Holding

Civil contempt requires a clear case of wilful disobedience of a court order; the appellants failed to prove such wilful disobedience, so contempt proceedings were not maintainable.

Summary

The appellants, untrained assistant teachers in Bihar, were terminated and later appointed on 4 October 1994 under directions of the Supreme Court and the High Court that vacancies existing before 1 January 1992 be filled and that such appointees be paid arrears from 1 July 1992. The appellants claimed arrears of salary, alleging that vacancies existed, but the State contended no such vacancies existed and therefore denied arrears. The appellants instituted contempt proceedings alleging wilful disobedience of the court orders; the High Court dismissed the contempt petition, holding there was no violation. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined the requirement of “wilful” disobedience under Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 and held that the appellants had not demonstrated any deliberate or contumacious breach. Consequently, the contempt proceedings were not maintainable and the High Court’s order was upheld, with the matter remitted to the High Court to determine the vacancy question through an interlocutory application.

Issues considered

Whether the State’s alleged failure to pay arrears amounts to wilful disobedience of the Supreme Court/High Court orders, constituting civil contempt under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.
What is the meaning of “wilful” disobedience in the context of civil contempt.
Whether contempt proceedings are the appropriate remedy when there is a factual dispute about the existence of vacancies as of 1 January 1992.
Whether the High Court was correct in dismissing the contempt petition.

Legislation cited

Contempt of Courts Act, 1971s. 2(b)

Subjects

civil contemptwilful disobedienceContempt of Courts Actarrears of salaryvacancy disputeuntrained teachersSupreme Court directionHigh Court order

Judgment

KAPILDEO PRASAD SAH AND ORS. A
v.
ST ATE OF BIHAR AND ORS.

AUGUST 25, 1999

[S. SAGHIR AHMED AND D.P. WADHWA, JJ.] B

Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 :

·~ Section 2(b)-Civil Contempt-Power to punish for contempt-When
should be exercised-Wilful disobedience of order of court alleged-Nothing C
shown to substantiate the allegations-Held, power to punish for contempt
should be resorted to when there is clear and wilful violation of order of the
court-Under the facts and circumstances of the case, held, contempt
proceedings not maintainable.

Words and Phrases-'Wilful'-Meaning of in the context of Contempt of D
Courts Act.

Appellants, untrained teachers, were working as Assistant Teachers in

- ,.;. Godda District in the State of Bihar when their services were terminated. In
the matter of similarly placed teachers Supreme Court issued a direction
that State Government should fill up the existing vacancies, if any, by
E

appointing untrained teachers who were eligible to be appointed and in case
vacancies existed before January 1, 1992 the teachers so appointed would be
entitled to salary from July 1, 1992 till their appointment. Appellants got
similar order in their writ petition from the High Court on the basis of the
Supreme Court Judgment. F
Appellants were appointed on October 4, 1994 and claimed arrears of
salary on the ground that it was a case of reappointment under the orders
of the Court and that since they were appointed against vacancies existing
prior to January 1, 1992, they were entitled to salary from July 1, 1992 till
October 3, 1994. On receiving no response from the State Government, the G

- appellants filed contempt proceedings in the High Court against the
respondent-State which contended that no vacancy existed in Godda District
as on January 1, 1992 High Court dismissed the contempt proceedings and
held that there was no violation of its order. Against the judgment of the ffjgh
Court, t~e appellants have filed the present appeal. H
I 725
726 SUPREME COUR l' REPORTS (1999] SUPP. l S.C.R.

A The appellants contended that the respondents were wilfully and
ddilJU&l:ely Oooting the orders and directions of the courts. The respondents
contended that the appellants were not entitled to arrears of salary since no
available vacancy existed before January 1, 1992; and that the appointment
orders of the appellants also did not show that they were appointed against
B any vacancy that existed before January 1, 1992.

Disposing of the appeal, the Court

HELD: 1. For holding a person to have committed contempt, civil
contempt at that, it has to be shown that there has been wilful disobedience
C of the judgment or order of the Court. Power to punish for contempt is to
be resorted to when there is clear violation of the Court's order. Since notice
of contempt and punishment for contempt have far reaching consequence,
these powers should be invoked only when a clear case of wilful disobedience
of the Court's order has been made out 'Wilful' would exclude casual,
accidental, bona fide or unintentional acts or genuine inability to comply
D with the terms of the order. Whether disobedience is wilful in a particular
case depends on the facts and circumstances of that case. Judicial orders are
to be properly understood and complied. Even negligence and carelessness
can amount to disobedience particularly when attention of the person is
drawn to the court's orders and its implication. Disobedience of court's
E order strikes at the very root of rule of law on which our system of governance
is based. Power to punish for contempt is necessary for the maintenance of
effective legal system. It is exercised to prevent perversion of the course of
justice. No person can defy court's order. Jurisdiction to punish for contempt
exists to provide ultimate sanction against the person who refuses to comply
with the order of the Court or disregards the order continuously.
F (730-8, C, D, El

