KISHAN SINGH (D) THROUGH LRS.versusGURPAL SINGH & ORS.

                         [2010) 10 S.C.R. 16

               KISHAN SINGH (D) THROUGH LRS.
A
                                 v.
                     GURPAL SINGH & ORS.
                (Criminal Appeal No. 1500 of 2010)
                         AUGUST 12, 2010
B
        [P.. SATHASIVAM AND DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, JJ.]

        CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973:
        s.482 -    Order of High Court quashing criminal
c proceedings, relying upon the finding of civil court on the same
  issue as involved in the criminal proceedings, in respect of the
  same subject matter- HELD: Is not sustainable - The findings
  of fact recorr:Jed by civil court do not have any bearing so far
  as the criminal case is concerned and vice-versa - However,
0 in the instant case, the complainant having approached the civil
  court and failed, filing of the complaint by him, pending his civil
  appeal, with inordinate delay without any plausible explanation
  and with the. sole intention of harassing the otherparty
  amounted to an abuse of the process of Jaw and, therefore, the
  order of High Court, though not sustainable in law, is not
E interfered with - Penal Code, 1860- ss.42013231467146814 711
   120-8 - Practice and Procedure - Simultaneous civil and
  criminal proceedings - Administration ofjustice - Abuse of the
  process of law - De/aylLaches.
                                                                   '
F      An agreement to sell the suit land was executed on
  4.1.1988 by the owner, namely, 'KL' in favour of
  respondents 1 to 4, to whom the land had already been
  mortgaged. Since the sale deed was not executed by the
  stipulated date i.e. 10.6.1989, the respondents filed a suit
  for specific performance and pursuant to the decree dated
G 8.5.1996, passed in the said suit, the sale deed was
  executed in favour of respondents 1 to 4 on 17.5.1996.
  Meanwhile, the father of the appellants also filed on
  6.2.1996 a suit for specific performance against the said

H                                  16
    KISHAN SINGH (D) THROUGH L.RS. v. GURPAL               17
                  SINGH & ORS.
  'KL' stating that he had executed on 22.10.1988 an A
  agreement to sell in his favour stipulating that the sale
- deed would be executed and registered by 15.6.1989. He
  filed another suit seeking cancellation/setting aside the
  decree dated 8.5.1996, which was dismissed on 10.6.2002,
  and consequently he filed a regular first appeal. Thereafter, B
  he filed an FIR on 22.7 .2002 against the respondents
  alleging commission of offences punishable u/ss 420/423/
  467/468/120-B IPC. On the petition filed by the respondents,
  the High Court quashed the FIR and the consequent
  criminal proceedings.                                         ·c
       In the instant appeal the question for consideratiQll
 before the Cou'rt was: "whether criminal proceedings can
 be quasbed by the High Court relying upon a finding of
 civil court on an issue involved in criminal proceeciings in
 respect of the same subject matter."               ,, '        D
     Disposing of the appeal, the Court
       HELD: 1.1. The findings of fact recorded by the civil
  court do not have any. bearing so far as the criminal case
  is concerned and vice-versa. Standard of proof is different E
· in civil and ·criminal cases. In civil cases it is
  preponderance of probabilities while in criminal cases it
  is proof beyond reasonable doubt. There is neither any
  statutory nor any legal principle that findings recorded by
  the court either in civil or criminal proceedings shall be
  binding between the same parties while dealing with the F
  same subject matter; and both the cases have to be
  decided on the basis ofthe evidence adduced therein.
  However, there may be cases where the provisions of ss.
  41 to 43 of the Evidence Act, 1872, dealing with the
  relevance of previous.judgments in subsequent cases G
  may be taken into consideration. [para 19] [26-F-H; 27-A]
     M.S. Sherrif Vs. The State of Madras & Ors., 1954
 SCR 1229 =AIR 1954 SC 397; KG. Premshankar Vs.
 Inspector of Police & Anr., 2002 (2) Suppl. SCR 350 =AIR
 2002 SC 3372; Iqbal Singh Marwah & Anr. Vs. Meenakshi          H
    18      SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [2010] 10 S.C.R.


