KARNAL IMPROVEMENT TRUST, KARNALversusSMT. PARKASH WANTI (DEAD) AND ANR.

A               KARNAL IMPROVEMENT TRUST, KARNAL
                                           v.
                 SMT. PARKASH WANTI (DEAD) AND ANR.

                                    MAY 9, 1995

B               [K. RAMASWAMY AND B.L. HANSARIA, JJ.]

          Punjab Improvement Trust Act 1922-S.60( 1)-Tribunal deciding land
    acquisition reference to consist of President and two assessors-President
    making awards in absence of assessors-Held, adjudication by three member
C   body mandatory; award made in disregard thereof void and inoperative.

           Constitution of India-Article 141-Punjab Improvement Trust Act
    1922, S.60 (1)-Stare decisis, doctrine of-Appellant acquiescing in single
    member awards for number of years-Held, applying stare decisis will defeat
    statutory objective; Court will not shirk from overruling illegal decision.
D
           Constitution of India-Article 141-Punjab Improvement Trust Act
    1922, S.60 (1)-Prospective operation-Supreme Court holding awards by
    President singly void-Held, decision to operate prospectively; will not unsettle
    single member awards that have become final-Practice and procedure.
E       Under s.60(1) of Punjab Improvement Trust Act, 1922 ('Act), the
  Tribunal constituted to hear a reference under s.18 of the Land Acquisition
  Act, 1894 "to consist of a President and two assessors". Under s.59(d)
  award of a Tribunal shall be deemed to be that of a court. In the instant
  cases, dissatisfied will\ award of the Land Acquisition Collector the
F respondent sought reference to the Tribunal. The President heard the
  reference in the absence of the two assessors and then prepared and signed
  the award. The High Court following its decision in Sohan Lal v. State of
  Haryana, AIR (1981) P & H 349 held that the President alone could make
  the award and upheld its validity.
G         Allowing the appeal, this Court

       Held : 1. The award prepared and signed by the President is not an
  award of the Tribunal. Adjudication by the three-member Tribunal is
  imperative and mandatory. Determination of the compensation in dis·
H regard thereof renders the adjudication void, invalid and in operative. Any
                                     136
             KARNALIMPROVEMENTTRUSTv. PARKASHWANTI                           137

    other interpretation would be inconsistent with and derogatory to the           A
    scheme, purpose and intendment of the Act. [143-F, 145-E] ·

         Sohan Lal v. State of Haryana, AIR (1981) Punjab & Haryana 349,
    overruled.

        Montreal Street Railway Company v. Normandin, AIR (1917) Privy              B
    Council 142 at 147, referred to.

          2. The doctrine of state decisis, if applied, would perpetrate an
    erroneous interpretation defeating the statutory objective of the Act and a
    decree by an incompetent adjudicator would get executed. Acquiescence           C
    does not confer jurisdiction. Normally decisions which have been followed
    for a long period of time and should generally be followed but this rule is
    not inexorable, inflexible and universally applicable in all situations. The
    appellate ~ourt will not shirk from overruling decisions which establish a
    ratio plainly outside the statute. [150-E, F, 146-B]



-
                                                                                    D
         Raj Narain Pandey v. Sant Prasad Tiwari, [1973] 2 SCC 35, distin-
    guished.

          Maktul v. Manbhari, AIR (1958) SC 918; Washington v. Dawson & Co.,
    264 U.S. 646 (68 L.Ed 219); Mark Graves v. People of the State of New York,     E
    306 U.S. 466; The Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar, [1955] 2 SCR
    603; A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak and Another, [1988] 2 SCC 602 and The
    Keshav Mills Co. Ltd. v. The Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay North,
    AIR (1965) SC 1636, followed.

         Darshan Singh v. Rampa/ Singh, [1992] Supp. 1 SCC 191 and                  F


-
    Kesavananda Bharati v. State or Kera/a, AIR (1973) SC 1461, referred to.

          Halsbury's Laws of England; Corpus Juris Secundum paras 192, 193
    at page 322, referred to.

          3. Any award made from this date by the member-President of the
                                                                                    G
    Tribunal only shall be void and it does not have the effect of unsettling the
    single member awards made and becoming final. [151-B]

          Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad v. B. Karunakar, [1993] 4 SCC
    727, followed.                                                         H
    138                  SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995) SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 4237 of
    1995 Etc.

         From the Judgment and Order dated 29.4.91 of the Punjab &
    Haryana High Court in LP.A. No. 1042 of 1990.

