KARAMJEET SINGHversusUNION OF INDIA

A                             KARAMJEET SINGH
                                          v.
                                UNION OF INDIA

                                OCTOBER 8, 1992

B                (AM. AHMADI AND K. RAMASWAMY, JJ.]

          Constitution of India, 1950 :

        ATticle 32--Writ Petition by third party challenging conviction and
C sentence by Supreme CouTt-Maintainabiliry of-Legal disabiliry iii invoking
  writ jurisdiction-Obsession based on religious belief or personal philo-
  sophy-Whether included.

           The petitioner, claiming to be the 'next friend' of two convicts tiled
    a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution questioning the le~lity and
D   validity of their conviction and sentence by the Designated Court, which
    was confirmed by this Court.

           The petitioner contended that the petitioner tiled this petition as the
    next friend of the two convicts, who were under a legal disability due to
E   their intense obsession that the person who was responsible for desecrat·
    ing the Harminder Sahib could not be allowed to survive and bad no right
    to live being guilty of such a high act of sacrilege against divinity; that the
    said obsession led the two convicts to believe that the perpetrator of the
    sacrilege against divinity was the Government of the day and justice could
    not be expected from it.
F
          The respondent contended that lf the aggrieved person was allowed
    to take the law in his own bands and later plead disability on the ground
    that bis action emanated from an acute obsession, he deserved the death
    penalty.
G         Dismissing the writ petition, this Court,

          HELD : I.I. Neither the provisions of the Code of Criminal Proce·
    dure, 1973 nor any other statute permitted a third party stranger to
    question the correctness of the conviction and sentence imposed l!y the
H   Court after a regular trial. [901-D]
                                        898
                      KARAMJEETSINGH v. U.0.1.                             899

      1.2. The dlsabillty must be one which the law recognises. A mere A
obsession based on religious belier or any other personal philosophy
cannot be regarded as a legal disability of the type recognised by the Code
or Criminal Procedure or any other law which would permit initiation of
proceedings by a third party, be be a rriend. [902 F-G]

      1.3. It Is hazardous to allow a third party to initiate proeeedings         B
under Article 32 challenging the order passed by the Designated Court and
confirmed by this Court on the mere ground that the convicts had acted
under such an obsession. [902·H, 903-A)

      1.4. In the instant case itselrthe co-accused who have been acquitted       C
by the Designated Court and whose acquittal has been confirmed by this
Court would run the risk of a fresh trial and a possible conviction. [902-H)

      1.5. It was stated in the petition that it was filed on behalf or the two
convicts; but it was clarified in paragraph 4 of the petition that the convicts
instructed that none of their relations should file any petition seeking          D
justice .or mercy for them. Therefore, this petition was not filed on instruc·
lions given by the two convicts or at their behest. [900-D)

      1.6. The petitioner bas no 'locus standi' to move this Court under
Article 32 of the Constitution fo~ challenging the conviction and sentence        E
awarded to the two convicts by this Court's order of Jul1 lS, 1992, reported
in State of Maharashtra v. Sukhdev Singh, (1992) 3 SCC 700. [903·F)

      Simranjit Singh Mann v. Union of India, JT (1992) S SC 441, ex·
plained.
                                                                                  F
    S.P. Gupta v. Union of India, (1981) Suppl. SCC 87; M. Krishna
Swami v. Union of India & Ors., JT (1992) S SC 92 and Janata Dal v. H.S.
Chowdhary & Ors., (1991) 3 SCC 756, referred to.

     CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION                           Writ Petition      G
(Criminal) No. 585 of 1992.

      (Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.)

       Dr. B.L. Wadehra, Ashok Kumar Sharma and M.S. Butalia for the
Petitioner.                                                                       H
    900                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A        Altaf Ahmed, Addi. Solicitor General, Ms. A. Subhashini, A.S.
    Bhasme and S.M. Jadhav for the Respondent.

          The following Order of the Court was delivered :

          The petitioner, Karamjeet Singh, who claims to be the 'next friend'
B of the convicts Sukhdev Singh @ Sukha and Harjinder Singh @ Jinda by
    reason of his having participated along with .them in Kar Seva for the
    restoration of Harminder Sahib, in Golden Temple, Arniitsar, h~s filed this
    petition under 'Article 32 of the Constitution questioning the legality and
    validity of their conviction and sentence by the Designated Court, Pune
C   and the confirmation thereof by this Court by its judgment rendered on
    July 15, 1992, See : State of Maharashtra v. Sukhdev Singh, [1992] 3 SCC
    700. Though it is stated in the petition that it is being filed 'on behalf of
    the aforesaid two convicts it is clarified in paragraph 4 thereof that the said
    convicts 'have given oral and written instructions that none of their rela-
    tions should file any petition seeking justice or mercy for them'. It is,
D   therefore, clear that this petition is not filed on instructions given by the
    two convicts or at their behest. The petition is strongly opposed by the
    learned Additional Solicitor General on behalf of the respondent.

          The question which falls for determination in this petition is identical
E to the one which had arisen for consideration by this Court in the case of
    Simranjit Singh Mann v. Union of India, JT {1992) 5 SC 441, namely,
    whether a third party who is a total stranger to the prosecution culminating
    in the conviction of the accused, has any 'locus standi' to challenge the
    conviction and sentence awarded to them, by invoking Article 32 of the
    Constitution ? This Court after considering the relevant provisions of the
F   Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and Order XX! of the Supreme Court
    Rules came to tho conclusion that such a petition by a third party stranger
    is not maintainable. In taking this view this Court relied on the observations
    in S.P. Gupta v. Union of India, [1981] Suppl. SCC 87, M. Krishna Swami
    v. Union of India & Ors., IT (1992) 5 SC 92 and in particular the observa-
G   tions in Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary & Ors., [1991] 3 SCC 756 to the
    following effect :

             "Even if there are million questions of law to be deeply
             gone into and examined in a criminal case of this nature
             registrered against specified accused persons, it is for them
H            and them alone to raise all such questions and challenge
                      KARAM JEET SINGH v. U.0.1.                       901

        the proceedings initiated against them at the appropriate             A
        time before the proper forum and not for third parties
        under the garb of public interest litigants."

