Holding

When a bona‑fide dispute over ownership exists, the State cannot resort to the summary eviction provisions of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971, and any notice issued under Section 4 is ultra vires and must be set aside.

Summary

The appellants, heirs of Kaihosrou (Chick) Kavasji Framji, claimed ownership of a 1.52‑acre property in Pune that had been leased to the Government and later requisitioned. The Union of India, asserting title, issued a notice under Section 4 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971, seeking their eviction. The Supreme Court held that a bona‑fide dispute over ownership existed, and therefore the Estate Officer could not invoke the summary eviction power of the Act. The Court also affirmed that the ratio in Express Newspapers v. Union of India is binding law under Article 141. Consequently, the notice dated 31‑July‑2001 was declared ultra vires and quashed, and the writ petition was allowed.

Issues considered

The existence of a bona‑fide dispute over title between the Union of India and the appellants
Whether the Estate Officer has jurisdiction to issue a notice under Section 4 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971 in such a dispute
Whether the summary eviction remedy under the Act can be invoked when title is contested
The applicability of the principle of merger to the High Court order of 1979 and the Supreme Court order of 1998
The binding nature of the ratio laid down in Express Newspapers v. Union of India under Article 141

Legislation cited

Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948
Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971s. 4(1), s. 4(2)(b)(ii)

Subjects

Public Premises Actsummary evictionbona fide disputejurisdictionArticle 141principle of mergercivil suitland ownershipnotice quashedSupreme Court of India

Judgment

222 [2019]REPORTS
SUPREME COURT 4 S.C.R. 222 [2019] 4 S.C.R.

A KAIKHOSROU (CHICK) KAVASJI FRAMJI
v.
UNION OF INDIA & ANR.
(Civil Appeal No. 5574 of 2009)
B MARCH 15, 2019
[ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE AND
DINESH MAHESHWARI, JJ.]
Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act,
1971: ss. 4(1) and 4(2)(b)(ii) – Issue of notice to show cause against
C order of eviction – Summary remedy of the State qua person in
possession of the land – On facts, predecessor of the appellants
leased their property to the Government twice – Said land was
requisitioned, derequisitioned and thereafter again requisitioned –
Issuance of notice by Estate Officer u/ss. 4(1) and 4(2)(b)(ii), to the
D appellants, treating them to be unauthorized occupants of the suit
property – Notice upheld by the High Court – On appeal, held:
Appellants raised a bona fide dispute on the question of ownership
of the suit property qua Union of India – A fortiori, in such case,
Estate Officer has no jurisdiction to invoke the powers u/s. 4 by
resorting to a summary procedure prescribed in the Act by sending
E a notice u/s. 4 for appellant’s eviction from the suit property – Facts
and the documents establish that there exists a bona fide long
standing dispute as to who is the owner of the suit property-
appellants or Union of India – Union of India itself stated in this
Court in earlier round of litigation that they would seek
F dispossession of the appellants from the property in accordance
with law and, if need be, by filing civil suit in the civil court, however,
the same was not resorted to – Respondents cannot now be permitted
to go back from their statement and take recourse to a remedy of
summary procedure under the Act, which is otherwise not available
to them – Effect of quashing the resumption notice issued by the
G respondents by the High Court in relation to the suit property was
that Union of India was not entitled to resort to any kind of summary
remedy to evict the appellants from the suit property – Civil court
alone could try and decide – Thus, the notice issued by the Estate
Officer is quashed.
H
222
KAIKHOSROU (CHICK) KAVASJI FRAMJI v. UOI 223

