Holding

The dismissal order was unsustainable; the appellant is to be reinstated but is not entitled to back wages.

Summary

The appellant, a constable in the Central Reserve Police Force, was repeatedly disciplined for unauthorized absence, culminating in dismissal after a departmental inquiry found some charges partially proved. He challenged the dismissal, but his appeal and subsequent writ petition were dismissed due to long delay. The Supreme Court examined Rule 27 of the CRPF Rules, holding that once a disciplinary inquiry is initiated it must be concluded and a second inquiry on the same charges is not permissible. The Court found the disciplinary authority’s order of dismissal unsustainable and, exercising discretionary power under Article 142 of the Constitution, ordered the appellant’s reinstatement but denied back wages because of the appellant’s unreasonable delay and laches. The appeal was therefore partly allowed.

Issues considered

Whether a second departmental inquiry can be lawfully initiated after a first inquiry where charges were partially proved and dismissal ordered under Rule 27 of the CRPF Rules.
Whether the dismissal order is sustainable in law.
Whether the appellant is entitled to back wages upon reinstatement given the delay in seeking judicial review.

Legislation cited

Central Reserve Police Force Rules, 1955s. Rule 27
Constitution of Indias. Article 142

Subjects

departmental inquirydisciplinary proceedingsRule 27CRPFreinstatementback wagesdelaylachesArticle 142service law

Judgment

A KANAILAL BERA
·:--{
v.
UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.

SEPTEMBER 24, 2007
B [S.B. SINHA AND H.S. BEDI, JJ.]

Service Law: ~.....,

Central Reserve Police Force Rules-Rule 27--Departmental
c inquiry-Initiation of second inquiry after dismissing the delinquent
from service having found that charges partially proved against him
in the first inquiry-Sustainability of-Held: Not sustainable-Once
a departmental proceeding has been initiated, same must be brought
to its logical end-Finding is to be arrived at whether delinquent was
D guilty ofcharges leveled or not-In view ofthe fact that long time has
elapsed and that the disciplinary Authority misdirected itself by not )-·
complying with Rule 2 7, in exercise of discretionary jurisdiction,
delinquent to be reinstated in service-However, since the delinquent
did not approach High Court against alleged misconduct within
E reasonable time, delinquent denied back wages-Constitution ofIndia,
1950-Article 142.
Appellant, a constable in CRPF remained unauthorisedly
absent and was sentenced to seven days confinement to Civil Lines.
F Thereafter, disciplinary proceeding was initiated against the
appellant and he was sentenced to ten days confinement in Civil
Lines. However, he refused to comply with the same and another
disciplinary proceeding was initiated against him. Charges levelled
against him were partially proved and he was dismissed from service
but another disciplinary proceeding was directed to be initiated.
G
Appellant filed appeal against dismissal order and the same was
dismissed. Both the Writ Petition as well as the appeal was dismissed
on the ground oflong delay. Hence the present appeal.
Partly allowing the appeal, the Court
H 612
KANAILAL BERA v. UNION OF INDIA 613

HELD: 1.1 Rule 27 of the Central Reserve Police Force Rules A
'r
1955, inter alia, lays down the procedure for conducting a
departmental inquiry. Once a disciplinary proceeding has been
initiated, the same must be brought to its logical end meaning
thereby a finding is required to be arrived at as to whether the
delinquent officer is guilty of charges levelled against him or not. In B
a given situation further evidences may be directed to be adduced
but the same would not mean that despite holding a delinquent officer
,·> to be partially guilty of the charges levelled against him another
inquiry would be directed to be initiated on the self same charges
which could not be proved in the first inquiry. It is accepted that the c
purported order of the disciplinary authority was unsustainable in
law. [Para 5] [616-D, E, C]
KR.Deb v. The Collector of Central Excise, Shillong, [1971] 2
sec 102, referred to.
D
1.2. In the meantime, fifteen years have elapsed. Ordinarily,
--.( although, quantum of punishment would not be interfered with but
keeping in view the fact that the disciplinary authority must be held
to have misdirected itself by not complying with Rule 27 of the
Central Reserve Police Force Rules, stricto sensu and having E
directed a further inquiry after ordering for the dismissal of services
of the appellant, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case
which may not be treated to be a precedent, in exercise of
discretionary jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of
~
India, the appellant should be directed to be reinstated in service. F
[Paras 8 and 9] [617-E-G]
+

1.3. Back wages cannot be directed to be granted automatically.
Several factors are required to be taken into consideration therefor.
The misconduct is alleged to have been committed in the year 1992.
Appellant, admittedly, did not approach the High Court within a G
->- reasonable time. The High Court had refused to exercise its power
of judicial review having regard to delay and laches on the part of
. .. the appellant. Having regard to the said fact, interest ofjustice would
be subserved if the appellant is denied the back wages for the said
period. However, appellant should be reinstated in service and be H
-~
614 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 10 S.C.R.

