Supreme Court of India
KISHORE SAMRITEversusSTATE OF U.P. & ORS.
- Citation
- 2012 INSC 483
- Decided
- 18 October 2012
- Disposal
- Disposed off
- Bench
- B S CHAUHAN
Holding
The Supreme Court held that the writ petitions were filed without proper locus standi, amounted to an abuse of the court process, and the High Court’s cost order was excessive, thereby imposing exemplary costs of Rs.5 lakh each on the next friends and setting aside the impugned order.
Summary
Kishore Samrite, a former MLA, filed writ petition No.111/2011 in the Allahabad High Court as a next friend of three residents of Amethi, alleging their illegal detention and a rape by Rahul Gandhi (respondent No.6). A second writ petition No.125/2011 was filed by Gajendra Pal Singh as a next friend of the same three persons, claiming the first petition was false and politically motivated. The High Court transferred petition No.111 to a Division Bench without the Chief Justice’s order, dismissed it and imposed Rs.50 lakh costs, which were later challenged before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that both petitions were filed by strangers without proper locus standi, constituted an abuse of the court process, and were based on falsehoods; it set aside the High Court’s cost order and imposed exemplary costs of Rs.5 lakh each on the next friends, directing the CBI to continue its investigation. The Court also clarified that the transfer of the writ petition violated natural‑justice principles and that the earlier 2009 writ had attained finality, precluding re‑litigation.
Issues considered
- The legality of transferring writ petition No.111/2011 to a Division Bench without an order from the Chief Justice and whether it violated natural justice.
- Whether the appellants, as next friends, had locus standi to file habeas corpus petitions on behalf of the alleged detainees.
- Whether the writ petitions constituted an abuse of the process of the court.
- The appropriateness of the Rs.50 lakh cost order imposed by the High Court.
- Whether the doctrine of res judicata applied to the earlier writ petition No.3719/2009.
Legislation cited
- Allahabad High Court Ruless. Chapter XXI Rule 1
- Code of Criminal Procedures. 320(4)(a), s. 330(2), s. 335(1)(b), s. 339
- Constitution of Indias. Art.21, s. Art.226, s. Art.227
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 120B, s. 181, s. 191, s. 211, s. 469, s. 499, s. 500
Subjects
habeas corpusabuse of processlocus standinatural justiceexemplary costspolitical vendettanext friendhigh court rulesCBI investigationfalse allegations
Judgment
[2012] 9 S.C.R. 733
KISHORE SAMRITE A
v.
STATE OF U.P. & ORS.
(Criminal Appeal No.1406 of 2012)
OCTOBER 18, 2012
B
[DR. B.S. CHAUHAN AND SWATANTER KUMAR, JJ.)
CONSTITUTION OF IND/A, 1950:
Art.226 - Petitions for a writ of habeas corpus -A/legation C
that a political leader had illegally detained a girl and her
parents - Held: From the specific averments made in both the
writ petitions filed in 2011, it is clear that the so-called next
friends in both the writ petitions have approached the court
with falsehood, unclean hands and have misled the courts by
0
showing urgency and exigencies in relation to an incident of
3.12.2006, which according to all the three petitioners and the
police was false, and have thus abused the process of court
and misused the judicial process - They maliciously and with
ulterior motives encroached upon the valuable time of the
court and wasted public money - The false a/legations made E
in the writ petitions have damaged and diminished the public
image of the political leader concerned - The girl and her
parents have been used by the persons who filed the writ
petitions - Their reputation has suffered a serious set back and
they were exposed to inconvenience of being dragged to court F
- Exemplary...costs of Rs. 5 lacs each is imposed upon the
next friends in both the writ petitions - Costs to be paid to the
affected persons - Order of High Court imposing cost of Rs.
50 lacs on next friend in WP No. 111 of 2011 set aside - CBI
shall continue the investigation in furtherance to the direction G
of the High Court against the next friend in Writ Petition No.
11112011 and all other persons responsible for the abuse of
the process of court, making false statement in pleadings,
733 H
734 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012) 9 S.C.R.
A filing false affidavits and committing such other offences as
the investigating agency may find during investigation -
Administration of justice - Abuse of process of court -
Administrative law - Natural justice.
Art. 226 - Petition for a writ of habeas corpus - Locus
8 standi - 'Person aggrieved' - Explained.
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE:
Abuse of process of court - Principles enumerated in the
C judgment - Held: Court must ensure that its process is not
abused.
ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT RULES:
Roster of Judges and listing of cases - Division Bench
D a
of High Court transferring writ petition on the Board of single
Judge, to its own Board - Held: The roster and placing of
cases before different Benches of the High Court is
unquestionably the prerogative of the Chief Justice of that
Court - In absence of the Chief Justice, the senior most Judge
E would pass directions in regard to the roster of Judges and
listing of cases - In the instant case, no order was passed by
the Chief Justice of the High Court or even the senior-most
Judge, administratively In-charge of the Lucknow Bench,
transferring Writ Petition No. 11112011 for hearing from a
F Single Judge before which it was pending, to the Division
Bench of that Court - On the basis of the a/legations made in
Writ Petition No. 11112011, it had been listed before Single
Judge - Transfer of Writ Petition No. 11112011 by Division
Bench, suo motu, to its own Board was an order lacking
administrative judicial propriety - Further, it has not been
G specifically recorded nor is it implicitly clear that a notice was
directed to petitioners in WP. No. 11112011 and they were
given opportunity to address the court - Natural justice -
Maxim 'Audi alteram partem'.
H
KISHORE SAMRITE v. ·STATE OF U.P. & ORS. 735
COST: A
False and frivolous writ petitions - Imposition of costs and
disbursement of - Maxim jure natvrae aequum est neminem
cum alterius detrimento et injuria fieri locupletiorem -
Explained, B
The appellant, an ex-MLA of Madhya Pradesh filed
writ petition No. 111 of 2011 before the Lucknow Bench
of the Allahabad High Court stating that he came to know
from certain websites to the effect that respondent no. 6,
while on a tour of his Parliamentary constituency in U.P., C
along with six others committed rape on a girl in 2006 and
the said girl, her mother and father were kept in illegal
detention by respondent no. 6. Invoking the right to life
and liberty of the three named petitioners, as enshrined
in Art. 21 of the Constitution, it was prayed that a writ of D
habeas corpus be issued commanding the opposite
parties, parti~ularly, respondent no. 6, to produce the
petitioners before the Court. The writ petition was listed
before a single Judge of the High Court. Meanwhile
another Writ Petition No. 125 of 2011 was filed by E
respondent no. 8, acting as the next friend of the three
petitioners, stating that a false Writ Petition No. 111 of
2011 was filed by the appellant as next friend of the
petitioners, which was publically motivated to harm the
reputation of the opposite party. This petition was listed F
before a Division Bench of the High Court, which directed
transfer of W.P. No. 111 of 2011 and tagging of the same
with W.P. No. 125 of 2011, and issued notice to the
Director General of Police to file a personal affidavit.
During investigation, it was revealed that the three named G
petitioners had shifted to a village in a different district. It
was stated that they never instructed any person to filed
any writ petition on their behalf. The three petitioners
named in the writ petition were produced before the
Court. On 1.3.2011, the Division Bench passed a detailed
H
736 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 9 S.C.R.
A order in Writ Petition No. 125 of 2011, disposing of Writ
Petition No. 111 of 2011 with a cost of Rs.50,00,000/- and
partly disposing of writ petition No. 125 of 2011. The High
Court directed that out of the said amount, Rs.25,00,000/
- would be paid to the girl, Rs.20,00,000/- to respondent
B no. 6 and Rs 5,00,000/- to the Director General of Police
for producing the alleged detenues within the time frame
as directed in the order. Further, the Dfrector, CBI was
directed to register a case against the appellant and all
other persons involved in the plot. Aggrieved, the next
c friend in W.P. No. 111 of 2011 filed the appeal.
Disposing of the appeal, the Court
HELD:
0 1. Whether transfer of Writ Petition No. 111/2011 was in
accordance with law, and whether there was violation of
Principles of Natural Justice?
1.1. In terms of proviso to Rule 1 of Chapter XXI of
the Allahabad High Court Rules, it is provided that an
E application under Art. 226 of the Constitution in the nature
of habeas corpus directed against private custody shall
be made to the Single Judge appointed by the Chief
Justice to receive such an application. The clear analysis
of the Rule shows that habeas corpus against a private
F custody has to be placed before a Single Judge while in
the case of custody other than private custody, the matter
has to be placed before a Division Bench. It appears that
on the strength of this Rule, Writ Petition No. 111/2011
was listed before the Single Judge of High Court. The
G roster and placing of cases before different Benches of
the High Court is unquestionably the prerogative of the
Chief Justice of that Court. In absence of the Chief
Justice, the senior most Judge would pass directions in
regard to the roster of Judges and listing of cases.
H Primarily, it is the exclusive prerogative of the Chief
KISHORE SAMRITE v. STATE OF U.P. & ORS. 737
Justice and does not admit any ambiguity or doubt in this A
regard. [para ·24] [765-B-H]
State of Rajasthan v. Prakash Chand & Ors., 1997 (6)
Suppl. SCR 1 = (1998) 1 SCC 1; State of Uttar Pradesh &
Ors. v. Neeraj Choubey and Ors. 2010 (11) SCR 542 = (2010)
B
10 sec 320
1.2. In the instant case, there is no dispute to the fact
that no order was passed by the Chief Justice of the High
Court or even the senior-most Judge, administratively
lncharge of the Lucknow Bench, transferring Writ Petition C
No. 11112011 for hearing from a Single Judge before
which it was pending, to the Division Bench of that Court.
On the basis of the allegations made in Writ Petition No.
111/2011, that matter had been listed before the Single
Judge. It does not appear to be apt exercise of jurisdiction o
by the Division Bench to suo motu direct transfer of Writ
Petition No. 111/2011 without leave of the Chief Justice,
as such action would ex facie amount to dealing with
matters relating to constitution and roster of Benches.
[para 28] [769-B-E] E
1.3. Transfer of a petition may not necessarily result
in lack of inherent jurisdiction. It may be an administrative
lapse but normally would not render the Division Bench
or court of competent jurisdiction as lacking inherent
jurisdiction and its orders being invalid ab initio. Such an F
order may necessarily not be vitiated in law, particularly,
when the parties participate in the proceedings without
any objection and protest. This, however, always will
depend on the facts and circumstances of a given case.
In the instant case, suffices it to note that transfer of Writ G
Petition No. 111/2011 by the Division Bench to its own
Board was an order lacking administrative judicial
propriety. [para 28] [769-F-H; 770-A]
H
738 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 9 S.C.R.
A 1.4. Compliance with the principle of audi alteram
partem and other allied principles of natural· justice is the
basic requirement of rule of law. In fact, it is the essence
of judicial and quasi-judicial functioning and, particularly,
the courts would not finally dispose of a matter without
8 granting notice and adequate hearing to the parties to the
lis. From the record, i.e. in the orders dated 4.3.2011 as
well as 7.3.2011 passed by the High Court, it has not been
specifically recorded nor is it implicitly clear that a notice
was directed to the petitioners in Writ Petition No.111/
2011 and they were given opportunity to address the
C court. Lack of clarity in this behalf does raise a doubt in
the mind of the court that the appellant did ~ot get a fair
opportunity to put forward his case before the Division
Bench. [para 23] (764-B-E] ·
D Abuse of the process of Court :
2.1. The cases of abuse of the process of court and
such allied matters have been arising before the courts
consistently. Some of the principles, emerging from
E various decisions are enumerated as follows:
(i) The people, who approach the court for relief
on an ex parte statement, are under a contract
with the court that they would state the whole
case fully and fairly to the court and where the
F litigant has broken such faith, the discretion of
the court cannot be exercised in favour of
such a litigant. (para 29(ii)] [770-D, G-H; 771-A]
(ii) The obligation to approach the court with
G clean hands is an absolute obligation and has
repeatedly been reiterated by this court. [para
29(iii)] [771-B]
(iii) A litigant who attempts to pollute the stream of
justice or who touches the pure fountain of
H
KISHORE SAMRITE v. STATE OF U.P. & ORS. 739
justice with tainted hands is not entitled to any A
relief, interim or final. [para 29(v)] [771-D]
(iv) The court must ensure that its process is not
abused and in order to prevent abuse of the
process the court, it would be justified even in 8
insisting on furnishing of security and in cases
of serious abuse, the court would be duty
bound to impose heavy costs. [para 29(vi)]
[771-E]
(v) Wherever a public interest is invoked, the court C
must examine the petition carefully to ensure
that there is genuine public interest involved.