Precedent: Binding effect of – Reading a decision to find out A
ratio decidendi – Three Judge Bench decisions – Judgment authored
by one judge, and the other two judges concurred with the said
view and the reasoning – Two concurring judges also supplemented
their individual concurring reasoning on the same lines on which
the lead judge expressed his view – No dissent inter se judges on
B
any issue – Held: Is a law by majority and thus, a law laid down by
the Court u/Art. 141 – Constitution of India – Art. 141.
Doctrines/Principles: Principle of merger – Applicability of
– Held: For merger to operate, the superior court must go into the
merits of the issues decided by the subordinate court and record
findings on its merits – If this is not done by the superior court, a C
plea of merger has no application in such a case and the order of
subordinate court would continue to hold the field – On facts, this
Court while disposing of the appeals by its order did not go into the
merits of the various contentions which were decided by the High
Court in its order and disposed of the appeal on the statement made D
by the respondents that they would take recourse to the remedy of
the civil court by filing a civil suit – Thus, the principle of merger
would not operate.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1 The submission of the counsel for the E
respondent that the view expressed by A.P. Sen J. in Paras 86-
87 in Express Newspaper case could at best be regarded as his
own view but not the view of the Court by majority because other
two Judges (E.S. Venkataramiah J. and R.B. Mishra J.) did not
express any opinion on this question, thus, this Court should not F
place any reliance on the statement of law laid down in Paras 86-
87, cannot be accepted. [Paras 51-52][240-B, C]
1.2 Keeping in view, the reasoning of Lord Esher M.R. in
the Guardian’s case when the statement of law laid down in
Express Newspaper decision is examined, the reasoning of A.P. G
Sen J. contained in Para 86-87 is the law laid down on behalf of all
the three Judges. It is a law by majority and is thus, a law laid
down by the Court under Article 141 of the Constitution. It is for
the reasons that though the lead judgment was authored by A.P.
Sen J., the other two Judges concurred with the view and the
H
224 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 4 S.C.R.

A reasoning of A.P. Sen J; both the concurring Judges also
expressed their individual views on the question on the same
lines on which A.P. Sen J. expressed his view and there is no
dissent inter se Lordships on any issue much less on the issue
with which this Court is concerned in this appeal. The law laid
down in the lead judgment in Express Newspaper’s case is the
B
law by three Hon’ble Judges who constituted the Bench and thus,
binds all the Courts in the country under Article 141 of the
Constitution. It satisfies the test laid down by Lord Esher M.R.
in the case of The Guardian’s case. [Paras 56, 57, 58][241-G, H;
242-A-C]
C Express Newspapers v. U.O.I. (1986) 1 SCC 133 :
[1985] 3 Suppl. SCR 382 – explained.
The Guardians of the Poor of the West Derby Union v.
The Guardians of the Poor of the Atcham Union Queen’s
Bench 1889 (Vol. XXIV) 117 – referred to.
D
2.1 Keeping in view the statement of law laid down by this
Court in Kaiser I Hind’s case and Northern India’s case, on
examination of the facts of the instant case, there is no hesitation
in holding that the appellants have raised a bona fide dispute on
the question of ownership of the suit property qua respondent
E No.1 (Union of India). [Para 64][243-F]
2.2 A fortiori, in such case, respondent No. 2 has no
jurisdiction to invoke the powers under section 4 of the PP Act
by resorting to a summary procedure prescribed in the PP Act by
sending a notice under Section 4 of the PP Act for appellant’s
F eviction from the suit property. First, the facts set out and the
documents filed in their support, in no uncertain terms, establish
that there exists a bona fide long standing dispute as to who is
the owner of the suit property-the appellants or Respondent No.1
(Union of India). Second, respondent No.1 itself admitted that
G there exists a bona fide dispute between the appellants and
respondent No.1 (Union of India) over the suit property involving
disputed questions of facts. Third, respondent No.1 (Union of
India) itself stated in this Court in earlier round of litigation that
they would seek dispossession of the appellants from the property
in question in accordance with law and, if need be, by filing civil
H suit in the Civil Court. The respondents cannot now be permitted
KAIKHOSROU (CHICK) KAVASJI FRAMJI v. UOI 225

