Holding

A withdrawal of consent under section 6 of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 operates only prospectively and does not affect investigations already underway, and Parliament was competent to enact the relevant provisions.

Summary

The former Chief Minister of Sikkim challenged a 1987 notification that withdrew the State's consent, given under section 6 of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946, for CBI investigations into alleged corruption. The petition raised whether a State could revoke such consent, whether section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 applied, and what effect the withdrawal would have on investigations already underway. The Court held that section 21 does not permit retrospective revocation; any withdrawal operates only prospectively and does not affect cases already under investigation. It also affirmed Parliament's competence to enact sections 5 and 6 of the Act, interpreting "State" in Entry 80 of List I to include Union Territories per the General Clauses Act. Consequently, the CBI could complete its investigations and file charge‑sheets under section 173 of the CrPC. The writ petition was allowed, declaring the 1987 notification prospective in operation.

Issues considered

Whether a State Government may withdraw consent given under section 6 of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946.
Whether section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 applies to such withdrawal and if it can have retrospective effect.
Effect of withdrawal of consent on investigations already commenced prior to the withdrawal.
Whether Parliament had legislative competence to enact sections 5 and 6 of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 with respect to Union Territories.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 173
Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946s. 5, s. 6
General Clauses Act, 1897s. 21
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947s. 5(1)(d), s. 5(1)(e), s. 5(2)

Subjects

Delhi Special Police Establishment ActGeneral Clauses ActConsent withdrawalCriminal investigationParliamentary competenceState vs Union TerritoryPrevention of Corruption ActSection 173 CrPCArticle 32Writ petitionProspective operationLegislative competence

Judgment

\

KAZI LHENDUP DORJI A
v.
THE CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION AND ORS.

MARCH 29, 1994

[S.C. AGRAWAL, B.P. JEEVAN REDDY AND B
M.K. MUKHERJEE, JJ.]

C1intinal Law--:Prosecution-Delhi Special Police Establislunent Act,
1946-Section 6-Withdrawal of consent given by State Govemment u/s
6-Whether pennissible-Effect on matter pending investigation-Applicability C
of S. 21 of the General Clauses Act-Extent of

General Clauses Act-Section 3(58}-Expression 'State'-Meaning of

Constitution of India-Entry 80 of List I, Schedule Vll-EXpression
'State'-Whether includes 'Union Territory'-Legislative competence of Par- D
liament to enact sections 5 and 6 of Delhi Special Police Establishment Act,
1946.

Words & Phrases : 'State'-Meaning of in the context of s. 3(58) of
General Clauses Act.
E
The Government of Sikkim conveyed the consent of the State
Government under section 6 of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act,
1946, to the members of the Delhi Special Police Establishment in exercis-
ing powers and jurisdiction on the whole of the State of Sikkim for the
investigation of the offences punishable under various provision of the F
Indian Penal Code as well as offences under various other enactments.
Respondent No.4 was the Chief Munister of Sikkim during the period 1979
to 1984. when he ceased to be the Chief Minister, a case was registered by
the Central Bureau of Investigation (C.R.!.) for offences punishable u/s
5(2) r/w s.S(l)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. While the matters
were U!Jder investigation respondent No.4 again became the Chief Minister G
of Sikkim. By a notification dated January 7, 1987, it was notified that all
consents of or on behalf of the State Government for investigation of
offences by C.B.J. under section 6 of the Act, were withdrawn and stood
cancelled with immediate effect. As a consequence of the Notification,
C.B.I. suspended further action in the two cases registered against respon- H
201
I

I

202 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994] 3 S.C.R.

A dent No. 4. The petitioner, a former Chief Minister of Sikkim, filed this
Writ Petition praying for quashing of the Notifiction.

The petitioner contended that there is no provision under the Act
which empowers the State Government to withdraw the consent which has
been accorded. It is urged that even if section 21 of the General Clauses
B Act is held to be applicable so as to permit withdrawal of consent given
u/s 6, such withdrawal of conse.nt cannot be related to an investigation
which has started on the basis of consent granted earlier.

The State of Sikkim has assailed the validity of section 6 of the Act
C on the ground of legislative competence of Parliament to make a law
providing for extension of powers and jurisdiction of members of a police
force belonging to a Union Territory to any area outside the Union Ter-
ritory.

