Supreme Court of India
KISHORE BHADKEversusSTATE OF MAHARASHTRA
- Citation
- 2017 INSC 14
- Decided
- 3 January 2017
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Bench
- S KHEHAR
Holding
The Supreme Court upheld the convictions, finding that the cumulative circumstantial evidence, including motive, last seen together, and admissible Section 27 disclosures, sufficiently proved the guilt of the appellants.
Summary
The Supreme Court examined the appeal of three accused (Nalini, Kishore Bhadke and Satish) convicted of murder, abduction and related offences arising from a land‑transaction dispute that led to the killing of Raman. The prosecution relied on circumstantial evidence – motive established by the land deal, the victim’s last being seen with the accused, and the discovery of the body and stolen items based on disclosures made by co‑accused under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. The Court held that the lack of documentary proof of the land agreement or blood‑group matching did not defeat the motive, and that statements and recoveries under Section 27 were admissible even without signatures. Consequently, the chain of circumstances was deemed sufficient to sustain the convictions. The appeals were dismissed and the convictions affirmed.
Issues considered
- The adequacy of motive and "last seen together" as circumstantial evidence for murder conviction
- Whether disclosures made by co‑accused under Section 27 of the Evidence Act are admissible against all accused
- The impact of the absence of documentary evidence of the land transaction on the motive element
- The admissibility of recovered items (watch, gold ring) without the accused’s signature on the recovery memo
- The necessity of blood‑group matching to link blood‑stained clothes to the victim
- The applicability of the benefit of doubt granted to other accused (e.g., No.7) to the present appellants
Legislation cited
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 27, s. 313
- Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 25, s. 26, s. 27
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 120-B, s. 201, s. 302, s. 34, s. 364
Subjects
circumstantial evidencemotivelast seen togetherSection 27 Evidence Actmurderconspiracyland disputeconvictionappeal
Judgment
[2017] 1 S.C.R. 330
A KISHORE BHADKE
v.
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA
(Criminal Appeal No. 467 of2010)
B JANUARY 03, 2017
[JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, ARUN MISHRA AND
A. M. KHANWILKAR, JJ.]
Penal Code, 1860: ss.364, 302, 201 rlw ss.341120-B -
Abduction and murder by strangulation - Destruction of clothes
c and articles of deceased - Recovery of wrist watch and gold ring
from accused persons - Motive - Transaction of purchase of land
by deceased from appellants - Conviction by courts below on the
ground that complete chain of circumstances pointed towards the
guilt of appellants - Held: Evidence of mother of the deceased was
D to the effect that on the fateful day, the deceased received a phone
call from accused no. I whereafter he left home with relevant
documents/papers to finalise deal of land - This was relevant fact
in support of circumstance of motive - Prosecution also established
the vital circumstance of last seen together - The circumstance was
further strengthened by evidence to the effect that concerned
E
accused persons loaded a gunny bag in a vehicle - Gunny bag as
found by courts below was used to carry dead body of deceased
which was transported in a vehicle and then thrown at the isolated
location - The fact where the dead.body of deceased was disposed,
was disclosed by accused nos. 2 and 3 in quick succession to the
F Investigating Officer - The discovery was made only after accused
nos.2 and 3 were taken together by the police to the spot - Dead
body was discovered at the instance of accused Nos. 2 and 3 from
the spot in a valley about 600 ft. deep - The fact disclosed by them,
therefore, and the discovery made at their instance, was admissible
against both the accused in terms of s.27 of the Evidence Act -
G
There was clinching evidence to point towards the involvement of
the appellants in the commission of the crime - No tangible reason
to deviate from the concurrent findings of the courts below -
Evidence Act, 1872 - s.27.
Evidence Act, 1872: s.27 -Applicability of - Held: When two
H
330
KISHORE BHADKE v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 331
persons in custody are interrogated separately and in quick A
succession and both of them furnish similar information leading to
the discovery of fact, such disclosure by two or more persons in
police custody does not go out of the purview of s.27 altogether -
What is relevant is that information given by one after the other
without any break, almost simultaneously and such information is
B
followed up by pointing out the material things by both of them
then there is no good reason to eschew such evidence from the regime
of s.27.
Dismissing the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1. The evidence given by PW-1 (brother of the c
deceased) and corroborated by PW-15 (mother) revealed that
there was transaction in respect of land between the accused
no.1 and the deceased. That version could not be demolished in
the .cross-examination. Another piece of.evidence relied by the
prosecution is about the destruction of clothes and articles of
deceased. The Police could only recover ash from the spot along D
with bunch of keys. That would lend support to the prosecution
case that the possibility of documents having been destroyed also
cannot be ruled out. Hence, it was open to the trial court as well
as the High Court to rely on the evidence of witnesses for the
limited purpose. The fact that deceased while leaving bis house E
bad carried some papers/documents with him has been stated by
PW-15, when be went to meet accused No.1. Therefore, there is
no tangible reason to discard the relevant fact established by the
prosecution witnesses in support of the circumstance of motive.
[Para 151 1352-C-D, HJ
F
2. The prosecution also established the vital circumstance
of last seen together. That evidence is given by PW-11 and PW-
12 in particular. Their evidence will have to be juxtaposed with
the evidence of PW-15, who bas spoken about the telephone call
received from accused no.1 and pursuant to which the deceased
left his house in her presence with relevant documents/papers. G
The courts below accepted her version as truthful and reliable.
The evidence of PW-11 corroborated the fact that deceased bad
gone to the Bank for withdrawing cash amount and then
proceeded to the house of accused no.1. He deposed that
deceased went inside the house of accused no.1 and saw accused H
332 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] I, S.C.R.
A nos.2, 3, 4 and 6 standing near the cattle shed. While returning
back be saw accused no.5 standing near the water tank. The fact
of deceased having gone to the Bank for withdrawing the amount
bas been corroborated by PW-8 who was Cashier in the Bank at
the relevant time. Even the evidence of PW-8 was found to be
truthful and reliable. There was sufficient evidence about the
B
factum of last seen together. This circumstance is further
strengthened by the evidence given by other prosecution
witnesses (PW 9, 6 and 12), who bad seen the concerned accused
persons loading a gunny bag in Sumo vehicle after some time;
and that accused Nos. 3 and 6 were also seen in the vehicle
c carrying that gunny bag. The gunny bag, as found by the two courts
below was used to carry the dead body of deceased which was
transported in a vehicle and then thrown at an isolated location
in the valley. There was no tangible reason to doubt the
correctness of the concurrent finding recorded by the two courts
below in this behalf. Thus, the prosecution succeeded in
D
establishing the circumstance of motive and last seen together
indicating the involvement of the appellants-accused nos.1, 3 and
6 in particular. [Paras 16, 17] [353-A-D; 354-B-D]
3. The trial court examined the evidence of the doctor (PW-
16), letter of requisition and the post mortem report. The Doctor
E
explained the fracture injury noticed on the dead body, which, in
his opinion, was due to strangulation and asphyxia. Thus, there
is no merit in the contention that the nature of injury noted in the
post mortem report would rule out the possibility of homicidal
death. The dead body was discovered at the instance of accused
F nos.2 and 3 from the spot in a valley about 600 ft. deep. The
Police reached that spot on the basis of the disclosure made by
the said accused nos. 2 and 3 under Section 27 of the Evidence
Act. Section 27 provides that any fact deposed to and discovered
in consequence of information received from a person accused
of any offence, in the custody of a Police Officer, so much of such
G information, whether it amounts to a confession or not, as relates
distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, may be proved. The
fact where the dead body of deceased was disposed, was disclosed
by both the accused nos.2 and 3 to the Investigating Officer in
the presence of (PW 2) one after another. The discovery was
H
KISHORE BHADKE v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 333
made only after accused oos.2 and 3 were taken together by the A
police to the spot in the neighbouring State. Io other words, the
disclosore of the relevant fact by accosed No.3 to the
Investigating Officer preceded the discovery of dead body from
the disclosed spot at the instance of both the accused nos. 2 and
3. It was not a case of recording of statement of accused No.3
B
after discovery nor a joint statement of accused oos.2 and 3, -but
disclosure made by them separately in quick soccessioo to the
Investigating Officer, preceding the discovery of the fact so stated.
The fact disc!Osed by them, therefore, and the discovery made at
their instance, was admissible against both the accused in terms
of Section 27 of the Evidence Act. The disclosure made by c
accused no. 3 about the relevant fact, per se, is not inadmissible.
The statement of accused no.2 and 3 has been recorded separately
and both the accused accompanied the Police and disclosed the
spot where the dead body of deceased was thrown. On the basis
of that disclosure, the dead body of deceased and the remains of
the burnt articles of deceased were recovered for which that fact
becomes relevant fact and can be used _against the appellants
(accused nos.2 and 3). (Paras 18, 19, 20, 23] (354-F-H; 355-A,
F-H; 356-A-B, E-F; 358-A-B]
State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu [2005] 2
Suppl. SCR 79 : (2005) 11 SCC 600 - relied on. E
A.R. Khima v. State.of Saurashtra AIR 1956 SC 217 :
[1955] SCR 1285 - distinguished.
Lohit Kaushal v. State of Haryana (2009) 17 SCC 106
- held inapplicable. F
-
5. The Courts found that no explanation was offered by the
accused no.3 in respect of presence of human blood on his clothes.
The presence of accused no.3 at the relevant time in the house
of accused no.I and also seen while loading the gunny bag in
Sumo vehicle and also travelliug in that vehicle, leaves no manner G
of doubt about his complicity in the commission of offence. (Paras
24, 25) (358-D-E, F-G]
6. It is well established that, ordinarily, direct evidence
regarding conspiracy may not be forthcomiug. Hence, in most of
H
334 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [20 l 7] l S.C.R.
A the cases, the Courts have to infer conspiracy on the basis of
established facts. In the present case, on analyzing the facts and
the events that unfold, the Courts below have answered the factum
of conspiracy against the appellants-accused nos. 1, 3 and 6.