A Marwah & Anr., 2005 (2) SCR 708 = (2005) 4 SCC 370; P.
  Swaroopa Rani Vs. M. Hari Narayana alias Hari Babu, 2008
  (3) $CR 900 ~ AIR 2008 SC 1884; Syed AksariHadi Ali
  Augustine Imam & Anr. Vs. State (Delhi Admn) & Anr., 2009
  (3) SCR 1017 = (2009) 5 SCC 528; and Vishnu Dutt Sharma
8 Vs. Daya Prasad, 2009 (7) SCR 977 = (2009) 13 SCC 729,
  relied on.
        Mis Karamchand Ganga Pershad &Anr. Vs. Union of India
    & Ors., AIR 1971 SC 1244, stood overruled
C      V.M. Shah Vs. State of Maharashtra & Anr., 1995 (3)
    Suppl. SCR 79 = (1995) 5 SCC 767 - disapproved.
         Emperor Vs. Khwaja Nazair Ahmad, AIR 1945 PC 18,
    referred to.
       1.2. In cases where there is a delay in lodging an FIR,
D the court should carefully examine the facts before it for
  the reason that a frustrated litigant who failed to succeed
  bef6re the civil court may initiate criminal proceedings just
  to harass
          . . the other side with .
                                    mala fide. intentions or the
  ulterior motive of wreaking vengeance on the other party.
E Chagrined and frustrated litigants should not be permitted
  to give vent to their frustrations by cheaply invoking the
  jurisdiction of the criminal court. The court proceedings
  ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of
  harassment and persecution. [para 22] (28-A-D]
F      Chandrapal Singh & Ors. Vs. Maharaj Singh & Anr., AIR
  1982 SC 1238; State of Haryana & Ors. Vs. Ch. Bhajan Lal &
  Ors., 1990 (3) Suppl. SCR 259=AIR1992 SC 604; G. Sagar
  Suri & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors., 2000 (1) SCR 417 =AIR
  2000 SC 754; and Gorige Pentaiah Vs. State of A.P. & Ors.,
G 2008 (12) SCR 623 = (2008) 12 sec 531 - relied on.
       1.3. In the instant case, the judgment and order of the
  High Court dated 13.02.2009 quashing the criminal
  proceedings against the re.spondents, though not
  sustainable in the eyes of law, is not interfered with in view
H of the facts and circumstances of the case. The agreement
~    KISHAN SINGH1 (D) THROUGH L.RS. v. GURPAL                 19
                    SINGH & ORS.
 to sell in favour of the appellants' father !s dated 22.10.1988    A
 and sale deed was to be executed and registered by
 15.06.1989. Respondent Nos. 1 to 4 filed the suit in 1989. It
 is difficult to believe that the appellants' father was not
  aware of the pendency of that suit. No explanation has
  been furnished as to why after expiry of the date of              B
 execution of the sale deed in favour of appellant's father,
  i.e. 15.06.1989, he did not file the suit for specific
  performance which was subsequently filed on 6.2.1996.
  Even if it is presumed that he was not aware of pendency
,of the suit filed by respondent Nos. 1 to 4, no explanation
 ·could be furnished that while he filed another suit in 1996       C
  for setting aside the decree dated 8.5.1996 in the suit of the
  respondents, why did he wait till the decision of that suit
 for lodging the FlB, as the civil and criminal proceedings
 could have proceeded simultaneously. The FIR was filed
 only on 23.07 .2002 i.e. after filing the appeal before the'High   D
 Court on 15.07 .2002. Therefore, there is an inordinate delay
 on the part of the complainant in filing the FIR and there is
 no explanation wha~oever for the same. [para 20] [27-B-
 F]
                                                                    E
       Sahib Singh Vs. State of Haryana, 1997 (3) Suppl.
    SCR 95 =AIR 1997 SC 3247, relied on.
       1.4. The allegations made in the FIR were substantially
  similar to the allegations made by the appellants in the civil
  suit, which had been decided against them. The FIR was            F
  lodged only after loosing in the civil court. Thus, it is
  evident that the FIR was lodged with the sole intention of
, harassing the respondents and enmeshing them in long
 and arduous.criminal proceedings. Such an action on .the
  part of the appellants' father would not be bona fide, and
  the criminal proceedings initiated by him against the             G
  respondents amount to an ab~se of the process of law.
  [para 24] [29-B-D]

                       Case Law Referene:
    AIR 1971 SC 1244           stood overruled       para 12        H
    20       SUPREME COURT REPORTS · [2010) 10 S.C.R.


