Holding

A second appeal under Section 100 CPC is invalid unless the High Court formulates a substantial question of law; in the present case no such question was formulated, so the appeal was set aside and remitted for fresh consideration.

Summary

The Supreme Court examined a second appeal filed under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, by Kashmir Singh against Harnam Singh & Anr. The High Court had allowed the appeal without formulating any substantial question of law, contrary to the statutory requirement. The Court clarified the meaning of a "substantial question of law" and emphasized that the memorandum of appeal must precisely state such a question, which the High Court must then formulate and hear. It held that a substantial question must be debatable, not settled by higher courts, and must have a material bearing on the rights of the parties. The Court also reiterated that the High Court cannot interfere with the factual findings of lower courts unless specific exceptions apply. Since no substantial question was formulated, the High Court's judgment was set aside and the matter remitted for fresh consideration, with the appeal allowed in part.

Issues considered

Whether the High Court correctly entertained a second appeal under Section 100 CPC without formulating a substantial question of law.
What constitutes a "substantial question of law" under Section 100 CPC.
Whether a second appeal can be heard on a substantial question of law not formulated by the High Court.
Whether a question of law already decided by a higher court can be treated as a substantial question of law.
The extent to which a High Court may interfere with the findings of fact of lower courts in a second appeal.

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. 100

Subjects

Section 100 CPCsecond appealsubstantial question of lawformulation of questioncivil procedureappeal jurisdictionhigh courtinterference with findings of fact

Judgment

(2008] 3 S.C.R. 763

"'J
,,,, KASHMIR SINGH A
II.
HARNAM SINGH & ANR.
(Civil Appeal No.1036 of 2002)

., MARCH 3,, 2008
B
(DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, P. SATHASIVAM
:';.l. AND AFTAB ALAM, JJ.)
•
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; s. 100:

Second appeal - Requirement of formulating substantial c
question of law- Held: In appeal filed uls. 100 CPC, High Court,
if satisfied that substantial question of law is involved, should
formulate the q(Jestion in terms of sub-section (4) of s.100 -
Since right to appeal is a substantive statutory right, it has to
· be regulated in accordance with law in force at relevant time - D
~·· ,.'. -t· Conditions me.ntioned therefor must strictly be fulfilled before
I
second appeal could be maintained - No Court has power to
enlarge the grounds - Whether a question of law is a
substantial one or not and inyolved in the case or not depends
on the facts and circumstances of each case - High Court E
empowered to hear the appeal on a substantial question of
law even though no question was formulated by it- Jn the instant
case, High Court did not formulate question/heard the second
appeal on the question - Hence, the impugned judgment can
·"'" not be maintained and set aside - Matter remitted to High F
Court. for consideration afresh.
,-
Raising of question of law when not amoun(ing to
substantial question of Jaw- Held: If it stands already decided
by a larger Bench of High Courr!Privy Council/Federal Court/
Supreme Court/when facts required for a point of law have not G

, been pleaded.
Words and Phrases:
'Substantial question of law' - Meaning of in the context
763 H
764 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 3 S.C.R.

A of s.100 CPC.
'Substantial question of law and substantial question of
fact' - Distinction between.
The question arose for determination in this appeal
B was as to whether the High Court was right in allowing
the second appeal filed by respondent No.1 u/s.100 CPC
without formulating the substantial question of law.
Partly allowing the appeal, the Court
c HELD: 1.1 A perusal of the impugned judgment
passed by the High Court does not show that any
substantial question of law has been formulated or that
the second appeal was heard on the question, if any, so
formulated. That being so, the judgment cannot be
maintained. (Para - 4) [770-C]
0
1.2 In view of s. 100 of the Civil Procedure Code the \ . .,
memorandum of appeal shall precisely state substantial
question or questions of law involved in the appeal as
required under sub-section (3) of s. 100 of the Code. Where
E the High Court is satisfied that in any case any substantial
question of law is involved it shall formulate that question
under sub-section (4) and the second appeal has to be
heard on the question so formulated as stated in sub-
section (5) of Section 100. (Para - 2) [769-C, D]
F 1.3 After the amendment made in s.100 CPC, a second
appeal can be filed only if a substantial question of law is
involved in the case. However, the respondent at the time
of hearing of the appeal has a right to argue that the case
in the court did not involve any substantial question of
G law. The proviso to the section acknowledges the
powers of the High Court to hear the appeal on a
substantial point of law, though not formulated by it
with the object of ensuring that no injustice is done to
the litigant where such a question was not formulated
H
KASHMIR SINGH v. HARNAM SINGH & ANR. 765