Further, ihe prosecution did not rest only ;on the factum of last
seen together but also on other circumstances to "point out the
B
involvement of the appellants in the commission of crime. [Para
26] [359-A-B]
Malleshappa v. State of Karnataka [2007] 10 SCR 153 :
(2007) 13 SCC 399; Ashok v. Slate of Maharashtra
(2015] 6 SCR 375 : (2015) 4 SCC 393; Mousam
c Kanhaiya Lal v. State of Rajasthan [2014] 3 SCR 744:
(2014) 4 sec 715 - relied on.
Keshav v. State of Maharashtra (2007] 13 SCR 264 :
(2007) 13 SCC 284; Singha Roy & Ors. 1( State of W.B.
(2003) 12 SCC 377; Sangili v. State of Tamil Nadu
D [2014] 7 SCR 788 : (2014) 10 SCC 264; Guiab Singh v.
State of UP. (1995) Supp. 4 SCC 502 - distinguished.
7. The argument of accused no. 3 that he may be given the
same benefit as given to accused no. 7 is also liable to be rejected.
Because, the High Court has given tangible reason for treating
.E the case of accused no. 7 differently. As regards accused no. 3,
there is consistent evidence that he was present in the house of
accused no.1 at the relevant time and also participated in loading
of the gunny bag containing dead body of deceased in the vehicle
and then travelling in the same vehicle for disposing the dead
F body in a valley. This distinguishes his role from that of accused
no.7. Tbe role of accused no. 3 was rightly analyzed by the courts
below to be similar to accused no. 6 and liable for punishment for
the offence in question. [Para 34] (362-F-G]
8. Accused no. 6 stated that the dead body of the deceased
G
was discovered at the instance of accused nos. 2 and 3 with which
accused No. 6 had no concern. The fact that accused no. 6 did not
make similar disclosure about disposal of dead body of deceased,
as made by accused no. 2 and 3, cannot absolve him. The courts
below have rightly concluded that the concerned accused, in
particular accused nos. 1, 3 and 6 were party to the conspiracy to
KISHORE BHADKE v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 335
cause homicidal death of deceased and for disposal of the evidence A
of crime. The fact that blood stains were not found on the gold
ring recovered at the instance of accused no.6 would not make
the recovery inadmissible. Similarly, the fact that the gold ring
was freely available in the market, would be of no avail to the
said accused. The accused has not produced any evidence to
B
explain the circumstances in which the said gold ring came in his
possession, which has been identified by the prosecution
witnesses as belonging to deceased. The fact that the no blood
stains were found on the clothes of accused no. 6 will also be of
no avail, considering the overwhelming evidence about other
relevant circumstances indicating his complicity in the commission c
of crime. [Paras 36, 37] . (363-B-E; 364-B)
Sunil Clifford Daniel v. State of Punjab (2012) 7 SCR
1100 : (2012) 11 sec 205 - distinguished.
S(Jju v. State of Kera/a [2000] 4 Suppl. SCR 621 :
(2001) 1 SCC J78; Arjun Marik and others v. State of D
Bihar (1994) 2 SCR 265 : (1994) Suppl. 2 SCC 372;
Mohibur Rahman & Anr. v. State of Assam (2002) 6
SCC 715; Niranjan Panja v. State of W.B. [2010] 7
SCR 113 : (2010) 6 SCC 525; Sk. Yusuf v. State of W.B.
(2011] 8 SCR 83 : (2011) 11 SCC 754; Shyamal Ghosh E
v. State of W.B. (2012) 10 SCR 95 : (2012) 7 SCC 646;
Nizam v. State of Rajasthan [20J5] 10 SCR 786 : (2016)
1 SCC 550; Jackaran Singh '" State nf Punjab AIR
(1995) SC 2345 - referred to.
Case Law Reference F
Am (1995) SC 2345 referred tQ Para9
[1955) SCR 1285 distinguished Para9
[2012] 7 SCR 1100 distinguished Para9
[2015] 10 SCR 786 referred to Para 10 G
· [2000] 4 Suppl. SCR 621 referred to Para 10
[2007] 13 SCR 264 referred to Para 10
(19941 2 SCR 265 referred to Para 10
H
336 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [20 l 7] l S.C.R.
A c2002) 6 sec 115 referred to Para 10
{2010) 7 SCR 113 referred to Para 10
[2011) 8 SCR 83 referred to Para 10
[2012) 10 SCR 95 referred to Para 10
B [2014) 3 SCR 744 relied on Para 10
[2007) 10 SCR 153 distingnished Para 10
[2015) 6 SCR 375 referred to Para 10
(2015) 10 SCR 786 referred to Para 10
c (2003) 12 sec 377 distinguishe(J Para 10
(2009) 11 sec 106 held inapplicable Para 10
(1995) Supp. 4 sec 502 distinguished Para 11
[2005) 2 Suppl. SCR 79 relied on Para20
D
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
No. 467 of2010.
From the Judgment and Order dated 15 .09 .2008 of the High Court
of Judicature at Bombay, Nagpur Bench, Nagpur in Criminal Appeal
No. 444 of2005
E
WITH
Cr!. A. No. 854 of 20 I 0
Cr!. A. No. l I of2015.
F Kishor Lambat, S. Rajappa, Gagan Sanghi, Rameshwar Prasad
Goyal, Satyajit A. Desai, Ms. Anagha S. Desai, Akash Kakade, N ishant
Ramakantrao Katneshwarkar, Advs. for the appearing parties.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
A.M. KHANW'ILKAR, J. I. These appeals are filed by the ·
G original accused No. I (Crl.A.No.854/2010), accused No.3
(Crl.A.No.467/20 I0) and accused No.6 (Crl.A.No.1112015). They were
tried for offence punishable under Sections 364, 302, 20 I read with 34/
120-B oflndian Penal Code (!PC) along with four other accused.
2. The prosecution case is that, on IO"' May 2003, Shriniwas son
H
KISHORE BHADKE v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 337
(A.M. KHANWILKAR, J.]
of Wasudeorao Tonpe lodged a report (Exh.154) that his elder brother A
Raman has gone missing since morning of 8'' May 2003. On the basis of
that report, a missing Register entry was effected by the Police Station,
Narkhed, District Nagpur (Maharashtra). On the next day i.e. 11 ''May
2003 another brother of the missing person, Madan son ofWasudeorao
Toupe lodged a second report (Exh.68) suspecting that accused No. l-
Nalini, her husband Vijay Dhpake, accused No.2-Rinku, and accused ~B
No.7- Suresh Chandra might have abducted his brother Raman in order
to commit his murder. On the basis of this report, Police Station registered
an offence punishable under Section 364 read with Section 34 of !PC
against the named persons. Police Inspector R.B.Bansod (PW-17) was
entrusted with the investigation of the case. On the same day, he called C
accused No.1-Nalini and Accused No.2- Rinku to the Police Station for
interrogation. As nothing came out of that interrogation, the said accused
· persons were allowed to go back. However, on the same evening, he
arrested both Nalini and Rinku and thereafter accused No.3 - Kishor,
accused No.4- Tarachand in the mid night of 12"' May 2003. It is stated
that accused No.2- Rinku and accused No.3- Kishor, during interrogation D
confessed that on 8'' May 2003 between 1.00 p.m.to 1.30 p.m. they
along with accused No.4-Tarachand and.accused No.6-Satish with the
help of accused No.1-Nalini and accused No.5-Arun had committed
murder of Raman by strangulation in the cattle shed of one Nitin Rai.
The <lead body of Raman was thereafter taken away in a gunny bag and E
then thrown in a valley near "Deona Darshan Point". Before throwing
the dead body, they had removed the clothes and wrist watch from the
dead body. They then burnt the gunny bag as w '! as the rope used for
0
strangulation including some documents possessed by the deceased by
pouring petrol at some other place at a distance of 10 km. before Deona
Darshan Point. They also agreed lo show the spot where the gunny bag, F
cloth~s and documents were burnt and the place where the dead body
was disposed. Pursuant to the said revelation, the police party along
with accused No.2-Rinku and accused No.3-Kishor proceeded to the
locations disclosed by the said accused. Firstly, they showed the place
of burning the articles from where the remains in the form of ash and a G
bunch of keys was seized. Thereafter, they proceeded to the other
location where the dead body was found lying in the valley near Deona
Darshan Point. The Investigating Officer R.B.Bansod completed the
necessary formalities of preparing memorandum of statements of the
said accused, Panchnamas, seizure panchnamas/memos, Inquest
H
338 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] I S.C.R.
A panchnama etc. ·of the dead body. The dead body and the recovered
articles were then brought to Narkhed. The dead body was identified by
the comolainant Madan Tonpe (PW-I) at the spot i.e. Deona Darshan
Point itself. The dead body was then sent to Primary Health Centre,
Narkhed for post mortem examination. After the post mortem was
conducted on the dead body, it was handed over to the family members/
B
relatives for funeral. The mother of the deceased, Smt. Shantabai (PW
15) also identified the dead body of her son when it was brought to their
house. The offence was then converted and registered under Section
364, 302 and 261 read with Section 34/120-I\ of the !PC. Thereafter
remaining accused i.e. accused No.5- Arun, accused No.6-Satish and
c accused No.7-Suresh Chandra were arrested.