A    1954 SCRA229            relied on                    para 13
     1995 (3)/suppl. SCR 79  disapproved                  para 14
     2002 (2) Suppl. SCR 350 relied on                    para 15
     AIR 1945 PC 18          referred to                  para 15
     2008 (3) SCR 900        relied on                    para 16
B
     2005 (2) SCR 708        relied on                    para 17
     2009 (3) SCR 1017       relied on                    para 18
     2009 (7) SCR 977        relied on                    para 18
     1997 (3) Suppl. SCR 95  relied on                    para 21
c    AIR 1982 SC 1238        retied on                    para 22
     1990 (3) Suppl. SCR 259 relied on                    para 22
     2000 (1) SCR 417        relied on                    para 22
     2008 (12) SCR 623       relied on                    para 22
        CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
D
    No. 1500 of 2010.

        From the Judgment & Order dated 13.2.2009. of the High
    Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in Crl. Misc. M. No.
    4136 of 2003.
E
         K.T.S. Tulsi, Priyanka A., Niraj Gupta for the Appellant.

        Abhinav Ramkrishna, Rakesh Dahiya, Kuldip Singh for the
    Respondents.

F        The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
         DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J. 1. Leave granted.

       2. This appeal has been preferred against the Judgment and
  Order dated 13.02.2009 of the Punjab & Haryana High Court at
G Chandigarh in Criminal Misc. No. 4136 of 2003, wherein the First
  Information Report (for short, "FIR") dated 23.07 .2002 lodged by
  the appellant under Sections 420/423/467/468/4 71 /120-B of the ·
  Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter called as, "IPC") has been -
  quashed placing reliance on the decree of Civil Court between
H the same parties in respect of the same subject matter.
   KISHAN SINGH (D) THROUGH L.RS. v. GURPAL                         21
       SINGH & ORS. [DR. S.S. CHAUHAN, J.)
     3. The only question for our consideration involved in this          A
appeal is as to whether criminal proceedings can be quashed
by the High Court relying upon a finding of Civil Court on an issue
involved in criminal proceedings in respect of the same subject
matter.

     4. Facts and circumstances giving rise to this case are that         B
one Kishori Lal executed an Agreement to Sell dated 4.1.1988
in favour of Respondent Nos. 1 to 4 for land measuring 114
Karials, 2 Marlas situate in the revenue estate of Mauza Jadali,
Tehsil Khanna, Punjab, at the rate of Rs. 11000/- per bigha.
Kisllori Lal had received a sum of Rs. 1 Lakh as Earnest Money            C
from the said respondents. The said land had already been
mortgaged with the said respondents for Rs. 52000/-. As per the
terms of the said Agreement dated 4.1.1988, the sale deed was
to be executed and registered by 10th June, 1989.
                                                                          D
     .Kishori Lal entered an Agreement to Sell dated 22.10.1988
with Kishan Singh, predecessor-in-interest ofthe appellants, in
respect of the same land at the rate of Rs. 15300/- per bigha
and received a sum of Rs. 54000/- as earnest money. As per
the said agreement, the sale was to be executed and registered
by 15.06.1989.                                                            E

   / 5. Respondent Nos. 1 to 4 filed suit No. 60 of 1989 against
Kishori Lal in Civil Court, Ludhiana for sp~cific performance and
got an interim relief restraining Kishori Lal to alienate the suit land
in favour of anyone else by any manner. Sh. Kishan Singh, father          F
of the appellants, filed Civil Suit No. 81 of 1996 against Kishori
Lal for specific performance on 6.2.1996, however, the suit filed
by the respondent Nos. 1 to 4 against Kishori Lal was decreed
in their favour vide Judgment !'Ind decree dated 8.5.1996 and in
pursuance thereof, the sale has been executed by Kishori Lal in           G
favour of the respondent Nos. 1 to4 on 17.05.1996.

