KHEKH RAMversusSTATE OF H.P.

                             [2017] l l S.C.R. 956


A                              KHEKH RAM
                                      v.
                               STATE OF H.P.
                     (Criminal Appeal No. 1110 of2016)
B                          NOVEMBER 10, 2017
               [N. V. RAMANA AND AMITAVA ROY, JJ.]
           Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 -
    Chapter IV - ss.20, 29 - In the wee hours of 20.10.2009 a police
C patrol party noticed a vehicle moving towards them - On seeing the
    patrol party, the driver escaped and could not be apprehended -
    During the search of the vehicle, contraband charas was found -
    Appellant's bank passbook also found in the vehicle- Jn report u/s.
    173 Cr.P. C., the driver of the vehicle who fled was referred to as the
    appellant - Appellant arrested - Trial court acquitted the appellant
D - High Court in appeal reversed the said acquittal - On appeal,
  · held: identification of the appellant to be the driver who absconded
    on seeing the patrol party is sine qua non for the proof of the charge
    leveled against him - However, on facts, the testimony of PW- I and
    PW-8 taken together by itself does not unimpeachably establish the
    identity of the driver of the vehicle to be appellant - Further, there
E
    was no test identification parade - Appellant was implicated in the
    offence due to the recovery of his bank passbook from the vehicle,
    however, in absence of any other cogent, coherent and clinching
    evidence of his identification as the driver of the car carrying the
    contraband, this document cannot be acted in isolation to be the
F basis of his conviction - Prosecution has failed to adduce conclusive
    and consistent evidence to bring home the charge against the
    appellant - With regard to the issue of identification, the view of
    trial court was overwhelmingly reasonable - Impugned judgment
    set aside and the acquittal of the appellant is restored - Appellant
G be released from custody if not required in connection with any
    other case - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - s.173.
          Criminal Trial - Standard of proof - Held: In a criminal trial
    suspicion however grave cannot take the place of proof -
    Prosecution to succeed has to prove its case and establish the charge
    by adducing convincing evidence to ward off any reasonable doubt
H
                                     956
                    KHEKH RAM v. STATE OF H.P.                                  957



 about the complicity of the accused - Prosecution case has' to be in           A
 the category of "must be true" and not "may be true".
        Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - s.378 -Appellate power
  of High Court - Discussed.
        Allowing the appeal, the Court
                                                                                B
          HELD: 1.1 An order of acquittal, if appealed against, ought
    not to be lightly interfered with, it is trite as well that the Appellate
    Court is fully empowered to review, re-appreciate and reconsider
    the evidence on record and to reach its own conclusions both on
    questions of fact and on law. As a corollary, the Appellate Court
    would be within its jurisdiction and authority to dislodge an               C
    acquittal on sound, cogent and persuasive reasons based on. the
    recorded facts and the law applicable. If only when the view taken
    by the Trial Court in ordering acquittal is an equally plausible
 . and reasonable one. that the Appellate Court would not readily
· · substitute the same by another view available to it, on its                 D
    independent appraisal of the materials on record. This legally
    acknowledged restraint on the power of the Appellate Court
    would get attracted only if the two views are equally plausible
    and reasonable and not otherwise: If the view taken by the Trial
    Court is a possible but not a reasonable one when tested on the
    evidence on record and the legal principles applied,                        E
    unquestionably it can and ought to be displaced by a plausible
 · and reasonable view by the Appellate Court in furtherance of the
    uUimate cause of justice. Though no innocent ought to be
    punished, it is equally imperative that a guilty ought not to be let
    of casually lest justice is a casualty. [Para 15] [972-C~F]                 F
        1.2 Section 20 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
  Substances Act, 1985 under which the appellant had been charged
  prescribes for punishment for contravention in relation to cannabis
  plant and cannabis. Section 29 of the Act ordains the punishment
  for abetment of and criminal conspiracy for commission of an                  G
  offence punishable under Chapter IV. The gravamen of the charge
  against the appellant is possessfon and transportation of charas
  as punishable under the above provisions. Thus, for the appellant
  to be guilty of the offence with which he had been charged, he
  must be proved to be in. conscious possession of the contraband
                                                                                H
958         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2017] 11 S.C.R.


A seized. This assumes great significance as admittedly the
  procedure of search of the Alto vehicle which allegedly he had
  been driving and the seizure of charas, the registration certificate
  of the vehicle and the passbook in the name of the appellant in
  particular had been in his absence as well as without the
  participation of any independent witness. The identification of
B
  the appellant to be the driver who had absconded on seeing the
  patrol party therefore is the sine qua non for the proof of the
  charge leveled against him. The materials on record propel three
  pieces of evidence in this regard, firstly the testimony of PW-1
  and PW-8, secondly the evidence of 'GS', co-accused according
c to whom the vehicle had been taken by the appellant for bringing
  his wife from Anni and most importantly the recovery of the bank
  passbook in his name from the vehicle. Though PW-1 claimed to
  have identified the absconding driver of the vehicle to be the
  appellant in the search light, in cross-examination he stated to
D have seen along with the other members of the patrol party, his
  back portion. He endeavoured to improve his observation, by
  mentioning that he had seen also his side face from a distance of
  40 to 50 yards, but admitted that appellant was not personally
  known to him before that incident. [Para 20] [974-F-H; 975-A-C]
        1.3 PW-8 though was silent with regard to the identification
E of the fleeing driver, in cross-examination he mentioned that at
  the point of time when the two vehicles were face to face, the
  driver of the Alto car was facing towards the police vehicle and
  he could recognize him. This witness however did not claim to
  have identified the driver to be the appellant, at that point of
F time. The testimony of PW-1 and PW-8 taken together by itself is
  not adequately persuasive to unimpeachably establish the identity
  of the driver of the Alto vehicle to be the appellant. In absence of
  any test identification parade, implication of the appellant on the
  basis of this piece of evidence, where the appellant was not known
  to either of these two witnesses or had been seen by them before
G would be clearly hazardous. Whereas the disclosure made by the
  co-accused 'GS' that he had lent the vehicle to the appellant to
  carry his wife on 19.10.2009 would not ipso facto be a conclusive
  proof of his identity as the driver of the vehicle at the time of its
  interception by the police party, the recovery of his passbook
H
                KHEKH RAM v. STATE OF H.P.                         959


