Holding

The election petition is not maintainable as it fails to plead material facts showing the candidate’s incurrence, authorisation, or undertaking of reimbursement of excess election expenditure.

Summary

Kamalnath, who was elected from the Chhindwara Lok Sabha constituency, was challenged by Sudesh Verma through an election petition alleging a corrupt practice under Section 123(6) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 for exceeding the prescribed expenditure ceiling. The Madhya Pradesh High Court struck several paragraphs of the petition but held that material facts regarding the alleged excess expenditure were disclosed, allowing the petition to proceed. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether the remaining averments sufficiently pleaded the material facts required under Section 77 and Section 123(6), namely that the candidate incurred, authorized, or undertook reimbursement of the excess expenditure. Finding only vague statements about helicopter usage without specific amounts, authorisation, or reimbursement undertakings, the Court held that the petition lacked the necessary material facts and was therefore not maintainable. The Court also considered the requirement of an affidavit under Section 83 and concluded that no fatal infraction existed. Consequently, the appeal was allowed and the High Court orders set aside, rendering the election petition non‑maintainable.

Issues considered

Whether, after striking out certain paragraphs, the election petition disclosed material facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action for corrupt practice under Section 123(6) read with Section 77 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951.
Whether the failure to disclose the source of information in the affidavit violates the proviso to Section 83 of the Act and renders the election petition non‑maintainable.

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
Representation of the People Act, 1951s. 123(6), s. 2(h), s. 77, s. 83

Subjects

election petitioncorrupt practiceexcess election expenditurematerial factspleading requirementsRepresentation of the People ActSection 123(6)Section 77Section 83affidavitConduct of Election Rules

Judgment

t
KAMALNATH A
v.
SUDESH VERMA

JANUARY 8, 2002

[G.B. PATTANAIK AND Y.K. SABHARWAL, JJ.) B

Election Laws:

Representation of the People Act, 1951-Sections 2(h), 77, 83 and
123(6) c
Election petition-Corrupt practices-Meaning of-Amount spent
exceeding the prescribed ceiling on election expenses-Expenditure so
incurred must be either by the candidate/his agent/authorised person-It
must be established and shown in pleading that authorisation and D
undertaking of reimbursement of such expenditure by the candidate/election
agent.

Material facts-Should disclose incurring of excess expenditure and
candidate's undertaking of liability to reimburse and allegations on which
Court could draw inferences of expenditure beyond the prescribed limit- E
Vague assertions would not constitute the material facts and election petition
not maintainable-Conduct of Election Rules-Rule 90.

S.83-Disclosure of sources of information of excess expenditure in the
affidavit-Requirements of-On facts the averment as well as the contents of
verifications and affidavit-Does not constitute infraction of the provision- F
Conduct of Election Rules-Rule 94-A.

Appellant was declared elected from a Lok Sabha Constituency.
Respondent filed an election petition challenging the election of the appellant,
on the grounds of corrupt practices under Section 123(6) of the
Representation of the People Act; and that appellant had incurred or authorised G
expenditure in contravention of Section 77 of the Act High Court struck down
certain paras of the petition by holding them unnecessary and frivoulous. As
regards the alleged expenditure in excess of the ceiling limit, High Court
held that the cause of action thereof has been disclosed and, therefore, petition
cannot be dismissed in limine. The appellant filed review petition which was H
63
64 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2002] l S.C.R

A rejected. Hence this appeal.

It was contended for the appellant that the assertions made in the petition
did not make out an allegation of corrupt practice as per Section 123(6) of
-
the Act; that on vague and general allegations without giving any material
particulars, no triable issue existed; that in the absence of requisite facts,
B details and particulars of the corrupt practice with exactitude, the election
petition must fail on the threshold; that in absence of more particulars on
source of information in the affidavit, there has been an infraction of
requfrement under Section 83 of the Act and the election petition ought to
have been rejected.

c It was contended for the respondent that the election petition contained
the material facts alleging that the returned candidate had spent more than
the ceiling provided for and there existed a triable issue which can only be
adjudicated after evidence being led.

