Holding

The Sikh Gurdwaras Act must be read purposively and in conformity with constitutional principles, so that the Judicial Commission is constituted ‘from time to time’ with a non‑perpetual tenure, and the State Government, not the Central Government, retains the power to appoint and remove its members, rendering the challenged notifications valid.

Summary

The case concerned the tenure of members of the Sikh Judicial Commission under the Sikh Gurdwaras Act, 1925, and the validity of several notifications issued by the Punjab Government and the Central Government. The appellant, Kashmir Singh, challenged the removal of commission members and the re‑constitution notifications, arguing that the commission members held office in perpetuity and that the State lacked authority to appoint or dissolve them. The Supreme Court examined the statutory language, especially the phrase “from time to time,” and held that the commission must be constituted periodically, not for life, and that the State Government retains the power to appoint and remove members consistent with Articles 16 and 310 of the Constitution. The Court also ruled that the Central Government’s 1978 notification did not delegate power and that the challenged notifications were valid. Consequently, the appellant could not set aside the notifications nor act as both approver and reprobate. The appeal was dismissed.

Issues considered

Whether the Central Government, under Section 72 of the Punjab Reorganisation Act, 1966, could issue a notification substituting "State Government" with "Government of Punjab" in the Sikh Gurdwaras Act.
Whether the notifications dated 19 October 1978 and 12 January 1999 are invalid and can be challenged by the appointees.
Which authority – the Central Government or the State Government – has jurisdiction to exercise powers under the Sikh Gurdwaras Act, particularly concerning the Judicial Commission.
Whether the tenure of a member of the Sikh Judicial Commission is fixed, co‑terminous with the Board, or is perpetual.
Whether the notification of 12 January 1999 is liable to be set aside on the ground of mala‑fide action.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. 16, s. 172, s. 245, s. 246, s. 310, s. 73
General Clauses Act
Punjab Reorganisation Act, 1966s. 72, s. 88, s. 89, s. 91, s. 96
Sikh Gurdwaras Act, 1925s. 40, s. 70, s. 71, s. 79, s. 83
State Reorganisation Act, 1956

Subjects

Sikh Gurdwaras ActJudicial Commissiontenureperpetuitystatutory interpretationconstitutional lawArticle 16Article 310delegation of powersPunjab Reorganisation Act

Judgment

[2008] 8 S.C.R. 464

I •
A KASHMIR SINGH
v.
UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 7024 Of 2002)

MAY 13, 2008
B
[S.S. SINHA AND V. S. SIRPURKAR, JJ.]

Sikh Gurudwaras Act, 1925:

Purpose of enactment - Held: To provide for the better
c administration of Sikh Gurdwaras and for inquiries into mat-
ters connected therewith - State Reorganisation Act, 1956 -
Punjab Reorganisation Act, 1966.
ss. 40, 70 and 83 - Tenure of member of Commission -
Held: A member of commission cannot claim appointment in
D
perpetuity - s.40 provides for constitution of Judicial Com-
mission from time to time - Even in terms of s. 70, members
are to be appointed from time to time - It is not correct to say
that tenure is for whole life of member as it would be violative
of Article 16 of Constitution - Also, for giving meaningful con-
E struction to provisions, Court is bound to take into consider-
ation situational change - In view of this, meaning which could
be attributed in the year 1925 cannot be given the same mean-
ing today - The Act is an ongoing one - Thus must be inter-
preted differently as the Court cannot ignore the ground reali-
F ties - The doctrine of 'independence of judiciary' has no ap- '
plication - Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 16
Constitution of India, 1950: Articles 16, 310- Held: Does
not envisage holding of any office in perpetuity-Article 310 of
the Constitution of India provides for a tenure - It does not con-
G
template a life tenure -Article 16 of Constitution speaks of grant
of equal opportunity to all - Allowing a person to hold public •
office indefinitely would be opposed to the constitutional scheme,
irrespective of any misconduct or other contingencies.
464 .t
H
KASHMIR SINGH v. UNION OF INDIA 465
& ORS.

Interpretation of statutes : A
Statute must be read in its entirety- It must then be read
part by part, chapter by chapter, section by section and then
clause by clause.
Violation of constitutional provisions - In construing a. B
statute, an interpretation which would lead to violation of the
constitutional provisions; cannot be taken recourse to.
Societal changes - While construing an ongoing statute
superior court must take into consideration the changes in the
societal condition. C
Purposive construction - If the statute has to be read
keeping in view the constitutional schemes and make it work-
able, the provisions thereof are required to be given a purpo-
sive construction - For the said purpose, even the past prac-
0
tice as also the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act
can be looked into.
Approbate and reprobate - Appellant questioned valid-
ity of Notification dated 6th January, 1999 on the premise that
Chief Minister of the State had acted ma/a fide - Appellant
again appointed as Chairman of the Commission by a Noti-
fication dated 17th March, 2605 - Notification used the words
"Reconstitution of the Commission" - He, therefore, is a func-
tionary thereof - Thus, he cannot be permitted to approbate
) and reprobate.
Punjab Reorganisation Act, 1966: Central Government
issued notification dated 19. 10. 1978 nominating State of
Punjab for exercising its power under 1966 Act - Held: By rea-
son of notification dated 19. 10. 1978, Central Government has
not delegated its power - The 1966 Act has an extra-territorial
application - No law has been enacted either by State of
Haryana or by State of Himachal Pradesh - In absence of
any law having been enacted to contrary, functions under 1966
Act must be performed by some authority -Central Govern-
ment with consent of State of Haryana has merely nominated
466 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 8 S.C.R.

I •
A State of Punjab to do so - When power has been conferred
upon State of Punjab by the Central Government, it exercises
a statutory power- It would, therefore, not case where the func-
tions of State Government must be held to be confined to its
territorial jurisdiction - Articles 245 or 246 or for that matter,
B Articles 73 and 172 of Constitution will have no application -
The ground of excessive delegation of power, thus, does not
arise - Administrative law - Delegation of powers - Constitu-
. tion of India, 1950 - Articles 73 and 172.
•
The Sikh Gurudwaras Act, 1925 was applicable to the
C entire territories of the undivided State of Punjab includ-
ing PEPSU. By reason of the provisions of the State
Reorganisation Act, 1956, the State of Himachal Pradesh
was constituted, having been carved out from the State
of Punjab. Another Parliamentary Act, being Punjab
D Reorganisation Act, 1966 was enacted in terms whereof
the State of Punjab was divided into the State of Punjab,
the State of Haryana and the Union Territory of
Chandigarh. The Central Government admittedly is the
appropriate authority for passing requisite orders in rela-
E tion to the matters involving inter-State Boards as envis-
aged under s.88 of the 1966 Act. It issued a notification
dated 19.10.1978 nominating the State of Punjab for the
purpose of exercising its power under the 1966 Act.
In terms of the provisions of the Sikh Gurudwaras
F Act, 1925, the SGPC(Board} was constituted. Appellant
was appointed as a member of the Commission in terms
of a Notification dated 4.7.89. He was elected the Presi-
dent thereof. A new Board was constituted on 21.11.1996.
While the Commission was functioning with the said mem-
G be rs, the State of Punjab issued a notification on 6.01.1999
whereby and whereunder all the members including the
appellant were removed and in their place new members
were appointed.
A writ petition was filed thereagainst in January, 1999.
H
KASHMIR SINGH v. UNION OF INDIA 467
& ORS.
•· I
During pendency of the said writ petition, the State of A
Punjab issued two more notifications on or about
12.01.1999. By reason of the first notification issued un-
der ss. 70 and 71 of the Act, the notification dated 6.01.1999
was rescinded and by reason of the second notification,
the Commission was reconstituted. The writ petition was B
amended questioning also the validity of the aforemen-
tioned two notifications dated 12.01.1999.
The Division Bench of High Courtreferred the mat-
ter to a Five Judge Bench. On. 13.9.2002, the judgment
was delivered. The Three Judges were of the opinion that C
the tenure of the members of the Commission is co-ter-
minus with the term of the Board; and that the Govern-
ment of Punjab had the power to issue directions in re-
gard to the constitution of the Commission. One of the
Judges opined that having regard to the decision of the D
Full Bench of the High Court in *Shiror:ani Gurdwaras
Parbandhak Committee, the members of the Commission
could not be removed. The Chief Justice of the High
Court, however, was of the opinion that in view of the ter-
minologies used in the relevant provisions of the Act and E
as no fixed period for holding the office has been pro-
vided therein, the Commission can be directed to be
wound up only when no case remains pending before it.
The judgment dated 13.9.2002 is impugned before
this Court. During pendency of the writ petition, members F
were appointed on 8.07.2002 whereagainst the Board filed
writ petition which was allowed by an order dated
14.08.2003. Civil Appeal Nos. 8169-8172 of2003 and 3162-
3165 of 2004 are directed against the said order dated
14.08.2003. G
Dismissing CA No. 7024/2002, 8171-72/2003 and Al-
lowing CA No. 3545/2008, 5546/2003, 8169-8170/2003 and
3162-3165/2004; the Court
HELD: 1.1. The Sikh Gurdwaras Act, 1925 was enacted H
---~---------

