KESHAB NARAYAN BANERJEE AND ORS.versusTHE STATE OF BIHAR

 A                  KESHAB NARAYAN BANERJEE AND ORS.
                                            v.
                                THE STATE OF BIHAR

                                 DECEMBER 16, 1999

 B
                    [G.T. NANAVATI AND S.N. PHUKAN, JJ.]


           Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950-Compensation Officer-Compensation
     Officer appointed under the Act is not a Court under Section 195(1) (b) Cr.
 C   P.C.-Criminal Procedure Code, 1973-195(J)(b).

          Words and phrases- "Court"-Meaning of in the context of Bihar
     Land Reforms Act, 1950.

           Tbe appellants were tried before the Special Judge (Vigilance) Patna .
. D It was alleged that in pursuance to a conspiracy, payment of Rs. 2 crores by
   · way of compensation was fraudulently obtained by them and consequently
     they had committed offences punishable under Sections 120B, 420, 467,468,
     471 and 473 IPC and under Sections 5 (2) read with Sections 5 (1) (c) and
     (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The appellants raised a
 E preliminary objection that as the aforesaid offences are alleged to have been
     committed in respect of a document produced in the compensation proceedings
     before the Compensation Officer, and as the said Officer under the Bihar
     Land Reforms Act, 1950 is a "Court" within the meaning of Section 195 (1)
     (b) Cr. P.C. the complaint would have to be filed by that Compensation Officer,
     and as that had not been done, the Special Judge (Vigilance) had no jurisdiction
 F to take cognizance of the said offences. The Special Judge having overruled
     this objection, the appellants moved the High Court under Section 482 Cr.
     P.C. for quashing the proceedings.

         The Division Bench of the High Court, doubted the correctness of a
  decision of an earlier Division Bench in Chandra Kishore Jha v. Sate of
G Bihar, (1975) BBCJ 656 which held that the Compensation Officer appointed
  under the Bihar Land Reforms Act 1950 was a "Court" as defined by Section
  195 (1) (b) of the Code. It accordingly referred the matter to a Full Bench
  of the High Court which held that the Compensation Officer appointed under
  the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950 was not a "Court" within the meaning
H of Section 195 (1) (b) Cr. P.C. Hence this appeal.
                                      394
                   K.N. BANERJEE v. STATE OF BIHAR                         395

     Dismissing the appeal, the Court                                             A
      HELD : 1.1. Section 195 (1) (b) (ii) Cr. P.C. debars the court from
taking cognizance of any offence described in Section 463 or punishable
under Sections 471, 475, 476 Cr. P.C. when offence is alleged to have been
committed in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in a
proceeding in any Court, except on a complaint in writing of that Court, or       B
some other Court to which that Court is subordinate. This bar also applies
to criminal conspiracy to commit, or attempt to commit, or abetment of such
offences. [397-D-E)

      1.2. It is not in dispute that the Compensation Officer appointed under
the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950, if he is a Tribunal, has not been declared      C
by that Act to be "Court" for the purposes of section 195 (1) (b). [397-E-FJ

     1.3. The High Court was right in holding that the Compensation Officer
appointed under the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950 was not a "Court" within
the meaning of Section 195 (1) (b) Cr. P.C. [402-D)                               D
       1.4. The word "Court" had a wider meaning under the old Code. While
enacting the New Code, Section 195 was redrafted as recommended by the
law Commission in its 41st Report. Now the word "Court" dose not include
all the judicial bodies and authorities constituted for administering justice.
The courts contemplated now by Section 195 are only Civil Courts, Revenue         E
Courts and Criminal Courts and those Tribunals which are required by the
Acts constituting them to be Courts for the purposes of section 195.
                                                                  [400-B, C]