The stream of justice should not be allowed to
be polluted by unscrupulous litigants. [para
29(vii)] [771-F] D
(vi) The court, especially the Supreme Court, has
to maintain strictest vigilance over the abuse
of the process of court and ordinarily
meddlesome bystanders should not be E
granted "visa". Many societal pollutants create
new problems of unredressed grievances and
the Court should endure to take cases where
the justice of the lis well-justifies it. [para
29(viii)] [771-G-H; 772-A]
F
2.2. It is the bounden duty of the court to ensure that
dishonesty and any attempt to surpass the legal process
must be effectively curbed and the court must ensure
that there is no wrongful, unauthorised or unjust gain to
anyone as a result of abuse of the process of the court. G
One way to curb this tendency is to impose realistic or
punitive costs. The legal maxim jure naturae aequum est
neminem cum a/terius detrimento et injuria fieri
/ocup/etiorem, means that it is a law of nature that one
should not be enriched by the loss or injury to another, H
740 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 9 S.C.R.
A is the percept for Courts. Wide jurisdiction of the court
should not become a source of abuse of the process of
law by the disgruntled litigant. Careful exercise is also
necessary to ensure that the litigation is genuine, not
motivated by extraneous considerations and imposes an
B obligation upon the litigant to disclose the true facts and
approach the court with clean hands. [para 32 and 34]
[773-F; 774-E-G]
P.S.R. Sadhanantham v. Arunachalam & Anr. (1980) 3
C SCC 141; K.D. Sharma v. Steel Authority of India Ltd. & Ors.
2008 (10) SCR 454 = (2008) 12 SCC 481; and Buddhi Kata
Subbarao (Dr.) v. K. Parasaran, 1996 (4) Suppl. SCR 574 =
(1996) 5 sec 530 - relied on
Da/ip Singh v. State of UP. & Ors. 2009 (16) SCR 111
D =(2010) 2 SCC 114; Amar Singh v. Union of India & Ors.
2011 (6) SCR 403 = (2011) 7 sec 69 and State of
Uttaranchal v Ba/want Singh Chaufal & Ors. 2010 (1) SCR
=
678 (2010) 3 SCC 402; Tilokchand H.B. Motichand & Ors.
v. Munshi & Anr. 1969 (1) SCC 110; A. Shanmugam v. Ariya
E Kshatriya Rajakula Vamsathu Mada/aya Nandhavana
Paripalanai Sangam & Anr. (2012) 6 SCC 430; Chandra
Shashi v. Anil Kumar Verma 1994 (5) Suppl. SCR 465 =
(1995) SCC 1 421; Abhyudya Sanstha v. Union of India &
Ors. 2011 (7) SCR .611 = (2011) 6 SCC 145; State of Madhya
F Pradesh v. Narmada Bachao Ando/an & Anr. 2011 (6) SCR
443 = (2011) 7 SCC 639; and Kalyaneshwari v. Union of India
=
& Anr. 2011 (1) SCR 894 (2011) 3 SCC 287) - referred to.
2.3. In the instant case, from the specific averments
made in both the writ petitions i.e. W.P. No. 111 of 2011
G and W.P. 125 of 2011, it is clear that next friends in both
the petitions are guilty of suppressing material facts,
approaching the court with unclean hands, filing petitions
with ulterior motive and finally for abusing the process
of the court. They have misled the courts by showing
H urgency and exigencies in relation to an incident of
KISHORE SAMRITE v. STATE OF U.P. & ORS. 741
3.12.2006 which, in fact, according to the three petitioners A
and the police was false. They maliciously and with
ulterior motives encroached upon the valuable time of the
court and wasted public money. The privilege of easy
access to justice has been abused by these persons by
filing frivolous and misconceived petitions. On the basis B
of incorrect and incomplete allegations, they had created
urgency for expeditious hearing of the petitions, which
never existed. Even this Court had to spend days to
reach at the truth. Prima facie it is clear that both these
persons have mis-stated the facts, withheld true facts and c
even gave false and incorrect affidavits. They knew well
that Courts are going to rely upon their pleadings and
affidavits while passing appropriate orders. The Director
General of Police, U.P., was required to file an affidavit and
CBI was directed to conduct investigation. Truth being 0
the basis of justice delivery system, it was important for
this Court to reach at the truth, which it has been able to
reach at with the able assistance of all the counsel. [para
37 and 45] [775-D; 779-G-H; 780-A-D]
2.4. The alleged incident which, according to the E
petitioners, police and the CBI, never happened and
illegal detention of the petitioners has been falsified by
the petitioners themselves in the writ petitions. It is a
matter of regret that the process of the court has been
abused by unscrupulous litigants just to attain publicity F
and adversely affect the reputation of another politician,
respondent No.6. One of the obvious reasons which can
reasonably be inferred from the peculiar facts and
circumstances of the case is the political rivalry. It is said
to be a case of political mudslinging. It has been rightly G
pointed out that the websites information was nothing
but secondary evidence, but not even an iota of evidence
has been placed on record of the writ petitions before the
High Court or even in the appeal before this Court, which
could show even the remotest possibility of happening H
742 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 9 S.C.R.
A of the alleged rape incident on 3.12.2006. The
methodology adopted by the next friends in the writ
petitions before the High Court was opposed to political
values and administration of justice. If such petitions are
not properly regulated and abuse averted, it becomes a
B tool in unscrupulous hands to release vendetta and
wreak vengeance as well. [para 51) [786-G-H; 787-A-G;
788-E-F)
Samant N. Balkrishna & Anr. v. V. George Fernandez
C and Ors. 1969 (3) SCR 603 = (1969) 3 sec 238 - relied on
Gosu Jayarami Reddy & Anr. v. State of Andhra Pradesh
2011 (9) SCR 503 = (2011) 11 SCC 766; Smt. Kiran Bedi v.
The Committee of Inquiry & Anr. 1989 (1) SCR 20 = (1989)
1 SCC 494; Nilgiris Bar Association v. T.K. Maha/ingam &
D Anr. 1997 (6) Suppl. SCR 246 =AIR 1998 SC 398; Kusum
Lata v. Union of India 2006 (3) Suppl. SCR 462 = (2006) 6
sec 180 - referred to.
2.5. This Court holds that the cases of both the
E petitioners suffered from falsehood, were misconceived
and were patent misuse of judicial process. Abuse of the
process of the court and not approaching the court with
complete facts and clean hands, has compelled this Court
to impose heavy and penal costs on the persons acting
as next friends in the writ petitions before the High Court.
F This Court cannot permit the judicial process to become
an instrument of oppression or abuse or to subvert
justice by unscrupulous litigants like the appellant and
respondent no. 8 in the instant case. [para 45) [780-D-F]
G 3.1. The question of locus standi would normally be
a question of fact and law both. Ordinarily, the party
aggrieved by any order has the right to seek relief by
questioning the legality, validity or correctness of that
order. There could be cases where a person is not
H directly affected but has some personal stake in the
KISHORE SAMRITE v. STATE OF U.P. & ORS. 743
outcome of a petition. In such cases, he may move the A
court as a guardian or next friend for and on behalf of the
disabled aggrieved party. Normally, a total stranger would
not act as next friend. There could be cases where a
public spirited person bonafidely brings petition in
relation to violation of fundamental rights, particularly in B
habeas corpus petitions, but even in such cases, the
person should have some demonstrable interest or
relationship to the involved persons, personally or for the
benefit of the public at large, in a PIL. But in all such
cases, it is essential that the petitioner must exhibit c
bonafides, by truthful and cautious exercise of such
right. The courts would be expected to examine such
requirement at the threshold of the litigation in order to
prevent abuse of the process of court. [para 46, 47 and
49) [780-G; 781-D-E; 784-B-D] D
Simranjit Singh Mann v. Union of India (1992) 4 SCC
=
653; S.P. Gupta v. Union of India AIR 1982 SCR 365 (1982)
SC 149; Karamjeet Singh v. Union of India 1992 (1) Suppl.
=
SCR 898 (1992) 4 SCC 666; Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary,
=
1992 (1) Suppl. SCR 226 (1992) 4 SCC 305; R & M Trust E
v. Koramangala Residents Vigilance Group 2005 (1) SCR
582 = (2005) 3 sec 91 - referred to.
3.2. In the instant case, both the appellant and
respondent No.8 are total strangers to the three F
mentioned petitioners. The appellant, in fact, is a resident
of Madhya Pradesh, belonging to a political party and was
elected an MLA in Madhya Pradesh. He has no roots in
Amethi and, in fact, he was a stranger to that place. The
appellant as well as respondent No.8 did not even know G
that the persons on whose behalf they have acted as
next friend had shifted their residence in the year 2010
to another district. They have made false averments in the
petition and have withheld true facts from the court. The
issue could be decided with reference to the given facts H
744 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 9 S.C.R.
A and not in isolation. They filed their respective writ
petitions before the High Court as next friends of the
three petitioners whose names have not been stated with
complete correctness in both the writ petitions. There has
been complete contradiction in the allegations made in
B the two writ petitions by the respective petitioners. It may
also be noticed that in both the writ petitions, baseless
allegations in regard to the alleged incident of 3.12.2006,
involving respondent rio.6, had also been raised. [para 46
and 49] [780-H; 781-A-C; 784-0-F]
c Charanjit Lal Chowdhury v. The Union of India & Ors.
1950 SCR 869 =AIR 1951 SC 41 - referred to
3.3. It is not a case of a mere third person moving the
court simpliciter on behalf of persons under alleged
D detention. It is a case of definite improprietory abuse of
process of court, justice and is a motivated attempt
based on falsehood to misguide the court and primarily
for publicity or political vendetta. More so, the petitioners
in the writ petitions have categorically stated that they
E made no complaint of the alleged incident of 3.12.2006
and never authorised, requested or approached either of
the appellant or respondent no. 8 to move the court for
redressal of any grievance. The question of filing habeas
corpus petitions on their behalf would not arise because
F they were living at their own house and enjoying all
freedoms. According to them, they were detained by none
at any point of time either by respondent No.6 or the
Police authorities. In the face of this definite stand taken
by these persons, the question of locus standi has to be
G answered against both the appellant and respondent no.
8. In fact, it is not only abuse of the process of the court
but also is a case of access to justice unauthorisedly and
illegally. Their whole modus operandi would be
unacceptable in law. Thus, this Court holds on the facts
H of the instant case that both the appellant and respondent
KISHORE SAMRITE v. STATE OF U.P. & ORS. 745
no. 8 had no locus standi to approach the High Court in A
the manner and method in which they did. (ppra 50) (785-
B-G)
4. As regards the plea that a petition for habeas
corpus is not struck by the rule of res judicata or 8
constructive res judicata, suffice it to note that the
judgment of the Allahabad High Court dated 17.4.2009 in
Civil Writ Petition 3719 of 2009 had attained finality as the
legality or correctness thereof was not challenged by any
person. There can hardly be any doubt that upon
pronouncement of this judgment this case squarely fell C
in the public domain and was obviously known to both
the petitioners but they did not even consider it
necessary to mention the same in their respective writ
petitions. (para 50) [785-G; 786-B-D]
D
Ghulam Sarwar v. Union of India 1967 SCR 271 =AIR
1967 SC 1335 and Kirli Kumar Chaman Lal Kundaliya v.
Union of India AIR 1981 SC 1621; Re: Shri Sham Lal 1978
(2) SCR 581 = (1978) 2 sec 479 cited
E
5.1. 'Reputation' is an element of personal security
and is protected by Constitution equally with the right to
enjoyment of life, liberty and property. In light of the legal
principles, the. appellant and, in fact, to a great extent
even respondent No.8 have made an attempt to hurt the
reputation and image of respondent no.6 by stating
F
incorrect facts, that too, by abusing the process of court.
[para 51-52) [788-B-C; G]
5.2. However, imposition of such heavy costs upon
the petitioner in W.P. No. 111 of 2011 as was imposed by G
the High Court, was not called for in the facts and
circumstances of the case as the Court was not dealing
with a suit for damages but with a petition for habeas
corpus, even if the petition was not bona fide.
Furthermore, the manner in which the costs imposed H
746 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 9 S.C.R.
A were ordered to be disbursed to the different parties can
also not be approved. Moreover, the question of paying
rewards to the Director General of Police does not arise
as the police and the Director General of Police were only
performing their duties by producing the petitioners in the
s Court, who, in any case, were living in their own house
without restriCtion or any kind of detention by anyone. In
fact, the three petitioners have been compulsorily
dragged to the court in Writ Petition No. 125/2011. They
had made no complaint to any person and thus, the
C question of their illegal detention and consequential
release would not arise. These three petitioners have
been used by both the appellant and respondent no. 8
and it is, in fact, they are the ones whose reputation has
suffered a serious setback and were exposec1 to
inconvenience of being dragged to courts for no fault of
0
their own. Certainly, the reputation of respondent no.6
has also been damaged, factually and in law. [para 53]
[789-8-F]
5.3. Therefore, the order under appeal cannot be
E sustained in its entirety and is modified as follows:
(i) Writ petition No. 111 /2011 was based upon
falsehood, was abuse of the process of court
and was driven by malice and political
F vendetta. The exemplary costs of Rs. 5 lacs is
imposed upon the next friend, costs being
payable to respondent no.6.