468 SUPREME cou"RT REPORTS [2008] 8 S.C.R.

A to provide for the better administration of certain Sikh \-.
Gurdwaras and for inquiries into matters connected there-
with. It is a complete Code. The Act provides for not only
the constitution of a Tribunal but also for the constitution of
a Commission. Both the Tribunal as also the Commission
B play significant and important roles under the Acl They deal
with a large number of disputes. [Para 27] [489, B-C]
*Shiromani Gurdwaras Parbandhak Committee, Amritsar •
and Anr. v. Lachhman Singh Gill and others AIR (1970) P & H
40 referred to.
c
1.2. The holders of the office both of the Tribunal as
also the Commission function under a statute. The Com-
mission/ Tribunal is· to be constituted from time to time.
Whereas sub-section (5) of s.12 empowers the Local Gov-
D ernment to remove any member of the Tribunal on the
grounds enumerated therein, s. 83 of the Act does not deal
with such a situation. [Para 28] [489, D-E]
•
2.1. A statute, as is well known, must be read in its
entirety. It must then be read part by part, chapter by chap-
E ter, section by section and then clause by clause. Be it
the constitution of the Tribunal or the Commission, it is
required to be done 'from time to time'. S.40 provides for
constitution of a Judicial Commission from time to time.
Undoubtedly, the same is required to be done in the man-
F ner provided for therein but that would not take away the
power of the Government as regards constitution of the '
Judicial Commission 'from time to time'. [Para 30-31]
[489,G-H; 490,A]
2.2. The fact that each Board must submit a list within
G 90 days from its constitution is itself indicative of the fact
that the same is imperative in nature. The Government
upon receipt of the said list must perform its functions.
Undoubtedly, the Commission exercises a judicial func-
tion but the same would not mean that in the name of in-
H dependence in its functioning, the members will continue
KASHMIR SINGH v. UNION OF INDIA 469
& ORS .
• j

to hold office in perpetuity. [Paras 35,36) [490, E-F] A
2.3. It is, one of the functions of the Board to submit
a list of the names of seven persons to the Local Govern-
ment. Two of the members of the Commission are to be
selected by the Local Government out of the list of quali-
fied persons prepared and maintained in terms thereof. If 8
the Board fails to perform its duties in preparing a select
list enlisting therein the names of seven persons who are
qualified to become a member of the Commission; a' for-
tiori it would be the duty of the State Government to se-
lect the names of two of them for appointment as mem- C
bers of the Commission only out of the said list. The said
provisions, clearly indicate the tenure of the Commission.
The dichotomy is created in view of the words "time to
time" and the limited power of the State to dissolve the
Commission. The power of dissolution is a separate D
power. It is a substantive power. Removal of the mem-
bers of a body corporate is also a substantive power. It is
one thing to say that on happening of certain contingen-
cies, which may include misconduct on the part of the
member of a body corporate, the power of removal can E
be resorted to or the power of dissolution of the entire
body can be taken recourse to, but then the same by it-
self would not lead to a conclusion that in the event the
said contingencies cannot be complied with, in a given
situation, the Chairman and members shall continue to F
hold the office in perpetuity. [Paras 38- 40] [491, A-F]
3.1. The Act is a pre-Constitutional Act. Upon com-
ing into force of the Constitution of India, it must be read
in the light of the constitutional scheme and its provisions.
In construing a statute, an interpretation which would lead G
to violation of the constitutional provisions, cannot be
taken recourse to. [Para 41] [491, F-G]
3.2:Article 310 of the Constitution of India provides
for a tenure. It does not contemplate a life tenure. It does H
470 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 8 S.C.R.

A not contemplate a permanent term. Article 16 of the Con-
\. .
stitution of India which is a species of the equality clauses
contained in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of In-
dia, speaks of grant of equal opportunity to all. Allowing
a person to hold public office indefinitely would be op-
B posed to the constitutional scheme, irrespective of any
misconduct or other contingencies. Constitution of India
does not envisage holding of any office in perpetuity.
[Para 44] [492, B-C]
4. This Court is not unmindful of the opinion of the
C Chief Justice of the High Court that the term shall come
to an end when no dispute would remain pending before
the Commission. [Para 45] [492, D]
5.1. If the contention of appellant is to be accepted
that having regard to the doctrine of independence of ju-
0
diciary, the State Government will have no role to play in
the matter of constitution of the Board, the Government
will never be in a position to dissolve the Commission
unless case is made out under one or the other provi-
sions of the Act. The doctrine of 'independence of judi-
E ciary' has nothing to do when the tenure is fixed by a stat-
ute. Even in relation to selection of the members of the
Board, the State has a limited role to play. With a view to
construe the said provision the past practice may also be
held to be relevant. The High Court has taken notice of the
F past practice in this behalf in great details showing as to
how the reconstitution of the Commission had taken place
from time to time, almost at regular intervals. A chart was
filed by the appellant which clearly show that constitution
and reconstitution of the Board had taken place from time
G to time. The very fact that it has been working continuously
and the members of the Board have been constituted at in-
tervals is also a pointer to show that the members had not
been holding office at their will, far less in perpetuity. The
same persons have been nominated more than once, even
H successively. [Paras 49-51] [493, C-G; 494, B]
KASHMIR SINGH v. UNION OF INDIA 471
& ORS.

5.2. In a case of this nature, literal interpretation is A
not possible. If the statute has to be read keeping in view
the constitutional schemes and make it workable, the pro-
visions thereof are required to be given a purposive con~
struction. For the said purpose, even the past practice as
also the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act can B
be looked into. [Para 52] [494, C-D]
New India Assurance Company Ltd. v. Nusli Neville
Wadia and Anr JT 2008 (1) SC 31; Pannalal Binjraj v. Union
of India AIR 1957 SC 397; The Quarry Owners Association v.
The State of Bihar & Ors., (2000) 8 SCC 655; Gurudevdatta C
VKSSS Maryadit & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., (2001)
4 sec 534; K. TM. S. Mohd. and another v. Union of India
Amanullah Quareshi v. Union of India, (1992) 3 SCC 178;
Gopal Narain v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr (1964) 4 SCR
869; Bhatnagars and Co. Ltd. v. The Union of India, (1957) 1 D
SCR 701; Sri Nasiruddin v. State Transport Appellate Tribu-
nal (1975) 2 sec 671 - relied on.
6. It may be true that the Court shall not interfere with
the judicial authority. It should be allowed to function in- E
dependently and impartially, but at the same time it can-
not be allowed to continue in perpetuity. A balance, thus,
must be struck. Whereas, on the one hand, the discre-
tionary jurisdiction of the State would not lightly be as-
sumed having regard to the nature of the office held by
the appellant, it cannot also be held that no tenure is fixed
therefor at all. [Paras 56, 57] [49,E-F]
7.1. A holistic reading of the statutes should be re-
sorted to, to find out as to what meaning should be as-
signed to the words "from time to time". The perpetuity in
office is neither contemplated under Act nor the constitu-
tional scheme permits the same. It may be true that
Clause (iv) of S.79 of the Act has been declared ultra vires
by the High Court in the case of *Shiromani Gurdwaras
Parbandhak Committee, but the same by itself, is not suf-
472 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 8 S.C.R.

