KINNARI MULLICK AND ANOTHERversusGHANSHYAM DAS DAMANI

                         [2017] 6 S.C.R. 657



              KINNARI MULLICK AND ANOTHER                                 A
                                  v.
                  GHANSHYAM DAS DAMANI
                   (Civil Appeal No. 5172of2017)
                           APRIL 20, 2017
                                                                          B
            [DIPAK MISRA, A. M. KHANWILKAR,
            MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR, JJ.)
        Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - s.34(4) -Appellants
 entered into an agreement with respondent - Disputes arose between
 the parties - Respondent invoked arbitration proceedings ,...
Arbitrator passed award allowing the claim of respondent -                c
Appellants filed application u/s.34 for setting aside the award -
Single Judge of High Court set aside the impugned award with the
finding that it did not disclose any reason in support thereof -
Division Bench affirmed the finding and conclusion recorded by
Single Judge 'however, suo motu relegated the parties before the          D
Arbitral Tribunal, in absence of any application filed by the parties
 to the arbitration proceedings and directed the Arbitrator to assign
reason to support award passed by him - Propriety of - Held: No
power /:las been invested by the Parliament in the Court to remand
 the matter to the Arbitral Tribunal except to adjourn the proceedings
for limited purpose mentioned u/s.34(4) - The limited discretion          E
available to the Court under s.34(4) can be exercised only upon a
written application made in that behalf by a party to the arbitration
proceedings - Respondent failed to make such a request before
Single Judge in the first instance and also failed to do so before
 Division Bench - The Court cannot exercise this limited power of         F
 deferring the proceedings before it suo motu - Further, the
 quintessence for exercising power uls.34(4) is that the arbitral award
 has not been set aside - In the instant case, Division Bench affirmed
 the conclusions recorded by the Single Judge and dismissed the
 appeal preferred by the respondent, thus the award was set aside
 on that count - Impugned direction of High Court suffers from            G
jurisdictional error and thus cannot be sustained.
      Allowing the appeal, the Court
     HELD: I. On a bare reading of s.34(4) of Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996, it is amply clear that the Court can defer
                                                                          H
                              657
658           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2017] 6 S.C.R.


A     the hearing of the application filed under Section 34 for setting
      aside the award on a written request made by a party to the
      arbitration proceedings to facilitate the Arbitral Tribunal by
      resuming the arbitral proceedings or to take such other action
      as in the opinion of Arbitral Tribunal will eliminate the grounds
B     for setting aside the arbitral award. The quintessence for
      exercising power under this provision is that the arbitral award
      has not been set aside. Further, the challenge to the said award
      has been set up under Section 34 about the deficiencies in the
      arbitral award which may be curable by allowing the Arbitral
      Tribunal to take such measures which can eliminate the grounds
 C    for setting.aside the arbitral award. No power has been invested
      by the Parliament in the Court to remand the matter to the Arbitral
      Tribunal except to adjourn the proceedings for the limited purpose
      mentioned in sub-section 4 of Section 34. [Para 13) [666-B-D]
             2. In any case, the limited discretion available to the Court
D     under Section 34(4) can be exercised only upon a written
      application made in that behalf by a party to the arbitration
      proceedings. It is crystal clear that the Court cannot exercise
      this limited power of deferring the proceedings before it suo motu.
      Moreover, before formally setting aside the award, if the party to
      the arbitration proceedings fails to request the Court to defer
 E    the proceedings pending before it, then it is not open to the party
      to move an application under Section 34(4) of the Act. For,
      consequent to disposal of the main proceedings under Section
      34 of the Act by the Court, it would become functus officio. In
      other words, the limited remedy available under Section 34(4) is
 F     required to be invoked by the party to the arbitral proceedings
       before the award is set aside by the Court. (Para 14) (666-G-H;
      667-A]
             3. In the present case, the Single Judge had set aside the
      award. Indeed, the Respondent carried the matter in appeal before
       the Division Bench. Even if it is assumed that the appeal was in
 G     continuum of the application under Section 34 for setting aside of
       the award and therefore, the Division Bench could be requested
       by the party to the arbitral proceedings to exercise its discretion
       under Section 34(4) of the Act, the fact remains that no formal
      written application was filed by the Respondent before the
 H     Division Bench for that purpose. In other words, the Respondent ·
 KINNARI MULLICK AND ANOTHER v. GHANSHYAM DAS                          659
                    DAMAN!