Attorney General v. Times Newspaper Ltd, (1973) 3 All E.R. 54, referred

G 2. A petitioner who complains breach of court's order must allege
deliberate or contumacious disobedience of the court's order. The appellants
have not produced anything to show that the claim of the respondents that
appellants have not been appointed against any vacancy existing on January
1, 1992 is not true or that the respondents are intentionally or deliberately
advancing the plea to deprive the appellants of their right to the arrears of
H salary for some ulterior motive. That being so, it was not a case where
"
'
K.P. SAH v. STATE [D.P. WADHWA, J.] 727
proceedings for contempt could have been initiated against the respondents. A
[730-G, HJ

3. Since there is a serious dispute whether any vacancy existed or not
as on January 1, 1992 against which appellants or anyone of them could have
been appointed, the matter certainly needs examination but perhaps only by
way of an interlocutory application in the writ petition and not by way of B
contempt. Thus, though the order of the High Court is upheld, the matter
is sent back to the High Court to go into the question if any vacancy existed
as on January 1, 1992 and, if so, to pass appropriate orders. [731-A, BJ

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 4706 of 1999. C
From the Judgment and Order dated 8.7.98 of the Patna High Court in
M.J.C. No. 3189 ofl997.

Shanti Bhushan and Jayant Bhushan for the Appellants.

B.B Singh for the Respondents. D

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

D.P. WADHWA, J. Leave granted.

On refusal of the Patna High Court to initiate proceedings for contempt E
against the respondents, the appellants have come to this court.

The appellants were working as Assistant Teachers in different
elementary schools in Godda District in the State of Bihar. They are in the
category of untrained teachers. Their services were terminated. Some of the
teachers similarly placed filed writ petitions in the High Court against their F
termination and the matter ultimately reached this Court. It is not necessary
to go. into the various stages of the litigation except to note that this Court
by order dated November 30, 1992 in Birendra Kumar and Ors. v. State of
Bihar, (1999] SCC 574 directed as under:

"We, therefore, direct once again that if there are vacancies and if
G
there are not trained teachers available the untrained teachers who
were employed prior to the new rule came into operation, would be
reinstated in service if after subjecting them to the selection process
they are found suitable. If there are no vacancies, they would be
empanelled according to their seniority and would be appointed H
728 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999] SUPP. I S.C.R.

A according to their seniority in the vacancies arising in future. Unless
this panel is exhausted, no new appointment of untrained teachers will
be made from outside. It is understood that those eligible for being
so appointed will be the ones who were appointed before the new rule
came into operation.

B While making the appointments of those who were so in service
prior to the date of appointment, the State Government will relax the
age limit, if necessary.

We are informed that the appellants involved in the present case
were paid salaries till 30th June, 1991. We also understand from Mr.
c B.B. Singh, learned advocate appearing fqr the State that all the
vacancies have been filled in till l. l.l 992. If there were vacancies and
yet the appellants were not appointed in the said vacancies such of
the appellants who were eligible to be appointed and yet were not
appointed in spite of the vacancies, would be entitled to the salaries
D from l July, 1992 till their appointment. However, if there were no
vacancies and all the appellants or some of them have to be appointed
in the new vacancies which may be available hereafter, they will not
be entitled to the salaries from l st July, 1992, till the date of their
appointment. However, when they are appointed the period of break
in service not exceeding one year will be taken into consideration for
E benefits other than salary.

The appeal is disposed of accordingly with no order as to costs."