A ficient to hold that save and except for the power of the State
\ .
Government under s.83 of the Act for dissolution of the Com-
mission, it would continue to function till any case is pend-
ing. The said interpretation would not only lead to an anoma-
lous situation, but also frustrate the constitutional scheme.
s For the aforementioned purpose, two salient principles, i.e.,
the 'power to appoint' carries with it the 'power to remove'
under the General Clauses Act. If the Commission is to be
constituted from time to tin;ie, it must be held that to effectu-
ate this power it would be reasonable to conclude that such
c power can be exercised as and when a necessity arises
therefor. [Paras 54,55, 59] [495, G-H; 496, A; 495, C-D]
7.2. For the purpose of giving an effective and mean-
ingful construction of the provisions, the court is bound
to take into consideration the situational change. The
D statute is an ongoing one. The number of litigations in
the year 1925 might have been small. Occasional forma-
tion of the Commission might be contemplated keeping
in view the number of litigations at that point of time. The
Act, however, must be interpreted differently as the court
E cannot ignore the ground realities. If it is to be held that
in terms of S. 83 of the Act, the State Government has the
power to dissolve the Commission only in terms thereof,
for all intent and purport, the Commission shall continue
till a member dies or resigns. [Para 60] [496, B-D]
F Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by LRs. v. Union of India (UOI)
and Anr. 2008 (6) SCALE 325 - relied on.
7.3. On the appellant's own showing, the Commis-
sion is not an occasional body. It has continued to func-
G tion for a long time. If that be so, the object and purpose
for which the statute contemplated constitution of such
occasional body has lost its purpose. Apart from s.40 of
the Act, even in terms of s.70 of the Act, the members are
to be appointed from time to time. If the tenure is for the
whole life of the member, there cannot be any fresh ap-
H
KASHMIR SINGH v. UNION OF INDIA 473
& ORS .
• i
pointment. If there cannot be any fresh appointment, the A
same would be clearly violative of Article 16 of the Consti-
tution. [Para 61] [496, E-F]
Sri Nasiruddin v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal
(1975) 2 SCC 671 and M.P Vidyut Karamchari Sangh v. M.P
Electricity Board (2004) 9 SCC 755 - relied on. B
7.4. In view of the situational change, a meaning
which could be attributed in the year 1925 cannot be given
the same meaning today. For the aforementioned purpose,
ss.40 and 70 of the Act must be read together. Therefor a c
holistic reading of the entire Act would be necessary. So
read, the opinion of the majority appeals. By reason of
such an interpretation, the apprehension that the State
would be endowed with the arbitrary power is wiped off.
The term 'from time to time' should be given an effective
0
and purposeful meaning. If any other meaning is assigned,
sub-section (3) of s.70 and sub-section (1) of s.72 would
be rendered otiose. [Paras 64, 65] [497, H; 498, A-B]
8. There is another aspect of the matter which can-
not be lost sight of. Appellant has questioned the validity E
of the Notification dated 6th January, 1999 on the premise
that the Chief Minister of the State had acted ma/a fide.
The Full Bench noticed that factual foundation had not
been laid therefor. For all intent and purport, the said point
was given up. Furthermore, the appellant has again been F
appointed as a Chairman of the Commission by a Notifi-
cation dated 17th March, 2005. The Notification used the
words "Reconstitution of the Commission". He, there-
fore, is a functionary thereof. He cannot be permitted to
approbate and reprobate. [Para 66] [498 C-E]
G
9.1. By reason of the notification dated 19.10.1978,
the Central Government has not delegated its power. The
1966 Act has an extra-territorial application. It is not in dis-
pute that no law has been enacted either by the State of
Haryana or by the State of Himachal Pradesh. In absence H
474 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 8 S.C.R.

A of any law having been enacted to the contrary, the func-
tions under the 1966 Act must be performed by some au-
thority. The Central Government with the consent of the
State of Haryana has merely nominated the State of Punjab
to do so. By reason thereof, it has not delegated any power.
B Sub-section (1) of s.72 of the 1966 Act envisages a direc-
tion upon the Central Government. Such a direction has
been issued by reason of the impugned notification. When
a power has been conferred upon the State of Punjab by
the Central Government, it exercises a statutory power. It
C would, therefore, not a case where the functions of the State
Government must be held to be confined to its territorial
jurisdiction. Articles 245 or 246 or for that matter, Articles
73 and 172 of the Constitution of India will have no appli-
cation. [Paras 67 and 68] [498, F-H; 499,A]
D 9.2. Even such questions have not been raised be-
fore the High Court. In issuing the notification, the Cen-
tral Government was merely exercising its statutory func-
tions. It has not exercised a power of delegation. The
ground of excessive delegation of power, thus, does not
E arise. Some authority is required to function. If an au-
thority has been nominated, all other questions become
academic. [Para 69] [499, B-C]
CIVILAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 7024
of 2002
F
From the final Judgment and Order dated 13.9.2002 of
the High Court Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in Civil Writ
Petition No. 371 of 1999
WITH
G
C.A. Nos. 3545 of 2008. 5546, 8171-8172 & 8169-8170
of 2003 3162-3165 of 2004
P.S. Parwalia, G.S. Vaidyanathan and Jaspal Singh. Aman
Preet Rahi, Tania Walia, Devesh Tripathi. Manoj Swarup, Ajay
H Pal, Nikhil Jain, Gagandeep Sharma. Kamaldeep Narang and
KASHMIR SINGH v. UNION OF !NOIA 475
& ORS. [S.B. SINHA, J)

Satinder Singh for the Appellant. A
Kiran Bhardwai, D.S. Mahra (for B.V. Balaram Das),
Naresh Bakshi, C.K. Sasi, Rana Ranjit Singh and Dr. Kailash
Chand for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was deliverd by B
S.B. SINHA, J : Leave granted.
1. Whether rule of perpetuity would be applicable in re-
spect of a member of a Sikh Judicial Commission (for short
"Commission") constituted under the Sikh Gurdwaras Act, 1925 c
(for short "the Act") is in question in this appeal which arises out
of a judgment and order dated 13.09.2002 passed by a Five-
Judge Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Civil
Writ Petition No. 371 of 1999.

2. The Act was applicable to the entire territories of the D
undivided State of Punjab including PEPSU. By reason of the
provisions of the State Reorganisation Act, 1956, the State of
Himachal Pradesh was constituted, having been carved out from
the State of Punjab.
3. Another Parliamentary Act, being Punjab Reorganisation E
Act, 1966 (for short "the 1966 Act") was enacted in terms whereof
the State of Punjab was divided into the State of Punjab, the
State of Haryana and the Union Territory of Chandigarh. ·

4. The Central Government admittedly is the appropriate F
authority for passing requisite orders in relation to the matters
involving inter-State Boards as envisaged under Section 88 of
the 1966 Act. It issued a notification dated 19.10.1978 nomi-
nating the State of Punjab for the purpose of exercising its power
under the 1966 Act. G
5. In terms of the provisions of the Act, the Shiromani
Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee (hereinafter referred to as
"the Board") was constituted. Appellant was appointed as a
member of the Commission in terms of a notification dated
4.07.1989. He was elected the President thereof. Along with H
476 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2008) 8 S.C.R.
\ .
A him one S. Dara Singh and S. Raghbir Singh were also ap-
pointed as members of the Commission.

