Holding

The respondent’s uninterrupted possession for over twelve years after the estate’s abolition, despite the cancellation of the power of attorney, constituted adverse possession, and the High Court’s finding was not a manifest error of law.

Summary

The appellant filed a suit for declaration of title and possession of agricultural land, while the respondent claimed title by adverse possession. The trial court held that the respondent had acquired title by adverse possession after more than twelve years of uninterrupted possession, but the district court reversed this, stating the respondent was merely an agent under a power of attorney that had been cancelled. On second appeal, the High Court re‑affirmed the trial court’s finding, concluding that the respondent’s possession continued after the estate’s abolition and thus amounted to prescription. The Supreme Court examined the documentary evidence, noting that the power of attorney was cancelled and no action was taken to eject the respondent, and that he remained in possession for well over twelve years. It held that the respondent’s possession was hostile and continuous, satisfying the statutory period for adverse possession, and that the High Court’s decision was not a manifest error of law. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.

Issues considered

Whether possession under a cancelled power of attorney can be treated as adverse possession.
Whether the respondent possessed the land continuously for the statutory period of twelve years after the abolition of the estate, thereby acquiring title by prescription.
Whether the High Court erred in interpreting the documentary evidence to conclude that the respondent’s possession was permissive rather than adverse.

Legislation cited

M.P. Land Revenue Codes. 169, s. 189, s. 190

Subjects

adverse possessionprescriptiontitleestate abolitionpower of attorneyland revenuepattadeclaration of titlepossessioncivil appeal

Judgment

KALIKA PRASAD AND ANR. A
v.
CHHATRAPAL SINGH (DEAD) BY LRS.

DECEMBER 18, 1996

[K. RAMASWAMY AND G.B. PATTANAIK, JJ.] B

Suit filed by appellant for declaration of title and for possession of
agricultural lands-Plea of adver~e possession by respondent-Trial Court
finding that the respondent had perfected his title by adverse possession-Ap-
pellate Court reversed the decree on the ground that the respondent had come C
into possession under a power of attorney-The power of attorney given to
respondent was cancelled and thereafter no action was taken to have him
ejected-On second appeal High Court held that respondent had perfected his
title by adverse possessiolt-High court recorded a finding that even after aboli-
tion of Estate Patta obtained by appellant till the date of filing of the suit, the D
respondent had remained in uninterrupted possession-Appeal before
Supreme Court~eld the respondent remained, without any interruption, for
well over 12 years, in possession in assertion of his own right, that too after

-
....
the abolition of the estate-Thereby, he perfected his title by prescription since
any person who got superior right had taken no action to have him ejected
from the lands-Under these circumstances, the finding recorded by the High E
Court has not been vitiated by any manifest error of law creating any substan-
tial question of law for interference in this appeal.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1589 of
1986.
F
From the Judgment and Order dated 12.10.85 of the Madhya
Pradesh High Court in S.A. No. 309 of 1980.

A.K. Chitale, S.K. Agnihotri, Mrs. V.D. Khanna and Mrs. Yogamaya
/,.gnihotri, for the Appellants.
G
S.S. Khanduja, B.K. Satija and Y.P. Dhingra for the Respondents.

The following Order of the Court was delivered :

This appeal by special leave arises from the judgment of the learned
single Judge of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh made on October 12, H
371
372 SUPREME COURT REPORTS(1996] SUPP.10 S.C.R.

A 1985 in Second Appeal No. 309/80.

The admitted facts are that the appellant-plaintiff filed a. suit for
de~laration of title and for possession of agricultural lands covered under
the schedule of the plaint. The respondent pleaded adverse possession. The
B trial Court, therefore, recorded a finding that the respondent had perfected
his title by adverse possession for having remained in possession for more
than 12 years. On appeal, the District Judge reversed the decree on the
ground that the respondent had come into possession under a power of
attorney and, therefore, he remained to be in possession as an agent on
C behalf of the principal. The appellant claimed title through one of the
principals who had given power of attorney under Ex. P.3. Respondent
admitted that he had come into possession thereunder and, therefore, he .
cannot plead adverse possession against the appellant. In second appeal,
the learned single Judge considered the controversy in relation to the
documentary evidence and held thus :
D
"The word 'Shikmi' used in the application has, therefore, to be
construed in the context of the facts expressly stated therein. Ex.
P-3 is the statement of defendant Chhatarpal Singh nowhere ad-
mitted his possession through the plaintiffs. He expressly stated
E that his possession was a result of an arrangement made before
abolition of Jagirs. No doubt, he also said that the Pawaidars
Ramkishore and Vimal Prasad had given Mukhtiyarnama, to begin
with, but the Mukhtiyarnama was cancelled long back. He nowhere
admitted the Mukhtiyarnama being given by plaintiffs Kalika
F Prasad and Ambika Prasad or his possession being through the
plaintiffs at any time. Ex. P-4 is the order dated 3.6.1969 in that
proceeding rejecting the defendant's application under Section 190
of the Code. In my opinion, there is nothing in these docum91ts,
which can be construed as defendant Chhatarpal Singh's admission
of being inducted into the suit-land by the plaintiffs so as to
G constitute his possession as permissive through the plaintiffs. His
admission of initial entry under a Mukhtiyaranama given by the

