KANTA RANI © KANTI DEVI & ANR.versusRAMA RANI
- Citation
- 1988 INSC 34
- Decided
- 8 February 1988
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- E S VENKATARAMIAH
Holding
A right of pre-emption, whether arising under statutory or customary law, is heritable as it attaches to the tenancy, and the right to sue survives the tenant’s death, allowing legal representatives to be substituted under Order 22 Rule 3, CPC.
Summary
The plaintiff tenant Kishan Chand claimed a customary right of pre-emption over a portion of a building that had been sold to the respondent. He filed a suit for pre-emption, but died during the proceedings. His legal representatives applied under Order 22 Rule 3 of the CPC to be substituted as parties. The respondent argued that the pre-emption right was a personal, non‑heritable right and that the suit should abate on the tenant's death, relying on a Punjab High Court decision (Chandrup Singh v. Data Ram). The Supreme Court held that a right of pre-emption, whether arising under statute or custom, is attached to the tenancy, which is heritable; consequently the right to sue survives the tenant’s death and the legal representatives may be brought on record. The Court overruled the Chandrup Singh decision, restored the trial court's order, and directed the suit to be tried on its merits.
Issues considered
- Whether a right of pre-emption conferred on a tenant by customary law is heritable.
- Whether a statutory right of pre-emption under the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913 is heritable.
- Whether the right to sue for pre-emption survives the death of the plaintiff and can be pursued by his legal representatives under Order 22 Rule 3, CPC.
- Whether the Punjab High Court decision in Chandrup Singh v. Data Ram is binding on the Supreme Court.
Legislation cited
- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. Order 22 Rule 11, s. Order 22 Rule 3, s. Section 115
- Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913s. 13, s. 15(1), s. 16
Subjects
Judgment
KANTA RANI ©KANT! DEVI & ANR.
A
v.
RAMA RANI
FEBRUARY 8, 1988
[E.S. VENKATARAMIAH AND N.O.. OJHA, JJ.] B
Civil Procedure Code, 1908: Order 22 Rule 3-Pre-emption
suit-Whether legal representatives of a tenant entitled to be brought on
record.
Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913: Section 15--Whether right to pre C
emption confe"ed on tenant by customary law heritable or not-
Whether any distinction between right of pre-emption arising under
Statute law and customary law-When right of tenancy heritable every
incidental right thereto heritable.
The property in dispute was sold by its original owner to the D
respondent. Claiming that there was a local custom under which the
tenant in occupation of a building had a right of pr.,....,mption, the
tenant of a portion of the property filed a suit for pr.,....,mption and
valued the portion at Rs. 10,000. The suit was opposed by the respon-
dent contending that there was no such customary law and that in case
the decree was passed, the plaintiff should be asked to pay Rs.20,000, as E
consideration.
During the pendency of the suit, the plaintiff-tenant died and the
appelhnts, his legal representatives filed an application under Order
22, Rule 3 of Civil Procedure Code, for being brought on record in
place of the original plaintiff and for permission to prosecute the suit F
further. The respondent, opposed the application contending that the
right of pr.,....,mption, even if it existed, was only a personal right of the
tenant and was not heritable, and consequent on his death the right to
sue did not survive, and therefore the snit was liable to be dismissed.
Aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the respondent filed a revision G
petition before the High Conrt, which allowed the same following a Full
Bench decision of that Court in Chandrup Singh and Anr. v. Data Ram
and Anr., [1985] Punjab Law Reporter 771, that a statutory right of
pre-emption resting only on blood relationship created bys. 15(1) of the
Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913 was not a heritable one and did not
devolve on the heirs on the death of the pre-i!mptor before the grant of H
895
896 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988) 2 S.C.R.
A the decree in the suit, and declared that the suit instituted by the tenant
had abated on his death.
Allowing the appeal,
HELD: While a right of pre-emption does not give right to an
B interest in immovable property, the right of tenancy itself was heritable
and, therefore, every right attached to the said right of tenancy or
incidental to it should ordinarily be heritable. There can be no distinc-
tion between the right of pre-emption arising nuder the statutory law
andthecustomarylaw. [900F,H]
C In the instant case, the plaintiff had acquired the said right of
pre-emption nuder customary law by virtue of right of tenancy which
he had In the portion of the property in his possession and had instituted
a suit for enforcing that right. The fact that the pre-emptor had died at
the trial stage cannot make any difference. [900G]
D The right to sue therefore survived on the death of the plaintiff-
tenant in favour of the appeUants, who were his legal representatives,
and they were entitled to be brought on record In substitution of the
original plaintiff-tenant nuder Order 22, Rnle 3 of the Civil Procedure
Code. [902B-C]
E The trial court was directed to bring the appellants on record as y
legal representatives of the deceased-plaintiff and to dispose of the suit
on merits. [902C)
Chandrup Singh and Another v. Data Ram and Another, 11982]
Punjab Law Reporter 771, over-ruled.