Allowing the appeal, the Court
D ~

HELD : 1.,1. On a combined reading of Section 77 and Section 123 ~

(C) of the Representation of the People Act, it is explicitly clear that the excess
expenditure must be incurred by the candidate or by any person authorised
by the candidate or his election agents. An expenditure incurred by a third
E person, who is not authorised by a candidate or who is not an election agent
of the candidate, will not be corrupt practice within the ambit of Section 123(6)
of the Act. It would, therefore, be necessary to establish a corrupt practice, to ....
plead requisite facts showing authorisation or undertaking of reimbursement {
by the candidate or his election agent. [68-G-H; 69-A)

F 1.2. Vague assertion would not necessarily constitute the material fact
that the candidate has spent by way of hiring of helicopter, an amount exceeding
the ceiling provided under Rule 90 of the Conduct of Election Rules. It is
difficult to hold that the material facts in relation to the alleged corrupt
practice within the ambit of Section 123(6) read with Section 77 of the Act,
have all been pleaded, so that the matter would be left to lead evidence during
G trial. It has not been pleaded specifically that either the appellant had incurred b
the expenditure amounting to a particular sum or has authorised his agent to
incur the same or that he has authorised any other person to make the
expenditure which the appellant has undertaken to reimburse. There is no
averment on record indicating that the appellant either did incur the
H expenditure of hiring helicopter for a specified number of hours or that he
'
A.
I

KAMALNATH v. SUDESH VERMA [PATTANAIK, J.] 65
has authorised any other person for hiring such helicopter to whom he has A
undertaken to reimburse the amount. Thus,·11ie material facts in relation to
an allegation of corrupt practice within the ambit of Section 123(6) read with
Section 77 of the Act are lacking and, therefore, the election petition must
be held to be not maintainable. (69-F; 71-F-G)

Dhartipakar Madan Lal Agarwal v. Rajiv Gandhi, (1987) Supp. SCC B
93 and V. Narayanaswamy v. C.P. Thirunavukkarasu, (2000) 2 SCC 294, relied
on.

r 2. Rule 94(A) of the Conduct ofElection Rules, provides that the Affidavit
referred to in the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 83 shall be sworn before C
a Magistrate of the First Class or a Notary or a Commissioner of Oaths and
shall be in Form 25. Considering the averments made in the election petition
as well as the contents of the verification and affidavit thereto, it is found there
has not been an infraction of the proviso to Section 83(1) of Act so as to reject
the petition on that score at the threshold. (73-F-H; 74-A-B)
D
V. Narayanaswamy v. C.P. Thirunavukkarasu, (2000) 2 SCC 294, relied
on.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 4042-4043 of
2001.
E
From the Judgment and Order dated 21.7.2000 and 31.1.2001 of the
Madhya Pradesh High Court in I.A. Nos. 2-3/99 and 50-51/2000 in E.P. No. 3
of 1998.

K.K. Venugopal, Ashok K. Gupta, Krishnan Venugopai Farrukh Rasheed F
and Mukesh Verma for the Appellant.

M. Ramajois, S.S. Khanduja and Y. P. Dhingra for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
G
PA TTANAlK, J. These appeals by special leave are directed against the
order dated 21.7.2000 of the High Court of Judicature at Jabalpur in Election
Petition No. 3 of 1998 as well as against the Order dated 31.1.2001 in the said
Election Petition. The appellant is the successful candidate from Chhindwara
Lok Sabha Constituency in the State of Madhya Pradesh. The respondent
filed an Election Petition, which was registered as Election Petition 3 of 1998 H
66 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] I S.C.R