t
other Pawaidars was only in respect of his possession prior to
abolition of Jagirs and it is obvious that the same is of no conse-
quence after abolition of Jagirs, which itself is an event more than
H twelve years prior to the date of suit. The only remaining document
KALIKAPRASADv. CHHATRAPALSINGH 373

for consideration is Ex. D-9. This is an order dated 30.7.1959 on A
an application made by Ramkishore, one of erstwhile Pawaidars
claiming a similar interest in the suit- land, as the present plaintiffs
by seeking a declaration under Section 169 of the M.P. Land
Revenue Code. That application was dismissed holding that the
plaintiff had no right over the suit land to challenge the defendant's B
possession therein. This document itself is sufficient to indicate the
assertion of hostile title by defendant Chhatarpal Singh and his
claim of possession over the suit-land in his own right at least when
the application under Section 169 of the Code was filed on
8.11.1957 by Ramkishore making the same assertion that the pos-
session of Chhatarpal Singh over the suit land was as Mukhtiyar C
of the Pawaidars. This claim was rejected on 30.7.1971. This
document alone proves defendant's adverse possession for more
than twelve years prior to the date of suit.

It is, therefore, clear that the first appellate Court misread and D
misconstrued the aforesaid documents, Ex. P-1 to Ex. P-4 & Ex.
D-9, to reach the conclusion that defendant's possession over the
suit-land was permissive, on account of which the plaintiffs suit
could be decreed. Reversal of the Trial Court's finding was the
result of this error. The conclusion reached by the first Appellate
court being contrary to law, has to be set-asiµe. E

On that basis, the learned single Judge concluded that the documen-
tary evidence, Ex. Pl to P4 and D-9 was misconstrued by the District Court
to come to the conclusion that the respondent had come into possession
by a permissive possession and remained in that capacity. Accordingly, he p
set aside the decree and concluded that the respondent had perfected his
. title by adverse possession.

Shri A.K. Chitale, learned senior counsel for the appellant, contends
that the view taken by the High Court is not correct in law. According to G
the learned counsel, the estate was abolished with effect from February 15,
1954; the appellant had obtained a patta on July 22, 1959; the respondent
made an application under Section 190 of the M.P. Land Revenue Code
on August 10, 1965, for conferment of asarni rights which was rejected; for
.the first time, he asserted his title to the property only on making an
application on August 10, 1965; the suit came to be filed within 12 years H
374 SUPREME COURT REPORTS(1996] SUPP. 10 S.C.R.

A from the date and, therefore, the respondent had not perfected his title by
prescription. We are unable to agree with the learned coun~el. The learned
Judge has recorded the finding that even after the abolition till the date of
the filing of the suit, the respondent had remained in uninterrupted pos-
session and thereby he perfected his title by prescription. It is also an
B admitted position that the power of attorney given to the respondent was
cancelled and thereafter no action was taken to have him ejected from the
lands in his possession. After the abolition of the estate, no attempt was
made to have him ejected. When we have put a question to the learned
counsel whether any notice was given to the respondent by the other party
before obtaining the patta under Section 189 on July 22, 1959, the learned
C counsel is unable to place before us any material to show that such a notice
was given to him. Obviously, therefore, the patta was obtained without
notice to him. The 1 ..spondent having remained, without any interruption,
for well over 12 years, it would be_obvious that he remained in possession
in assertion of his own right, that too after the abolition of the estate.
I
D Thereby, he perfected his title bf prescription since any person who got
superior right had taken no action to have him ejected from the lands.
Under these circumstances, the finding recorded by the High Court has
not been vitiated by any manifest error of law creating any substantial
question of law for interference in this !lppeal.

E The appeal is accordingly dismissed. No costs.

T.N.A. Appeal dismissed.