Holding

The Motor Transport Workers Act, 1961 does not impliedly repeal the Bombay Shops and Establishments Act, 1948; both statutes coexist, with the Central Act prevailing only on overlapping provisions.

Summary

Kishorebhai Khamanchand Goyal, a motor‑transport operator, was convicted under the Bombay Shops and Establishments Act, 1948 and challenged the conviction on the ground that the later Motor Transport Workers Act, 1961 (specifically s.37) had by necessary implication repealed the State Act. The Supreme Court examined the doctrine of implied repeal, emphasizing the presumption against it and the requirement of a clear repugnancy or an exhaustive legislative scheme to overturn it. It held that the two statutes pursue different objectives, occupy distinct fields and contain no direct conflict, so they can coexist. Where the Central Act specifically covers an aspect, it will prevail on that point, but the State Act is not wholly displaced. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Gujarat High Court’s order and dismissed the appeal, confirming that the State Act continues to apply to motor‑transport workers except for the limited overlapping provisions.

Issues considered

Whether the Motor Transport Workers Act, 1961 impliedly repeals the Bombay Shops and Establishments Act, 1948.
Whether Section 37 of the Central Act creates a necessary implication of repeal of the State Act.
Whether the presumption against implied repeal can be rebutted in the present facts.
Whether the two statutes occupy the same field or are repugnant to each other.

Legislation cited

Bombay Shops and Establishments Act, 1948

Subjects

implied repealpresumption against implied repealstatutory interpretationcentral and state legislationmotor transport workersBombay Shops and Establishments Actconcurrent jurisdictionSection 37labor law

Judgment

• KISHOREBHAI KHAMANCHAND GOY AL A
v.
STATE OF GUJARAT AND ANR.

OCTOBER 30, 2003

[DORAISWAMY RAJU AND ARIJIT PASAYAT, JJ.) B

' Bombay Shops and Establishments Act, 1948--App/icability of on coming
into force ofMotor Transport Workers Act, 1961-Motor Transport Operator-
Found guilty of violations of provisions of State Act-Contending that on
coming into force of the Central Act, the State Act stood repealed by necessary
c
implication-Held, High Court rightly opined that notwithstanding enactment
of the Central Act, obligation to comply with the requirement of the State Act
did not get wiped out.
....
Interpretation of Statutes : D
Implied repeal-lriference-Held, there is presumption against repeal
by implication-Presumption when stands rebutted and repeal iriferred by
necessary implication-Discussed.

Legal Maxim-expressio unius (persone vel nei) est exclusio alterius- E
Applicability of

The appellant, a motor transport operator, was found guilty of
violation of Bombay Shops and Establishments Act, 1948 (State Act). The
fine imposed on him was upheld by the High Court, which held that
notwithstanding the enactment of the Motor Transport Workers Act, 1961 F
(Central Act) the obligation to comply with the requirement of the State
Act did not get wiped out.

The transporter filed the present appeal contending that in view of
s.37 of the Central Act, by necessary implication there was repeal of the
State Act. G

Dismissing the appeal, the Court
>
HELD : 1.1. There is presumption against repeal by implication.
~

H
2 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 5-S.C.R.

A When a new Act contains a repealing section mentioning the Acts which
it expressly repeals, the presumption against implied repeal of other laws
is further strengthened on the principle expressio unius (persone vet nei)
est exclusio alterius, i.e., the express intention of one person or thing is the
exclusion of another. The presumption is however rebutted and a repeal
B is inferred by necessary implication when the provisions of the later Act
are so inconsistent with or repugnant to the provisions of the earlier Act
and that the two cannot stand together. The necessary considerations in
this regard are: (1) whether there is direct conflict between the two
provisions; (2) whether the legislature intended to lay down an exhaustive
code in respect of the subject matter replacing the earlier law; and (3)
C whether the two laws occupy the same field. [4-D-G; 5-A-B)

Municipal Council, Palai through the Commissioner of Municipal
Council, Palai v. l.J. Joseph, AIR (1963) SC 1561; Northern India Caterers
(Private) Ltd. and Anr. v. State of Punjab and Anr., AIR (1967) SC 1581;
Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Shiv Shanker, [1971) 1 SCC 442; Ratan
D Lal Adukia and Anr. v. Union of lridia, AIR (1990) SC 104; R.S. Raghunath
v. State of Karnataka and Anr., AIR (1992) SC 81; Pt. Rishikesh and Anr. v.
Sa/ma Begum, (Smt.) [1995) 4 SCC 718 and Shri A.B. Krishna and Ors. ".·
The State of Karnataka and Anr., JT (1998) 1 SC 613, relied on.

E Garnett v. Bradley, (1878) 3 AC 944 (HL) and A.G. v. Moore, (1878)
3 Ex.D 276, referred to.

