Holding

Clause 5 of the lease deed authorises only residential use of the premises, and the eviction under Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, is justified.

Summary

The landlord filed an eviction suit under Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, claiming a bona‑fide requirement for the premises. The tenant, a company, relied on Clause 5 of the lease deed which stated the premises were for the residence and personal use of directors, their relatives, and "for the purpose of the Company", arguing that the lease allowed a composite residential‑commercial use. The Rent Controller held the lease permitted only residential use and ordered eviction; the High Court reversed this, accepting the composite‑use argument. The Supreme Court examined the interpretation of Clause 5, reading it in context with other lease clauses and municipal zoning, and concluded that the clause authorises only residential occupation. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court’s decision, restored the Rent Controller’s order, and allowed the landlord’s eviction application. No costs were awarded, and the tenant was given six months to vacate.

Issues considered

Whether Clause 5 of the lease deed permits only residential use or a composite residential‑commercial use of the premises.
Whether the landlord’s claim of bona‑fide requirement under Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, is valid.

Legislation cited

Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958s. 14(1)(e)

Subjects

evictionbona fide requirementresidential premiseslease interpretationDelhi Rent Control Actcommercial usecontractual construction

Judgment

A KESHAV KUMAR SWARUP
v.
FLOWMORE PRIVATE LIMITED

JANUARY 18, 1994

B [S. MOHAN AND M.K. MUKHERJEE, JJ.]

Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958: s.14(1)(e)-Residential Premises--
Leased out to Company-C'lause of leasedeed authorising lessee to use
premises ''for residence and personal use of Directors and/or their relatives
C and for the purpose of the Company''-Held, tenant authorised to use premises
only for residential purpose.

Interpretation of Documents : Intention of parties-To be ascertained
from expressions used in document-Reading of entire document-Looking
into attending circumstances-Need for.
D
The appellant-landlord filed an application under s.14(1)(e) of the
Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, seeking eviction of the respondent from his
pnmises on the ground of bona fide requirement. The respondent-com-
pany, relying upon clause 5 of the leasedeed·to the effect that the lessee
E would use the premises "for the resi<lence and personal use of Directors
and/or their relatives and for the purpose of the Company", contended that
the premises were let out both for residential as also commercial purpose
and the composite. purpose of the tenancy took the premises out of the •
purview of the residential accommodation. The Rent Controller rejected
tenant's contentions and allowed the application. The High Court, in the
-"i •
F revisional application filed by the tenant, accepted its plea of composite
purpose of tanancy and rejected the application of the landlord. Hence,
the appeal by special leave.

Dismissing the appeal, setting aside the order of the High Court and
G restoring that of the Rent Controller, this Court

HELD·: 1.1. On a plain reading of clause 5 of the lease-deed, it is
patently clear that the landlord authorised the tenant to use the premises ;..-
only for residential purpose and for no other purpose. The words 'for the
purpose of the Company' ought to be read in conjunction with 'residence'
H · and· when so read there is no escape from the conclusion that what the
148
K.K. SWARUP v. FLOWMORE (P) LTD. [MUKHERJEE, J.) 149

parties intended was that the premises were to be used for residence of the A
Directors, their relatives and also others ·who may have to be accom·
modated 'for the purpose of the Company'. This was established by the
other clauses of the agreement as also by the other materials appearing
on record. From clause 11 of the lease deed it is clear that under the
agreement only installation of air conditioners and cooking ranges were B
permitted and there is no mention of any kind of office equipment. Further,
clause 13, when read in the context of the master and zonal plans clearly
indicates that the residential user of the premises was only contemplated.
The High Court erred in law in reversing the decision of the Rent Control·
ler allowing the eviction. (151-F-H, 152-G]
c
2. In interpreting a document the intention of the parties has to be
ascertained, if possible from the expressions used therein. More often than
not, this causes no difficulty, but if difficulty is felt owing to inarticulate
drafting or inadvertence or other causes, the intention may be gathered
reading the entire document and, if so necessary, from other attending
circumstances also. If through such a process the intention of the parties D
can be culled out consistently with the rule of law, the Courts are required
to take that course. (151-D-E]

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 3487 of
1988.
E
From the Judgment and Order dated 25.4.1988 of the Delhi High
Court in C.R. (R) No.869 of 1987.

