KHUSHI RAM & ORS.versusNAWAL SINGH & ORS.

                         [2021] 4 S.C.R. 1019                              1019


                       KHUSHI RAM & ORS.                                   A
                                   v.
                      NAWAL SINGH & ORS.
                   (Civil Appeal No. 5167 of 2010)
                        FEBRUARY 22, 2021                                  B
    [ASHOK BHUSHAN AND R. SUBHASH REDDY, JJ.]
       Hindu Succession Act, 1956 – s.15 – Succession – Properties
inherited by female Hindus – “Family” – Family settlement – ‘J’, a
widow inherited share of her late husband in the land in question –
                                                                           C
Family settlement – She gave said share to her nephews-respondents
(her brother’s sons) – Respondents filed suit against ‘J’ claiming
decree of declaration as owners in possession thereof – Respondents’
claim accepted by her, consent decree passed in favour of
respondents – Appellants (descendants of J’s late husband’s brother)
filed suit inter alia for declaring the decree invalid – Dismissed –       D
First and second appeals were also dismissed – Held: s.15(1)(d)
indicates that heirs of the father of a female are covered in the
heirs who can succeed – Thus, it cannot be held that the respondents
who were J’s nephews were strangers and not the members of the
family qua her – Further, she was the absolute owner when she
                                                                           E
entered into settlement – All the Courts rightly dismissed the suit of
the appellants, which need no interference – Indian Registration
Act, 1908 – s.17(2)(vi).
       Indian Registration Act, 1908 – s.17(1)(b), 17(2)(vi) – Consent
decree passed on the basis of family settlement, if required
                                                                           F
registration – Held: Issue in the present case is squarely covered by
the judgment in Mohammade Yusuf & Ors. v. Rajkumar & Ors.
reported as 2020(3) SCALE 146 wherein it was held that since the
decree which was sought to be exhibited was with regard to the
property which was subject matter of suit, hence, was not covered
by exclusionary clause of s.17(2) (vi) and did not require registration    G
– In the present case also, the consent decree related to the subject
matter of the suit, thus was not required to be registered u/s.17(2)(vi)
– Courts below rightly held that the decree did not require
registration.
                                                                           H
                                 1019
1020           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2021] 4 S.C.R.


 A           Words & Phrases – “Family” – Concept of – Discussed.
             Dismissing the appeal, the Court
             HELD : 1.1 There is no dispute that in the earlier Civil
       Suit No.317 of 1991 in which consent decree was passed on
       19.08.1991, the subject matter of suit was the agricultural land
 B     situated in Village Garhi, Bajidpur. Further the suit was decreed
       on the written statement filed by Smt. ‘J’ (the widow) accepting
       the claim of plaintiffs that there was family settlement between
       the parties in which the half share in the land was given to the
       plaintiffs of Civil Suit No.317 of 1991. [Para 12][1027-E-F]
 C           1.2 In Mohammade Yusuf & Ors. Vs. Rajkumar & Ors.
       this Court held that since the decree which was sought to be
       exhibited was with regard to the property which was subject matter
       of suit, hence, was not covered by exclusionary clause of Section
       17(2) (vi) and decree did not require registration. The issue in
 D     the present case is squarely covered by the said judgment. In
       view of the fact that the consent decree dated 19.08.1991 relate
       to the subject matter of the suit, hence it was not required to be
       registered under Section 17(2) (vi). The consent decree dated
       19.08.1991 was not registrable and Courts below rightly held that
       the decree did not require registration. [Para 20][1036-G-H; 1037-
 E     A]
             Mohammade Yusuf & Ors. v. Rajkumar & Ors. 2020
             (3) SCALE 146 – relied on.
             2.1 It is necessary to find out what is the concept of family
 F     with regard to which a family settlement could be entered. Every
       party taking benefit under a family settlement must be related to
       one another in some way and have a possible claim to the property
       or a claim or even a semblance of a claim. Term “family” has to
       be understood in a wider sense so as to include within its fold not
       only close relations or legal heirs but even those persons who
 G     may have some sort of antecedent title, a semblance of a claim or
       even if they have a spes successionis. [Paras 22, 23][1037-C-D;
       1038-A-B]
             Ram Charan Das v. Girjanandini Devi and Ors. [1965]
             3 SCR 841; Kale and Ors. v. Deputy Director of
 H
       KHUSHI RAM & ORS. v. NAWAL SINGH & ORS.                          1021


      Consolidation and Ors., (1976) 3 SCC 119 : [1976] 3               A
      SCR 202 – relied on.
       2.2 The defendants-respondents were nephews, i.e.,
brother’s sons of Smt. ‘J’. The Hindu Succession Act, 1956,
Section 15, deals with the general rules of succession in the case
of female Hindus for properties inherited by female Hindus, which       B
are devolved in according to Sections 15 and 16. A perusal of
Section 15(1)(d) indicates that heirs of the father are covered in
the heirs, who could succeed. When heirs of father of a female
are included as person who can possibly succeed, it cannot be
held that they are strangers and not the members of the family
qua the female. ‘Smt. J’, who as a widow of ‘SS’, who had died in       C
1953, had succeeded to half share in the agricultural land and
she was the absolute owner when she entered into settlement.
No merit in the submission that the defendants-respondents were
strangers to the family. All the Courts have rightly dismissed the
suit of the plaintiffs-appellants, which need no interference. [Paras   D
26-29][1042-F-G; 1043-B-E]
      Mata Deen v. Madan Lal & Ors. Decision of Supreme
      Court in Civil Appeal No. 890 of 2008 – held
      inapplicable.
      K. Raghunandan and Ors. v. Ali Hussain Sabir and Ors.             E
      (2008) 13 SCC 102 : [2008] 8 SCR 657 – relied on.
      Bhoop Singh Vs. Ram Singh Major and Ors., (1995) 5
      SCC 709 : [1995] 3 Suppl. SCR 466, Som Dev and
      Ors. v. Rati Ram and Anr., (2006) 10 SCC 788 : [2006]
      5 Suppl. SCR 778 – referred to.                                   F
                       Case Law Reference
[1995] 3 Suppl. SCR 466        referred to         Para 13
[2006] 5 Suppl. SCR 778        referred to         Para 17
[2008] 8 SCR 657               relied on           Para 18              G

2020(3) SCALE 146              relied on           Para 19
[1965] 3 SCR 841               relied on           Para 22
[1976] 3 SCR 202               relied on           Para 23
                                                                        H
1022             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                             [2021] 4 S.C.R.