A given all other consequential benefits.
[Paras 11, 12 and 13] [618-C-D]
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 4493 of
2007.
B From the Judgment and final Order dated 9.11.2006 of the High
Court of Calcutta in F.M.A. No. 594 of2003.

"''...
Bikas Kar Gupta, Bikash Ranjan Neogi, R.K. Gharai and V.
Sivasubramanian for the Appellant.
c A. Sharan, ASG., B. Sunita Rao and Sushma Suri for the
Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
S.B. SINHA, J. Leave granted.
D
1. Appellant herein was appointed as a Constable in the Central
Reserve Police Force. He allegedly proceeded on medical leave on 'y
17.2.1992. He reported for duty on 1.4.1992. He was found medically
fit and declared as such on 6.4.1992. He again applied for medical leave
and without such leave being sanctioned he unauthorisedly left his place
E
of posting on 9.4.1992. He remained unauthorisedly absent for a period
of 67 days. He returned back to his duty only on 12. 7.1992. On the
charges of having remained unauthorisedly absent, he was sentenced to
seven days confinement to Civil Lines. As against the said order, he made
a representation. The said representation, however, was not routed r
F through proper channel, whereupon a proceeding was again initiated
against him. He was directed to be confined for ten days in the Civil Lines
and on the premise that he refused to comply with the requirements of
such confinement to Civil Lines, another disciplinary proceeding was
initiated against him. In the said proceedings the charges against him were
G held to be partially proved. He was dismissed from service but then
.,(_-;
another disciplinary proceeding was directed to be initiated.
...
2. The order of dismissal was passed in the year 1994. He preferred
an appeal thereagainst. The appeal filed by him was also dismissed on
H 5.4.1995.
KANAILAL BERA v. UNION OF INDIA [SINHA, J.] 615

3. He filed a writ petition before the Calcutta High Court questioning A
the said order of dismissal in the year 1997 which was marked as W.P.
85/1997. On the premise that the said writ petition was filed after a lapse
of two years, a learned Single Judge of the High Court refused to exercise
his discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution oflndia
Aggrieved by and dis-satisfied therewith an intra Court appeal was B
preferred thereagainst. By reason of the impugned judgment dated
9.11.2006,the said appeal has also been dismissed stating:
~ ".. The appeal was dismissed on 5.4.95 but the writ petition was
filed on 9.5.97. Within the four comers of the writ petition the writ
petitioner/appellant has not assigned any reason for this long delay c
for moving this Court in writ jurisdiction.
In the case report in (2006) 4 Supreme Court at page 322 it has
been laid down that the delay or laches is one of the factors which
is to be borne in mind by the High Court when they exercise their D
discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. In an
'(' appropriate case the High Court may refuse to invoke its
extraordinary powers if there is such negligence or omission on
the part of the applicant to assert his right as taken in conjunction
with the lapse of time and other circumstances causes prejudice E
to the opposite party.
In this case the writ petitioner/appellant has prayed for invoking
the power of the Court in writ jurisdiction after unexplained delay
of a number of years. He by his conduct had accepted the
punishment inflicted upon him. The chapter was closed. Now again F,
after long lapse of a number of years the said closed chapter cannot
be reopened. Thus, the learned Single Judge was perfectly justified
in dismissing the writ petition on the ground of inordinate delay."

Appellant is thus before us. G
-.>--
4. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant in support
of his appeal submitted that the High Court in a situation of this nature
should not have refused to entertain the writ petition as also the Letters
Patent Appeal preferred by the appellant herein only on the ground of
H
.·~·
. I

616 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 10 S.C.R.

