KN ASWATHNARAYANA SETTY (D) TR. LRS. & ORS.versusSTATE OF KARNATAKA & ORS.

                    [2013) 11 S.C.R. 1029


  KN ASWATHNARAYANA SETTY (D) TR. LRS. & ORS.                        A
                                v.
             STATE OF KARNATAKA & ORS.
    (Special Leave Petition (C) No.22311 of 2012 etc.)
                     DECEMBER 2, 2013
                                                                     B
      [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN AND S.A. BOBDE, JJ.]

    Land Acquisition Act, 1894:

      ss. 4 and 48(1) - Purchase of land, subsequent to              c
issuance of notification for acquisition of land - Competence
of purchaser to challenge the validity of acquisition - Held:
Vandee not competent to challenge the validity of acquisition
- He can at the most claim compensation on the basis of his
vendor's title - In the present case, the de-notification of land    0
having been refused by the courts, vendee cannot seek de-
notification of the land - He would be bound by the orders of
the court.

    ss. 48(1), 16 and 17 - Application of de-notification of
acquired land - Maintainability of - ·Held: Once possession          E
is taken u/ss. 16 and 17, the land vests in State, free from all
encumbrances - Once land is vested in State, free from all
encumbrances, it cannot be divested - In the facts of the case,
since the possession of the land already taken by the State,
application for de-notification, not maintainable.           ·       F
     Doctrine - Doctrine of tis pendens - Transfer of property
pendente lite - Effect of - Held: Transferee cannot deprive
the successful plaintiff of the fruits of decree, if purchased the
property pendente lite - He is bound by the decree just as           G
much as he was a party to the suit.

      Maxim - Maxim ut lite pendente nihil 'innovetur' (During
a litigation, nothing new should be introduced).
                              1029                                   H
    1030    SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2013] 11 S.C.R.


A      The land in question was acquired under Land
  Acquisition Act, 1894 for the benefit of the State
  Government Houseless Harijan Employees Association
  (Respondent No.3 Society). The land was further
  denotified u/s. 48(1) of the Act, at the behest of the owners
9 of the land. After one round of litigation, the order de-
  notifying the land was set aside by Supreme Court.
  During pendency of the appeal before Supreme Cou.rt,
  the petitioner purchased the land and approached the
  Government for denotifying the same from acquisition.
c Though the land was denotified by the Revenue Minister,
  by order dated 27.2.2004, the order could not be complied
  with in view of the fact that the matter had attained finality
  after having been decided by Supreme Court, and
  possession of the land had already been taken and
  handed-over to the respondent-Society on 6.9.2002.
0
  Petitioner filed writ petition challenging the order; but the
  same was dismissed by Single Judge of High Court.
  Division Bench of High Court affirmed the order of Single
  Judge. Hence the present appeal.