 A           CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 5167
       of 2010.
             From the Judgment and Order dated 16.04.2009 of the High Court
       of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in RSA No. 750 of 2002.
             Manoj Swarup, Sr. Adv., Ranbir Singh Yadav, Prateek Yadav,
 B     Mrs. Pratima Yadav, Rohit Kumar Singh, Advs. for the appearing parties.
              The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
              ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.
             1. This appeal has been filed by the plaintiffs of Civil Suit challenging
 C     the judgment dated 16.04.2009 of High Court of Punjab & Haryana
       dismissing the second appeal filed by the appellant.
              2. The brief facts of the case as emerged from the pleadings of
       the parties are:
              2.1    One Badlu, who was the tenure-holder of agricultural land
 D
                     situate in Village Garhi Bajidpur, Tehsil and District Gurgaon,
                     had two sons Bali Ram and Sher Singh. Sher Singh died in
                     the year 1953 issueless leaving his widow Smt. Jagno.
              2.2    Plaintiffs-appellants are descendents of Bali Ram. After
                     death of Sher Singh, his widow inherited share of her late
 E                   husband, i.e., the half of the agricultural property owned by
                     Badlu. A Civil Suit No.317 of 1991 was filed by Nawal
                     Singh and two others against Smt. Jagno in the Court of
                     Sub-Judge, Gurgaon claiming decree of declaration as
                     owners in possession of the agricultural land mentioned in
 F                   the suit to the extent of half share situate in Village Garhi
                     Bajidpur. The plaintiffs claim was that Smt. Jagno, who
                     was sharer of the half share, has in a family settlement
                     settled the land in favour of the plaintiffs, who were the
                     brother’s sons of Smt. Jagno.
 G            2.3    Smt. Jagno filed a written statement in the suit admitting
                     the claim of the plaintiffs. Smt. Jagno also made a statement
                     in the suit accepting the claim of plaintiffs, the trial court
                     vide its judgment and decree dated 19.08.1991 passed the
                     consent decree in favour of the plaintiffs declaring the
                     plaintiffs owners in possession of the half share in the land.
 H
 KHUSHI RAM & ORS. v. NAWAL SINGH & ORS.                                1023
          [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

2.4   The plaintiffs, who were descendents of brother of husband        A
      of Smt. Jagno filed a Civil Suit No.79 of 1991 in the Court
      of Senior Sub-Judge Gurgaon praying for declaration that
      the decree passed in Civil Suit No.317 of 1991 dated
      19.08.1991 is illegal, invalid and without legal necessity. The
      plaintiffs also claimed decree of declaration in their favour
                                                                        B
      declaring them owners in possession of land in question. In
      Suit No.79 of 1991, a joint written statement was filed by
      the defendants. Smt. Jagno was also defendant No.4 in the
      civil Suit No.79 of 1991. The defendants supported the
      decree dated 19.08.1991. The defendants No.1 to 3 claimed
      land by family settlement out of love and affection by the        C
      defendant No.4, which family settlement was duly affirmed
      by Civil Court decree dated 19.08.1991.
2.5   The trial court framed nine issues. Issue No. 5 being
      “Whether the decree dated 19.08.1991 passed in civil suit
      no.317/91 titled Nawal Singh Etc. Vs. Smt. Jagno passed           D
      by Sh. K.B. Aggarwal SJIC, Gurgaon is illegal, invalid
      without jurisdiction and against custom, without legal
      necessity and consideration and a result of fraud and undue
      influence and is liable to be set aside?
2.6   Issue Nos. 2 to 5 were answered in favour of defendants.          E
      The trial court also rejected the argument of the plaintiffs
      that in absence of registration of decree, no right or title
      would pass in favour of the defendants. Trial court held
      that registration is required when fresh rights are created
      for the first time by virtue of decree itself. It was held that
      in the case in hand, defendants were having pre-existing          F
      right in the suit property under as in a family settlement
      defendant No.4 acknowledged them as owner and
      surrendered the possession of the suit property in their favour
      at the time of family settlement and the decree dated
      19.08.1991 merely affirms their pre-existing rights and           G
      hence, does not require registration.
2.7   The plaintiffs aggrieved by the judgment filed first appeal
      before the learned District Judge, which too was dismissed.
      The First Appellate Court held that under Section 14(1) of
      the Indian Succession Act, a Hindu female become full owner       H
1024            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2021] 4 S.C.R.


 A                  of the property, which she acquires before the
                    commencement of the Act and not as a limited owner. The
                    First Appellate Court also held that defendants being near
                    relations of defendant No.4, they cannot be said to be
                    strangers to her. First Appellate Court also held that decree
                    did not require registration. The findings of the trial court
 B
                    were affirmed by the First Appellate Court dismissing the
                    appeal. Aggrieved against the judgment of the First
                    Appellate Court, the plaintiffs filed R.S.A. No.750 of 2002.
                    Second appeal was admitted on following question of law:-
                        “Whether in the absence of any pre-existing right with
 C                      the defendant- respondents 1 to 3, a decree ( Exhibit
                        P.2) suffered by Jagno (who is father’s sister of
                        defendant- respondent) required registration under
                        Section 17(1) of the Indian Registration Act, 1908?”
             2.8    The High Court answered the above question of law against
 D                  the plaintiffs and in favour of the defendants-respondents.
                    The High Court held that judgment and the decree rendered
                    in Civil Suit No.317 of 1991 dated 19.08.1991 merely
                    recognise the existing right which was created by the oral
                    family settlement. High Court further held that apart from
 E                  relationship of Smt. Jagno with defendants-respondents 1
                    to 3, she has developed close affinity, love and affection for
                    defendant respondent Nos.1 to 3 as per the findings recorded
                    by the learned Courts below. The High Court dismissed the
                    second appeal, aggrieved against which judgment, this appeal
                    has been filed.
 F
             3. We have heard Shri Ranbir Singh Yadav, learned counsel for
       the appellant and Shri Manoj Swarup, learned senior counsel for the
       respondent.
               4. Learned counsel for the appellants, Shri Yadav submits that no
 G     family settlement could have been entered by Smt. Jagno in favour of
       defendant Nos.1 to 3, they being strangers to the family. A Hindu widow
       cannot constitute a Joint Hindu Family with the descendants of her brother,
       i.e., her parental side. Family settlement can take place only between
       members, who have antecedent title or pre-existing right in the property
       proposed to be settled. Smt. Jagno could have transferred her absolute
 H     share in favour of the respondents or to any stranger only in accordance
        KHUSHI RAM & ORS. v. NAWAL SINGH & ORS.                              1025
                 [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