Allowing the petition, this Court
D
HELD : 1.1. Section 21 of the General Clauses Act does not confer
a power to issue an order having retrospective operation. Even if section
21 is held applicable to an order passed under section 6 of the Delhi
Special Police Establishment Act, an order revoking an order giving "'
E consent under section 6 can have only prospective operation and would
not affect matters in which action bas been initiated prior to the issuance
of the order of revocation. It would mean that in the instant case,
investigation which was commenced by C.B.I. prior to withdrawal of
consent under the Notification dated January 7, 1987, had to be
completed and It was not affected by the said withdrawal of consent. The
F
C.B.I. was competent to complete the investigation in the cases registered
by it against respondent No. 4 and other persons and submit the report
under section 173 Cr. P.C in the competent court. [pp. 211E-H; 212-A)

Strawboard Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. Gutta Mill Workers Union,
G [1963] SCR 439, relied on.

1.2. Parliament was competent to enact section 6 as the Act. The
expression "State" in Entry 80 of List I in the Seventh Schedule to the
Constitution includes "Union territory'' in view of the definition of "State"
H contained in section 3(58) of the General Clauses Act, and members of
\

\
KL. DORJJ v. C.B.I. [AGRAWAL.J.] 203

police force belonging to the Union Territory can have their powers and A
jurisdiction extended to another State provided the Government of that
State consents. [p. 210-C-D]

Management of Advance Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Gurndasmal & Ors.,
(1970] 3 SCR 881, relied on.
B
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition (Civil) No. 313
of 1993.

(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.)

K.T.S. Tulsi, Additioal Solicitor General, Ram Jethrnalani, N. San- c
tosh Hedge, Hemant Sharma, P. Parmeswaran, Santosh Hedge, B.N.
Agrawalla, H.L. Bhandari, P.H. Parekh, Vepa P. Sarathy and K. Swami for
the Petitioners.

K. Parasaran, Rakesh K. Sharma, Shivi Sharma, P.R. Tiwari and K. D
Rajendra Chowdhary for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

S.C. AGRAWAL, J. This Writ Petition filed under Article 32 of the
Constitution raises the question whether it is permissible to withdraw the E
consent given by the State Government under section 6 of the Delhi Special
Police Establishment Act, 1946 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act')
whereby a member of the Delhi Special Police Establishment (D.S.P.E.)
was enabled to exercise powers and jurisdiction for the inves\igation of the
specified offences in any area in the State and, if so, what is the effect of F
such withdrawal of consent on matters pending investigation on the basis
of such consent on the date of withdrawal.

2. The Act was enacted to make provision for the constitution of a
special police force in Delhi for the investigation of certain offences in the
Union Territories, for the superintendence and administration of the said G
force and for the extension to other areas of the powers and jurisdiction
of members of the said force in regard to the investigation of the said
·-- offences. D.S.P.E. constituted under the said Act is now known as the
Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI). Sections 5 & 6 of the Act read as
under :- H
204 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994] 3 S.C.R.

A "Section 5

(1) The Central Government may by order extend to any area
(including Railway areas) in a State, not being a Union Territory
the powers and jurisdiction of members of the Delhi Special Police
Establishment for the investigation of any offences or classes of
B offences specified in a notification under section 3.

(2) When by an order under sub-section (1) the powers and
jurisdiction of members of the said police establishment are ex-
tended to any such area, a member thereof may, subject to any •
c orders which the Central Government may make in this behalf,
discharge the functions of a police officer in that area and shall,
while so discharging such functions, be deemed to be a member
of the police force of that area and be vested with the powers,
functions and privileges and be subject to the liabilities of a police
D officer belonging to that police force.

(3) Where any such order under sub-section (1) is made in relation
to an area, then, without prejudice to the provisions of sub-section
(2), any member of the Delhi Special Police Establishment of or
above the rank of Sub-Inspector may, subject to any orders which
E the Central Government may make in this behalf, exercise the
powers of the officer in charge of a police station in that area and
when so exercising such powers, shall be deemed to be an officer
in charge of a police station discharging the functions of such an
officer within the limits of his station."
F
"Section 6. Nothing contained in section 5 shall be deemed to
enable any member of the Delhi Special Police Establishment to
exercise powers and jurisdiction in any area in a State, not being
a Union Territory or rci.ilway area, without the consent of the
Government of that State."
G
3. By his letter dated October 20, 1976, addressed to the Deputy
Secretary to the Government of India, Department of Personnel and
Administrative Reforms, the Chief Secretary to the Government of Sikkim
conveyed the consent of the Government of Sikkim under section 6 of the
·--
H Act to the members of the D.S.P.E. in _exercising powers and jurisdictiop.
K.L. DORJI v. C.B.I. [AGRAWAL. J.] 205