B         Mohan Lal Verma, S.K. Bagga, Muni Lal Verma, D.V. Sehgal,
    Madhava Reddy, Seeraj Bagga, Ms. Tanuj Bagga, Ms. Shuresh Bagga,
    Debasi~ Misra, Bhuvneshwar Bawa (Intervenor-in-person), KG.Bhagat,
    Ms. K Choudhary, Tara Chandra Sharma, Rajeev Sharma, Ms. Neelam
    Sharma, Ajay Sharma, K.C. Bajaj and D.B. Vohra for the appearing
C   parties.

          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

         K. RAMASWAMY, J. These appeals by special leave arise from the
  judgments of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in LPA 1042/90 and
D batch dated April 29, 1991. The facts lie in a short compass for deciding
  the question of law arising for adjudication in these appeals. The appellant
  framed Schedule No. 37 to improve the existing roads and development of
  the area in Old Sabzi Mandi, Kamal, and for that purpose a resolution
   under s.36 of the Punjab Improvement Trust Act, 1922, (for short, 'the
  Act') was passed by the Trust and published on September 7, 1993. After
E its sanction by the State Government, notification under s.45 was published.
  The Land Acquisition Collector in his award dated May 24, 1976, granted
  compensation at the rate of Rs. 100 per sq.yd. Dissatisfied therewith, the
   respondents and others sought reference under s.18 of the Land Acquisi-
   tion Act to the Tribunal constituted in that behalf under the Act. The
   President of Tribunal in his awards dated November 18, 1988 etc., en-
F hanced the compensation in some case to Rs. 1396 per sq. yd. and in some
   other case to Rs. 450 per sq.yd. etc. Dissatisfied therewith, the appellant
   as well as the respondents filed writ petitions under Article 226 and the
   High Court. The single Judge as also the Division Bench, granted compen-
   sation at the rate of Rs. 1396 uniformly to all the claimants. Thus these
                                                                                 ..
G appeal.
        Shri Verma, learned counsel appearing for the Trust, raised five- fold
  contentions. The main thrust is the validity of the award made by the
  President of the Tribunal. Besides, he also challenged the correctness of
  the amendment of the writ petition claimed enhanced compensation al-
H lowed by the High Court; omission to deduct developmental charges;
KARNALIMPROVEMENTTRUSfv.PARKASHWANTI[K.RAMASWAMY,J.]                  139

taking irrelevant sale deeds into consideration; omission to consider two . A
relevant sale deeds; and lastly the errors in calculation of the compensa-
tion. The counsel for the respondents and some of the parties in-person
resisted the contentions of the appellants. We have heard both sides
primarily on the first question and, therefore, the appellant had not ad-
dressed us in full on other points, though respondent sought to support the B
award on merits. The question is whether the Chairman alone can pass the
award under the Act. If the finding would be in favour of the validity, then
only the need to go into the other questions would arise. The Division
Bench, following the ratio in Sohan Lal v. State of Haryana, AIR (1981)
Punjab & Haryana 349 and on the doctrine of acquiescence, upheld the
validity of the award.                                                       C

     In SiJhan Lal' case, the High Court in coming to its conclusion that
the President alone could make the award under the Act, reasoned that
the President holds pivotal position having administrative and judicial
experience with the qualifications of eligibility for appointment as a judge D
of Punjab & Haryana High Court. He presides over the proceedings. He
has power to summon the witnesses, compel the production of documents;
he is a judge under the Act; he holds the proceedings as a Civil Court; he
had administrative control over the staff; he has the exclusive power to
decided questions of law and title and procedure on which the opinion of
the President is final. The assessors are ancillary and practically they are E
not members of the Tribunal stricto sensu. No qualifications have been
prescribed as eligibility for their appointment as assessors. No quorum has
been prescribed. They need to hold no previous experience either judicial
or administrative. Their attending the enquiry is optional and in the event
of their being present and participation their dissent may be relevant: The F
operation of the statute must be so construed as to avoid inconvenience
and hardship to the litigant public.