F
Hazari & Ors. v. Neki & Ors., [1968) 2 S.C.R. 833, followed.
Wajid Ali & Anr. v. Shaban & Ors., I.L.R. 31 Allahabad 623,
approved.
G Muhammad Husain v. Niamet-un-nissa and Ors.. I.L.R. 20
Allahabad 88., distinguished.
Faqir Ali Shah v. Ram Kishan & Ors., 133 P.R. 1907, referred to.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 453
H of 1988.
KANTA RAN! v. RAMA RAN! [VENKATARAMIAH, J.] 897
From the Judgment and Order dated 5.3.1984 of the Punjab and A
Haryana High Court in Civil Revision No. 3411of1983.
""' I E.C. Agarwala for the Appellants.
G .K. Bansal for the Respondent.
,
B
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
VENKA TARAMIAH, J. The two short questions involved in
... this case are (i) whether the right of pre-emption conferred on a ten-
ant by a customary law is heritable or not and (ii) whether on the death
of such a tenant, who had filed a suit for pre-emption his legal re-
presentatives can continue the suit. C
The property in dispute which is a double storied building
situated in the town of Jagadhri, District Ambala, Haryana originally
belonged to one Orn Prakash. Kishan Chand was in possession of a
part of the ~aid property as a tenant. Orn Prakash sold the entire D
property including the portion occupied by Kishan Chand to the
respondent for a sum of Rs.23,000 under a registered sale deed dated
11. 7.1980. It is alleged that in the town of Jagadhri there was in force a
customary law under which a tenant in occupation or a building had a
right of pre-emption. Aggrieved by the sale of the property in his
occupation as a tenant, Kishan Chand filed a suit for pre-emption in E
the Court of the Sub--Judge, II Class, Jagadhri in Civil Suit No. 131 of
1980 on 26.8.1980 stating that the value of the portion of the property
occupied by him was Rs.10,000. The respondent denied that there was
such a customary law conferring a right of pre-emption on a tenant in
force in the town of J agadhri and that in the event of a decree being
passed in the suit the plaintiff should be asked to pay a sum of F
Rs.20,000 by way of consideration. During the pendency of the suit,
Kishan Chand died on 8.8.1983. An application was filed under Order
22, Rule 3, Civil Procedure Code by the appellants, who were the legal
representatives of Kishan Chand to bring them on record in the place
of the original plaintiff, Kishan Chand and to permit them to prosecute
the suit further. The respondent opposed the said application contend- G
"' .\
j ing that the right of pre-emption, even if it existed, was only a
personal right of Kishan Chand and was not heritable and, therefore,
the appellants were not entitled to be brought on record as the legal
representatives of Kishan Chand. It was further contended by the
respondent that the suit was liable to be dismissed on the death of
Kishan Chand as the right to sue did not survive. The trial court H
•
898 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988) 2 S.C.R.
A allowed the application made under Order 22, Rule 3, Civil Procedure
Code holding that the right of pre-emption was heritable and the right
to sue survived on the death of the plaintiff in favour of his legal
representatives. Aggrieved by the order passed by the trial court, the
respondent filed a revision petition under section 115, Civil Procedure
Code before the High Court of Punjab & Haryana in Civil Revision
·B No. 3411 of 1983. Before the High Court, the respondent relied on a
Full Bench decision of the High Court of Pun jab & Haryana in
Chandrup Singh and Another v. Data Ram and Another, I1982) Punjab
Law Reporter 771 in which it had been held that a statutory right of
pre-emption resting only on blood relationship created by section
15(1) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913 (1 of 1913) (hereinafter
1
C referred to as 'the Act') (as it was in force in Haryana) was not a
heritable right and did not devolve on the heirs on the death of the
plaintiff-pre-emptor before the grant of the decree in the suit.
Though the learned Judge, who heard the revision petition, was of the
view that the above Full Bench decision ran counter to the decision of
the Supreme Court in Hazari & Ors. v. Neki & Ors., [1968) 2 S.C.R.