therefrom, albeit a factor weighing against him, cannot as well A
clinch by itself the issue of his identification in favour of the
prosecution. With the evidence forthcoming that the registered
OWQer of the vehicle was PW-2 who deposed to have sold it to
'GS', co-accuse~ but the registration thereof had not been
transferred and further that the vehicle had been temporarily lent B
to the appellant for his personal work, does not irrefutably rule
out the possibility of use thereof by anyone of them at the relevant
time. In the overall state of evidence with regard to identification,
the view taken by the Trial Court ·was overwhelmingly reasonable.
[Para 21] [975-D-H; 976-A]
       1.4 The photographs, claimed by the prosecution to have C
been taken by the Investigating Officer, PW-8 with his digital
camera to correlate the seized article with the one captured
therein, wholly lacked in credence and persuasion. Not only, the
photographs with the kind of camera used, did not record the
date of the procedure i.e. 20.10.2009, some of those did not bear D
any date whereas the rest are dated 05.01.2008, 7.06 a.m. The
prosecution has failed to offer any explanation whatsoever for
this anomaly. It is thus more than apparent that the appellant was
implicated in the offence wholly due to the recovery of his bank
passbook from the vehicle for which as a consequence his name
was recorded in all the documents prepared in connection with E
the exercise undertaken. In absence of any other cogent, coherent
and clinching evidence of his identification as the driver of the
Alto car carrying the contraband, this document, cannot be acted
in isola~ion to base his conviction. Having regard to the materials
on record, it is clear that his arrest in connection with this case F
was due to the recovery of his bank passbook from the car and
not on the basis of his spot identification. The prosecution has
failed to adduce conclusive and consistent evidence to bring home
the charge against the appellant. [Para 22] [976-C-F]
     · 1.5 In a criminal trial, suspicion, however grave, cannot
                                                                   0
take the place of proof and the prosecution to succeed has to
prove its case and establish the charge by adducing convincing
evidence to ward off any reasonable doubt about the complicity
of the accused. For this, the prosecution case has to be in the
category of "must be true" and not "may be true". [Para 23]
[976-F-G]                                                          H
960          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2017) I I S.C.R.


A       1.6 Having regard to the quality of evidence on record as a
  whole and in particular on the aspect of identification, the view
  taken by the Trial Court being convincingly reasonable is
  acceptable in comparison to one adopted by the High Court. This
  Court shares the concern expressed by the Trial Court on the
B shoddy investigation conducted in the case, having regard in
  particular to the seriousness of the offence involved and reiterate
  the direction issued by it to the Superintendent of Police, Kullu
  to enquire into the matter to ascertain the reason for the omission/
  lapses in the investigation, identify the person(s) responsible
  therefor and the action taken in connection therewith so as to
C ensure against repetition of such shortcomings in future. [Para
  25] [978-E-G]
          Prem Singh v. State of Haryana (2013) 14 SCC 88 :
          [2013] 10 SCR 51 ; Krishan Chand v. State of H.P.
          2017(6) SCALE 468 ; Murugesan and others vs. State
D         (2012) 10 SCC 383 : [2012] 13 SCR 1 ; Rajiv Singh v.
          State of Bilwr and another 2015 (12) JT 305 - relied
          on.
          Mahinder Singh v. State of Himachal Pradesh
          2017 (13) SCALE 357 - referred to.
E                          Case Law Reference
          [2013] 10 SCR 51            relied on             Para 11
          2017(6) SCALE 468           relied on             Para 11
           2017(13) SCALE 357         referred to           Para 11
 F                                                          Para 13
           [2012] 13 SCR 1            relied on
            CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
      No. 1110 of 2016.
          From the Judgment and Order dated 19.09.2016 and 22.09.2016
 G of the High Court of Himachal Pradesh at Shimla in Criminal Appeal
   No. 218 of201 I.
           Ajay Marwah, Adv for the Appellant.
           Varinder Kumar Sharma, Adv for the Respondent.

H
                    KHEKH RAM v. STATE OF H.P.                                    961



        The Judgment of the Court was delivered by                                A
          AMITAVA ROY, J. 1. The instant appeal mounts a challenge to
   the judgment and orders dated 19.09.2016 and 22.09.2016 of the High
· Court ofHimachal Pradesh at Shimla rendered in Criminal Appeal No.
   218 of 2011 thereby reversing the verdict dated 29.12.2010 of acquittal
   of the appellant by the Trial Court from the charge under Sections 20          B
· and 29 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985
   (for short, hereafter referred to as the "Act"). By the impugned decision,
   the appellant thus stand convicted under the above provisions of the Act
   and has been sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 20 years
  .and to pay a fine of Rs. 2 lakhs, in default to suffer rigorous imprisonment
   for a period of one year.                                                      C
       2. We have heard Mr. Ajay Marwah, learned counsel for the
 appellant and Mt Varinder Kumar Sharma, learned counsel for the
 respondent/State.
         3. The skeletal facts portraying the prosecution case originate D
  from the wee hours of 20.10.2009, precisely 4 a.m when the police
  patrol party led by Inspector/SRO Sanjeev Chauhan (PW-8), while
  located at a place known as Kelti Dhar noticed an Alto vehicle bearing
  registration No.HP-OIK-0805 moving towards them from Shallang
  onward to Kullu. On seeing the patrol party, the driver of the vehicle
  stopped it, alighted therefrom and rnade good his escape in the adjacent E
  apple orchard so much so that in spite of vigorous search operations by
  using the search lights, he could not be apprehended. As the place was
  secluded, the investigating officer, PW-8 directed HHC-Hira Singh, a
  member of the team to scout for independent witnesses to participate in
  the imminent search operations. The said constable however returned F
  after 15-20 minutes to disclose that neither any independent witness
 ·was available at that hour nor any passerby was noticeable. At this, the
  investigating officer associated HHC-Kashmi Ram and HHC-Hira Singh
  as witnesses and initiated a search of the vehicle in their presence. In
  course of the search, a black and red bag was found by the side of the
  seat of the driver and when opened the search party found black G
  substance which prima facie by its smell appeared to be charas. The
  search team also retrieved the registration certificate of the vehicle which
   was in the name of Ses Ram son of Shri Devi Singh as well as a bank
   passbook of Himachal Gram in Bank issued in the name of Khekh Ram
   son of Chuhru Ram, Rio village Gramang, PO ,- Shallang showing a H
 962             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2017] ll S.C.R.