A delay and laches as a result whereof manifest injustice has been caused
to him. Learned counsel would point out that in terms of Rule 27 of the
Central Reserve Police Force Rules, the respondent could not have
initiated a second inquiry after having found that the charges have been
partially proved in the first inquiry. It was, furthermore, contented that in
B the Central Reserve Police Force Act and the Rules framed thereunder,
there does not exist any provision for imposition of punishment of
confinement to Civil Lines which was applicable only to the persons
governed by the Almy Act. ~

5. The question as to whether a punishment of confinement to Civil
as
C Lines could have been directed or not should not detain us we agree
with the contention raised by learned counsel for the appellant that the
purported order dated 5.4.1995 of the disciplinary authority was
unsustainable in law. Rule 27 of the Central Reserve Police Force Rules
1955 , inter alia, lays down the procedure for conducting a departmental
D inquiry. Once a disciplinary proceeding has been initiated, the same must
be brought to its logical end meaning thereby a finding is required to be
arrived at as to whether the delinquent officer is guilty of charges levelled ./
against him or not. In a given situation further evidences may be directed "
to be adduced but the same would not mean that despite holding a
E delinquent officer to be partially guilty of the charges levelled against him
another inquiry would be directed to be initiated on the self same charges
which could not be proved in the first inquiry.
6. In KR.Deb v. The Collector ofCentral Excise, Shillong, [1971]
F 2 SCC 102, this Court while considering the provisions contained in Rule
15(1) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal)
Rules, 1957 held as under:
"12. It seems to us that Rule 15, on the face of it, really provides
for one inquiry but it may be possible if in a particular case there
G has been no proper enquiry because some serious defect has crept
into the inquiry or some important witnesses were not available at
the time of the inquiry or were not examined for some other reason,
the Disciplinary Authority may ask the Inquiry Officer to record
further evidence. But there is no provision in Rule 15 for completely
H setting aside previous inquiries on the ground that the report of the
KANAILALBERA v. UNIONOFINDIA[SINHA,J.] 617

),-

Inquiring Officer or Officers does not appeal to the Disciplinary A
Authority. The Disciplinary Authority has enough powers to
reconsider the evidence itself and come to its own conclusion under
Rule 9.
13. In our view the rules do not contemplate an action such as B
was taken by the Collector on February 13, 1962. It seems to us
that the Collector, instead of taking responsibility himself, was
- .>
determined to get some officer to report against the appellant. The
procedure adopted was not only not warranted by the rules but
was harassing to the appellant".
c
7. The next question which arises for our consideration is as to
whether we would follow the normal rule, namely, set aside the impugned
judgment and remit the matter back to the High Court or deal with the
matter ourselves. One other option which is available to us was to set
aside the punishment recorded by the disciplinary authority and request D
--{ the High CoUit to consider the matter afresh on the basis of the materials
brought on record in the disciplinary proceedings.
8. Fifteen years, however, in the meantime have elapsed. Ordinarily,
although, we would not interfere with the quantum of punishment but
E
keeping in view the fact that the disciplinary authority must be held to have
misdirected itself by not complying with Rule 27 of the Central Reserve
Police Force Rules stricto sensu and having directed a further inquiry after
---< orde1ing for the dismissal of sef\~ces of the appellant, we are of the opinion
that in the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case which may not be
treated to be a precedent, we shall pass an appropriate order in exercise F
of our discretionary jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of
India.
9. In our view in terms of the foregoing reasons and on the finding
-),
aforementioned, the appellant should be directed to be reinstated in sef\'ice. G
The question, however, remains as to whether he should be granted back
wages. We think not.
10. Learned counsel vehemently submits that in a situation of this
nature, where the illegality committed by the disciplinary authority is
H
~·
. '.
618 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 10 S.C.R.

A apparent on its face,the appellant should not be denied back wages.
11. It is now a trite law that back wages cannot be directed to be
granted automatically. Several factors are required to be taken into
consideration therefor. Furthermore, we have not and could not have gone
into the question as to whether the appellant in fact has committed any
B misconduct or not as we are inclined to set aside the impugned order of
punishment only on technicality.
'~-.

12. The misconduct is alleged to have committed in the year 1992.
He, admittedly, did not approach the High Court within a reasonable time.
c The High Court had refused to exercise its power ofjudicial review having
regard to delay and laches on the part of the appellant.
13. Having regard to the said fact, we are of the opinion that interest
of justice would be subserved ifthe appellant is denied the back wages
for the said period. He, however, should be reinstated in service and be
D given all other consequential benefits.
14. The appeal is allowed to the aforementioned extent. In the facts
and circumstances of this case, however, there shall be no order as to
costs.
E NJ. Appeal partly allowed.