D 833 he allowed the petition following the Full Bench decision on the
ground that the said decision was bindig on him and declared that the
suit instituted by Kishan Chand had abated on his death.
We have gone through the decision of this Court in Hazari's case
(supra) and also the Full Bench decision of the High Court of Punjab
E & Haryana in Chandrup's case (supra). The 'facts in Hazari's case y
(supra) were these. The plaintiff, who was the father's brother of one
Dhara Singh instituted three suits for pre-emption of the lands sold by
Dhara Singh under three sale deeds qn the ground that he had a
superior right of pre-emption on the basis of his relationship with the
vendor as against the purchasers under section 15(1)(a) of the Act.
F The suits were decreed ty the trial court. The purchasers took the
matter in appeal before the lst Appellate Court and those appeals
were dismissed, but in one of the appeals there was a slight modifica-
tion in the amount which the plaintiff had to pay to the purchasers.
The purchasers filed three second appeals before the High Court
against the judgments and the decrees of the lst Appellate Court and
G the plaintiff also preferred a second appeal before the High Court in I
one of the cases against the increase made in the price of the land by
the 1st Appellate Court. While the second appeals were pending in the
High Court, the plaintiff died. After his death application were moved
under Order 22, Rule 11 of the Civil Procedure Code to bring the legal
+
representatives of the deceased plaintiff on record. All the four second
H appeals were heard and dismissed by the High Court. The purchasers
!'
KANTA RAN! v. RAMA RANI [VENKATARAMIAH, J.] 899
' having failed in the Letters Patent Appeals filed before the Punjab & A
Haryana High Court against the decrees passed in the second appeals,
filed three appeals before this Court by special leave. It was contenqed
before this Court by the purchasers that on the death of the plaintiff,
the right to sue came to an end and his legal representatives were not
entitled to claim any benefit under the decrees in question. Rejecting
the above contention this Court observed at page 836 of the Report B
thus:
"In support of these appeals, learned counsel put for-
ward the argument that the right of pre-emption claimed
by Neki deceased plaintiff was a personal right which died
with him upon his death and the legal representatives of C
Neki were not entitled to be granted a decree for pre-
emption. The argument was that the statutory right of pre-
emption under the Punjab Act was not a heritable right and
no decree for pre-emption shollld have been passed by the
lower court in favour of the legal representatives as repre-
senting the estate of Neki. We are unable to accept the D
argument put forward by the appellants. It is not correct to
say that the right of pre-emption is a personal right on the
·part of the pre-emptor to get the re-transfer of the pro-
perty from the vendee who has already become the owner
of the same. It is true that the right of pre-emption
becomes enforceable only when there is a sale but the right E
exists antecedently to the •ale, the foundation of the right
being the avoidance of the inconveniences and distur-
bances which would arise from the introduction of a
stranger into the land. The correct legal position is that the
statutory law of pre-emption imposes a limitation or dis-
ability upon the ownership of a property to the extent that F
it restricts the owner's right of sale and compels him to sell
the property to the person entitled to pre-emption under
the statute. In other words, the statutory right of pre-
emption though not amounting to an interest in the land is
a right which attaches to the land and which can be en-
forced against a purchaser by the person entitled to pre- G
empt."
In reaching the above conclusion this Court while accepting the
contention that the right of pre-emption under section 15( 1)(a) of the
Act did not create an interest in the land was, however, of the view that
the right did not abate on the death of the plaintiff during course of the H
~
900 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988) .2 S.C.R.
proceedings in court. This Court referred to the decision of the Punjab
A
& Haryana High Court in Faqir Ali Shah v. Ram Kishan & Ors., 133 1--
P.R. 1907 and the decision of the Allahabad High Court in Wajid Ali•
& Anr. v. Shaban & Ors., l.L.R. 31 Allahabad 623. In the latter
decision, namely, the Wajid Ali's case (supra) the High Court of
Allahabad had held that where a right of pre-emption existed by
B custom as recorded in the village Wajib-ul-arz, the right having once
accrued did not of necessity lapse by the death of the pre-emptor
before making a claim, but descended along with the property in virtue
of which it subsisted to the heir of the pre-emptor. It is significant that
in that case the High Court of Allahabad had taken the view that the
l
~
right of pre-emption which had accrued in favour of the pre-emptor
would descend along with the property in virtue of which it subsisted
c to the heir of the pre-emptor, even when the death of the pre-emptor
had taken place before he made a claim for pre-emption. The Full
Bench of the High Court of Punjab & Haryana which heard Chan-
drup's case (supra) after noticing the decision of this Court in Hazari's
case (supra) distinguished the said decision observing thus:
D ' -
"21. To conclude, on the particular language of the
statute, on principle, and on the weight of precedent, it is
held that the purely statutory right of pre-emption, resting
wholly on blood relationship alone under section 15(1) of
the Punjab Pre-emption Act, is not a heritable right and y
E does not devolve on the heirs on the death of the plaintiff-
pre-emptor before the grant of the decree in the suit. The
answer to the question posed at the very outset is thus
rendered in the negative."