1.2. The areas of operation of the Motor Transport Workers Act,
1961 and the Bombay Shops and Establishments Act, 1948 are different
with wholly different aims and objects. They operate in their respective
F fields and there is no impediment for their existence side by side. There is
no direct conflict between any of the provisions of the two statutes. The
operation of the Central Act is not restricted in its area of operation by
what is provided in the State Act and vice versa. The responsibilities and
obligations of the management under both the Acts cannot be avoided
altogether and it is only where on any particular aspect or stipulation, the
G prescription is found to overlap - to that extent and in respect of any such
matter alone the Central Act will apply to the exclusion of a .contra
stipulation in the State Act and consequently, the State Act as ~· whole
cannot be held to have been abrogated by the Central Act. [5-H; 6-D-E) .._

Bihar State Road Transport Corporation v. Orang Bahadur, AIR (1968)
H
K.K. GOYAL v. STATE OF GUJARAT [PASAYAT,J.] 3
~ Pat. 200; Amamatsingh v. Pr~iding Officer, Industrial Tribunal, Bihar, AIR A
(1970) Pat. 269 and Corporation ofthe City ofNagpur through Shop Inspector
v. Mis Inland Carriers, Nagpur and Anr., (1987) LLJ 270, approved.

Re: Berry (1936) Ch. 274, referred to.

"Craies on Statute Law" Seventh Edition, 366, referred to. B
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No.
642 of 1996.

From the Judgment and Order dated 1.3.95 of the Gujarat High Court
in Crl. No. 338 of 1994. C
Rajesh Mahale for the Appellant.

Moullick Nanavati, Ms. Sadhna Sandhu and Ms. Hemantika Wahi for
the Respondents.
D
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

ARIJIT PASAYA T, J. By the impugned judgment, the Gujarat High
Court held that notwithstanding enactment of the Motor Transport Workers
Act, 1961 (for short 'the Act') the obligation to comply with the requirement
of the Bombay shops and Establishments Act, 1948 (for short 'the E
Establishments Act') did not get wiped out.

Though the fine that was imposed on the appellant is not very much in
terms of money, the appellant contended that the problem is of recurring
nature, therefore, the issues should be settled. It was contended that there was
divergence in views of several High Courts. The Patna High Court in Bihar F
State Road Transport Corporation v. Orang Bahadur, AIR (1968) Patna
page 200 and Amamathsingh v. Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal Bihar,
AIR (1970) Patna page 269 (Full Bench) held that the enactment of Act did
away with the requirement to comply with requirements of Establishment
Act by applying logic of implied repeal. The Bombay High Court also held G
likewise in the Corporation of the City of Nagpur· through Shop Inspector v.
Mis Inland Carriers, Nagpur and Anr., (1987) LLJ 270. But a different view
was adopted by the Gujarat High Court in the impugned judgment which
different from the view of Patna High Court and Bombay High Court.

H
4 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003) SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the appeilant submitted
that the:e must be a definite legislative intent that two statute should operate
in respect of identical issues. The Establishments Act has been rendered
repugnant by enactment of the Act. Reference is made to Section 37 of the
Act to submit that by necessary implication there was repeal of the
Establishments Act. Both these statutes fall under Entry 24 of List III (the
B Concurrent List) of VII Schedule to the Constitution of India, 1950 (in short
the 'Constitution') and, therefore, it is but natural to presume that there was
a repeal by implication.

Per contra, learned counsel for the State, submitted that the two statutes
C in question operate in different fields and there is no question of any
repugnancy as was rightly held by the High Court.

The submission require careful consideration.

There is presumption against a repeal by implication; and the reason of
D this rule is based on the theory that the Legislature while enacting a law has
a complete knowledge of the existing laws on tire same subject matter, and
therefore, when it does not provide a repealing provision, the intention is
clear not to repeal the existing legislation. (See: Municipal Council, Palai
through the Commissioner of Municipal Council, Palai v. T.J. Joseph, AIR
(1963) SC 1561, Northern India Caterers (Private) Ltd and Anr. v. State of
E Punjab and Anr., AIR (1967) SC 1581, Municipal Corporation of Delhi v.
Shiv Shanker, [1971] 1 SCC 442 and Ratan Lal Adukia and Anr. v. Union
of India, AIR (1990) SC 104. When the new Act contains a repealing section A

mentioning the Acts which it expressly repeals, the presumption against implied
repeal of other laws is further strengthened on the principle expressio unius
F (persone vel rei) est exclusio alterius, (The express intention of one person
or thing is the exclusion of another), as illuminatingly stated in Garnett v.
Bradley, (1878) 3 Ac 944 (HL). The continuance of existing legislation, in
the absence of an express provision of repeal being presumed the garden to
show that there has been repeal by implication lies on the party asserting the
same. The presumption is, however, rebutted and a repeal is inferred by
G necessary implication when the provisions of the later Act are so inconsistent
with or repugnant to the provisions of the earlier Act and that the two cannot
stand together. But, if the two can be read together and some application can
be made of the words in the earlier Act, a repeal will not be inferred. (See:
A.G. v. Moore, (1878) 3 Ex. D 276, Ratanla/'s case (supra) and R.S. Raghunath
H v. State of Karnataka and Anr., AIR (1992) SC 81.
I

K.K. GOYAL v. STATEOFGUJARAT[PASAYAT,J.] 5
., The necessary questions to be asked are : A
(I) Whether there is direct conflict between the two provisions.