Appellants and some other teachers like them got similar orders from
the High Court in their respective writ petitions. The main order passed by
F the High Court is dated January 20, 1993 in CWJC No.7000/92. In this judgment
the High Court noticed the appointments made in some districts and the
number of existing vacancies. State had contended that only one regular
vacancy existed when according to the petitioners, there were not less than
2,000 vacancies. Counter affidavit filed by the State did not indicate if all the
G 2,000 vacancies had been filled up. With the consent of the counsel for the
petitioners and the Advocate General that these petitions may also be disposed
of in the light of the aforementioned direction of the Supreme Court, the High
Court directed it accordingly. High Court said: "We may, however, direct the
State to fill up posts in tem1s of the aforementioned direction of the Supreme
Court with utmost expedition and preferably within two months from the date
H of receipt of a copy of this order." Similar orders were passed in other writ
K.P. SAH v. STATE [D.P. WADHWA, J.] 729
petitions filed by untrained teachers as well. A
Under the orders of the Supreme Court and those of the High Court
which followed, the State Government was to fill up the existing vacancies,
if any, by appointing the appellants and other untrained teachers who were
eligible to be appointed against those vacancies and in case vacancies did
exist as on January 1, 1992 the teachers so appointed against those vacancies B
would be entitled to salary from July 1, 1992 till their appointment. This was
so as salaries had been disbursed up to June 30, 1991. If there were no
vacancies, these untrained teachers had to be appointed in the new vacancies
which might be available thereafter and in that case they were not be entitled
to the salary from 1st July 1992 till the date of their appointment. C
Appellants were appointed on October 4, 1994 pursuant to the directions
of the High Court on October 4, 1994 by an order issued by the District
Superintendent of Education, Godda. Appellants are receiving their salaries
w.e.f. October 4, 1994. They claimed that it was case of reappointment under
the orders of the Court and that since they were appointed against vacancies D
existing prior to January l, 1992, they were entitled to salary from July I, 1992
till October 3, 1994. They made their claim for the arrears of salary and since
there was no response from the State Government, they filed petition for
initiation of contempt proceedings against the State as well as its functionaries
being the Director, Primary Education; Deputy Commissioner-cum-Chairman E
of the District Establishment Committee, Godda; and District Superintendent
of Education, Godda District. Since it was the case of the respondents that
no vacancy existed in the Godda District as on January I, 1992, High Court
by the impugned order dated July 8, 1998 dismissed the contempt proceedings.
High Court said that there was no "violation of the order passed by the High
Court and if the appellants alleged that any direction of the Supreme Court F
had been violated, then it was not for the High Court to initiate any contempt
proceedings. Aggrieved, appellants have come to this Court.

Here again the stand of the respondents has been that there has not
been any violation of any order either of this Court or of the High Court. They
are specific in their stand that no available vacancy existed before January G
I, 1992 and as such the appellants were not entitled to the arrears of salary.
~
I
Respondents have also contended that the orders appointing the appellants
did not show that they were appointed against any vacancy existed before
January 1, 1992. Appellants have also not stated before us as to how they
claim that any vacancy existed as on January I, 1992. Yet they state that there H
730 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1999] SUPP. l S.C.R.

A has been deliberate inaction on the part of the respondents which showed
that they had no regard and respect for Court's orders and that the respondents
were wilfully and deliberately flouting the orders and direction of the Courts.

Once the respondents take the stand that there was no vacancy existing
as on January l, 1992 in the Godda District and in the absence of any
B evidence to the contrary, it cannot be said that the orders of the courts have
been contravened.

For holding the respondents to have committed contempt, civil contempt
at that, it has to be shown that there has been wilful disobedience of the
judgment or order of the Court. Power to punish for contempt is to be resorted
C to when there is clear violation of the Court's order. Since notice of contempt
and punishment for contempt is of far reaching consequence, these powers
should be invoked only when a clear case of wilful disobedience of the
court's order has been made out. Whether disobedience is wilful in a particular
case depends on the facts and circumstances of that case. Judicial orders are
D to be properly understood and complied. Even negligence and carelessness
can amount to disobedience particularly when attention of the person is
drawn to the Court's orders and its implication. Disobedience of Court's order
strikes at the very root of rule of law on which our system of governance is
based. Power to punish for contempt is necessary for the maintenance of
effective legal system. It is exercised to prevent perversion of the course of
E justice.
In his famous passage, Lord Diplock in Attorney General v. Times
Newspapers Ltd., (1973) 3 All.E.R. 54 said that there is also "an element of
public policy in punishing civil contempt, since administration of justice
F would be undermined if the order of any court of law could be disregarded
with impunity". Jurisdiction to punish for contempt exists to provide ultimate
sanction against the person who refuses to comply with the order of the court
or disregards the order continuously. Initiation of contempt proceedings is
not a substitute for execution proceedings though at times that purpose may
also be achieved.
G
No person can defy Court's order. Wilful would exclude casual, accidental
bona fide or unintentional acts or genuine inability to comply with the terms
of the order. A petitioner who complains breach of Court's order must allege
deliberate or contumacious disobedience of the Court's order.

H Nothing has been shown that the claim of the respondents that appellants
K.P. SAH v. STATE [D.P. WADHWA, J.] 731

. .,.,_ have not been appointed against any vacancy existing on January I, 1992 is A
not true or that the respondents are intentionally or deliberately advancing
this plea to deprive the appellants of their right to the arrears of the salary
for some ulterior motive. That being so, it was not a case where proceedings
for contempt could have been initiated against the respondents. High Court
is right in dismissing the contempt petition. However, since there is a serious B
dispute whether any vacancy existed or not as on January I, 1992 against
which appellants or anyone of them could have been appointed the matter
certainly needs examination but perhaps only by way of an interlocutory
application in the writ petition and not by way of contempt. Thus, though
upholding the order of the High Court, we send the matter back to the High
Court to go into the question if any vacancy existed as on January I, 1992 C
and, if so, pass appropriate orders.

With these observations, this appeal stands disposed of.

A.K.T. Appeal disposed of.

•