certificate was issued after the appellant completed
E   his Standard X in the School in 1g17-78. This School-Leaving
    Certificate has been produced by PW-1, N.S. Saji Kumar, and
    is the same as Exhibit R-2 produced by the appellant. The
    appellant in his evidence (affidavit filed before the High Court
    in Election Petition No. 7 of 2oog) has stated in para 5 that in
F   Exhibits P-4, p_g and P-10 and Exhibit R-2, his religion is
    shown as Christian, but he did not profess Christian religion at
    any point of time. In para 8 of the affidavit, he has stated that
    in Exhibit pg his father's name is Joseph and his father was
    called 'Joseph' by Christian Missionaries because his father
G   was visiting Christian Missionaries to avail help and his father
    was actually Kunjan and continued to be a Hindu and his
    alleged conversion was only nominal. The appellant has
    explained in his cross-examination that when he was admitted
    in the School for the first time his father had gone for work and
H   his friend Thomas had taken him to School and as his father
  KODIKUNNIL SURESH @ J. MONIAN v. N.S. SAJI                  657
      KUMAR, ETC. ETC. [A.K. PATNAIK, J.]

was called by the Missionaries as 'Joseph', his name was              A
shown by Thomas as Joseph. The appellant has stated in his
affidavit that he decided to get himself converted to Hinduism
in 1978 and got himself converted as a Hindu on 25.05.1978
and the Kerala Hindu Mission has issued a certificate (Exhibit
R-10) .in proof of such conversion and his name has been              B
shown therein as Suresh J. ·

     8. Hence, this Court has to decide which of the two
versions is proved: whether the appellant was born to Christian
parents and was Christian during his childhood or whether he
was born to Hindu parents and was Hindu during his childhood.         C
Sub-section (2) of Section 87 of the Act states that the
provisions of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 shall, subject to the
provisions of this Act, be deemed to apply in all respects to
the trial of an election petition. Thus, we have to be guided by
the relevant provisions of the Indian Evidence Act to decide an       D
issue of fact arising in an election trial under the Act. Section
3 of the Indian Evidence Act states that a fact is said to be
proved when, after considering the matters before it, the Court
either believes it to exist, or considers its existence so probable
that a prudent man ought, under the circui:nstances of the            E
particular case, to act upon the supposition that it exists.
 Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act states that an entry in
 any public or other official book, register or record, stating a
fact in issue or relevant fact, and made by a public servant in
the discharge of his official duty, or by any other person in         F
performance of a duty specially enjoined by the law of the
country in which such book, register or record is kept, is itself
a relevant fact. Relying on Section. 35 of the Indian Evidence
Act, this Court has held in Birad Mall Singhvi v. Anand Purohit
[1988 (supp.) SCC 604] that the entry contained in the                G
Admission Form or in the Scholar's Register must be shown
to be made on the basis of information given by the parents or
a person having special knowledge about the date of birth of
the person concerned and if the entry is made on the basis of
the information given by a stranger or by someone else who            H
    658      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   (2011] 7 S.C.R.


A had no special means of knowledge of the entry, such an entry
  will have no evidentiary value. In the present case, on the other
  hand, we are called upon to decide not the date of birth but the
  religion of a candidate in an election. In Desh Raj v. Bodh Raj
  ((2008) 2 sec 186] where the caste of the candidate in an
B election was in issue, this Court held that the residents of a
  village have more familiarity with the 'caste' of a co-villager than
  the date of birth of the co-villager and relied upon the evidence
  of the co-villagers to record a finding on the caste of the
  candidate. It can similarly be said that the residents of a village
c have familiarity with the religion of the co-villagers and the
  information furnished by them have probative value and can be
  considered by the Court.

          9. Thomas, who was a friend of the father of the appellant,
    obviously must be familiar with the religion of the father of the
D   appe11ant as well as of the appellant during his childhood. The
    entry in Ext. P-9 which is part of the School Admission Register
    of the Government Higher Secondary School with regard to the
    Christian name of the father of the appellant and the Christian
    religion of the appellant had been admittedly made on the basis
E   of the information of Thomas. If the appellant's case is that
    Thomas had no knowledge of the religion of the appellant and
    his father, he should have examined Thomas as a witness or
    should have explained why he was not examined. The entry in
    Ext. P-9 regarding the religion of the appellant having been
F   made on the information of Thomas in 1967 during the
    childhood of the appellant several decades before the appellant
    contested .the election must be taken to be a very relevant
    circumstance of great probative value for coming to the
    conclusion that the appellant was a Christian during his
G   childhood. The entries in Ext. P-10 which is part of the Laxmi
    Vilasom High School, Pothencode, have been made in 1975
    on the basis of the transfer certificate obtained from his
    previous school and these also indicate the religion of the
    appellant as Christian. The entry relating to the religion of the
H   appellant could have been corrected by the mother of the
  · KODIKUNNIL SU RESH @ J. MONIAN v. N.S. SAJI               659
        KUMAR, ETC. ETC. [A.K. PATNAIK, J.]