did not make such a request before the Single Judge in the first       A
instance and also failed to do so before the Division Bench
rejected the appeal of the Respondent. [Para 15) (667-B-D)
       4. The power of the Court under Section 34 of the Act is
not to remand the matter to the Arbitral Tribunal after setting
aside the arbitral award. A priori, it must follow that the Division   B
Bench committed manifest error in relegating the parties before
the Arbitral Tribunal with a direction to assign reasons in support
of the impugned award. Such direction could not have been issued
in the fact situation of the present case. The impugned direction
suffers from the vice of jurisdictional error and thus cannot be
sustained. [Paras 16, 17) (668-D-E)                                    C
       McDermott International Inc. v. Burn Standard Ltd.
       (2006) 11 SCC 181 : [2006) 2 Suppl. SCR 409 - relied
       on.
       MMTC v. Vicnivass Agency (2009) 1 MLJ 199; Raitani
       Engineering Works Pvt. Ltd. v. The Union of India and           D
       Others [2015 (2) GLD 615 (Gau)); and Bhaskar
       Industrial Development Limited v. South Western
       Railway (decision of High Court of Karnataka in MFA
       No.103528 of 2015) - approved.
       BSNL v. Motorola India Pvt. Ltd. (2009) 2 SCC 337 :             E
       [2008) 13 SCR 445; Konkan Railway Corporation
       Limited v. Rani Construction Private Limited (2002) 2
       SCC 388 : [2002) 1 SCR 728; GAIL v. Keti Construction
       (I) Ltd. (2007) 5 SCC 38 : (2007) 6 SCR 439 - referred
       to.
                                                                       F
                         Case Law Reference
[2008) 13 SCR 445               referred to            Para9
(2002) 1 SCR 728                referred to            Para9
(2007] 6 SCR 439                referred to            Para9
(2009) 1 MLJ 199                approved               Para9           G
(2015 (2) GLD 615 (Gau)]        approved               Para9
[2006) 2 Suppl. SCR 409         relied on             Para 9
     CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 5172
of2017.
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660            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2017] 6 S.C.R.


A           From the Judgment and Order dated 13.08.2014 of the High Court
      at Calcutta in APO No. 223 of 2014.
             Rana Mukherjee, Sr. Adv., Ms. Daisy Hannah, Shekhar Kumar,
      Ad vs. for the Appellants.
            M. C. Dhingra, Ashwini Kr. Gupta, Piyush Kant Roy, Advs. for
B     the Respondent.
            The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
             A. M. KHANWILKAR, J. 1. This appeal raises a short question
      as to whether Section 34 (4) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,
      1996 (for short "the Act") empowers the Court to relegate the parties
C     before the Arbitral Tribunal after having set aside the arbitral award in
      question and moreso suo moto in absence of any application made in
      that behalf by the parties to the arbitration proceedings?
             2. The Appellants, being joint owners of premises No.4 Wood
      Street, Kolkata, known as 4C, Dr. Martin Luther King Sarani, Kolkata,
D     entered into two development agreements with the Respondent for a
      construction of a multi storied building. On completion of construction of
      the building sometime in 2003, the Appellants entered into a further
      agreement with the Respondent in terms of which the Respondent, for
      better enjoyment of the property, distributed the owner's allocation. In
 E    terms of the said agreement, the Respondent fully sold and transferred
      his share of the premises to various prospective buyers with proportionate
      area of the land to them as well as in common areas. According to the
      Appellants, the Respondent is not in possession of any portion of the suit
      premises. The Appellants have also executed and registered the
      conveyance along with the proportionate right in common areas and
.F    land of the said premises to various transferees, save and except two
      flats. The said agreement contained an Arbitration clause which reads
      thus:
            "21. That all disputes and/or differences between the parties
            herein shall be referred to arbitration in terms of the provisions
 G          of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996. "
             3. The Respondent asserted that he was entitled to execution and
      registration of conveyance in respect of 50% built up area on the ground
      floor of such premis.es. That claim was rejected by the Appellants. The
      Respondent, through his advocate's letter dated 21.11.2009 addressed
 H    to the Appellants, inter alia informed them about the appointment of one
 KINNARI MULLICK AND ANOTHER v. GHANSHYAM DAS                                    661
          DAMAN! [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