       The question, therefore, is whether the view of the High Court is
correct in law. Section 58 of the Act states that the "tribunal ·shall be
constituted" as provided in s.60. The Tribunal thus constituted, performs G
the functions of the court in reference to the acquisition to the land for the
trust under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, (for short, 'the Central Act').
Under s.2(5) Tribunal means a Tribunal constituted under s.60. Under
sub-s. (1) of s.60, the Tribunal "shall consist of a President and two asses-
sors". Sub-s.(2) prescribes the qualifications of the President who shall be H
    140                  SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A a person qualified for appointment as a Judge of the High Court of Punjab
    & Haryana. The amendment in this behalf made by the Legislature of
  Haryana enlarges and includes person who held the office of a Collector
  for a period of 10 years or has served as a District Magistrate. Under sub-
  s.(3), the State Government shall be the appointing authority of the Presi-
B dent and one assessor. The Municipal Committee concerned shall appoint
  within two months of their being required by the State Government to
  make such appointment and on its committing default, the Stale Govern-
  ment shall appoint the second assessor. The terms of office of each member
  of the Tribunal shall be of two years subject to re-appointment. When any
  person ceases for any reason to be a member of the Tribunal or any member
C is temporarily absent due to illness of any unavoidable cause, the authority
  i.e, the State Government or Municipal Committee, as the case may, shall
  forthwith appoint a fit person to be a member in his place; with the same
  rider for default in appointment by the Municipal Committee on expiry of
  two months thereafter, the State Government would appoint such a mem-
D ber. Under s.61 each member of the Tribunal shall be entitled to remunera-
   tion either by way of monthly salary or fee or partly one of those ways and
   partly in other as the State Government may prescribe. The member is
   liable to be removed under s.10 for the grounds envisaged therein. A
   trustee of the trust is ineligible for appointment as a member of the
   Tribunal.
E
         Under s.59, for the purpose of acquiring land under the Central Act
  for the trust, the Tribunal shall be deemed to be the Court. The President
  shall be the Judge and shall have power to summon of enforce the atten-
  dance of witness and to compel the production of documents as a civil
F court under CPC. The President of the Tribunal may record evidence on
  any matters in the absence of assessors, unless he considers their presence
  necessary. On the questions of law and title and procedure, despite any-
  thing contained in clause (a) of sub-s.(1) of s.65, the decision shall rest
  solely, as stated in clause (6) with the President and he may try and decide
  the same in the absence of assessors unless he considers their presence
G necessary. If there is any disagreement as to the measurement of land or to
  the amount of compensation or cost to be allowed, the opinion of the majority
  of members of the Tribunal shall prevail. Under s.59(d), the award of a
  Tribunal shall be deemed to be the award of the court under the Central Act
  and shall be final. Under s.26 of the Central Act, every award shall be
H deemed to be a decree and the statement of the grounds of every such award,
      KARNALIMPROVEMENfTRUSTv.PARKASHWANTI[K.RAMASWAMY,J.]                     141

      a judgment under s.2(2) and s.2(9) of CPC; and every award shall be in A
      writing signed the judge specifying the amount awarded under clause (1)
      of sub-s.(1) of s.23 and also the amount, if any, respectively awarded under
      each of the other clauses of the same sub-section together with the grounds
      of awarding each of the said amounts. By operation of sub-s.(2) of s.65, the
      award of the Tribunal and every order made by the Tribunal for the              B
      payment of money, shall be enforced by the Court of Small Causes or in
      its absence by the senior Sub-Judge within local limits of whose jurisdiction
      it was made if it were a decree of that Court.

             A conspectus of the above provisions would given us unerring indica-
      tion of the legislative animation that the Tribunal shall consist of three C
      members, namely, the President and two assessors and each is co-existent
      with the others. The Tribunal is a civil court and the President is the
      Presiding Judge of the Court. Being a judicial member, undoubtedly, he
      has been conferred with power to preside over the Tribunal, summon the
      witnesses secure the evidence and decide on questions of law and title and D
      procedure. If he considers necessary he may also do so in association with
•··   other members. Even fo matters of procedure to a limited extent, namely,
      in summoning the witnesses who would be competent or necessary or
      material witnesses to unfold the measurement of the land or the value
      thereof, the views of the assessor-members may be relevant, germane and
      sometimes necessary, as being local persons. It is true that no qualifications E
      have been prescribed for appointment of a assessor, while qualifications
      for the member-president stood prescribed. The reason appears to be that
      the assessor being a local member, obviously, having had personal
      knowledge of the local conditions of the land and its prevailing value, the
      legislature appears to have intended that opinion of men of common F
      experience, perhaps, would be more appropriate to determine compensa-
      tion. That would not elevate the position of the President to be pivotal and
      relegate the assessors to be adjunct or ancillary to the President. If it were
      to be otherwise, the legislature would have employed the language that the
      President, with the assistance of the assessors, ·would determine the com- G

-     pensation or have the land measured etc. etc. The power to decide on
      question of law and title and in some case the procedure solely given to
      the President, in obviously for the reason that the President has had judicial
      or legal experience of questions relating to disputes of title and also
      conversant with the procedure in the Code of Civil Procedure. Section
      59(c) amplifies that scope and gives power to the presiding member the H
    142                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995] SUPP. l S.C.R.