3. The Investigating Officer R.B.Bansod carried out further
investigation. He recorded statements of the witnesses, seized the vehicle/
Tata Sumo used in the commission of offence for transporting the dead
body, recovered the wrist watch and gold ring at the instance of accused
D No.3 - Kishor and accused No.6 - Satish respectively. He prepared a
panchnama of the place of incident in the cattle shed ofNitin Rai, seized
clothes of accused No.2 - Rinku, accused No.3-Kishore and accused
No.6-Satish and of deceased Raman. He then verified the bunch of
keys recovered from the spot disclosed by the accused by applying it on
the cupboard in the house of deceased Raman. He also arranged for
E
identification parade of the wrist watch and gold ring. He seized some
currenc) at the instance of accused No.6-Satish. The muddemaVproperty,
seized articles, viscera etc. was then sent to the Chemical Analyser for
analysis. After the investigation was completed, police report was filed
in the Court of J.M.F.C., Narkhed, who committed the case for trial of
F the accused before the Sessions Court at Nagpur. The trial proceeded
before t'1e 3" Addi. Sessions Judge, Nagpur, who framed charges for
offence punishable under Section 364, 302, 201 read with Section 34 in
the alternative 120-B ofIPC. All the accused pleaded not guilty and to
have been falsely implicated. They claimed to be tried.
G 4. The-prosecution examined in all 18 witnesses. On considering
the oral and documentary evidence adduced by the prosecution, the Trial
Court held that the accused persons conspired to kill Raman. In
furtherance of that conspiracy on Slh May 2003, Raman was abducted
by the accused persons and on the same day in the noon he was killed in
the cattle shed of Nitin Rai. Thereafter with a view to dispose of the
H
KJSHORE BHADKE v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 339
[A.M. KHANWILKAR, J.]
dead body of Raman and to destroy the evidence of murder, they carried A
the dead body of Raman and threw it in the valley near Pachmadi (in the
State· of Madhya Pradesh) at the spot later on disclosed to the Police by
the concerned accused. Similarly, the articles such as gunny bag used
for carrying the dead body and rope used for strangulation, clothes worn
by deceased Raman at the relevant time as also the documents in his
B
possession were burnt at a different spot which was disclosed to the
Police by the concerned accused. The Trial Court held that the death of
Raman was homicidal death. Accordingly, the Trial Court convicted the
accused for their involvement in the concerned offence. The operative
part of the Trial Court judgment reads thus:
"!.Accused No. 1 Nalini W/o Vijay Dhapke is hereby c
convicted vide section 235 (2) Cr.P. Code for the offence
punishable under Section 302 read with 120-B of LP.Code
to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life and to pay a fine
of Rs. 2,000/- (Rupees two thousand only) in default of
payment of fine amount to suffer further rigorous D
imprisonment for four months.
2. Accused ·No.2 Rinku alias Anand S/o Suresh Chandra
Roy is hereby convicted vi de section 23 5(2) of Cr.P. Code
for the offence punishable under section 302 read with 120-
B of LP.Code to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life E
and to pay a fine of Rs. 2,000/-(Rupees two thousand only)
in default of payment of fine amount to suffer further
rigorous imprisonment for four months.
3. Accused no. 3 Kishor is hereby convicted vide Section
235(2) of Cr.P. Code for the offence punishable under F
Section 302 read with 120-B of LP. Code to undergo
rigorous imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs. 2,000/
- (Rupees two thousand only) in default of payment of fine
amount to suffer further rigorous imprisonment for four
months.
G
4. Accused No.4 Tarachand is hereby convicted vide Section
235(2) of Cr.P. Code for the offence punishable under
Section 302 read with 120-B ofIP.Code to undergo rigorous
imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs. 2,000/-
(Rupees two thousand only) in default of payment of fine
H
340 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 1 S.C.R.
A amount to suffer further rigorous imprisonment for four
months.
5. Accused No. 6 Satish is hereby convicted vide Section
235(2) of Cr.P.Code for the offence punishable under
Seciion 302 read with 120-B of LP.Code to undergo rigorous
B imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs. 2,000/-
(Rupees two thousand only) in default of payment of fine
amount to suffer further rigorous imprisonment for four
months.
6. Accused Nos. I to 4 and 6 namely Nalini, Rinku, Kishor,
c Tarachand and Satish are hereby convicted vide Section
235(2) of Cr.P.Code for the offence punishable under
Section 364 read with 120-B oflP.Code to undergo rigorous
imprisonment for three years and to pay a fine of Rs. 2,000/
- (Rupees two thousand only) each in default of payment
oi fine amount to suffer further rigorous imprisonment for
D two months.
7. Accused Nos. 1 to 4 and 6 namely Nalini, Rlnku, Kishor,
Tarachand and Satish are hereby convicted vide Section
235(2) of Cr.P.Code for the offence punishable under
rigorous imprisonment for two years and to pay a fine of
E Rs. 1,000/- (Rupees one thousand only) each in default of
payment of fine amount to suffer further rigorous
ir.iprisonment for two months. ·
8. The above sentence ofAccused Nos. 1 to 4 and 6 namely
Nalini, Rinku, Kishor, Tarachand and Satish shall run
F concurrently
9. Accused No. 7 Suresh Chandra B,oy is hereby convicted
vide Section 235(2) ofCr.P.Code forthe offence punishable
urider Section 201 of LP.Code to undergo rigorous
imprisonment for two years and to pay a fine of Rs. l,000/
G -.(Rupees one thousand only) in default of payment of fine
amount to suffer simple imprisonment for two months.
10. Accused No. 7 Suresh Chandra Roy is directed to
si.rrenderhis bail bond forthwith.
11. Accused No. 7 Suresh Chandra Roy is acquitted vide
H
KISHORE BHADKE v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 341
[A.M. KHANWILKAR, J.]
Section 235 ofCr.P.Code for the offence punishable under A
Section 302, 364, read wi.th 120-B of LP. Code.
12. Accused No. 5 Arun Nasre is acquitted under Section
235 ofCr.P.Code forthe offence punishable under sections
302, 364, 201 read with 120-B of LP.Code and his bail bonds
shall stand cancelled. B
13. The period of undergone period by the accused by set
off against the above sentence of imprisonment under
Section 428 ofCr.P.Code.
14. The valuable muddemal property namely wrist watch,
golden ring and cash amount of Rs.4,600/- (Rupees four c
thousand six hundred only) be returned to the complainant
Madan S.o Wasudeo Tonpe RIO Narkhed after the appeal
period is over.
15. The remaining muddemal property being worthless be
destroyed after the appeal period is over." D
5. Aggrieved by the aforementioned decision, accused Nos. I to
4, 6 and 7 filed separate appeals before the High Court being Criminal
Appeal Nos.367, 435, 444 and 452 all of2005. The High Court dismissed
Appeal Nos.367, 435 and 444 of 2005 filed by the concerned accused
(Nos.2, 6, and 7; I; and 3 respectively); and allowed Appeal No.452 of E
2005 filed by accused No.4, by a common judgment dated 15"' September
2008. After re-appreciating the entire evidence adduced by the
Pros~cution, the High Court in paragraph 44 of the impugned judgment
summed up the circumstances which led to the finding of guilt against
the concerned accused. The sa~ reads thus: F
"44. It was submitted by the learned counsel for the
appellants that the motive is not established and everything
is in the air. We are, however, satisfied that the prosecution
has proved that Raman wanted to purchase the land of A-
l Nalini and her husband Vijay; that he entered into
G
transaction of purchasing the land from them; that two
agreements of sale were executed by Nalini and her husband
on consideration paid by Raman to them; that on 8.5.2003
A-1 Nalini called Raman to her house by giving him a ring;
that accordingly Raman went to her house after
H
342 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] I S.C.R.
A withdrawing Rs. 58,000/- from the Bank of Maharashtra,
Branch Narkhed; that at that time A-3 Kishore Bhadke, A-
4 Tarachand Vaidya and A-6 Salish Baµsod were also at
the house of A-1 Nalini; that thereafter Raman was not
seen alive; that Tata Sumo of Avinash Kalbande was
engaged by A-2 Rinku Roy for taking goods from the cattle
B
shed ofNitin Rai to Parasiya; that Sanjay Kalkar was the
driver ofthe said vehicle; that gunny bags were loaded in
Tata Sumo in the cattle shed ofNitin Roy; thatA-3 Kishore
B!ladke, A-6 Salish Bansod and A-7 Suresh Roy travelled
by the said Sumo from Narkhed to Parasiya; thatA-2 Rinku
c Roy followed Tata Sumo on motorcycle; that in the midnight
the gunny bags were unloaded from Tata Sumo at the house
of A-7 Suresh Roy; that on the next day morning Sanjay
Kalkar brought Tata Sumo to the house of owner thereof;
·that on I 0.5.2003 Sanjay Kalkar again came to take back
Tata Sumo and thereafter he never turned up."
D
After analyzing the other circumstances and contentions, the High
Court concluded that the finding reached by the Trial Court that the
dead bo1y discovered from the valley near Deona Darshan Point was..
that of deceased Raman and that he met with homicidal death, was
unassaiiablc. The High Court also considered the circumstance of
E discovery of wrist watch at the instance of accused No.3, gold ring of
Raman and cash of Rs.4800/- ( 48 notes of I 00 denomination) seized
. from accused No.6; including the blood stained earth seized from cattle
shed ofNitin Rai on I 6'h May 2003 under seizure memo (Exh.92) which
as per th~ report of Chemical A ,alyser (Exh.151) showed human blood.
F Human blood was also found on the pant of Accused No.2 Rinku, which
circums.ance remained unexplained. Similarly, full pant and shirt of
accused No.3 Kishor which were seized on 15"' May 2003 from his
house and on analysis by the Chemical Analyser it showed human blood,
which also remained unexplained. After taking over all view of the matter,
the High Court concluded that the complete chain of circumstances
G unequivocally point out towards the gUilt ofacc11~cd ';o.1- Nalini, accused
No.2 -Rinku, accused No.3- Kishore Bhadke, and accused No.6- Salish
Bansod, excluding any hypothesis consistent with their innocence.
Accordingly, they were convicted for offence punishable under Section
364/120-B, 302/120-B and 201/120-B of the !PC. The finding of guilt
H
KISHORE BHADKE v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 343
[A.M. KHANWILKAR, J.]
reached against these accused by the Trial Court was once again A
reiterated by the High Court.