6. A new Board was constituted on 21.11.1996. While the
Commission was functioning with the said members, the State
of Punjab issued a notification on 6.01.1999 whereby and
B whereunder all the members including the appellant were re-
moved and in their places S. Man Mohan Singh, S. Amrik Singh
and S. Ajwant Singh Mann were appointed.

7. A writ petition was filed thereagainst in January, 1999.
c During pendency of the said writ petition, the State of Punjab
issued two more notifications on or about 12.01.1999. By rea-
son of the first notification issued under Sections 70 and 71 of
the Act, the notification dated 6.01.1999 was rescinded and by
reason of the second notification, the Commission was recon-
D stituted.
8. The writ petition was amended questioning also the
validity of the aforementioned two notifications dated
12.01.1999.
9. The State of Punjab as also the Union of India, however,
E opposed the said writ petition contending that the State of
Punjab had the requisite jurisdiction to remove the members of
the Commission.
10. It was furthermore contended that the Union of India in
F terms of Section 72 of the 1966 Act had the requisite power to
amend the law in regard to an intra-state body corporate. It
was urged that by reason of the notification dated 19.10.1978,
only a clarification had been issued to the effect that the word
"State Government" would mean the "Government of State of
G Punjab" and even the State of Haryana consented thereto.
11. As regards the notifications dated 12.01.1999, it was •
contended that some inadvertent mistake had crept in; which
was corrected by the said notifications, insofar as the source of
power for issuance of the said notifications being Section 79 of
H the Act was not available, particularly, in view of the fact that
KASHMIR SINGH v. UNION OF INDIA 477
& ORS. [S.B. SINHA, J]
~ I
clause (iv) thereof had been declared ultra vi res by a Full Bench A
of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shiromani Gurdwaras
Parbandhak Committee, Amritsar and another v. Lachhman
Singh Gill and others (AIR 1970 P & H 40].
12. The matter was placed before a Division Bench of the
Punjab and Haryana High Court. By an order dated 19.04.1999, B
the Division Bench formulated the following five questions and
referred the matter to a Five-Judge Bench:
"(i) Whether the Government of India has power under
Section 72 of the Punjab Re-organisation Act to issue c
notification dated 19.10.1978 directing the substitution of
the words "the State Government" with the words "the
Government of the State of Punjab" in Sections 70, 71,
74, 78, 79 and 80 of the Sikh Gurdwaras Act, 1925?
(ii) If the answer to question No. (i) is in negative, then D
(a) Whether the petitioners and such other
members who have been appointed by the
Government of Punjab State after
reorganization can challenge the notifications E
dated 19.10.1978 and 12.1.1999 as their own
appointments are invalid?
(b) Which Government would exercise the powers
of the State Government in relation to the various
} provisions of the Sikh Gurdwara Act, 1925 F
which deals with the functioning of the Judicial
Commission, powers to issue directions in
relation to the Judicial Commission?
(rii) If the answer to question No. (i) is in affirmative, then
G
(a) Whether the jurisdiction of the Central
f Government would be ousted in view of the
provisions of Sections 3 and 4 of the Inter-state
Cooperation Act, 1957? And
(b) Whether notification dated 19:10.1~73 su/f;&rs H
478 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008) 8 S.C.R.

A from the vice of excessive delegation? ' .
(iv) Whether under the Sikh Gurdwara Act, 1925
any period is fixed for which a member of the
Commission will hold the office or does he hold
the office in perpetuity?
B
(v) Whether the notification dated 12.1.1999 is
liable to be set aside on account of mala-fide?"

13. The Five-Judge Bench heard the matter for some time
and reserved its judgment on 24.05.2001. On or about
C 5.07.2002, however, the purported notification dated 12.01.1999
was withdrawn and the Commission was restored. Appellant
herein filed an application for withdrawal of the said writ peti-
tion which having been opposed, by an order dated 16.07.2002,
permission to withdraw the said writ petition was refused.
D
The judgment was delivered on 13.09.2002.
Three Hon'ble Judges were of the opinion:
(i) The tenure of the members of the Commission is co-
tenuous with the term of the Board; and
E
(ii) The Government of Punjab had the power to issue
directions in regard to the constitution of the Commission.
One of the Hon'ble Judges opined that having regard to
the decision of the Full Bench of the High Court in Shiromani
F Gurdwaras Parbandhak Committee (supra), the members of
the Commission cannot be removed.
The Chief Justice of the High Court, however. was of the
opinion that in view of the terminologies used in the relevant
G provisions of the Act and as no fixed period for holding the of-
fice has been provided therein, the Commission can be directed
to be wound up only when no case rerr:ains pending before it.
14. We may place on record that during pendency of the
writ petition, members were appointed on 8.07.2002
H whereagainst the Board filed writ petition which was allowed by
KASHMIR SINGH v. UNION OF INDIA 479
& ORS. [S.B. SINHA, J]
·-,;.
an order dated 14.08.2003. Civil Appeal Nos. 8169-8172 of A
2003 and 3162-3165 of 2004 are directed against the said or-
der dated 14.08.2003.
15. The Act was enacted to provide for the legal proce-
du re in terms whereof Gurdawaras and Shrines which, owning
to their origin and habitual use, are regarded by Sikhs as es- B
sentially places of worship may be brought effectively and per-
,,. manently under Sikh control and their administration reformed
so as to make it consistent with the religious views of the said
community.
c
The Act extended to the territories which immediately be-
fore 1.11.1956 were in the States of Punjab and Patiala and
East Punjab States Union.
"Commission" had been defined in Section 2(2) of the Act
to mean "the Judicial Commission constituted under the provi- D
... sions of Part 111" of the Act.
"Committee" has been defined in Section 2(3) of the Act
to mean "a committee of management constituted under the
provisions of Part Ill".
E
Chapter 11 of the Act consists of Sections 3 to 11. It deals
with the matter relating to filing of petitions to State Government
relating to Gurdwaras.
Chapter Ill, consisting of Sections 12 to 37, deals with
> appointment of the members of the Tribunal and proceedings F
before it. Sub-section (1) of Section 12 of the Act reads as
under:
"12(1) For the purpose of deciding claims made in
accordance with the provisions of this Act the Local
G
Government may from time to time by notification direct
. the constitution of a tribunal or more tribunals than one
and may in like manner direct the dissolution of such tribunal
or tribunals."
Chapter V of the Act, occurring in Part 111, deals with the H
480 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 8 S.C.R.

A control of Sikh Gurdwaras. Section 40 of the Act deals with the .. •
Board, Committee and Commission to be constituted for the
purposes of this Act. Section 41 of the Act reads as under:

"41. The management of every Notified Sikh Gurdwara
shall be administered by the committee constituted therefor,
B the Board and the Commission in accordance with the
provisions of this Part."

In terms of the provisions of the Act, the Board is the high-
est administrative body. It is controlled by the State Govern-
C ment. All regional political parties participate in the election of
the Board.
Section 42 of the Act provides for constitution of the Board.
Process of election is contemplated by Sections 43, 43-A and
50 of the Act.
D
Section 43-A of the Act reads as under:
'
"43-A. Constitution of new Board.- (1) Whenever a new
Board within the meaning of Section 51 is constituted, it
shall consist of -
E
(i) one hundred and forty elected members;
(ii) the Head Ministers of the Darbar Sahib, Amritsar, and
the following ground Takhats, namely-

the Sri Akal Takht Sahib, Amritsar, the Sri Takhat Keshgarh
F Sahib, Anandpur, the Sri Takhat Patna Sahib, Patna the
Sri Takht Hazur Sahib, Nanded; and
(iii) fifteen members resident in India, of whom not more
than five shall be residents of Punjab, co-opted by the
G .members of the Board as described in clauses (i) and (ii);
(2) The State Government shall, as soon as may be, call
~
a meeting of the members of the Board described in
clauses (i) and (ii) of sub-section (1) for the purpose of co-
opting the members described in clause (ii) of that sub-
H section, and after the members have been co-opted, the
KASHMIR SINGH v. UNION OF !NOIA 481
& ORS. [S.B. SINHA; J]

State Government shall notify the fact of the Board having A
been duly constituted; and the date of the publication of
the notification shall be deemed to be the date of the
constitution of the Board."
The term of the members of the Board is five years from
the date of its constitution or until the constitution Of a new Board, B
whichever is later as provided under Section 51 of the Act. Life
\
of the Board is also limited.

