KISHAN LAL AND ORS.versusSTATE OF RAJASTHAN & ORS.

                        KISHAN LAL AND ORS.
A
                                 v.
                     STATE OF RAJASTHAN & ORS.

                               MARCH 23, 1990

B         [K. JAGANNATHA SHETTY AND R.M. SAHAI, JJ.]

            Rajasthan Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1961: Section 40
    and Schedule-Market fee-Levy of-On Khandsari, Shakkar, Gur
    and Sugar.as agricultural produce-Validity of.

C        Constitution of India, 1950: Articles 14, 19, 301, 304, 246,
    254(2), Seventh Schedule, List I Entry 52, List II Entries 28, 66 and List
    III Entry 33-Market Fee-Levy of-On Khandsari, Shakkar, Gur
    and Sugar as agricultural produce-State Legislature-Competency
    of-Rajasthan Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1961 Section 40 and
    Schedule-Repugnancy and validity of.                                         J __
                                                                                  /


D
          Words and Phrases: 'Sugar'-'Agricultural produce'-Meaning
    of.

          In the Writ Petition filed in this Court, the validity of Rajasthan
    Agricultnral Produce Markets-Act, 1961, levying market-fee on sale
E   and purchase of agricultnral produce was challenged for lack of legisla-
    tive competence, and arbitrary inclusion of Khandsari, Shakkar, Gur
    and Sugar as agricultural produce in the Schedule. It was contended
    that inclusion of sugar was arbitrary inasmuch as it being a declared
    commodity of public importance under Entry 52 of List I of Schedule
    VII, the State Legislature was precluded from legislating on it and that
F   being a mill or factory produce, it could not be deemed to be                 ·-
    agricultural produce, which was basically confined to produce of or
    from soil.

          Dismissing the Petitions, this Court,

G         HELD: 1.1 Sugar is one of the items which was included in the
    Schedule to the Rajasthan A~ricultural Produce Markets Act, 1961,
    statutorily, right from the inception. Such inclusion is found in many
    States. Whether it was subsequently deleted or re-included or re-
    grouped or was added later was immaterial, as Section 40 of the Act
    empowered State Government to amend or include any item in the
H . Schedule of agricultural produce. Existence of such delegated power is

                                       142
                      KISHAN LAL v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN                     143

     usual feature of the statutes. No illegality or infirmity could be pointed   A
     out in it. Any challenge. therefore, founded on exc.essive delegation of
     legislative power was misconceived. [ 144H, 145A-B]

           1.2 The definition of the word "agricultural produce" in the Act
     inclndes all produce whether agricultural, horticultural, animal
                                                                                  B
     husbandry or otherwise as specified in the Schedule. The legislative
     power to add or include and define a word even artificially, apart, the
     definition which is not exhaustive but inclusive, neither excludes any
     item produced in mill or factories nor it confines its width to produce
I
_/   from soil. Nor switch over from indigenous method of producing any-
     thing to scientific or mechanical method changes its character. To say,
     therefore, that sugar being produced in mill or factories could not be       c
     deemed to be agricultnral produce is both against the statutory
     language and judicial interpretation of similar provisions of the Act in
     statntes of other States. [145C-D, F]

           Kewal Krishan Puri v. State of Punjab, [1979] 3 SCR 1217;
                                                                                  D
     Ramesh Chandra v. State of U.P., [1980] 3 SCR 166; Rathi Khandsari
     Udyog v. State of U.P., [1982] 2 SCR 966; Sreenivisa General Traders
     v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1983 SC 1264; Ramesh Chandra v.
     U.P. State [1980] 3 SCR 194 and State of U.P. v. Ganga Das Mill,
     [1985] SCR87-88, referred to.

           Halsbury's Law of England, Vol. I and Paragraph 1845, referred         E
     to.

           2. In view of the settled position of law that sugar legislations
     are within the scope of Entry 33 of Concurrent List, no further dis-
     cussion on clash between Entry 52 of List I of Vllth Schedule and
     Entry 28 of List II is necessary. There is no repugnancy in the Cen-         F
     tral and State legislation. Even if there would have been any, the
     Act having received assent of th_e President is fully protected by Article
     254(2) of the Constitution. [1468-D]

           Choudhary Tika Ram and Others v. State of U.P., [1956] SCR
     393, foilowed.                                                               G

          ORIGINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Writ Petition
     No. 1555 of 1979 etc. etc.

           (Under Article 32 of the Constitution oflndia).
                                                                                  H
    144                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [1990] 2 S.C.R.

          D.N. Dwivedi and Sarwa Mitter for the Petitioners.
A
          Dr. L.M. Singhvi, B.D. Sharma, Shri Narain, Sandeep Narain,
    Shrid Rizvi and D.K. Singh for the Respondents.

          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
B
        R.M. SABAi, J. Validity of Rajasthan Agricultural Produce
  Markets Act, 1961 {for brevity the Act) levying market-fee on sale
  and purchase of agricultural produce in market-yard or sub-market-
  yard was challenged by dealers for ·lack of legislative competence,
  violation of Articles 14, 19, 301 and 304 of Constitution, absence of
C any quid pro quo in the fee paid and service rendered, illegal and
  arbitrary inclusion of manufactured articles such as Khandsari, Shak-
  kar, Gur and Sugar as agricultural produce in the schedule etc.