(ii) The next friend in Writ Petition No. 125/2011
had approached the court with unclean hands,
G without disclosing complete facts and
misusing the judicial process. In fact, he filed
the petition without any proper authority, in
fact and in law. Costs of Rs. 5 lakhs is imposed
upon next friend for abuse of the process of
H the court and/or for such other offences that
KISHORE SAMRITE v. STATE OF U.P. & ORS. 747
they are found to have been committed, which A
shall be payable to the three petitioners
produced before the High Court.
(iii) On the basis of the affidavit filed by the
Director General of Police, U.P., statement of 8
the three petitioners in the writ petition, CBl's
stand before the Court, its report and the
contradictory stand taken by the next friend in
Writ Petition No.111/2011, this Court is, prima
facie, of the view that the allegations against C
respondent no.6 in regard to the alleged
incident of rape on 3.12.2006 and the alleged
detention of the petitioners, are without
substance and there is not even an iota of
evide.nce before the Court to validly form an
opinion to the contrary. In fact, as per the D
petitioners (allegedly detained persons), they
were never detained by any person at any
point of time.
(iv) The CBI shall continue the investigation in E
furtherance of the direction of the High Court
against the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 111 /
2011 and all other persons responsible for the
abuse of the process of court, making false
statement in pleadings, filing false affidavits F
and committing such other offences as the
investigating agency may find during
investigation. The CBI shall submit its report
to the court of competent jurisdiction as
expeditiously as possible. [para 54) [789-G-H; G
790-A-H; 791-A-B]
Case Law Reference:
1997 (6) Suppl. SCR 1 relied on para 24
2010 (11) SCR 542 relied on para 26 H
748 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 9 S.C.R.
A 2009 (16) SCR 111 relied on para 29
2011 (6) SCR 403 relied on para 29
2010 (1) SCR 678 relied on para 29
(1980) 3 sec 141 relied on para 30
B
1969 (1) sec 110 referred to para 33
2012 (6) sec 430 referred to para 33
1994 (5) Suppl. SCR 465 referred to para 33
c
2011 (7) SCR 611 referred to para 33
2011 (6) SCR 443 referred to para 33
2011 (1) SCR 894 referred to para 33
D 2008 (10) SCR 454 relied on para 35
1996 (4) Suppl. SCR 574 relied on para 36
(1992) 4 sec 653 referred to para 47
E 1982 SCR 365 referred to para 47
1992 (1) Suppl. SCR 898 referred to para 47
1992 (1) Suppl. SCR 226 referred to para 48
2005 (1) SCR 582 referred to para 47
F
1950 SCR 869 referred to para 50
1978 (2) SCR 581 cited para 50
1967 SCR 271 cited para 50
G
AIR 1981 SC 1621 cited para 50
1969 (3) SCR 603 relied on para 51
2011 (9) SCR 503 referred to para 51
H 1989 (1) SCR 20 referred to para 51
KISHORE SAMRITE v. STATE OF U.P. & ORS. 749
1997 (6) Suppl. SCR 246 referred to para 51 A
2006 (3) Suppl. SCR 462 referred to para 51
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
No. 1406 of 2012.
B
From the Judgment & Order dated 07.03.2011 of the High
Court of Allahabad at Lucknow in WP No. 111of 2011.
Harin P. Raval, ASG, P.P. Rao, Rakesh Diwedi, S.P.
Singh, K.T.S.. Tulsi, Gaurav Bhatia, AAG, Kamini Jaiswal,
Asbhimanue Shrestha, S.M. Royekwar, R.K. Shukla, Ajay C
Singh, Kr. Prashant, Mahalakshmi Pavani, G. Balaji, Rajiv
Nanda, P.K. Dey, B.V. Bairam Das, Arvind Kumar, Sharma,
Mohd. Fuzail Khan, Gaurav Dhingra, V.K. Biju, Sadhana
Sandhu, Sunit Sharma, Anil Katiyar, Subramonium Prasad, Raj
Kamal, Kuber Boddh for the Appearing Parties. D
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
SWATANTER KUMAR, J. 1. Challenge in the present
appeal is to the order dated 7th March, 2011 passed by a
Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad E
(Lucknow Bench). The operative part of the order reads as
under:
"In view of all the aforesaid and particularly for the reasons
that the writ petition No.111 (H/C) of 2011 was filed on the F
instructions of Kishor Samrite (who has also sworn the
affidavit in support of the writ petition) which contained wild
allegations/insinuation against Shri Rahul Gandhi and
questions the virtue and modesty of a young girl of 22 years
Km. Kirti Singh, we dismiss this writ petition with a cost G
of Rs.50,00,000/- (Fifty lacs). Out of the cost amount,
Rs.25,00,000/- (Twenty five lacs) shall be paid to Km. Kirti
Singh and Rs.20,00,000/- (Twenty lacs) to Shri Rahul
Gandhi, opposite part no.6. The cost amount shall
bedeposited within a period of one month with the H
750 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 9 S.C.R.
A Registrar of this Court, failing which the Registrar shall
take necessary action for recovery of the amount as land
revenue.
We also record our special note of appreciation for
Shri Karamveer Singh.Director General of police, U.P. (a
B
highly decorated police officer), for producing the alleged
detenues within the time frame as directed in the order.
Thus, for all thepromptness and sincerity shown, in themidst
of serious law and order problems all over the State on
account of some agitation in obeying and complying with
c the directions, we direct payment of Rs.5,00,000/- (five
lacs) towards a reward to the DGP. We also record our
appreciation for Shri Jyotindra Misra, learned Advocate
General and the State Government for showing concern
in this matter.
D
We also direct the Director, Central Bureau of
Investigation, to register case against Kishor Samrite, the
websites referred to in Writ Petition No.111 (H/C) of 2011
and all other persons who are found involved in the plot, if
E any, hatched in order to frame up Shri Rahul Gandhi,
Member of Parliament from Amethi. We also appreciate
Shri Gajendra Pal singh, author of Writ Petition No.125(H/
C) of 2011 for approaching this Court in order to save the
reputation of Shri Rahul Gandhi and the family of alleged
F detenues at the hands of vested interests responsible for
filing Writ Petition No.111 (H/C) of 2011.
Till the investigation continues and the websites in
question are not cleared by the CBI, their display in India
shall remain banned. The Director, CBI, shall ensure
G compliance of this order forthwith. He shall also prepare
a list of such other websites which are involved in display
of scandalous informations about the functionaries holding
high public offices and submit a report in respect thereof
on the next date of hearing.
H
KISHORE SAMRITE v. STATE OF U.P. & ORS. 751
[SWATANTER-KUMAR, J.]
Thus, writ petition No.125 (H/C) of 2011 is partly A
disposed of to the extent insofar as it relates to production
of the alleged detenues. However, it shall remain pending
in respect of notice issued to the Registrar General
Allahabad High Court and for the submission of report by
the CBI as directed hereinabove. The matter shall remain B
part heard.
List the matter on 11.04.2011 for further hearing.
The Registrar of this Court shall issue copy of this
order to all the concerned parties including the Director, C
Central Bureau of Investigation, for immediate
compliance."
2. Challenge to the above impugned order, inter alia, but
primarily is on the following grounds : D
(i) The Court could not have called for the records of
Writ Petition No.111 of 2011. Consequently it
lacked inherent jurisdiction to deal with and decide
the said writ petition. Furthermore, no order was
passed by the competent authority, i.e., the Chief E
Justice of the High Court transferring that writ
petition to the Bench dealing with Writ Petition
No.125 of 2011.
(ii) The Bench showed undue haste and has not dealt F
with Writ Petition No.125 of 2011 in accordance
with the prescribed procedure.
(iii) The order was passed without notice and grant of
appropriate hearing to the present appellant.
G
(iv) The orders for imposition of cost and registration
of a case against the appellant by the CBI are
uncalled for and in any case are unjust and
disproportionate as per the known canons of law.
H
752 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 9 S.C.R.
A 3. Stands on merits is that Writ Petition Ne.125 of 2011
was, in fact and in law, not a petition for habeas corpus and,
thus, could not have been entertained and dealt with by a
Division Bench of that Court. The said petition primarily related
to transfer of a petition though in the garb of a prayer for
B production of the corpus. It did not satisfy the pre-requisites of
a petition of habeas corpus.
4. Writ Petition No.111 of 2011, even if not complete in
its form, was maintainable and the same could not have been
dismissed by the Court as the prayer by the appellant in that
C writ petition for habeas corpus was maintainable in view of the
right to life and liberty of the petitioners stated therein, as
enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution of India, was violated.
The petition had been filed by the appellant as next friend and
had not seen the alleged detenues since 4 th January, 2007
D when they were last seen in Amethi. According to the appellant
the representations made to various authorities had failed to
yield any results. Thus, that petition was not liable to be
dismissed.
E 5. To the contra, it is contended on behalf of the State of
Uttar Pradesh that :
(i) The Writ Petition No.111 of 2011 was an abuse of
the process of Court. The appellant had not
approached the Court with clean hands as the facts
F as were pleaded by him were not correct to the
knowledge of the appellant.
(ii) The petition was mala fide and even the affidavit
of the appellant was not in conformity with the
G prescribed procedure.
(iii) The averments made in the affidavit and in the other
documents were contradictory in terms.
(iv) The appellant was neither the next friend of the
H
KISHORE SAMRITE v. STATE OF U.P. & ORS. 753
[SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
stated petitioners (in Writ Petition No.111 of 2011) A
nor was he competent to institute such a petition.
Moreover, the petition itself did not satisfy the basic
ingredients of a petition for habeas corpus.
(v) In view of the dismissal of the Writ P_etition No.3719 B
of 2009 by the same High Court and its non-
mentioning by the petitioner in Writ Petition No.111
of 2011, besides being suppressioi:i of material
facts was hit by the principles of res judicata.
(vi) Writ Petition No.111 of 2011 had been rightly C
transferred by the Division Bench and its dismissal
and imposition of costs was in proper exercise of
jurisdiction.
(vii) Lastly, it is contended that the next friend had given o
fictitious addresses of the petitioners which are
different than the ones given in the present appeal.
6. On behalf of Respondent No.6, Shri Rahul Gandhi, it
was contended that Writ Petition No.111 of 2011 is an. abuse
of the process of Court and, in fact, is a motivated petition E
primarily based on 'political mudslinging'. While supporting the
stand of Respondent No. 1, the State of Uttar Pradesh, it is also
contendee:l that the appellant, Shri Kishore Samrite, was a total
stranger, had no knowledge of the facts ar:id, therefore, had no
right to file the petition as next friend. It was not a case of private F
detention and the petition filed by the appellant was not in
conformity with the rules. The petition was primarily aimed at
hurting the reputation and image of respondent No.6 out of
ulterior motives and political vendetta.
G
7. According to Respondent No. 7, the Central Bureau of
Investigation (for short "CBI"), it had investigated the matter and
found that it was not a case of detention and, therefore, petition
for habeas corpus was nol maintainable. It had, in furtherance
to the order of the Court, registered a case on 11th March, H
754 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 9 S.C.R.
A 2011 being RC No.219-2011-(E)2002 under Sections 120B,
181, 191, 211, 469, 499 and 500 of the Indian Penal Code,
1860 (IPC). The CBI could not complete the investigation
because of the order of stay passed by this Court on 6 th April,
2011. From the limited investigation which was conducted
B during that period and from the statement of Shri Bairam Singh
and other witnesses, it came to light that nothing had happened
on 3 rd December, 2006 as alleged by the appellant. In fact,
the persons and the addresses given in the petition were found
to be fictitious and non-existent. Shri Bairam Singh had not
c supported the version advanced by the appellant. On the
contrary, he had belied the entire version and categorically
denied the allegations and informed that the name of his wife
and daughter were incorrectly mentioned as Smt. Sushila and
Sukanya Devi. In regard to the website, CBI stated that the three
suspected websites were posted outside the geographical
0
limits of our country and the originating IP address could not
. be traced and further investigation had to be stopped.
It was specifically contended on behalf of the CBI that the
appellant had made no enquiry, had no personal knowledge
E and that the litigation had been funded from sources other than
appellant's own sources.