6. As regards accused No.4-Tarachand, in paragraph 74 of the
impugned judgment, the High Court observed thus:
"74. On close scrutiny of the evidence we find that though
there is evidence to show that A-4 Tarachand Vaidya was B
at the house of A-I Nalini on 8.5.2003 when Raman came
to her house and he was also seen loading gunny bags in
Tata Sumo, he did not travel by Tata Sumo from Narkhed
to Parasiya thereafter. From the evidence it seems that
the role of A-4 Tarachand Vaidya is only to the extent of c
loading gunny bags in Tata Sumo from the cattle shed of
Nitin Roy. There is no evidence to show that he was aware
of the murder of Raman. Immediately after loading gunny
bags in Tata Sumo, he left the place and did not travel by
Tata Sumo from Narkhed onwards. From these
circumstances A-4 Tarachand Vaidya is entitled to get D
benefit of doubt. Accordingly we extend benefit of doubt to
him and acquit him."
7. While dealing with the case ofaccused No.7- Suresh, the High
Court in paragraph 75 ofthe impugned judgment observed thus:
E
"75. The role of A-7 Suresh Roy is only to the extent of
helping the other accused persons in removing the dead
body of Raman from Narkhed to Parasiya and thereafter
causing disappearance of the dead body and other evidence
of the offence. As such his conviction for the offence
punishable under Section 201/120-B of IPC needs to be F
maintained."
'8. The High Court finally disposed of the appeals in the following
terms:
"(i)Appeal Nos. 367 of2005, 435 of2005 and 444 of2005
G
are dismissed. Bail bonds of original accused No.7/
Stireshchandra Jagannath Rai stand cancelled. He is
directed to surrender within four weeks to serve out the
sentence.
(ii) Appeal No. 452 of2005 is allowed. The conviction of
H
344 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] I S.C.R.
A Tarachand s/o Shalikram Vaidya for the offence punishable
under Sections 364, 302 and 20 I r/w 120-B of IPC is set
aside and he is acquitted of the said charges. He be released
forthwith ifnot required in any other offence."
9. Aggrieved by the aforementioned decision, accused Nos. I, 3
B and 6 have assailed the same by way of separate appeals before this
Court. The argument was led by Advocate R.R.Deshpande for accused
No.3. He submitted that the prosecution case hinges on circumstantial
evidence. If the chain of circumstances is not complete pointing towards
the guilt of the accused, it would be unsafe to uphold the finding of guilt
though concurrent by two courts below. He submits that the High Court
c has not analyzed the circumstance about the nature of death of Raman
as to whether it was suicidal or homicidal death. He submits that
circumstance held against accused No.3 of recovery of blood stained
clothes ~this instance is questionable. In that, the prosecution has failed
to establish the blood group much less that the blood stains pertained to
D the bloc,d group of deceased Raman. He submits that the evidence
regarding factum of motive produced by the prosecution is very weak.
In any case, motive is attributed to Nalini (Al) with which accused No.3
has no concern. Therefore, that circumstance cannot .be used against
him. He has also taken us through the evidence bf prosecution witnesses
who have spoken about the presence of accused at the scene of offence,
E relied by the prosecution to substantiate the circumstance of last seen
together. He submitted that the evidence of PW-11 and PW-12 is not
reliable. Their statements wer~ recorded after a long gap and the reason
for such delay has not been explained. Further, the prosecution witness
(PW 12) examined in support of this circumstance is a chance witness.
F He was residing in another village. The prosecution theory about homicidal
death is doubtful. Even the evidence regarding the manner in which the
body of deceased Raman was thrown is doubtful. For, no lacerated injury
wasfour.d by the Doctor while conducting post mortem. Only four injuries
have been noted which belies the prosecution theory that the body was
thrown in the valley from the height of aroun~ 600 ft. He submits that
G the factual position mentioned in the memorandum of disclosure recorded
under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, relied by the prosecution qua
accused 1'10.3, is inadmissible and cannot be taken into account. In absence
thereof, there is no legal evidence about discovery of dead body of
deceased or articles belonging to the deceased ascribable to accused
H
KISHORE BHADKE v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 345
[A.M. KHANWILKAR, J.]
No.3 Thus, that circumstance cannot be used against him. He submits A
thatthe said evidence is inadmissible also because no signature ofaccused
is tahn on the recovery panchnama. He then submits that the statement
of accused No.3 recorded under Section 313, Cr.P.C., the who:e of it is
vitiated because it is a joint statement of ali the accused recorded by the
Trial Court. In support of this contention, he invited our attention to the
B
said statement recorded under Section 313, Cr.P.C. Lastly, he submits
that benefit be given to accused No.3 on the same reasoning as given to
accused No.7. Learned counsel has placed reliance on the decisions of
this Court in the cases of Jackaran Sin1:!1 vs. State of Paniah 1; A.R.
K/1ima vs. State of Saurashtra2; and Sunil Clifford Daniel vs. State
of Punjab3• c
I 0. The accused No. I is represented by Advocate Mr. Gagan
Sanghi. His argument essentially revolved around the two circumstances
held against accused No. I. Firstly, of motive and secondly last seen
together. He submits that no recovery has been made at the instance of
accused No. I nor it is the case of prosecution that accused No. I was D
seen along with other accused travelling in Tata Sumo vehicle wherein
the dead body of deceased Raman was carried away. As regards motive,
he submits that the prosecution theory about the illicit relations between
accused No. I Nalini and accused No.2 Rinku has been discarded by
both the courts below. The Trial Court as well as the High Court has,
however, accepted the prosecution case that there was some transaction E
about land between accused No. I Nalini and deceased Raman over
which the matter got escalated causing death of Raman. The evidence
in this behalf produced by the prosecution, however, is very weak. PW-
1 in his cross-examination says that he had disclosed about the said fact
to PW-17 (1.0.) i.e. about the agreement executed between the parties. F
But PW-I was not aware as to why that fact is not mentioned in his
statement recorded by the police. Further, PW-17(1.0.) in the cross-
examination has denied of any such statement given by PW-I. PW-l 7 .
(1.0.) admitted in his cross-examination that he had not inveSiigatedtlie · ·
matter with regard to the land transaction. Moreover, PW- I in his ct6ss-
examination admits that he does not know who and in whose name the G
stamp papers were purchased and how payments were made. The other
witntss, who has spoken about the land transaction)s PW-15, mother of
1
AIR .1995 SC 2345 -Para 8
'AIR 1956SC217
' (20!2) I I sec 205 Para 37 to 40 H
346 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] I S.C.R.
A deceasec Raman. She has spoken about the phone call received on S•h
May 2003 from Nalini. She wanted to talk to Raman. Raman attended
the phone call and thereafter disclosed to PW! 5 that Nalini (accused
No. I) had called him to her house and he will go along with docm'1ents
in respect of agricultural land to get her signature. She has stated that
deceased Raman left the house at about 11.30 a.m. According to the
B
learned counsel, evidence of PW-15 cannot be taken into account as
neither the documents regarding transaction have been produced by the
prosecution nor the documentary evidence regarding the fact that phone
call was received by PW-15 has been produced. As regards the factum
of last seen together, it is submitted that the evidence of PW- I I is
c unreliable and is replete with material omissions and contradictions.
Similarly, the evidence of PW-12 is also unreliable. As a result, the
prosecution has failed to substantiate the crucial circumstance of last
seen tog~ther with accused No. I. This being a crucial link and as no
satisfactory evidence is forthcoming to indicate the complicity ofaccused
No. I, th~ finding of guilt qua accused No. I would be unsafe. Further,
D
being a case of circumstantial evidence, the Court must analyze the
evidence with utmost circumspection and even if one crucial Iink is
missing, benefit must go to the accused. He has placed reliance on Niz(lnt
(Ind (lnotller vs. St(lte of Rajastl1an'. On the issue of motive he has
placed n~liance on Saju vs. State of Kerafo' to contend that motive by
E itself cannot be a proof of conspiracy. Reliance is also placed on Kes/iav
vs. State of Mallaras/1tra' to contend that conviction cannot be based
solely on the basis of motive; and the circumstal)ce oflast.seen together
becomes relevant only when the death is proved to have taken place
within a short time of the accused being last seen. Reliance is then
placed on Arjun Marik (Ind others vs. State of Bi/i(lr 7 to buttress the
F
argument that the factum of motive assumes importance in a case of
circumstantial evidence, if it is established from the evidence on record
that the accused had a strong motive and also an opportunity to commit
the crime; and that the established circumstances along witl1 the
explanation of the accused, ifany, exclude the reasonable possibility of
G anyone else being the perpetrator of the crime then the chain of evidence
may be considered to show that within all human probability the crime
must have been committed by the accused. Thus, the only circumstance
'(2016) 1 sec 550-Para 8,9, 18-20
'(2001) 1 sec 378
• (2007) 13 sec 284
H '1994 SuiJpl.(2J sec 372
KISHORE BHADKE v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA· 347
[A.M. KHANWILKAR, J.]
of last seen together will not be enough to complete the chain of A
circumstances to record a finding of guilt against accused No. I. He has
also placed reliance on the other decisions, more or less dealing with
similar aspect, in the case of Moltibur Rollman & Anr. vs. State of
Assam•; Niranjan Panja vs. State of W.B. •; Sk. Yusuf vs. State of
W.B.1°; Sf1yamaf Ghosfl vs. State of W.B. 11; K<mftaiya Lal vs. State B
of Rajasthan 11; Mafleshappa vs. State of Karnatakau; Ashok vs. .
State of Maharashtra,,; Nizam vs. State of Rajastftan'·'.; Mousam
Singha Roy & Ors. vs. State of W.B. 16 and Sangifi vs. State of Tamil
Nadu 17 Reliance is also placed on the decision in the case of Lohit
Kaushal vs. State of Haryana 18 about the efficacy of statement of a
co-accused under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. C
. I I. Ms. Anagha SJ)esai, Advocate appeared for accused No.6.
