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Supreme Court of India

KIRPAL SINGH, M.L.A.versusUTTAM SINGH & ANR.

Citation
1985 INSC 226
Decided
9 October 1985
Disposal
Disposed off

Holding

The Court held that the extension of disqualification to employees of public sector undertakings is a legislative policy question for Parliament, and it set aside the High Court's award of costs against the appellant.

Summary

Kirpal Singh was elected to the Punjab Legislative Assembly in 1972, but his election was set aside by the Punjab and Haryana High Court because the nomination of another candidate, Basant Singh, had been improperly rejected on the ground that he was a development officer in the Life Insurance Corporation, a public sector undertaking. The High Court held that the corporation's staff regulations could only subject Basant Singh to disciplinary action and did not disqualify him, leading to the cancellation of Kirpal Singh's election. Kirpal Singh appealed to the Supreme Court under Section 116A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, and the Court granted a limited interim order allowing him to attend the Assembly without voting or remuneration. While disposing the appeal, the Court observed that the question of extending disqualification to employees of public sector undertakings under Article 191(1)(e) and Section 10 of the Act is a policy matter for Parliament, not the judiciary. The Court set aside the High Court's award of costs against the appellant and noted that the appeal had become infructuous after three subsequent general elections. No substantive ruling on the disqualification issue was made, and the Court recommended that the matter be examined by the Law Commission.

Issues considered

  • Whether employees of public sector undertakings are disqualified from contesting elections under Article 191(1)(e) of the Constitution and Section 10 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951.
  • Whether the High Court was correct in setting aside Kirpal Singh's election on the basis of the improper rejection of another candidate's nomination.
  • What interim relief is appropriate when an election is set aside for reasons unrelated to the elected candidate's fault.
  • Whether the award of costs against the appellant by the High Court was proper.

Legislation cited

Subjects

election lawdisqualificationpublic sector undertakingsRepresentation of the People ActArticle 191interim reliefcostsparliamentary policy

Judgment

     022


                               KIRPAL SINGH, M.L.A.
A
                                        v.
                               U'ITAM SINGH & ANR.

                                 OCTOJ!El\ 9, 1985

     l 0. CHlNNAJ'PA l\EUUY,  J; .s. Vt;NKATAlWIIAti, V. llAlAKlUSHNA lillAIJI,
ll
                         R.Jl. HlSAA ANU V. KHALllJ, JJ.J

           Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 191 (1) (a) read
     with section 10 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 -
     Disqualification for membership, applicability to Public Sector
     Undertakings - Right to be elected and Right to speak for the
     people are questions to be decided by Parliament and not by the
c    Court - Nature of interim orders to be passed by the Court in an
     election appeal when the election was set aside on grounds not
     covered by part Vll of the Act, explained.

            The appellant Kirpal Singh was elected to the Punjab
     Legislative Assembly from Majitha constituency at the general
     elections held in 1972. His election was set aside by High Court
ll
     ill an Election Petition filed by one of the defeated candidates
     on the ground that the nomination paper of another candidate was
     improperly rejected by the Returning Officer for the reason that
     he was a development officer in the employment of the Life
     Insurance Corporation under whose Staff Regulations he was
     prohibited from seeking election. The High Court was of the view
E
     that the staff regulations could, at best, make Basant Singh
     liable to disciplinary action only. In the appeal under section
     116A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, the Court
     passed an interim order enabling the appellant to attend the
     assembly and sign the register, without participating in the
     proceedings or voting, and without drawing any remuneration.
F
     Subsequent to the filing of the appeal, there were three general
     elections with the result the appeal became wholly 1nfructuous.

            Disposing of the appeal, the Court,

            HELD : 1.1. Where an election is set aside for no fault of
G     the duly elected candidate, such as a corrupt practice comnitted
      by him or his agent or a disqualification suffered by him, but on
      the ground that someone else's nomination had been improperly
      rejected, the more appropriate interim order would perhaps be to
      grant an absolute stay so that the Constituency may not go
      unrepresented for no fault of either the elected or those who
H     elected. [624 C--D]
                     KllU'AL SINGI! v. UTTAM SINGH                   623


      1. 2 The awarding of the cos ts by the High Court, in such
circumstances is uncalled for. The appellant will receive his              A
remwieration for the period for which he was elected as a
legislator. t626 C-ll)

      1.3 The clear and undoubted object of Article 19l(l)(a) to
(e) and the provisions of the Representation of the People Act
(including section 10) is the preservation of the purity and               B
integrity of the election process by preventing Government or
State employees from taking part in the elections. Nowadays the
activities of the State are so manifold and prolific that the
State has been forced, in the interests of better management and
administration and in order to further the Directive Principles
of State POlicy, to set up various Corporations which are but              c
mere instrumentalities of . the State. Whether the principle of
Article 19l(l)(a) has to be extended to employees of State
Corporations and other Public Sector Undertakings by suitable
legislation is a question of policy better left to, be decided by
the elected representatives of the people themselves and not to
the Court whose decision can only be confined to interpretation.           D
[625 E-H; 626 A)

       (The Court recommended to the Government to have several
questions posed before it examined by the Law Commission early.)

      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION ·: Civil Appeal No. 650 (NCE)           E
of 197 5.

      r'rom the Judgment and Order dated 14. 3. 1975 of the Punjab
and Haryana High Court in Election Petition No. 27 of 1972.

      K.K. Garg, A.K. Ganguli, M.M. Kshatriya and Mrs. Vandana
Sharma for the Appellant.                                                  F

      G.L.     Sanghi,   P.H.   Parekh and   P.K.    Manohar   for   the
Respondents.