  appellant who has been shown in Ext.P-10 as his parent if the A
· entry was not correct. The entries in the School Leaving
  Certificate (Exhibit P-4) issued in 1978 are on the basis of -
  information in Exhibit P-10 and these also indicate that the
  appellant was a Christian. This entry relating to the religion of
  the appellant could also.have been corrected by his mother in B
  1978 if his religion was not Christian. In Exhibit R-10, a
  certificate issued by the Kerala Hindu Mission on 25.05.1978
  with regard to the conversion of the appellant to Hinduism,
  moreover, the appellant has been described as a Cheramar
  Christian upto the age of 16 years. If he was not a Christian till c
  the age of 16 years, where was the need of his converting to
  Hindu religion in 1978? On consideration of all these facts and
  circumstances which have come into evidence, the High Court,
  in our considered opinion, was right in coming to the conclusion
  that the fact that the appellant was born to Christian parents has 0
  not been seriously.disputed by the appellant..The_decisions of
  this Court iri · M. Chandra v. M. Thangamuthu (supra) and in
  Ranjana v. State of Maharashtra (supra) cited by Mr. Rao have
  no application to the facts of the present case where the
  evidence clearly proves that the appellant was born to Christian E
  parents and that the appellant was a Christian during his
  childhood upto the age of 16 years.

      10. Mr. Rao next contended that the finding of the High
 Court that when the appellant undertook the expiatory ceremony
 in 1978 to reconvert himself to Hinduism, he had not attained       F
 the age of discretion as he .was under 18 years of age is not
 correct. He relied on Section 2(o) of the Children Act, 1960 to
 submit that a boy who is 16 years is no longer a child. He relied
 on the decision of the Madras High Court in Aravamudha
 lyenger v. Ramaswami Bhattar & Anr. [AIR 1952 Madras 245]           G
 wherein it has been held that under the Hindu Law minority
 comes to an end on the comp.letion of the 16th year. He
 submitted that this Court has held in Kai/ash Sonkar v. Smt.
 Maya Devi [(1984) 2 SCC 91] that a member of the Scheduled
 Caste, who is converted into Christianity and after she attains     H
     660    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2011] 7 S.C.R.


A the age of discretion, can decide of her own volition to re-
  embrace Hinduism. He cited the decision of this Court in S.
  Anba/agan v. 8. Devarajan & Ors. [(1984) 2 SCC 112] in which
  this Court observed that the precedents, particularly those from
  South India, clearly establish that no particular ceremony is
B prescribed for re-conversion to Hinduism of a person who had
  earlier embraced another religion and unless the practice of the
  caste makes it necessary, 110 expiatory rites need be
  performed. He submitted that the appellant was more than 16
  years of age when he undertook Shudhi Ceremony in 1978 for
c·reconversion and it will be clear from Ext. R-10, the certificate
  issued by the Kerala Hindu Mission on 25.05.1978, and Ext.
  R-9, the notification issued in the Kerala Gazette on 21.11.1978
  that he reconverted to Hinduism in 1978. He argued that the
  evidence of appellant before the High Court and the evidence
0 of RW-4 would show that the appellant had in fact abjured the
  Christian religion and was professing the Hindu religion and his
  marriage was performed following the ceremonies of Hindu
  religion with a Hindu named Bindu. He submitted that in the
  Admission Register of the Law College, Thiruvananthapuram
  (Ext. R-6) the religion of the appellant has been shown to be
E Hindu religion and the date of admission of the appellant is
  shown as 09.10.1984. He submitted that after considering such
  evidence, the High Court has in fact held that the appellant has
  been professing Hinduism at least from the date of his
  admission to the Law College, Thiruvananthapuram.
F
       11. In reply, Mr. Venugopal relying on this Court's decision
  in S. Nazeer Ahmed v. State Bank of Mysore & Ors. [(2007)
  11 SCC 75] submitted that the respondents before this Court
  are entitled to support the impugned judgment of the High Court
G by challenging any finding that might have been rendered by
  the High Court against the respondents in the impugned
  judgment. He submitted that the respondents are therefore
  entitled to challenge the finding of the High Court in the
  impugned judgment that the appellant had been professing
H Hinduism at least from the date of admission in the law college
    KODIKUNNIL SURESH @ J. MONIAN v. N.S. SAJI               661
        KUMAR, ETC. ETC. (A.K: PATNAIK, J.]