She contends that that the dead body was recovered at the instance of
accused Nos.2 and 3. The recovery of gold ring atthe instance ofaccused
No.6 is doubtful. The prosecution has not established the special identity
of gold ring and it has come on record that such gold rings are freely D
availl!ble in the open market. Further, no blood stains or any incriminatory
evidence was noticed on the gold ring. The accused No.6 was arrested .
on JJth May 2003 on which day his statement was also recorc!ed. The
recovery of gold ring, however, is on I 8th May 2003, while the accused
No.6 was in police custody. Similarly, the cash amount recovered at the ·
instance of accused No.6 was of no avaiHo-the prosecution. It was a E
paltry amount as compared to the amount withdrawn by Raman on 8th
May 2003 from the Bank. Further, there is no evidence that the. currency'
recovered .from accused No.6 was the same as withdrawn by the ·
· deceased Raman from the Bank. No blood stains were found on the
clothes recovered at the instance of accused No.6. In the confession F
statement ofaccused No.2, there is no mention ofgold ring. The signature
• (2002) 6sec115
'(2010) 6 sec 525
10
(2011) 11 sec 754
"(2012)7 sec 646
"(20;4) 4 sec 115
G
" (2007) 13 sec 399
1
4(2015) 4 sec 393
1
' (2016) 1 sec 550
1
• (20P3) 12 sec 377
11
(2014) 10 sec 264
"(2009) 17 sec 106 - Para 18, 21 H
348 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] I S.C.R.
A of accused No.6 was obtained on a blank paper and it was then used as
a memorandum under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. Recovery of
clothes as well as gold ring attributed to the accused No.6 was doubtful.
Reliance is placed by the counsel on Guiab Si11f(fl vs. State of U.P. 19 to
contend :hat recovery of ring of deceased from the accused No.6 after
such long gap and even ifaccused No.6 failed to offer valid explanation
B
for possession of the gold ring, is at best liable to be convicted tinder
Section 411 off PC and not for the offence of murder. She submits that
the.accused No.6 should be given the same benefit as given to accused
No.7, if not an acquittal as in the case of accused Nos.4 and 5.
12. Per contra, Mr. N.R. Katneshwarkar, Advocate appearing
c for the State supported the findings and conclusions reached by the two
courts below. He submits thatthe argument of the appellants is essentially
on the basis of some minor discrepancies in the evidence and not because
of material omissions amounting to contradictions or contradictory
evidence of the prosecution. Two courts below have had the opportunity
D to analyze the evidence threadbare; and the view taken by the High
Court being a possible view, does not merit any interference. He submits
that there is clinching evidence to indicate the complicity of accused
Nos. I, 3 and 6, who are the appellants before this Court. No fault can be
found with the courts below for having convicted them for the stated
offence. He took us through the evidence of the concerned witnesses
E and pointed out the findings of the two courts below which have analyzed
the said "vidence exhaustively and analytically. Regarding the factum of
land transaction, the evidence of PW! was unassailable. He submits
that the prosecution has successfully substantiated the circumstance of
motive of accused No. I. The fact that no discovery is made at the
F instance of accused No. I would be of no avail to the said accused. She
was the master mind of the conspiracy to murder Raman. There was
dispute between accused No. I and deceased Raman in respect of land
transaction and non-payment of the agreement amount. The prosecution
evidence has established that Nalini had made a telephone call to
deceased Raman on 8'h May 2003. PW-15 has also spoken aboi:t the
G fact disclosed to her by Raman before leaving the house at around 11.30
a.m. The prosecution was also able to substantiate the fact that Raman
after leaving the house in the presence of PW-15, proceeded towards
the Bank and withdrew an amount of Rs.58,000/-. He went to the house
" I 995 Supp. (4) sec 502
H
KISHORE BHADKE v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 349
[A.M. KHANWILKAR, J.]
of Nal ini where he was last seen. The dead body of Raman was put in A
a gunny bag and transported by Tata Sumo vehicle. It was then Jisposed
at a spot disclosed by the accused Nos.2 and 3. He submits that
prosecution has succeeded in establishing motive and last seen together
which is good enough to affirm the finding of guilt against accused No. I
Nalini. As regards accused No.6, he submits that the recovery of ring
B
which belonged to deceased Raman has been established by the
prost>cution. Besides that, accused No.6 was not only last seen together
with the deceased in the house ofNalini but also while taking away the
dead body of deceased Raman in Tata Sumo vehicle. His involvement
'cannot be equated with the role of accused Nos. 4, 5 and 7, which has
been found to be materially different by the Courts below. While refuting c
the argument ofaccused No.3, he submits that the prosecution has been
able to establish that the death was homicidal death and was caused due
to strangulation by a rope. The prosecution has also established the
presence of accused No.3 at the relevant time. He was not :inly last
seen together in the house ofNalini accused No. I at the relevant time
D
but also in the Tata Sumo vehicle in which the dead body of Raman was
transported. Moreover, the location where the dead body and articles of
Raman were disposed has been disclosed even by accused No.3. Reliance
is placed on the decision of this Court in the case of Suni/ Clifford
Daniel (supra) to contend that absence of signature of the accused on
the memorandum ofrecovery would make no difference. The statement E
of the accused No.3 recorded under Section 27 of the Evidence has
been signed by the accused. A separate statement of accused No.3 was
recorded before the police proceeded to the location which was jointly
disclosed by accused Nos. 2 and 3. Learned counsel submits that all the
appeals deserve to be dismissed and the finding of guilt and sentence
F
awarded to the concerned accused be affirmed.
13. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length.
We were ably assisted by the learned counsel for the respective parties
who took us through the relevant depositions and documents and the .
analysis done by the Trial Court and the High Court in that behalf. We
must appreciate the exhaustive judgment delivered by the Trial Court, G
meticulously dealing with every aspect of the evidence on record. We
find that the High Court has also analyzed the relevant piece of evidence
on its own besides adverting to the findings rendered by the Trial Court
in that regard. In other words, we have to deal with concurrent findings
H
350 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2017] 1 S.C.R.
A of fact on most of the relevant aspects concerning the matters in issue.
Our analysis, therefore, must focus on the legal aspects emanating from
the concurrent findings so recorded and not to re-appreciate the entire
evidence.
14. In this backdrop, we may first advert to the main question as
B to whefoer the circumstance of motive and last seen together, as
answered· by the two courts below, is just a.nd proper. As regards the
circumstance of motive, prosecution has mainly relied on the evidence
of PW-I and PW-15. The criticism is that no documentary evidence to
buttress the factum of land transaction between deceased Raman and
Nalini (accused No. I) and about the telephone call made by Nalini to
c Raman in the morning on 8"' May 2003, as stated' by the said witnesses
have been brought on record or any attempt made by the Investigating
Officer to recover the same. The courts below have found that absence
of documentary evidence in the form of agreement of land transaction
or a civil suit between the parties, that cannot be the basis to outright
D discard the statements given by the witnesses to the Investigating Officer
. and more particularly the evidence before the court. They have spoken
about the dispute regarding taking of possession of the land. Fµrther, the
accused No. I in her statement under Section 313, Cr.P.C. has stated
that the members ofTonpe family wanted her land and they cheated her
and that Raman ·Tonpe and his brother Madan Tonpe (PW-I) caused
E heavy loss to her agricultural land and also defamed her. The courts
below, therefore, held that absence of documents regarding such
transaction was not fatal. The evidence on record was enough tb accept
the theory of demand for compliance of the transaction from the side of
Tonpe family, as the cause of motive. The courts h~ve also noted from
F the evidence that there was some dispute in respect of hotel premises
for which Vijay Dhpake (husband of accused No.1-Nalini), had lodged
a report against accused No.2. That dispute was settled by deceased
Raman. The Courts below have found that the prosecution proved the
following circumstances. That deceased Raman was the Director of
Rashtra Mata Indira Gandhi Kanya Vidyalaya,Narkhed. The land of
G accused No. I Nalini and her husband Vijay Dhpake was adjacent to the
said school. Since Raman was looking after the family affairs ofTonpe,
he had entered into an agreement with accused No. I Nalini and her
husband Vijay for purchase oftheir land. Accused No. I and her husband
executed an agreement in favour of Madan and her elder brother Pramod
H
KISHORE BHADKE v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 351
[A.M. KHANWILKAR, J.]
by accepting Rs.25,000/-. Another agreement of sale was executed in A
favour of Pramod by accepting Rs.1,33,000/-. The possession of the
land was also delivered to Tonpe family. Besides the said amount,
deceased Raman had paid Rs.50,000/- and Rs.30,000/-to Nalini towards
the transaction for which receipts were executed on separate stamp
paper. This had happened one year before the incident in question. The
B
High Court in paragraph 26 has dealt with the argument under
consideration and observed thus:
"26. lt is true that neither the alleged agreements of sale no
receipts for payment made after the agreements have been
produced by the prosecution. However, we cannot overlook
the evidence to the effect that when on the date of incident c
deceased Raman had left his house, he had carried the
documents about those transactions with him. Neither those
documents nor the cash amount which was carried by
deceased Raman was recovered perhaps because all the
belongings of deceased Taman were burnt before his dead D
body was thrown in the valley. As agreements of sale might
not have been registered and as such no certified copies
· thereof could be obtained by the prosecution in order to
support its case. Even otherwise this is not a civil
proceeding in which transactions of sale are to be proved
by production of documents. We can rely on oral testimony E
of PW! Madan for this purpose. Hence we find that the
sale transactions between A-I Nalini and Raman have been
proved by the prosecution."
Also in para 31 the High Court observed thus:
F
"31. It was urged by the learned counsel for the appellants
that the investigating officer has not verified the record from
the Telephone Exchange about the call received at the
residence of deceased Raman on 8.5.2003. In the absence
of corroboration by the record of Telephone Exchange, the
testimony of PW Shantabai should not be' accepted. We G
are unable to agree with this submission. We see no reason
to disbelieve the testimony of PW Shantabai. This would
show that the documents about transaction of purchase of
land were taken by deceased Raman with him and as those
H
352 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 1 S.C.R.