      6. Being aggrieved, Kishan Singh, predecessor-in-interest
of the appellants, filed suit No. 1075of1996 seeking cancellation/
setting aside of the decree dated 8.5."1_996 passed in favour of
respondent Nos. 1 to 4. The said Civil Suit stood dismissed by            H
     22        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2010] 10 S.C.R.


 A   the Civil Court vide Judgment and decree dated 10.06.2002
     against which, the appellants have preferred Regular First
     Appeal (for short, "RFA") No. 2488 of 2002 before the High Court,
     which is still pending.
      •                                                     .I
           7. Kishan Singh, predecessor-in-interest of the appellc;mts,
 8   filed FIR No.144 dated 23.07.2002 under Sections 420/423/467/
     468/120-B IPC at Police Station Division No. 8, Ludhiana
     alleging forging of the signatures of Kishori Lal on the agreement
     to sell dated 4.1.1988.

 c       8. The respondents preferred a Criminal Misc,. No. 41364
   of 2003 before the High Court for quashing of the FIR No. 144
   dated 23.07.2002 and proceeding subsequent thereto, on the
   ground that appellants had lodged it after losing the civil cas~
   and with inordinate delay. Findings on factual issues recorded
~D in civil proceedings are binding on criminal proceedings. The
   High Court, vide its Judgment and order dated 13.02.2009,
   allowed the said application and,quashed the FIR on the ground
   that the appellants could not succeed before the Civil Court and
   findings have been recorded by the Civ:il Court to the effect that
   the document i.e. agreement to sell waS'"not forged or fabricated.
 E Hence, this appeal.                                     ,

         9. Sh. K. T.S. Tulsi, learned senior counsel appearing for the
   appellants, has submitted that there is no prohibition in law for
   simultaneously pursuing the civil as well as criminal remedies
 F available in law. Both the proceedings have to take course and
   to be decided according to the evidence adduced therein.
   Findings of fact recorded by the Civil Court are not binding on
   the criminal courts or vice-versa. The.High Court committed a:
   grave error in quashing the FIR only on the basis of firictings of
 G fact- recorded by the Civil Court.        ··

          10. Per contra, Sh. Abhinav Ramkrishna, learned counsel
     appearing for the respondents, has vehemently opposed the
     appeal contending that Kishan Singh filed-the FIR at a much
     belated stage, i.e. after dismissal of the civil suit by the Trial Court
 H   on 10.06.2002. In case, the agreement in their favour provided
   KISHAN SINGH (D) THROUGH L.RS. v. GURPAL                     23
       SINGH & ORS. [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
that sale deed was to be executed. by 15th June, 1989, there A
could be no justification for them to wait and file suit No. 81/1996
for specific performance on 6.2.1996. Thus, FIR has been filed
with inordinate delay of about 14 years and even if, it is presumed
that they were.not aware of pendency of suit No. 60/1989. Kishan
Singh had become fully aware of al.I the relevant facts at the time B
of filing the suit no. 1075of1996. There is no explanation of delay
even after 1996. Thus, the Judgment and Order of the High Court
does not warrant any interference·. The appeal lacks. merit and·
 is liable to be dismissed.

     11. We have considered the rival submissions made by the          C
learned counsel fortheparties and perused the record. The issue
as to whether the findings recorded by Civil Court are binding in
criminal proceedings between the same parties in respect of the
same subject matter, is no more Res lntegra.
                                                                       D
  '.i12. In Mis Karamchand Ganga Pershad & Anr. Vs. Union
oflndia & Ors., AIR 1971SC1244, this Court, while dealing with
the same issue, held as under:-

      "It is well established principle of law that the decisions of
      the civil courts are binding on the criminal courts. The         E
  : ~ converse is nottrue."