E       Dismissing the Petitions, the Court

       HELD: 1. At the time of purchase of the suit land by
  the present petitioners the matter was sub-judice before
  this Court and if the order of de-notification dated
F 5.8.1993 stood quashed, it would automatically revive the
  land acquisition proceedings meaning thereby the
  notification under Section 4 and declaration under
  Section 6 resurfaced by operation of law. In such a fact-
  situation, it is not permissible for the present petitioners
  to argue that merely because there was no interim order
G in the appeal filed by the respondent No.3, petitioners had
  a right to purchase the land during the pendency of the
  litigation and would not be bound by the order of this
  Court quashing the de-notification of acquisition
  proceedings. [Para 5] [1037-F-H; 1038-A]
H
   KN ASWATHNARAYANA SETTY (D) TR. LRS. v.           1031
           STATE OF KARNATAKA
     2. Doctrine of /is pendens is based on legal maxim       A
'ut lite penden(e nihil innovetur' (During a litigation
nothing new should be introduced). This doctrine stood·
embodied in Section 52 ·of the Transfer of Property Act
1882. The principle of '/is pendens' .is in accordance with
the equity, good conscience or justice because they rest      B
upon an equitable and just foundation th'!t it will be
impossibie to bring an action or suit to a successful.
termination if alienations are permitted to prevail. A
transferee pendente lite is bound by the· decree just as·
much as he was a party to the suit. A litigating party is     c
exempted from taking notice of a title acquired during the
pendency of the litigation. However, mere pendency of a
suit does not preverit one of the parties from dealing with
the· property constituting the subject matter of the suit.
The law simply postulates a condition that the alienation     0
will, in no manner, affect the rights of the other party
under any decree which may be passed in the suit unless
the pr.operty was alienated with the .permission ofthe
Court. The transferee cannot deprive the successful
plaintiff of the fruits of the decree if. he purchased the
property penciente lite. [Para 6] [1038-B-E]          ·       E
   · ·K. Adivi Naidu and Ors. vs. E. Duruvasulu Naidu and
Ors. (1995) 6 sec 150: 1995 (3) Suppl. scR 524;
Venkatrao Anantdeo Joshi arid Ors. vs. Ma/atibai and Ors.
(2003) 1. SCC 722: 2002 (4) Suppl. SCR 211; ·Raj Kumar        F
vs. SardariLal and Ors: (2004) 2 sec 601: 2004 (1) SCR
838; Sanjay Verma vs. Manik Roy <Jnd Ors. AIR 2007 SC
1332: 2006 (10) Suppl. SCR 469; Rajender Singh and Ors.
vs. Santa Singh and Ors. AIR 1973 sc· 2537: 1974 (1) SCR
381; T.G. Ashok Kumarvs. Govindammal and Anr. (2010)          G
14 SCC 370: 2010 (14) SCR 560 - relied on.           .

    3. A person who purchases fand subsequent to the·
issuance of a Section 4 notification with respect to it, is
not competent to challenge the validity of the acquisition
                                                              H
   1032    SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [2013] 11 S.C.R.


A proceedings on any ground whatsoever, for the reason
  that the sale deed executed in his favour does not confer
  upon him, any title and at the most he can claim
  compensation on the basis of his vendor's title. In order
  to meet the menace of sale of land after initiation of
B acquisition proceedings, various States enacted the Acts
  and making such transfers as punishable, e.g., The Delhi
  Lands (Restrictions on Transfers) Act, 1972 made the
  sales permissible only after grant of permission for
  transfer by the authority prescribed therein. In absence
c of such permission if the sale is made in contravention
                                   a
  of the statutory provisions it is punishable offence with
  imprisonment for a term which may extend to 3 years or
  with fine or with both. [Paras 10 and 11) [1040-B-D]
        V. Chandrasekaran and Anr. vs. The Administrative
D Officer and Ors. JT 2012 (9) SC 260; Leela Ram vs. Union
  of India and Ors. AIR 1975 SC 2112: 1976 (1) SCR 341; Smt.
  Sneh Prabha etc. vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr. AIR
  1996 SC 540: 1995 (5) Suppl. SCR 264; Meera Sahni vs.
  Lieutenant Governor of Delhi and Ors. (2008) 9 SCC 177:
E 2008 (10) SCR 1012; Tika Ram and Ors. vs. State of U.P.
  and Ors. (2009) 10 SCC 689: 2009 (14) SCR 905 - relied
  on.
      4. Therefore, it is not permissible to say that in case
F the petitioners had purchased the suit property during the
  pendency of the appeal filed by respondent No.3 before
  this Court, the petitioners are not bound by the final
  orders of this Court. [Para 8] [1039-C]
      5. It is not correct to say that the Supreme Court had
G quashed the de-notification of acquisition proceedings
  only on technical ground as the respondent-society was
  not heard. This Court had held that the withdrawal of the
  acquisition under Section 48(1) of Land Acquisition Act
  was vitiated not only because the appellant was not
H
   KN ASWATHNARAYANA SETTY (D) TR. LRS. v.             1033
            STATE OF KARNATAKA

heard but also because the reason for withdrawal was           A
wrong. [Para 12] [1040-F; 1041-A]