  A deposit of Rs.1,79,029/- as on 03.10.2009. The contraband on being
    weighed was found to be of 14.750 kgs. The bag containing the
    contraband was put in a cloth parcel and sealed with seal of impression
       "T".
           4. In the report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. the driver of the vehicle
 B who   fled  was described to be stoutly built with height of 5'5" and aged
   about 30-35 years and was referred to as Khekh Ram. After the
   completion of seizure, ruqqa was sent to the police station through HHC-
   Hira Singh for the registration thereof. In course of the investigation on
   20.10.2009, the owner of the vehicle Ses Ram was summoned who
   disclosed that he had sold the vehicle to one Govind Singh on 03.08.2009.
-C
   Gov ind Singh was intercepted on 20. I0.2009 who in tum disclosed that
   on 19.10.2009 the vehicle was taken by Khekh Ram for some personal
   work. Subsequent thereto, the appellant, Khekh Ram was arrested on
   21.10.2009 while he was driving another vehicle. Govind Singh was later
   on arrested on 06.03.2010 and on completion of the investigation following
 D the receipt of the report of the chemical analysis, proceedings under
   Sections 20 and 29 of the Act was instituted against the appellant and
   Gov ind Singh. The accused persons having denied the charge, they were
   put to trial.
              5. The prosecution examined in all eight witnesses including the
 E     investigating officer. In course of their statements recorded under Section
       313 Cr.P.C., the appellant and the co-accused stood by the denial of the
       charge and alleged false implication. No defence evidence was however
       adduced.
              6. The Trial Court on an analysis of the evidence on record
  F    acquitted both the accused persons. On appeal being filed by the State,
       as stated hereinabove, the High Court reversed the acquittal qua the
       appellantonly while maintaining the exoneration of the co-accused Gov ind
       Singh.
          7. The impugned judgment being one of reversal altering the order
 G of acquittal into conviction on the basis of common set of evidence,
   expedient it would be to briefly note the findings of the two forums
   before adverting to the rival assertions made in this appeal. Noticeably,
   in essence, whereas it was canvassed on behalf of the prosecution that
   the materials on record amply establish the charge against the accused
   persons, it was urged on behalf of the defence that there was no evidence
 H
                  KHEKH RAM v. STATE OF H.P.                              •963
                      [AMITAVA ROY, J.]

worth the name either to identify the appellant Khekh Ram to be the A
driver of the offending vehicle who fled on seeing the police patrol party
or that either or both the accused persons were in conscious possession
of the contraband claim to be seized therefrom.
      · 8. The Trial Court in assessing the evidence adduced by the
prosecution was cognizant of the legal proposition that graver the offence B
and severer the punishment, greater ought to be the care taken to ensure
that all statutory safeguards have been.scrupulously adhered to and that
a heightened scrutiny of such compliance thereof is warranted. On the .
aspect of identification, it dealt in particular with the. testimony of HHC-
Hira Singh, PW-1 who though in his examination-in-chief stated that he C
could recognize the pers-on fleeing from the vehicle, in the search light
as Khekh Ram, he admitted in his cross-examination that prior to the
incident, the appellant was not personally known to him and that he had
seen him on that occasion from a distance of 40 to 50 yards. It also
recorded that the investigating officer, PW-8 had not stated in his deposition
that the absconding person was Khekh Ram and that he had been D
identified to be so by PW-1, HHC-Hira Singh and another member of
the raiding party, namely, HHC-Kashmi Ram. The investigating officer
deposed that the co-accused Govind Singh had disclosed on interrogation,
that Khekh Ram had taken his vehicle for bringing his wife from Anni.
The admission of the investigating officer, PW-8 that he did not record in
the ruqqa the fact that the driver of the vehicle carrying the contraband E
was facing him and that he accordingly could recognize him was noted.
The Trial Court thus discarded the evidence of these two witnesses to
connect the appellant with the offence. It was also mentioned by the
Trial Court that if the seizure memo, Ext.PW IIA in fact had been prepared
by the investigating officer at the spot, the same ought to have contained F
the above facts bearing on the identification of the appellant and that
absence thereof and the omission to refer the name of the appellant in
the ruqqa Ext.PW8/A and the special report Ext.PW3/A did bely as well
the claim of his identification by the police party. It was of the view that
as evident from the ruqqa Ext.PW8/A, the name of the appellant got
mentioned therein on the basis of his passbook recovered from the vehicle. G
In the face of these anomalies, the Trial Court also concluded that the
recovery memo Ext.PW 1/A had not been prepared at the spot as claimed
by the investigating officer. It also observed in this.regard that in the
special report Ext.PW3/A, the facts mentioned in the recovery memo
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964             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2017) 11 S.C.R.



A     Ext.PWl/A were not referred to and held that either the identification of
      the appellant was not available to the investigating agency or was
      subsequently introduced by the investigating officer in order to connect
      him with the commission of the offence. The Trial Court recorded as
      well that no test identification parade had been conducted qua the
      appellant and also marked the absence of any claim by PW-I, HHC-
B
      Hira Singh that on the arrest of the appellant on 21.10.2009, he had
      identified him as the person who had fled from the spot. It discarded as
      well the NCB Form, Ext.PW4/E (in which the name of the appellant
      was mentioned), on the ground that as this document was supposed to
      be prepared prior in point of time to ruqqa, it was inexplicable as to why
c     then the name of the appellant was not mentioned in the ruqqa which
      was sent to the police for registration of the case. According to the Trial
      Court, there was also no endorsement with regard to registration of the
      FIR on the ruqqa Ext.PW8/A. The Trial Court viewed with disapproval
      as well, the photographs Ex. PW-8/B-l to Ex. PW-8/B-8 claimed to
D     have been taken by the investigating officer with his digital camera, of
      the car and the seized article, as some of those did not bear any date and ·
      the rest were of 05.01.2008 at 7.06 a.m., different from the date of
      seizure of the contraband i.e. 20.10.2009. lri the estimate of the Trial
      Court, these photographs thus could not be related to the seizure claimed.
      Vis-a-vis the co-accused Govind Singh, the Trial Court noticed that there
E     was no incriminating material to prove his involvement in the commission
      of the offence. Consequently, it acquitted the appellant and the coc
      accused of the charge.
             9. The High Court however on a reappraisal of the evidence on
      record laid emphasis on the testimony of PW-1, HHC-Hira Singh in the
F     matter of identification of the appellant as the person who fled from the
      scene on seeing the patrol party. Decisive weight was also extended to
      the recovery of the passbook of the appellant from the chamber of the
      dashboard of the vehicle. It recorded that the name of the appellant was
      mentioned both in the ruqqa Ex. PW-8/A and the NCB form which
      according to it had been missed by the Trial Court. The High Court
G     noted that the appellant had failed to offer any explanation about the
      presence of his passbook in the offending vehicle and by observing that
      there was no reason for the prosecution to falsely implicate him, returned
      a finding that the charge against him had been proved beyond all
      reasonable doubt. It however reiterated that the prosecution had failed
H
                  KHEKH RAM. v. STATE OF H.P.                               965
                      ·[AMITAVA ROY, J.]