   . 13. The said Judgment was delivered by a three-Judge
Bench of this Court without taking note of the Constitution Bench
Judgment in M.S. Sherrif Vs. The State of Madras & Ors., AIR
                                                                       F
1954 SC 397 on the same issue, wherein this Court has held
as under:-

      "As between the civil and the criminal proceedings we are
      of the opinion that the criminal matters should be given
      precedence. There is some difference of dpinion in the High      G
  ·· Courts of India on this point. No hard and fast rule can be
      laid down but we do not consider that .the possibility of
      conflicting decisions in· the civil and criminal courts is a
  f relevant consideration. The law envisages such an
    1
      eventuality when it expressly refrains from making the
   ."'                                                                 H
    24        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  (2010] 10 S.C.R.


A         decision of one court binding on the other, or even relevant,
          except for certain limited purposes, such as sentence ot       1
                                                                             ''   .,



          damages. The only relevant consideration here is the
          likelihood of embarrassment. Another factor which weighs
          with us is that a civil suit often drags on for years and it is
B         undesirable that a criminal prosecution should wait till
         ·everybody concerned has forgotten all about the crime. The
          public interests demand that criminal justice should be swift
          and sure; that the guilty should be punished while the events
          are still fresh in the public mind and that the innocent should
          be absolved as early as is consistent with a fair and
c         impartial trial. Another reason is that it is undesirable to let
          things slide till memories have grown too dim to trust. T~is,
          however, is not a hard and fast rule. Special considerations
          obtaining in any particular case might make some other
          course more expedient and just."
D
        14. In V.M. Shah Vs. State of Maharashtra & Anr., (1995)
    5 SCC 767, this Court has held as under:-

         "As seen that the civil court after full-dressed trial recorded
         the finding that the appellant had not come into possession
E        through the Company but had independent tenancy rights
         from the principal landlord and, therefore, the decree for
         eviction was negatived. Until that finding is duly
         considered by the appellate court after weighing the
         evidence afresh and if it so warranted reversed, the findings
F        bind the parties. The findings, recorded by the criminal
         court, stand superseded by the findings recorded by the
         civil court. Thereby, the findings of the civil court get
         precedence over the findings recorded by the trial court,
         in particular, in summary trial for offences like Section
G        630. The mere pendency of the appeal does not have the
         effect of suspending the operation of the decree of the trial
         Court and' neither the finding of the civil court gets
         disturbed nor the decree becomes inoperative."

          15. The correctness of the aforesaid judgment in V.M. Shah
H
  KISHAN SINGH (D) THROUGH L.RS. v. GURPAL                , 25
      SINGH & ORS. [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]                 ,
(supra) was doubted by this Court and the case was referr~d to A
a larger Bench in K. G. Premshankar Vs. Inspector of Police &
Anr., AIR 2002 SC 3372. In the said case, the Judgment in V.M.
Shah (supra) was not approved. While deciding the case, this
Court placed reliance upon the Judgment of the Privy Council in
Emperor Vs. Khwaja Nazair Ahmad, AIR 1945 PC 18 wherein B
it has been held as under :-

    "It is conceded that the findings in a civil proceeding are
    not binding in a subsequent prosecution founded upon the
    same or similar a/legations. Moreover, the police
    investigation was stopped and it cannot be said with C
    certainty that no more information could be obtained. But
    even if it were not, it is the duty of a criminal court when a
    prosecution for a crime takes place before it to form its own
    view and not to reach its conclusion by reference to any
    previous decision which is not binding upon it." (Emphasis D
    a~e~                                               ·

    16. In Iqbal Singh Marwah & Anr. vs. Meenakshi Marwah
& Anr (2005) 4 SCC 370, this Court held as under:-
    "Coming to the last contention that an effort should be E
    made to avoid conflict of findings between the civil and
    criminal courts, it is necessary to point out that the standard
    of proof required in the two proceedings are entirely
    different. Civil cases are decided on the basis of
    preponderance of evidence while in a criminal case the F
    entire burden lies on the prosecution and proof beyond
    reasonable doubt has to be given. There is neither any
    statutory provision nor any legal principle that the findings
    recorded in one proceeding may be treated as final or
    binding in the other, as both the cases have to be decided G
    on the basis of the evidence adduced therein."
    17. In Dr. Swaroopa Rani vs. Hari Narayana Alias Hari
Babu AIR 2008 SC 1884, this Court held as under:-

                                                                 H
    26        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2010) 10 S.C.R.