     State Govt. Houseless Harijan Employees Association
vs. State of Kamataka and Ors. AIR 2001 SC 437: 2000 (5)
Suppl. SCR 483 - referred to.                                  8
     6. Upon possession being taken under Section 16 or
17 of the Act, the land vests in the State free from all
encumbrances. There is ample evidence on record to
show that possession of the suit land had been taken on
6.9.2002. In such a fact-situation, question of de-notifying   C
the acquisition of land could not arise. Thus, the orcler
dated 27.2.2004 could not be passed. Thus, in case
possession of the land has been taken, application for
release of land from acquisition is not maintainable. Once
the land is vested in the State, free from encumbrances,       D
it cannot be divested. [Para 13] [1041-C-D]

     LT. Governor of H.P. and Anr. vs. Sri Avinash Sharma
AIR 1970 SC 1576: 1971 (1) SCR 413; Satendra Prasad Jain
and Ors. vs. State of U.P. and Ors. AIR 1993 SC 2517: 1993
(2) Suppl. SCR 336; Mandir Shree Sitaramji alias Shrfte        E
Sitaram Bhandar vs. Land Acquisition Collector and Ors. AIR
2005 SC 3581: 2005 (2) Suppl. SCR 969; Smt. Sulochana
Chandrakant Galande vs. Pune Municipal Transport and Ors.
AIR 2010 SC 2962: 2010 (9) SCR 476 - relied on.
                                                               F
                    Case Law Reference:
    1995 (3). Suppl. SCR 524       relied on       Para 6
    2002 (4) Suppl. SCR 211        relied on       Para 6
    2004 (1) SCR 838               relied on       Para 6      G
    2006 (10) Suppl. SCR 469       relied on       Para 6
    1974 (1) SCR 381              relied on        Para 6
    2010 (14) SCR 560              relied on       Para 7
                                                               H
    1034    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2013) 11 S.C.R.

A       JT 2012 (9) SC 260               relied on..     Para 9
        1976 (1) SCR 341                 relied on       Para 10
        1995 (5) Suppl. SCR 264          relied on       Para 10
        2008 (10) SCR 1012               relied on·      Para 10
B
        2009 (14) SCR 905                relied ·on      Para 10
        2000 (5) Suppl. SCR 483
                              '     '
                                         referred to     Para 12
        1971 (1) SCR 413                 relied on       Para 13
                                                          .   .   ..

c       1993 (2) Suppl. SCR 336.         relied on       Para.....13
        2005 (2) Suppl. SCR 969          relied on       Para ~3
        2010 (9) SCR 476                'relied on       Para 13
       CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Special Leave
D Petition (Civil) No. 22311. of 2012.

        From the Judgment & Order dated 24.10.2011 of the Hjgh
    Court of Karn~taka at Bangalore in W.A. No. 1421 of 2008.
                                  WITH
E SLP (C) Nos. 22307-22309, of 2012.
       Kailash Vasdev, P. Vishwanath, Girish An;mthmurthy,
    Umrao Singh Rawat, Vaijayanthi Girish for the Appellant
      . Rama Jois, K,N. Bhat Shetty, S.N. Bhat, D.P. Chaturvedi,
F   Ravi Panwar, Dasharath T.M., V.N. Raghupathy, Anahtha
    Narayana M.G., for the Respondents.
       ·· The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
        D.R~ e.s. CHAUHAN, J. t. These petitions have be~n filed
G against the judgment and order dated 24.10.2011 •. passed by
  the High Court of Karnata~a at Bangalore in Writ Appeal
  No.1421 of 2008 etc. affirming the judgment of the learned
  Single Judge dated 17.4.2008 passed iri \JVrit Petition. No.
  1150212006, by which and whereunder the court had quashed
H the order dated 27.2.2004, passed by the Revenue Minister,
   KN ASWATHNARAYANA SETTY (D) TR. LRS. v.  1035
  STATE OF KARNATAKA [DR. 8.S. CHAUHAN, J.]

Government of Karnataka de-notifying the suit land from                A
acquisition.

       2. Facts and circumstances giving rise to these petitions
are:
                                                                       8
    A. That a preliminary notification under Section 4( 1) of the
Land Acquisition Act 1894 (hereinafter referred to as 'Act
1894') was issued in respect of huge chunk of land including
Survey No.49/1 admeasuring 15 Acres on 6.8.1991 for the
benefit of the State Government Houseless Harijan Employees            C
Association (Regd.) (hereinafter referred to as 'Society'). In
respect of the same land declaration under Section 6 of the Act
1894 was issued on 15.5.1992.