Siddhartha Sankar Manda!, Advocate as arbitrator and further, that the           A
said arbitrator would send intimation to the Appellants about the date,
time and venue in respect of the arbitration proceedings to be held by
him. The said letter, however, did not specify that Siddhartha Sankar
Manda! was appointed as Sole Arbitrator nor did it call upon the Appellants
to appoint their nominee arbitrator.. The Appellants then received               B
communication through Siddhartha Sankar Manda! dated 01.11.2009
stating that he has been appointed as arbitrator to arbitrate the dispute
between the Appellants and the Respondent and that he would enter
upon the reference on 10.11.2009. By this letter, the Appellants were
called upon to remain present so as to hold a meeting as scheduled.
According to the Appellants, the letter did not even provide for 30 days'        C
time between the date of meeting and the receipt of the communication
by the Appellants. Nevertheless, the arbitrator proceeded with the
arbitration proceedings and held meetings. The Appellants did not file
their statement of'defence. Instead, they filed an application on
10.05.2010 before the arbitrator under Section 16 of the Act, inter alia         D
challenging the composition of the Arbitral Tribunal and also raising the
issue of jurisdiction to proceed with the arbitration as a Sole Arbitrator.
The arbitrator, however, rejected the said application on 27.08.2010 by
an interim award.
        4. The Appellants then filed their counter statement in November
20 io to the statement of claim in the said arbitral proceedings without         E
prejudice to their contention that, the Arbitral Tribunal has not been
properly constituted and that the arbitrator had no jurisdiction to adjudicate
the alleged dispute referred to him. The Appellants were also advised to
file an application under Section 14 before the High Court, alleging bias
on the part of the arbitrator and for a declaration that the arbitrator had      F
become incompetent to perform his functions. The learned Single Judge
of the High Court at Calcutta vi de judgment dated 17 .09.2012 disposed
of the said application by reserving the right of the Appellants to raise all
grounds mentioned in the application regarding the competence of the
Arbitral Tribunal at the time of challenging the award under Section 34
of the Act, if such occasion arose.                                              G
       5. The Appellants then received a copy of the purported award
dated 18.06.2013 passed by the Arbitral Tribunal. The arbitrator allowed
the claim of the Respondent and directed the Appellants to execute and
register appropriate deed and/or deeds as proposed by the Respondent
vide its Advocate's letter dated 29.06.2009; and further directed that H
662             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2017] 6 S.C.R.



A     conveyance and/or conveyances was/were to be executed and registered
      by the Appellants, costs and expenses thereof were to be borne by the
      Respondent within a period of 30 days from the date of the award
      irrespective of any intervening holiday and/or holidays. The said award,
      however, did not contain any reason for allowing .the claim of the
B     Respondent.
             6. Being dissatisfied with the interim award dated 27.08.2010 and
      final award dated 18.06.2013 passed by the Arbitral Tribunal, the
      Appellants filed an application under Section 34 of the Act, for setting
      aside of the said awards. The learned Single Judge was pleased to allow
      the said application on the finding that the impugned award did not disclose
C     any reason in support thereof. The impugned award was accordingly
      set aside and the parties were left to pursue their remedies in accordance
      with law. The relevant portion of the decision of the learned Single Judge
      reads thus:
             "Since the present award is completely lacking in reasons and
D            is littered with the unacceptable expressions like "I feel.that
             the claim is justified", "/find no basis" and the like which
             cannot be supplement for reasons that the statute demands,
             A.P. No.1074 of 2013 is allowed by setting aside the award
             dated June 18, 2013. The parties are left free to pursue their
 E           remedies in accordance with law. "
            7. Against the aforementioned decision the Respondent preferred
     an appeal before the Division Bench of the High Court at Calcutta. The
    Appellants also filed a cross objection in respect of the adverse findings·
     recorded by the learned Single Judge against them. The cross objection
 F bearing APO No.223,of2014 and APOT No.318 of 2014, were heard
   · and decided together by the Division Bench vide impugned judgment
     dated 13.08.2014. The Division Bench affirmed the findings and
     conclusion recorded by the learned Single Judge that the award did not
     contain any reason whatsoever and thus rejected the appeal preferred
     by the Respondent, in the following words:
 G
             "We have considered the rival contentions. Section 31 is i:lear
             that would require the Tribunal to assign reason. The award
             wouldsuffer from such lacunae. We would not be in a position
             to agree with Mr. Sharma when he would contend, it was
             reasoned, but reasons might have been insufficient.
 H
  KINNARI MULLICK AND ANOTHER v. GHANSHYAM DAS                                  663
           DAMAN! [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