on the whole of the State of Sikkim for the investigation of the offences A
punishable under various provisions of the Indian Penal Code specified
therein as well as offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947.
Similar consent in respect of offences under other enactments was con-
veyed by letter of the Chief Secretary, Government of Sikkim, dated July
10, 1979 and the orders of the Government of Sikkim dated December 24,
1983, June 28, 1984 and December 10, 1984.
B

4. Respondent No. 4 was the Chief Minister of Sikkim during the
period 1979 to 1984. He ceased to be the Chief Minister on May 11, 1984.
On May 26, 1984, a case [RC.5/84-CIU(A)] was registered by the C.B.I.
... for offences punishable under section 5(2) read with section 5(1)( e) of the c
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. The allegations, in brief, were that
Respondent No. 4, while acting as the Chief Minister of the State of Sikkim
and thus being a public servant, had acquired assets disproportionate to
his known sources of income. On August 7, 1984, another case [RC.
8/84-CIU(A)J was registered by C.B.I. for offence punishable under section D
120-B I.P.C. and section 5(2) read with section 5(1)(d) of the Prevention
of Corruption Act, 1947, against respondent No. 4 and others. The allega-
tions, in brief, were that respondent No. 4 and Shri P.K. Pradhan, the then
Secretary Rural Development Department, Government of Sikkim, by
corrupt or illegal means or by otherwise abusing their position as public
servants in conspiracy with other persons caused pecuniary advantage to E
the private parties and the corresponding loss to the Government of Sikkim
and further that these persons entered into a criminal conspiracy with other
private persons and awarded contracts to the tune of Rs. 1,62,31,630 to the
private parties for implementing Rural Water Supply Scheme under the
minimum need programme during 1983-84 on higher rates and had ignored F
the recommendations of the concerned Rural Development Department
officials .on this point. After registering these two cases C.B.I. started
investigation and while the matters were under investigation respondent
No. 4 again became the Chief Minister of Sikkim in March, 1985. By
Notification dated January 7, 1987, when the respondent No. 4 was the
Chief Minister of Sikkim, it was notified that all consents of or on behalf G
of the State Government under letters dated October 20, 1976 and July 10,
1979 and orders dated December 24, 1988, June 28, 1984 and December
10, 1984 for investigation of offences by C.B.I. under section 6 of the Act,
·- are withdrawn and stand cancelled with immediate effect. Inspite of reqests
made by officals of the Government of India, in their letters dated October H
I

206 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994] 3 S.C.R.

A 17, 1988, December 12, 1988 and February 10, 1989 and the Ministers of
Stale in the Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions in
letters dated March 9, 1989 and September 16, 1992, the Government of
Sikkim did not agree to permit investigation by C.B.I. in respect of cases
under the Prevention of Corruption Act and declined to give consent for
such investigation. As a consequence of the Notification dated January 7,
B 1987, C.B.I. suspended further action in the aforementioned two cases
registered against respondent No. 4. The petitioner, who happens to be a
former Chief Minister of Sikkim, has filed this writ petition, by way of
public interest litigation, "'herein he has sought various reliefs including the
...
quashing of the Notification dated January 7, 1987. The petitioner has
c submitted that there is no provision under the Act which empowers the
State Government to withdraw the consent which has been accorded and
that impugned Notification dated January 7, 1987, withdrawing the consent
is in violation of the provisions of the Act.