A status of civil judge to summon the witnesses, enforce their evidence and
    to compel production of the documents as it provided in CPC.

          The award of the Tribunal has been designated to be the award of
  the Court and the Tribunal is the Court and each member is entitled to his
B own opinion in determination of the compensation or measurements of the
  land. The Chairperson as a Civil Judge is empowered to sign the award on
  behalf of the Tribunal. In case of difference of opinion, the majority
  opinion of the members shall be the decree of the Tribunal. The mandatory
  quorum, therefore, is three members and the award of the Tribunal is a
  decree of a civil court. The President also is a member of the Tribunal and
C everyone of them is liable to be removed for any of the grounds
  enumerated in s.10. Each member qua discharge of the functions is an
  independent member. Mere fact that the President will record the
  evidence, in the absence of the assessors, or that he is given power to
  preside over the Tribunal and to compel the presence of the witnesses or
D to secure the evidence does not per force minimise or undermine the
  composition of, continuance and functions of the assessors as members of
  the Tribunal. Temporary absence of a member including President, may
  entail, by implication, his removal and appointment of a substitute member,
  which would reinforce that in the discharge of the functions as a member,
  the presence and participation of each member of the Tribunal should be
E mandatory, unless his absence becomes unavoidable and beyond his con-
   trol. Take for instance, absence due to being out of station. The power to
   record evidence in the absence of the assessors does not clothe the Presi-
  dent with the power to decide himself the question of compensation or
   measurement of land as sole member Tribunal. When the Tribunal consists
F of three members, the opinion has to be of the composit body, and not of
   the sole President. The power vested in the President to decide questions
   of law and title and procedure does not undermine the position of asses-
   sor-members of the Tribunal and other matters. The President need not            •
   necessarily be a local man. He may be a judicial office drafted from the
   service of the respective State; and the assessors, by implication, may be
G only local men having acquaintance with the prevailing prices of the land.
   The President must be necessity be either judicial trained or administra-
   tively experienced person. When the Tribunal determines compensation or
                                                                                    -
   dispute as the extent of the land acquired or of the quality of the land
   under acquisition, the decision is that of the Tribunal. In case of difference
H of opinion, the majority view would be the executable decree. In other
    KARNALIMPROVEMENTTRUsrv. PARKASH WAND [K RAMASWAMY, J.]              143


    words, it indicates that it is a three-member statutory body and does not A
    consist of the presiding Judge only. He is left with no option but has to
    associate the other member in determining the compensation of the ac-
    quired land for the trust or its nature or extent. Any other interpretation
'   would be inconsistent with and derogatory to the scheme, purpose and
    intendment of the Act. The presence and participation of each member in B
    the adjudication of the compensation or measurement or quality of land,
    is of necessity mandatory. The Tribunal will have the assistance of the
    counsel for the trust and of the claimant or/and counsel for the claimant,
    if any, engaged by the claimant in determining the compensation or for the
    measurement and quality of the land. It would, therefore, be clear that all
    the three members should be present and should participate at the time of C
    enquiry unless unavoidable, hear the matter on merits and the decision of
    the Tribunal, if not unanimous and ifthere be difference of opinion, be as
    per the majority.

         In other words, the award and the decree are that of the Tribunal D
    and not that of the Presiding Judge alone, though the President signs the
    award. In case of difference of opinion , the opinion of each member is a
    judgment but the enforceable award and decree are that of the majority.

          Admittedly, the assessors did not take any active part in the cases at
    hand in hearing the argument and President has recorded that "they told E
    the undersigned that I should hear the arguments by myself. Today neither
    of these two assessors is present. It appears they are not interested in
    hearing the arguments" . This is dereliction of the statutory duty enjoined
    by the Act defeating the purpose of the Act. The award prepared and
    signed by the President is that of the President, as he says, it is not an F
    award of the Tribunal. Thus the decree is not that of the Tribunal, which
    alone is executable in a Court of Small Causes or senior Sub-Judge.