to prove the case against the co-accused Govind Singh and affirmed his A
acquittal. The appeal of the State was partly allowed and the appellant
was convicted under Section 20 of the Act and was sentenced as
mentioned hereinabove.
      10. Before we move on to the analysis of the facts and the evidence
on records apt it would be to deal with the rival contentions.              B
        11. Mr. Ajay Marwah, learned counsel for the appellant has
insistently argued that the prosecution having utterly failed to establish
the identity of the appellant with the driver of the vehicle from which the
contraband had been allegedly seized, the view taken by the Trial Court
on the basis of the evidence both oral and documentary being flawless c
and reasonable, the High Court had erred in law and on facts in reversing
the same on grounds patently untenable. According to the learned counsel,
as neither the evidence of PW-1 and/or PW-8 nor any of the
contemporaneous documents claimed to have been prepared in connection
with the search and seizure does establish in any manner the complicity ·
of the appellant in the offence, the conviction as recorded by the High D
Court if allowed to stand would be a travesty of justice. Mr. Marwah
urged that in absence of any clinching evidence with regard to the
identification of the appellant as the driver of the vehicle who had fled
on seeing the patrol party, the recovery of his passbook from the car per
se cannot prove beyond reasonable doubt his culpability. The learned E
counsel maintained that an overall consideration of the oral and
documentary evidence adduced by the prosecution would unerringly
indicate that the documents with regard to search and seizure had 11ot
been prepared at the spot but subsequently, to falsely foist the prosecution
on the appellant only on the basis of his passbook and no other evidence
whatsoever. Mr. Marwah argued that the photographs relied upon by F
the prosecution as contemporaneous documents in· support of the search
and seizure also bely the prosecution case. as none of those, though
clicked with a digital camera, depict the date thereof i.e. 20.10.2009 and
therefore cannot by any stretch of imagination be related thereto. The
learned counsel argued that as conscious possession of the contraband G
is an indispensable prerequisite for conviction of the appellant on the
charge framed against him, absence of his identification is destructive of .
the substratum of the prosecution case. According to him, as the view
 taken by the Trial Court is not only formidably plausible but also irrefutably
 reasonable, the High Court had.grossly erred in reversing the same by
                                                                            H
966              SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2017] l 1 S.C.R.


A merely substituting its view, unsupported by the material available. In
  buttressal of his pleas, the learned counsel has placed reliance on the
  decisions of this Court in Prem Singh vs. State of Haryana 1, Krishan
  Chand vs. State of H.P. 2 and Mahinder Singh vs. State of Himachal
  Pradesh 3 •
B         12. Per contra, it has been assiduously argued on behalf of the
   respondent/State that the identification of the appellant as the driver of
  the vehicle carrying the contraband having been established beyond doubt
  and the search and seizure of the commodity having been undertaken
  strictly in accordance with the prescriptions of law, his conviction· is
  unassailable and ought to be affirmed. According to the learned counsel,
C the inferences drawn by the Trial Court are not borne out by the materials
  on record and therefore have been rightly repudiated in the impugned
  judgment and order.
         13. It would next be expedient to briefly deal with the authorities
  cited at the Bar to recapitulate the judicial enunciation of the scope of an
D Appellate Court to reverse an order of acquittal in a criminal trial. In
  Prem Singh1, the challenge was to the judgment of reversal of the
  jurisdictional High Court whereby the appellant was convicted along
  with the co-accused Vishwa Bandhu under Section 302 read with Section
  34 of the Indian Penal Code (for short hereafter referred to as the "IPC")
E and  sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life. The appellant
  and the aforenamed co-accused had been acquitted by the Trial Court.
  All the seven accused persons were acquitted of the charge of murder
  of Siri Krishan who as per the prosecution case was on 26.11.1993 at
  about 6.30/6.45 a.m. gunned down by some persons while he was on his
  morning walk. The incident was reported to the brother of the deceased
F PW-16, Sohan Lal by one Vijay Kumar, a neighbour. On receipt of the
  information, PW-16 along with his nephew Navneet Kumar and Vijay
  Kumar went to the spot and found the deceased lying in a pool of blood.
  He was removed in injured condition to the Government Hospital where
  he was declared to have been brought dead.
G           The FIR was registered and on the completion of the investigation,
      charge-sheet was laid against the appellant and others under Sections
      120-B, 148, 302 read with Section 149 IPC and Section 25 of the Anus
      1
        c2013J 14 sec 88
      22017(6) SCALE 468
H     'Criminal Appeal No.1286 of 2017 decided on 31.7.2017.
                   KHEKH RAM v. STATE OF H.P.                                  967
                       [AMITAVA ROY, J.]