  in 1978. He vehemently argued that the appellant has not A
  pleaded in his written statements filed before the High Court
  that he was a Christian during his childhood and he converted
  himself fo Hinduism on attaining majority and his plea in the
  written statements was that his parents were Hindu and that he
  was a Hindu even during his childhood and therefore he cannot B
  be allowed to contend that his parents were Christian and during
  his childhood he was a Christian and on attaining majority he
  re-converted himself into Hinduism by abjuring a Christian
  religion. He submitted that in Perumal Nadar (dead) by LRs.
  v. Ponnuswami (1970 (1) SCC 605] this Court has ,held that a c
  mere theoretical allegiance to the Hindu faith by a person born
  in another faith does not convert him into a' Hindu, nor is a bare
  declaration that he is a Hindu sufficient to convert him to
  Hinduism but a bona fide intention to be converted to the Hindu
  faitti, accompanied by conduct unequivocally expressing that
                                                                     0
. intention may be sufficient evidence of conversion and no formal
  ceremony of purification or expiation is necessary to effectuate
  conversion. He submitted that in KailashSonkarv. Smt. Maya
  Devi (supra) this Court has held that the main test to determine
  whether there has been reconversion is that there should be a
  genuine intention of the reconvert to abjure his new religion and E
  completely dissociate himself from it and reconversion should
  not be only a ruse or a pretext or a cover to gain mundane
  worldly benefits. He argued that in the facts of the present case,
  no evidence has been adduced to show that the appellant
  abjured Christian religion and reconverted himself into Hindu F
  and the evidence only shows that the appellant went through a
  formal reconversion to Hindu religion only with a view to avail
  the benefits of reservation. Mr. Giri and Mr. Rajendran adopted
  these contentions of Mr. Venugopal.
                                                                     G
         12. We have considered the submissions of the learned
  counsel for the parties and we have found that in Kai/ash
  Sonkarv. Smt. Maya Devi (supra) this Court has held that even
  where a person has been a Christian during his childhood, after
  he attains the age of discretion, he may decide of his own H
    662       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  (2011] 7 S.C.R.


A   volition to re-embrace Hinduism and the test in such a case
    would be that such person had a genuine intention of
    reconverting to Hinduism and to abjure Christianity and
    completely dissociate himself from it. In the aforesaid judgment
    this Court has not specifically held as to what would be the age
s   of discretion of a person willing to reconvert himself to Hinduism.
    In Aravamudha lyenger v. Ramaswami Bhattar & Anr. (supra)
    the Madras High Court has taken a view that minority as per
    Hindu law comes to an end on completion of 16 years of age
    and this rule applies to males and females. This view, however,
c   was expressed by the Madras High Court in the context of the
    Hindu Law relating to adoption and not in the context of
    reconversion and therefore does not apply to the facts of this
    case. In our considered opinion, it is on the facts of each case
    that the Court has to decide whether the child had attained
    sufficient maturity to understand the religious significance and
0
    the social consequences of this decision to reconvert to the
    Hindu religion. To quote Vivian Bose, J. from his judgment
    delivered for the Court in Chatturbhuj Vithaldas Jasani v.
    Moreshwar Parashram & Ors. (1954 SCR 817) at page 837
    cited by Mr. Giri:
E
          "What we have to determine are the social and political
          consequences of such conversions and that, we feel,
          must be decided in a common sense practical way rather
          than on theoretical and theocratic grounds."
F
          13. We find that the appellant has pleaded in his written
    statements that in May 1978 he underwent ceremonies and he
    was given a Shudhi Certificate by the Kerala Hindu Mission
    and he got rid of Christianity by reconverting to Hinduism. Mr.
G   Venugopal is thus not right in his submission that the appellant
    has not taken a plea of reconversion from Christianity to
    Hinduism in his written statements. The appellant has stated
    in his evidence (affidavit before the High Court) that he decided
    to get himself converted to Hinduism in the year 1978 and
    accordingly on 25.05.1978, he approached the Kerala Hindu
H
 KODIKUNNIL SURESH @ J. MONIAN v. N.S. SAJI                663
     KUMAR, ETC. ETC. [A.K. PATNAIK, J.]