           The learned Judge observed, "'The award does not indicate A
      a line or sentence of reasons and notwithstanding the
      petitioners herein, having pulled out of the reference and not
      urging their counter-statement or any defence to the claim, it
      was still incumbent on the arbitrator to indicate the grounds
      on which the respondents were entitled to succeed".
                                                                                B
           We fully endorse what his Lordship would say as quoted
       (supra). Hence, the appeal fails on such count. "
       While considering the cross objection filed by the Appellants, the
Division Bench negatived the ground urged before it about the
inappropriate and illegal constitution of the Arbitral Tribunal. As a result,   c
the cross objection filed by the Appellants was also rejected. Having
decided as above, the Division Bench suo moto decided to relegate the
parties before the Arbitral Tribunal by sending the award back with a
direction to assign reasons in support of its award. It will be useful to
reproduce the observations of the Division Bench in this regard. The
same reads thus:                                                                D
      "On the cross-objection we wpuld, however, agree with Mr.
      Sharma when he would draw our attention to Section 13. The
      learned Judge, in our view. rightly rejected the contention of
      the respondents. The challenge procedure as spelt out in
      Section 13 would refer to constitution of the Tribunal as well. E
      Section 4 would clearly provide, if a party knowing his right
      does not take any step that would debar him to object at a .
      later stage. as if he shall be deemed to have waived his right
      to object.
            Section 34 would ·empower the Court to remit the award F
      to the Arbitrator. at a stage when the award was under
      challenge.. to eliminate the ground for setting aside of the
      arbitral award. Aqplying such provision we send the award
      back to the Arbitrator with a direction. he must assign reason
      to support his award. However. we wish to give the Arbitrator G
      a free hand: If he feels. further hearing to be given to the
      parties. he may do so and upon hearing. he mgy publish his
      award in accordance with law adhering to the norms and
      procedures laid-down under.the said Act 1996 without being
      influenced by the award that the learned Judge already set
      aside.                                                          H''.
664               SUPREME COURT REPORTS                             (2017] 6 S.C.R.



A                 The appeal is dismissed without any order as to costs. "
                      ·                                 (emphasis supplied)
            8. Aggrieved by the highlighted operative part of the direction
      issued by the Division Bench to send back the award to the ArQitral
      Tribunal for assigning reasons in support of the award, the Appellants
B     have approached this Court by way of present appeal.
            9. Indeed, the Appellants have also challenged the approach of
      the Division Bench and of the learned Single Judge in rejecting the
      contention of the Appellants about the jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal.
      According to the Appellants, that objection could be raised by the
C     Appellants and ought to be answered in their favour, keeping in mind,
      the decision of this Court in BSNL Vs. Motorola India Pvt. Ltd.'. It is
      contended that the Appellants could raise the plea, that theArbitral Tribunal
      did not have jurisdiction. Further, the Appellants had submitted the
      submission of defence without prejudice and thus the participation of the
      Appellants in the proceedings before the Arbitral Tribunal would not
D     come in the way of the Appellants to raise that contention. The Appellants
      have also relied on the decisions of this Court in the case of Konkan
      Railway Corporation Limited Vs. Rani Construction Private Limited1
      and GAIL Vs. Keli Construction (I} Ltd. 3• However, it may not be
      necessary for us to examine this argument if we were to accept the
 E    challenge set up by the Appellants to the concluding part of the impugned
      judgment of the Division Bench of having relegated the parties before
      the Arbitral Tribunal with a direction to assign reasons in support of the
      impugned award. As regards this contention, the Appellants have relied
      on the dictum in the case of MMTC Vs. Vicnivass Agency' of the High
      Court of Madras, Raitani Engineering Works Pvt. Ltd. Vs. The Union
 F    of India and Others' decided by the Gauhati High Court dated
      28.05.2015, Bhaskar Industrial Development Limited Vs. South
       Western Railway' decided by the High Court of Karnataka, Dharwad
      Bench and lastly in McDermott International Inc. Vs. Burn Standard
      Ltd.7