"
We find it difficult to agree with the decision of the Full Bench of
F the High Court of Punjab & Haryana in the above case.
)it
While it may not be disputed that a right of pre-emption does not
give rise tp an interest in immovable property, in the instant case the
plaintiff had acquired the said right of pre-emption under the custom-
ary law by virtue of the right of tenancy which he had in the portion of •
G the property in his possession. It cannot be disputed that the right of
tenancy itself was heritable and, therefore, every right attached to the
said right of tenancy or incidental to it should ordinarily be heritable.
There can be no distinction between a right of pre-emption arising
under the statute law or such a right arising under customary law. The
other reason given by the Full Bench in order to distinguish the deci-
H sion of this Court in Hazari's case (supra) namely that the pre-emptor
KANTA RAN! v. RAMA RAN1 [VENKATARAMIAH, J.] 901
•4y had died at the stage of second appeal in the said case while the A
pre-emptor had died in the case before the Full Bench at the stage of
trial also does not appeal to us. The view expressed in Muhammad
Husain v. Niamet-un-nissa and Ors., I.L.R. 20 Allahabad 38 that
under Mohammadan law applicable to the Sunni sect if a plaintiff in a
suit for pre-emption had not obtained his decree for pre-emption in
his life time the right to sue did not survive to his heirs is not relevant B
for purposes of this case. It is true that the said decision was noticed by
this Court in Hazari's case (~upra) but this Court did not express any
opinion on the correctness of the above position. In the case before us
the right of pre-emption is claimed not on the basis of Mohammadan
law but under customary law by the heirs of a tenant who was in
possession of the property in question and who had instituted a suit for C
enforcing the said right of pre-emption. It is appropriate to refer to the
following passage in Faqir Ali's case (supra) which is extracted in
Hazari's case (supra) at page 837:
"While, therefore, there is good reason why volun-
tary transfers should not pass a right of pre-emption as D
regards properties previously sold, those reasons do not
apply to transfers by inheritance. As regards transfers by
inheritance, the general principle should apply that the
right of pre-emption passes with the land.
Mr. Grey laid great stress on sections 13 and 16 of the
E
Punjab Laws Act urging that the father was the person on
whom the notice had to be served, and that it was he who
had the right to sue and that the right was thus a personal
one that could not be inherited by the son. The right was no
doubt a personal one in the father based on his land, but I
can see no reason why such right cannot be inherited by the F
son. If the father had waived or otherwise disposed of his
right this would no doubt be binding on the son, as the
father was representing the whole estate.
Where, however, the father has done nothing of the
kind, but has simply taken no steps in the matters, there G
seems to me no reason why the son should not step into the
shoes of his father and take the same action as the father
could have done. The son inherits the other causes of
action belonging to his father and why not this one? Nor do
I see why the son cannot come in under section 16, simply
alleging that no notice as required by section 13 was served
H
on his father."
902 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1988] 2 S.C.R.
A Hence the fact that the pre-emptor had died in the present case
JA
at the trial stage cannot make any difference. We are, therefore, of the
view that the decision of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in
Chandrup's case (supra) is inconsistent with the decision of this Court
in Hazari's case (supra) and has to be overruled. We accordingly over-
rule it. We hold that the right to sue in the present case survived on the
B
death of Kishan Chand in favour of the appellants who were his legal
representatives and they were entitled to be brought on record in
substitution of the original plaintiff Kishan Chand under Order 22
Rule 3 of the Civil Procedure Code. The appeal is accordingly allowed,
the order of the High Court is set aside and the order of the trial court
is restored. The trial court is directed to bring the appellants on record
C as the legal representatives of the deceased-plaintiff and to proceed to~.
dispose of the suit on merits. f
N.P.V. Appeal allowed
y
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