  Act, 1959. The investigation amongst others led to the recovery of firearms A
- on the disclosure of the appellant and co-accused Ballu. Further, several
  empty cartridges and lead bullets were also recovered from the place of
  occurrence. In the postmortem, three- bullets were extricated from the
  dead body. The investigating agency forwarded the firearms recovered
  along with the bullets retrieved from the dead body for forensic B
  examination. Charge was framed against the accused persons on the
  provisions of law under which charge-sheet had been submitted. At the
  end of the trial however, all the accused persons were acquitted. In the
  appeal by the State, the High Court, as noted hereinabove, reversed the
  acquittal qua the appellant and the co-accused Vishwa Bandhu.
        This Court while reflecting on the scope of the power of the High C -
 Court under Section 378 of the Co-de of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for
 short hereafter referred to as the "Code") in dealing with an order of
 acquittal referred amongst others to an extract from its earlier verdict in
 Murugesan and others vs. State4• The legal proposition as enunciated
 in paragraph 21 of the said ruling, as quoted hereunder, was noted:         D
        "21. A concise statement of the law on the issue that had emerged
        after over half a century of evolution since Sheo Swarup is to be
        found in para 42 of the Report in Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka.
        The same may, therefore, be usefully noticed below: (SCC p.432)
        "42. ·From the above decisions, in our considered view, the            E
        following general principles regarding powers of the appellate court
        while dealing with an appeal against an order of ac9uittal emerge:
           (1) An appellate court has full power to review, re-appreciate
           and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal
           is founded.                                                         F
            (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation,
            restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an
            appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own
          - conclusion, both on questions of fact and oflaw.
                                                                               G
           (3) Various expressions, such as, 'substantial and compelling
           reasons', 'good and sufficient grounds', 'very strong
           circumstances', 'distorted conclusions~, 'glaring mistakes', etc.
           are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate
  •c2012) 10 sec 383
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968          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2017] 11 S.C.R.


A             court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are
              more in the nature of 'flourishes oflanguage' to emphasise the
              reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than
              to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to
              come to its own conclusion.
B            (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case
             of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the
             accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to
             him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence
             that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he
             is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the
c            accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his
             innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened
             by the trial court.
              (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of
              the evidence on record. the appellate court should not disturb
D             the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court."
                                                        (Emphasis supplied)
         In the above jurisprudential backdrop, this Court next analyzed
  the evidence adduced by the prosecution and the scrutiny thereof by the
E Trial Court in recording acquittal of the appellant and the co-accused.
  The fatal anomalies and deficiencies in the prosecution case, as noticed,
  by the Trial Court were enumerated thus:
          (a) Vijay Kumar who had reported about the incident to PW-16,
               Sohan Lal had not been examined by the prosecution, though
               it was its case that Vijay Kumar had witnessed the
F
               occurrence.
          (b) Though the prosecution tried to justify the non-examination
              of Vijay Kumar by contending that it was his daughter who
              had witnessed the occurrence, even she was not adduced
              as a witness.
G
          (c) The testimony of PW-11, Sohan Lal and PW-12, Bharat Lal
               were not worthy of any credence as they conceded that
               they had not received any summons to appear as witness
               and in fact had appeared at the request of the son of the
               deceased.
H
                  KHEKH RAM v. STATE.OF H.P.                                969
                      [AMITAVA ROY, J.]

      (d) PW-11, Sohan Lal was an employee of the brother of PW-            A
          13, Smt. Pushpa Devi, who was the wife of the deceased.·
      (e) Though PW-11 and PW-12 claimed that they knew the
          deceased from before and that the house of the deceased
          was very near to the place of occurrence, they did neither
          visit the house of the deceased nor inform the family members B
          of the deceased nor did they report the incident to the police ..
      (f) They instead roamed about aimlessly in the streets of Kamal
            until they came to the place of occurrence when their
            statements were recorded by the poiice.
       (g) The recovery of weapons at the instance. of the appellant C
           and the co-accused Ballu was highly doubtful.
       (h) As per the report of the Forensic Science Laboratory,
           Madhuban, no neims could be established between the bullets
           recovered from the dead body and the firearms allegedly
           recovered.                                                       D
       (i) PW-11 and PW-12 had identified the accused including.the
            appellant for the first time in Court. ·
       (j) The evidence of PW-11 and PW-12 was full of significant ·
           discrepancies with regard to the identity ofthe accused and
           the roles attributed to them in the perpetration of the crime. E
        In the above overwhelming factual premise, this Court concluded
 that the finding of innocence recorded by Trial Court was a reasonably
 possible view taken on the basis of the evidence and materials on record
 and thus the High Court ought not to have disturbed the same even if, on
 a re-app~eciation of the evidence it was inclined to take' a different view.
                                                                              F
 This Court reiterated the oft quoted fundamental propo'sition that so long
 the view taken by the Trial Court in awarding acquittal on a criminal ·
 charge was a possible one, the exercise of the appellate power of the
 High Court under Section 378 of the Code would remain circumscribed
 by the well-settled parameters noticed hereinabove.The conviction of
 the appellant was set aside in the attendant facts and circumstances and G
                        .
 his acquittal was res.tored.
   .

        14. This Court in Krishan Chand2 , was seized· with the
·impugnment of the judgment of the territorial High Court convicting the
  appellant under Section 30 of tbe Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
  Substances, Act, 1985 (for short hereafter referred to as the "NDPS H
970             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2017] ll S.C.R.


A Act") and sentencing him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period
  of20 years and to pay fine of Rs. 2,00,000/- with default stipulation, by
  reversing the acquittal recorded by the Trial Court.
         The prosecution case, as noted in brief was that on 27.11.2010 at
  about 5 a.m. while the patrol party including the complainant-SRO
B Gurbachan Singh, PW-6 was on duty at the Patarna Bridge, a person
  was seen coming with a rucksack on his back. On ·seeing the police
  party, he tried to flee but was apprehended and he disclosed his name to
  be Krishan Chand. His bag was searched which revealed some black
  substance which appeared to be charas. The contraband on being
  weighed was found to be of7 kgs. It was seized and sealed. The appellant
C was arrested. Ruqqa was prepared and was sent to the police station
  and after obtaining the report from the Forensic Science Laboratory, the
  appellant was sent up for trial. Prosecution examined six witnesses. In
  course of his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. the appellant denied
  recovery of charas from him. He further claimed to be innocent and
D alleged that he had been falsely implicatt:J. He also examined two
  witnesses Narain Singh and Govind Singh in defence.
         The Trial Court acquitted the appellant holding that the prosecution
  had failed to prove the charge beyond reasonable doubt. In the appeal,
  filed by the State, the High Court convicted and sentenced the appellant
E as above.
             The principal plea of the appellant before this Court was thatthe
      High Court had failed to appreciate that in absence of any independent
      witness, the evidence of the police witnesses ·ought to have been
      scrutinized with greater care and as the police witnesses had contradicted
F     themselves about the authorship of the seizure memo, the arrest memo,
      consent memo and the NCB, no interference with the acquittal ought to
      have been made. The evidence of PWc4 and PW-6 was referred to for
      reinforcing the above assertion.
         This Court noted that the Trial Court in acquitting the appellant
G had laid emphasis on two aspects, namely, no independent witness was
  examined and fatal contradictions in the testimonies of PW-4 and PW-6.
  This Court, analyzing the testimony of PW-4, Umesh Kumar recorded
  that this witness had stated that as the place of the occurrence was
  isolated having no habitation nearby, he was associated in the investigation
  by PW-6, Gurbachan (complainant) whereafter the person as well as
H
                   KHEKH RAM v. STATE OF H.P. ··                            971
                       [AMITAVA ROY, J.]