A impugning the election of the appellant alleging corrupt practice under Section
123(6) of the Representation of the People Act (hereinafter referred to as "The
Act"), in as much as the appellant is alleged to have incurred or authorised
expenditure in contravention of Section 77 of the Act. It may be stated, apart
from the aforesaid allegation of corrupt practice, there was no other allegation
B in the Election Petition. The appellant had won the election by defeating his
nearest rival by 1,53,398 votes. In the Election Petition the appellant filed two
applications seeking dismissal of the Election Petition on the ground that the
said Petition does not disclose material facts with regard to alleged corrupt
practices, as required under Section 83 of the Act. It was also urged that the
accompanying affidavit is too vague and is not in accordance with the
C proviso to Section 83 of the Act. The appellant also prayed that several
paragraphs of the Election Petition should be deleted as it has no connection
with the allegation of corrupt practice within the ambit of Section 123(6). It
was also prayed that the Election Petition having not disclosed any triable
issue, the same is liable to be dismissed. The learned judge, who had been
appointed as Election Tribunal, by his order dated 21.7.2000 came to hold that
D the pleadings in paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 9, 15, 16, 17, 18 and 19 are wholly
unnecessary and frivolous and deserve to be struck down, and accordingly
directed for striking out those paragraphs. But so far as the allegation of
corrupt practice on the ground, that the amount spent exceeded the ceiling
on election expenses, the learned Judge came to hold that the material facts
E with regard to the ingredients of the cause of action for the alleged corrupt
practice has been disclosed, and therefore, the Election Petition cannot be
dismissed in limine. The appellant thereafter filed yet another application
seeking review of the aforesaid order dated 21. 7.2000, and that Review
Application was rejected by Order dated 31.1.200 I, and hence the present
appeals.
F
Mr. K.K. Venugopal, the learned senior counsel, appearing for the
appellant contended, that the validity of Explanation I to 77( I) of the
Representation of the People Act, 1951 having been up held by this Court
in the case of Dr. P. Na/la Thampy Terah v. Union of India, [1985] Supp.
G Supreme Court Cases 189, unless an Election Petition contains averment to
the effect that the returned candidate, either has incurred or has authorised ~
expenditure to be incurred by the election agent, more than the ceiling
prescribed under the Act, a mere vague allegation will not make an Election
Petition maintainable to be tried under Section 123(6) of the Act, and in the
case in hand, after striking out of the paragraphs as per the order of the High
H Court, on the assertions made in the residue of the paragraphs do not make
.(_
)

KAMALNATH v. SUDESH VERMA [PATTANAIK, J.] 67

~
out an allegation of corrupt practice within the ambit of Section 123(6) of the A
Act, and as such, the Election Petition was liable to be rejected and the High
~ Court committed error in rejecting the said submission of the appellant. Mr.
Venugopal further contended, that the allegations of corrupt practice being
quasi criminal in nature, the pleadings require a strict examination, and
therefore, there should not be any vagueness in the allegations made which
a returned candidate would be required to meet. According to Mr. Venugopal, B
on vague and general allegation without giving any particulars, it is difficult
to hold that there exists a triable issue, therefore the High Court committed
... error in not dismissing the Election Petition. According to Mr. Venugopal the
Election Petition cannot be entertained to have a fishing and roving enquiry
and, therefore, it is obligatory on the Election Petitioner to give requisite facts, c
details and particulars of the corrupt practice with exactitude, and in the
absence of such particulars the Election Petition must fail at the thresh-hold.
Mr. Venugopal further urged that on a true construction of Section 83 of the
Act, more particularly, proviso to Section 83 [l][c], the source of information
is required to be given in the affidavit and the same not having been furnished
there has been an infraction of requirement of law and Election Petition ought D
to have been rejected on this ground also.
k

Mr. Ramajois, learned senior counsel appearing for respondents, on the
other hand contended, that the material facts and material particulars are not
one and the same thing. Material facts are those primary facts which disclose
E
the cause of action and those primary facts have to be specifically pleaded,
and failure to do so will result in rejection of the Election Petition. But if such
...
material facts have been pleaded, then the rest would be a matter for trial and,
>- therefore, in the case in hand, since the Election Petition did contain the
material facts alleging that the returned candidate had spent more than the
ceiling provided for, the Election Petition could not have been rejected at the F
thresh-hold, and on the other hand there exists a triable issue which can only
be adjudicated after evidence being lead. In this view of the matter, the