       1.5. Assuming that the Compensation Officer appointed under the Bihar
Land Reforms Act 1950 can be said to be a Court, it as not possible to hold       F
that he is a Civil Court Neither the Act nor any other legislation expressly
provides that the Compensation Officer is a Civil Court Though he possesses
certain powers which a Civil Court possesses under the Code of Civil
Procedure, and the proceedings before him are deemed to be judicial
proceedings he does not possess all the attributes of a Civil Court. He lacks     G
the essential attributes which a Civil Court possesses. Considering the nature
of his jurisdiction and the extent of powers conferred on him it has to be said
that he is not a Civil Court. Determination of compensation for divesting a
tenure holder or an intermediary of his right in the estate or tenure is not
a matter pertaining to Revenue. For that reason he is not a Revenue Court
also. (401-F, G; 402-B-CI                                                         H
     396                      SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1999] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A          Baliram v. Justice B. Lentin, AIR(1988) SC 2267, relied on

          Canara Bank v. Nuclear Power Corporation ofIndia Ltd, [1995) Supp.
     3 SCC 81 and Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd v. Shyam Sunder Jhunjhunwala,
     (1962) 2 SCR 339 and Chandra Kishore Jha v. The State of Bihar, (1975)
     B.B.C. 656, referred to.
B
         CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 765
    ofl991.

         From the Judgment Order dated 15.1.1990 of High Court of Patna in
    Criminal Misc. No. 4073 of 1986.
c
           S.B. Sanyal, K.J. John and P.S. Sudheer for the Appellants.

           Rakesh K. Dwivedi and B.B. Singh for the Respondent.

           The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
D          G. T. NANA VATI, J. The question which arises in this appeal is whether
    Compensation Officer appointed under the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950 is
    a 'Court' within the meaning of Section 195 (1) (b) of the Code of Criminal
    Procedure,· 1973. The High Court held that Compensation Officer is not a
    Court and dismissed Criminal Miscellaneous Application No. 4073 of 1986,
E   filed by the appellants, for quashing the proceedings .pending against them
    in the Court of Special Judge (Vigilance), Patna.

           The appellants are facing trial in the Court of Special judge (Vigilance),
    Patna wherein it is alleged that in pursuance of a conspiracy entered into.by
    them, payment ofRs.2 crore by way of compensation was fraudulently obtained
F   by them and thus they have committed offences punishable under Sections
     120B, 420, 467, 458, 471 and 477 of the Indian Penal Code and under Section
    5(2) read with sub-section (l)(c) and (d) of Section 5 of the Prevention of
    Corruption Act, 1947. The appellants raised a preliminary objection before the
    learned Special Judge that the aforesaid offences are alleged to have been
G   committed by the appellants in respect of a document produced in the
    compensation proceedings before the Compensation Officer and as
    Compensation Officer appointed under the Bihar Land Reforms Act is a
    "Court" within the meaning of Section 195(l)(b) the complaint could have
    been filed only by that Compensation Officer and as that has not been done
    in this case, the Special Judge (Vigilance) had no jurisdiction to take cognizance ·.
H   of those offences. The learned Special Judge overruled that objection. The
             K.N. BANERJEE v. STATE OF BIHAR [ G.T. NANAVATI, J.]                  397
     appellants then filed an application under Section 482 of the Code in the Patna       A
     High Court praying that the proceedings before the Special Judge be quashed
     on the ground. that no proper complaint, as required by Section 195( 1)(b) of
,_
     the Code has been filed. Initially, the said application was heard by a Division
     Bench of that Court. It doubted correctness of the decision of an earlier
     Division Bench in Chandra Kishore Jha v. The State of Bihar, (1975) B.B.C.J.          B
     656, wherein it was held that Compensation Officer appointed under the Act
     is a 'Court' as defined by Section 195( 1)(b) of the Code. The said application
     was, therefore, placed before a Full Bench of the High Court. It held that
     Compensation Officer appointed under the Act is not a Court within the
     meaning of Section 19 5(1 )(b) of the Code. The correctness of that decision
     is questioned in this appeal.                                                         C
            Section 195( 1)(b)(ii) of the Code debars Court from taking cognizance
     of any offence described in Section 463, or punishable under Section 471,
     Section 475 or Section 476, of the Code of Criminal Procedure, when offence
     is alleged to have been committed in respect of a document produced or given
     in evidence in a proceeding in any Court, except on a complaint in writing of D
     that Courts, or some other Court to which that Court is subordinate. This bar
     also applies to criminal conspiracy to commit, or attempt to commit, or abetment
     of such offences. Sub-section 3 of that Section provides that the term "Court"
     means a Civil, Revenue or Criminal Court, and includes a tribunal constituted
     by or under a Central, Provincial or State Act, if declared by that act to be E
     a Court for the purposes of that Section. It is now not in dispute that the .
     compensation officer appointed under the Bihar Land Reforms Act, if he is
     a tribunal, has not been declared by that Act to be a Court for the purposes
     ofSection 195(l)(b).