Mission and reconverted to Hinduism and changed his name A
as Suresh J. and published the fact of his conversion into
Hinduism in the notification dated 21.11.1978 of the Kerala
Gazette. The notification dated 21.11.1978 has been produced
by him as Ext. R-9 and Certificate No.107365 dated
25.05.1978 relating to the conversion of the appellant issued B
by the Kerala Hindu Mission has been produced before the
High Court and marked as Ext. R-10. The President of the
Kerala Hindu Mission (RW-3) has been examined before the
High Court and he has said that Ext. R-10 was issued by the
Kerala Hindu Mission and its counterfoil receipt is in the receipt c
book produced by him. RW-3 has identified the signature of
the Secretary of the Kerala Hindu Mission, Mr. Sudhakaran, in
Ext. R-10. RW-3 has also stated before the Court that a person
to be converted must first go to Hindu temple and perform the
ceremonies and thereafter has to appear before the Kerala
                                                                   0
Hindu Mission alongwith receipt and the Kerala Hindu Mission
confirms the performance of ceremonies from the temple over
phone and then issues a conversion certificate. RW-3 has also
stated that before issuing a certificate, the Kerala Hindu Mission
ascertains whether the person to be converted is willing to be
converted and is having belief in Hinduism and only thereafter E
permits the conversion. The evidence of the appellant (RW-1),
President of the Kerala Hindu Mission (RW-3) and the
Certificate issued by the Kerala Hindu Mission on 25.05.1978
(Ext. R-10) clearly establish that the appellant had on his own
volition decide·d to reconvert to Hinduism. We also find that Ext. F
R-10 was followed by the Gazette Notification (Ext. R-9). These
two documents are clear proof of the declaration of the intention
of the appellant to reconvert himself to Hinduism from
Christianity. This declaration of intention of the appellant has
also been accompanied by conduct unequivocally expressing 'G
that the appellant has in fact reconverted himself to Hinduism.
The appellant has produced before the High Court a certificate
of marriage issued under the Kerala Registration of Marriages
(Common) Rules, 2008, which is marked as Ext. R-14 and in
Ext. R-14, the date of marriage ofthe appellant is shown as H
    664      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2011] 7 S.C.R.


A  30.06.1994 and the name of the appellant is shown as
   Kodikunnil Suresh and the wife of the appellant is shown as
   Bindu Sekhar. The appellant has stated in his affidavit before
   the High Court that Bindu is a member of Scheduled Caste and
   is a Hindu and that during the marriage there was tying of Tahali
B and that he garlanded the bride in the marriage ceremony and
   his wife also garlanded him. He has also stated that there was
  exchange of rings and he gave pudava to her and the form of
  the marriage was that of the Cheramar community. He has
  further stated in the affidavit that he worshipped Dharma
c Sastha in Sabarimala and that he also goes for worship to
  Pazhavangadi Ganapathi Temple and he has two children,
  elder one is named Aravind Suresh and younger one is named
  Gayathri Suresh and that Ezhuthiniruthu of the elder and the
  younger one took place at Mookambika Temple. RW-4, who
  is a voter of Adoor Parliamentary Constituency and who had
0
  been the Head Master of the Kulthupuzha Government High
  School and the Deputy Director of Education; Kallam, has been
  examined before the High Court and he has stated that he was
  invited for the marriage of the appellant at the Subramaniam
  Hall of Trivandrum Club and the marriage was performed
E following the ceremonies of Hindu religion and after lighting the
  lamp in front of Nirapara, the bride and the bridegroom were
  made to sit there and the marriage was performed under the
  guidance of Sri. Krishnan Nair of Kottarakkara and that the
  appellant had tied the Thali and the bride and bridegroom
F exchanged garlands. Nothing also has been brought out in the
  cross-examination of either the appellant or RW-4 to disbelieve
  their evidence. Nothing has been brought out in the cross-
  examination of the appellant for the Court not to rely on his
  evidence that he has been visiting the temples for worship. On
G a consideration of the evidence led before the High Court, we
  are thus of the opinion that the appellant had not only
  unequivocally expressed the intention of reconverting to
  Hinduism in 1978, but also conducted himself since 1978 in a
  manner true to the faith of Hindu religion by marrying a Hindu
H in accordance with the ceremonies of the Hindu religion and
  KODIKUNNIL SURESH @ J. MONIAN v. N.S. SAJI                 665
      KUMAR, ETC. ETC. [A.K. PATNAIK, J.]

had been visiting Hindu temples for worship of different idols       A
and had in fact abjured the Christian religion. In other words,
the appellant had reconverted to Hinduism in 1978 after fully
realizing the religious significance and social consequences of
his decision to reconvert to Hinduism. The High Court,
therefore, was not right in holding that the conversion of the       B
appellant under Ext. R-9 and R-10 at the age of 16 years was
not a valid conversion to Hinduism. In fact, the High Court has
realized the difficulty in the aforesaid finding and has at the
same time rendered a contradictory finding that the respondent
has been professing Hindu religion at least from the time of his     c
admission to the law college, Thiruvananthpuram.