-
,
impugned order of the High Court does not suffer from illegality requiring
interference by this Court. In support of his contention reliance is placed on
the decision of this Court in V.S. Achuthanandan v. P.J. Francis and Anr.,
[1999] 3 Supreme Court Cases 737.
G

In view of the rival contentions two questions arise for consideration:-

(I) After striking out of the paragraphs from the Election Petition in
pursuance of order of the High Court, whether on the residue of H
68 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002) 1 S.C.R.

A the averments can it be said that material facts leading to the
allegation of corrupt practice have been pleaded or the allegations
are such that it would involve a chance or conjecture for the
Court to draw inference by adopting an involved process of
reasoning to arrive at a conclusion that the Petition contains an
averment of expenditure beyond the prescribed limit, and as
B such, a triable issue still exists.

(2) Whether non-mention of source of information in the affidavit
constitutes an infraction of the provisions of Section 83 of the
Act, and as such is fatal to the maintainability of an Election
Petition.
c Coming to the first question, Chapter VIII of the Act deals with election
expenses. Under Section 77 of the Act every candidate at an election either
by himself or by his election agent, is required to keep a separate and correct
account of all expenditure in connection with the election incurred or authorized
by him or by his election agent between the date on which he has been
D nominated and the date of declaration of the result thereof. Sub-section (3)
of Section 77 provides that the total of the said expenditure shall not exceed
such amount as may be prescribed. The expression "prescribed" has been
defined in Section 2(h) to mean prescribed by the rules made under the Act.
Under Section 123(6) of the Act incurring excessive expenditure than the
E maximum amount prescribed, would tantamount to corrupt practice. But the
said expenditure has to be incurred either by the candidate or by his election
agent or by a person authorized by him and further such expenditure must
be between the date of publication of the notification calling the election and
.
the date of declaration
I
of the result thereof. Rule 90 of the Conduct of Election
Rules provides the maximum amount that can be spent by a candidate or his
F authorised agent under Section 77 and for a Parliamentary Constituency, the
amount is specified in Column (2) of the table in the State of Madhya Pradesh.
It may be stated that mere non-disclosure of the expenditure will not be a
corrupt practice but it is incurring of expenditure in excess of the prescribed
amount would be held to be a corrupt practice. On a combined reading of
G Section 77 and Section 123(6) of the Act, it is explicitly clear that the excess
expenditure must be incurred by the candidate or by any person authorised
by the candidate or his election agent. In other words, an expenditure incurred
by a third person, who is not authorised by a candidate or who is not an
election agent of the candidate, will not be a corrupt practice within the ambit
of Section 123(6) of the Act. It would, therefore, be necessary to establish a
H corrupt practice, as contemplated under Section 123(6) of the Act to plead
~
I