  the bag of the appellant was searched after making him aware of his A
  right to have the said exercise undertaken before a Magistrate or a
  Gazetted Officer. This witness affirmed that on searching the bag of the
  appellant, charas weighing 7 kg. was detected which was seized, parceled
  and sealed whereafter NCB form was filled up, sample seal. was taken
   in a separate piece of cloth and the seized contraband was taken in B
 · possession and the related memo was signed by him as well as Head
 ·Constable, Tain Singh. This witness disclosed further that the party was
   at the spot for about l hour 40 minutes and it was dark at the relevant
   point of time. Further they did neither have any search light nor the lights
   of the vehicle had been switched on. He expressed ignorance as to in
   whose handwriting the consent memo was written. He however stated C
· that the search memo, seizure memo, arrest memo, sample seal and the
    NCB Form were all in the hand of SHO, Gurbachan Singh. He also
    stated that he was not aware as to who scribed the personal search
 · memo of the accused.
        While appraising the testimony of PW-6 this Court noticed in D
 particular that this witness did not remember the duration of the stay of
 the police party at the spot before the accused was apprehended. This
 witness .however was clear in deposing that it was not night time and ·
 that the accused could be seen from a distance of 10 meters. He
 contradicted PW-4 by stating that the consent memo, memo of search,
 seizure memo, noting on the sample seal, memo of personal search was E
 not in his hands but was got written by him from one of the members of
 the police party under his dictation.
      · This Court noticed the contradiction on the above aspects in the
 evidence of PW-4 and PW-6 and observed that those could not be glossed
 over as minor, more particularly in the background of the allegation of F
 false implication made by the accused/appellant. It held the view, that
 from the evidence it appeared that the place where the accused/appellant ·
 had been apprehended was not an isolated'one as one house of Govind
 Singh, DW-2 was located nearby. This Court thus rejected the version
 of the prosecution that independent witnesses could not be associated G
 as the place was desofate. In all, in view of the above inconsistencies
 and the deficiencies in prosecution evidence, this Court held that the ·
 possession of the contraband by the accused/appellant and seizure thereof
 from him was dot\btful. It noted as well that though there was a reference
 of recovery of knife at the time of opening of the bag allegedly carried
                                                                             H
972             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2017] l l S.C.R.


 A by the accused/appellant, it did not find place in the seizure memo which
    further created doubt in the prosecution case. The conviction was set
    aside holding that the High Court had failed to take note of the
    contradictions in the evidence in the proper perspective and had failed
    thereby to appreciate that harsher is the punishment, the stricter ought
    to be the proof of the charge.
 B
            15. The elaboration of the facts in the decisions cited at the Bar
    has been to underline the factual setting in which reversal of the orders
   of acquittal had been interfered with by this Court. Though it is no longer
    res integra that an order of acquittal, if appealed against, ought not to be
 C lightly interfered with, it is trite as well that the Appellate Court is fully
   empowered to review, re-appreciate and reconsider the evidence on
   record and to reach its own conclusions both on questions of fact and on
   law. As a corollary, the Appellate Court would be within its jurisdiction
   and authority to dislodge an acquittal on sound, cogent and persuasive
   reasons based on the recorded facts and the law applicable. If only
 D when the view taken by the Trial Court in ordering acquittal is an equally
   plausible and reasonable one that the Appellate Court would not readily
   substitute the same· by another view available to it, on its independent
   appraisal of the materials on record. This legally acknowledged restraint
   on the power of the Appellate Court would get attracted only ifthe two
   views are equally plaµsible and reasonable and not otherwise. If the
 E view taken by the Trial Court is a possible but not a reasonable one
   when tested on the evidence on record and the legal principles applied,
   unquestionably it can and ought to be displaced by a plausible and
   reasonable view by the Appellate Court in furtherance of the ultimate
   cause of justice. Though no innocent ought to be punished, it is equally
 F imperative that a guilty ought not to be let of casually lest justice is a
   casualty.
           16. Having regard to the two irreconcilable views adopted by the
    Courts below, it is felt expedient to revisit the essential aspects of the
    evidence bearing in particular on the identification of the appellant as the
. G possessor and carrier of the contraband. The FIR registered on 20.10.2009
    discloses PW-8, Inspector Sanjeev Chauhan to be the complainant/
    informant. It sets out that on 20.10.2009 at about 4 a.m. the vehicle HP-
    OlK-0805 which was coming from Shallang was signalled to stop by the
    patrol party, whereupon the driver thereof stopped the car, alighted
    therefrom and disappeared in the adjoining apple orchard and could not
H
                  KHEKH RAM v. STATE OF H.P.                                  973
                      [AMITAVA ROY, J.]