A documents must have been burnt. So there is no question
of production of those documents in order to prove the
transaction between A-I Nalini and deceased Raman."
15. The question is whether the approach of the High Court
regarding the argument under consideration is correct. We !)lay hasten
B to add that Criminal Court trying the offence of murder was not required
to decide about the issue of title of the land or to consider the relief of
specific performance. The evidence given by PW-1 and corroborated
by PW-15, revealed that there was transaction in respect ofland between
the accused No. l and Tonpe's. That version could not be demolished in
c .the cross-examination. Another piece of evidence relied by the prosecution
is about the destruction of clothes and articles of deceased Raman. The
Police could only recover ash from the spot along with bunch of keys.
That lends support to the prosecution case that the possibility of
documents having been destroyed also cannot be ruled out. Hence, it
was open to the Trial Court as well as the High Court to rely on the
D evidence of witnesses for the limited purpose. The fact that deceased
Raman while leaving his house had carried some papers/documents with
him has been stated by PW-15, when he went to meet accused No. I
Nalini. The counsel for the appellants and in particular accused No. I
had drawn our attention to cross-examination of PW-15. He has also
drawn our attention to cross-examination of PW-1 to contend that the
E
factum ofland transaction between Tonpe and Nalini was not disclosed
in the statement recorded by the Police under Section 161 of the Code.
On close examination of the said cross-examination, we found that the
question posed to the witness was limited to the initial statement and not
to the supplementary statement recorded by the Investigating Officer. A
F supplementary statement of the witnesses was given to the Investigating
Officer, which mentioned the fact of land transaction, as was deposed
by the witness in the examination-in-chief. In other words, it was half
hearted cross-examination by the accused. No question was posed in
respect of the contents of the supplementary statement which was also
part of the charge-sheet and crucial to the relevant fact. The answer
G given by Investigating Officer PW-17 therefore will have to be understood
in the same context. Confronted with this situation, the argument of the
appellants is that no documentary evidence regarding the transaction is
forthcoming. For the reasons already mentioned', there is no tangible
reason to discard the relevant fact established by the prosecution
H witnesses in support of the circumstance of motive.
KISHORE BHADKE v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 353
[A.M. KHANWILKAR, J.]
16. The prosecution has also established the vital circumstance A
of last seen together. That evidence is given by PW-11 and PW-12 in
particular. Their evidence will have to be juxtaposed with the evidence
of PW-15, who has spoken about the telephone call received from Nalini
and pursuant to which Raman left his house in her presence with relevant
documents/papers. The courts below have accepted her version as
B
truthful and reliable. That evidence cannot be discarded on the basis of
some minor discrepancies pointed out during the course of argument.
The finding recorded by the two courts below with regard to PW-15
about the truthfulness of her version is unexceptional. The evidence of
PW-I I corroborates the fact that deceased Raman had gone to the Bank
for withdrawing cash amount and then proceeded to the house ofNalini c
ac.cused No. I. He has deposed that Raman went inside the house of
Nalini and saw accused Nos.2, 3, 4 and 6 standing near the cattle shed
ofNitin Rai. While returning back he saw accused No.5 standing near
the water tank.
17. The fact of deceased Raman had gone to the Bank for D
withdrawing the amount has been corroborated by PW-8 who was
Cashier in the Bank at the relevant time. Even the evidence of PW-8
has been found to be truthful and reliable. In other words, there is credible
evidence on record that Raman started from his house in the presence
of PW-15 as stated by her. He then proceeded to the Bank for
E
withdrawing amount ofRs.58,000/-, which obviously was to be paid to
accused No. I Nalini. From the Bank he straight proceeded to the house
of Nalini. That fact stated by PW-I I stands corroborated from the
evidence of PW-12, who has deposed that he hdu gone to Nalini's house
to finalise the deal concerning her agricultural land for cultivation on
yearly rent basis. He met her in her house at about 11.30 a.m. to 12.00 F
noon and found that Raman WJS sitting in the verandah of the house
with her. He had also seen accused Nos.2, 3, and 6 in the same room.
The counsel forthe appellants no doubt made an attempt to discredit this
witness on the basis of some discrepancies in his evidence such as the
place where his statement was recorded by the Police - whether in his
house or in the Police Station and that he knew Raman for the last 10 G
years and was therefore an interested witness. Further, the fact stated
by him that Raman was sitting in Varandah and talking to Nalini and
when he saw other accused were present has not been disclosed to the
Investigating Officer and unable to assign any reason as to why he had
H
354 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] l S.C.R.
A not disclosed that fact. The evidence of this witness has been analyzed
by the Trial Court as well as by the High Court. This witness has been
found to be independent and truthful. He has deposed about the relevant
facts which have been corroborated by the version of PW-11 about the
concerned accused persons last seen together. No other witnesses has
come forward to depose that after the meeting of deceased Raman with
B
Nalini, Raman was seen elsewhere at a later point of time. Thus, there
is sufficient evidence about the factum of last seen together. This
circumstance is further strengthened by the evidence given by other
prosecution witnesses (PW 9, 6 and 12), who had seen the concerned
accused persons loading a gunny bag in Sumo vehicle after some time;
c and that accused Nos. 3 and 6 were also seen in the vehicle carrying
that gunny bag. The gunny bag, as found by the two courts below was
used to carry the dead body of deceased Raman which was transported
in a vehicle and then thrown at an isolated location in the valley. There is
no tangible reason to doubt the correctness of the concurrent finding
recorded by the two courts below in this behalf. The Courts below have
D
undertaken detailed analysis of the evidence of the concerned prosecution
witnesses. Thus, the prosecution has succeeded in establishing the
circumstance of motive and last seen together indicating the involvement
of the appellants -accused Nos.I, 3 and 6 in particular.
18. It was then argued that the High Court has failed tQ..analyse
E the fact as to whether death of Raman was suicidal or homicidal. From
the judgment of the Trial Court, we find that every aspect on this issue
has been considered threadbare from para 16 to para 25, to conclude
that the death of deceased Raman was homicidal death. The Trial Court
has examined the evidence of Dr.R.N.Gakare (PW-16), letter of
F requisition (Exh.127) and the post mortem report (Exh.129). The Doctor
has explained the circumstances in which he could notice the injuries on
the dead body. He has categorically deposed that although the dead
body was decomposed because of passage of time but identity of the
person could be discerned. The Doctor himself identified deceased
Raman as he was known to him. The other prosecution witnesses PW-
G 1 and PW-15 have also identified the dead body of Raman. The Qoctor
has also explained the fracture injury noticed on the dead body, which, in
his opinion, was due to strangulation and asphyxia. Thus, we find no
merit in the contention that the nature ofinjury noted in the post mortem
report would rule out the possibility of homicidal death. The dead body .
H
KISHORE BHADKE v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 355
[A.M. KHANWILKAR, J.]
has been discovered at the instance of accused Nos.2 and 3 from the A
spot in a valley about 600 ft. deep. The Police reached that spot on the
basis of the disclosure made by the said accused Nos. 2 and 3 under
Section 27 of the Evidence Act. The Police party along with other
witnesses had proceeded to the spot disclosed by accused Nos.2 and 3
and recovered the dead body of Raman from the valley.
B
19. It was contended by the counsel for the accused No.3 that
the evidence regarding discovery of the dead body of Raman cannot be
used against accused No.3. Inasmuch as, when accused No.3 gave his
statement and recorded in the form of Memorandum under Section 27
of the Evidence Act, the Police already knew about the spot where the
dead body was thrown as it was disclosed by accused No.2. It was
c
contended that the.statement made by accused No.2 can be used only
against accused No.2. This argument has been negatived by the Trial
Court after analyzing the decisions which were brought to its notice, as
can be discerned from para 46 to para 53 of the judgment. The Trial
Court found that in the present case the accused Nos.2 and 3 made D
disclosure (about the spot where dead body of Raman was thrown by
them) one after another in quick succession and that their statement
came to be recorded separately. The only thing that had happened was
a joint discovery made at the instanc"· of both the accused Nos.2 and 3,
on proceeding to the spot along with the police. Section 27 of the Evidence.
Act is an exception to Section 25 of the Act. Section 25 mandates that
no confession to a Police Officer while in police custody shall be proved
as against a person accused of any offence. Section 27, however, provides
that any fact deposed to and discovered in con,~4uence of information
received from a person accused of any offence, in the custody of a
Police Officer, so much of such informatipn, whether it amounts to a F
confession or not, as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered,
may be proved. The fact where the dead body of deceased Raman was
disposed, was disclosed by both the accused Nos.2 and 3 to the
Investigating Officer in the presence of SK Idris (PW 2) one after another
on 12'h May 2003 at 3.05 hrs and 3.25 hrs. respectively. The discovery
was made only after accused Nos.2 and 3 were taken together by the G
police to the spot in the neighbouring State (Madhya Pradesh), where
the recovery Panchnama was recorded bearing Exh. 76A. In other words,
the disclosure of the relevant fa2t by accused No.3 to the Investigating
Officer preceeded the discovery of dead body from the disclosed spot
H
356 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2017] I S.C.R.
A at the instance of both the accused Nos. 2 and 3. It was not a case of
recording of statement of accused No.3 after discovery nor a joint
statement ofaccused Nos.2 and 3, but disclosure made by them separately
in quick succession to the Investigating Officer, preceding the discovery
of the fact so stated. The fact disclosed by them, therefore, and the
discovery made at their instance, was admissible against both the accused
B
in terms of Section 27 of the Evidence Act.