to go back from their statement and take recourse to a remedy A
of summary procedure under the PP Act, which is otherwise not
available to them. Fourth, this Court while granting special leave
to appeal had also granted liberty to respondent No.1 (Union of
India) to file civil suit against the appellants, if they are so advised.
It was, however, not resorted to. Fifth, the effect of quashing the
B
resumption notice issued by the respondents by the High Court
in relation to the suit property was that respondent No.1 (Union
of India) was not entitled to resort to any kind of summary remedy
to evict the appellants from the suit property not only under the
Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948 but also under the PP Act
because the PP Act also provides similar summary remedy of C
eviction. Sixth, the Civil Court alone could try and decide the
question of declaration of ownership of any immovable property
between the parties and such disputes could not be decided in
summary proceedings under the PP Act. [Paras 65-71][243-G, H;
244-A-F]
D
3. The principle of merger is fairly well settled. For merger
to operate, the superior court must go into the merits of the issues
decided by the subordinate court and record finding/s one way or
other on its merits. If this is not done by the superior court, a
plea of merger has no application in such a case and the order of
subordinate court would continue to hold the field. As to whether E
judgment rendered by the High Court stood merged in the order
of this Court dated 04.08.1998, this Court while disposing of the
appeals by its order did not go into the merits of the various
contentions which were decided by the High Court in its order
and disposed of the appeal on the statement made by the F
respondents through the Solicitor General that respondent No.1-
Union of India would take recourse to the remedy of the civil
court by filing a civil suit. Indeed, in the light of such statement
made by the respondents (appellants in the appeal), which
resulted in disposal of their appeal, the respondents themselves
did not call upon this Court to examine the merits of the issues G
raised by them in their appeals. In such a situation, there was no
occasion for this Court to apply the mind to the merits much less
to record any finding on any of the issues arising in the appeal. In
this view of the matter, the principle of merger could not operate.
[Paras 72-75][244-G, H; 245-A-D] H
226 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 4 S.C.R.

A Shanmugaval Nadar v. State of Tamil Nadu (1989) 4
SCC 187 : [1989] 3 SCR 488 – relied on.
4. The respondents submitted that there lies a distinction
between the two types of tribunals – one which exercises powers
only when it is shown that certain state of facts exist and other
B which has jurisdiction to determine whether the preliminary state
of facts exists as well as it has the jurisdiction to proceed further
to do something more, and on the basis thereof, the Estate Officer
has jurisdiction to examine the facts of this case in Section 4
proceedings under the Act, cannot be accepted. Once in the case
of Kaiser-I Hind it has been laid down the law as to how the PP
C Act operates and needs to be applied, all the issues arising under
the PP Act has to be examined in the light of law which deals with
the PP Act. [Paras 76-78][245-E-G]
Kaiser-I-Hind Pvt. Ltd. v. National Textile
Corp.(Maharashtra North) Ltd. (2002) 8 SCC 182 :
D [2002] 2 Suppl. SCR 555 – followed.
Chaube Jagdish Prasad v. Ganga Prasad Chaturvedi
[1959] Supp 1 SCR 733 – distinguished.
5. The submission that the writ petition was not
E maintainable to challenge the notice issued under Section 4 of
the PP Act has no merit and is rejected. Firstly, the High Court
having entertained the writ petition and dismissing it on merits,
this objection does not survive for consideration and second, in
the light of long line of decisions on this question, a writ petition
to question the legality and correctness of the notice issued under
F any Act is no bar in entertaining the writ petition in appropriate
case. The case at hand was regarded as an appropriate case for
entertaining the writ petition. [Para 80][246-B, C]
Siemens Ltd. vs. State of Maharashtra (2006) 12 SCC
33 : [2006] Suppl. SCR 925; Whirlpool Corporation
G vs. Registrar of Trade Marks (1998) 8 SCC 1 : [1998]
2 Suppl. SCR 359 – relied on.
6. The impugned order is set aside. As a consequence, the
writ petition filed by the appellants is allowed and the notice issued
by respondent No.2 impugned in the writ petition is quashed by
H issuance of writ of certiorari. [Para 83][246-F]
KAIKHOSROU (CHICK) KAVASJI FRAMJI v. UOI 227