with law by complying with the provisions of the Transfer of Property        A
Act, 1882, the Indian Registration Act, 1908 and the Indian Stamp Act,
1899. Learned counsel further contends that registration of compromise
decree was compulsory by virtue of Section 17 of the Indian Registration
Act and the decree dated 19.08.1991 having not been registered, it did
not confer any valid title to the defendant Nos.1 to 3. All the Courts
                                                                             B
below committed error in upholding the decree dated 19.08.1991 whereas
the decree being an unregistered decree was liable to be ignored and
declared in operative.
       5. Shri Manoj Swarup, learned senior counsel for the respondents
refuting the submissions of the learned counsel for the appellant contends
that defendant Nos.1 to 3 had pre-existing right in the suit property,       C
which was clear from the pleadings of Civil Suit No.317 of 1991. In the
above suit, it was categorically pleaded that family settlement/
arrangement took place about two years back and since then plaintiffs
are owners in possession of land and defendant No.4 had relinquished
all her rights therein.                                                      D
       6. It is submitted that decree passed in the Civil Suit dated
19.08.1991 only declared the existing rights of the defendant Nos.1 to 3,
which was based on the family settlement. It is submitted that the
defendant Nos.1 to 3 being brother’s sons of Smt. Jagno, they were not
strangers to Smt. Jagno and family settlement could have been very           E
well entered by Smt. Jagno with them. It is submitted that the expression
“family” for the purpose of family settlement is not to be given any
narrow meaning; it should be given a wide meaning to cover the members,
who are by any means related. It is further submitted that the decree
dated 19.08.1991 did not require any registration under Section 17 of the
Indian Registration Act, 1908. The decree was passed with regard to          F
subject matter of the suit property, it was exempted from registration by
virtue of Section 17(2)(vi) of the Indian Registration Act, 1908. Shri
Swarup further contends that the family settlement could have been
made out of love and affection with regard to which there was ample
pleading in the Civil Suit No.317 of 1991 and out of love and affection      G
defendant No.4, Smt. Jagno could have very well settled the properties
in favour of defendant Nos.1 to 3, her nephews being brother’s sons.
      7. Learned counsel for the parties have relied on judgments of
this Court for their respective submissions, which shall be referred to
while considering the submissions in detail.                                 H
1026            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2021] 4 S.C.R.


 A            8. The Civil Suit No.79 of 1991, which gives rise to this appeal
       was a suit where following reliefs were claimed by plaintiffs-appellants:-
             “10. That the plaintiffs, therefore, pray that a decree for declaration
             to the effect that the decree in question passed in Civil Suit No.317
             of 1991 dated 19.8.1991 is illegal, invalid, without legal necessity
 B           and consideration on the grounds stated above in the plaint, and
             the same does not convey any title in favour of the defendants
             No.1 to 3 and does not effect any reversionary rights of the plaintiffs
             and the plaintiffs are owners in possession of the land in question,
             fully detailed and described in para no.3 of the plaint above, with
             consequential relief of permanent injunction restraining the
 C           defendants further alienating the land in question to anyone else,
             may kindly be passed in favour of the plaintiffs and against the
             defendants with costs of this suit.
             Any other relief which this Hon’ble Court may deems fit and
             proper may also be granted to the plaintiffs.”
 D
              9. There is no dispute between the parties that Shri Sher Singh,
       husband of Smt. Jagno had half share in the agricultural land situate in
       village Garhi Bajidpur, which was suit property. Sher Singh died in 1953.
       Smt. Jagno after enforcement of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 by
       virtue of Section 14 became the absolute owner of the half share of the
 E     suit property. The bone of contention between the parties centres round
       the decree dated 19.08.1991 passed by the Sub-Judge in Civil Suit No.317
       of 1991 filed by defendant Nos.1 to 3 against Smt. Jagno seeking
       declaration that they are owners in possession of the suit land. In Civil
       Suit No.317 of 1991, following was pleaded in paragraphs 2 and 3:-
 F           “2. That the parties are closely related to each other, the plaintiffs
             are nephews of the deft and constituted a Joint Hindu Family.
             The deft Smt. Jagno Devi is the daughter of Sh. Shib Lal, the
             grand father of the plaintiffs.
             3. That the defendant is living with the plaintiffs at Village
 G           Chakerpur and the plaintiffs are looking after her in her old age
             and the deft has no issue. The deft is very happy with the services
             of the plaintiff rendered to her and out of love and affection, the
             deft had allotted the above mentioned land to the plaintiffs in equal
             share in a family settlement /arrangement, which took place about
             2 years back and since then the plaintiffs are owners in possession
 H
             of the said land and the deft had relinquished all rights therein.”
        KHUSHI RAM & ORS. v. NAWAL SINGH & ORS.                                  1027
                 [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

      10. In the aforesaid suit, written statement was filed by Smt. Jagno       A
admitting the claim of the defendants. The trial court in its decree dated
19.08.1991 held following in paragraph 2:-
       “2. The defendant appeared and filed written statement admitting
       in toto the claim of the plaintiffs. Statements of the parties were
       also recorded. In view of the written statement and statements of         B
       parties, a consent decree in favour of the plaintiffs and against
       the defendant is passed for declaration as prayed for, leaving the
       parties to bear their own costs. Decree sheet be prepared and file
       be consigned to the record room.”
       11. In this appeal, following two questions arise for consideration:-     C
       (1) Whether the decree dated 19.08.1991 passed in Civil Suit
           No.317 of 1991 requires registration under Section 17 of the
           Indian Registration Act, 1908?; and
       (2) Whether the defendant Nos.1 to 3 were strangers to
           defendant No.4 so as to disable her to enter into any family          D
           arrangement with defendant Nos.1 to 3?
       Question No.(1)
        12. There is no dispute that in the earlier Civil Suit No.317 of 1991
in which consent decree was passed on 19.08.1991, the subject matter
                                                                                 E
of suit was the agricultural land situated in Village Garhi, Bajidpur. Further
the suit was decreed on the written statement filed by Smt. Jagno
accepting the claim of plaintiffs that there was family settlement between
the parties in which the half share in the land was given to the plaintiffs
of Civil Suit No.317 of 1991. The question is as to whether the decree
passed on 19.08.1991 required registration under Section 17 of the Indian        F
Registration Act, 1908. Sections 17(1) and 17(2)(vi), which are relevant
for the present case, are as follows:-
       “17. Documents of which registration is compulsory.—(l)
       The following documents shall be registered, if the property to
       which they relate is situate in a district in which, and if they have     G
       been executed on or after the date on which, Act No. XVI of
       1864, or the Indian Registration Act, 1866, or the Indian
       Registration Act, 1871, or the Indian Registration Act, 1877, or
       this Act came or comes into force, namely:—
                                                                                 H
1028            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                              [2021] 4 S.C.R.