    8. At the behest of the then owners of the suit land the
Government de-notified the land from acquisition vide order            D
dated 5.8.1993 issuing notification under Section 48(1) of the
Act 1894.

      C. Aggrieved the respondent no.3-Society challenged the
said order of de-notifying the. land from acquisition by filing Writ   E
Petition which was dismissed by the learned Single Judge. The
said order was also affirmed by the Division Bench dismissing
the Writ Appeal preferred by the Society. The Society
approached this court by filing special leave petitions which
were entertained and finally heard Civil Appeal No. 5015!_1999         F
etc.· and this court vide judgment and order dated 11.12.2000
quashed the order dated 5.8.1993 de-notifying the suit land
from acquisition.

     D. During the pehdency of Civil Appeal No.5015 Of 1999
etc. filed by the 'respondent-society, the present petitioners         G
purchased the suit land in the years 1997-1998 and approached
the Government of Karnataka to de-notify the said land from
acquisition. As their application for release was not dealt with
by the Government, they preferred Writ Petition· Nos.19968-97
of 2002 etc. before the High Court for directions to the               H
    1036    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2013] 11 S.C.R.


A   Government to release the land.

         E. The High Court vide judgment and order dated
    19.2.2003 disposed of the said writ petition, directing the
    Government to decide their application in accordance with law
8   expeditiously. In pursuance of the High Court order, the
    Government of Karnataka issued notice to all concerned parties
    and against all the parties the Hon'ble Revenue Minister
    passed an order dated 27.2.2004, directing to de-notify the
    land from acquisition.
c       F. The order dated 27.2.2004 was not complied with as
  the Deputy Secretary to the Government of Karnataka raised
  certain objections and made an endorsement dated 21.9.2005
  that the matter had attained finality after being decided by this
  Court and possession of the land had already been taken and
D handed over to the respondent-society on 6.9.2002, much prior
  to the order passed by the Hon'ble Minister.

       G. The present petitioners filed Writ Petition No.11502 of
  2006 etc. before the High Court to quash the endorsement
E dated 21.9.2005 made by the learned Deputy Secretary,
  Government of Kamataka. The writ petition stood dismissed
  on 17.4.2008 in terms of the judgment of the same date in a
  similar case, i.e. Writ Petition No.9857 of 2006 (M. V. Kasturi
  & Ors. v. State of Kamataka & Ors.}.
F
        H. Aggrieved, petitioners preferred a Writ Appeal No.
     1421/2008 which has been dismissed by the impugned
    judgment and order.

        Hence, these petitions.
G
       3. Shri Kailash Vasdev, learned senior counsel appearing
  for the petitioners submitted that the courts below have
  comrpitted an error in dismissing the case of the petitioners as
  the courts failed to appreciate the legal issues. This Court set
H aside the order of de-notification dated 5.8.1993 on a technical
   KN ASWATHNARAYANA SETTY (D) TR. LRS. v. 1037
  STATE OF KARNATAKA [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]

ground as the order of de-notification was passed without              A
hearing the respondent-society for whose benefit the land had
been acquired. Thus, there could be no prohibition for the State
to de-notifying the land from acquisition after hearing the
concerned parties. More so, the Hon'ble Minister had
competence to deal with the acquisition proceedings and thus           B
the finding recorded by the High Court about his competence
is perverse. More so, as there was no interim order of this court
in Society's appeal, petitioners could purchase the land.
Hence, these petitions should be accepted.
                                                                       c
      4. Per contra, Shri Rama Jois and Shri K.N. Bhat, learned
senior counsel for the respondents have opposed the petitions
contending that this Court has set aside the order dated
5.8.1993 de-notifying the land from acquisition not only on the
ground of violation of principles of natural justice but also on       0
merits as it had been held by this Court that there was no
justification for de-notifying the land. The present petitioners are
purchasers of land subsequent to notification under Section 4(1)
of the Act 1894, and they could not purchase the land at all. In
view of the fact that the appeal filed by the respondent no.3          E
against the order dated 5.8.1993 was pending before this
 Court, doctrine of /is pendens would apply. Thus, the petitions
 are liable to be dismissed.