           Therefore, what we have to consider is whether compensation officer             F
     can be said to be a Civil or Revenue Court. For deciding this question it is
     necessary to refer to those provisions of the Act which provide for
     appointment and jurisdiction of a Compensation Officer and consider the
     nature of functions which he has to perform.

           The Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950 has been enacted to provide for the
                                                                                           G
     transference to the state of the interests of proprietors and tenure-holders in
     land and for certain other purposes connected therewith. Section 3 of the Act
     provides that the State government may by notification, declare that the
     estates or tenures of a proprietor or tenure-holder, specified in the notification,
     have passed to and become vested in the State. Section 3-A provides for               H
    398                        SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A    similar declaration with respect to the intennediary interests of all intennediaries.
     As a result of such divestiri;g of their right compensation has to be paid to
     the estate or tenure-holders or the intermediaries, as the case may be, and for
     determination thereof Sectio.n I 9 provides for appointment of a compensation
     officer. It is his legal obligation to prepare a Compensation Assessment Roll
B    containing gross asset and net income of each proprietor or tenure holder of
     the estate or tenure and the amount of compensation to qe paid to him. In
     case of a trust comprising an estate or tenure he has to refer the matter to
     the Collector, who, in his turn, has to submit a report to the State Government
     for passing a final Order thereon and the Compensation officer thereafter has
     to act in accordance with that order. Section 22 defines 'Gross Asset' and in
C    terms thereof the Compensation Officer has to detennine the gross asset of
    the proprietor or the tenure holder. Section 23 provides which amounts are
    to be deducted from the gross asset for purpose of determining the net
     income. After net income has thus been computed the Compensation Officer
     has to determine the amount of compensation in accordance with the table·
    given therein. He has also to compute compensation payable for mines and
D   minerals. After thus preparing a draft Compensation Assessment Roll he has
    to publish it together with a public notice declaring that the amount of
    compensation specified in the draft is the entire amount of compensation
    payable in respect of the interest of the tenure holder or intennediary in that
    estate or tenure or part thereof, as the case may be, and that the person
E   named therein is presumed to be the only person entitled thereto and inviting
    objections, if any, in respect of any entry in that draft assessment roll. Section
    26(1)(b) empowers certain officers of the State .Government to issue such
    directions to the Compensation Officer, before the publication of the draft
    Compensation Assessment-roll, in regard to the computation of compensation
    and matter relating thereto, as they consider fit. The Compensation Officer
F   has to consider the objections that may filed pursuant to the notice issued
    by him and after all such objections is have been disposed of and suitable
    alterations in the draft compensation assessment roll are made he has to
    finally publish the compensation assessment roll. Entries made in the roll so
    finally published are made final and conclusive evidence of the matters
G   referred to in such entries and also in the nature of the interest of an
    intennediary and the apportionment of the compensation among the persons
    claiming interest therein. The Compensation Officer has then to make payment
    of compensation in accordance with the compensation assessment roll. Section
    35 of the Act bars the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in respect of any entry.
    in or omission from a compensation assessment roll or in respect of any order
H   passed by the Compensation Officer under chapters V & VI of the Act or
         K.N. BANERJEE v. ST ATE OF BIHAR [ G.T. NANA YA TI, J.]               399