20. In the case of State (NCT of Del/ii) Vs. Navjot Sandliu, 10
this Court has held that a joint disclosure or simultaneous disclosures,
per se, are not inadmissible under Section 27. ·A person accused need
not necessarily be a single person, but it could be a plurality of the accused.
c The Court held that a joint or simultaneous disclosure is a myth, because
two or more accused persons would not have uttered informatory words
in chorus. When two persons in custody are interrogated separately and
simultaneously and both of them may furnish similar information leading
to the discovery of fact which was reduced into writing, such disclosure
D by two or more persons in police custody do not go out of the purview of
Section 27 altogether. What is relevant is that information given by one
after the other without any break, almost simultaneously, as in the present
case and such information is followed up by pointing out the material
things by both of them then there is no good reason to eschew such
evidence from the regime of Section 27. Whether that information is
E credible is a matter of evaluation of evidence. The Courts below have
accepted the prosecution version in this behalf, being credible. Suffice it
to say that the disclosure made by Accused No. 3 about the relevant
fact, per se, is not inadmissible.
21. Reliance was placed on A.R. Kliima (supra) to contend that
F incriminating articles alleged to have been recovered at this instance of
the accused is inadmissible in evidence, ifthe police already knew where
they were hidden. The dictum in the said decision is in the context of the
fact situation of that case. The Court found that the police already knew
where the articles were hidden. Further, the information was not derived
G from the accused but from someone else, one of the other suspects. In
that case, the Sub-Inspector to whom the disclosure was made was not
examined by the prosecution. The Court also found that articles were
not hidden but kept in the manner which might be normally kept in any
average household. In the present case, as found by .the Courts below,
"2005 ( 11) sec 600 (para 45)
H
KISHORE BHADKE v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 357
[A.M. KHANWILKAR, J.]
the disclosure was made by the Accused Nos. 2 and 3 in quick succession. A
The police party along with witnesses and both the accused thereafter
proceeded to the isolated spot (in a valley) disclosed by the said accused
from where the dead body of Raman was discovered. The concerned
Police Officer as well as the witnesses to the Memorandum of Statement
recorded under Section 27 have been examined by the prosecution and
B
found to be reliable and trustworthy. This reported decision, therefore,
does not take the matter any further.
22. It was then argued that the recovery Panchnama (Exh.76A)
did not contain signature of the accused and for which reason the same
was inadmissible. Even this submission does not commend to us. In that,
no provision has been brought to our notice which mandates taking
c
signature of the accused on the recovery Panchnama. Admittedly,
signature of accused was taken on the statement recorded under Section
27 of the Evidence Act (Exh.76 and 77 respectively). The statement of
accused No.3 (Exh. 77) bears his signature. Therefore, even this argument
does not take the matter any further. D
23. In the case of the Jackara11 Singh (supra), the Court opined
that the disclosure statement given by the accused regarding conscious
possession of the weapon did not inspire confidence. One of the reason
was that disclosure statement did not bear the signature or the thumb
impression of the appellant. The Court found that even, the recovery E
memo of the revolver and the cartridges did not bear eitherthe signatures
or the thumb impression of the accused. In the present case, the
disclosure statement bears the signature of accused Nos. 2 and 3
respectively. The absence of signatures on the recovery memo (Exhibit
76-A) would not make it inadmissible and it has been rightly taken into
account because of the other evidence regarding its authenticity and F
genuineness. In the recent decision in the case of Sunil C/iffor<l Dm1iel
(supra), in paras 37 to 40, the issue stands answered againstthe appellants.
Reliance was placed on the dictum in paras 18 and 21 in the case of
Lollit Kaushal (supra). In that case, the Court found that the statement
of accused who was discharged by the Trial Court was hit by Section 25 G
and 26 of the Evidence Act. The same was inadmissible in evidence.
The Court, however, observed that statement made to the Police can
only be used for the limited purpose provided under Section 27 of the
Evidence Act and that too only agaiiist the person making the statement.
In that case, the statement made by the concerned accused who was
H
358 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] I S.C .R.
A discharged did not lead to the recovery of any item whatsoever. In the
present case, however, the statement of accused No.2 and 3 has been
recorded separately and both the accused accompanied the Police and
disclosed the spot where the dead body of Raman was thrown. On the
basis of that disclosure, the dead body of Raman and the remains of the
burnt articles of Raman were recovered for which that fact becomes
B
relevant fact and can be used against the appellants (accused Nos.2 and
3). In other words, this decision will be of no assistance to the said
appellants.
24. It was then contended that the circumstance of blood stained
clothes recovered at the instance· of accused No.3 was questionable
c because no evidence regarding the blood group or the fact that the blood
stains belonged to the blood group of deceased Raman is forthcoming.
Further, the recovery itself was doubtful. Even this aspect has been
considered by both the courts below and negatived. The absence of
evidence regarding blood group cannot be fatal to the prosecution. The
D finding recorded by the courts below about the presence of human blood
on the clothes recovered at the instance of accused No.3 has not been
questioned. The Courts have also found that no explanation was offered
by the accused No.3 in respect of presence of human blood on his clothes.
Accordingly, we affirm the concurrent finding recorded by the courts
below in that behalf including about the legal icy of such recovery at the
E instance of accused No.3.
25. It was then argued by the counsel fo~ accused No.3 that even
if circumstance of motive is proved, that can be relevant only against
accused No. I. That cannot be used against accused No.3. This argument
completely overlooks the charge for which accused No.3 was tried,
F which included charge of conspiracy under Section 120-8 of !PC. As
aforesaid, the presence of accused No.3 at the relevant time in the house
ofNalini and also seen while loading the gunny bag in Sumo vehicle and
also travelling in that vehicle, leaves no manner of doubt about his
complicity in the commission ofoffence.
G 26. In the case of Saju (supra), on facts of that case it was held
that the circumstances of last seen together and motive were not
conclusive to indicate hatching of criminal conspiracy. The Court held
that there was no evidence regarding the circumstance attributing the
pregnancy of the deceased to the appellant and his insistence for abortion
of the child. On that finding, the circumstance of motive was answered
H
. ·''
KISHORE BHADKE v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 359
[A.M. KHANWILKAR, J.]
against the prosecution and in favour of the appellant. In that context the A
Court observed that even otherwise motive by itself cannot be proof of
conspiracy. It is well established that, ordinarily, direct evidence regarding
conspiracy may not be forthcoming. Hence, in most of the cases, the
Courts have to infer conspiracy on the basis of established facts. ln the
present case, on analyzing the facts and the events that unfold, the Courts
B
below have answered.the factum of conspiracy against the appellants-
accused Nos. I, 3 and 6. Further, the prosecution did not rest only on
the factum of last seen together but also on other circumstances to point
out the involvement of the appellants in the commission of crime. In the
Case of Arjun Mariks(supra), which deals with similar contention, the
Court restated the settled legal position that interference by the Supreme c
Court with concurrent finding of fact is justified only when it is possible
to take the view th at the findings are manifestly erroneous, unreasonable,
unjustified or illegal or violative of some Fundamental Rules of Procedure
or natural Justice. In the present case, concurrent finding recorded· by
two Courts below after exhaustive analysis of the evidence, is that the
D
same unambiguously points out towards the 'involvement ofthe appel )ants
in the commission of crime. In the reported decision, this Court has also
observed that mere absence of proof of motive for commission of a
crime cannot be a ground to presume the innocence of an accused if the
involvement of the accused is otherwise established. But in the case of
circumstantial evidence motive, does assume some relevance. If it is E
an
evident from the evidence on record that the accused had opportunity
to commit the crime and the established circumstances along with
explanation of the accused, if any, exclude the reasonable possibility of
anyone else being the perpetrator of the crime then the chain of evidence·
may be considered to show that within all human probability the crime
F
must have been committed by the accused. On the facts of the present
case, we find no tangible reason to disturb the concurrent findings
recorded by the two Courts below.
27. The case of Nizam (supra) was also based on circumstantial
evidence. In that case, the courts below placed emphasis on the last
seen theory. After analyzing the evidence on facts of that case, this G
Court held that none of the circumstances relied upon by the prosecution
and accepted by courts below can be said be pointing only towards the
guilt of appellants and to no other inference. In that case, more than one
inferences could be drawn on the basis of evidence brought before the
H
360 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017) I S.C.R.
A Court for which benefit of doubt was given to the appellants. The
Court noted several other lapses in the investigation and missing links.
And therefore, observed that last seen together though an important link
in the chain of circumstances yet the court is required to take into account
the entire evidence in its entirety and ensure that only inference that
could be drawn from evidence, is guilt of the accused. In the present
B
case, however, two courts below have justly analysed the entire evidence
and considered all the circumstances and not limited to the circumstance
of last seen together. The concurrent finding recorded by the courts
below is that the only inference that can be drawn is pointing towards
the guilt of the concerned accused in particular accused Nos. 1,3 and 6.
c 28. Similarly, in the case of Kanflltiya Lal (supra), the Court
observed that last seen together circumstance does not by itself
necessarily lead to inference that it was accused who committed crime
but there must be something more to connect the accused with the crime
and to point out the guilt of the accused and none else. As aforesaid, in
D the present case there is clinching evidence to point towards the
involvement of the appellants in the commission of the crime. We find
no tangible reason to deviate from the concurrent findings of the courts
below in that behalf.
29. Reliance placed on the dictum in the case of Sa11gili (supra)
E in our view is inapposite. In that case, the court found that the evidence
of last seen together was not established and the factum of motive was
based on hearsay evidence. Further, except the alleged recovery there
was no other circumstance worth the name which could be proved against
the appellants. That is not the position in the present case. For, the
courts below have analytically considered die prosecution evidence in
F its entirety to answer both the counts against the appellants. The
concurrent finding recorded by the courts below in that behalf does not
merit interference. Reliance was placed on the decision in Guiab Singh
(supra). In that case, however, the Court found as of fact that the
prosecution had failed to establish the guilt of the accused as evidence
G against him on the factum of last seen together was deficient. In the
present case, however, the fact situation is different.