 G    1 (2009) 2 sec 337
      2
        (2002) 2 sec 388
              s
      • (2007) sec 38
      '(2009) I MU 199
      'Arbitration Petition No.13 of2015 [2015 (2) GLD 615 (Gau)]
      6
        MFA No.103528 of2015
 H    1
        (2006)11sec131
 KINNARI MULLICK AND ANOTHER v. GHANSHYAM DAS                               665
          DAMAN! [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

       10. The Respondent, on the other hand, submits that ample power A
is bestowed upon the Court to relegate the parties to the award under
challenge back to the Arbitral Tribunal to eliminate the ground for setting
aside of the arbitral award, in terms of Section 34 of the Act. It is submitted
that no jurisdictional error has been committed by the Division Bench in
exercising that power for sending the award back to the Arbitral Tribunal B
with a direction to assign reasons in support of the award. It is submitted
that the dismissal of the appeal preferred by the Respondent against the
judgment of the learned Single Judge will not come in the way of the
Respondent muchless to participate in the proceedings before the Arbitral
Tribunal as has been remitted by the Division Bench for the limited
purpose of assigning reasons in support of the award. It is submitted that C
no interference is warranted with the concluding part of the judgment of
the Division Bench which intends to facilitate rectification of the
deficiencies in the award already pronounced by the Arbitral Tribunal.
       11. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties. At the
outset, we may note that, if the plea taken by the Appellants in relation to D
the concluding part of the impugned judgment - of sending the award
back to the Arbitral Tribunal for recording reasons - was to be accepted,
we may not be required to dilate on any other argument. Inasmuch as
the learned Single Judge allowed the application under Section 34 of the
Act for setting aside of the award preferred by the Appellants; and the E
Division Bench has already affirmed the conclusion recorded by the
learned Single Judge while dismissing the appeal preferred by the
Respondent. Thus, the award has been set aside on that count. The
Respondent has not challenged that part of the impugned judgment and
has allowed it to become final.
       12. In this backdrop, the question which arises is:· whether the      F
highlighted portion in the operative part of the impugned judgment of the
Division Bench can be sustained in law? For that, we may advert to
Section 34(4) of the Act which is the repository of power invested in the
Court. The same reads thus:
       "Section 34 ............ .                                            G

      (4). On receipt of an application under sub-section (1), the
      court may, where it is appropriate and it is so requested by a
      party, adjourn the proceedings for a period of time determined
      by it in order to give the arbitra/ tribunal an opportunity to
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666            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2017] 6 S.C.R.



A           resume the arbitral proceedings or to take such other action
            as in the opinion of arbitral tribunal will eliminate the grounds
            for setting aside the arbitra/ award. "
             13. On a bare reading of this provision, it is amply clear that the .
      Court can defer the hearing of the application filed under Section 34 for
B     setting aside the award on a written request made by a party to the
      arbitration proceedings to facilitate the Arbitral Tribunal by resuming the
      arbitral proceedings or to take such oth~r action as in the opinion of
      Arbitral Tribunal will eliminate the grounds for setting aside the arbitral
      award. The quintessence for exercising power under this provision is
      that the arbitral award has not been set aside. Further, the challenge to
C     the said award has been set up under Section 34 about the deficiencies
      in the arbitral award which may be curable by allowing the Arbitral
      Tribunal to take such measures which can eliminate the grounds for
      setting aside the arbitral award. No power has been invested by the
      Parliament in the Court to remand the matter to the Arbitral Tribunal
D     except to adjourn the proceedings for the limited purpose mentioned in
      sub-section 4 of Section 34. This legal position has been expounded in
      the case of McDermott International Inc. (supra). In paragraph 8 of
      the said decision, the Court observed thus:
            "8 .....parliament has not conferred any power of remand to
E           the Court to remit the matter to the arbitral tribunal except to
            adjourn the proceedings as provided under sub-section (4)
            of Section 34 of the Act. The object of sub-section· (4) of
            Section 34 of the Act is to give an opportunity to the arbitral
            tribunal to resume the arbitral proceedings or to enable it to
            take such other action which will eliminate the grounds for
 F          setting aside the arbitra/ award. "
                                                       (emphasis supplied)
             14. In any case, the limited discretion available to the Court under
      Section 34(4) can be exercised only upon a written application made in
      that behalf by a party to the arbitration proceedings. It is crystal clear
 G    that the Court cannot exercise this limited power of deferring the
      proceedings before it suo moto. Moreover, before formally setting aside
      the award, ifthe party to the arbitration proceedings fails to request the
      Court to defer the proceedings pending before it, then it is not open to
      the party to move an application under Section 34(4) of the Act. For,
.H    consequent to disposal of the main proceedings under Section 34 of the
   KINNARI MULLICK AND ANOTHER v. GHANSHYAM DAS                                667
            DAMAN! [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.)