Constitution of Judicial Commission is contained in Sec·
tion 70 of the Act. The members of the Commission must be c
Sikhs appointed from time to time, as may be found necessary
by the local Government. Sub-section (2) of Section 70 pro-
vides for the essential qualifications for being appointed as
members. Sub-section (3) of Section 70 of the Act provides
that two of the members of the Commission sh<iill be selected
0
·" by the State Government out of a list of qualified persons pre-
pared and maintained as specified in Section 71 thereof.
Section 71 of the Act reads as under:
"71. Appointment of members of the Commission.-· (1) E
For the purpose of the appointment of members of the
Commission the Board shall, as soon as may be, after its
constitution submit a list of the names of seven persons
nominated by the Board, and the State Government shall
after being satisfied that the persons are qualified as
• required by section 70 record the list; provided that if the F
Board fails to submit a list within ninety days from the
constitution of the Board the State Government may itself
complete a list of qualified persons.
(2)A person whose name is on the list described in sub- G
section (1) shall be entitled to have his name retained
? thereon for two years after his nomination has been
'
recorded, provided that the State Government may at any
time remove his name, if it is satisfied upon a report made
by the Board and any enquiries it may see fit to make, that H
482 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 8 S.C.R.

A r
A he· is incapable of acting as a member of the commission.
(3) If any person whose name is on the list dies, or applies
to the Board to have his name removed therefrom the
Board shall inform the State Government and his name
; · shall fie removed from the list.
B
(4) The State Government shall on request being made to
it for this purpose by the Board remove from the list the j

name of any person whose name has been on the list for
more than three years, provided that the name of any
c person shall not be so removed while such person is a
member of the commission.
(5) When a name has been removed from the list the
Board shall nominate a qualified person for the purpose
of filling the vacancy, and the State Government shall after
D being satisfied that such person is qualified, place his
nam~_upon the 'ist. "
(6) If the Board fails to nominate a person to fill a vacancy
as required by sub-section (5) the State Government may
after giving one month's notice of its intention to the Board
E place the name of any qualified person on the list to fill the
vacaney." ·

Section 79 providing for removal of member of Comm is-
sion states:
F "79. Removal of member of Commission.- The State
•
Government may remove any member of the Commission-
(i) if he refuses to act or becomes in the opinion
of the State Government incapable of acting or
G unfit to act as a member; or
(ii) if he has absented himself from more than the
consecutive meetings of the commission, or
(iii) if it is satisfied after such enquiry as it may
deem necessary that he has flagrantly abused
H
KASHMIR SINGH v. UNION OF INDIA 483
& ORS. [S.B. SINHA, J]

his position as a member; or A
(iv) if he has served as a member for more than
two years."
16. It may be noted that clause (iv) of Section 79 of the
Act, which was incorporated by Amending Act of 1954 has been· s
declared ultra vires by the High Court in Shiromani Gurdwaras
Parbandhak Committee (supra).

17. We may also notice t~at the object of introducing the
said Amending Act was stated to be as under:

"Under the existing provisions of section 83 of the Sikh
c
Gurdwaras Act, 1925, the State Government "may at any
time, when there is no proceeding pending before the
Commission, dissolve the Commission". So that the State
Government can dissolve the Judicial Commission only D
when there is no proceeding pending before it and as
long as there are any proceedings pending before the
Commission, it cannot be dissolved.
As fresh cases are instituted in the Court of the Judicial
Commission frprn -time to time, the effect of the existing E
provision of the Act is that a Commission once constituted
is more or less perpetuated. In the interest of the efficient
working of the Judicial Commission and in order to remedy
a possible awkward situation in which the life of a Tribunal
may get very unnecessarily prolonged, it is, therefore, F
desirable that there should be a provision in the Act
empowering the State Government to remove any member
of the Commission after he has served on it for a specified
period, where circumstances may so require. Hence
clause (iv) to section 79 is added.
G
1 2. Amendment of section 79 of Punjab Act VII I of 1925 -
• In section 79 of the Sikh GurdwarasAct, 1925, after clause
(iii), the word "or" and thereafter the following new clause
shall be added:-
H
484 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 8 S.C.R

A "(iv) if he has served as a member for more than two
years"."

18. Section 83 of the Act deals with the dissolution of the
Commission stating that the State Government may at any time,
when there is no proceeding pending before it, dissolve the
B same.

19. Chapter VIII of the Act deals with the Committee of .•
Gurdwaras. 'The committee forthe gurdwaras known as the Sri
Akal Takht Sahib, Amritsar and Sri Takht Kesgarh Sahib,
c Anandpur' is the Board as contained in Section 85 of the Act.
For every notified Sikh Gurdwara, other than the one specified
in Section 85, the Committee is required to be constituted after
it has been declared to be a Sikh Gurdwara under the provi-
sions of the Act or upon application of the provisiJns of Part Ill
thereof. The tenure of the members of the Committee admit-
0
tedly is five years from the date of Constitution or until a new
Committee is constituted, whichever is later. All Committees
are body corporates having perpetual succession and a com-
mon seal. The vacancy in the Committee is to be filled up in the
manner in which the predecessor in office was elected or nomi-
E nated.

20. The Commission is a judicial body. Management of
every notified Sikh Gurdwara is administered by the Commit-
tee constituted therefor, the Board as also the Commission. If
F a person is aggrieved by a finding of the Board, he has a rem-
edy of preferring an appeal thereagainst before the Commis-
sion. The order passed by the Commission is final. The ques-
tion as to whether a person has become a 'patit' or not has to
be determined by the Commission. An election dispute under
G certain situations is also amenable to the jurisdiction of the
Commission. The Board can also apply to the Commission for
an order allowing it to devote the whole or part of such surplus
sum or income to a particular and specified religious, educa-
tional or other charitable purpose or any purpose which pro-
motes social welfare as envisaged under Section 106 of the
H
KASHMIR SINGH v. UNION OF !NOIA 485
& ORS. [S.B. SINHA, J]
-. A
Act whereupon the Commission may determine what portion if A
any of such surplus sum or income has to be retained as a re-
serve fund for the concerned Gurdwara whereupon it may di-
rect the remainder of the surplus sum or income to be devoted
to any such religious educational or charitable purpose as it
may deem proper. 8
21. The Committees and the Commission have various
t
other functions with which we are not concerned.

22. We may briefly also notice the provisions of the 1966
Act. It was enacted to reorganize the existing State of Punjab c
into the States of Punjab and Haryana and the Union Territory of
Chandigarh and to transfer certain areas of the existing State
of Himachal Pradesh. Section2(f) of the 1966 Act defines "ex-
isling State of Punjab" to mean the State of Punjab as existing
immediately before the appointed day, which is 1.11.1966.
D
1"'°
23: Section 72 of the 1966 Act, which is relevant for our
purpose, reads, thus:
"72. General provisions as to statutory corporations- (1)
Save as otherwise expressly provided by the foregoing
provisions of this Part, where any body corporate E
constituted under a Central Act, State Act or Provincial Act
for the existing State of Punjab or any part thereof serves
the needs of the successor States or has, by virtue of the
+ provisions of Part 11, become an inter..State body corporate,
1>
then, the body corporate shall, on and from the appointed F
day, continue to function and operate in those areas in
respect of which it was functioning and operating
immediately before that day, subject to such directions as
may from time to time be issued by the Central Government,
until other provision is made by law in respect of the said G
t body corporate.
' (2) Any direction issued by the Central Government under
sub-sec. (1) in respect of any such body corporate may
include a direction that any law by which the said body
H
486 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 8 S.C.R.