 A           (a) instruments of gift of immovable property;
             (b) other non-testamentary instruments which purport or operate
             to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish, whether in present
             or in future, any right, title or interest, whether vested or contingent,
             of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards, to or in
 B           immovable property;
             (c) non-testamentary instruments which acknowledge the receipt
             or payment of any consideration on account of the creation,
             declaration, assignment, limitation or extinction of any such right,
             title or interest; and
 C           (d) leases of immovable property from year to year, or for any
             term exceeding one year, or reserving a yearly rent;
             (e) non-testamentary instruments transferring or assigning any
             decree or order of a Court or any award when such decree or
             order or award purports or operates to create, declare, assign,
 D           limit or extinguish, whether in present or in future, any right, title
             or interest, whether vested or contingent, of the value of one
             hundred rupees and upwards, to or in immovable property:]
                    Provided that the State Government may, by order published
             in the Official Gazette, exempt from the operation of this sub-
 E           section any lease executed in any district, or part of a district, the
             terms granted by which do not exceed five years and the annual
             rents reserved by which do not exceed fifty rupees.
                            XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
             (2) Nothing in clauses (b) and (c) of sub-section (l) applies to—
 F
             (vi) any decree or order of a Court except a decree or order
             expressed to be made on a compromise and comprising immovable
             property other than that which is the subject-matter of the suit or
             proceeding; or
 G                               XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX”
              13. The submission of the learned counsel for the appellant is that
       there was no existing right in the plaintiffs of Civil Suit No.317 of 1991,
       hence the decree dated 19.08.1991 required registration under Section
       17(1)(b) since decree created right in favour of the plaintiffs. In support
 H
        KHUSHI RAM & ORS. v. NAWAL SINGH & ORS.                                   1029
                 [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

of his submission, he has placed reliance on judgment of this Court in            A
Bhoop Singh Vs. Ram Singh Major and Ors., (1995) 5 SCC 709
where this Court held that decree or order including compromise decree
granting new right, title or interest in praesenti in immovable property of
value of Rs.100 or above is compulsorily registrable. In paragraphs 17
and 18 of the judgment, following was laid down:-
                                                                                  B
      “17. It would, therefore, be the duty of the court to examine in
      each case whether the parties have pre-existing right to the
      immovable property, or whether under the order or decree of the
      court one party having right, title or interest therein agreed or
      suffered to extinguish the same and created right, title or interest in
      praesenti in immovable property of the value of Rs 100 or upwards           C
      in favour of other party for the first time, either by compromise or
      pretended consent. If latter be the position, the document is
      compulsorily registrable.
      18. The legal position qua clause (vi) can, on the basis of the
      aforesaid discussion, be summarised as below:                               D

          (1) Compromise decree if bona fide, in the sense that the
          compromise is not a device to obviate payment of stamp duty
          and frustrate the law relating to registration, would not require
          registration. In a converse situation, it would require registration.
                                                                                  E
          (2) If the compromise decree were to create for the first
          time right, title or interest in immovable property of the value
          of Rs 100 or upwards in favour of any party to the suit the
          decree or order would require registration.
          (3) If the decree were not to attract any of the clauses of sub-        F
          section (1) of Section 17, as was the position in the aforesaid
          Privy Council and this Court’s cases, it is apparent that the
          decree would not require registration.
          (4) If the decree were not to embody the terms of compromise,
          as was the position in Lahore case, benefit from the terms of           G
          compromise cannot be derived, even if a suit were to be
          disposed of because of the compromise in question.
          (5) If the property dealt with by the decree be not the “subject-
          matter of the suit or proceeding”, clause (vi) of sub-section
          (2) would not operate, because of the amendment of this clause
                                                                                  H
1030            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2021] 4 S.C.R.


 A               by Act 21 of 1929, which has its origin in the aforesaid decision
                 of the Privy Council, according to which the original clause
                 would have been attracted, even if it were to encompass
                 property not litigated.”
              14. The decree passed in Bhoop Singh’s case (supra) has been
 B     quoted in paragraph 2 of the judgment, which clearly proved that
       declaration was granted that plaintiff will be the owner in possession
       from today. In the above case, the suit was decreed on the basis of
       compromise though the decree is on the ground that defendant admitted
       the claim of the plaintiff in written statement.
 C           15. Learned counsel for the appellant has further placed reliance
       on another judgment of this Court in Civil Appeal No.890 of 2008 –
       Mata Deen Vs. Madan Lal & Ors., in which case also, decree was
       passed on the ground of family settlement in favour of the plaintiffs-
       defendants. The decree passed was required to be compulsorily registered
       under Section 17(2)(vi) of the Registration Act, which having not been
 D     done, the judgment was set aside and the case was remanded for the
       consideration of the question of law. The observation of this Court in the
       above judgment is to the following effect:-
                    “………………………..The second Appellate Court was
             required to examine this aspect of the case. As it is a substantial
 E           question of law which fell for consideration under Section 100
             CPC, as could be seen, the impugned judgment passed by the
             High Court is simply concurred with the finding of fact concurred
             with by the first Appellate Court in its judgment in exercise of its
             appellate jurisdiction and it had not adverted to the substantial
 F           question of law with respect to compulsory registration of a decree
             in favour of the first defendant and the consequences for non
             registration of a decree under Section 17(2)(vi) of the Act and the
             law laid down by this Court in the case of Bhoop Singh vs. Ram
             Singh Major & Ors., (1995) 5 SCC 709 is not applied to the case
             on hand, which rendered the impugned judgment and decree bad
 G           in law.
                     In view of the reasons stated supra, we set aside the
             impugned judgment and decree passed by the High Court and
             remand the matter to it with a request to reconsider the matter
             after framing the substantial questions of law that would arise for
 H
        KHUSHI RAM & ORS. v. NAWAL SINGH & ORS.                                   1031
                 [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