concerning any matter which is or has already been the subject of any                 A
application made or proceeding taken under the said chapters. Section 40
confers upon the Compensation Officer power to ask for information or
require production of documents relating to any estate or tenure. Rule 15 of
the Bihar Land Reforms Rules, 1963 provides, apart from the form in which
the notices are to be issued and the compensation assessment roll is to be
prepared, that the Compensation Officer must give reasonable opportunity to           B
the proprietors, tenure holders and other persons concerned to be heard and
to place before him evidence before finalising the roll. He has to record a brief
summary of the evidence and also record his finding. Section 42-B gives an
overriding effect to the provisions contained in the Act.
                                                                                      c
          As the Act provides imposition of penalty for non-compliance with the
requisition to give true information or produce a document, it was at one time
contended by Mr. Sanyal that the compensation officer can be said to be a
Criminal Court. But finding that the said contention was not tenable he gave
it up. It was, however, forcefully contended by Mr. Sanyal that compensation
officer appointed under the Act can rightly be held a "Civil Court" or "Revenue D
Court". He submitted that it is the function of the compensation officer under
the Act to determine right title and interest of the tenure holders and
intermediaries and the amount of compensation to be paid to them. These
issues are of a civil nature and they are required to be decided by the
Compensation Officer in the same way as they are required to be decided by E
a Civil Court. He also submitted that for deciding such issue jurisdiction of
the ordinary Civil Courts is taken away and conferred upon the compensation
officer. While holding an enquiry under the Act the compensation officer has
by virtue of Section 38 the same powers as the Civil Court has under the Code
of Civil Procedure for the purposes of summoning and enforcing attendance
of witnesses and for compelling production of documents or relevant F
information. He also drew our attention to Rule 33 which provides for the
notices to be given to the affected parties and the following words in forms
in Nos. N(3) and N(3-A), in which notices have to be given: "In the Court
of the Compensation Officer............ Given under my hand and the seal of the
Courts, this day ...... of 19 ..... " and "In the Court of the Compensation Officer G
...... "respectively.

       The word 'Court' is a word of very wide connotation. In legal parlance
it indicates a place where justice is judicially administered. But for the purposes
of Section 195(1 )(b) of the Code we have to go by the definition of the word
'Court' contained in sub-section 3 of that Section. Under the old Code (1898          H
    400                       SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1999] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A    Code) the tenn 'Court' was defined differently, and it read "In Clauses (b) and
     (c) of sub-section (1) the term 'Court' includes a Civil, Revenue or Criminal
     Court, but does not include a Registrar or Sub-Registrar under the Indian
     Registration Act, 1877." While enacting the new Code Section 195 was redrafted
     as recommended by the law Commission in its 41 st Report. The Commission
B    had felt that for the purposes of clause (b) of sub-section (1 ), the tenn 'Court'
     should mean a Civil Court,.a Revenue Court or a Criminal Court properly so
    called and include a Tribunal created by an Act it is declared by that Act to
     be a Court for the purposes of Section 195. The term '.Court' had a wider
    meaning under the old Code but under the new Code it is given a restricted
    meaning. Now the word 'Court' does not include all the judicial bodies and
C   authorities constituted for administering justice. The Courts contemplated
    now by Section 195 are only Civil Courts, Revenue Courts and Criminal
    Courts and those Tribunals which are required by the Acts constituting them
    to be Courts for the purposes of Section 195.

          As to what Courts and Tribunals, this Court in Canara Bank v. Nucle_ar
D   Power Corporation ofIndia Ltd, [ 1995] Supp 3 SCC 81, after referring to its
    earlier decision in Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd v. Shyam Sunder Jhunjhunwala,
    [1962] 2 SCR 339 and particularly the judgment delivered by Hiadyatullah, J.,
    observed as under:

            "He said that all tribunals were not courts though all courts were
E
            tribunals. The word 'courts' was used to designate those tribunals
            which were set up in an organised State for the administration of
           justice. By administration of justice was meant the exercise of the
           judicial power of the State to maintain and uphold right and to punish
            wrongs. Whenever there was an infringement of a right or an injury,
F           the courts were there to restore the "vinculum juris". When right were
            infringed or invaded, the aggrieved party could go and commence a
            'querela' before the ordinary civil courts. These courts were invested
           with the judicial power of the State and their authority was derived
           from the Constitution or some act of legislature constituting them.
           Their number was ordinarily fixed and they were ~rdinarily permanent
G
           and could try any suit or cause within their jurisdiction. Their numbers
           might be increased or decreased but they were almost always permanent
           and went under the compendious name of "Courts of Civil Judicature.
           xxxxxxxxxxx With the growth of civilisation and the problems of modern
           life, a large number of administrative tribunals had come into existence.
H          These tribunals had the authority of law to pronounce upon valuable
        K.N. BANERJEE v. STATE OF BIHAR [ G.T. NANA VA Tl, J.)                401
        rights. They acted in a judicial manner and even on evidence on oath,         A
        but they were not part of the ordinary courts of civil judicature. They
        shared the exercise of the judicial power of the State but were brought
        into existence to implement some administrative policy or to determine
        controversies arising out of some administrative law. They were very
        similar to courts but were not courts."
                                                                                      B
This Courts has also further observed in this behalf as under:
        "A court in the strict sense was a tribunal which was a part of the
        ordinary hierarchy of courts of civil judicature maintained by the State
        under its Constitution to exercise the judicial power of the State.
        These courts performed all the judicial functions of the State except         C
        those that were excluded by law from their jurisdiction. The word
        'judicial' was itself capable of two meanings. It might refer to the
        discharge of duties exercisable by a judge or by justice in court or to
        administrative duties which need not be performed in court but in
        respect of which it was necessary to bring to bear a judicial mind to         D
        determine what was fair and just in respect of the matters under
        consideration. That an officer was required to decide matters before
        him judicially in the second sense did not make him a court or even
        a tribunal because that only established that he was following a
        standard of conduct and was free from bias or interest. Courts and
        tribunals acted judicially in both senses and in the term 'Courts' were       E
        included the ordinary and permanent tribunals and in the term
        'tribunals' were included all others which were not so included."

       Assuming that the Compensation Officer appointed under the Act can
be said to be a Court, it is not possible to hold that he is a Civil Court. Neither
the Act nor any other legislation expressly provides that the Compensation            F
Officer is a Civil Court. Though he possesses certain powers which a Civil
Court possesses under the Code of Civil Procedure and the proceedings
before him are deemed to be judicial proceedings he does not possess all the
attributes of a Civil Court. Though a proceeding before him is to be considered
as a Judicial proceeding and is of a civil nature, it is of a limited nature. His     G
appointment is under a Special Law and for a specific and limited purpose.
His main function is to determine the amount of compensation. The amount
of compensation is to be determined by finding out the rent and then making
certain additions, subtractions and multiplications as provided in the Act
itself. He cannot determine the questions of title or rights of the rival claimants
except for the purpose qf determining who should be paid compensation. The            H
    402                       SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A party claiming compensation cannot lead evidence as regards the value of his
     interest in the estate or tenure. Nor does a Compensation officer has the
    discretion to decide independently the amount of compensation on the basis
                                                                                         ,.
    of such evidence. We have already pointed out earlier that in the matter of
    preparation of draft assessment roll directions can be given to him by the
    state Government and Officers mentioned in Section 26(ii). He lacks the
B   essential attribute of evidence which a Civil Court possesses Thus , considering
    the nature of his jurisdiction and the extent of powers conferred on him it has
    to be said that he is not a Civil Court. Though not directly on the point the
    decisions of this Court in Baliram v. Justice B. Lentin. AIR (l 988) SC 2267
    supports the view that we are taking. Determination of compensation for
C   divsting a tenure holder or an intermediary of his right in the estate or tenure
    is not a matter pertaining to revenue. For that reason he is not a Revenue
    Court also.

          We are, therefore, of the opinion that the High Court was right in
    holding that Compensation Officer appointed under the Act is not a 'Court'
D   within the meaning of Section l 95( I )(b) of the Code. In the result, this appeal
    is dismissed. The limited interim stay granted by this Court stands vacated.

    P.KS.                                                         Appeal dismissed.




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