be apprehended in spite of being chased with search lights. The FIR A
discloses that in spite of an endeavour made no independent witness
could be secured and that on the search of the vehicle a bag of red and
black colour was recovered containing 14 kg. 750 grams of charas which
was seized and sealed in presence of the members of the patrol team,
namely, HHC-KashmiRam andHHC-Hira Singh (PW-1). That in course B
of the search a registration certificate in the name of Ses Ram s/o Devi
Ram and a passbook of Himachal Gramin Bank, Kullu in the name of
the appellant was recovered was stated as well. It was mentioned that
the driver of the vehicle, who had run away after stopping the same,
was well built with a height of 5' 5" and aged about 30-35 years and the
person was named as Khekh Ram.'                                          C
        17. PW-1, HHC-Hira Singh, who was a member of the patrol as
well as search team substantially reiterated the facts leading to the spotting
of the vehicle, the escape of the driver, recovery of the contraband and
the seizure thereof. Qua the aspect of identification, this witness stated
that at the time of his fleeing from the spot, he could recognize him in the D
search light as Khekh Ram and also located him in the Court. In cross-
examination however this witness stated that when the search light was
focused on the person, the police party noticed the back portion of his
and he claimed further to have seen his side face from a distance of 40
to 50 yards. He admitted as well that Khekh Ram was not personally
known to him before the incident. This witness testified that photographs ·E
of the bag lying on the seat of the vehicle were taken at the spot. He
denied the suggestion that Khekh Ram was lifted from his house in the
night of 20.10.2009 merely on the basis of suspicion and that he was
falsely implicated in the case.                                  ·
         18. PW-2, Ses Ram deposed that he was the owner of the Alto F
car and had on 13.08.2009 sold the same to Gov ind Singh. He clarified
that though the sale transaction had occurred, as the vehicle had been
privately financed and the loan was not repaid, the same could not be
transferred in the name of Govind Singh. This witness in his cross-
examination stated that after the purchase of the vehicle by Gov ind Singh,   G
he had employed a Nepali, as a driver thereof.
       19. PW-8, Inspector Sanjeev Chauhan, the Investigating Officer,
on oath reiterated his .version in the FIR and stated in particular that
after packing the bag containing the contraband with a cloth, he sealed
the same with nine seals of "T" and thereafter filled the NCB forms,· H
974           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2017] 11 S.C.R.


A amongst others Ext.PW4/E. He drew up also the seizure memo of the
  car, the keys, the registration certificate, the passbook and the charas
  vide Ext.PWI/A. He stated to have prepared the ruqqa Ext.PW8/A and
  handed over the same to HHC-Hira Singh, PW-I to take it to the police
  station, Kullu for registration of the FIR. He claimed that photographs
  were also taken by him of the seized commodity in the form ofExt.PW8/
B
  B-1 to Ext.PW8/B-10 with his digital camera. He stated to have
  completed the proceedings at the spot with the help of search lights and
  the headlights of the vehicles whereafter he directed ASI Ratan Lal to
  locate Ses Ram and to arrest Khekh Ram. He deposed to have summoned
  Ses Ram and Govind Singh to the police station and after the disclosures
C made by them about the sale of the vehicle and the temporary
  entrustment by Govind Singh of the vehicle to Khekh Ram, he arrested
  the appellant on 21.10.2009 at 4 p.m. He stated that after the arrest of
  the appellant, he prepared a special report, Ext.PW-3/A. In his
  examination-in-chief though this witness had reiterated his narration in
D the FIR that the driver of the Alto car on being stopped, jumped therefrom
  and fled, he did not claim to have identified him to be the appellant. In his
  cross-examination he however testified that when he came down from
  the vehicle, the driver of the Alto vehicle was facing him and he could
  thus recognize him. He denied the suggestion that he had not mentioned
  in the ruqqa that he could see the face ofKhekh Ram. As the identification
E of the appellant is of determinative significance, the instant scrutiny of
  the evidence has been, for obvious reasons, confined chiefly to this aspect.
         20. Section 20 of the Act under which the appellant had been
  charged prescribes for punishment for contravention in relation to
  cannabis plant and cannabis. Section 29 of the Act ordains the punishment
F for abetment of and criminal conspiracy for commission of an offence
  punishable under Chapter IV. The gravamen of the charge against the
  appellant is possession and transportation of charas as punishable under
  the above provisions. It cannot be gainsaid thus, that the appellant to be
  guilty of the offence with which he had been charged, he must be proved
  to be in conscious possession of the contraband seized. This assumes
G great significance as admittedly the procedure of search of the Alto
  vehicle which allegedly he had been driving and the seizure of charas,
  the registration certificate of the vehicle and the passbook in the name
  of the appellant in particular had been in his absence as well as without
  the participation of any independent witness. The identification of the
H
                 KHEKH RAM v. STATE OF H.P.                                975
                     [AMITAVA ROY, J.]

appellant to be the driver who had absconded on seeing the patrol party A
therefore is the sine qua non for the proof of the charge leveled against
him. The materials on record propel three pieces of evidence in this
regard, firstly the testimony of PW-1 and PW-8, secondly the evidence
of Govind Singh according to whom the vehicle had been taken by the
appellant for bringing his wife from Anni and most importantly the B
recovery ofthe bank passbook in his name from the vehicle. To recall,
though PW-1 claimed to have identified the absconding driver of the
vehicle to be the appellant Khekli Ram in the search light, in cross-
examination he stated to have seen along with the other members of the
patrol party, his back portion. He endeavoured to improve his observation,
by mentioning that he had seen also his side face. from a distance of 40 C
to 5,0 yards, but admitted that Khekh Ram was not personally known to
him before that incident.
        2i.PW-8 though was silent with regard to the identification of the
fleeing driver, in cross-examination he mentioned that at the point of
time when the two vehicles were face to face, the driver of the Alto car D
was facing towards the police vehicle and he could recognize him. This
witness however did not claim to have identified the driver to be the
appellant, Khekh Ram at that point of time. The testimony of PW- I and
PW-8 taken together by itself is not adequately persuasive to
unimpeachably establish the identity of the driver of the Alto vehicle to
be Khekh Ram, the appellant. In absence of any test identification parade, E
implication of the appellant on the basis, this piece of evidence, where
the appellant Khekh Ram was not known to either of these two witnesses
or had been seen by them before would be clearly hazardous. Whereas
the disclosure made by the co-accused Govind Singh that he had lent the
vehicle to the appellant to carry his wife on 19.10.2009 would not ipso F
facto be a conclusive proof of his identity as the driver of the vehicle at
the time of its interception by the police party, the recovery of his passbook
therefrom, albeit a factor weighing against him, cannot as well clinch by
itself the issue of his identification in favourofthe prosecution. With the
 evidence forthcoming thatthe registered owner of the vehicle was Ses
 Ram (PW-2) who deposed to have sold it to Govind Singh but the G
 registration thereof had not been transferred and further that the vehicle
 had been temporarily lent to the appellant for his personal work, does
 not irrefutably rule out the possibility ofuse thereof by anyone of them
 at the relevant time. In the overall state of evidence with regard to
                                                                            H
976             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2017] 11 S.C.R.