,. 1 at the time of admission either by mistake or by A
)I
inadvertence. (Para - 8) [771-F, G; 772-A]
/shwar Dass Jain vs. Sohan Lal (2000)1 SCC 434; Roop
Singh vs. Ram Singh (2000) 3 SCC 708 and Kanahaiyala/
and Ors. vs. Anupkumar and Ors. JT (2002) 10 SC 98 -
referred to. B

1.4 It has to be kept in mind that the right of appeal is
~~
• neither a natural nor an inherent right attached to the
litigation. Being a substantive statutory right, it has to be
regulated in accordance with law in force at the relevant c
time. (Para - 9) [772-C, D]
1.5 'The conditions mentioned in the section must be
strictly fulfilled before a second appeal can be maintained
and no court has the power to add or to enlarge those
grounds. The second appeal cannot be decided on merely D
" • -r equitable grounds. The concurrent findings of facts will
not be disturbed by the High Court in exercise of the
powers under this section. Further, a substantial question
of law has to be distinguished from a substantial question
of fact. (Para - 9) [772-D, E, F] E
Sir Chunilal V Mehta and Sons Ltd. vs. Century Spg. &
Mfg. Co. Ltd, AIR (1962) SC 1314 - followed.
2.1 In a case where from a given set of circumstances
two inferences of fact are possible, one drawn by the lower F
appellate court will not be interfered by the High Court in
~ second appeal. Adopting any other approach is not
permissible. The High Court will, however, interfere where
it is found that the conclusions drawn by the lower
appellate court were erroneous being contrary to the
G
mandatory provisions of law applicable or its settled
position on- the basis of pronouncements made by the
Apex Court, or was based upon inadmissible evidence
or arrived at by ignoring material evidence. (Para - 10)
[773-C, D, E]
H
766 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008) 3 S.C.R.

1"' ~
A 2.2 The question of law raised will not be considered <
as a substantial question of law, if it stands already
decided by a larger Bench of the High Court concerned
or by the Privy Council or by the Federal Court or by the
Supreme Court. Where the facts required for a point of
B law have not been pleaded, a litigant should not be allowed
to raise that question as a substantial question of law in
second appeal. (Para - 11) [773-E, F, G] _;.•
•
2.3 Mere appreciation of facts, the documentary
evidence or the meaning of entries and the contents of
c the documents cannot be held to be raising a substantial
question of law. But where it is found that the first appellate
court has assumed jurisdiction which did not vest in it,
the same can be adjudicated in the second appeal, treating
it as a substantial question of law. Where the first appellate
D court is shown to have exercised its discretion in a judicial
manner, it cannot be termed to be an error either of law or '\ . ,..
of procedure requiring interference in second appeal.
(Para 11) [773-G; 774-A]
Reserve Bank of India vs. Ramkrishna Govind Morey
E (1976 (1) SCC 803 and Kondiba Dogadu Kadam vs. Savitribai
Sopan Gujar and Others (1999) 3 sec 722 - relied on.
2.4 The phrase "substantial question of law", as
occurring in the amended Section 100 is not defined in
F the Code. The word substantial, as qualifying "question
of law", means - of having substance, essential, real, of
sound worth, important or considerable. It is to be
understood as something in contradistinction with -
technical, of no substance or consequence, or academic
merely. However, it is clear that the legislature has chosen
G
not to qualify the scope of "substantial question of law"
by suffixing the words "of general importance" as has
been done in many other provisions such as Article
133(1)(a) of the Constitution. The substantial question of
law on which a second appeal shall be heard need not
H
KASHMIR SINGH v. HARNAM SINGH & ANR. 767