     5. We have considered the rival submissions made by the
learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.                F

      The facts are not in dispute. At the time of purchase of the
suit land by the present petitioners the matter was sub-judice
before this Court and if the order of de-notification dated
5.8.1993 stood quashed, it would automatically revive the land         G
acquisition proceedings meaning thereby the notification under
Section 4 and declaration under Section 6 resurfaced by
operation of law. In such a fact-situation, it is not permissible
for the present petitioners to argue that merely because there
was no interim order in the appeal filed by the respondent no.3,       H
    1038     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2013] 11 S.C.R

A   petitioners had a right to purchase the land during the pendency
    of the litigation and would not be bound by the order of this
    Court quashing the de-notification of acquisition proceedings.

           6. Doctrine of /is pendens is based on legal maxim 'ut lite
8 pendente nihil innovetur (During a litigation nothing new
    should be introduced). This doctrine stood embodied in
    Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882. The principle
    of 'tis pendens' is in accordance with the equity, good
    conscience or justice because they rest upon an equitable and
c , just foundation that it will be impossible to bring an action or
    suit to a successful termination if alienations are permitted to
    prevail. A transferee pendente lite is bound by the decree just
    as much as he was a party to the suit. A litigating party is
    exempted from taking notice of a title acquired during the
D pendency of the litigation. However, it must be clear that mere
    pendency of a suit does not prevent one of the parties from
    dealing with the property constituting the subject matter of the
    suit. The law simply postulates a condition that the alienation
    will, in no manner, affect the rights of the other party under any
E decree which may be passed in the suit unless the property was
    alienated with the permission of the Court. The transferee
    cannot deprive the successful plaintiff of the fruits of the decree
    if he purchased the property pendente lite. [Vide: K. Adivi
    Naidu & Ors. vs. E. Duruvasulu Naidu & Ors., (1995) 6 SCC
F 150; Venkatrao Anantdeo Joshi & Ors. vs. Ma/atibai & Ors.,
    (2003) 1 SCC 722; Raj Kumar vs. Sardari Lal & Ors., (2004)
    2 SCC 601; and Sanjay Vetma v. Manik Roy & Ors., AIR 2007
    SC 1332).

      7. In Rajender Singh & Ors. v. Santa Singh & Ors., AIR
G 1973 SC 2537, while dealing with the application of doctrine
    of /is pendens, this court held as under:

               "The doctrine of /is pendens was intended to strike
         at attempts by parties to a litigation to circumvent the
H       jurisdiction of a court, in which a dispute on rights or
     KN ASWATHNARAYANA SETTY (D) TR. LRS. v. 1039
    STATE OF KARNATAKA [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]

      interests in immovable property is pending by private · A
      dealings which may remove the subject matter of
      litigation from the ambit of the court's power to decide a
      pending dispute or frustrate its decree."

      (See also: T.G. Ashok Kumar v. Govindammal & Anr.,               8
  c2010) 14 sec 370).

        8. In view of the above, we are of the considered opinion
  that it is not permissible to say that in case the petitioners had
  purchased the suit property during the pendency of the appeal
  filed by respondent no.3 before this Court, the petitioners are      C
  not bound by the final orders of this Court.

        9. By operation of law, as this Court quashed the de-
  notification of acquisition proceedings, the proceedings stood
  revived. In V. Chandrasekaran & Anr. vs. The Administrative          D
  Officer & Ors., JT 2012 (9) SC 260, this Court considered the
  right of purchaser of land subsequent to the issuance of Section
  4 notification and held that any one who deals with the land
  subsequent to a Section 4 notification being issued, does so,
  at his own peril. Section 4 notification gives a notice to the       E
  public at large that the land in respect to which it has been
  issued, is needed for a public purpose, and it further points out
  that there will be "an impediment to any one to encumber the
  land acquired thereunder." The alienation thereafter does not
  bind the State or the beneficiary under the acquisition. In fact,    F
  purchase of land after publication of a Section 4 notification in
  relation to such land, is void against the State and at the most,
  the purchaser may be a person-interested in compensation,
  since he steps into the shoes of the erstwhile owner and may
  therefore, merely claim compensation. Thus, the purchaser            G
  cannot challenge the acquisition proceedings. While deciding
  the said case this court placed reliance on a very large number
  of its earlier judgments including Leela Ram v. Union of India
_ & Ors., AIR 1975 SC 2112; Smt. Sneh Prabha etc. v. State of
  Uttar Pradesh & Anr., AIR 1996 SC 540; Meera Sahni v.                H
    1040    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2013) 11 S.C.R.