          Shri K. Madhava Reddy, learned senior counsel appearing for the
    respondent in C.A. 4243/94, contended that the word 'shall' employed in
    s.58 and s.60(1) should be construed as a directory. The constitution of the G
    Tribunal and its functioning are under he control of the claimants. The
    attendance or failure to attend the hearings during the enquiry by the
    assessors are not regulated by the provisions of the Act or the Rules made
    thereunder. The interpretation that the performance of the duties by the
    assessors is mandatory would cause great hardship to the claimants. The H
    144                  SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995) SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A provisions of the Act should be so construed as to avoid hardship to the
    claimants. In support thereof, he placed reliance on Montreal Street Railway
    Company v. Normandin, AIR (1917) Privy Council 142 and 147. It was held
    therein that :

            "When the provisions of a statute relate to the performance of a
B           public duty and the case is such, that to hold null and void, acts
            done in neglect of this duty would work serious general incon·
            venience for injustice to persons, who have no control over those
            entrusted with the duty, and at the same time, would not promote
            the main object of the Legislature, such provisions are to be held
c           to be directory only, the neglect of them though punishable not
            affecting the validity of the acts done."

  In the said case, the list of the jury was to be revived from time to time.
  Without revising the list, the old jury continued four years in neglect to
D the duty to revise the list of jury by the Sharief. The question then arose
  whether the adjudication by such a jury was valid in law? In the light of
  the facts, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council held that it was a
  directory.

          There is distinction between ministerial acts and statutory or quasi-
E judicial functions under the statute. When the statute requires that some·
  thing should be done or in a particular manner or form, without expressly
  declaring what shall be the consequence of non-compliance, the question
  often arise; What intention is to be attributed by inference to the legisla·
  tore? It has been repeatedly said that no particular rule can be laid down
F in determining whether the command is to be considered as a mere
  direction or mandatory involving invalidating consequences in its disregard.
  It is fundamental that it depends on the scope and object of the enactment.
  Nullification is the natural and usual consequence of disobedience, if the
  intention is of an imperative character. The question in the main is
G governed by considerations of the object and purpose of the Act; con·
  venience and justice and the result that would ensue. General incon·
  venience or injustice to innocent persons or advantage to those guilty of
  the neglect, without promoting the real aim and object of the enactment
  would be kept at the back of the mind. The scope and purpose of the
  statute under consideration must be regarded as an integral scheme. The
H general rule is that an absolute enactment must be obeyed or fulfilled
     KARNALIMPROVEMENTTRUSfv. PARKASHWANTI[K.RAMASWAMY,J.]                   145


     exactly but it is sufficient if a directory enactment be obeyed or fulfilled   A
     substantially. When a public duty, as held before, is imposed and statute
     requires that is shall be performed in a certain manner or within a certain
     time or under other specified conditions, such prescriptions may well be
     regarded as intended to be directory only in cases when injustice or
     inconvenience to others who have no control over those exercising the duty     B
     would result if such requirements are not essential and imperative.

            The question thus arises whether the function by the Tribunal as a
     body is mandatory or directory? The discharge of the duties under the Act
     are quasi-judicial. The power to determine compensation and other ques-
     tions involves adjudication. The discharge of the functions by the Tribunal C
     being quasi-judicial cannot be regarded as ministerial. When the statute
     directs the Tribunal consisting of three members to determine compensa:
     tion etc., and· designates the award as judgment and decree of the civil
     court, it cannot be held that the quasi-judicial functions of the Tribunal
     would be considered as directory, defeating the very purpose of the Act. D
     Though inconvenience and delay may occasion in some cases by holding
     the provisions to be mandatory, but that is an inescapable consequence. In
     the light of the aforesaid discussion, it must be held that the adjudication
     by the three-member Tribunal is imperative and mandatory. Determination
.,
C'
     of the compensation in disregard thereof renders the adjudication void,
     invalid and in operative.                                                    E

           It is contended by learned senior counsel Shri Sehgal appearing for
     some other respondents that Sohan La/'s ratio held the field for more than
     14 years, based thereon several award came to be made by the President
     of the Tribunals under the Act and therefore, the doctrine of stare decisis    F
     should be applied and Sohan Lal decision be upheld.