       consideration and hear the parties and pass appropriate orders in          A
       accordance with law. Since the matter is of 1995 we request the
       High Court to dispose of the matter as expeditiously as possible
       but not later than six months from the date of receipt of a copy of
       this Order.
              The appeal is disposed of accordingly.”                             B
       16. From the above judgment, it is not clear as to whether the
decree, which was passed on the basis of family settlement, relate to the
suit property or the property which was covered in the decree was not
part of the suit land. The above fact is crucial and it is yet to be determined
in view of the remand by this Court, hence, the said judgment cannot be           C
said to be lend any support to the learned counsel for the appellant.
      17. Shri Manoj Swarup, learned counsel for the respondents has
on the other hand placed reliance on judgment of Som Dev and Ors.
Vs. Rati Ram and Anr., (2006) 10 SCC 788. The above was a case
where decree was based on an admission recognising pre-existing rights            D
under family arrangement. This court held that in the above case, the
decree did not require registration under Section 17(1)(b).
      18. This Court in a subsequent judgment in K. Raghunandan
and Ors. Vs. Ali Hussain Sabir and Ors., (2008) 13 SCC 102,
Court had occasion to interpret Section 17 and laid down following in             E
paragraphs 23, 24, 25 and 28:-
       “23. Sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the Act, however, carves
       out an exception therefrom stating that nothing in clauses (b) and
       (c) of sub-section (1) of Section 17 would inter alia apply to “any
       decree or order of a court except a decree or order expressed to           F
       be made on a compromise and comprising immovable property
       other than that which is the subject-matter of the suit or
       proceeding”. Even if the passage was not the subject-matter of
       the suit, indisputably, in terms of the Code of Civil Procedure
       (Amendment) Act, 1976, a compromise decree was permissible.
                                                                                  G
       24. A plain reading of the said provision clearly shows that a
       property which is not the subject-matter of the suit or a proceeding
       would come within the purview of exception contained in clause
       (vi) of sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the Act. If a compromise
       is entered into in respect of an immovable property, comprising
       other than that which was the subject-matter of the suit or the            H
1032            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                             [2021] 4 S.C.R.


 A           proceeding, the same would require registration. The said provision
             was inserted by Act 21 of 1929.
             25. The Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976 does
             not and cannot override the provisions of the Act. The purported
             passage being not the subject-matter of the suit, if sought to be
 B           transferred by the respondent-defendants in favour of the appellant-
             plaintiffs or if by reason thereof they have relinquished their own
             rights and recognised the rights of the appellant-plaintiffs,
             registration thereof was imperative. The first appellate court held
             so. The High Court also accepted the said findings.
 C           28. Bhoop Singh [(1995) 5 SCC 709], inter alia, lays down: (SCC
             p. 715, para 18)
                “18. (1) Compromise decree if bona fide, in the sense that the
                compromise is not a device to obviate payment of stamp duty
                and frustrate the law relating to registration, would not require
 D              registration. In a converse situation, it would require registration.
                (2) If the compromise decree were to create for the first
                time right, title or interest in immovable property of the value
                of Rs 100 or upwards in favour of any party to the suit the
                decree or order would require registration.”
 E                                                          (emphasis in original)
             Thus, indisputably, if the consent terms create a right for the first
             time as contradistinguished from recognition of a right, registration
             thereof would be required, if the value of the property is Rs 100
             and upwards.”
 F
             19. In the above judgment, the case of Bhoop Singh was also
       considered and distinguished. In a recent judgment delivered by Two
       Judge Bench of this Court of which one of us was also member (Ashok
       Bhushan, J.), the judgment of Bhoop Singh and Som Dev came to be
       considered in Mohammade Yusuf & Ors. Vs. Rajkumar & Ors.,
 G     2020(3) SCALE 146. The question arose in the above case was also
       non-registration of a decree on the basis of which the Court has refused
       to admit the decree in evidence in a subsequent suit. This Court had
       occasion to interpret Section 17 and had also considered the Bhoop
       Singh and Som Dev’s case. In paragraphs 6, 8, 13 and 14 of the judgment,
       which are relevant are as follows:-
 H
 KHUSHI RAM & ORS. v. NAWAL SINGH & ORS.                               1033
          [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

“6. A compromise decree passed by a Court would ordinarily be          A
covered by Section 17(1)(b) but sub-section (2) of Section 17
provides for an exception for any decree or order of a court except
a decree or order expressed to be made on a compromise and
comprising immovable property other than that which is the subject-
matter of the suit or proceeding. Thus, by virtue of sub-section
                                                                       B
(2)(vi) of Section 17 any decree or order of a court does not
require registration. In sub-clause (vi) of sub-section (2), one
category is excepted from sub-clause (vi), i.e., a decree or order
expressed to be made on a compromise and comprising immovable
property other than that which is the subject-matter of the suit or
proceeding. Thus, by conjointly reading Section 17(1)(b) and           C
Section 17(2)(vi), it is clear that a compromise decree comprising
immovable property other than which is the subject-matter of the
suit or proceeding requires registration, although any decree or
order of a court is exempted from registration by virtue of Section
17(2)(vi). A copy of the decree passed in Suit No. 250-A of 1984
                                                                       D
has been brought on record as Annexure P-2, which indicates
that decree dated 4-10-1985 was passed by the Court for the
property, which was subject-matter of the suit. Thus, the
exclusionary clause in Section 17(2)(vi) is not applicable and the
compromise decree dated 4-10-1985 was not required to be
registered on plain reading of Section 17(2)(vi). The High Court       E
referred to the judgment of this Court in Bhoop Singh Vs. Ram
Singh Major and Others, (1995) 5 SCC 709, in which case, the
provision of Section 17(2)(vi) of the Registration Act came for
consideration. This Court in the above case while considering clause
(vi) laid down the following in paras 16, 17 and 18:
                                                                       F
   “16. We have to view the reach of clause (vi), which is an
   exception to sub-section (1), bearing all the aforesaid in mind.
   We would think that the exception engrafted is meant to cover
   that decree or order of a court, including a decree or order
   expressed to be made on a compromise, which declares the
   pre-existing right and does not by itself create new right, title   G
   or interest in praesenti in immovable property of the value of
   Rs 100 or upwards. Any other view would find the mischief of
   avoidance of registration, which requires payment of stamp
   duty, embedded in the decree or order.
                                                                       H
1034   SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2021] 4 S.C.R.