A   Lieutenant Governor of Delhi & Ors., (2008) 9 SCC 177; and
    Tika Ram & Ors. v. State ofU.P. & Ors., (2009) 10 SCC 689.

          10. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect
    that a person who purchases land subsequent to the issuance
8   of a Sect[on 4 notification with respect to it, is not competent
    to challenge the validity of the acquisition proceedings on any
    ground whatsoever, for the reason that the sale deed executed
    in his favour does not confer upon him, any title and at the most
    he can claim compensation on the basis of his vendor's title.
c       11. In order to meet the menace of sale of land after
  initiation of acquisition proceedings, various States enacted the
  Acts and making such transfers as punishable, e.g., The Delhi
  Lands (Restrictions on Transfers) Act, 1972 made the sales
  permissible only after grant of permission for transfer by the
D authority prescribed therein. In absence of such permission if
  the sale is made in contravention of the statutory provisi.ons it
  is a punishable offence with imprisonment for a term which may
  extend to 3 years or with fine or with both.

E        Therefore, we do not see any cogent reason to accept any
    plea taken by the petitioners that they could purchase the suit
    land even subsequent to Section 4 notification.

         12. We do not find force in the submission made by Shri
F   Kailash Vasdev, learned senior counsel that this Court had
    quashed the de-notification of acquisition proceedings only on
    technical ground as the respondent-society was not heard.

       This Court in State Govt. Houseless Harijan Employees
  Association v. State of Kamataka & Ors., AIR 2001 SC 437
G held as under:

        "71. From all this, the ultimate position which emerges is
        that the acquisition in favour of the appellant was properly
        initiated by publication of the Notification under Section
H       4(1) and by the declaration issued under Section 6. The
   KN ASWATHNARAYANA SETTY (D) TR. LRS. v.                  1041
  STATE OF KARNATAKA [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]

    withdrawal of the acquisition under Section 48(1) was            A
    vitiated not only because the appellant was not heard but
    also because the reason for withdrawal was wrong.
    The High Court erred in dismissing the appellant's writ
    petition. The decision of the High Court is accordingly set
    aside. The impugned Notification under Section 48(1) is          B
    quashed and the appeal is allowed with costs." (Emphasis
    added)

     13. There is ample evidence on record to show that
possession of the suit land had been taken on 6.9.2002. In such      C
a fact-situation, question of de-notifying the acquisition of land
could not arise. Thus, the order dated 27.2.2004 could not be
passed. There cannot be a dispute in law that upon possession
being taken under Section 16 or 17 of the Act 1894, the land
vests in the State free from all encumbrances. Thus, in case
possession of the land has been taken, application for release       D
of land from acquisition is not maintainable. Once the land is
vested in the State free from encumbrances, it cannot be
divested. (See: LT. Governor of H.P. & Anr. v. Sri Avinash
Sharma, AIR 1970 SC 1576; Satendra Prasad Jain & Ors. v.
State of U.P. & Ors., AIR 1993 SC 2517; Mandir Shree                 E
Sitaramji alias Shree Sitaram Bhandar v. Land Acquisition
Collector & Ors., AIR 2005 SC 3581; and Smt. Sulochana
Chandrakant Galande v. Pune Municipal Transport & Ors.,
AIR 2010 SC 2962).
                                                                     F
    14. In view of the above, we do not think it necessary to
examine the other issues raised in the petitions particularly, the
competence of the Hon'ble Minister to deal with the matter.

      15. The petitions are devoid of any merit and are              G
accordingly dismissed. However, it is made clear that the
petitioners shall be entitled to compensation as determined
under the provisions of the Act 1894.

K.K.T.                                     Petitions dismissed.
                                                                     H