     14. Mr. Rao finally challenged the findings of the High Court
that there was no acceptable evidence to prove that the
appellant was accepted as a member of the Cheramar caste
or the Pulayan caste after his reconversion to Hinduism. i-le        D
submitted that the appellant had himself stated on oath before
the High Court that he belongs to Cheramar caste and that the
form of his marriage with Bindu was the one to which the
Cheramar community adheres. He submitted that the Kerala
Cheramar Sangham had issued a certificate dated 25.10.1979           E
produced before the High Court as Exhibit R-17 which would
show that the appellant was accepted and taken in.to the fold
of Hindu Cheramar community by its members. He referred to
the evidence of RW-7, the Ex-Secretary of Kerala Chera111ar
 Sangham, who has identified the signature of Sri Rajaratnam         F
the President of the Kerala Cheramar Sangham in Exhibit R-
 17. He submitted that in Kerala the Cheramar caste and the
Pulayan caste are actually one and the same caste. He referred
to the evidence of RW-5, the General Secretary of Kerala
 Pulayan Mahasabha, that the appellant participated in a rally       G
of Kerala Pulayan Mahasabha at Eranakulam in February,
2008. He submitted that the Returning Officer in his
proceedings dated 31.03.2009 has considered the caste
certificate dated 12.03.2009 issued by the Tehsildar,
Nedumangad, certifying that the appellant belongs to the Fiindu      H
    666      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 (2011] 7 S.C.R.


A Cheramar caste and has acc·epted the declaration of the·
  appellant in the nomination papers that he belongs to the
  Cheramar caste. The certificate issued by the Tehsildar,
  Nedumangad, has also been exhibited as Exhibit P-2. He also
  relied on the findings of PW-8, Tehsildar, Kotarakkara that
B persons, who are known as Cheramar in Kollam, are known
  as Pulayan in Kotrakkara. He argued that the appellant has
  been elected from the Adoor reserved constituency in the years
  1989, 1991, 1996 and 1999 and this shows that he has been
  accepted as a member of the Scheduled Caste by the voters
c of the reserved constituency. He cited the decision of this Court
  in S. Anbalagan v. 8. Devarajan & Ors. (supra) and Kai/ash
  Sankar v. Smt. Maya Devi (s1.:pra) wherein the circumstance
  that the voters of the Rasipuram Parliamentary Constituency
  reserved for the Scheduled Castes elected a candidate to the
0 Lok Sabha has been. treated as an outstanding circumstance
  to prove acceptance of that candidate by the Scheduled Caste
  community. He submitted that the High Court was, therefore,
  not at all right in recording the finding that the appellant who
  was professing Hindu religion had not been accepted by the
E members-of the Cheramar caste or the Pulayan caste.

        15. In reply, Mr. Venugopal submitted that the fact that the
  appellant was elected from a reserved constituency in the
  earlier elections cannot prevent the disqualification from being
  established in a subsequent election as each election results
F in a fresh cause of action. He cited the decisions of this Court
  in C.M. Arumugam v. S. Rajgopal and others ((1976) 1 SCC
  863] and Satruchar/a Vijaya Rama Raju v. Nimmaka Jaya
  Raju and others ((2006) 1 SCC 212] in which it has been held
  that every election furnishes a fresh cause of action for a
G challenge to that election and adjudication on a prior election
  petition cannot be conclusive in a subsequent proceeding.
  According to him, therefore, the fact that the appellant on five
  earlier elections had been elected from a· constituency reserved
  for Sc:heduled Caste is hot a bar to the challenge to his election
H in 2009 from a· constituency reserved for Scheduled Caste on
  KODIKUNNIL SURESH @ J. MONIAN v. N.S. SAJI                 667
      KUMAR, ETC. ETC. [A.K. PATNAIK, J.]

the ground that he was not a member of the Scheduled Castes.        A
He submitted that in C.M. Arumugam v. S. Rajgopal and
others (supra) this Court consideredwhether in fact S. Rajgopal
was accepted as a member of Adi Dravida caste after his
 reconversion to Hinduism and after considering the various
circumstances detailed in para 18 of the judgment as reported       B
in the sec came to the conclusion that after his reconversion
to Hinduism, S. Rajgopal was recognized and accepted as a
member of Adi Dravida caste by the other members of that
community. He vehemently argued that in the facts of the
present case there is no circumstance to show that the              c
appellant, if at all has been reconverted to Hinduism, was
accepted by the Cheramar caste.