A corporate is governed shall, in its application to that' body
.....
corporate, have effect, subject to such exceptions and
modifications as may be specified in the direction.
(3)For the removal of doubt it is hereby declared that the
provisions of this section shall apply also to the Punjab
B University constituted under the Punjab University Act,
1947, the Punjab Agricultural University constituted under
the Punjab Agricultural University Act, 1961, and the Board
constituted under the provisions of Part Ill of the Sikh
Gurdwaras Act, 1925.
c (4) For the purpose of giving effect to the provisions of this
section in so far as it relates to the Punjab University and
the Punjab Agricultural University referred to in sub-section
(3), the successor States shall make such grants as the
Central Government may, from time to time, by order,
D
determine."
Section 88 of the 1966 Act provides for the territorial ex-
tent ofthe laws. Section 89 provides for power to adapt laws.
Section 91 provides for power to name authorities. Section 96
E provides for power to remove difficulties in the following terms:
"96. Power to remove difficulties- If any difficulty arises in
giving effect to the provisions of this Act, the President
may, by order, do anything not inconsistent with such
provisions which appears to him to be necessary or +
F expedient for the purpose of removing the difficulty."
24. Mr. P.S. Patwalia, learned senior counsel appearing
on behalf of the appellant, would submit:
(i) Having regard to the fact that Section 79(iv)
G was deleted by Act No. 11 of 1944 and the
same having been re-introduced by Act No. 11
of 1954 which having been found to be ultra
vires, it must be held that the tenure of a member
of the Commission being not fixed he would
H continue in office unless it is dissolved in terms
KASHMIR SINGH v. UNION OF INDIA· .A87
& ORS. [-8.B. SINHA, J]

of Section 83 of the Act, viz., as long as any A
proceedings remains pending before the
Commission.
(ii) The Board alone being vested with a power to
forward a list of seven persons out. of whom two
are appointed by the Government as members, • B
t the High Court committed a manifest error in
opining that the tenure of the Commission is
co-terminus with that of the Board.

(iii) The notification issued by the State of Punjab c
was wholly illegal as the Commission is an inter- ·
state body corporate as envisaged under
Section 72 of the· 1966 Act and in that view of
tbe matter the Central Government was the only
competent. authority to exercise the requisite ..·
0
jurisdiction as contemplated under Entry 44 of'.
List I of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution
of India and Section 7:2(1) of the 1966 Act.
(iv) The purported delegation of power by the
Central Government in favour of the State · E
Government in terms of the said notification
dated 19.10.1978 is ex facie illegal in view of
the principles contained in the maxim delegatus
non potest delegare as thereby the Central
Government abdicated its essential statutory F
functions in favour of the delegatee ..,, .
.. ~'
"
25. Mr. C.S. Vaidyanathan, learned senior counsel appear-
ing on behalf of the State of Punjab, on the other hand, would
submit: . , ,
G
(i) The Commission is not an occasional body but
a perpetual body.
(ii) Having regard to the tenor of Sections 40 and
70 of the Act wherein the words "from time to
time" have been used, .it. is evident that the· H
488 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 8 S.C.R.

Air
A reasonable meaning which is required to be
given thereto would lead to the conclusion that
the Government has the power to make fresh
appointments of the members.
(iii) For the aforementioned purpose, the provisions
B of Sections 40 and 70 of the Act have to be
given a harmonious construction and upon
giving a holistic reading of the entire Act.
(iv) The Act had an extra-territorial application
c keeping in view the provisions of Section 88 of
the State Reorganisation Act, particularly, in view
of the fact that no law has been enacted in that
behalf either by the State of Haryana or by the
State of Himachal Pradesh.
D (v} The Central Government in exercise of its power 1''
under Sectior. 89 of the Act merely directed
that the State of Punjab shall carry out the
provisions of the Act. The said order is only
clarificatory in nature and does not amount to
E delegation or sub-delegation of its power under
the 1966 Act. In any event, the power of the
Central Government in this behalf being not
under challenge nor any act of mala fide having
been attributed, the impugned judgment does
..;-
F not call for any interference.
26. Mr. Jaspal Singh, learned senior counsel appearing
on behalf of the SGPC, supplementing Mr. Vaidyanathan urged:
(i) Upon reading of the provisions of Sections 40,
41. 51, Sub-section (3) of Section 70 and Sub-
G
section (6) of Section 71, it would be evident
that the life of the Board is limited. \
(ii) Writ Petition must be held to have been given
up the challenge in respect of the notification
H dated 12.01.1999 as the appellant being a
KASHMIR SINGH v. UNION OF INDIA 489
& ORS. [S.8. SINHA, J]
. "· beneficiary in respect of the said notification, A
and thus, he is estopped from challenging the
subsequent notification dated 17.02.2005 also
as he should not be permitted to approbate
and 'reprobate at the same time.
27. The Act was enacted to provide for the better ad minis- 8
tration of certain Sikh Gurdwaras and for inquiries into matters
t
connected therewith. It is a complete Code. The Act provides
for not only the constitution of a Tribunal but also for the constitu-
tion of a Commission. Both the Tribunal as also the Commis-
sion play significant and important roles under the Act. ·They c
deal with a large number of disputes. The disputes which are
dealt with by the Commission are contained in various provi-
sions of the Act, some of which we have noticed hereinbefore.
28. The holders of the office both of the Tribunal as also
,,--'I
0
the Commission function under a statute. The Commission/ Tri-
bunal is to be constituted from time to time. Whereas sub-sec-
tion (5) of Section 12 empowers the Local Government to re-
move any member of the Tribunal on the grounds enume_rated
therein, Section 83 of the Act does not deal with such a situa-
tion. E

29. Would that by itself mean that the Chairman or the
Members of the Tribunal can hold office at their pleasure? Does
it contemplate a rule of perpetuity is the question involved
.... herein? Answers to these questions may seem to be difficult
j
F
as the Full Bench of the High Court noticed.
30. A statute, as is well known, must be read in its entirety.
It must then be read part by part, chapter by chapter, section by
section and then clause by clause.
G
31. Be it the constitution of the Tribunal or the Comm is-
.../ sion, it is required to be done 'from time to time'. Section 40
provides for constitution of a Judicial Commission from time to
time. Undoubtedly, the same is required to be done in the man-
ner provided for therein but that would not take away the power
H
490 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 8 ~.C.R.

A of the Government as regards constitution of the Judicial Coll'!-
mission from time to time. The Commission exercises control
of management of the Notified Sikh Gurdwaras alongwith the
Committee and the Board.
32. Chapter VI of the Act deals with Constitution, functions
B and status of the Board. Constitution and functions of a Judi-
cial Commission are dealt with in Chapter VII of the Act.
33. Sub-section (1) of Section 70 provides that the Judi-
cial Commission shall consist of three members who shall be
c Sikhs, appointed from time to time as may be necessary by the
Local Government. Sub-section (2) of Section 70 lays down
the qualification of a Member of the Commission. Sub-section
(3) of Section 70, which has some bearing for our purpose, em-
powers the State to select two members out of a list of qualified
members as described in Section 71.
0
34. How the list shall be prepared and the members of the
Commission are to be appointed, is provided for under sub-
section (1) of Section 71 of the Act.
35. The fact that each Board must submit a list within 90
E days from its constitution is itself indicative of the fact that the
same is imperative in nature. The Government upon receipt of
the said list must perform its functions.
36. Undoubtedly, the Commission exercises a judicial func-
F tion but the same would not mean that in the name of indepen- -+
dence in its functioning, the members will continue to hold of-
fice in perpetuity.
37. It is not for us to prescribe age of superannuation. A
recommendation undoubtedly was made in that behalf by the
G Full Bench of the High Court in Shiromani Gurdwaras
Parbandhak Committee (supra). but the recommendations .,
having not been accepted and we, having been called upon to •
determine only the question with regard to construction of stat-
ute, will have to do so independent of the said observations.
H
KASHMIR SINGH v. UNION OF INOIA 491
& ORS. [S.B. SINHA, J]

38. It is, thus, one of the functions of the Board to submit a A
list of the names of seven persons to the Local G.overnment.
Two of the members of the Commission are to be selected by
the Local Government out of the list of qualified persons .pre-
pared and maintained in ter:ns thereof. If the Board fails to per-
form its duties in preparing a select list enlisting therein the B
names of seven persons who are qualified to become a mem-
t ber of the Commission; a' fortiori it would be the duty of the
State Government to select the names of two of them for ap-
pointment as members of the Commission only out of the said
list. The said provisions, in our opinion, clearly indicate the ten- c
ure of the Commission.