D 5. In the counter-affidavit of Shri Parag Prakash, Deputy Secretary
to Government of India, Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and
Pensions, filed on behalf of respondent No. 2, Union of India, it has been
stated that after due investigation in case No. RC.5/84-CIU(A) the C.B.l.
had eome to the conclusion that respondent No. 4 had acquired assets
worth Rs. 16,49,434 which were disproportionate to his known sources of
E income and that a prima facie case for offences punishable under sections
5(2) read with section 5(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act was
made out against him and that similarly after investigation of case No. RC.
8/84-CIU (A) the C.B.l. had come to the conclusion that a prima facie case
for the offences punishable under Section 120-B l.P.C. and section 5(2)
F read with section 5(i)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act was made
out against respondent No. 4 and Shri P.K. Pradhan, the then Secretary
Rural Development Department, Government of Sikkim, and fifteen others
for having caused pecuniary advantage to the private parties to the tune of
Rs. 3,07,230. It has been further stated in the said affidavit that before the
C.B.I. eould file charge-sheet as provided under section 173 Cr. P.C. in
G either of the aforesaid two cases in the court of law, the State of Sikkim,
'by its Notification dated January 7, 1987, withdrew the consent earlier
accorded by it to the members of the Special Police Establishment for
investigation of offences in the Staie of Sikkim as provided nuder section
6 o(the Act and that inspite of various communications sent by Govern-
H ment of India to the Government of Sikkim requesting for restoration of·
\
K.L. DORJI v. C.B.l. [AGRAWAL, I.] 207

; ' the consent under section 6 of the Act, the State Government had declined A
to give consent as requested. It has been further stated in the said affidavit
that the withdrawal of the consent by the State Government through
Notification dated January 7, 1987, has caused grave injustice to the
investigation of the aforesaid two cases registered by C.B.I. bcause for want
of said consent the reports under section 173 Cr. P.C. could not be filed
in the court of law. It has also been stated that the law, once set in motion B
by registering criminal cases, ought not be permitted to be stalled and the
case must be allowed to reach its logical conclusion and that criminal
justice requires that the investigating agency should be allowed to bring the
.• result of investingation to the court of law by filing reports under section
173 Cr.P.C. as required under law, notwithstanding the withdrawal of C
consent during pendency of investigation. It is also stated in the said
. affidavit that Notification dated January 7, 1987, through which the consent
was withdrawn, is prejudicial to the fair and free investigation by C.B.I. and
thus illegal and not tenable under the law and further that there is no
provision in law for withdrawal of consent once accorded and that, in any D
case, in respect of cases already taken up for investigation or trial on the
basis of a valid consent legally accorded by the State Government, there is
no scope of withdrawing it in between and that Notification dated January
7, 1987, deserves to be quashed in totality and certainly in respect of the
cases already taken up for investigation by C.B.I.
E
6. A counter-affidavit has been filed by Shri K.A. Varadan, Chief
Secretary, State of Sikkim, on behalf of respondent No. 3, the State of
Sikkim, but the said affidavit is confined to the question whether a meeting
of the Cabinet was held on May 19, 1984 wherin, as asserted in the writ
petition by the petitioner, it was decided that since respondent No. 4 had F
acquired assets by illegal means the Central Government be requested to
require C.B.I. to institute complaints/file case against respondent No. 4. In
• the said affidavit no reference has been made to the order dated January
7, 1987, whereby the consent granted under section 6 of the Act was
withdrawn as well as the legality of the said action.
G
7. Respondent No. 4 has also filed a counter affidavit wherein he has
alleged that the writ petition was Politically motivated and further that the
registration of cases by C.B.I. against him was vitiated by ma/aft.des and is
part of a campaign of character assassination against him. In his counter
affidavit respondent No. 4 has disputed that a meeting of the Cabinet was H
208 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994J 3 S.C.R.

A held on May 19, 1984, or a decision was taken empowering C.B.I. to
investigate the allegati:Jns of corruption against respondent No. 4 and that
the sanction to investigate offences by C.B.I. under section 6 of the Act
was illegally granted which had been properly withdrawn. Along\\,th the
said counter affidavit respondent No. 4 has placed on record (as Anncxure
VI) the notings in the file containing the opinions of the then Advocate
B General as well as the Chairman of the Slate Law Commission expressing
the view that the consent given udner section 6 could be rescinded under
section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897.
-~'

8. Section 21 of the General Clauses Act., 1897 is in following terms:-
c
"Section 21 : Power to issue, to include power to add to, amend,
vary or rescind, notifications, orders, rules or bye-laws. Where, by
any Central Act or Regulation, a power to issue notification,
orders, rules, or bye-laws is conferred, then that power includes a
power, exercisable in the like manner and subject to the like
D
sanction and conditions if any to add to, amend, vary or rescind
any notifications, orders, rule or bye- laws so issued. 11