8. Lastly, Respondent No.8 in this appeal, Shri Gajendra
Pal Singh, who was the petitioner in Writ Petition No.125 of
F 2011, has stated that he had filed that petition bona fidely while
Writ Petition No.111 of 2011 was based upon a false affidavit,
public justice system has been abused by the petitioner in that
case and he has committed perjury. According to Respondent
No.8, Writ Petition No.125 of 2011 was necessitated and he
G had the right to file the habeas corpus petition as next friend of
the petitioners stated therein.
9. As is evident from the varied stand taken by the
respective parties, they are not ad idem in regard to the factual
matrix of the case. The facts as they emerge from the record
H
KISHORE SAMRITE v. STATE OF U.P. & ORS. 755
[SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
before this Court can usefully be noticed as follows: - A
10. The appellant, Shri Kishore Sam rite, an ex-member of
legislative assembly of Madhya Pradesh, elected on the ticket
of Samajwadi Party from the legislative constituency of Tehsil
Langi in District Balaghat, Madhya Pradesh, instituted a Writ B
Petition in the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad being Writ
Petition No. 111 /2011 acting as next friend of one Sukanya
Devi, Bairam Singh and Sumrita Devi. Address of all these
three persons was given as 23-12, Medical Chowk, Sanjay
Gandhi Marg, Chhatrapati Shahu Ji Mahraj Nagar, Uttar C
Pradesh. According to the appellant, these three persons were
kept in illegal detention by the respondent no.6 and were
incapacitated to file the writ petition. It was averred in the
petition filed by him before the High Court that he came to know
from certain websites viz., www.indybay.org,
www.arizona.indymedia.org and www.intellibriefs.blogspot.com, D
which contained news items stating that on the night of 3 rd
December, 2006, while on a tour of his parliamentary
constituency in Amethi, respondent no.6, along with six of his
friends (two from Italy and four from Britain) committed rape on
Sukanya Devi, daughter of Bairam Singh. The appellant placed E
the said news reports on record along with the writ petition.
11. The writ petition also contained the averment that
Bairam Singh is a congress worker in Amethi constituency and
Sukanya Devi along with Sumitra Devi wanted to report the said F
incident but the concerned authorities did not lodge the
complaint. They approached various other authorities but to no
avail. The appellant specifically averred that he had not seen
all the three persons in public for a long time, particularly since
4 th January, 2007, when they were last seen in Amethi. He G
claims to have visited Amethi to verify these facts and also a
couple of times thereafter. Lastly, on 12th December, 2010, he
visited the place where all the three persons lived, but found
the same locked. The incident was reported to various
authorities, including the Chief Minister, the Home Minister,
H
756 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 9 S.C.R.
A Chief Secretary of the State, Governor and the other authorities
of the State. The only communication he received was from the
office of the Governor wherein it was said that his application
had been sent to the State Government for proper action.
Invoking the right to life and liberty as enshrined under Article
B 21 of the Constitution of India on behalf of the three named
petitioners in the writ petition and alleging that respondent No.6
would influence any fruitful investigation, the appellant prayed
for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus commanding the
opposite party particularly respondent No.6 to produce the
c petitioners before the Court and for passing any other
appropriate order or direction.
12. Before we refer to the events subsequent to the filing
of the Writ Petition no.111/2011, it must be noticed that a
person named Ram Prakash Shukla, a practising advocate at
D Lucknow, who claimed himself to be a human rights activist and
a public spirited person had earlier instituted a writ petition on
the same facts being Writ Petition No. 3719/2009 tilted as Ram
Prakash Shukla v. Union of India and Ors. He also stated that
he had got information from the internet website about the rape
E of Ms. Sukanya Devi in the evening of 3rd December, 2006
and no action was being taken on the basis of the said report.
He further stated that congress men had threatened to kill both,
Smt. Sumitra Devi and Sukanya Devi, if they raised the issue.
According to him they had stayed at Delhi for over a fortnight
F to meet the authorities which they ultimately could not. It was
stated that they are missing since then and were not traceable.
On the basis of the news report, though an offence under
Section 376 of the IPC was made out, yet no FIR was being
registered by the authorities. In that writ petition, Ram Prakash
G Shukla had made the following prayers: -
"(i) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of
Mandamus commanding the opposite parties nos. 1 to 4
to ensure the lodging of the F. l.R. and to refer it for
investigation to independent agency like S.l.T or C.B.I.
H
KISHORE SAMRITE v. STATE OF U.P. & ORS. 757
[SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
(ii) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of Habeas A
Corpus commanding the respondents nos. 1 to 4 to search
and produce the Ms. Sukanya Devi, her mother Smt.
Sumitra Devi, her father Bairam Singh as well as
Videographer Mr. Drupadh and the CNN-IBN Cameramen
before this Hon'ble Court. B
(iii) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of
Mandamus directing the respondents nos. 5 & 6 (the
Human Right Commission) and the National Commission
for Women) to submit the report of the investigation if any, C
done by them on the complaint lodged by Ms. Sukanya
Devi.
(iv) Issue any other order or directions which this Hon'ble
Court may deem fit and proper under the facts and
circumstances of the case in favour of the petitioner in the D
interest of justice.
(v) Allow the cost of the writ petition in favour of the
petitioner."
.
13. This writ petition was heard by a Division Bench of the E
Allahabad High Court at Lucknow and was dismissed by a
detailed judgement dated April 17th, 2009. The Court
specifically noticed that before passing a direction for lodging
of an FIR, the Court is required to see that the pleadings are
absolutely clear, specific and precise and that they make out F
a charge or criminal offence,, which prima facie is supported
by cogent and reliable evidence and that the State machinery
has failed to ·take appropriate .action in accordance with law
for no valid reason. In absence thereof, the Court cannot issue
such a direction. The Court recorded its complete G
dissatisfaction about the correctness of the allegations made
in the writ petition as they were not supported by any reliable
or cogent evidence. The Court, while declining to grant the
reliefs prayed for, dismissed the writ petition. The operative part
of the judgment reads as under : H
758 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 9 S.C.R.
A "So far the petitioner's plea that the respondents may be
required fo inform the court, whether any such incident had
taken place or not, suffice would be to mention that in the
absence of clear and precise pleadings with no supporting
evidence, the Court will not make any roving and fishing
B enquiry.
The writ petition does not make any case for grant
of the rnliefs claimed.
The writ Petition has not force, which is being
C dismissed."
14. It may be noticed that Writ Petition No. 3719 of 2009
itself was instituted in the year 2009 nearly three years after the
alleged news and was dismissed vide order dated 17th April,
D 2009. It was in the beginning of the year 2011 that the present
appellant instituted Writ Petition No.111 of 2011 in the
Allahabad High Court. The latter writ petition was filed by the
appellant herein as next friend of the three petitioners, namely,
Sukanya Devi, Bairam Singh and Sumitra Devi, all residents
E of 23/12, Medical Chowk, Sanjay Gandhi Marg, Chhatrapati
Shahu Ji Maharaj Nagar, Uttar Pradesh relying upon the
website news relating to the alleged occurrence of 2006 and
making the same allegations, including illegal detention of the
petitioners by resp?ndent No.6, and praying as follows :
F "WHEREFOR, it is most humbly prayed that this Hon'ble
Court may be pleased to
1. Issue a writ of or writ .. order or direction in the nature
of habeas corpus commanding the opposite
parties, particularly opposite party No.6, to produce
G
the petitioners before this Hon'ble Court and set
them at liberty.
2. Issue any other order or direction which it deems
fit and proper in the present circumstances, in
H
KISHORE SAMRITE v. STATE OF U.P. & ORS. 759
[SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
favour of the petitioners, in the interest of justice. A
3. Award the cost of Petition to the petitioners."
15. This Writ petition was listed before a Single Judge of
the Allahabad High Court who, vide order dated 1 st March,
2011 directed issuance of notice to respondent No.6 to submit B
his reply. The matter was to be listed before the Court after
service of notice. During the pendency of this writ petition,
respondent No. 8, Shri Gajendra Pal Singh, again acting as
next friend of Sukanya Devi, Shri Bairam Singh and Smt.
Sumitra Devi @ Mohini Devi, all residents of Ward No.5, near C
Gurudwara, Town Area Amethi District, Chhatrapati Shahu Ji
Maharaj Nagar, Uttar Pradesh filed Writ Petition No.125 of 2011
on 4th March, 2011 stating that a false writ petition No.111 of
2011 was filed by Shri Kishore Samrite as next friend and that
it was politically motivated to harm the reputation of the opposite D
party. Further that Shri Kishore Samrite was neither the next
friend of the petitioners in that petition nor had any interest in
the liberty of those petitioners. Respondent No. 8, Shri Gajendra
Pal Singh claimed to be a neighbour of Shri Bairam Singh,
father of Sukanya and husband of Smt. Sumitra @ Mohini Devi. - E
According to him, when the three petitioners in Writ Petition
No.125 of 2011 were not seen in their house for some time,
he approached the Police Station, Amethi, to lodge a complaint
but the police authorities refused to file/register the complaint
on the ground that the petitioners were in custody of police as F
they had committed some wrong. Seeing that right to life and
liberty of the petitioners was involved, he prayed for the following
refliefs :
"Wherefor it is most respectfully prayed that this
Hon'ble Court may· kindly be pleased to : G
a. Issue a writ or writ order or direction in the nature
of habeas corpus commanding the opposite
parties to produce the petitioner before this Hon'ble
Court and set them at Liberty. H
760 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 9 S.C.R.
A b. To call the record of Writ Petition No.111 H.C. of
2011 and connect with this present Writ Petition.
The order passed in Writ Petition. The order
passed in Writ Petition No.111 H.C. of 2011 be
reviewed and recalled.
B
c. To order the investigation by the appropriate
agency.
d. Issue any other order or direction which is deemed
fit and proper in the present circumstances in favour
c of the petitioners, in the interest of justice.
e. Award the cost of the petition to the petitioner.
16. This petition was taken up by a Division Bench of the
D Allahabad High Court and the Court passed the following order
on 4th March, 2011 :
"In view of all the aforesaid, we direct that the records of
Writ Petition No.111 (H/C) of 2011, said to be pending
before a learned Single Judge, shall be connected with this
E writ petition. Besides, we also direct that the Director
General of Police, U.P., shall produce the petitioners, in
particular, Sukanya Devi, on the next date of hearing i.e.
7.3.2011. However, we make it clear that this direction to
the Director General of Police, U.P., shall not be construed
F to mean that the detenu is in illegal custody of State
authorities and the Director General of Police, U.P., in this
case shall function ·only as an officer of the Court for the
purpose of production of detenu."
17. The Court directed transfer of Writ Petition No.111 of
G 2011 and directed tagging of the same with Writ Petition
No.125 of 2011, besides issuing notice to the Director General
of Police, U.P. to produce the petitioners on 7th March, 2011.
In Writ Petition No.125 of 2011, the Director General of Police
filed a personal affidavit. According to him, the Superintendent
H of Police, Chhatrapati Shahu Ji Maharaj Nagar, while noticing
KISHORE SAMRITE v. STATE OF U.P. & ORS. 761
[SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
the allegations made in both the writ petitions reported that the A
address mentioned in Writ Petition No.111 of 2011 was wrong
and there was no such place in the town of Amethi with the
name of Medical Chowk, Sanjay Gandhi Marg and the address
mentioned in Writ Petition no.125 of 2011 was the correct
address of Shri Bairam Singh who lived there in the past. On B
3rd December, 2007, Bairam Singh had sold the plot, which
was in the name of his wife, Smt. Sushila Singh, to one Smt.
Rekha and, thereafter he himself shifted to village Hardoia,
Police Station Kumar Ganj, District Faizabad. Even the house
adjacent to the plot was sold off by Bairam Singh to Dr. Vikas c
Shukla who was residing at the said village with his entire family.
It was staled that Bairam Singh was living in Village Hardoia
with his wife and four children, three daughters and one son.
Name of their eldest daughter is Kumari Kirti Singh, aged
about 21 years. She had passed her B.Sc. examination in the D
year 2009-2010. Bairam Singh had stated to the police that he
knew Gajendra Pal Singh but did not know Kishore Samrite.
According to this affidavit, Bairam Singh also informed the
police that in the year 2006 some men claiming to be media
persons had come to his house in Amethi and asked his wife E
after showing photograph of Sukanya Devi, if she was her
daughter. Upon this, his wife produced their daughter before
them and told them that the girl in the photograph was different
than their daughter. Further, Bairam Singh also stated to the
police that they had never authorised any advocate or anybody
else to institute any writ petition in the court. In this very affidavit, F
in regard to the incident of 3rd December, 2006, the DGP has
referred to the following statement of Bairam Singh :
"It has also been stated by Sri Bairam Singh that neither
he nor his wife Sushila Singh nor daughter Kirti Singh has G
ever made any allegation either on 03.12.2006 or before
or after that against Shri Rahul Gandhi or anybody else;
nor any writ petition has been preferred in the Hon'ble High
Court making any kind of allegations. He has never
authorised any Advocate or anybody else to institute any H
762 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 9 S.C.R.