 A     17. It would, therefore, be the duty of the court to examine in
       each case whether the parties have pre-existing right to the
       immovable property, or whether under the order or decree of
       the court one party having right, title or interest therein agreed
       or suffered to extinguish the same and created right, title or
       interest in praesenti in immovable property of the value of Rs
 B
       100 or upwards in favour of other party for the first time, either
       by compromise or pretended consent. If latter be the position,
       the document is compulsorily registrable.
       18. The legal position qua clause (vi) can, on the basis of the
       aforesaid discussion, be summarised as below:
 C
          (1) Compromise decree if bona fide, in the sense that the
          compromise is not a device to obviate payment of stamp
          duty and frustrate the law relating to registration, would not
          require registration. In a converse situation, it would require
          registration.
 D
          (2) If the compromise decree were to create for the first
          time right, title or interest in immovable property of the value
          of Rs 100 or upwards in favour of any party to the suit the
          decree or order would require registration.

 E        (3) If the decree were not to attract any of the clauses of
          sub-section (1) of Section 17, as was the position in the
          aforesaid Privy Council and this Court’s cases, it is apparent
          that the decree would not require registration.
          (4) If the decree were not to embody the terms of
 F        compromise, as was the position in Lahore case, benefit
          from the terms of compromise cannot be derived, even if a
          suit were to be disposed of because of the compromise in
          question.
          (5) If the property dealt with by the decree be not the
          “subject-matter of the suit or proceeding”, clause (vi) of
 G
          sub-section (2) would not operate, because of the
          amendment of this clause by Act 21 of 1929, which has its
          origin in the aforesaid decision of the Privy Council,
          according to which the original clause would have been
          attracted, even if it were to encompass property not
 H        litigated.”
 KHUSHI RAM & ORS. v. NAWAL SINGH & ORS.                                 1035
          [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

8. Following the above judgment of Bhoop Singh (supra), the High         A
Court held that since the compromise decree dated 4-10-1985 did
not declare any pre-existing right of the plaintiff, hence it requires
registration. The High Court relied on the judgment of Gurdwara
Sahib vs. Gram Panchayat Village Sirthala and another (supra)
and made following observations in paras 11, 12 and 13:
                                                                         B
   “11. In the present case, in the earlier suit CS No. 250-A/1984
   the petitioner had claimed declaration of title on the plea of
   adverse possession and the compromise decree was passed in
   the suit. The very fact that the suit was based upon the plea of
   adverse possession reflects that the petitioner had no pre-
   existing title in the suit property. Till the suit was decreed, the   C
   petitioner was a mere encroacher, at the most denying the title
   of lawful owner.
   12. The Supreme Court in the matter of Gurdwara
   Sahib v. Gram Panchayat Village Sirthala reported in (2014)
   1 SCC 669 has settled that declaratory decree based on plea           D
   of adverse possession cannot be claimed and adverse
   possession can be used only as shield in defence by the
   defendant. It has been held that:
      “7. In the Second Appeal, the relief of ownership by adverse
      possession is again denied holding that such a suit is not         E
      maintainable. There cannot be any quarrel to this extent
      the judgments of the courts below are correct and without
      any blemish. Even if the plaintiff is found to be in adverse
      possession, it cannot seek a declaration to the effect that
      such adverse possession has matured into ownership. Only           F
      if proceedings filed against the appellant and appellant is
      arrayed as the defendant that it can use this adverse
      possession as a shield/defence.”
   13. The plea of the petitioner based upon Section 27 of the
   Limitation Act is found to be devoid of any merit since it relates    G
   to the extinction of the right of the lawful owner after expiry of
   the Limitation Act, but in view of the judgment of the Supreme
   Court in Gurdwara Sahib (supra), the petitioner cannot claim
   himself to be the owner automatically after the expiry of the
   said limitation.”
                                                                         H
1036            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2021] 4 S.C.R.


 A           13. This Court in Som Dev v. Rati Ram and Another, (2006) 10
             SCC 788 while explaining Section 17(2)(vi) and Sections 17(1)(b)
             and (c) held that all decrees and orders of the Court including
             compromise decree subject to the exception as referred that the
             properties that are outside the subject-matter of the suit do not
             require registration. In para 18, this Court laid down the following:
 B
                “18. ………………… But with respect, it must be pointed
                out that a decree or order of a court does not require registration
                if it is not based on a compromise on the ground that clauses
                (b) and (c) of Section 17 of the Registration Act are attracted.
                Even a decree on a compromise does not require registration
 C              if it does not take in property that is not the subject-matter of
                the suit………………..”
             14. In the facts of the present case, the decree dated 4-10-1985
             was with regard to the property, which was the subject-matter of
             the suit, hence not covered by exclusionary clause of Section
 D           17(2)(vi) and the present case is covered by the main exception
             crafted in Section 17(2)(vi) i.e. “any decree or order of a court”.
             When registration of an instrument as required by Section 17(1)(b)
             is specifically excluded by Section 17(2)(vi) by providing that
             nothing in clauses (b) and (c) of sub-section (1) applies to any
 E           decree or order of the court, we are of the view that the
             compromise decree dated 4-10-1985 did not require registration
             and the learned Civil Judge as well as the High Court erred in
             holding otherwise. We, thus, set aside the order of the Civil Judge
             dated 7-1-2015 as well as the judgment of the High Court dated
             13-2-2017. The compromise decree dated 4-10-1985 is directed
 F           to be exhibited by the trial court. The appeal is allowed
             accordingly.”
              20. This Court held that since the decree which was sought to be
       exhibited was with regard to the property which was subject matter of
       suit, hence, was not covered by exclusionary clause of Section 17(2)(vi)
 G     and decree did not require registration. The issue in the present case is
       squarely covered by the above judgment. We, thus, conclude that in
       view of the fact that the consent decree dated 19.08.1991 relate to the
       subject matter of the suit, hence it was not required to be registered
       under Section 17(2)(vi) and was covered by exclusionary clause. Thus,
 H     we, answer question No.1 that the consent decree dated 19.08.1991
        KHUSHI RAM & ORS. v. NAWAL SINGH & ORS.                                      1037
                 [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