     16. Mr. Giri, learned counsel for respondent in Civil Appeal
No.6391 of 2010, adopted the arguments of Mr. Venugopal and
further submitted that in the Constitution (Scheduled Castes        D
Order, 1950; Part VIII) relating to State of Kerala, in Entry 54,
Pulayan and Cheramar castes have been shown as two
separate castes. He submitted that Pulayan and Cheramar
castes are thus two separate and distinct castes and onus is
on the appellant to show that after his reconversion he was         E
accepted by either the Pulayan caste or the Cheramar caste.
He argued that the pleadings of the appellant and the evidence
produced by him would show that the appellant was not clear
as to which of the two castes he was accepted. He cited the
decision in S. Rajagopal v. C.M. Armugam & Ors. [1969 (1)           F
SCR 254) in which the law relating to acceptance of a person
by members of caste to which the appellant originally belonged
after his reconversion to Hinduism has been laid down.

     17. Mr. C. Rajendran, learned counsel for the respondent
in Civil Appeal No.6393 of 2010, relied on the decisions of this    G
Court in S. Rajagopal v. C.M. Armugam & Ors. (supra) cited
by Mr. Giri and C.M. Arumugam v. S. Rajgopal & Ors. (supra)
cited by Mr. Venugopal and submitted that the appellant has
not been.able to prove the kind of circumstances mentioned in       H
    668      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2011] 7 S.C.R.


A the aforesaid decisions to show that he had been accepted into
  the fold .of Cheramar caste after his reconversion to Hinduism.

          18. We have perused the decisions of this Court cited by
    the learned counsel for the parties on the acceptance of the
    reconvert by the members of the original caste of the reconvert.
8
    In S. Rajagopal v. C. M. Armugam & Ors. (supra) this Court
    agreed with the High Court that Rajagopal, on conversion to
    Christianity, ceased to belong to Adi Dravida caste but held
    that if the members of the caste accept the reconversion of a
C   person as a member of their caste, it should be held that he
    does become the member of that case, even though he may
    have lost membership of that caste on conversion to another
    religion. In the aforesaid decision, this Court, however, held that
    Rajgopal though married to a member of the Adi Dravida caste,
    his marriage was not performed according to the rites observed
D   by members of that caste and the marriage not being according
    to the system prevalent in the caste itself, that marriage cannot
    therefore be proof of admission of Rajgopal in the caste by
    members of the caste in general. This Court further found in the
    aforesaid case that no other evidence was given to show that
E   at any subsequent stage any step was taken by the members
    of the caste indicating that Rajgopal was being accepted as a
    member of that caste. In C.M. Arumugam v. S. Rajgopa/ & Ors.
    (supra), this Court noted that in its earlier decision in S.
    Rajagopal v. C.M. Armugam and others (supra) Rajgopal had
F   not produced evidence to show that after his reconversion to
    Hinduism, any step had been taken by the members of Adi
    Dravida caste indicating that he was being accepted as a
    member of that caste. This Court, however, found in this later
    case of C. M. Arumugam v. S. Rajgopa/ & Ors. (supra) that
G   there were several circumstances to show that Rajgopal was
    accepted as Adi Dravida Hindu and these circumstances were:
    he had been invited to lay the foundation stone for the
    construction of a new wall of the temple at Jambakullam, which
    was essentially a temple of Adi Dravida Hindus; he was
H   requested to participate in Margazhi Thiruppavai celebration
  KODIKUNNIL SURESH @ J. MONIAN v. N.S. SAJI                 669
      KUMAR, ETC. ETC. [A.K. PATNAIK, J.]

at the Kannabhiran temple, which was also a temple essentially       A
managed by the Adi Dravida Hindus; he was invited to preside
at the Adi Krittikai festival at Mariamman temple where the
devotees are Adi Dravidas or to start the procession of the
deity at such festival; the children of Rajgopalwere registered
in the school as Adi Dravida Hindus and even he himself issued       8
a certificate stating that his son was a Scheduled Caste Adi
Dravida Hindu; he participated in the All India Scheduled
Castes Conference attended largely by Adi Dravida Hindus.
Considering all these circumstances, this Court held that
Rajgopal after his reconversion to Hinduism was recognized           C
and accepted as a member of Adi Dravida caste by the other
members of that caste.