j. il
_)I
necessarily be a $Ubstantial question of law of general A
importance. (Para 12) [774-8, C, D, E]
Sir Chunilal II. Mehta and Sons Ltd. vs. Century Spg. &
Mfg. Co. Ltd. AIR (1962) SC 1314 - followed.
,.
Guran Ditta vs. T Ram Ditta AIR (1928) PC 172 - relied B
on.
~~
~ Rimmalapudi Subba Rao vs. Noony Veeraju AIR (1951)
Mad. 969 - approved.
2.5 To be a question of law "involving in the case" c
there must be first a foundation for it laid in the pleadings
and the question should emerge from the sustainable •
findings of fact arrived at by court of facts and it must be
necessary to decide that question of law for a just and
proper decision of the case. An entirely new point raised
D
--t- ,... -r for the first time before the High Court is not a question
involved in the case unless it goes to the root of the matter.
It will, therefore, depend on the facts and circumstance of
each case whether a question of law is a substantial one
and involved in the case, or not; the paramount overall
consideration being the need for striking a judicious E
balance between the indispensable obligation to do
justice at all stages and impelling necessity of avoiding
prolongation in the life of any lis. (Para - 15) [775-E, F, G]
Ml"<
Sir Chunilal II. Mehta and Sons Ltd. vs. Century Spg. & F
_.,, Mfg. Co. Ltd. AIR (1962) SC 1314 - followed.
Dy. Commnr Hardoi vs. Rama Krishna Narain AIR
(1953) SC 521 and Santosh Hazari vs. Purushottam Tiwari
(deceased) by Lrs. (2001) 3 SCC 179 - relied on.
G
3.1 The principles relating to Section 100, relevant
for the present case, are: (i) when there is misconstruction
of a document or wrong application of a principle of law
in construing a document, it gives rise to a question of
law and (ii) the High Court should be satisfied that the
H
768 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 3 S.C.R.

A case involves a substantial question of law, and not a mere <.
question of law. (Para - 16) [776-A, B, C]
3.2 The general rule is that High Court will not interfere
with concurrent findings of the Courts below. But it is not
an absolute rule. Some of the well recognized exceptions
8 are where (i) the courts below have ignored material
evidence or acted on no evidence; (ii) the courts have
drawn wrong inferences from proved facts by applying
the law erroneously; or (iii) the courts have wrongly
cast the burden of proof. When this Court refers to
C 'decision based on no evidence', it not only refers to
cases where there is a total dearth of evidence, but also
refers to any case, where the evidence, taken as a
whole, is not reasonably capable of supporting the
finding. (Para - 17) [776-F, G; 777-A]
D
4.1 In view of the facts and circumstances of the case,
the matter is remitted to the High Court for fresh
consideration. The Second Appeal can be only maintained
after formulating substantial question of law, if any and
E not otherwise. (Para - 18) [777 -B]
4.2 It is clarified that no opinion has been expressed
in the present case on the question as to whether any
substantial question of law is involved or not. (Para -18)
[777-B, C]
F CIVILAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1036
of 2002.
From the final Judgment and Order dated 16.01.2001 of
the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in Regular
G Second Appeal No. 873 of 1996.
J.S.N. Joshi, A.S. Bhasme and Brijesh Pande for the
Appellant.
Raj at Sharma, Siddhartha Singh and A. P. Mohanty for the
H Respondents.
KASHMIR SINGH v. HARNAM SINGH &ANR. 769
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
j, ~
,• The Judgment of the Court was delivered by A
Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. 1. Challenge in this appeal is to
the judgment of a learned Single Judge of the Punjab and
Haryana High Court allowing the Second Appeal filed by
respondent No.1. The Second Appeal was filed under Section
100 -of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (in short the 'Code'). B
"' •,4. Though many points were urged in support of the appeal it was
" primarily submitted that no substantial question of law was
formulated and Second appeal would not have been allowed
without formulating any such question.
2. In view of Section 100 of the Code the memorandum of
c
appeal shall precisely state substantial question or questions
of law involved in the appeal as required under sub-section (3)
of Section 100. Where the High Court is satisfied that in any
case any substantial question of law is involved it shall formulate
D
~ i" -t· that question under sub-section (4) and the second appeal has
to be heard on the question so formulated as stated in sub-
section (5) of Section 100.
3. Section 100 of the Code deals with "Second Appeal".
The provision reads as follows: E
"Section 100- (1) Save as otherwise expressly provided
in the body of this Code or by any other law for the time
4""' being in force, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from
every decree passed in appeal by any Court subordinate
to the High Court, if the High Court is satisfied that the F
case involves a substantial question of law:
(2) An appeal may lie under this section from an appellate
decree passed ex parte.
(3) In an appeal under this Section, the memorandum of G
appeal shall precisely state the substantial question of
........ law involved in the appeal .
•
(4) Where the High Court is satisfied that a substantial
question of law is involved in any case, it shall formulate
H
770 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 3 S.C.R.