A writ petition."
18. The Ration Card and Pan Card of Bairam Singh was
produced during investigation. It is also noticed that Sukanya
and Kirti, the name mentioned in Writ Petition No.125 of 2011
B partially matches the particulars of daughter of Bairam Singh
and they have no relation whatsoever to any of the next friend
in either of the writ petition. Shri Bairam Singh, Kumari Kirti
Singh and Smt. Sushila Singh, all three were produced by he
Director General of Police in Court.
C 19. When the Writ Petition No.125 of 2011 came up for
hearing before the Court on 7 th March, 2011., the Division
Bench passed the detailed order impu_gned in the present
appeal. Vide this order, Writ Petition No.111 ~f 2011 was
disposed of while Writ Petition No.125 of 2011 was partly
D disposed of and, as aforenoticed, Director of CBI was directed
to register a case against Shri Kishore Samrite and all other
persons involved in the plot. The Court also imposed cost of
Rs.50,00,000/- which was to be distributed as per the order.
The contention raised was that the counsel appearing for the
E petitioner in Writ Petition No.111 of 2011 was not given the
opportunity of hearing by the Bench before passing the
impugned order and, in fact, the counsel was standing in the
Court when the order was being dictated.
20. At this stage, we may also notice that according to the
F appellant, he was not aware of Writ Petition No.3719 of 2009
having been filed or the orders passed by the Bench thereupon.
The appellant has also stated that there was no urgency for
taking up the matter on that very day and, in any case, Writ
Petition No.111 /11 could not have been transferred by that
G Bench. The appellant in the present appeal has even gone to
the extent of saying that the girl Kumari Kirti Singh has been
implanted in place of Sukanya Devi and even the name of the
mother has been wrongly described. No notice is stated to
have been given to the petitioner in Writ Petition No.111 of
H
KISHORE SAMRITE v. STATE OF U.P. & ORS. 763
[SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
2011. It is contended that.the Writ Petition No.111 of 11 had A
been filed in consonance with the proviso to Rule 1(2) of
Chapter XXI of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952 under
which habeas corpus against a private person was
maintainable and could be listed before a Single Judge.
Allegations have been made in Writ Petition No.125 of 11 B
calling the present appellant, petitioner in Writ Petition No.111
of 2011, as mentally challenged. The Division Bench dealing
with Writ Petition No. 125 of 2011 could not have dealt with Writ
Petition No.111 of 2011 and could not have exercised its
appellate jurisdiction. The cost imposed upon the appellant is c
exorbitant and without any basis.
21. In the background of the above factual matrix and the
stand taken by the respective parties, we shall now proceed
to examine the contentions raised before the Court by the
learned counsel appearing for the parties. For this purpose, we D
would deal with various aspects of the case under different
heads.
(1) Whether there was violation of Principles of
Natural Justice and whether transfer of Writ E
Petition No. 111/2011 was in accordance with
law?
22. It is contended that the impugned order dated 7th
March, 2011 has been passed in violation of the principles of
F
natural justice. No adequate opportunity was granted to the
present appellant to put forward his case. The Writ Petition No.
111/2011 had been transferred to the Division Bench without
even issuing notice to the appellant. The order dated 4 th
March, 2011 had not directed issuance of notice. It is only vide
order dated 7th March, 2011 that the Registrar of the High G
Court was directed to issue copy of the order to all the
concerned parties for immediate compliance. Absence of
notice and non-grant of adequate hearing has caused serious
prejudice to the appellant and the order is liable to be set aside
on this sole ground. It is also contended that the appellant's H
764 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 9 S.C.R.
A counsel was present only when the order was being dictated
and had no notice of the hearing. On the contrary, the contention
on behalf of Respondent No. 1, State of Uttar Pradesh, and
other parties is that the counsel for the appellant was present
and had due notice of hearing of the Writ Petitions No. 125/
B 2011 and 111/2011 and as such there was neither any violation
of the principles of natural justice nor has any prejudice been
caused to the appellant.
23. Compliance with the principle of audi alteiam partem
and other allied principles of natural justice is the basic
C requirement of rule of law. In fact, it is the essence of judicial
and quasijudicial functioning, and particularly the Courts would
not finally dispose of a matter without granting notice and
adequate hearing to the parties to the lis. From the record, i.e.
in the orders dated 4th March, 2011 as well as 7th March, 2011
D it has not been specifically recorded nor is it implicitly clear that
a notice was directed to the petitioners in Writ Petition No.111/
2011 and they were given opportunity ta address the Court.
Lack of clarity in this behalf does raise a doubt in the mind of
the Court that the appellant did not get a fair opportunity to put
E forward his case before the Division Bench. The fact that we
have issued notice to all the concerned parties in both the Writ
Petitions bearing nos.125/2011 and 111/2011, have heard
them at great length and propose to deal with and dispose of
both these writ petitions in accordance with law, renders it
F unnecessary for this Court to examine this aspect of the matter
in any further detail. Suffice it to note that we have heard the
counsel appearing for the parties on all aspects including
maintainability, jurisdiction as well as merits of both the
petitions, which issues we shall shortly proceed to deal with
G hereinafter. Thus, this submission of the appellant need not
detain us any further.
24. From the above narrated facts it is clear that a petition
for habeas corpus (Writ Petition No. 111 /2011) had been filed
H by the present appellant while referring to the news on the
KISHORE SAMRITE v. STATE OF U.P. & ORS. 765
[SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
website in relation to the incident dated 3rd December, 2006 A
(in paragraphs 3 and 4) to the effect that since the petitioners,
because of their illegal detention by private opposite party no.6
are incapacitated to file the instant writ petition and also that
those petitioners were in illegal detention of the private opposite
party no.6 and they have not been seen since 4th January, 2007. B
This writ petitionwas treated as private habeas corpus and was
listed before a Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court. Rule
1 of Chapter XXI of the Allahabad High Court Rules provided
that an application under Article 226 of the Constitution for a
writ in the nature of habeas corpus, except against private c
custody, if not sent by post or telegram, shall be made to the
Division Bench appointed to receive applications or on any day
on which no such Bench is sitting, to the Judge appointed to
receive applications in civil matters. In the latter case, the Judge
shall direct that the application be laid before a Division Bench D
for orders. In terms of proviso to this Rule, it is provided that
an application under Article 226 of the Constitution in the nature
of habeas corpus directed against private custody shall be
made to the Single Judge appointed by the Chief Justice to
receive such an application. The clear analysis of the above
E
Rule shows that habeas corpus against a private custody has
to be placed before a Single Judge while in the case of custody
other than private custody, the matter has to be placed before
a Division Bench. It appears that on the strength of this Rule,
Writ Petition No. 111/2011 was listed before the Single Judge
of Allahabad High Court. The roster and placing of cases F
before different Benches of the High Court is unquestionably
the prerogative of the Chief Justice of that Court. In the High
Courts, which have Principal and other Benches, there is a
practice and as per rules, if framed, that the seniormost Judge
at the Benches, other than the Principal Bench, is normally G
permitted to exercise powers of the Chief Justice, as may be
delegated to the senior most Judge. In absence of the Chief
Justice, the senior most Judge would pass directions in regard
to the roster of Judges and listing of cases. Primarily, it is the
exclusive prerogative of the Chief Justice and does not admit H
766 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 9 S.C.R.
A . any ambiguity or doubt in this regard. Usefully we can refer to
some judgments of this Court where such position has been
clearly stated by this Court. In the case of State of Rajasthan
v.Prakash Chand & Ors., (1998) 1 SCC 1, a three-Judge
Bench of this Court was dealing with the requirement of
B constitution of Benches, issuance of daily cause list and the
powers of the Chief Justice in terms of the Rajasthan High Court
Ordinance, 1949 read with Article 225 of the Constitution of
India. The Court held as under: -
"10. A careful reading of the aforesaid provisions of the
c Ordinance and Rule 54 (supra) shows that the
administrative control of the High Court vests in the Chief
Justice of the High Court alone and that it is his prerogative
to distribute business of the High Court both judicial
andadministrative. He alone, has the right and power to
D decide how the Benches of the High Court are to be
constituted: which Judge is to sitalone and which cases
he can and is required to hear as also as to which Judges
shall constitute a Division Bench and what work those
Benches shall do. In other words the Judges of the High
E Court can sit alone or in Division Benches and do such
work only as may be allotted to them by an order of or in
accordance with the directions of the Chief Justice. That
necessariiy means that it is not within the competence or
domain of any Single or Division Bench of the Court to give
F any direction to the Registry in that behalf which will run
contrary to the directions of the Chief Justice. Therefore
in the scheme of things judicial discipline demands that in
the event a Single Judge or a Division Bench considers
that a particular case requires to be listed before it for valid
G reasons, it should direct the Registry to obtain appropriate
orders from the Chief Justice.The puisne Judges are not
expected to entertain any request from the advocates of
the parties forlisting of case which does not strictly fall
within the determined roster. In such cases, it is
H appropriate to direct the counsel to make a mention before
KISHORE SAMRITE v. STATE OF U.P. & ORS. 767
[SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
the Chief Justice and obtain appropriate orders. This is A
essential for smooth functioning of the Court. Though, on
the judicial side the Chief Justice is only the "first amongst
the equals", on the administrative side in the matter of
constitution of Benches and making of roster, he alone is
vested with the necessary powers. That the power to make B
roster exclusively vests in the Chief Justice and that a daily
cause list is to be prepared Under the directions of the·
Chief Justice as is borne out from Rule 73, which reads
thus:
"73. Daily Cause List.-The Registrar shall subject C
to such directions as the Chief Justice may give
from time to time cause to be prepared for each
day on which the Court sits, a list of cases which
may be heard by the different Benches of the Court.
The list shall also state the hour at which and the D
room in which each Bench shall sit. Such list shall
be known as the Day's List."
xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx
E
24 ................The correctness of the order of the Chief
Justice could only be tested in judicial proceedings
in a manner known to law. No Single Judge was
competent to find fault with it. n
25. In view of the above discussion, the Court amongst F
others, stated the following conclusions: -
"59 ....... (1) That the administrative control of the High Court
vests in the Chief Justice alone. On the judicial side,
however, he is only the first amongst the equals. G
(2) That the Chief Justice is the master of the roster. He
alone has the prerogative to constitute benches of the court
and allocate cases to the benches so constituted.
H
768 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [20121 9 S.C.R.
A (3) That the puisne Judges can only do that work as is
allotted to them by the Chief Justice or under his directions.
(4) That till any determination made by the Chief Justice
lasts, no Judge who is to sit singly can sit in a Division
Bench and no Division Bench can be split up by the
B
Judges constituting the bench themselves and one or both
the Judges constituting.such bench sit singly and take up
any other kind of judicial business not otherwise assigned
to them by or under the directions of the Chief Justice."
C 26. Similarly, in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.
v. Neeraj Choubey and Ors. (2010) 10 SCC 320, the Court
had directed appearance of certain persons in the matter of
selection to the post of Assistant Professor and treated the
matter as a writ petition in the nature of Public Interest Litigation.
D The Court, while passing widespread orders, in paragraph 10
of the judgment held as under: -
"10. In case an application is filed and the Bench comes to the
conclusion that it involves some issues relating to public interest,
E the Bench may not entertain it as a public interest litigation but
the court has its option to convert it into a public interest
litigation and ask the Registry to place it before a Bench which
has jurisdiction to entertain the PIL as per the Rules, guidelines
or by the roster fixed by the Chief Justice but the Bench cannot
F convert itself into a PIL and proceed with the matter itself."
27. Judicial discipline and propriety are the two significant
facets of administration of justice. Every court is obliged to
adhere to these principles to ensure hierarchical discipline on
the one hand and proper dispensation of justice on the other.
G Settled canons of law prescribe adherence to the rule of law
with due regard to the prescribed procedures. Violation thereof
may not always result in invalidation of the judicial action but
normally it may cast a shadow of improper exercise of judicial
discretion. Where extraordinary jurisdiction, like the writ
H
KISHORE SAMRITE v. STATE OF U.P. & ORS. 769
[SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
jurisdiction, is very vast in its scope and magnitude, there it A
imposes a greater obligation upon the courts to observe due
caution while exercising such powers. This is to ensure that the
principles of natural justice are not violated and there is no
occasion of impertinent exercise of judicial discretion.