(2) Whether the Legislature intended to lay down an exhaustive Code
in respect of the subject-matter replacing the earlier law;
B
(3) Whether the two laws occupy the same field.

(See: Pt. Rishikesh and Anr. v. Sa/ma Begum (Smt.), [1995] 4 SCC
718, and Shri A.B. Krishna and Ors. v. The State of Karnataka and Ors., JT
(1998) I SC 613.

The doctrine of implied repeal is based on the theory that the Legislature,
c
which is presumed to know the existing law, did not intend to create any
confusion by retaining conflicting provisions and, therefore, when the court
applies the doctrine, it does not more than give effect to the intention of the
Legislature by examining the scope and the object of the two enactments and
by a comparison of their provisions. The matter in each case is one of the D
construction and comparison of the two statutes. The Court leans against
implying a repeal, "unless two Acts are so plainly repugnant to each other
that effect cannot be given to both at the same time, a repeal will not be
implied, or that there is a necessary inconsistency in the two Acts standing
together." (See Craies on Statute Law, Seventh Edition, page 366, with E
reference to Re: Berrey (1936) Ch. 274). To determine whether a later statute
repeals by implication an earlier, it is necessary to scrutinize the terms and
consider the true meaning and effect of the earlier Act. Untill this is done,
it is impossible to ascertain whether any inconsistency exists between the two
enactments. The areas of operation of the Act and the Establishments Act in
question are different with wholly different aims and objects. They operate F
in their respective fields and there is no impediment for their existence side
by side. (See State ofMP. v. Kedia Leather and Liquor Ltd and Ors., (2003)
6 Supreme 213).

It is to be noted that there is no direct conflict between any of the
provisions of the two statutes. The determinative test as noted above is whether G
the enactments are sharply conflicting or are inconsistent and/or repugnant.
In the instance case it is not so. The operation of the Act is not restricted in
its area of operation by what is provided in the Establishments Act and vice
versa. Absence of some provisions in another Act does not amount to
conflicting provision or inconsistent provision amounting to repugnancy of H
6 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A such provision. ~

If both Acts are made applicable it will serve workmen the best as the
benefits which are not made available to them in the Central Act i.e. the Act
are made avaih:ble to them in the State Act i.e. the Establishments Act and
the benefits which are not made available to them in the State Act are made
B available in the Central Act. By repeal of one, the benefits under the repealed
Act stand withdrawn and such benefits are not provided in the existing Act.
The workmen by applying logic of implied repeal will be deprived of such
benefits. Both the Acts are enacted for the benefits and well being of workmen,
and it would be appalling to comprehend a situation that withdrawal of benefit
c by enacting a statute was contemplated.

On a careful scrutiny of the provisions contained in both the above
Acts, we find that the Act makes some specific provisions on certain aspects
and areas of relationship between worker and management. It is not only
silent but also does not advert to or deal with several other vital and crucial
D aspects of such relationship as are dealt with by the Establishments Act. The
responsibilities and obligations of the management under both Acts cannot
be avoided altogether and it is only where on any particular aspect or
stipulation, the prescription is found to overlap - to that extent and in respect
of any such matter alone the Act, pertaining to motor transport workers will
apply to the exclusion of a contra stipulation in the Establishments Act and
E consequently, the Establishments Act as a whole cannot be held to have been
abrogated by the Act. Jn substance, if at all, if can only at best be claimed
that the operation of the law as contained in the Establishments Act would
stand curtailed, if on any particular aspect there is a contra stipulatron or
provision in the Act in respect of a Motor Transport worker, and not otherwise.
F This would be the proper, reasonable and inevitable consequence of a
harmonious construction of the provisions of the two welfare legislations, so
that the best of the both would be available to the worker concerned. The
view taken by the Patna High Court and the Bombay High Court in the
decisions noted S!lpra, does not lay down the correct position of law while
the one taken by the Gujarat High Court in the impugned judgment, merits
G approval in our hands.

Above being the position, the judgment of the High Court does not
suffer from any infirmity to warrant interference. The appeal fails and is
•.
dismissed.

H R.P. Appeal dismissed.