  Act by the Court, it would become functus officio. In other words, the       A
· limited remedy available under Section 34(4) is required to be invoked
  by the party to the arbitral proceedings before the.award is set aside by
  the Court.
         15. In the present case, the learned Single Judge had set aside the
 award vi de judgment dated 07 .03.2014. Indeed, the Respondent carried        B
 the matter in appeal before the Division Bench. Even if we were to
 assume for the sake of argument, without expressing any opinion either
 way on the correctness of this assumption, that the appeal was in
 continuum of the application under Section 34 for setting aside of the
 award and therefore, the Division Bench could be requested by the party
 to the arbitral proceedings to exercise its discretion under Section 34(4)    C
 of the Act, the fact remains that no formal written application was filed
 by the Respondent before the Division Bench for that purpose. In other
 words, the Respondent did not make such a request before the leam~d
 Single Judge in the first instance and also failed to do so before the
 Division Bench rejected the appeal of the Respondent.                         D
         16. In the case ofMMTC (supra), the Madras High Court, while
 dealing with the purport of Section 34(4) of the Act in paragraph 22 (C)
 of the reported judgment, observed thus:
        "(C) ...... On the other hand, Section 34(4) of the new Act, does
        not prescribe any condition precedent on the substance of E
        the matter but prescribes three procedural conditions namely .
        that there should be an application ui1der Section 34(1) of
        the new Act and that a request should emanate from a party
        and the Court considers it appropriate to invoke the power
        under Section 34(4) of the new Act."                              F
       Again, in paragraph 22 (e) (IV) of the reported judgment, it
 observed thus:
        "But under the 1996 Act, the Court has only two sets ofpowers
        after the award is pronounced viz.,
                                                                               G
        (i) to set aside the award under Section 34(2); or
        (ii) to adjourn the proceedings to enable the arbitral tribunal
        to resume the proceedings or take such· other action as in the
        opinion of the tribunal will eliminate the grounds for setting
        aside the arbitral award. "
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668            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2017] 6 S.C.R.


A           In the case of Raitani Engineering Works Pvt. Ltd. (supra),
      the Gauhati High Court, placing reliance on the decision in MMTC
      (supra) in paragraph 8 of its decision, observed thus:
            "But unfortunately in the present case, the award given by
            the arbitration panel on 13.07.2012 was quashed in its entirety
B           and the appeal under Section 34 is no more pending before
            the Court. Therefore, invoking the powers conferred under
            sub-section (4) of Section 34 of the Arbitration Act to facilitate
            the arbitration panel to take rectificatory steps is not an option
            in this matter. Moreover neither of the contesting party in this
            dispute have applied for an additional award and therefore
c           it may not be appropriate to direct the arbitration panel to re-
            decide on the six un-decided claims of the contractor. "
         The Division Bench of the High Court of Karnataka in the case
  of Bhaskar Industrial Development Limited (Supra) has expounded
  that the power of the Court under Section 34 of the Act is not to remand
D the matter to the Arbitral Tribunal after setting aside the arbitral award.
         17. A priori, it must follow that the Division Bench committed
   manifest error in issuing direction in the concluding part of the impugned·
   judgment, as reproduced hereinbefore in paragraph No. 7. Such direction
   could not have been issued in the fact situation of the present case. The
 E impugned direction suffers from the vice of jurisdictional error and thus
   cannot be sustained. We have no option but to quash and set aside the
   same.
             18~ As the Respondent has not challenged the decision of the
      Division Bench, we are left with the situation where the award has been
 F    set aside, and as observed by the learned Single Judge, with liberty to
      the parties to pursue their remedies in accordance with law.
            19. Accordingly, we allow this appeal to the extent indicated above
      with no order as to costs.

 G
      Ankit Gyan                                                  Appeal allowed.