      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
                                                                           G
      ClilNNAPPA REDDY, J, Shri Kirpal Singh was elected to the
Punjab Legislative Assembly from Majitha Constituency at the
general elections held in 1972. His election was set aside by
High Court in an Election Petition filed by one of the defeated
candidates on the ground that the nomination paper of another
candidate was improperly rejected by the Returning OffiGer. The
                                                                           H
        624               SUPREME COURT REPORTS      [1985] SUPP.3 s.c.R.

A
        nomination paper of one Basant Singh had been rejected on the
        ground that Basant Singh was a development officer in the employ-
        ment of the Life Inaurance Corporation and was therefore
        ineligible to seek election to the Assembly under the Staff
        Regulationa of the Life Inaurance Corporation. The High Court
B       took the view that if Basant Singh defied the Staff Regulations
        and sought election to the Assembly he might have made himself
        liable to disciplinary action but that did not disqualify him
        from see~ng election to the Assembly. So the nomination paper of
        Basant Singh was held to have been improperly rejected and the
        election of Kirpal Singh was set aside. His election having been
        set aside he appealed to this Court under Section 116-A of the
c       Representation of the People . Act. While admitting the appeal,
        this Court made an interim order enabling the appellant to attend
        the Assembly and sign the register, without participating in the
        proceedings or voting and without drawing any reDllneration. With-
        out meaning any disrespect to the learned judges who made the
        interim order we think that where an election is set aside for no
        fault of his, such as a corrupt practice comnitted by him or his
D       agent or a disqualification suffered by him, but on the ground
         that someone else's nomination had been improperly rejected, the
        more appropriate order would perhaps be to grant an absolute stay
        so that the Conatituency may not go unrepresented for no fault of
        either the elected or those who elected.

E             Subsequent to the filing of the appeal, there have been
        three more general electiona. The present appeal has thus beeome
        wholly infructuous, indeed a sad commentary on the legal process.
        Though the question raised is an important one which may arise
        again and again in the future we do not propose to make any
        pronouncement upon it since we think the. matter is one which
F       should receive the conaideration of the Parliament and suitable
        legislation be enacted. Under Art. 191(1) of the Conatitution a
        person shall be disqualified for being chosen as, and for being,
        a member of the Legislative Assembly or Legislative Council of a
        State -

G                  (a) if he holds any office of profit under the
                   Government of India or the Government of any State
                   specified in the First Schedule, other than an off ice
                   declared by the Legislature of the State by law not to
                   disqualify its holder ;

    H               (b) if he is of unaound mind and stands so declared by
                    a competent court;
            KIRPAL SINGH v. U'ITAM SINGH [CHINNAPPA REDDY, J. ]   625


                (c) if he is an undischarged insolvent;                  A


               (d) if he is not a citizen of India, or has volun-
               tarily acquired the citizenship of a foreign State, or
               is under any acknowledgement of allegiance or
               adherence to a foreign State;
                                                                         B
               (e) if he is so disqualified by or under any law made
               by Parliament.

     Chapter III of the Representation of the People Act which
     certainly is a law made by Parliament within the meaning of Art.
     19l(l)(e) of the Constitution enwnerates some further grounds of    c
     disqualification for nembership of Parliament and State
     Assemblies. In particular we may refer to Section 10 which says,

               "Disqualification for office under Government Company
               - A person shall be disqualified if, and for so long

I              as, he is a managing agent, manager or secretary of
               any company <1r corporation (other than a co-operative
               society) in the capital of which· the appropriate
                                                                         D



               Government has not less than twenty-five per cent
                share."

          The clear and undoubted object of Art. 19l(l)(a) to (e) and    E
     the provisions of the Representation of the People Act (including
     sec. 10) is the preservation of the purity and integrity cf the
     election process by preventing Government or State employees from
     taking part in the elections. But then sec. 10 appears to confine
     the disqualification, in so far as it relates to employees of
     Government Companies to the •top-brass• only if such an uncouth
     expression may be allowed to creep into the judgment of a Court.    F
     Nowadays the activities of the State are so manifold and prolific
     that the State has been forced, in the interests of better
     management and administration and in order to further the
     Di rec tive Principles of State Policy, to set up varlous
     Corporations which are but mere instrumentalities of the State.
     Is the principle of Art. 191(1)(e) then to be extended to           G
     employees of State Corporations also by enacting appropriate laws
     under Art. 19l(l)(e)? Or are employees of Public Corporations to
     be treated differently from employees of the Government? Are not
     some of them in a better position to exert undesirable pressure,
     than Government employees? On the other hand, are a trerrendously
.,   large number of employees of Public Corporations to be denied the
     opportunity of being chosen, as representatives of the People? Do   H
     626               SUPREME COURT REPORTS       [1985] SUPP.3 s.c.R.

     all the considerations applicable to Government Employees equally
A    apply to employees of Public Sector Undertakings? ls there no
     distinguishing feature. Are a large mass of highly or moderately
     literate people to be denied the right to speak for the people?
     ls the right to be elected, to be confined, without meaning any
     disrespect to anyone to the professional politicians only? These
     are some of the vital questions posed and which require to be
B    answered. The answer should be best given by the elected
     representatives of the people themselves. We are not shirking the
     decision of these questions but our decision can only be confined
     to interpretation. Not so, Parliament which can decide upon the
     Policy. That is why, we recomnend to the Government to have the


c
     matter examined by the Law Commission very early. When a suitable
     occasion arises in the future we will, of course, deal with the
     matter, probably helped by new legislation.                          l
           The High Court has awarded costs against the appellant. That
     was uncalled for. We set aside that part of the order. We express
     no opinion on the other questions. The appellant will receive his
     remuneration for the period for which he was elected as a
JJ   legislator.




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