        Acts of other States, for instance, Punjab and Haryana and U.P.
  were also assailed for similar infirmities. Whether these petitions,
D which appear to be identical, are reproduction of any of those peti-
  tions, which were pending in this Court from before is not relevant but
  various group of petitions of Punjab and Haryana deale~s challenging
  constitutionality and legality of Act and its provisions including Gur,
  Khandsari and Shakkar as agricultural produce in the schedule of
  Pun jab Act have been dismissed by different benches presumably
E because of decisions in Kewal Krishan Puriv. State of Punjab, [1979] 3
  SCR 1217; Ramesh Chandra v. State of U.P., [1980] 3 SCR 166; Rathi
  Khandsari Udyog v. State of U.P., [1982] 2 SCR 966 and Sreenivisa
  General .Traders v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1983 SC 1264.

          Despite these decisions spelling out basic principles for deter-
F   mining validity of marketing legislations dealing with agricultural pro-
    duce the petitioners were not willing to take it lying down probably
    because none of these decisions dealt with sugar. It was urged that
    inclusion of sugar in the Schedule of the Act was arbitrary,, primarily
    because it being a declared commodity of public importance under
    Entry 52 of List I of Schedule VII the State legislature was precluded
G   from legislating on it. Its inclusion in the Schedule was also assailed as
    it being a Mill or Factory produce it could not be deemed to be
                                                                                 ..
    agricultural produce which is basically confined to produce of or from
    soil.

         Sugar is one of the items which was included in the Schedule to
H   the Act, statutorily, right from its inception. Such inclusion is found in
                                            .
                KISHAN LAL v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN [SAHAI, J.[              145

      Maharashtra, Gujarat, West Bengal, Bihar etc. Whether it was subse-        A
      quently deleted or re-included or re-grouped or it was added later was
      immaterial as Section 40 of the Act empowered State Government to
      amend or include any item in the Schedule of agricultural produce.
      Existence of such delegated power is usual feature of the statutes.
      No illegality or infirmity could be pointed out in it. Any challenge,
      therefore, founded on excessive delegation of legislative power was
                                                                                 B
      misconceived.

            Inclusion of sugar in the Schedule was urged to be arbitrary as it
      was not produced out of soil the basic ingredient of agricultural pro-
      duce. Fallacy of the submission is apparent as it was in complete disre-
      gard of definition of the word "agricultural produce" in the Act which     c
      includes all produce whether agricultural, horticultural, animal
      husbandry or otherwise as specified in the Schedule. The legislative
      power to add or include and define a word even artificially, apart, the
      definition which is not exhaustive but inclusive neither excludes any
      item produced in mill or factories nor it confines its width to produce
      from soil. If that be the construction then all items of animal            D
      husbandry shall stand excluded. It further overlooks expanse of the
      expression "or otherwise as specified in the Schedule." Nor switch
      over from indigenous method of producing anything to scientific or
      mechanical method changes its character. Khandsari sugar, which is
      produced by open pan process and is not different from sugar pro-
··~                                                                              E
      duced by vacuum pan process except in composition, filterability and
      conductivity as held in Rathi Khandsari Udyog, (supra) was held to be
      agricultural produce in some decisions. No distinction was made on
      method of production, namely, by modem plant and machinery. To
      say, therefore, that sugar being produced in mill or factories could not
      be deemed to be agricultural produce is both against the statutory
      language and judicial interpretation of similar provisions of the Act in   F
      statutes of other States. Rice or dal produced in mills have been held
      to be agricultura\produce in Ramesh Chandra v. U.P. State, (1980] 3
      SCR 194 and State of U.P. v.Ganga Das Mill, (1985] SCR 87-88. Even
      in Halsbury Law of England,' Vol. I the word agricultural produce for
      purpose of agricultural marke.ting schemes is understood as, 'including
      any product of agriculture or horticulture and any article of food or      G
      drink wholly or partly manufactured or derived from any such product
      and fleeces (including all kinds of wool) and the skins of animals'. In
      the same volume products covered by the provisions of EEC Treaty as
      to agriculture (classified according to the Brussels Nomenclature of
      1965) are mentioned in paragraph 1845. Sugar is one of them.
                                                                                 H
    146                     SUPREME'COURT REPORTS         [1990] 2 S.C.R.

A        Another legalistic challenge regarding inhibition of State to
  legislate on SU_llar or of repeated argument of occupied field was more
  attractive than of any substance. Reliance on Article 246 of the Con-
  stitution was academic only. As far back as 1956 Constitution Bench of
  this Court in Choudhary Tika Ram and others v. State of U. P., [ 1956]
  SCR 393 examined the matter in detail and held sugar legislations to
B
  be within the scope of Entry 33 of concurrent list. It was observed that
  all 'Acts and the notifications issued thereunder by the Centre in
  regard to sugar and sugarcane were-enacted in exercise of concurrent ·
  jurisdiction'. Effect of it was described thus, 'The Provincial Legisla-
  tur¢ as well as the Central Legislature would be competent to enact
  such pieces of legislation and no question of legislative competence
c would arise'. Any further discussion on clash between Entry 52 of List
  I of VII Schedule with Entry 28 of List II in the circumstances is
  unnecessary. As regards the submission of occupied field suffice it to
  say that there is no repugnancy in the Central and State legislation.
  Atleast none was made out. Even if there would have been any the Act
  having received assent of the President it is fully protected by Article
D 254(2).

             For these reasons these petitions fail and are dismissed with
    costs.

    N.P.V.                                             Petitions dismissed.
E