KAMALNATH v. SUDESH VERMA [PATTANAIK, J.] 69
requisite facts showing authorisation or undertaking of reimbursement by the A
candidate or his election agent. In the case of Dhartipakar Madan Lal
~ ' Agarwal v. Rajiv Gandhi, [1987] Supp. S.C.C. 93, this Court examined the
allegations made in the election petition and came to hold that mere allegation
that several jeeps were plying in the constituency and that food was given
to the party workers, would not tantamount to an allegation of corrupt practice
and, therefore, the election petition was held to be not maintainable. Explanation
B
(I) to Section 77 in the context of expenditure incurred or authorised by the
..,. candidate bears considerable significance inasmuch as voluntary expenditure
incurred by friends, relations or sympathisers of the candidate is not required
to be included in the candidate's return of expenses unless expenses were
incurred in the circumstances from which it could be positively inferred that c
the successful candidate had undertaken that he would reimburse the person,
who incurred the expenses. When maintainability of an election petition is
considered from the stand point as to whether materials facts have been
pleaded or not in a petition alleging corrupt practice on the ground that
expenses incurred by the candidate is more than the prescribed limit, it would
be necessary to aver the fact that the candidate has incurred the expenditure D
or has authorised any other person to incur the expenditure or that his
election agent has incurred the expenditure and further the candidate has
undertaken the liability to reimburse. These would constitute the material
facts of an election petition, which is filed, alleging corrupt practice within the
ambit of Section 123(6) read with Section 77 of the Act and Rule 90 of the E
Conduct of Election Rules. We would, therefore, examine the residue of
A. averments made in the election petition to find out whether such material facts
.. had in fact been averred in the election petition, so that a triable issue can
be said to subsist, which could be adjudicated upon, after evidence being
lead. Vague assertion that an helicopter was used for a specified number of
flying hours and the standard charges for flying hour was Rs. 53,000 would F
not necessarily constitute the material fact that the candidate has spent by
way of hiring of the helicopter, an amount exceeding the ceiling provided
.I under Rule 90 of the Conduct of Election Rules. In Dhartipakar Madan Lal
Agarwal v. Rajiv Gandhi, [1987] Supp. S.C.C. 93, the Court examined the
allegation that at least 100 jeeps for 30 days and his workers with his consent G
d used 40 jeeps and spent money on propaganda badges, leaflets, making
arrangements for holding meetings throughout Amethi constituency and money
was spent in providing food to I 00 workers of Raj iv Gandhi, which was not
accounted for in the election expenses return and came to hold that the
allegations contained therein do not make out any case of corrupt practice.
It was held in the aforesaid case that it is necessary to plead requisite facts H
70 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] l S.C.R.

A showing authorisation, or undertaking of reimbursement by the candidate or
his election agent and a mere vague and general statement that the candidate
and his workers with his consent spent money in election in excess of the
permissible ceiling would not be sufficient to constitute corrupt practice. In
V. Narayanaswamy v. C.P. Thirunavukkarasu, [2000] 2 S.C.C. 294, a three
B Judge Bench of this Court examined the distinction between material facts and
material particulars and ultimately came to hold on fact that the election
petition had lacuna in material facts. The allegation in that case was also
corrupt practice but relating to bribery and undue influence. But the Court
observed that in a petition on the allegation of corrupt practice, the cause of
action cannot be equated with the cause of action, as is normally understood
C because of the consequences that follow in a petition based on the allegations
of corrupt practices inasmuch as an election petition seeking a challenge to
the election of a candidate on the allegation of corrupt practices is a serious
. matter and if proved, not only does the candidate suffer ignominy, but he also
suffers disqualification from standing for election for a period that may extend
to six years. After taking note of all the earlier decisions, the Court held that
D to plead corrupt practice as contemplated by law it has to be specifically
alleged that the corrupt practices were committed with the consent of the ..
candidate and that a particular electoral right of a person has affected and it
cannot be left to time, chance or conjecture for the Court to draw inference
by adopting an involved process of reasoning. Applying the aforesaid test
E to the residue of pleadings that are available in the election petition, after
striking of several paragraphs pursuant to the orders of the High Court, it is
difficult for us to hold that the material facts in relation to the alleged corrupt
practice within the ambit of Section 123(6) read with Section 77 of the Act,
have at all been pleaded, so that the matter would be left to lead evidence
during trial. On the other hand, vague assertion with regard to the use of
F helicopter and what are the standard charges of an helicopter per flight hour
have been mentioned on it. It has not been specifically pleaded that either
the appellant had incurred the expenditure amounting to a particular sum or
has authorised his agent to incur the same or that he has authorised any other
person to make the expenditure which the appellant has undertaken to
G reimburse. The High Court in paragraph ( 11) has culled out the residue of
averments in the petition which were considered to be sufficient pleadings of
the corrupt practice within the ambit of Section 123(6) read with Section 77·
of the Act. But on examining the averment which remains in the election
petition after several paragraphs having been struck off, we do not find any
averment on record, indicating that the appellant either did incur the expenditure
H of hiring an helicopter for a specified number of hours or that he has authorised
L
KAMALNATH v. SUDESH VERMA [PATTANAIK, J.) 71