A        ~·t is, however, well settled that in a given case, civil
         proceedings and criminal proceedings can proceed
         simultaneously. Whether civil proceedings or criminal
         proceedings shall be stayed depends upon the fact and
         circumstances of each case ...... Filing of an independent
B        criminal proceeding, although initiated in terms of some
         observations made by the civil court, is not barred under any
         statute ...... It goes without saying that the respondent shall
         be at liberty to take recourse to such a remedy which is
         available to him in law. We have interfered with the
         impugned order only because in law simultaneous
c        proceedings of a civil and a criminal case is permissible."
         18. In Syed Aksari Hadi Ali Augustine Imam & Anr. Vs.
    State (Delhi Admn) & Anr., (2009) 5 SCC 528, tnis Court
    considered all the earlier Judgments on the issue and held that
D   while deciding the case in Karam Chand (supra), this Court failed
    to take note of the Constitution Bench Judgment in M.S. Sherrif
    (supra) and, therefore. it remains per incuriam and does not lay
    down the correct law.

E        A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Vishnu
    Dutt Sharma Vs. Daya Prasad, (2009) 13 SCC 729, wherein it
    has been held by this Court that the decision in Karamchand
    (supra) stood overruled in K. G, Premshankar (supra).

          19. Thus, in view of the above, the law on the issue stands
F   crystallized to the effect that the findings of fact recorded by the
    Civil Court do not have any bearing so far as the criminal case is
    concerned and vice-versa. Standard of proof is different in civil
    and criminal cases. In civil cases it is preponderance of
    probabilities while in criminal cases it is proof beyond reasonable
G   doubt. There is neither any statutory nor any legal principle that
    findings recorded by the court either in civil or criminal
    proceedings shall be binding between the same parties while
    dealing with the same subject matter and both the cases have to
    be decided on the basis of the evidence adduced therein.
    However, there may be cases where the provisions of Sections
H
   KISHAN SING.H (D) THROUGH L.RS. v. GURPAL                       27
       SINGH & ORS. (DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
~.1Jo 43 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, dealing with the               A
relevance of previous Judgments in subsequent cases may be
taken into consideration.

      20. In view of the above, the Judgment and order of the High
Court dated 13.02.2009 is not sustainable in the eyes of law and
                                                                          8
is liable to be set aside. However, the facts and circumstances
of the case do not warrant so. The agreement to sell in favour of
the appellants' father is dated 22.10.1988 and sale deed was
to be executed and registered by 15.06.1989. The respondent
Nos.1 to 4 filed Civil suit No. 60/1989 in 1989. It is difficult to
believe that the appellants' father was not aware of the pend ency        C
of that suit. No explanation has been furnished as to why after
expiry of the date of execution of the sale deed in favour of Kishan
Singh, i.e. 15.06.1989, the appellants' father did not file the suit
for specific performance which was subsequently filed on
6.2.1996 as Civil Suit No. 81/1996. Even if it is presumed that           D
Kishan Singh was not aware of pendency of suit filed by the
respondent Nos. 1 to 4, no explanation could be furnished that
in case, the appellants' father filed another suit No. 1075/1996
for setting aside the decree dated 8.5.1996 in Civil Suit no.60/
1989, why did he wait till the decision of that suit for lodging FIR,     E
as the civil and criminal proceedings could have proceeded
simultaneously. The FIR has, been filed only on 23.07.2002 i.e.
after filing the RFA No. 2488/2002 before the High Court on
 15.07.2002. Therefore, there is an inordinate delay on the part
of the appellants' father in filing the FIR and there is no explanation   F
whatsoever for the same.

     21. Prompt and early reporting of the occurrence by the
informant with all its vivid details gives an assurance regarding
truth of its version. In case, there is some delay in filing the FIR,
the complainant must give explanation for the same. G
Undoubtedly, delay in lodging the FIR does not make the
complainant's case improba~le when such delay is properly
explained. However, deliberate delay in lodging the complaint
is always fatal. [vide: Sahib Singh Vs. State of Haryana, AIR
1997 SC 3247].                                                            H
    28       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2010) 10 S.C.R.