A that question. If "

(5) The appeal shall be heard on the question so
formulated and the respondent shall, at the hearing of the
appeal, be allowed to argue that the case does not involve
such question:
B
Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall be
deemed to take away or abridge the power of the Court -4-.
'(
.
to hear, for reasons to be recorded, the appeal on any
other substantial question of law, not formulated by it, if it
c is sa~isfied that the case involves such question."
4. A perusal of the impugned judgment passed by the High
Court does not show that any substantial question of law has
been formulated or that the second appeal was heard on the
question, if any, so formulated. That being so, the judgment
D
cannot be maintained ..
t ~

. 5. In /shwar Dass Jain v. Sohan Lal (2000 (1) SCC 434) ~
this Court in para 10, has stated thus:
"10. Now under Section 100, after the 1976 Amendment,
E
it is essential for the High Court to formulate a substantial
question of law and it is not permissible to reverse the judgment
of the first appellate Court without doing so."
6. Yet again in Roop Singh v. Ram Singh (2000 (3) SCC ,.
F 708) this Court has expressed that the jurisdiction of a High
Court· ls confined to appeals involving substantial question of ....
law. Para 7 of the said judgment reads:
"7. It is to be reiterated that under section 100 jurisdiction
of the High Court to entertain a second appeal is confined
G
only to such appeals which involve a substantial question
of law and it does not confer any jurisdiction on the High
Court to interfere with pure questions of fact while exercising
its jurisdiction under section 100. That apart, at the time
of disposing of the matter the High Court did not even
H
· KASHMIR SINGH v. HARNAM SINGH & ANR. 771
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J:]
~r
, notice the question of law formulated by it at the time of A
admission of the second appeal as there is no reference
of it in the impugned judgment. Further, the fact findings ·
courts after appreciating the evidence held that the
defendant entered into the possession of the premises as
a batai, that is to say, as a tenant and his possession was B
permissive and there was no pleading or proof as to when
". ..
,~ it became adverse and hostile. These findings recorded
• by the two courts below were based on proper
appreciation of evidence and the material on record and
there was no perversity, illegality or irregularity in those c
findings. If the defendant got the possession of suit land
as a lessee or under a batai agreement then from the
permissive possession it is for him to establish by cogent
and convincing evidence to show hostile animus and
possession adverse to the knowledge of the real owner. D
Mere possession for a long. time does not result in
,~ converting permissive possession into adverse
possession (Thakur Kishan Singh v. Arvind Kumar (1994
(6) SCC 591). Hence the High .Court ought not to have
interfered with the findings of fact recorded by both the E
courts below."
7. The position has been reiterated in Kanahaiyafal and
Ors. v. Anupkumar and Ors. (JT 2002 (10) SC 98)
t}<
8. After the amendment, a second appeal can be filed only
F
if a substantial question of law is involved in the case. The
.. memorandum of appeal must precisely state the substantial
question of law involved and the High Court is obliged to satisfy
itself regarding the existence of such a question. If satisfied, the
High Court has to formulate the substantial question of law
G
involved in the case. The appeal is required to be heard on the
question so formulated. However, the respondent at the time of
hearing of the appeal has a right to argue that the case.in the
~
court did not involve any substantial question of law. The proviso
to the section acknowledges the powers of the High Court to
H
772 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 3 S.C.R.