           Shri Sehgal further contended that awards have been made for years
     by a single member without any demur and the appellant acquiesced to it.
     The parties have worked out their rights on the basis of the awards thus G
     made. Any declaration of its invalidating would cause great inconvenience,
     unsettling the settled rights. The Act is a local legislation. The High Court
     had interpreted the Act so as to avoid inconvenience to the claimants. In
     support thereof, he placed strong reliance in Raj Narain Pandey v. Sant
     Prasad Tiwari, [1973] 2 SCC 35 (para 10), and Darshan Singh v. Rampa/
     Singh, [1992] Supp. 1 sec 191 (para 33).                                      H
    146                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A          In Halsbury's Laws of England, the principle of stare decisis is stated
    thus: "The decision which has been followed for a long period of time and
    has been acted upon by person in any formation of contracts or in the
    disposition of their property or in legal procedure of in other ways will
    generally be followed by courts of higher authority than the court estab-
B   lishing the rule even though the court before whom the matter arises
    afterwards might not have given the same decision had the question come
    before it originally. But the supreme appellate Court will not shrink from
    overmling a decision or series of decisions which establish a doctrine plainly
    outside the statute, (emphasis supplied) and outside the common law and
    given right and no contract will be shaken, no person can complain and no
C general conrse of dealing be altered by tht remedy of a mistake. In Corpus
    Juris Secundum, it is stated in para 192 that "Under the stare decisis rule,
    a principle of law which has become settled by a series of decisions
    generally is binding on the courts and should be followed in similar cases.
    This rule is based on expediency and public policy, and, although generally
D   it should be strictly adhered to by the courts it is not universally applicable."
    In para 193 at page 322, it was further stated that "previous decisions
    should not be followed to the extent that grievous wrong may result; and
    accordingly the courts ordinarily will not adhere to a rule or principle
    established by previous decisions which they are convinced is erroneous.
    The rule of stare decisis is not so imperative or inflexible as to preclude a
E   departure therefrom in any case, but its application must be determined in
    each case by the discretion of the court and previous decisions should not
    be followed to the extent that error may be perpetuated and grievous wrong
    may result."

F       In Maktul v. Mst. Manbhari, AIR 1985 SC 918, a Bench of three
  Judges, considered a Full bench judgment of Lahore High Court which
  held the field from 1895. The same was held to be erroneous and was
  overruled. In Bengal Immunity Company Limited v. State Washington v.
  Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 646, ( = 68 L.Ed. 219) Brandies, J., in his
G dissenting judgment held that "the doctrine of stare decisis should not deter
  us from overruling that case and those which follow it. The decisions are
  recent ones. They have not been acquiesced in. They have not created a
  rule of property around which vested interests have clustered. They affect
  solely matters of a transitory nature. On the other hand, they affect
  seriously the lives of men, Women and children, and the general welfare".
H Stare decisis is ordinarily a wise rule of action. But it is not a universal and
KARNALIMPROVEMENfTRUSfv.PARKASHWANTI[K.RAMASWAMY,J.)                  147

inexorable command. In Mark Graves v. People of the State of New York, A
306 U.S. 466, (- 83 L.Ed. 927) Frank further, J. observed "Judicial exigen-
cies is unavoidable with reference to an Act like our Constitution, drawn
in many particulars with proposed vagueness so as to leave room for the
unfolding future." In The Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar and
others, (1955] 2 SCR 603, a Bench of 7 Judges of this Court held that B
non-interference may result in an erroneous interpretation of the Constitu-
tion being perpetuated or may, if unrectified, cause great detriment to
public well being. Accordingly, this Court overruled the previous decision.

       The Court bows to the lessons of experience and the force of better
reasoning recognising that the process of trial and error so fruitful in the C
physical sciences is appropriate also in the judicial function. In A.R.
Antulay v. R.S. Nayak and another, [1988] 2 SCC 602, a Bench of 7 Judges
of this Court held at page 658 that a decision touching the jurisdiction of
the court has to be, not only consistent with the fundamental rights gu~ran­
teed by the Constitution, the same cannot even be inconsistent with the D
substantive provisions of the relevant statutory law. In The Keshav Mills Co.
Ltd. v. The Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay No!th, AIR (1965) SC
1636, considering the effect of statutory interpretation, Constitution Bench
of this Court said at page 1644 that :

