KAPUS EKADHIKAR KARMACHARI SANGHversusSTATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ANR

A                KAPUS EKADHIKAR KARMACHARI SANGH
                                 v.
                   STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ANR

                                  APRIL 11, 2000

B       [M. JAGANNADHARAO, S.N. PHUKAN AND S.N. VARIAVA, JJ.]


          Maharashtra Raw Cotton (Procurement, Processing and Marketing)
    Act, 1971 : Sections 2(j) and 42.

         Section 2(j)-Interpretation of-Held does not refer to the nature of
c   employment-It only refers to the period of season.

           Writ filed by petitioner-Prayerfor quashing the awanl passed by Indus-
    trial Tribunal-Writ dismissed by High Court relying upon a Judgment of the
    Supreme Court-Appeal before Supreme Coun-Contention that judgment
D   relied upon by High Court was per incuriam as the definition of "cotton
    season" given in section 2(j) was not considered-Held submission made was
    not correct-There was no me1it in the contention.

          Maharashtra State Co-operative Cotton Growers' Marketing Federa-
    tion Ltd & Am: v. Employees Union & Am:, [1994) Supp 3 SCC 385, referred
E   to.

          CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Special Leave Petition (C) No.
    61 of 1998.

          From the Judgment and Order dated 28.7.97 of the Bombay High Court
F   in W.P. No. 2134 of 1988.

          H.N. Salve, Solicitor General, H.W. Dhabe, S.B. Wad, Manoj Kumar,
    A.S. Bhasme, Manish Pitale, A.K. Sanghi and S.S. Shinde for S.V. Deshpande
    for the appearing parties.

G         The following Order of the Court was delivered :

        This S.L.P. has been filed against the judgment of the High Court of
    Bombay, Aurangabad Bench, dated 28.7.1997 in W.P.(C) No. 2134/1998.

         The High Court dismissed the Writ Petition filed by the petitioner
H   (Kapus Ekadhikar Karmachari Sangh), for quashing the award passed on
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                                                                                    l
              KAPUS EKADHIKAR KARMACHARI v. STATE                         1273
27.9.1988, by the Industrial Comt in complaint No. 175 of 1987. The High           A
Comt dismissed the Writ Petition mainly relying upon the Judgment, in
Maharashtra State Co-operative Cotton Growers' Marketing Federation Ltd.
and Anr. v. Employees Union & Am; [1994] Supp 3 SCC 385. The material
part of the order of this Court reads as follows :

              "The State Government under Section 42 of the Maharashtra            B
        Raw Cotton (Procurement, Processing & Marketing) Act, 1971,
        appointed the Maharashtra Cooperative Marketing Federation (here-
        inafter referred to as 'Marketing Federation'), a cooperative society,
        as the chief agent to implement the Cotton Monopoly Procurement
        Scheme (the 'Cotton Scheme'). The Marketing Federation was                 c
        before that date engaged in the marketing of several commodities.
        From that date onwards till August 31, 1984, it continued to act as
        the chief agent of the State Government for procurement, processing
        and marketing of cotton as well. For this purpose it recruited and
        maintained a separate section with a separate staff. The staff
        consisted of those who were needed throughout the year and those           D
         who were needed only during the season. The cotton trade (which
        expression will include procurement, processing and manufacturing
        of cotton) is mostly in Vidarbha, Marathwada and Khandesh region,
        and commences roughly in the first week of November and extends
        up to April of the next year. The Cotton Scheme introduced by the          E
        Government has three aspects - (i) procurement (ii) processing, and
         (iii) marketing. The first two activities extend over four to six
        months in a year depending upon the extent of the availability of
         the crop, the third stage, viz., the marketing and also the function of
        maintenance of accounts are spread over throughout the year. The
        seasonal employees engaged in the said two activities consist of
                                                                                   F
        Supervisors etc. who work at the collection centres and the process-
        ing centres. On an average, the seasonal employees are about twice
        the number of the perennial employees".

      At the time when the S.L.P. came up for admission, this Court passed         G
an order on 19.1.98 as follows :

            "It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that in
        Mahara~htra State Cooperative Cotton Growers' Marketing Federa-

        tion Ltd. & Anr. v. Employees' Union & Anr., reported in [1994] 3
        Supp. SCC 385, the definition of "Cotton Season" was contained in          H
    1274                      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2000] 2 S.C.R.
A            Maharashtra Raw Cotton (Procurement, Processing & Marketing)
             Act, 1971 was not considered and therefore the decision required
             consideration so far as the season employees are concerned.

                   Issue notice".

B         We, therefore, heard learned counsel for the petitioner. We have con-
    sidered his submissions in the light of the definition of "Cotton Season" in
    Section 2(j) of the Maharashtra Raw Cotton (Procurement, Processing &
    Marketing) Act, 1971. Section 2(j) defines "Cotton Season" as follows :

                 "Cotton Season" means the period from the 1st day of July of any
c            year to the 30th day of June of the next year (both days inclusive)".

          After hearing counsel on both sides, we are of the view that his
    submission that this definition was not kept in mind when this Court decided
    the earlier matter in 1994 is not correct. A reference to para 15 of the
    judgment of this Court in the said case indicates that though Section 2(j) was
D   not specifically referred to in that para, this Court definitely had the definition
    in mind.

         This is clear from the following observations made m the said
    judgment:
E                 "Although some attempt was made before us on behalf of the
             respondent-Union to show that the operation of procuring and
             processing of cotton is carried on throughout the year, there is
             nothing on record to support the said contention. On the other hand,
             the record shows that out of the three operations under the Scheme,
F            the procurement and processing of cotton lasts on an average only for
             six months from November to April in the principal cotton regions,
             viz., Vidarbha, Marathwada and West Kandesh and rarely extends
             beyond that period depending upon the cotton crop. In fact, if the
             crop is less, the said period ends even earlier. In western Maharashtra,
             where there is scant crop of cotton, the procurement and processing
G
             season lasts only for.about four months from August to November.
             Hence the staff needed for procurement and processing is only for
             about six months on an average but never beyond 7 to 8 months in
             any year. It is only the operation of marketing which goes _?n
                                                                                          ---
              throughout the year and for the marketing as well as for the
H             maintenance of accounts the staff is needed throughout the year''.
                      AJAIB SINGH AND AN~ v. STi\TE                      1275
      We are, therefore, of the view that there is no merit in the contention     A
that Section 2G) was not kept in mind while \the judgment was rendered in
the earlier case.

       Learned Solicitor General appearing for the respondent has pointed out
that this very point based on Section 20), was raised in the review application
earlier and that the said petition was rejected. That would show that the         B
Judges who decided the above case were clearly of the opinion that there was
nothing in this very point that was raised in the review petition.

      Even on merits, we are of the opinion that Section 2G) is not of much
relevance as it does not refer to the nature of employment, but only refers to
the period of the "Season". It has no bearing on the nature of employment
                                                                                  c
of the various persons dliring the season.

      For the aforesaid reasons, the Special Leave Petition is dismissed.

T.N.A.                                                     Petition dismissed.