    19. We further find that in Kai/ash Sonkar v. Smt. Maya
Devi {supra), this Court observed that a dominant factor to
determine the revival of the caste of a convert from Christianity· D
to his old religion would be that in cases of election to the State
Assemblies or the Parliament where under the Presidential
Order a particular constituency is reserved for a member of the
scheduled caste or tribe and the electorate gives a majority
verdict in his favour, then this would be doubtless proof positive E
of the fact that his community has accepted him back to his old
fold and this would result in a revival of the original caste to
which the candidate belonged. Similarly, in S. Anba/agan v. B.
Devarajan & Ors. (supra) this Court observed that the fact that
the voters of the Rasipuram Parliamentary Constituency F
reserved for the Scheduled Castes accepted his candidature
for the reserved seat and elected him to the Lok Sabha twice
was an outstanding circumstance to show that he belongs to
Adi Dravida caste.

     20. In the light of the aforesaid decisions of this Court, we   G
may now examine the facts of.the present case. The father of
the appellant, it is not disputed, originally was a member of the
Cheramar caste which was admittedly a Scheduled Caste in
the State of Kerala. On conversion to Christianity, the father of
                                                                     H
    670     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                i201111 s.c.R·.


A the appellant had ceased to be a member of the Cheramar
  caste. This is because on conversion to Christianity, a person
  ceases to belong to his original caste as has been held by this
  Court in S. Rajagopa/ v. C.M. Armugam and others (supra).
  We have already held that in 1978 the appellant reconverted
8 into Hinduism and continued to be a Hindu thereafter. The
  appellant has stated in para 13 of his affidavit (examination-
  in-chief) before the High Court that in 1979 he was actively
  working for the upliftment of the Cheramar community and the
  Kerala Cheramar Sangham issued a certificate dated
C 25.10.1979 produced and marked before the High Court as
  Exhibit R-17. This certificate has been signed by S.
  Rajaretnam, the then President of the Kerala Cheramar
  Sangham, and it states that being a descendant of Scheduled
  Caste convert and by the conversion the appellant is accepted
  and admitted into the fold of Hindu Cheramar Community by
D its memb.ers who are Cheramar Hindus and by this fact has
  become a member of Cheramar Community which is
  recognized as a Scheduled Caste. This certificate dated
  25.10.1979 has been issued ten years prior to 1989 when the
  appellant for the first time contested from the Adoor
E Parliamentary Constituency reserved for the Scheduled Caste.
  In the years 1989, 1991, 1996 and 1999, the appellant
  contested and got elected from the Adoor Parliamentary
  Constituency reserved for Scheduled Caste. In between, in the
  year 1994, the appellant got married to Bindu and his affidavit
F (examination-in-chief) before the High Court states that the
  marriage was performed in accordance with the form of
  Cheramar community. All these circumstances clearly establish
  that the appellant after his reconversion to Hinduism in 1978
  had been accepted by the members of the Cheramar caste.
G
       21. The Cheramar community and the Pulayan community,
  however, appear to be two distinct castes as per Entry 54 in
  Part VIII of the Schedule to the Constitution (Scheduled Castes)
  Order, 1950 as has been contended by Mr. Giri. From the
H written statements of the appellant and from his evidence,
  KODIKUNNIL SURESH @ J. MONIAN v. N.S. SAJI                   671
      KUMAR, ETC. ETC. [A.K. PATNAIK, J.]
however, it appears that the appellant entertains a belief that A
the Cheramar caste and the Pulayan caste are one and the
same caste. Perhaps, because of this belief he has married
Bindu who belongs to the Pulayan caste. The fact, however,
remains that the appellant has declared himself to be belonging
to the Cheramar caste in his nomination form and there was B
no declaration by him that he belongs to the Pulayan caste. The
Returning Officer relying on the certificate Ext. P-2 issued by
the Tehsildar, Nedumangad dated 12.03.2009 had come to the
conclusion that the appellant belongs to Cheramar caste and
had accordingly accepted his nomination. The relevant findings         c
of the Returning Officer in the proceedings dated 31.03.2009
(Ex.P-3) are quoted here:

       "The distinction between Hindu Cheramar and Hindu
       Pulaya is very thin and the local usage confuses even
       experts. Both are scheduled castes-and these areas which        D
       require a thorough enquiry by experts and examination of
       witnesses on both sides are also required which I was not
       supposed to do so as .the Returning Officer. These
       questions can be enquired into and decided only by a
       court of competent jurisdiction perhaps in an election          E
       petition. If the nomination of a candidate is refused on
       grounds not established ignoring an authoritative evidence
       he will be prejudiced in exercising his constitutional right
       to contest an election and to establish his claim before a
       court of law. If he is not eligible the other candidates have   F
       a remedy by way of election petition which will settle the
       issue finally. Therefore, I rely on the certificate of the
       Tahsildar, Nedumangadu and decide that the candidate is
       competent to contest in the election from the reserved
       constituency. The nomination satisfies all the legal            G
       requirements and it is valid in law. In the circumstance the
       nomination is accepted."

     The aforesaid findings of the Returning Officer would show
that he was of the view that the distinction between Hindu
   ,                                                                   H
    672     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2011] 7 S.C.R.


A   Cheramar and Hindu Pulaya was very thin and the local usage
    confuses even the experts and that both were Scheduled
    Castes and the areas which require a thorough enquiry by
    experts and examination of witnesses on both sides are also
    required which he was not supposed to do so as the Returning
B   Officer. The evidence would further show that ultimately the
    Returning Officer relied on the certificate of Tehsildar,
    Nedumangad, according to which the appellant belongs to the
    Hindu Cheramar caste and decided that the appellant was
    competent to contest the election from the reserved
c   constituency and accordingly accepted his nomination.
    According to us, the appellant was required to plead and lead
    evidence that he was a member of the Cheramar caste and
    after his reconversion he was accepted by the members of the
    Cheramar caste. So long as he has pleaded and adduced
    reliable evidence to show that he was originally a member of
0
    the Cheramar caste and after his conversion has been
    accepted back as a member of the Cheramar caste, the court
    cannot throw out his case only on the ground that he, like the
    Returning Officer, did not know the thin distinction between the
    Cheramar and Ptilayan castes. The findings of the High Court,
E   therefore, that there was no acceptable evidence to prove that
    the appellant was accepted as a member of the Cheramar
    caste after his reconversion to Hinduism was contrary to the
    evidence on record.

F      22. In the decisions of this Court in C.M. Arumugam v. S.
  Rajgopa/ and others (supra) and Satrucharla Vijaya Rama
  Raju v. Nimmaka Jaya Raju and others (supra) cited by Mr.
  Venugopal, this Court has held that every election petition
  furnishes a fresh cause of action for a challenge to that election
G and adjudication on a prior election petition cannot be
  conclusive in a subsequent proceeding. These decisions have
  no application to the facts of the present case. It is not the case
  of the appellant that any decision in an election petition has
  been rendered by the court that the appellant was a member
H of the Scheduled Caste and was therefore qualified to contest
   KODIKUNNIL SURESH @ J. MONIAN v. N.S. SAJI                673
       KUMAR, ETC. ETC. [AK. PATNAIK, J.]

.the election for a constituency reserved for Scheduled Caste        A
 and that such earlier decision of the Court constitutes res
 judicata on this issue. The case of the appellant is that in four
 earlier elections the voters of a constituency reserved for
  Scheduled Castes have elected him from the constituency and
  this conduct of the voters show that the members of the            B
  Scheduled Castes have accepted him back to the fold of his
  original cast, namely, the Cheramar community. The fact that
  the appellant has been elected four times from the Adoor
  Parliamentary Constituency reserved for the Scheduled Caste
  is a verj strong circumstance to establish that he has been        c
  accepted by the members of his caste after his reconversion
  to Hinduism.

     23. In the result, we set aside the impugned order of the
High Court and hold that the appellant was qualified under
Section 4(a) of the Act to be chosen to fill the seat in the House D
of People from Mavelikkara Parliamentary Constituency
reserved for the Scheduled Castes and that his nomination was
not improperly accepted by the Returning Officer and
accordingly his election was not void under Section 100 (1)(a)
and 100 (1)(d)(i) of the Act. The appeals are allowed and the E
three Election Petitions of the respondents are dismissed. The
appellant will be entitled to the amount deposited by the
respondents under Section 117 of the Act as security deposit
towards the costs. The substance of this decision will be
intimated to the Election Commission and the Speaker of the . F
House of the People in accordance with Section 116-C (2) of
the Act.

D.G.                                          Appeals allowed.