was not registrable and Courts below have rightly held that the decree               A
did not require registration.
      Question No.2
       21. The submission of the learned counsel for the appellant is that
the consent decree was passed in favour of nephews of Smt. Jagno,
who do not belong to the family of the plaintiffs-appellants. It is submitted        B
that plaintiffs-appellants belonged to the family of Badlu, who was the
tenure-holder of the property. It is submitted that the defendants-
respondents belong to family of Smt. Jagno being brother’s son of Smt.
Jagno, i.e., nephews, hence, they belong to different family and no family
arrangement could have been entered with them.                                       C
       22. Before we answer the above issue, it is necessary to find out
what is the concept of family with regard to which a family settlement
could be entered. A Three-Judge bench of this Court in Ram Charan
Das Vs. Girjanandini Devi and Ors., 1965 (3) SCR 841 had occasion
to consider a family settlement regarding the immovable property, this               D
Court laid down that every party taking benefit under a family settlement
must be related to one another in some way and have a possible claim to
the property or a claim or even a semblance of a claim. Following was
laid down at page 851:-
      “....................In the first place once it is held that the transaction   E
      being a family settlement is not an alienation, it cannot amount to
      the creation of an interest. For, as the Privy Council pointed out
      in Mst. Hiran Bibi case [AIR 1914 (PC) 44] in a family settlement
      each party takes a share in the property by virtue of the independent
      title which is admitted to that extent by the other parties. It is not
      necessary, as would appear from the decision in Rangasami                      F
      Gounden v. Nachiaopa Gounden [LR 46 I.A. 72] that every party
      taking benefit under a family settlement must necessarily be shown
      to have, under the law, a claim to a share in the property. All that
      is necessary is that the parties must be related to one another in
      some way and have a possible claim to the property or a claim or               G
      even a semblance of a claim on some other ground as, say,
      affection..................
      23. A Three Judge Bench in the celebrated judgment of this Court
in Kale and Ors. Vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation and Ors.,
(1976) 3 SCC 119 had elaborately considered all contours of the family
                                                                                     H
1038             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2021] 4 S.C.R.


 A     settlement. This Court laid down that term “family” has to be understood
       in a wider sense so as to include within its fold not only close relations or
       legal heirs but even those persons who may have some sort of antecedent
       title, a semblance of a claim or even if they have a spes successionis. In
       paragraphs 9 and 10, this Court laid down following:-
 B            “9. Before dealing with the respective contentions put forward
              by the parties, we would like to discuss in general the effect and
              value of family arrangements entered into between the parties
              with a view to resolving disputes once for all. By virtue of a family
              settlement or arrangement members of a family descending from
              a common ancestor or a near relation seek to sink their differences
 C            and disputes, settle and resolve their conflicting claims or disputed
              titles once for all in order to buy peace of mind and bring about
              complete harmony and goodwill in the family. The family
              arrangements are governed by a special equity peculiar to
              themselves and would be enforced if honestly made. In this
 D            connection, Kerr in his valuable treatise Kerr on Fraud at p. 364
              makes the following pertinent observations regarding the nature
              of the family arrangement which may be extracted thus:
                        “The principles which apply to the case of ordinary
                 compromise between strangers do not equally apply to the case
 E               of compromises in the nature of family arrangements. Family
                 arrangements are governed by a special equity peculiar to
                 themselves, and will be enforced if honestly made, although
                 they have not been meant as a compromise, but have proceeded
                 from an error of all parties, originating in mistake or ignorance
                 of fact as to what their rights actually are, or of the points on
 F               which their rights actually depend.”
              The object of the arrangement is to protect the family from long-
              drawn litigation or perpetual strifes which mar the unity and
              solidarity of the family and create hatred and bad blood between
              the various members of the family. Today when we are striving to
 G            build up an egalitarian society and are trying for a complete
              reconstruction of the society, to maintain .and uphold the unity
              and homogeneity of the family which ultimately results in the
              unification of the society and, therefore, of the entire country, is
              the prime need of the hour. A family arrangement by which the
 H            property is equitably divided between the various contenders so
 KHUSHI RAM & ORS. v. NAWAL SINGH & ORS.                                 1039
          [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

as to achieve an equal distribution of wealth instead of                 A
concentrating the same in the hands of a few is undoubtedly a
milestone in the administration of social justice. That is why the
term “family” has to be understood in a wider sense so as to
include within its fold not only close relations or legal heirs but
even those persons who may have some sort of antecedent title,
                                                                         B
a semblance of a claim or even if they have a spes successionis
so that future disputes are sealed for ever and the family instead
of fighting claims inter se and wasting time, money and energy on
such fruitless or futile litigation is able to devote its attention to
more constructive work in the larger interest of the country. The
courts have, therefore, leaned in favour of upholding a family           C
arrangement instead of disturbing the same on technical or trivial
grounds. Where the courts find that the family arrangement suffers
from a legal lacuna or a formal defect the rule of estoppel is
pressed into service and is applied to shut out plea of the person
who being a party to family arrangement seeks to unsettle a settled
                                                                         D
dispute and claims to revoke the family arrangement under which
he has himself enjoyed some material benefits. The law in England
on this point is almost the same. In Halsbury’s Laws of England,
Vol. 17, Third Edition, at pp. 215-216, the following apt observations
regarding the essentials of the family settlement and the principles
governing the existence of the same are made:                            E
       “A family arrangement is an agreement between members
of the same family, intended to be generally and reasonably for
the benefit of the family either by compromising doubtful or disputed
rights or by preserving the family property or the peace and security
of the family by avoiding litigation or by saving its honour.            F
        The agreement may be implied from a long course of dealing,
but it is more usual to embody or to effectuate the agreement in a
deed to which the term “family arrangement” is applied.
       Family arrangements are governed by principles which are
not applicable to dealings between strangers. The court, when            G
deciding the rights of parties under family arrangements or claims
to upset such arrangements, considers what in the broadest view
of the matter is most for the interest of families, and has regard to
considerations which, in dealing with transactions between persons
not members of the same family, would not be taken into account.         H
1040      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2021] 4 S.C.R.