Harish N. Salve, Ambrish Kumar, H.K. Puri, M.V. Goswami and
Sharad Puri for t~e Appellant. F
G,L. Sanghi, Mahesh Aggarwal and Anant V. Palli for the Respon-
dent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

1. MUKHERJEE, J. The appellant-landlord filed an application G
under Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 before the
Rent Controller seeking eviction of the respondent-tenant (Company) from
the premises in question on the ground of bona fide requirement. After
obtaining leave to contest the application, the tenant contended, relying
upon clause 5 of the deed of lease which reads as under :- H
150 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994] 1 S.C.R.

A "That the lessee shall use the pr,emises fo1 the residence
and personal use of Directors &for their relatives and for
the purpose of the Company."

that the premises were let out both for residential as also commercial
. purpose and the composite pur"pose of the tenancy took the premises out
B of the purview of the residential accommodation. The other ground on
which the application was resisted was that the claim of the landlord that
the premises were required for his own occupation was not a bona fide
one. The Controller rejected both the contentions of the tenant and passed
an or<ler for eviction. Aggrieved thereby, the tenant filed a revisional
C application ·in the Delhi High Court and reiterated both its contentions.
The High. Court, while affirming the finding re.corded by the Controller
about the bona fide requirement of the landlord upset the finding of the
Controller that clause 5 of the deed mistakably proved that the premises
were let out for residential purpose only. In interpreting clause 5, the High
D Court first observed : ~:~

"Clause 5 is not ambiguous. There is no confusion in the
word used in this clause. The words 'personal use of
Directors &/or their relatives and for the purpose of the
Company'· were used after mentioning that the premises
E can be used for residence meaning tereby that the other
users were also permissible besides residence and that the
user was for the purpose of the Company, i.e., for the
business of the Company and the Directors and their
relatives also could use does not mean that Directors and ·
their relatives are to use the premises for reside.nee only.
F The personal use could be of many nature. It cou1~ be
that Director or their relatives can have their office in
particular rooms for their personal work beyond the work
of the company."

G And ultimately concluded by saying :
"The words 'for the purpose of the Company' are very
significant and cannot be given a go by. They do clearly
show that the premises can be used for the purpose of
Company which is obviously business of the Company.
H Hence it has to be held that the premises have been let
K.K. SW AR UP v. FLOWMORE (P) LTD. [MUKHERJEE, J.] 151

out not only for residential purpose but also for commer- A
cial purpose. The interpretation of the Rent Controller
with regard to the particular clause does not appear to be
sound. So, I set aside the finding of the Rent Controller
in this regard."

-- 2. On such conclusion, the High Court reversed the order of the
Controller and rejected the application of the landlord. Hence, this appeal
by special leave.
B

- In view of the concurrent finding recorded by the Controller and the
High Court regarding bonafide requirement of the premises by the
landlord, the only point that survives for consideration in this appeal is as
C

to the true meaning of clause 5 of the lease deed. In other words, we have
to find as answer to the question whether the premises were let out for
residential purpose only or for a composite purpose.

3. In interpreting a document the intention of the parties has to be D
ascertained, if possible from the expressions used therein. More often than
not, this causes no difficulty, but if difficulty is felt owing to inarticulate
drafting or inadvertence or other causes, the intention may be gathered
reading the entire document and, if so necessary, from other attending
circumstances also. If through such a process the intention of the parties E
can be culled out consistently with the rule of law, the Courts are required
to take that course. Keeping these principles in mind, we may proceed to
consider the facts of the instant case.