39. The dichotomy is created in view of the words "time to
time" and the limited power of the State to dissolve the Com-
mission.
D
40. The power of dissolution is a separate power. It is a
substantive power. Removal of the members of a body corpo-
rate is also a substantive power. It is one thing to say that on
happening of certain contingencies, which may include miscon-
duct on the part of the member of a body corporate, the power
of removal can be resorted to or the power of dissolution of the E
entire body can be taken recourse to, but then the same by it-
self would not lead to a conclusion that in the event the said
contingencies cannot be complied with, in a given situation, the
Chairman and members shall continue to hold the office in per-
~ui~ F
41.The Act is a pre-Constitutional Act. Upon coming into
force of the Constitution of India, it must be read in the light of
the constitutional scheme and its provisions. In construing a
statute, an interpretation which would lead to violation of the G
constitutional provisions, cannot be taken recourse to.
l
1 42. We have noticed hereinbefore the different opinions
of the learned Judges constituting the Full Bench.

43. While agreeing with one or the other view, this Court H
492 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 8 S.C.R.

A cannot lose sight of the constitutional scheme of equality be-
fore law and equal protection of law as adumbrated in Articles
14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. We may notice some
other provisions in this behalf.

44. Article 310 of the Constitution of India provides for a
8 tenure. It does not contemplate a life tenure. It does not con-
template a permanent term. Article 16 of the Constitution of
India which is a species of the equality clauses contained in
Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India, speaks of grant
of equal opportunity to all. Allowing a person to hold public of-
C fice indefinitely would be opposed to the constitutional scheme,
irrespective of any misconduct or other contingencies. Consti-
tution of India does not envisage holding of any office in perpe-
tuity.
45. We are not unmindful of the opinion of the learned Chief
0
Justice of the High Court that the term shall come to an end
when no dispute wou:d remain pending before the Commis-
sion.

46. The superior courts must remember a well-known prin-
E ciple of law that the Court while construing an ongoing statute
must take into consideration the changes in the societal condi-
tion. It would be a relevant fact. It must take into consideration
the development in science and technology. [See Satyawati
Sharma (Dead) by LRs. v Union of India (UO/) and Anr [2008
F (6) SCALE 325].
47. Before the Act was enacted. the office of Commission
was hereditary. The Rule of perpetuity was, therefore, very much
in the mind of the Legislature as would appear from paragraph
5 of the objects and reasons of the said Act. We are aware that
G the said paragraph related to the Tribunal but then evidently the
composition of the holder of a hereditary office was very much
in the mind of the Legislature.
48. The Tribunal has a wide jurisdiction. The Commission
also deals with a large number of disputes which have been
H
KASHMIR SINGH v. UNION OF !NOIA 493
& ORS. [S.B. SINHA, J]

noticed by the High Court. The Court while construing a statute A
cannot shut its eyes towards the ground realities. The number
of cases coming up before the Commission has gone up. When
the Act was enacted, occasional meeting was probably thought
to be sufficient. The period offive years during which the Com-
mission was to function probably was more than enough in those B
days. It is only in that view of the matter, the legislature might
t have thought of dissolution of the Commission when no case
was to remain pending.

49. We have noticed hereinbefore that in view of the num-
ber of cases having gone up for all intent and purport the Com- C
mission has been functioning continuously. If the contention of
Mr. Patwalia is to be accepted, the same would lead to an ab-
surd situation, viz., the members of the Commission would hold
·office in perpetuity. They may even abuse their position to keep
one or the other matter pending before it. If the contention of D
Mr. Patwalia is to be accepted that having regard 10 the doc-
trine of independence of judiciary, the State l.3overnment will
have no role to play in the matter of constitution of the Board,
the Government will neve• be in a position to dissolve the Com-
mission unless case is made out under one or the other provi- E
sions of the Act. The doctrine of 'independence of judiciary'
has nothing to do when the tenure is fixed by a statute. Even in
relation to selection of the members of the Board, the State has
a limited role to play.
50. With a view to construe the said provision the past F
practice may also be held to be relevant. The High Court has
taken notice of the past practice in this behalf in great details
showing as to how the reconstitution of the Commission had
taken place from time to time, almost at regular intervals.
G
51. Our attention, however, has been drawn to a chart filed
1 by the appellant to show that the reconstitution of the Commis-
sion has not taken place immediately after the reconstitution of
the Board. That may be so but the very fact that the constitution
of Commission had taken place, for instance in October, 1949;
H
494 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 8 S.C.R.

A January, 1955 ; .i:.pril, 1955 ; March, 1957 ; September, 1965;
. ~

April, 1968; July, 1980; July, 1981; July, 1989 ;August, 1989;
January, 1999 and July, 2002 clearly goes to show that consti-
tution and reconstitution of the Board had taken place from time
to time. The very fact that it has been working continuously and
B the members of the Board have been constituted at intervals is
also a pointer to show that the members had not been holding
office at their will, far less in perpetuity. It had been noticed by "!
us heretobefore that the same persons have been nominated .
more than once, even successively.
c 52. In a case of this nature literal interpretation is not pos-
sible. If the statute has to be read keeping in view the constitu-
tional schemes and make it workable, the provisions thereof
are required to be given a purposive construction. [See New
India Assurance Company Ltd. v. Nusli Neville Wadia and
D Anr JT 2008 (1) SC 31] -;.

For the said purpose, even the past practice as also the
Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act can be looked
into.

E 53. In Pannalal Binjraj v. Union of India [AIR 1957 SC
397), where the vires of Section 5(7-A) of the Income tax Act,
1922 were put in issue before this Court, the challenge was
repelled and during the course of the judgment the previous his-
tory of the earlier Income tax Acts was taken into account to
F decide what policy could be said to underlie the provisions of ...
the impugned Section.
That judgment has been followed by this court in a plethora
of decisions for the purpose of looking into the statement of
objects and reasons of enacting an Act for appreciating the
G background of legislature's classification. [See for instance, The
Quarry Owners Association v. The State of Bihar & Ors., (2000)
8 SCC 655, Gurudevdatta VKSSS Maryadit & Ors. v. State of
Maharashtra & Ors., (2001) 4 SCC 534, K. TM.S. Mohd. and
another v. Union of India With Amanullah Quareshi v. Union
H of India, (1992) 3 SCC 178, Gopal Narain v. State of Uttar
KASHMIR SINGH v. UNION OF INDIA 495
& ORS. [S.B. SINHA, J]
.- ·~
Pradesh and Anr (1964) 4 SCR 869, Bhatnagars and Co. Ltd. A
v. The Union of India, ("1957) 1 SCR 701]
54. Clause (iv) of Section 79 might have been declared
ultra vires but the same by itself is not sufficient to hold that save
and except the power of the State Government to dissolve the
Commissioo there does not exist any provision to bring to an B
end its tenure and it would continue to function till a case re-
t
mains pending. The said interpretation would not only lead to
an anomalous situation, but also frustrate the constitutional
scheme.
c
55. For the aforementioned purpose, we must bear in mind
two salient principles, i.e., the 'power to appoint' carries with it
the 'power to remove' under the General Clauses Act. If the
Commission is to be constituted from time to time, it must be
held thatto effe_ctuate this power it would be reasonable to con-
... D
elude that such power can be exercised as and when a neces-
sity arises therefor.