his election agent for hiring such helicopter or that he has authorised any A
other person for hiring such helicopter to whom he has undertaken to reimburse
the amount Mr. Ramajois, appearing for the respondents vehemently argued
that paragraph (6) of the election petition unequivocally satisfies the material
facts in relation to the allegation of corrupt practice under Section 123(6) of
the Act, but paragraph (6) merely states that the facts narrated below B
specifically would show that the expenses beyond the maximum limit as
prescribed under Section 77 were actually incurred by the returned candidate
or he has authorised the same. But on scrutinizing the facts narrated below
did not indicate the factual averrnent that the returned candidate had in fact
incurred expenditure beyond the prescribed limit and all that had been stated
• is that a helicopter had been used for a number of hours and the normal rate C
of hiring a helicopter being minimum Rs. 2,12,000 per day and the helicopter
having been used for 14 days, the returned candidate must have been required
to pay more than the prescribed limit towards the expenses of the helicopter.
This in our considered opinion, cannot be held to be an assertion of material
fact and on the other hand, it would be in the realm of conjecture, requiring
the Court to draw inference by adopting an involved process of reasoning D
and that would not satisfy the requirement of the pleadings of material facts.
We are unable to agree with the submissions of Mr. Ramjois, appearing for
the respondents that in fact the election petition does indicate the cause of
action and the applicant would be required to establish them only during trial
inasmuch as an electior. petition which purports to unsettle the wish of the E
electorates has to be strictly construed and more so when an allegation of
corrupt practice is the basis of the petition, the said allegation being quasi
criminal in nature. Having examined the averrnents which remain after striking
off several paragraphs pursuant to the order of the High Court, we have no
hesita~ion to come to the conclusion that material facts in relation to an
allegation of corrupt practice within the ambit of Section 123(6) read with F
Section 77 of the Representation of the People Act are lacking and, therefore,
the election petition must be held to be not maintainable. In our view, the High
Court committed error in coming to the conclusion that a triable issue does
subsist on the residue of the allegations. Our answer to the first question,
therefore, is that there has been an infirmity in the election petition, as the G
material facts in the context of allegation of corrupt practice within the ambit
-cl of Section 123(6) read with Section Tl of the Representation of the People Act
are lacking and such an election petition is liable to be dismissed.

So far as the second question is concerned, Mr. Venugopal's contention
is based upon the language used in the proviso to Section 83(1) of the H
i·
I

72 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] I S.C.R.

A Representation of the People Act. The proviso to Section 83( 1) reads thus:-

"83. Contents of petition. (I) An election petition

(a) shall contain a concise statement of the material facts on which
the petitioner relies;
B
(b) shall set forth full particulars of any corrupt practice that the
petitioner alleged including as full a statement as possible of the
names of the parties alleged to have committed such corrupt
practice and the date and place of the commission of each practice;
and
c
(c) shall be signed by the petitioner and verified in the manner laid
down in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) for the
verification of pleadings;

(Provided that where the petitioner alleges any corrupt practice, the
D
petition shall also be accompanied by an affidavit in the prescribed
form in support of the allegation of such corrupt practice and the
particulars thereof.)"