A hear the appeal on a substantial point of law, though not
~ .
formulated by it with the object of ensuring that no injustice is '
done to the litigant where such a question was not formulated at
the time of admission either by mistake or by inadvertence.
9. It has been noted time and again that without insisting
8 for the statement of such a substantial question of law in the
memorandum of appeal and formulating the same at the time
of admission, the High Courts have been issuing notices and
generally deciding
\
the second appeals without adhering to the
procedure prescribed under Section 100 of the Code. It has
C further been found in a number of cases that no efforts are made
to distinguish between a question of law and a substantial
question of law. In exercise of the powers under this section in
several cases, the findings of fact of the first appellate court are
found to have been disturbed. It has to be kept in mind that the
D right of appeal is neither a natural nor an inherent right attached
to the litigation. Being a substantive statutory right, it has to be
regulated in accordance with law in force at the relevant time.
The. conditions mentioned in the section must be strictly fulfilled
before a second appeal can be maintained and no court has
....
E the power to add or to enlarge those grounds. The second
appeal cannot be decided on merely equitable grounds. The
concurrent findings of facts will not be disturbed by the High
Court in exercise of the powers under this section. Further, a
substantial question of law has to be distinguished from a
F substantial question of fact. This Court in Sir Chunilal V. Mehta
and Sons Ltd. v. Century Spg. & Mfg. Co. Ltd. (AIR 1962 SC
1314) held that:
"The proper test for determining whether a question
of law raised in the case is substantial would, in our opinion,
G be whether it is of general public importance or whether
it directly and substantially affects the rights of the parties
and if so whether it is either an open question'in the sense
that it is not finally settled by this Court or by the Privy
Council or by the Federal Court or is not free from difficulty
H
KASHMIR SINGH v. HARNAM SINGH & ANR. 773
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
. • 1'
.,, or calls for discussion of alternative views. If the question A
is settled by the highest court or the general principles to
be applied in determining the question are well settled
and there is a mere question of applying those principles
or that the plea raised is palpably absurd the question
would not be a substantial question of law." B
...... ....-«· 10. It is not within the domain of the High Court to investigate
the grounds on which the findings were arrived at, by the last
court of fact, being the first appellate court. It is true that the
lower appellate court sho!Jld not ordinarily reject witnesses
accepted by the trial court in respect of credibility but even where c
it has rejected the witnesses accepted by the trial court, the
same is no ground for interference in second appeal when it is
found that the appellate court has given satisfactory reasons for
doing so. In a case where from a given set of circumstances
two inferences of fact are possible, one drawn by the lower D
•• I appellate court will not be interfered by the High Court in second
appeal. Adopting any other approach is not permissible. The
High Court will, however, interfere where it is found that the
conclusions drawn by the lower appellate court were erroneous
being contrary to the mandatory provisions of law applicable or E
its settled position on the basis of pronouncements made by
the Apex Court, or was based upon inadmissible evidence or
arrived at by ignoring material evidence.
f7'.
11. The question of law raised will not be considered as a
substantial question of law, if it stands already decided by a F
larger Bench of the High Court concerned or by the Privy Council
or by the Federal Court or by the Supreme Court. Where the
facts required for a point of law have not been pleaded, a litigant
should not be allowed to raise that question as a substantial
question of law in second appeal. Mere appreciation of facts, G
the documentary evidence or the meaning of entries and the
contents of the documents cannot be held to be raising a
~
substantial question of law. But where it is found that the first
· appellate court has assumed jurisdiction which did not vest in
it, the same can be adjudicated in the second appeal, treating H
774 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 3 S.C.R.

lt' •
A it as a substantial question of law. Where the first appellate court t(
is shown to have exercised its discretion in a judicial manner, it
cannot be termed to be an error either of law or of procedure
requiring interference in second appeal. This Court in Reserve
Bank of India v. Ramkrishna Govind Morey (1976 (1) SCC
B 803) held that whether the trial court should not have exercised
its jurisdiction differently is not a question of law justifying
interference.([See: Kondiba Dogadu Kadam v. Savitribai -.~
~