56. It may be true that the Court shall not interfere with the
judicial authority. It should be allowed to function independently
and impartially, but at the same time it cannot be allowed to E
continue in perpetuity. A balance, thus, must be struck.

57. Whereas, on the one hand, the discretionary jurisdic-
tion of the State would not lightly be assumed having regard to
+ the nature of the office held by the appellant, it cannot also be
• held that no tenure is fixed therefor at all. F

58. The State of Punjab, in this appeal, also opposes the
appellant's contention.

59. With a view to find out an answer to the question as to
what meaning should be assigned to the words "from time to G
l- time", in our opinion, a holistic reading of the statutes should be
I
resorted to. It has to be borne in mind that perpetuity in office is
neither contemplated under Act nor the constitutional scheme
permits the same. It may be true that Clause (iv) of Section 79
of the Act has been declared ultra v1res by the Punjab High Court H
•
496 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 8 S.C.R.

A in the case of Shiromani Gurdwaras Parbandhak Committee ....
(supra), but the same by itself, in our considered opinion, is not
sufficient to hold that save and except for the power of the State
Government under Section 83 of the Act for dissolution of the
Commission, it would continue to function till any case is pend-
B ing.
60. For the purpose of giving an effective and meaningful
construction of the provisions, the court is bound to take into -!

consideration the situational change. The statute is an ongoing
one. The number of litigations in the year 1925 might have been
c small. Occasional formation of the Commission might be con-
templated keeping in view the number of litigations at that point
of time. The Act, however, must be interpreted differently as the
court cannot ignore the ground realities. If it is to be held that in
terms of Section 83 of the Act, the State Government has the
D power to dissolve the Commission only in terms thereof, for all
intent and purport, the Commission shall sontinue till a member
dies or resigns.
61. On the appellant's own showing, the Commission is
not an occasional body. It has continued to function for a long
E time. ,If that be so, the object and purpose for which the statute
contemplated constitution of such occasional body has lost its
purpose. Apart from Section 40 of the Act, even in terms of
Section 70 of the Act, the Members are to be appointed from
time to time. If the tenure is for the whole life of the Member,
F there cannot be any fresh appointment. If there cannot be any ....
•
fresh appointment, the same would be clearly violative of Ar-
tic le 16 of the Constitution.
62. In Sri Nasiruddin v. State Transport Appellate Tribu-
na/ [(1975) 2 sec 671], the interpretation of the words "such
G
Judges of the new High Court, not less than two in number, as
the Chief Justice, may, from time to time nominate, shall sit at .,
Lucknow as used in The United Provinces High Courts (Amal- '
gamation) Order, 1948 came up for consideration before this
court.
H .::.:.:
,
KASHMIR SINGH v. UNION OF INDIA 497
& ORS. [S.B. SINHA, J)
.... ·4'
It was held by this court that the words "from time to time" A
suggest not only that Judges who may come from Allahabad to
Lucknow or vice versa but also that the number may be in-
creased or decreased according to exigencies, the only limita-
tion being that it shall not be less than two.
'1
63. In a more recent decision of this court in M.P Vidyut B
1
Karamch2 ,; Sangh v. M.P Electricity Board [(2004) 9 SCC
755], t, d question which fell for this Court's determination was
whether an agreement despite expiry would prevail over a regu-
lation made under Section 79(c) of the Electricity (Supply) Act,
1948 as regards the age of superannuation of an employee of c
the Respondent-Board having regard to the use of the words
"time to time" in Section 2 of the Madhya Pradesh Industrial
Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1961 which applies to ev-
ery undertaking wherein the number of employees on any day
.- .A. during the twelve months preceding or on the day the said Act D
came into force or any day thereafter was or is more than twenty
and such other class or classes of undertakings as the State
Government may, from time to time, by notification, specify in
this behalf, this court observed :
"44. The power of the Board, therefore, to lay down the E
conditions of service of its employees either in terms of
regulation or otherwise would be subject only to any valid

•
.. law to the contrary operating in the field. Agreement within
the meaning of proviso appended to Rule 14A is not a law
and, thus, the regulations made by the Board shall prevail F
thereover.
45. The Board has power to make regulations which having
regard to the provisions of General Clauses Act would
mean that they can make such regulations from time to
G
time."
64. We, therefore, are of the opinion that in view of the
situational change, a meaning which could be attributed in the
year 1925 cannot be given the same meaning today. For the
aforementioned purpose, Sections 40 and 70 of the Act must H
L
498 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 8 S.C.R.

.. ~

A be read together. Therefor a holistic reading of the entire Act
would be necessary. So read, the opinion of the majority ap-
peals to us. By reason of such an interpretation, the apprehen-
sion that the State would be endowed with the arbitrary power
is wiped off.
::
B 65. The term 'from time to time' should be given an effec-
tive and purposeful meaning. If any other meaning is assigned, t
sub-section (3) of Section 70 and sub-section (1) of Section 72
would be rendered otiose.

c We cannot, thus, agree with the contention of Mr. Patwalia.

66. There is another aspect of the matter which cannot be
lost sight of. Appellant herein has questioned the validity of the
Notification dated 61" January, 1999 on the premise that the Chief
Minister of the State had acted mala fide. The Full Bench no-
D ticed that factual foundation had not been laid therefor. For all •
intent and purport, the said point was given up. Furthermore,
the appellant has again been appointed as a Chairman of the
Commission by a Notification dated 171h March, 2005. The No-
tification used the words "Reconstitution of the Commission".
E He, therefore, is a functionary thereof. He cannot be permitted
to approbate and reprobate.

67. By reason of the notification dated 19.10.1978, the
Central Government has not delegated its power. The 1966
Act has an extra-territorial application. It is not in dispute that ....
F no law has been enacted either by the State of Haryana or by
the State of Himachal Pradesh. In absence of any law having
been enacted to the contrary, the functions under the 1966 Act
must be performed by some authority. The Central Government
with the consent of the State of Haryana has merely nominated
G the State of Punjab to do so. By reason thereof, it has not del-
egated any power. Sub-section (1) of Section 72 of the 1966 i
,
Act envisages a direction upon the Central Government. Such
a direction has been issued by reason of the impugned notifi-
cation. When a power has been conferred upon the State of
H Punjab by the Central Government, it exercises a statutory power.
KASHMIR SINGH v. UNION OF INDIA 499
& ORS. [S.B. SINHA, J]

It would, therefore, not a case where the functions of the State A
Government must be held to be confined to its territorial juris-
diction.

68. Articles 245 or 246 or for that matter, Articles 73 and
172 of the Constitution of India will have no application.
B
69. Even such questions have not been raised before the
t
High C :iu .•. In issuing the notification, the Central Government
was merely exercising its statutory functions. It has not exer-
cised a power of delegation. The ground of excessive delega-
tion of power, thus, does not arise. Some authority is required c
to function. If an authority has been nominated, all other ques-
tions become academic.

70. For the reasons aforementioned, Civil Appeal Nos.
7024 of 2002 and 8171-8172 of 2003 are dismissed and Civil
..li
/• Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 20803 of 2002 as also Civil D
Appeal Nos. 5546 of 2003, 8169-8170 of 2003 and 3162-3165
of 2004 are allowed. No costs.
D.G. Civil Appeal Nos. 7024/2002 &

8171-72/2003 dismissed. E

Civil Appeal Nos. 5546, 8169-8170

of 2003, 3162-65 of 2004 and 3545 of 2008 allowed.

•+

i