B
28. In the present case there is no dispute to the fact that
no order was passed by the Chief Justice of Allahabad High
Court or even the senior-most Judge, administratively lncharge
of the Lucknow Bench, transferring Writ Petition No. 111/2011
for hearing from a Single Judge before which it was pending,
to the Division Bench of that Court. On basis of the allegations C
made in the Writ Petition No. 111/2011, that matter had been
listed before the Single Judge. If this writ petition was
improperly instituted before the Single Judge of the High Court
then it was for the Registry of that Court or any of the contesting
parties to that petition, to raise an objection in that behalf. The D
objection could relate to the maintainability and/or jurisdiction
on the facts pleaded. If the Writ Petition No. 125 of 2011 was
filed with a prayer for transfer of Writ Petition No. 111/2011 on
the ground stated in the petition, this power fell within the
exclusive domain of the Chief Justice or the Senior Judge E
lncharge for that purpose. It does not appear to be apt exercise
of jurisdiction by the Division Bench to suo moto direct transfer
of Writ Petition No. 111/2011 without leave of the Chief Justice
of that Court as such action would ex facie amount to dealing
with matters relating to constitution and roster of Benches. We F
have alre¥!9¥ cited various judgments of this Court where
matters relating to the roster and constitution of the Benches
fall within the exclusive domain of the Chief Justice of the
concerned High Courts. Transfer of a petition may not
necessarily result in lack of inherent jurisdiction. It may be an G
administrative lapse but normally would not render the Division
Bench or Court of competent jurisdiction as lacking inherent
jurisdiction and its orders being invalid ab initio. Such an order
may necessarily not be vitiated in law, particularly when the
parties participate in the proceedings without any objection and H
770 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 9 S.C.R.
A protest. This, however.always will depend on the facts and
circumstances of a given case. In the present case, suffices it
to note that transfer of Writ Petition No. 11112011 by the
Division Bench to its own Board was an order lacking
administrative judicial propriety and from the record it also
B appears that adequate hearing had not been provided to the
writ petitioners before dismissal of the Writ Petition No. 111
of 2011 by the Division Bench.
Abuse of the process of Court :
C 29. Now, we shall deal with the question whether both or
any of the petitioners in Civil Writ Petition Nos. 111/2011 and
125/2011 are guilty of suppression of material facts, not
approaching the Court with clean hands, and thereby abusing
the process of the Court. Before we dwell upon the facts and
D circumstances of the case in hand, let us refer to some case
laws which would help us in dealing with the present situation
with greater precision. The cases of abuse of the process of
court and such allied matters have been arising before the
Courts consistently. This Court has had many occasions where
E it dealt with the cases of this kind and it has clearly stated the
principles that would govern the obligations of a litigant while
approaching the court for redressal of any grievance and the
consequences of abuse of the process of court. We may
recapitulate and state some of the principles. It is difficult to
F state such principles exhaustively and with such accuracy that
would uniformly apply to a variety of cases. These are: ·
(i) Courts have, over the centuries, frowned upon
litigants who, with intent to deceive and mislead the
Courts, initiated proceedings without full disclosure
G of facts and came to the courts with 'unclean
hands'. Courts have held that such litigants are
neither entitled to be heard on the merits of the
case nor entitled to any relief.
H (ii) The people, who approach the Court for relief on
KISHORE SAMRITE v. STATE OF U.P. & ORS. 771
[SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
an ex parte statement, are under a contract with the A
court that they would state the whole case fully and
fairly to the court and where the litigant has broken
such faith, the discretion of the court cannot be
exercised in favour of such a litigant.
B
(iii) The obligation to approach the Court with clean
hands is an absolute obligation and has repeatedly
been reiterated by this Court.
(iv) Quests for personal gains have become so intense
that those involved in litigation do not hesitate to C
take shelter of falsehood and misrepresent and
suppress facts in the court proceedings.
Materialism, opportunism and malicious intent have
over-shadowed the old ethos of litigative values for
small gains. D
(v) A ·litigant who attempts to pollute the stream of
justice or who touches the pure fountain of justice
with tainted hands is not entitled to any relief,
interim or final. - E
(vi) The Court must ensure that its process is not
abused and in order to prevent abuse of the
process the court, it would be justified even in
insisting on furnishing of security and in cases of
serious abuse, the Court would be duty bound to F
impose heavy costs.
(vii) Wherever a public interest is invoked, the Court
must examine the petition carefully to ensure that
there is genuine public interest involved. The stream G
of justice should not be allowed to be polluted by
unscrupulous litigants.
(vii) The Court, especially the Supreme Court, has to
maintain strictest vigilance over the abuse of the
H
772 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 9 S.C.R.
A process of court and ordinarily meddlesome
bystanders should not be granted "visa". Many
societal pollutants create new problems of
unredressed grievances and the Court should
endure to take cases where the justice of the lis
B well-justifies it.
[Refer: Dalip Singh v. State of UP. & Ors. (2010) 2 SCC
114; Amar Singh v. Union of India & Ors. (2011) 7 SCC
69 and State of Uttaranchal v Ba/want Singh Chaufal &
Ors. (201 O) 3 sec 402].
c
30. Access jurisprudence requires Courts to dea·1 with the
legitimate litigation whatever be its form but decline to exercise
jurisdiction, if such litigation is an abuse of the process of the
Court. In P. S. R. Sadhanantham v. Arunachalam &Anr. (1980)
D 3 SCC 141, the Court held:
"15. The crucial significance of access jurisprudence has
been best expressed by Cappelletti:
"The right of effective access to justice has emerged
E with the new social rights. Indeed, it is of paramount
importance among these new rights since, clearly,
the enjoyment of traditional as well as new social
rights presupposes mechanisms for their effective
protection. Such protection, moreover, is best
F assured be a workable remedy within the
framework of the judicial system. Effective access
to justice can thus be seen as the most basic
requirement the most basic 'human-right' of a
system which purports to guarantee legal rights."
G
16. We are thus satisfied that the bogey of busybodies
blackmailing adversaries through frivolous invocation of
Article 136 is chimerical. Access to justice to every bona
fide seeker is a democratic dimension of remedial
jurisprudence even as public interest litigation, class action,
H
KISHORE SAMRITE v. STATE OF U.P. & ORS. 773
[SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
pro bono proceedings, are. We cannot dwell in the home A
of processual obsolescence when our Constitution
highlights social justice as a goal. We hold that there is
no merit in the contentions of the writ petitioner and
dismiss the petition."
B
31. It has been consistently stated by this Court that the
entire journey of a Judge is to discern the truth from the
pleadings, documents and arguments of the parties, as truth
is the basis of the Justice Delivery System.
32. With the passage of time, it has been realised that C
people used to feel proud to tell the truth in the Courts,
irrespective of the consequences but that practice no longer
proves true, in ~II cases. The Court does not sit simply as an
umpire in a contest between two parties and declare at the end
of the combat as to who has won and who has lost but it has a D
legal duty of its own, independent of parties, to take active role
in the proceedings and reach at the truth, which is the
foundation of administration of justice. Therefore, the truth should
become the ideal to inspire the courts to pursue. This can be
achieved by statutorily mandating the Courts to become active E
seekers of truth. To enable the courts to ward off unjustified
interference in their working, those who indulge in immoral acts
like perjury, prevarication and motivated falsehood, must be
appropriately dealt w!th. The parties must state forthwith
sufficient factual details to the extent that it reduces the ability F
to put forward false and exaggerated claims and a litigant must
approach the Court with clean hands. It is the bounden duty of
the Court to ensure that dishonesty and any attempt to surpass
the legal process must be effectively curbed and the Cou.rt must
ensure that there is no wrongful, unauthorised or unjust gain to G
anyone as a result of abuse of the process of the Court. One
way to curb this tendency is to impose realistic or punitive costs.
33. The party not approaching the Court with clean hands
would be liable to be non-suited and such party, who has also
succeeded in polluting the stream of justice by making patently H
774 SUPREME COURT REPORTS . [2012] 9 S.C.R.
A false statements, cannot claim relief, especially under Article
136 of the Constitution. While approaching the court, a litigant
must state correct facts and come with clean hands. Where such
statement of facts is based on some information, the source
of such information must also be disclosed. Totally
B misconceived petition amounts to abuse of the process of the
court and such a litigant is not required to be dealt with lightly,
as a petition containing misleading and inaccurate statement,
if filed, to achieve an ulterior purpose amounts to abuse of the
process of the court. A litigant is bound to make "full and true
c disclosure of facts". (Refer: Tilokchf!nd H.B. Motichand & Ors.
v. Munshi & Anr. [1969 (1) SCC 11 O]; A. Shanmugam v. Ariya
Kshatriya Rajaku/a Vamsathu Mada/aya Nandhavana
Paripalanai Sangam & Anr. [(2012) 6 SCC 430]; Chandra
Shashi v. Anil Kumar Verma [(1995) SCC 1 421]; Abhyudya
D Sanstha v. Union of India & Ors. [(2011) 6 SCC 145]; State
of Madhya Pradesh v. Narmada Bachao Ando/an & Anr.
[(2011) 7 SCC 639]; Kalyaneshwari v. Union of India & Anr.
[(2011) 3 sec 287)].
34. The person seeking equity must do equity. It is not just
E the clean hands, but also clean mind, clean heart and clean
objective that are the equi-fundamentals of judicious litigation.
The legal maxim jure naturae aequum est neminem cum alterius
detrimento et injuria fieri locupletiorem, which means that it is
a law of nature that one should not be enriched by the loss or
F injury to another, is the percept for Courts. Wide jurisdiction of
the court should not become a source of abuse of the process
of law by the disgruntled litigant. Careful exercise is also
necessary to ensure that the litigation is genuine, not motivated
by extraneous considerations and imposes an obligation upon
G the litigant to disclose the true facts and approach the court with
clean hands.
35. No litigant can play 'hide and seek' with the courts or
adopt 'pick and choose'. True facts ought to be disclosed as
the Court knows law, but not facts. One, who does not come
H with candid facts and clean breast cannot hold a writ of the court
KISHORE SAMRITE v. STATE OF U.P. & ORS. 775
[SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
with soiled hands. Suppression or concealment of material facts A
is impermissible to a litigant or even as a technique of
advocacy. In such cases, the Court is duty bound to discharge
rule nisi and such applicant is required to be dealt with for
contempt of court for abusing the process of the court. {K.D.
Sharma v. Steel Authority of India Ltd. & Ors. [(2008) 12 SCC B
481].
36. Another settled canon of administration of justice is that
no litigant should be permitted to misuse the judicial process
by filing frivolous petitions. No litigant has a right to unlimited C
drought upon the court time and public money in order to get
his affairs settled in the manner as he wishes. Easy access to
justice should not be used as a licence to file misconceived and
frivolous petitions. (Buddhi Kota Subbarao (Dr.) v. K.
Parasaran, (1996) 5 SCC 530).
D
37. In light of these settled principles, if we examine the
facts of the present case, next friends in both the petitions are
guilty of suppressing material facts, approaching the court with
unclean hands, filing petitions with ulterior motive and finally for
abusing the process of the court. E
38. In this regard, first of all we may deal with the case of
the appellant, Kishore Samrite:
39. Firstly, he filed Writ Petition No. 111/2011 on vague,
uncertain and incomplete averments. In fact, he withheld the fact F
that the earlier Writ Petition No. 3719/2009 had been dismissed
by a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court as back as
on 17th April, 2009, while he instituted Writ Petition No. 111/
2011 in the year 2011. The excuse put forward by the appellant
was that he did not know about the dismissal of that case. This G
flimsy excuse is hardly available to the appellant as he claims
to be a public person (ex-MLA), had allegedly verified the facts
and incidents before instituting the petition and made the
desired prayers therein. It is obvious that subject matter of Writ
Petition No. 3719/2009 must have received great publicity H
776 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 9 S.C.R.
A before and at the time of the dismissal of the writ petition.
40. Secondly, without verification of any facts, the appellant
made an irresponsible statement that the petitioners Sukanya
Devi, Sh. Bairam Singh and Smt. Sumitra Devi were in the
B illegal detention of Respondent no.6. The averments made in
the writ petition were supported by an affidavit filed in the High
Court stating that contents of paragraphs 1 and 3 to 15 were
true, partly true to knowledge and partly based on record while
paragraphs 2 and 16 were believed to be correct as per legal
advice received. This stood falsified from the fact that the
C appellant did not even know the three petitioners, their correct
addresses and identity.
41. Thirdly, in the Writ Petition in paragraph 10, it is stated
that the petitioners were last seen on 4 th January, 2007 in
D Amethi and the appellant had not seen them thereafter. The
appellant also claims in the same paragraph that the facts came
to his knowledge when he, in order to personally verify the facts,
visited Amethi a couple of times and also as late as in
December, 2010. From this, the inference is that the petition
E was based upon the facts which the petitioner learnt and
believed during these visits. On the contrary, when he filed an
affidavit in this Court on 25th July, 2012, in paragraph 6 of the
affidavit, he stated as under:
".... The Petitioner has been the Member of Ruling Party in
F the State of M.P. and because of his standing in the
Society, in 2007 he was called for by the Samajwadi Party
Leadership, to contest Legislative Assembly Election from
Constituency Lanji, Dist. Balaghat, Madhya Pradesh, he
won the Bye-election and remained MLA, during
G 03.11.2007 to 08.12.2008. True Copy of the Identity Card
is annexed herewith and marked as ANNEXURE P-8.