9. Shri Ram Jethmalani, the learned senior counsel appearing for the
petitioner, has urged that section 21 of the General Clauses Act has no
E application to a consent given under section 6 of the Act inasmuch as
section 2l of the General Clauses Act postulates conferment of the power
to issue notifications, orders, rules, or bye-laws by any Central Act or
Regulation and that section 6 of the Act does not confer a power to issue
a notification or order and that the consent given under section 6 cannot
be regarded ·as a notification or order. In this context, Shri Jethmalani has
contrasted the provisions of section 6 with section 3 of the Act which l
prescribes that the "the Central Government may, which prescribes that the
"the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette,
specify the offences or classes of offences which are to be investigated by
the Delhi Special Police Establishment." Shri J ethmalani has pointed out
G that the original consent dated October 20, 1976, was contained in the
letter of the Chief Secretry and was not in the form of a notification and
so also was the consent contained in the letter dated July 10, 1979. Shri

H
Jethmalani has also contended that even if section 21 of the General
Clauses Act is held to be applicable so as to permit witdrawal of consent
given under section 6, such withdrawal of consent cannot be related to an
·-
\
'

KL.DORJI v. C.B.l.[AGRAWAL,J.] 209

investigation which has started on the basis of consent granted earlier and A
that once the investigation has started Chapter XII of Cr. P.C. comes into
play and the statutory powers vested in the C.B.I. under the provisions of
the Code has to be exercLsed and the exercise of said powers is not affected
by a subsequent withdrawal of the consent. Shri Jethmalani has further
contended that since the impugned Notification for withdrawal of the
consent was one in which respondent No. 4 had a vital interest, the decision
B
for such withdrawal should have been taken by the Governor in exercise
of his personal discretion and not on the advice of the Council of Minister
and that in the present case the impugned Notification was issued on the
basis of advice of the Council of Ministers headed by respondent No. 4,
who was the Chief Minister at that ime. c
10. The learned Additional Solicitor General, appearing for respon-
dents Nos. 1 and 2, has also assailed the validity of the impugned Notifica-
tion and has urged that no action of any authority can be permitted to
impede the course of criminal justice and that but for the impugned
Notification withdrawing the consent the C.B.I. would have discharged its D
statutory obligations in the matter of investigation and prosecution of the
accused persons.

11. Shri Hegde, the learned senior counsel appearing for the State
of Sikkim, has assailed the validity of section 6 of the Act on the ground E
that D.S.P.E. is a police force of the Union territory and Parliament does
not have the legislative competence to make a law providing for extension
of powers and jurisdiction of members of a police force beloging to a
Union Territory to any area outside the Union Territory.

12. Shri Parasaran, the learned senior counsel appearing for respon- F
dent No. 4, has submitted that the writ petition is an abuse of the process
of the court inasmuch as ·it is politically motivated and, in this context, he
has invited our attention to the order passed by this Court on May 5, 1993,
wherein it has been stated :

"Sri Jain strongly urged that the petitioner who was instrumental G
in the admission of Sikkim as a State in the Indian Union, is greatly
exercised and troubled over the inaction of the C.B.J. in investigat-
ing into certain charges against respondent No. 4. It would appear
that in 1987 there was a purorted revocation of the sanction. If the
reyocation is valid, we are afraid, reagitation of the matter at this H
210 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994] 3 S.C.R.

A distance of time by the petitioner would not be proper and would
earn the criticism of amounting to an abuse of the process. But,
Sri Jain would say that there is no power of revocation and the
C.B.I. must proceed on the assumption that none exist."

Shri Parasaran has also urged that there is inordinate delay in filing of the
B writ petition inasmuch as the F.I.R. was registered as far back as in 1984
and the Notification withdrawing the consent was issued in 1987 but the
writ petition was filed in 1993, nearly six years after the passing of the
impugned Notification.

c 13. The contention urged by Shri Hegde about the legislative com-
petence of Parliament to enact sections 5 and 6 of the Act stands con-
cluded by the decision of the Constitution Bench of this Court in
Management of Adva11ce Insura11ce Co. Ltd. v. Shri Gurudasmal & Ors.,
[1970] 3 SCR 881, wherein the expression "State" in Entry 80 of List I in
the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution bcludes "Union, territory" in view
D
of the definition of "State" contained in section 3(58) of the General
Clauses Act and members of police force helonging to the Union Territory
can have their powers and jurisdiction extended to another State provided
the Government of that State consents.