30. In the case ofShyamal Gl10sl1 (supra), on the basis of the
evidence before the Court in that case, in para 74, the court observed
that reasonableness. of the time gap is of some significance. If the time
gap is very large, then it is not only difficult but may not even be proper
H
KISHORE BHADKE v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 361
[A.M. KHANWILKAR, J.]
for the court to infer that the accused had been last seen alive with the A
deceased and the former, thus, was responsible for commission of the
offence. In the present case, however, it is noticed from the evidence
on record that deceased Raman visited the house of Nalini accused
No. I when the appellants (accused Nos. 3 and 6) were also present in
the house at the relevant time. He did not come out of that house nor
B
was seen by anyone thereafter elsewhere. The dead body of Raman
was taken away in a vehicle for being dispose of, in which accused Nos.
3 and 6 also travelled. The two courts below have carefully analysed the
entire evidence to conclude that there was no other possibility except
that within all human probability the crime must have been committed in
particular by the appellants. It is well established that facts of each case c .
must be appreciated on its own merits to draw inference about the
involvement of the accused in commission ofoffence or otherwise. The
case of Mollibur Rahman (supra) was also a case of circumstantial
evidence. On facts of that case, the Court found that the circumstances
were sufficient to conclusively point out to the commission of murder of
D
the deceased by the accused, though the circumstances did not establish
offence of causing disappearance of the evidence. While dealing with
the factum of last seen together, the Court held that there must be a
close proximity between the event of accused last seen together with
the deceased. In the present case, as noted earlier, the courts below
have meticulously analyzed the prosecution evidence and have found E
that the same established the guilt of appellants in the commission of
crime. On facts of the present case, no fault can be found with the said
concurrent findings recorded by the two courts below. For the same
reason, even the exposition in the cases of As/wk and M11us11m Singlut
Roy (s11pra) will be of no avail to the appellants. As the same is in the
context of facts of that case.
F
3 I. In the case of M11/leslutppa (supra) the cou1t found that no
witness had spoken about who gave the information to the police. Further,
the deceased was forcibly taken on 12.07.2001, while his dead body
was found on 21.07.2001 and what transpired during the intervening
period was not brought on record. The court also noted that when the G
death of deceased actually occurred was .also not established. In the
present case, however, evidence establishes the fact that the deceased
Raman entered the house of Nalini accused No. 1 and was not seen
thereafter. His dead body was placed in a .gunny bag which was then
H
362 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 1 S.C.R.
A loaded in a vehicle in close proximity of deceased Raman entering the
house ofNalini on the same day. The gunny bag after being loaded in
the vehicle was taken away in which accused Nos. 3 and 6 also
accompanied. The medical evidence supports the prosecution case that
the death of Raman occurred around S•h May, 2003 and the Doctor who
conducted the post mortem opined that it was a case of homicidal death.
B
32. In the case of Kesl1av (supra), the court held that in the case
of circumstantial evidence, conviction can be recorded on the basis of
motive. Further, the circumstance of last seen together becomes relevant
only. ifthe death takes place shortly after accused and deceased were
last seen together. Even this decision is of no avail to the fact situation
c of the present case, for the reasons already discussed hitherto.
33. According to the learned counsel for the accused No.3, a
joint statement of all the accused was recorded by the Trial Court under
Section 313,Cr.P.C. This contention, in our opinion, is ill-founded. We
have examined the record and found that separate statement under Section
D 313 of each accused has been recorded. It is a different matter that
their statements have been recorded in part on different dates. That, in
our opinion, does not vitiate the trial. Had it been a case ofall questions
put to all the accused jointly and one statement recorded by the Trial
Court, it may have become necessary for. us to consider this argument.
E In the present case, we find that separate statement of each accused
under Section 313, has been recorded on different dates. That is
substantial compliance of Section 313, Cr.P.C.
34. The argument of accused No. 3 that he may be given the
same benefit as given to accused No. 7 is also liable to be rejected. We
F say so because, the High Court has given tangible reason for treating
the case of accused No. 7 differently. As regards accused No. 3, there
is consistent evidence that he was present in the house ofNalini at the
relevant time and also participated in loading of the gunny bag containing
dead body of deceased Raman in the vehicle and then travelling in the
same vehicle for disposing the dead body in a valley. This distinguishes
a his role from that of accused No.7. The role of accused No. 3 has been
rightly analyzed by the courts below to be similar to accused No. 6 and
liable for punishment for the offence in question.
35. Reverting to the argument of accused No. I, we reject the
same in so far as the circumstance of motive and last seen together as
H
KISHORE BHAOKE v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 363
[A.M. KHANWILKAR, J.]
we have affimted the concurrent findings of the courts below in that A
behalf. The decisions pressed into service by the counsel for the accused
No. I have no bearing on the facts of the present case, including against
accused No. l .
36. That takes us to the argument of the counsel for the accused
No. 6-that the dead body of the deceased was discovered at the instance B
of accused Nos. 2 and 3 with which accused No. 6 had no concern.
The fact that accused No. 6 did not make similar disclosure about disposal
of dead body of Raman, as made by accused No. 2 and 3, cannot absolve
him. The courts below, in our opinion, have rightly concluded that the
concerned accused, in particular accused Nos. I, 3 and 6 were party to
the conspiracy to· cause homicidal death of deceased Raman and for c
disposal of the evidence of crime. We have already analyzed that aspect
ofthe matter in the earlier part ofthe judgment, which needs no repetition.
37. The next argument of accused No.6 is that no blood stains
were noticed on the gold ring recovered at his instance. Even this
argument is devoid of merit. The fact that blood stains were not found D
on the gold ring would not make the recovery inadmissible. Similarly,
the fact that the gold ring was freely available in the market, would be of
no avail to the said accused. The accused has not produced any evidence
to explain the circumstances in which the said gold ring came in his
possession, which has been identified by the prosecution witnesses as E
belonging to deceased Raman. The fact that no mention was· made
about the said gold ring in the statement of other accused, does not
make the recovery doubtful as the gold ring has been recovered on the
basis of disclosure made by the accused No. 6 himself after his arrest.
On the same lines it was contended by the counsel for accused No. 6
that the recovery of cash amount from accused No. 6 cannot be used F
against him as incriminatory evidence. In as much as, the prosecution
has failed to produce any legal evidence to establish the fact that the
currency recovered was part of the same amount which was withdrawn
by the deceased Raman from the Bank on S•h May, 2003. The fact that
·the entire amount of Rs. 58,000/- withdrawn by the deceased Raman on G
S•h May, 2003 was not recovered by the investigating agency also cannot
be.the basis to disregard the complicity of accused No. 6, in view of the
credible evidence about his presence in the house-of acc11sed No. I
Nalini at the relevant time and of having assisted in loading the gunny
bag carrying the dead body of Raman in the vehicle and then travelling
H
364 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2017) I S.C.R.
A in the same vehicle to dispose of the dead body of Raman. Evidence in
this regard being clinching, absence of legal evidence regarding the
source from where the currency notes had come in possession of accused
No. 6 will be of no avail. The fact that the no blood stains were found
on the clothes of accused No. 6 will also be of no avail, considering the
overwhelming evidence about other relevant circumstances indicating
B
his complicity in the com1nission of cri1ne.
38. In the case of Sunil Clifford Daniel (supra) the court held
that non-matching of blood group or absence ofreport regarding origin
of blood, no advantage can be conferred upon accused to claim benefit
of doubt. This decision also deals with the argument canvassed by the
c appellants about absence of signature of accused on the seizure memo/
recovery memo. The court rejected that plea and held that merely because
the recovery was not signed by accused, it will not vitiate the recovery
itself. Further, every case has to be decided on its own facts. Accordingly,
even this contention of the appellants must fail.
D 39. The argument that the memorandum under Section 27 of the
Evidence Act was a fabricated document as the signature of accused
was obtained on a blank paper, does not impress.us .The courts below
have considered the evidence on record and found that the memorandum
making disclosure about the gold ring in possession of accused No. 6
E was admissible and trustworthy. We are not inclined to disturb the
concurrent findings recorded by the two courts below in that behalf.
40. The next argument of the counsel for the accused No. 6 is
that even if accused No.6 had failed to offer any valid explanation
regarding possession of gold ring of deceased Raman, he can at best be
F proceeded for offence punishable under Section 411 off PC and not for
the offence of murder. This submission is obviously an argument of
desperation. For, conviction simpilicitor under Section 411 oflPC or under
Section 201/120B ofIPC as rendered against accused No. 7 would be
possible, if evidence on other crucial facts was absent. In so far as
accused No. 6, there is clinching evidence to hold against him on the
G basis oflast seen together, seen loading the gunny bag in the vehicle and
then travelling in the same vehicle for disposal of the dead body. This
evidence cannot be disregarded. The finding recorded by the Trial Court
in favour of the acquitted accused or by the High Court in favour of the
accused No. 7, is not by disbelieving the evidence of the same prosecution
witnesses. But, it is in the context of the limited role of the concerned
H
KJSHORE BHADKE v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 365
[A.M. KHANWILKAR, J.]
accused established from the evidence of the same prosecution A
witnesses. The accused No. 6 cannot take advantage of that finding, in
view of overwhelming evidence of his complicity in the commission of
crime.
41. Jn view of the above, we hold that the appeals filed by accused
Nos. I, 3 and 6 respectively, are devoid of merits. B
42. We accordingly uphold the finding of guilt as against these
accus~d Nos~l ,3 and 6 as recorded by the courts below as also the
sentence imposed in respect of the offence committed by them.
43. Hence these appeals fail and the same are dismissed. Accused
No.I Nalini Dhapke, appellant in Criminal Appeal No.854/2010 and c
accused No.6 Satish, appellant in Criminal Appeal No.11/2015 are on
bail. Their bail bonds shall stand cancelled and they are directed to
surrender before the Trial Court within four weeks from today for
undergoing the remaining period of sentence.
Devika Gujral Appeals dismissed. D
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