4. On a plain reading of clause 5 it is patently clear to us that the
landlord authorised the tenant to use the premises in dispute . only for F
residential purpose and for no other purpose. The words 'for the purpose
of the Company' ought to be read in conjunction with 'residence' and when
so read there is no escape from the conclusion that what the parties
intended was that the premises were to be used for residence of the
Directors, their relatives and also others who may have to be accom-
modated 'for the purpose of the Company'. The interpretation given by the G
High Court to the above quoted words cannot be accepted for if the
landlord was to permit the tenant to use the premises for any other purpose
the whole exercise of prescribing the purpose and circumscribing the
category of persons who can use it for for that purpose would have been
~~ H
152 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1994) 1 S.C.R.

A 5. Even if it is assumed, for arguments sake, that the words 'for the
purpose of the Company' in Clause 5 created some confusion about the
intention of the parties, it stood completely dispelled by the other clauses
of the agreement as also by the other materials appearing on r€cord.
Reference in this connection may first be made to clauses 11 and 13 of the
agreement which read as under :
B
"11. That the lessee shal\ not carry out any structural
addition or alterations to the said premises, lay-out, fit-
tings or fixtures but can instal air conditioners, cooking
range etc. \
c
xxx xxx xxx xxx

13. That the lessee shall abide by all rules and regulations
of the Municipal Corporation, DDA and other authorities
and shall be responsible for any loss or damages suffered
D by the lessor on account pf lessee's failure to do so.

Besides, the above clauses reference may be made to the certificate dated
10.2.1975 issued by the Managing Director of the tenant (Ext.AX) whereby
he confirmed that the premises had been let out to him for his residence
at a monthly rent of Rs.2,000/- and the report dated 17.4.1975 prepared by
E
the officers of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi (Ext.AW3/l), after
inspection of the premises for assessment of property tax wherein it has
been specifically mentioned that the user of the premises was residential.
Materials on record further show that under the master plan and the zonal
plan of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi the colony in which the
F premises in question are situated is exclusively residential and that it cannot
be used for any purpose other than residential.

6. ·From clause 11 quoted above, we fmd that under the agreement
only installation of air conditioners and cooking ranges were permitted and
G there is no mention of any kind of office equipment. Further, clause 13,
when read in the context of the master and zonal plans referred to earlier,
dearly indicates that the residential user of the premises was only con- )-
template,d. ·

7. For the foregoing discussion, we are of the opinion that the High
H Court erred in law in reversing the decision of the Rent Controller allowing
K.K.SWARUP v. FLOWMORE (P) LTD. [MUKHERJEE,J.) 153

the eviction. We, therefore, allow this appeal, set aside the order of the A
High Court and restore that of the Controller. However, there will be no
order as to costs.

8. Before we part with this judgment we may record that after the
hearing of this appeal was concluded we requested the learned counsel for
the parties to effect a settlement, if possible. Pursuant thereto the parties B
negotiated but could not arrive at a settlement. The learned counsel for
the respondent, however, submitted before us, on the basis of the negotia-
tions that took place that the claim of the landlord regarding requirement
of the premises was not a bona fide one and therefore the appeal should
be dismissed on that score alone. Needless to say, the landlord agreed to C
negotiate for the settlement only in deference to our suggestion and without
prejudice to his rights and contentions in the appeal. Therefore, no cog-
nizance could be, and should be, taken of the terms offered or exchanged
during negotiations, far less, relied upon to dispose of the appeal.

CMP No.16601/89 :- Since the appeal is disposed of, no orders are D
necessary on the C.M.P.

9. After the delivery of the judgment, a prayer on behalf of the
respondent-tenant has been made to seek some time to vacate the
premises. Accordingly, we direct that the appellant shall not levy execution
for a period of six months. The respondent-tenant will file an undertaking E
within two weeks from today agreeing to the delivery of vacant possession
on the expiry of said six months, i.e. 31.7.1994.

R.P. Appeal Disposed of.