.;
Sopan GCJjar and Others (1999(3) SCC 722)].
12. The phrase "substantial question of law", as occurring
c in the amended Section 100 is not defined in the Code. The
word substantial, as qualifying "question of law", means - of
having substance, essential, real, of sound worth, important or
considerable. It is to be understood as something in
contradis.tinction with - technical, of no substance or
D consequence, or academic merely. However, it is clear that the
legislature has chosen not to qualify the scope of "substantial ' ' ..
question of law" by suffixing the words "of general importance"
as has been done in many other provisions such as Article
133(1 )(a) of the Constitution. The substantial question of law on
E which a second appeal shall be heard need not necessarily be
a substantial question of law of general importance. In Guran
Ditta v. T Ram Ditta (AIR 1928 PC 172), the phrase 'substantial
question of law' as it was employed in the last clause of the then
existing Section 100 (since omitted by the Amendment Act,
'"!:"
F 1973) came up for consideration and their Lordships held that
it did not mean a substantial question of general importance
but a substantial question of law which was involved in the case.
In Sri Chunilal's case (supra), the Constitution Bench expressed
agreement with the following view taken by a full Bench of the
Madras High Court in Rimmalapudi Subba Rao v. Noony
G
Veeraju (AIR 1951 Mad. 969):
"When a question of law is fairly arguable, where there is
room for difference of opinion on it or where the Court
thought it necessary to deal with that question at some
H length and discuss alternative views, then the question
KASHMIR SINGH v. HARNAM SINGH'&ANR. 775
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
• 't
,, would be a substantial question of law. On the other hand A
if the question was practically covered by the decision of
the highest court or if the general principles to be applied
in determining the question are well settled and the only
question was of applying those principles to the particular
facts of the case it would not be a substantial"question of B
law."
·"'. •. • 'r:-
13. This Court laid down the following test as proper test,
for determining whether a question of law raised in the case is
substantial as quoted in Sir Chunilal's case (supra).
c
14. In Dy. Commnr. Hardoi v. Rama Krishna Narain (AIR
1953 SC 521) also it was held that a question of law of
importance to the parties was a substantial question of law
entitling the appellant to a certificate under (the then) Section
100 of the CPC.
D
~I T 15. To be "substantial" a question of law must be debatable,
not previously settled by law of the land or a binding precedent,
and must have a material bearing on the decision of the case, if
answered either way, insofar as the rights of the parties before
it are concerned. To be a question of law "involving in the case" E
there must be first a foundation for it laid in the pleadings and
the question should emerge from the sustainable findings of
fact arrived at by court of facts and it must be necessary to decide
,,.. that question of law for a just and proper decision of the case.
An entirely new point raised for the first time before the High F
Court is not a question involved in the case unless it goes to the
root of the matter. It will, therefore, depend on the facts and
circumstance of each case whether a question of law is a
substantial one and involved in the case, or not; the paramount
overall consideration be1ng the need for striking a judicious
G
balance between the indispensable obligation to do justice at
all stages and impelling necessity of avoiding prolongation in
-t the life of any lis. (See :Santosh Hazari v Purushottam Tiwari
(deceased) by Lrs. [(2001) 3 SCC 179].

H
776 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2008] 3 S.C.R.

r: •
A 16. The principles relating to Section 100, relevant for this (
case, may be summarized thus:-
(i) An inference of fact from the recitals or contents of
a document is a question of fact. But the legal effect
of the terms of a document is a question of law.
B Construction of a document involving the application
of any principle of law, is also a question of law.
Therefore, when there is misconstruction of a ~
,., "' '.
document or wrong application of a principle of law
in construing a document, it gives rise to a question
c of law.
(ii) The High Court should be satisfied that the case
involves a substantial question of law, and not a mere
question of law. A question of law having a material
bearing on the decision of the case (that is, a
D
question, answer to which affects the rights of parties
t- 'r
to the suit) will be a substantial question of law, if it
is not covered by any specific provisions of law or
settled legal principle emerging from binding
precedents, and, involves a debatable legal issue. A
E substantial question of law will also arise in a contrary
situation, where the legal position is clear, either on
account of express provisions of law or binding
precedents, but the court below has decided the
matter, either ignoring or acting contrary to such legal ~

F principle. In the second type of cases, the substantial
question of law arises not because the law is still ....
debatable, but because the decision rendered on a
material question, violates the settled position of law.
17. The general rule is that High Court will not interfere
G
with concurrent findings of the Courts below. But it is not an
absolute rule. Some of the well recognized exceptions are where
(i) the courts below have ignored material evidence or acted on
no evidence; (ii) the courts have drawn wrong inferences from
proved facts by applying the law erroneously; or (iii) the courts
H
KASHMIR SINGH v. HARNAM SINGH & ANR. 777
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
•t have wrongly cast the burden of proof. When we refer to 'decision A
> based on no evidence', it not only refers to cases where there
is a total dearth of evidence, but also refers to any case, where
· the evidence, taken as a whole, is not reasonably capable of
supporting the finding.
18. In view of the aforesaid position, we set aside the B
impugned judgment of the High Court and remit the matter to it
for fresh consideration. The Second Appeal can be only
maintained after formulating subst;mtial question of law, if any
and not otherwise. We make it clear we have not expressed
any opinion on the question as to whether any substantial, C
question of law is involved or not.
19. The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent without:
any order as to costs.
S.K.S. Appeal partly allowed. D