Mr. Venugopal contends, that when an Election Petition alleges any corrupt
E practice the said petition, under law, is required to be accompanied by an
affidavit in the prescribed form in support of the allegation of such corrupt
practice and the J?llrticulars thereof. The underlined idea behind the aforesaid
proviso is that the person against whom allegations are made should also be
aware of the source of information of the deponent so that the person
concerned can challenge the same in cross-examination. This being the
F position, according to Mr. Venugopal, lack of source of infom1ation of the
deponent constitutes an infraction of the proviso, even if the prescribed form
does not provide to indicate such source of information, and any petition
which Jacks the source of information should be rejected at the thresh-hold.
In support of the same, reliance has been placed on the decision of this Court
G in Ravinder Singh v. Janmeja Singh and Ors., [2000] 8 Supreme Court Cases
191, as well as a Three Judge Bench decision in V Narayanaswamy v. C.P.
Thirunavukkarasu, [2000] 2 Supreme Court Cases 294. In Ravindra Singh's
case (supra) this Court, construed the provision of Section 83 of the Act and
held that not only a concise statement of material facts and full particulars
of the alleged corrupt practice to present a full and complete picture of the
H action to be detailed in the election petition, but also under the proviso to
KAMALNATH v. SUDESH VERMA [PATTANAIK, J.] 73
Section 83( I) of the Act, the election petition levelling a charge of corrupt A
practice is required, by law, to be supported by an affidavit in which the
~- election petitioner is obliged to disclose his source of infonnation in respect
of the commission of that corrupt practice. According to learned Judges the
reason for this insistence is obvious. It is necessary for an election petitioner
to make such a charge with full responsibility and to prevent any fishing and
roving inquiry and save the returned candidate from being taken by surprise.
B
The Court in this case held that in the absence of proper affidavit, in the
prescribed fonn, filed in support of the corrupt practice of bribery, the allegation
.... pertaining thereto, could not be put to trial, the defect being of a fatal nature .
• In the aforesaid case the Court found that there was no affidavit filed in
support of the allegations of corrupt practice of bribery. c
In V. Narayanaswamy's case the Court also construed the provision of
Section 83 of the Representation of the People Act and examined the purpose
with which proviso to sub-section (I) of Section 83 was inserted by Act 40
of 1961. The Court held that an Affidavit within the meaning of proviso to
Section 83(1) has to conform not only to the form prescribed in substance but D
' also contain particulars as prescribed by the Rules. It was also held that if
several paragraphs of the Election Petition alleging corrupt practices remain
unaffirmed under the verification clause as wel! as the affidavit, the unsworn
. allegation could have no legal existence and the Court could not take cognizance
thereof. Charge of corrupt practice being quasi-criminal in nature the Court
E
must always insist on strict compliance with the provisions of law. Bearing
in mind the principles laid down in the aforesaid cases, and on examining the
,. affidavit that has been sworn to in the case in hand, it appears, that Rule
94(A) of the Conduct of the Election Rules, which was inserted by way of
tr
amendment with effect from 27th February, 1962, provides that the Affidavit
referred to in the proviso to sub-section (I) of Section 83 shall be sworn F
before a Magistrate of the first class or a Notary or a Commissioner of oaths
and shall be in Form 25. Thus Form 25 is the prescribed form required under
the proviso to Section 83(1), in which form the affidavit is required to be made.
,. The form indicates that the deponent must state that which of the paragraphs
are true to his knowledge and which of the paragraphs are true to his
G
- information. The Election Petition in the present case contains a verification
which states that paragraphs 2 to 2 I are true to the information received by
the petitioner of which sources have been disclosed in the main petition. The
accompanying affidavit also states that the particulars of corrupt practices
mentioned in paragraphs 2 to 21 are true to the information received from the
concerned authorities/persons are believed to be true. Out of these paragraphs, H
74 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] l S.C.R.

A paragraph nos. 3, 4, 5, 9, 15, 16, 17, 18 and 19 have already been struck up
by the order of the High Court dated 21.7.2000. On considering the avennents
made in the Election Petition, as well as the contents of the verification and
affidavit referred to earlier, we are unable to persuade ourselves with the

B
submission of Mr. Venugopal that there has been an infraction of the proviso
to Section 83( 1) of the Act so as to reject the Petition on that score at the
(
thresh-hold.

In view of our conclusion on question no. 1, the appeals are allowed
and the impugned orders of the High Court dated 21. 7.2000 as well as 31.1.2001
are set aside and the Election Petition No. 3 of 1998 in the High Court of
C Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur is held to be not maintainable.

S.K.S. Appeals allowed.

...