            "But different considerations must inevitably arise where a E
        previous decision of this Court has taken a particular view as· to
        the construction of a statutory provision as, for instance, s.66(4) of
        the Act. When it is urged that the view already taken by this Court
        should be reviewed and revised it may not necessarily be an
        adequate reason for such review and revision to hold that though F
        the earlier view is a reasonably possible view, the alternative view
        which is pressed on the subsequent occasion is more reasonable.
        In reviewing and revising its earlier decision, this Court should ask
        itself whether in the interests of the public good or for any other
        valid and compulsive reasons, it is necessary that the earlier
        decision should be revised. When this Court decides questions of G
        law, its decisions are, under Art. 141 binding on all Courts within
        the territory of India, and so, it must be the constant endeavour
        and concern of this Court to introduce and maintain an element
        of certainty and continuity in the interpretation of law in the
        country. Frequent exercise by this Court of its power to review its H
    148                  SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A           earlier decisions on the ground that the view pressed before it later
            appears to the Court to be more reasonable, may incidentally tend
            to make law uncertain and introduce confusion which must be
            inconsistently avoided. That is not to say that if on a subsequent
            occasion, the Court is satisfied that its earlier decision was clearly
            erroneous, it should hesitate to correct the error; but before a
B           previous decision is pronounced to be plainly erroneous, the Court
            must be satisfied with a fair amount of unanimity amongst its
            members that a revision of the said view is fully justified. It is not
            possible or desirable, and in any case it would be inexpedient to
            lay down any principles which should govern the approach of the
c           Court in dealing with the question of review and revising its earlier
            decisions. It would always depend upon several relevant considera-
            tions : what is the nature of the infirmity or error on which a plea
             for a review and revision of the earlier view it based? On the earlier
             occasion, did some patent aspects of the question remain un-
             noticed, or was the attention of the Court not drawn to any relevant
D
             and material statutory provision, or was any previous decision of
             the Court bearing on the point not noticed? Is the Court hearing
             such plea fairly unanimous that there is such an error in the earlier
             view? What would be the impact of the error on the general
             administration of law or on public good? Has the earlier decision
E            been followed on subsequent occasions either by this Court or by
             the High Courts? And, would the reversal of the earlier decision
             lead to public inconvenience, hardship or mischief? These and
             other relevant considerations must be carefully borne in mind
             whenever this Court is called upon to exercise its jurisdiction to
F            review and revise its earlier decisions. These considerations be-
             come still more significant when the earlier decision happens to
             be a unanimous decision of a Bench of five learned Judges of this
             Court."

          It was also further observed that the principle of stare decisis cannot
G   be pressed into service in cases where the jurisdiction of the Supreme
    Court to reconsider and revise its earlier decision is invoked; yet, the
    normal principle that judgments pronounced by this Court would be final
    and cannot be ignored unless considerations of a substantial and compell-
    ing character make it necessary to do so. This Court should and would be
H   reluctant to review and revise its earlier decisions. That, broadly stated, is
KARNALIMPROVEMENTTRUSf v. PARKASH WANT! [K. RAMASWAMY,J.]               149

the approach which we propose to adopt in dealing with the point of stare A
decisis.