That the Petitioner, from a young age since 1986 he
has been involved in Social Activities, in State of Madhya
H Pradesh being a Social Activist, he has filed several Writ
KISHORE SAMRITE v. STATE OF U.P. & ORS. 777
[SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
Petitions before Various High Courts, raising serious A
public and Social issues, and the issues concerning
Corruption and Crime in Politics, and the courts have been
pleased to entertain his writ petitions and grant reliefs in
the several such writ Petitions filed by him. This List of Writ
Petitions filed by the Petitioner is annexed herewith and B
marked as ANNEXURE P-9.
That taking into account his standing and
antecedent at behest of the leader of his political
party the Petitioner was called to C-1/135, Pandara C
Park, New Delhi in 2010 to meet the other Senior
Leaders, who were in Delhi as the Parliament was
in Session, where he was appraised about the
facts of the serious incident that had been reported
from a village in U. P. and in view of th~ fact that he
had taken up several public causes in'the past he D
was requested to file a Writ Petition in the nature
of a public interest litigation in the High Court of
Judicature at.Allahabad Lucknow Bench at
Lucknow and thus the Writ Petition came to be
filed. Notice was issued in the said Writ Petition." E
42. Thus, t~ere is definite contradiction and falsehood in
the stand taken by the petitioner in the writ petition and in the
affidavit filed before this court, as afore-noticed. This clearly
indicates the falsehood in the averments made and the intention F
of the appellant to misguide the courts by filing such frivolous
petitions. No details, whatsoever, have been furnished to state
as to how he verified the alleged website news of the incident
of 3rd December, 2006 and from whom. Strangely, he did not
even know the petitioners and could not even identify them. The G
prayer in the writ petition was for issuance of a direction in the
nature of habeas corpus to respondent no.6 to produce the
petitioners. And lastly, the writ petition is full of irresponsible
allegations which, as now appears, were not true to the
knowledge of the petitioner, as he claimed to have acted as H
778 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 9 S.C.R.
A next friend of the petitioners while he was no relation, friend or
even a person known to the petitioners. His acting as the next
friend of the petitioners smacks of malice, ulterior motive and
misuse of judicial process.
B 43. The alleged website provides that the girl was missing.
It was not reported there that she and her parents were in illegal
detention of the respondent no.6. So by no means, it could not
be a case of habeas corpus.
44. Now, we would deal with Writ Petition No.125 of 2011
C instituted by Sh. Gajender Pal Singh, respondent No.8 in this
appeal, being next friend of petitioners Sukanya Devi, Sh.
Bairam Singh and Sh. Sumitra Devi. The glaring factors
showing abuse of process of Court and attempt to circumvent
the prescribed procedure can be highlighted, inter alia, but
D primarily from the following :
(a) Sh. Gajender Pal Singh also had no relationship,
friendship or had not even known the three
petitioners.
E (b) In face of the statements made by the three
petitioners before the Police and the CBI, stating
that they had never approached, asked or even
expected respondent No.8 to act as next friend, he
had no authority to act as their next friend before
F the Court and pray for such relief.
(c) In the garb of petition for habeas corpus, he filed a
petition asking for transfer of Writ Petition No.111
of 2011, to which he was neither a party nor had
G any interest.
(d) Respondent No.8 intentionally did not appear in writ
petition No.111 of 2011 raising the question of
jurisdiction or any other question but circumvented
the process of Court by filing Writ Petition No.125
H
KISHORE SAMRITE v. STATE OF U.P. & ORS. 779
[SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
of 2011 with the prayers including investigation by A
an authority against the petitioner in writ petition
No.111 of 2011. Respondent No.8, despite being
a resident of that very area and town, Amethi, did
not even care to mention about the dismissal of Writ
Petition No.3719 of 2009. B
(e) In the writ petition, he claimed to be a neighbour of
the three petitioners but did not even know this much
that the petitioners had, quite some time back,
shifted to Village Hardoia in district Faizabad. He C
also stated in paragrah 5 of the writ petition that he
was neighbour of the petitioners and having not
seen them, had sought to lodge a police report,
which the authorities refused to take on the ground
that the petitioners were in custody of the police as
they had committed some wrong. This averment, to D
the knowledge of the petitioner, was false inasmuch
as the Director General of Police, U.P had stated
in his affidavit that they were never detained or
called to the police station. In fact, they had shifted
their house to the aforestated Village. Respondent E
No.8 has, thus, for obvious and with ulterior motive
abused the process of the court and filed a petition
based on falsehood, came to the Court with
unclean hands and even attempted to circumvent
the process of law by making motivated and F
untenable prayers. This petitioner (respondent No.8)
also made irresponsible allegations stating that
Kishore Samrite, petitioner in Writ Petition No.111
of 2011, was a mentally challenged person.
G
45. From the above specific averments made in the writ
petitions, it is clear that both these petitioners have approached
the Court with falsehood, unclean hands and have misled the
courts by showing urgency and exigencies in relation to an
incident of 3rd December, 2006 which, in fact, according to the
H
780 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 9 S.C.R.
A three petitioners and the police was false, have thus abused
the process of the court and misused the judicial process. They
maliciously and with ulterior motives encroached upon the
valuable time of the Court and wasted public money. It is a
settled canon that no litigant has a right to unlimited drought
B upon the court time and public money in order to get his affairs
settled in the manner as he wishes. The privilege of easy
access to justice has been abused by these petitioners by filing
frivolous and misconceived petitions. On the basis of incorrect
and incomplete allegations, they had created urgency for
c expeditious hearing of the petitions, which never existed. Even
this Court had to spend days to reach at the truth. Prima facie
it is clear that both these petitioners have mis-stated facts,
withheld true facts and even given false and incorrect affidavits.
They well knew that Courts are going to rely upon their
pleadings and affidavits while passing appropriate orders. The
0
Director General of Police, U.P., was required to file an affidavit
and CBI directed to conduct investigation. Truth being the basis
of justice delivery system, it was important for this Court to
reach at the truth, which we were able to reach at with the able
E assistance of all the counsel and have no hesitation in holding
that the case of both the petitioners suffered from falsehood,
was misconceived and was a patent misuse of judicial process.
Abuse of the process of the Court and not approaching the
Court with complete facts and clean hands, has compelled this
Court to impose heavy and penal costs on the persons acting·
F as next friends in the writ petitions before the High Court. This
Court cannot permit the judicial process to become an
instrument of oppression or abuse or to subvert justice by
unscrupulous litigants like the petitioners in the present case.
G Locus Standi
46. Having discussed the abuse of process of Court and
misuse of judicial process by both the petitioners, the issue of
locus standi would obviously fall within a very narrow compass.
H The question of locus standi would normally be a question of
KISHORE SAMRITE v. STATE OF U.P. & ORS. 781
[SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
fact and law both. The issue could be decided with reference A
to the given facts and not in isolation. We have stated the facts
and the stand of the respective parties in some detail. Both,
the appellant and respondent No.8, had filed their respective
writ petitions before the Allahabad High Court as next friends
of the three petitioners whose names have not been stated with B
complete correctness in both the writ petitions. There has been
complete contradiction in the allegations made in the two writ
petitions by the respective petitioners. According to the
appellant, the three stated petitioners were illegally detained by
the respondent no.6 while according to the respondent no.8 they c
were detained by the authorities. These contradictory and untrue
allegations are the very foundation of these writ petitions. It may
also be noticed that in both the writ petitions, baseless
allegations in regard to the alleged incident of 3rd December,
2006, involving the respondent no.6, had also been raised.
D
47. Ordinarily, the party aggrieved by any order has the
right to seek relief by questioning the legality, validity or
correctness of that order. There could be cases where a person
is not directly affected but has some personal stake in the
outcome of a petition. In such cases, he may move the Court E
as a guardian or next friend for and on behalf of the disabled
aggrieved party. Normally, a total stranger would not act as next
friend. In the case of Simranjit Singh Mann v. Union of India
[(1992) 4 SCC 653], this Court held that a total stranger to the
trial commencea against the convicts, cannot be permitted to F
question the correctness of the conviction recorded against
some convicts unless an aggrieved party is under some
disability recognised by law, othewise it would be unsafe or
hazardous to allow a third party to question the decision against
him. In the case of S.P. Gupta v. Union of India [AIR (1982) G
SC 149], the Court stated, "but we must be careful to see that
the member of the public, who approaches the court in cases
of this kind, is acting bona fide and not for personal gain or
private profit or political motivation or other oblique
consideration. The court must not allow its process to be H
782 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 9 S.C.R.
A abused by politicians and others." Dealing with the question of
the next friend bringing a petition under Article 32 of the
Constitution, this Court in the case of Karamjeet Singh v. Union
of India [(1992) 4 SCC 666], held as under:
"We are afraid these observations do not permit a mere
B
friend like the petitioner to initiate the proceedings of the
present nature under Article 32 of the Constitution. The
observations relied upon relate to a minor or an insane or
one who is suffering from any other disability which the law
recognises as sufficient to permit another person, e.g. next
c friend, to move the Court on his behalf; for example see :
Sections 320(4)(a), 330(2) read with Section 335(1 )(b) and
339 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Admittedly, it is
not the case of the petitioner that the two convicts are
minors or insane persons but the learned counsel argued
D that since they were suffering from an acute obsession
such obsession amounts to a legal disability which permits
the next friend to initiate proceedings under Article 32 of
the Constitution. We do not think that such a contention is
tenable. The disability must be one which the law
E recognises."
48. Dealing with public interest litigation and the cases
instituted by strangers or busybodies, this Court in the following
cases cautioned the courts and even required that they be
F dismissed at the threshold:
I) Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary, (1992) 4 SCC 305, at
page 347:
"Sarkaria, J. in Jasbhai Motibhai Desai v. Roshan Kumar
G expressed his view that the application of the busybody
should be rejected at the threshold in the following terms:
'It will be seen that in the context of locus standi to
apply for a writ of certiorari, an applicant may
ordinarily fall in any of these categories: (i) 'person
H
KISHORE SAMRITE v. STATE OF U.P. & ORS. 783
[SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
aggrieved'; (ii) 'stranger'; (iii) busybody or A .
meddlesome interloper.· Persons in the last
category are easily distinguishable from those
coming under the first two categories. Such
persons interfere in things which do not concern
them. They masquerade as crusaders for justice. B
They pretend to act in the name of pro bone
publico, though they have no interest of the public
or even of their own to protect. They indulge in the
pastime of meddling with the judicial process either
by force of habit or from improper motives. Often, c
they are actuated by a desire to win notoriety or
cheap popularity; while the ulterior intent of some
applicants in this category, may be no more than
spoking the wheels of administration. The High
Court should do well to reject the applications of
0
such busybodies at the threshold'."
II) R & M Trust v. Koramangala Residents Vigilance
Group (2005) 3 sec 91]
"25. In this connection reference may be made to a recent E
decision given by this Court in the case of Dattaraj Nathuji
Thaware v. 49Page 50 State of Maharashtra in which
Hon'ble Pasayat, J. has also observed as follows:
'12. Public interest litigation is a weapon which has
to be used with great care and circumspection and
F
the judiciary has to be extremely careful to see that
behind the beautiful veil of public interest, an ugly
private malice, vested interest and/or publicity-
seeking is not lurking. It is to be used as an effective
weapon in the armoury of law for delivering social G
justice to citizens. The attractive brand name of
public interest litigation should not be used for
suspicious products of mischief. It should be aimed
at redressal of genuine public wrong or public injury
and not be publicity-oriented or founded on H
784 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 9 S.C.R.
A personal vendetta'."