A         22. In cases where there is a delay in lodging a FIR, the Court
    has to look for a plausible explanation for such delay. In absence
    of such an explanation, the delay may be fatal. The reason for
    quashing such proceedings may not be merely that the
    allegations were an after thought or had given a coloured version
B   of events. In such cases the court should carefully examine the
    facts before it for the reason that a frustrated litigant who failed
    to succeed before the Civil Court may initiate criminal
    proceedings just to harass the other side with mala fide
    intentions or the ulterior motive of wreaking vengeance on the
    other party. Chagrined and frustrated litigants should not be
c   permitted to give vent to their frustrations by cheaply invoking
    the jurisdiction of the criminal court. The court proceedings ought
    not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment
    and persecution. In such a case, where an FIR is lodged clearly
    with a view to spite the other party because of a private and
D   personal grudge and to enmesh the other party in long and
    arduous criminal proceedings, the court may take a view that it
    amounts to an abuse of the process of law in the facts and
    circumstances of the case. (vide: Chandrapal Singh & Ors. Vs.
    Maharaj Singh & Anr., AIR 1982 SC 1238; State of Haryana &
E   Ors. Vs. Ch. Bhajan Lal & Ors., AIR 1992 SC 604; G. Sagar
    Suri & Anr. Vs. State of UP. & Ors., AIR 2000 SC 754; and
    Gorige Pentaiah Vs. State of A.P. & Ors., (2008) 12 SCC 531).

         23. The case before us relates to a question of the
    genuineness of the agreement to sell dated 4.1.1988. The said
F
    agreement was between Kishori Lal and respondents and
    according to the terms of the said agreement, the sale deed was
    to be executed by 10.6.1989. As the sale deed was not executed
    within the said time, suit for specific performance was filed by
    the other party in 1989 which was decreed in 1996. So far as
G   the present appellants are concerned, agreement to sell dated
    22.10.1988 was executed in favour of their father and the sale
    deed was to be executed by 15.6.1989. No action was taken till
    1996 for non-execution of the sale deed. The appellants' father
    approached the court after 7 years by filing Suit No.81/1996 for
H   specific performance. However, by that time, the suit filed by the
          KISHAN SINGH (D) THROUGH L.RS. v. GURPAL                  29
              SINGH & ORS. [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]

1,., . present respondents stood decreed. The appellants' father filed     A
       another Suit No.1075/96 for setting aside the judgment and
       decree passed in favour of the respondents 1 to 4. The said suit
       was dismissed by the Additional District Judge (Senior Division),
       Khanna on 10.6.2002. Subsequently, the appellants preferred
       RFA No. 2488/02 on 15. 7 .2002 against the aforesaid order, and     B
       the said appeal is still pending before the Punjab & Haryana High
       Court.

          24: It is to be noted that the appellants' father Kishan Singh
    lodged FIR No.144/02 on 23.7.2002 through his attorney Jaswant
    Singh Mann under Sections 420/323/467/468/471/120-8 IPC,. C
    against the respondents. The allegations made in the FIR were
    substantially similar to the allegations r1"tade by the appellants in
    Civil Suit No.1075/96, which had been'decided against them. It
    is evident that the aforesaid FIR was filed with inordinate delay
    and there has been no plausible explanation for the same. The D
    appellants lodged the aforesaid FIR only after meeting their
    Waterloo· in the Civil Court. Thus, it is evident that the FIR was
    lodged with the sole intention of harassing the respondents and
    enmeshing them in long and arduous,eriminal proceedings'. We
    are of the view that such an action on the part of the appellants' E
    father would not be bona fide, and the criminal proceedings
    initiated by him against the respondents amount to an abuse of
    the process of law.

         25. In view of the above, and to do substantial justice, we
    are not inclined to interfere with the order passed by the High        F
    Court quashing the criminal proceedings against the
    respondents in spite of the fact that the impugned judgment
    dated 13.02.2009 passed in Criminal Misc. No. 4136 of 2003
    is not sustainable in the eyes of law.
                                                                           G
           26. With these observati~ns, the appeal stands disposed
    of.

    R.P.                                         Appeal disposed of.