       In Raj Narayan Pandey's case (supra), this Court was confronted with
a Divisions Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Mahabal Singh v. Ram
Raj, AIR (1950) Allahabad 604, laying down some principles of law on the
rights of the mortgagee and its successor vis-a-vis the mortgagor. That B
principle was consistent with equity, justice and the rights of the
mortgagor and mortgagee. When its correctness was challenged, this Court
held in paragraph 10 that contrary view would unsettle the law established
for a number of years and that, therefore, the doctrine of stare decisis was
applied. It is to remember that the ratio in Mahabal' case does to touch C
the jurisdiction and interpretation of the statute. In Darshan Singh v. Ram
Pal Singh and another, [1992] Supp. 1 SCC 191, interpreting the customary
law of Punjab and the amendment of the Hindu Succession Act to the
pending cases, this Court applied the doctrine stare decisis to alongate
justice.
                                                                              D
      In Kesavananda and Others v. State of Kera/a and Another, AIR
(1973) SC 1461 (at page 1894-95, para 1530) while interpreting Article 31A
of the Constitution in the dissenting judgment, Khanna, J. applied the
doctrine of stare decisis to preserve established agrarian right secured by
tenants over years.
                                                                              E
      Thus we hold that normally the decisions which have been followed
for a long period of time and have been acted upon by persons in the
formulation of contracts or in the disposition of that property or other legal
processes should generally be followed afterwards but this rule is not
inexorable, inflexible and universally applicabkln all situations. The appel- F
!ant could will not shirk from overruling the decision or series of decision
which establish a ratio plainly outside the statute or in negation of the
object resulting in defeating the purpose of the statute or when the Court
is convinced that the view is clearly erroneous or illegal. Perpetration of
such an illegal decision would result in grievous wrong. When the decision
touches upon the jurisdiction of the Court or the Tribunal, it is but the duty G
of the appellate court to consider the correctness thereof and lay down the
correct law. When two views are reasonably possible, the alternative view
which is consistent with justice and equity, and if no irremedial would
ensure thereunder, the earlier view may be accepted in the interest of
public or for any other valid and compulsive reasons. If it touches the H
    150                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A jurisdiction or question of law of great public importance or involves
  interpretation of the statute, the erroneous interpretation would not be a
  ground for the court to shirk its responsibility to reconsider the interpreta-
  tion and lay down the correct principle of law. In that behalf, the doctrine
  of stare decisis becomes inapplicable. Interpretation of the special statue
B of local character, it if is consistent with the purpose of the statute and
  justice and no irremedial would arise therefrom, the view of the High Court
  will be respected by this Court. If the previous decision is plainly er-
  roneous, the court must be satisfied that the view of the High Court is
  justified. It is not possible or desirable or expedient to lay down any
  principle which should govern the approach of this court in dealing with
C the applicability of the doctrine of stare decisis. It would always depend
  upon several relevant considerations particularly touching the jurisdiction
  of the court or the Tribunal which decides the dispute. It is seen that Sohan
  Lal's ratio was laid in the year 1981 and within 7 years when the oppor-
  tunity arose, its legality was questioned but the subsequent bench upheld
D the ratio of Sohan Lal's case. Therefore, it is a case of transient nature and
  it did not acquire the status attracting stare decisis. The Act intended
   adjudication by plurality of opinions with multi-voice rather than individual
   dicta. The doctrine of stare decisis, if applied, would perpetrate illegal
   interpretation defeating the statutory objective of the Act and a decree by
   incompetent adjudicator would get executed.
E
         It is next contended that since the matter is long pending and the
  appellant has acquiesced to the jurisdiction of the single member award, it
  is not a fit case warranting interference under Art. 136. Acquiescence does
  not confer jurisdiction and erroneous interpretation equally should not be
F permitted to perpetuate and perpetrate defeating of legislative animation.
  It is next contended that the decision in this appeal should be given
  prospective operation to the future cases without disturbing the decision
  under appeal, since long time has lapsed from the date of the notification
  under s.28 of the Act. We do not agree. In Managing Director, ECIL,
  Hyderabad v. B. Karnnakar, [1993] 4 SCC 727, a Constitution Bench of this
G Court held that the decision .laying down a principle of law for the first
  time should be given prospective operation from the date of the judgment
  and any action taken prior to that date would not be reopened. In that
  case, the question was whether the delinquent officer is entitled to the
  supply of inquiry report and non-supply there of vitiates the punitive action
H taken against the delinquent officer. This Court held that the decision must
KARNALIMPROVEMENTTRUSfv. PARKASHWANT![K.RAMASWAMY,J.]                  151

be given effect from the date it was rendered. In other words, the ratio A
would not be applicable to the pending cases in the courts below or this
Court and be given effect from the date of the judgment. In that view, it
must be held that since the award of the Tribunal is of the President of the
Tribunal and not of that Tribunal, the consequence is that the award and
decree are void. Therefore, it cannot be given effect. Since, we are inter-
                                                                             B
preting law, we declare that any award made from this date by the member-
President of the Tribunal only shall be void and it does not have the effect
of unsettling the single member awards made and becoming final.

      It is not in dispute that is some cases, this Court remitted them for
decision afresh by the Tribunal and we are informed, they are still pending   C
decision. Since these are all old cases, State Government of Haryana is
directed to constitute the tribunal as provided in the Act if not already
done and the Tribunal will consider, decide and dispose of all the claims
within a period of not more than six months from the date of the constitu-
tion.
                                                                              D
       May it be stated before closing that an effort was made by the
respondents appearing in person (Shri Jawa) that the appellant had ac-
cepted the valuation of Rs. 1326 as fixed by the Tribunal in some cases and
so, it should not be allowed to question the judgment of the High Court,
when it has fixed the same. valuation for the similarly situated lands of E
others. This point was sought to be brought home to us by referring to the
table prepared by the Tribunal which is at page 211 of the C.A. 4237/95.
We have gone into this aspect and after Shri Verma for the appellants, we
cannot accept this contention of hearing Shri Jawa. Nor do we accept his
contention that all the lands are similarly situate; the map at page 325 of
this appeal does not establish the same.                                    F
      The appeals are, therefore, allowed. The judgments of the High
Court and the awards of the Tribunal are set aside. The Tribunal shall
decide the dispute in accordance with law as stated earlier. Several ques-
tions on merits had arisen but since not allowed to the canvassed, we are G
not expressing any opinion on merits. All the questions are kept at large
to be dealt with in accordance with law. No costs.

S.M.                                                      Appeal allowed.