49. On the analysis of the above principles, it is clear that
a person who brings a petition even for invocation of a
fundamental right must be a person having some direct or
indirect interest in the outcome of the petition on his behalf or
8
on behalf of some person under a disability and/or unable to
have access to the justice system for patent reasons. Still, such
a person must act bonafidely and without abusing the process
of law. Where a person is a stranger/unknown to the parties
and has no interest in the outcome of the litigation, he can
C hardly claim locus standi to file such petition. There could be
cases where a public spirited person bonafidely brings petition
in relation to violation of fundamental rights, particularly in
habeas corpus petitions, but even in such cases, the person
should have some demonstrable interest or relationship to the
D involved persons, personally or for the benefit of the public at
large, in a PIL. But in all such cases, it is essential that the
petitioner must exhibit bonafides, by truthful and cautious
exercise of such right. The Courts would be expected to
examine such requirement at the threshold of the litigation in
E order to prevent abuse of the process of court. In the present
case, both the appellant and respondent No.8 are total
strangers to the three mentioned petitioners. Appellant, in fact,
is a resident of Madhya Pradesh, belonging to a political party
and was elected in constituency Tehsil Lanji in District Balaghat
F at Madhya Pradesh. He has no roots in Amethi and, in fact, he
was a stranger to that place. The appellant as well as
respondent No.8 did not even know that the persons on whose
behalf they have acted as next friend had shifted their residence
in the year 2010 to Hardoia in District Faizabad. They have
G made false averments in the petition and have withheld true
facts from the Court.
50. This Court, in the case of Charanjit Lal Chowdhury v.
The Union of India & Ors. [AIR 1951 SC 41], while discussing
H the distinction between the rights and possibility of invocation
KISHORE SAMRITE v. STATE OF U.P. & ORS. 785
[SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
of legal remedy of a company and a shareholder, expressed A
the view that this follows logically from the rule of law that a
corporation has a distinct legal personality of its own with rights
and capacities, duties and obligations separate from those of
its individual members. As the rights are different and inhere
in different legal entities, it is not competent to one person to B
seek to enforce the right of another except where the law
permits him to do so. A well known illustration of such exception
is furnished by the procedure that is sanctioned in an
application for a writ of habeas corpus. Not only the man who
is imprisoned. or detained in confinement but any person, c
provided ·he is not an absolute stranger, can institute
proceedings to obtain a writ of habeas corpus for the purpose
of liberating another from an illegal imprisonment. It is not a
case of a mere third person moving the court simpliciter on
behalf of persons under alleged detention. It is a case of definite
0
improprietory abuse of process of court, justice and is a
motivated attempt based on falsehood to misguide the Court
and primarily for publicity or political vendetta. More so, when
the petitioners in the writ petitions have categorically stated that
they made no complaint of the alleged incident of 3rd E
December, 2006 and never authorised, requested or
approached either of the petitioners to move the court for
redressal of any grievance .. The question of filing habeas
corpus petitions on their behalf would not arise because they
were living at their own house and enjoying all freedoms.
According to them, they were detained by none at any point of F
time either by respondent No.6 or the Police authorities. ln face
of this definite stand taken by these persons, the question of
locus standi has to be answered against both the petitioners.
In fact. it is not only abuse of the process of the Court but also
is a case of access to justice unauthorisedly and illegally. Their G
whole modus operandi would be unacceptable in law. Thus, we
have no hesitation in holding on the facts of the present case
that both the petitioners had no locus standi to approach the
High Court of Allahabad in the manner and method in which
they did. It was contended on behalf of the appellant as well as H
786 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 9 S.C.R.
A respondent No.8 that a petition for habeas corpus is not struck
by the rule of res judicata or constructive res judicata. According
to them, the decision of the Writ Petition No.3719 of 2009 was
in no way an impediment for institution of the writ petition as in
the case of habeas corpus every day would be a fresh and a
B continuing cause of action. For this purpose, reliance has been
placed upon the judgment of this Court in the case of Ghulam
Sarwar v. Union of India [AIR 1967 SC 1335] and Kirti Kumar
Chaman Lal Kundaliya v. Union of India [AIR 1981 SC 1621].
We do not consider it necessary to decide this question as a
c question of law in the facts and circumstances of the present
case particularly in view of the findings recorded by us on other
issues. Suffice it to note that the judgment of the Allahabad High
Court dated 17th April, 2009 in Civil Writ Petition 3719 of 2009
had attained finality as the legality or correctness thereof was
not challenged by any person. There can hardly be any doubt
0
that upon pronouncement of this judgment this case squarely
fell in the public domain and was obviously known to both the
petitioners but they did not even consider it necessary to
mention the same in their respective writ petitions. Another
contention that has been raised on behalf of the appellant is
E that a petition of habeas corpus lies not only against the
Executive Authority but also against private individual. Reliance
is placed on the case of In Re: Shri Sham Lal [(1978) 2 SCC
479]. As a proposition of law, there is no dispute raised before
us to this proposition. Thus, there is no occasion for this Court
F to deliberate on this issue in any further elaboration.
51. Having dealt with various aspects of this case, now we
must revert to the essence of the present appeal on facts. The
petitions instituted by the appellant and respondent No.8 were
G certainly an abuse of the process of Court. They have
encroached upon the valuable time of the courts. The
contradictory stands taken before the courts and their entire
case being denied by the petitioners themselves clearly show
that they have misused the judicial process and have stated
H facts that are untrue to their knowled!;ja. The alleged incident
KISHORE SAMRITE v. STATE OF U.P. & ORS. 787
[SWATANTER l<UMAR, J.]
which, according to the petitioners, police and the CBI, never A
happened and illegal detention of the petitioners has been
falsified by the petitioners themselves in the writ petitions. It is
a matter of regret that the process of the court has been abused
by unscrupulous litigants just to attain publicity and adversely
affect the reputation of another politician, respondent No.6. One B
of the obvious reasons which can reasonably be inferred from
the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case is the political
rivalry. According to the counsel appearing for respondent No.6,
it is a case of political mudslinging. He has rightly contended
that the websites information was nothing but secondary c
evidence, as stated by this Court in Samant N. Balkrishna &
Anr. v. V. George Fernandez and Ors. [(1969) 3 SCC 238] but
not even an iota of evidence has been placed on record of the
writ petitions before the High Court or even in the appeal before
this Court, which could even show the remote possibility of
0
happening of the alleged rape incident on 3rd December, 2006.
There is an affidavit by the police and report by the CBI to show
that this incident never occurred and the three petitioners have
specifically disputed and denied any such incident or making
of any report in relation thereto or even in regard to the alleged
E
illegal detention. Political rivalry can lead to such ill-founded
litigation. In the case of Gosu Jayarami Reddy & Anr. v. State
of Andhra Pradesh [(2011) 11 SCC 766], this Court observed
that political rivalry at times degenerates into personal vendetta
where principles and po!icies take a back seat and personal
ambition and longing for power drive men to commit the foulest F
of deeds to avenge defeat and to settle scores. These
observations aptly apply to the facts of the present case
particularly the writ petition preferred by the appellant. At one
place, he claims to have acted as a public figure with good
conscience but has stated false facts. On the other hand, he G
takes a somersault and claims that he acted on the directives
of the political figures. It is unworthy of a public figure to act in
such a manner and demonstrate a behaviour which is
impermissible in law. Appellant as well as respondent No.8 filed
Habeas corpus petitions claiming it to be a petition for H
788 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 9 S.C.R.
A attainment of public confidence and right to life. In the garb of
doctrines like the Right to Liberty and access to justice, these
petitioners not only intended but actually filed improper and
untenable petitions, primarily with the object of attaining publicity
and causing injury to the reputation of others. The term 'person'
B includes not only the physical body and members but also every
bodily sense and personal attribute among which is the
reputation a man has acquired. Reputation can also be defined
to be good name, the credit, honour or character which is
derived from a favourable public opinion or esteem, and
c character by report. The right to enjoyment of a good reputation
is a valuable privilege of ancient origin and necessary to human
society. 'Reputation' is an element of personal security and is
protected by Constitution equally with the right to enjoyment of
life, liberty and property. Although 'character' and 'reputation'
are often used synonymously, but these terms are
0
distinguishable. 'Character' is what a man is and 'reputation'
is what he is supposed to be in what people say he is.
'Character' depends on attributes possessed and 'reputation'
on attributes which others believe one to possess. The former
E signifies reality and the latter merely what is accepted to be
reality at present. {Ref. Smt. Kiran Bedi v. The Committee of
Inquiry & Anr. [(1989) 1 SCC 494] and Nilgiris Bar Association
v. T.K. Mahalingam & Anr. [AIR 1998 SC 398]}. The
methodology adopted by the next friends in the writ petitions
before the High Court was opposed to political values and
F administration of justice. In the case of Kusum Lata v. Union
of India [(2006) 6 SCC 180], this Court observed that when
there is material to show that a petition styled as a public
interest litigation is nothing but a camouflage to foster personal
disputes, the said petition should be dismissed by the Court. If
G such petitions are not properly regulated and abuse averted, it
becomes a tool in unscrupulous hands to release vendetta and
wreak vengeance as well.
52. In light of these legal principles, appellant and, in fact,
H to a great extent even respondent No.8 have made an attempt
KISHORE SAMRITE v. STATE OF U.P. & ORS. 789
[SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
to hurt the reputation and image of respondent no.6 by stating A
incorrect facts, that too, by abusing the process of court.
53. Coming to the judgment of the High Court under appeal
it has to be noticed that the appellant was deprived of adequate
hearing by the High Court, but that defect stands cured
inasmuch as we have heard of the concerned parties in both
8
the writ petitions at length. The transfer of Writ Petition No. 111 /
2011 was not in consonance with the accepted canons of
judicial administrative propriety. The imposition of such heavy
costs upon the petitioner was not called for in the facts and
circumstances of the case as the Court was not dealing with a C
suit for damages but with a petition for habeas corpus, even if
the petition was not bona fide. Furthermore, we are unable to
endorse our approval to the manner in which the costs imposed
were ordered to be disbursed to the different parties. Moreover,
the question of paying rewards to the Director General of.Police D
does not arise as the police and the Director General of Police
were only performing their duties by producing the petitioners
in the Court. They, in any case, were living in their own house
without restriction or any kind of detention by anyone. In fact,
the three petitiqners have been compulsorily dragged to the E
court by the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 125/2011. They had
made no complaint to any person and thus, the question of their
illegal detention and consequential release would not arise.
These three persons have been used by both the petitioners
and it is, in fact, they are the ones whose reputation has suffered F
a serious setback and were exposed to inconvenience of being
dragged to courts for no fault of their own. We hardly see any
attributes of the Police except performance of their duties in
the normal course so as to entitled them to exceptional rewards.
Certainly, the reputation of respondent no.6 has also been G
damaged, factually and in law. Both these petitions are based
on falsehood. The reputation of respondent no.6 is damaged
and his public image diminished due to the undesirable acts
of the appellant and respondent no.8.
H
790 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 9 S.C.R.
A 54. For these reasons, we are un~ble to sustain the order
under appeal in its entirety and while modifying the judgments
under appeal, we pass the following order: -
1. Writ petition No. 111/2011 was based upon
falsehood, was abuse of the process of court and
B was driven by malice and political vendetta. Thus,
while dismissing this petition, we impose exemplary
costs of Rs. 5 lacs upon the next friend, costs being
payable to respondent no.6.
c 2. The next friend in Writ Petition No. 125/2011 had
approached the court with unclean hands, without
disclosing complete facts and misusing the judicial
process. In fact, he filed the petition without any
proper authority, in fact and in law. Thus, this
D petition is also dismissed with exemplary costs of
Rs. 5 lakhs for abuse of the process of the court
and/or for such other offences that they are found
to have committed, which shall be payable to the
three petitioners produced before the High Court,
E i.e. Ms. f<irti Singh, Dr. Bairam Singh and Ms.
Sushila @ Mohini Devi.
3. On the basis of the affidavit filed by the Director
General of Police, U. P., statement of the three.
petitioners in the Writ Petition, CBl's stand before
F the Court, its report and the contradictory stand .
taken by the next friend in Writ Petition No.111/
2011, we, prima facie, are of the view that the
allegations against the respondent no.6 in regard
to the alleged incident of rape on 3rd December,
G 2006 and the alleged detention of the petitioners,
are without substance and there is not even an iota
of evidence before the Court to validly form an
opinion to the contrary. In fact, as per the petitioners
(allegedly detained persons). they were never
H detained by any person at any point of time.
KISHORE SAMRITE v. STATE OF U.P. & ORS. 791
[SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
4. The CBI shall continue the investigation in A
furtherance to the direction of the High Court against
petitioner in Writ Petition No. 111/2011 and all other
persons responsible for the abuse of the process
of Court, making false statement in pleadings, filing
false affidavits and committing such other offences B
as the Investigating Agency may find during
investigation. The CBI shall submit its report to the
court of competent jurisdiction as expeditiously as
possible and not later than six months from the date
of passing of this order. c
5. These directions are without prejudice to the rights
of the respective parties to take such legal remedy
as may be available to them in accordance with
law. We also make it clear that the Court of
competent jurisdiction or the CBI would not in any D
way be influenced by the observations made in this
judgment or even the judgment of the High Court.
All the pleas and contentions which may be raised
by the parties are left open.
E
55. The appeal is disposed of in the above terms.
R.P. Appeal disposed of.
' ...
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