 A     Matters which would be fatal to the validity of similar transactions
       between strangers are not objections to the binding effect of family
       arrangements.”
       10. In other words to put the binding effect and the essentials of
       a family settlement in a concretised form, the matter may be
 B     reduced into the form of the following propositions:
              “(1) The family settlement must be a bona fide one so as to
       resolve family disputes and rival claims by a fair and equitable
       division or allotment of properties between the various members
       of the family;
 C           (2) The said settlement must be voluntary and should not
       be induced by fraud, coercion or undue influence;
             (3) The family arrangement may be even oral in which
       case no registration is necessary;

 D            (4) It is well settled that registration would be necessary
       only if the terms of the family arrangement are reduced into
       writing. Here also, a distinction should be made between a document
       containing the terms and recitals of a family arrangement
       made under the document and a mere memorandum prepared
       after the family arrangement had already been made either for
 E     the purpose of the record or for information of the court for making
       necessary mutation. In such a case the memorandum itself does
       not create or extinguish any rights in immovable properties and
       therefore does not fall within the mischief of Section 17(2) of the
       Registration Act and is, therefore, not compulsorily registrable;
 F            (5) The members who may be parties to the family
       arrangement must have some antecedent title, claim or interest
       even a possible claim in the property which is acknowledged by
       the parties to the settlement. Even if one of the parties to the
       settlement has no title but under the arrangement the other party
       relinquishes all its claims or titles in favour of such a person and
 G
       acknowledges him to be the sole owner, then the antecedent title
       must be assumed and the family arrangement will be upheld and
       the courts will find no difficulty in giving assent to the same;
            (6) Even if bona fide disputes, present or possible, which
       may not involve legal claims are settled by a bona fide family
 H
        KHUSHI RAM & ORS. v. NAWAL SINGH & ORS.                                   1041
                 [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

      arrangement which is fair and equitable the family arrangement              A
      is final and binding on the parties to the settlement.”
      24. After reviewing the earlier decision, this Court laid down
following in paragraph 19:-
             “19. Thus it would appear from a review of the decisions
      analysed above that the courts have taken a very liberal and broad          B
      view of the validity of the family settlement and have always tried
      to uphold it and maintain it. The central idea in the approach made
      by the courts is that if by consent of parties a matter has been
      settled, it should not be allowed to be reopened by the parties to
      the agreement on frivolous or untenable grounds.”                           C
      25. In the above case, the Kale, with whom the two sisters of
his mother entered into family settlement was not a legal heir within
meaning of U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939 but the family settlement entered
with Kale was upheld by this Court. Following was laid down in paragraph
27:-                                                                              D
      “27. As regards the first point it appears to us to be wholly
      untenable in law. From the principles enunciated by us and the
      case law discussed above, it is absolutely clear that the word
      “family” cannot be construed in a narrow sense so as to confine
      the parties to the family arrangement only to persons who have a            E
      legal title to the property. Even so it cannot be disputed that appellant
      Kale being the grandson of Lachman and therefore a reversioner
      at the time when the talks for compromise took place was
      undoubtedly a prospective heir and also a member of the family.
      Since Respondents 4 and 5 relinquished their claims in favour of
      appellant Kale in respect of Khatas Nos. 5 and 90 the appellant,            F
      according to the authorities mentioned above, would be deemed
      to have antecedent title which was acknowledged by Respondents
      4 and 5. Apart from this there is one more important consideration
      which clearly shows that the family arrangement was undoubtedly
      a bona fide settlement of disputes. Under the family arrangement            G
      as referred to in the mutation petition the Respondents 4 and 5
      were given absolute and permanent rights in the lands in dispute.
      In 1955 when the compromise is alleged to have taken place the
      Hindu Succession Act, 1956, was not passed and Respondents 4
      & 5 would have only a limited interest even if they had got the
      entire property which would ultimately pass to appellant Kale after         H
1042            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2021] 4 S.C.R.


 A           their death. Respondents 4 & 5 thought that it would be a good
             bargain if by dividing the properties equally they could retain part
             of the properties as absolute owners. At that time they did not
             know that the Hindu Succession Act would be passed a few months
             later. Finally the compromise sought to divide the properties
             between the children of Lachman, namely, his two daughters and
 B
             his daughter’s son appellant Kale in equal shares and was, therefore,
             both fair and equitable. In fact if Respondents 4 & 5 would have
             got all the lands the total area of which would be somewhere
             about 39 acres they might have to give away a substantial portion
             in view of the ceiling law. We have, therefore, to see the
 C           circumstances prevailing not after the order of the Assistant
             Commissioner was passed on the mutation petition but at the time
             when the parties sat down together to iron out differences. Having
             regard to the circumstances indicated above, we cannot conceive
             of a more just and equitable division of the properties than what
             appears to have been done by the family arrangement. In these
 D
             circumstances, therefore, it cannot be said that the family settlement
             was not bona fide. Moreover, Respondents 4 and 5 had at no
             stage raised the issue before the revenue courts or even before
             the High Court that the settlement was not bona fide. The High
             Court as also Respondent 1 have both proceeded on the footing
 E           that the compromise was against the statutory provisions of law
             or that it was not registered although it should have been registered
             under the Registration Act.”
             26. Reverting to the facts of the present case, admittedly, the
       defendants-respondents were nephews, i.e., brother’s sons of Smt.
 F     Jagno. We need to look into the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, Section
       15, which deals with the general rules of succession in the case of female
       Hindus for properties inherited by female Hindus, which are devolved in
       according to Sections 15 and 16. Section 15(1), which is relevant is as
       follows:-
 G           “15. General rules of succession in the case of female
             Hindus.—(1)The property of a female Hindu dying intestate shall
             devolve according to the rules set out in section 16,—
             (a) firstly, upon the sons and daughters (including the children of
             any pre-deceased son or daughter) and the husband;
 H
        KHUSHI RAM & ORS. v. NAWAL SINGH & ORS.                                 1043
                 [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

      (b) secondly, upon the heirs of the husband;                              A
      (c) thirdly, upon the mother and father;
      (d) fourthly, upon the heirs of the father; and
      (e) lastly, upon the heirs of the mother.”
       27. A perusal of Section 15(1)(d) indicates that heirs of the father     B
are covered in the heirs, who could succeed. When heirs of father of a
female are included as person who can possibly succeed, it cannot be
held that they are strangers and not the members of the family qua the
female.
       28. In the present case, Smt. Jagno, who as a widow of Sher              C
Singh, who had died in 1953, had succeeded to half share in the agricultural
land and she was the absolute owner when she entered into settlement.
We, thus, do not find any merit in the submission of learned counsel for
the appellants that the defendants-respondents were strangers to the
family.                                                                         D
        29. In view of our discussions on above two questions, we do not
find any merit in this appeal. All the Courts have rightly dismissed the
suit of the plaintiffs-appellants, which need no interference. This appeal
is dismissed. Parties shall bear their own costs.
                                                                                E
Divya Pandey                                                Appeal dismissed.




                                                                                F




                                                                                G




                                                                                H