A identification, in our comprehension, the view taken by the Trial Court is
  overwhelmingly reasonable. To the contrary, the conclusion of the High
  Court on this issue seems to be dominantly guided by the recovery of the
  bank passbook in the name of the appellant from the vehicle and the
  reference of his name in the ruqqa Ext.PW8/A and the NCB form. The
  failure of the appellant to explain the presence of his bank passbook in
B
  the car also weighed considerably with the High Court against him.
          22. The photographs, claimed by the prosecution to have been
  taken by the Investigating Officer, PW-8 with his digital camera to
  correlate the seized artide with the one captured therein, to state the
  least, wholly lack in credence and persuasion. Not only, as expected, the
C photographs with the kind of camera used, do not record the date of the
  procedure i.e. 20.10.2009, some of those do not bear any date whereas
  the rest are dated 05.01.2008, 7.06 a.m. The prosecution has failed to
  offer any explanation whatsoever for this anomaly. It is thus more than
  apparent that the appellant has been implicated in the offence wholly
D due to the recovery of his bank passbook from the vehicle for which as
  a consequence his name was recorded in all the documents prepared in
  connection with the exercise undertaken. In absence of any other cogent,
  coherent and clinching evidence of his identification as the driver of the
  Alto car carrying the contraband, this document to reiterate, cannot be
  acted in isolation to base his conviction. Having regard to the materials
E on record, it is clear that his arrest in connection with this case was due
  to the recovery of his bank passbook from the car and not on the basis
  of his spot identification. The prosecution, in our view, has failed to adduce
  conclusive and consistent evidence to bring home the charge against the
  appellant.
F        23. It is a common place proposition that in a criminal trial suspicion
  however grave cannot take the place of proof and the prosecution to
  succeed has to prove its case and establish the charge by adducing
  convincing evidence to ward off any ·reasonable doubt about the
  complicity of the accused. For this, the prosecution case has to be in the
G category of "must be true" and not "may be true". This Court while
  dwelling on this postulation, in Rajiv Singh vs. State of Bihar and
  anotlier5 dilated thereon as hereunder:
             "66. It is well entrenched principle of criminal jurisprudence that
           . a charge can be said to be proved only when there is certain and
H     '(2015) 16 sec 369
           KHEKH RAM v. STATE OF•, H.P.                            977
               [AMITAVA ROY, J.]

explicit evidence to warrant legal conviction and that no person A
can be held guilty on pure moral conviction. Howsoever grave
the alleged offence may be, otherwise stirring the conscience of
any court, suspicion alone cannot take the place of legal proof.
The Well established cannon of criminal justice is "fouler the crime
higher the proof'. In unmistakable terms, it is the mandate oflaw B
that the prosecution in order to succeed in a criminal trial, has to
prove the charge(s) beyond all reasonable doubt.
67. The above enunciations resonated umpteen times to be
reiterated in Raj Kumar Singh v. State ofRajasthan as succinctly
summarized in paragraph 21 as hereunder:
                                                                   c
·21. Suspicion, however grave it may be, cannot take the place of
 proof, and there is a large difference between something that
 "may be" proved and "Will be proved". In a criminal trial. suspicion
 no matter how strong. cannot and must not be permitted to take
 place of proof. This is for the reason that the mental distance
  between "may be" and "must be" is quite large and divides vague D
  conjectures from sure conclusions. In a criminal case, the court
  has a duty to ensure that mere conjectures or suspicion do not
  take the place of legal proof. The large distance between "may
  be" true and "must be" true, must be covered by way of clear,
  cogent and unimpeachable evidence produced by the prosecution, E
  before an accused is condemned as a convict, and the basic .and
  golden rule must be applied. In such cases, while keeping in mind
  the distance between "may be" true and "must be" true, the court
  must maintain the vital distance between conjectures and sure
  conclusions to be arrived at, on the touchstone of dispassionate
  judicial scrutiny based upon a complete and comprehensive F
  appreciation of all features of the case, as well as the quality and
  credibility of the evidence brought on record. The court must ensure
. that miscarriage of justice is avoided and if the facts and
  circumstances of a case so demand. then the benefit of doubt·
  must be given to the accused. keeping in mind that a reasonable G
  doubt is not an imaginary. trivial or a merely probable doubt. but a
   fair doubt that is based upon reason and common sense.
                                    [Emphasis laid by the Court]

                                                                    H
978              SUPREME COURT REPORTS                       [2017] 11 S.C.R.


 A            68. In supplementation, it was held in affirmation of the view
              taken in Kali Ram v. State of H.P. that if two views are possible
              on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of
              the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is
              favourable to the accused should be adopted.
B            69. In terms of this judgment, suspicion, howsoever grave cannot
             take the place of proof and the prosecution case to succeed has
             to be in the category of "must be" and not "may be" a distance to
             be covered by way of clear, cogent and unimpeachable evidence
             to rule out any possibility of wrongful conviction of the accused
             and resultant miscarriage of justice. For this, the Court has to
c            essentially undertake an exhaustive and analytical appraisal of
             the evidence on record and register findings as warranted by the
             same. The above proposition is so well-established that it does
             not call for multiple citations to further consolidate the same."
         24. In our estimate, having regard to the quality of evidence on
D record as a whole and in particular on the aspect of identification, the
  view taken by the Trial Court being convincingly reasonable is acceptable
  in comparison to one adopted by the High Court.
         25. The High Court in the attendant facts and circumstances, in
   our determination, erred in upturning the findings recorded by the Trial
E Court. The impugned judgment and orderis thus set aside and the acquittal
  of the appellant is restored. This Court shares the concern expressed by
  the Trial Court on the shoddy investigation conducted in the case, having
  regard in particular to the seriousness of the offence involved and reiterate
  the direction issued by it to the Superintendent of Police, Kullu to enquire
F into the matter to ascertain the reason for the omission/lapses in the
  investigation, identify the person(s) responsible therefor and the action
  taken in connection therewith so as to ensure against repetition of such
  shortcomings in future. The Superintendent of Police, Kullu would
  complete the inquiry and submit a report to this Court within a period of
  three months herefrom. The appeal is allowed. The appellant be released
G from custody if not required in connection with any other case.



      Divya Pandey                                               Appeal allowed.