                                                        (Emphasis supplied)

On this line of reasoning we in that case observed as under :                 B

        "The two convicts could, if so minded, have raised the
        contention in the earlier proceedings but a third party, a
        total stranger to the trial commenced against the two
        convicts, cannot be permitted to question the correctness
        of the conviction recorded against them. If that were
                                                                              c
        permitted any and every person could challenge convic-
        tions recorded day in and day out by courts even if the
        persons convicted do not desire to do so and are inclined
        to acquiesce in the decision."
                                                                              D
  We, therefore, took the view that neither the provisions of the Code of
 Criminal Procedure, 1973 nor any other statute permitted a third party
'Stranger to question the correctness of the conviction and sentence im-
 posed by the Court after a regular trial.

       Learned counsel for the petitioner contendecl that the petitioner had E
filed this petition as the next friend of the two convicts who were under a
legal disability due to their intense obsession that the person who was
responsible for desecrating the Harminder Sahib cannot be allowed to
survive and has no right to live being guilty of such a high act of sacrilege
against divinity. He submitted that the said obsession led the two convicts F
to believe that the perpetrator of the sacrilege against divinity was the
Government of the day and justice could not be expected from it and hence
they would themselves have to mete out the 'punishment' to the said
authorities responsible for the demolition of the Akaal Takht. He sub-
mitted that the two convicts were under such legal disability and hence the
petitioner, as their next friend, was entitled to move this petition under G
Article 32 of the Constitution. In support of the contention that the
petitioner was the next friend of the two convicts reliance was placed at
the hearing on a letter purported to have been written on March 30, 1992
by one of the convicts Harjinder Singh @ Jinda to Balwinder Singh wherein
a reference was made to the petitioner. We assume that the petitioner is a H
    902                  SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. l S.C.R.

A friend of the two convicts and had brushed shoulders with them during Kar
    Seva at Harminder Sahib. Learned counsel, therefore, invited our attention
    to the observations in paragraph 7 of the judgment in Simranjit Singh
    Mann ·,s case wherein we observed :

            "Ordinarily, the aggrieved party which is affected by any
B           order bas the right to seek redress by questioning the
            legality, validity or correctness of the order, unless such
            party is a minor, an insane person or is suffering from any
            other disability which the law recognises as sufficient to
            permit another person, e.g. next friend, to move the Court
c           on his behalf. If a guardian or a next friend initiates
            proceedings for and on behalf of such a disabled aggrieved
            party, it is in effect proceedings initiated by the party
            aggrieved and not by a total stranger who bas no direct
            personal stake in the outcome thereof."
D
    We are afraid these observation do not permit a mere friend like the
    petitioner to initiate the proceedings of the present nature under Article
    32 of the Constitution. The observations relied upon relate to a minor or
    an insane or one who is suffering from any other disability which the law'
    recognises as sufficient to permit another person, e.g. next friend, to move
E   the Court on bis behalf; for example see : Sections 320(4a), 330(2) read
    with section 335(1)(b) and 339 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Admit-
    tedly, it is not the case of the petitioner that the two convicts are minors
    or insane persons but argued the learned counsel that since they were
    suffering from an acute obsession such obsession amounts to a legal
F   disability which permits the next friend to initiate proceedings under
    Article 32 of the Constitution. We do not think that such a contention is
    tenable. The disability must be one which the law recognises. A mere
    obsession based on religious belief or any other personal philosophy cannot
    be regarded as a legal disability of the type recognised by the Code of
G   Criminal Procedure or any other law which would permit initiation of
    proceedings by a third party, be be a friend. It must be remembered that
    the repercussions of permitting such a third party to challenge the findings
    of the Court can be serious, e.g. in the instant case itself the co-accused
    who have been acquitted by the Designated Court and whose acquittal has
    been confirmed by this Court would run the risk of a fresh trial and a
H   posible conviction. It is, therefore, hazardous to allow a third party to
                      KARAMJEETSINGH v. U.0.1.                             903

initiate proceedings under Article 32 challenging the order passed by the A
Designated Court and confirmed by this Court on the mere ground that
the convicts had acted under such an obsession. Such a submission, urgued
the learned Additional Solicitor General, is fraught with grave consequen-
ces and would, we agree, shake the very foundation of the rule of law on
which a civilised society is based if the aggrieved person is allowed to take
the law in his own hands and later plead disability on the ground that his B
action emalnated from an acute obsession that his victim had by his action
forfeited the right to live and deserved to be punished with death. Such a
submission cannot be countenanced.

      Lastly it was submitted that this case differed from the earlier case C
because the petitioner has come as a next friend. He also submitted that
the sentiments of the entire Sikh community expressed through their
leaders of all hues should be taken note of by the Court. We appreciate
their sentiments but that cannot alter the legal position. Besides, as a
matter of record we may also state that even Simranjit Singh Mann had in
the earlier petition by his affidavit dated August 25, 1992 contended that D
he was filing the writ petition as the next friend of the condemned
prisoners. That petition was dismissed' for want of 'locus standi' and we see
no distinguishing feature in the present petition to take a different view.

      In the result, we hold that the petitioner has no 'locus standi 1 to move
this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution for challenging the convic-       E
tion and sentence awarded to the two convicts by this Court's order of July
15, 1992. The petition is, therefore, summarlily rejected.

V.P.R.                                                     Petition dismissed.