E 14. The submission of Shri Parasaran that the filing of the writ
petition amounts to abuse of the process of court also does not merit
acceptance. The counter affidavit filed on behalf of respondent No. 2,
Union of India, shows that after due investigation of both the cases it has
been found that prima facie case for offences under section 5(2) read with
f section 5(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 and offences
udner section 120-B read with section 5(2) and section 5(1)(d) is made out
and that if the impugned Notification had not been issued the charge-sheet
under section 173 Cr. P.C. would have been filed by C.B.I. In these
circumstances, merely because the petitioner happens to be a political rival
of respondent No. 4 it cannot be said that filing of this writ petition
G amounts to abuse of process of the court. The order of this Court dated
May 5, 1993, only means that if the revocation is found to be valid re-
agitation of the matter at this distance of time by the petitioner would not
be proper and would earn the criticism of amounting to an abuse of the
process. By the same order the Court after noticing the contention of Shri
-
H R.K. Jain that there was no power of revocation and that C.B.I. must
\
K.L. DORJI v. C.B.l. [AGRAWAL,J.] 211

proceed on the assumption that none exists, decided to issue notice to A
C.B.I. in the first instance and on October 1, 1993 after examining the
affidavit filed by Shri Ram Dea Pandey, Superintendent of Police, C.B.I.,
directed that notice be issued to other respondents. The order of this Court
dated May 5, 1993, therefore, does not lend support to the contention that
the filing of the writ petition amounts to abuse of the process.
B
15. As regards delay in filing of writ petition wc find that after the
issuance of the impugned Notification in 1987, efforts were made by the
Central Government during the period from 1988 to 1992 to persuade the
Government of S.ikkim to accord the necessary consent and when the said
attempts failed, the petitioner moved this Court in 1993. Having regard to C
the seriousness of the allegations of corruption that have been made against
a person holding the high public office of Chief Minister in the State which
have cast a cloud on his integrity, it is of utmost importance that the truth
of these allegations is judicially determined. Such a course would subserve
public interest and public morality because the Chief Minister of a State D
should not function under a cloud. It would. also be in the interest of
respondent No. 4 to have his honour vindicated by establishing that the
allegations are not true. The cause of justice would, therefore, be better
served by permitted the petitioner to agitate the issued raised by him in
the writ petition than by non-suiting him on the ground of !aches.
E
16. Coming to the contention urged by Shri Jethmalani on merits it
may be mentioned that Section 21 of the General Clauses Act does not
confer a power to issue an order having retrospective operation. [See :
Strawborad Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. Gutta Mill Workers' Union, (1963]
SCR 489, pages 447-448. Therefore. even if we proceed on the basis that F
section 21 of the General Clauses Act is applicable to an order passed
under section 6 of the Act, an order revoking an order giving consent under
section 6 of the Act can have only prospective operation and would not
affect inattcrs in \\'hich action has bt.!en initiated prior to the issuance of
the order of revocation. The in1pugned Notification dated January 7, 1987,
has to be construed in this light. If thus construed it would mean that G
investigation which was coml11enced by C.B.I. prior to withdrawal of con-
sent under the impugned Notification dated January 7, 1987, had to be
completed and it was not affected by the said withdrawal of consent. In
other words, the C.B.l. was competent to complete the investigation in the
cases registered by it against respondent No. 4 and other persons and H
212 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994] 3 S.C.R.

A submit the report under section 173 Cr. P.C. in the competent court. On
that view of the matter, it not necessary to go into the question whether
the provisions of section 21 of the General Clauses Act can be invoked in
relation to consent given under section 6 of the Act.

17. The writ petition is, therefore, allowed and it is declared that the
B Notification dated January 7, 1987, withdrawing the consent given by the
Government of Sikkim under letters dated October 20, 1976, and July 10,
1979 and orders dated December 24, 1983, June 28, 1984, and December
10, 1984, under section 6 of the Act, operates only prospectively and the
said withdrawal would not apply to cases which were pending investigation
C on the date of issuance of the said Notification. The Notification dated
January 7, 1987, does not preclude the C.B.I. from submitting the report
'
in the competent court under section 173 Cr. P.C. on the basis of the
investigation conducted by it in RC.5/84-CIU(A) and RC.8/84-CIU(A).

No order as to costs.
D
AG. Petition allowed.

-·