Phiroze Temulji Anklesaria v. H.C. Vashistha AIR 1980 A
Bombay 9; State of Orissa v. Ram Chandra Dev AIR
1964 SC 685; Western Coalfields Ltd. & Anr. v. Ballapur
Collieries Company & Ors. (2019) 2 SCC 327; M/s.
Ballapur Collieries Company & Ors. v. Estate Officer
& Ors. (Judgment dated 22.01.2007 of the Bombay
B
High Court in Civil Revision Application No.801 of
2002 and Civil Revision Application No.803 of 2003;
State of U.P. & Anr. v. Zia Khan (1998) 8 SCC 483;
State of A.P. v. Thummala Krishna Rao (1982) 2 SCC
134; State of Rahasthan v. Padmavatidevi (1995) Suppl
2 SCC 872; Northern India Caterers (P) Ltd. v. State of C
Punjab AIR 1967 SC 1581 : [1967] SCR 399 – referred
to.
Case Law Reference
AIR 1980 Bombay 9 referred to Para 14
D
AIR 1964 SC 685 referred to Para 40
(2019) 2 SCC 327 referred to Para 40
(1998) 8 SCC 483 referred to Para 40
(1982) 2 SCC 134 referred to Para 40
E
(1995) Suppl 2 SCC 872 referred to Para 40
[1985] 3 Suppl. SCR 382 referred to Paras 51,
52, 56, 58
[1967] SCR 399 referred to Para 62
F
[1989] 3 SCR 488 relied on Para 73
[2002] 2 Suppl. SCR 555 followed Para 78
(1959) Supp 1 SCR 733 distinguished Para 79
[2006] Suppl. SCR 925 relied on Para 80
G
[1998] 2 Suppl. SCR 359 relied on Para 80

H
228 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 4 S.C.R.

A CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 5574
of 2009.
From the Judgment and Order dated 17.06.2009 of the High Court
of Judicature at Bombay in Writ Petition No. 4386 of 2001.
Darius Khambata, Huzefa Ahmadi, Sr.Advs., Mahesh Agarwal,
B Rishi Agrawala, Ankur Saigal, Ms. Devika Mohan, Jai Chhabaria,
Ms. Akanksha Sexana, Arnav Behari, E. C. Agrawala, Rohan Sharma,
Advs. for the Appellants.
Aman Lekhi, ASG, Harish Pandey, Sachin Sharma, Arvind Kumar
Sharma, Mrs. Anil Katiyar, Advs. for the Respondents.
C
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J. 1. This appeal is filed against
the final judgment and order dated 17.06.2009 passed by the High Court
of Bombay at Mumbai in Writ Petition No.4386 of 2001 whereby the
D Division Bench of the High Court dismissed the said writ petition filed
by appellants herein.
2. Though the controversy involved in this appeal is short, in
order to appreciate as to how it arose, it is necessary to set out its
background facts in detail infra. The facts are stated from the SLP
paper books and the List of Dates furnished by the parties.
E
3. The appellants herein are the writ petitioners and the
respondents herein are the respondents in the writ petition out of which
this appeal arises.
4. The dispute relates to a property, which is situated at Survey
F No.417, Bungalow No.17, Dr. Coyaji Road (formerly known as
“Elphinstone Road”) Pune-411001. The property consisted of a main
bungalow, a cottage, outhouses, garages, and an open plot of land (garden)
admeasuring around 1.52 acres (hereinafter referred to as “the suit
property”).
G 5. One Burjorji Goostadji and Cooverbai Homi Karani were the
owners of the suit property. They sold the suit property to one Mr.
Mohammad Hajjibhoy by indenture of conveyance dated 01.03.1920
pursuant to the order of the District Judge made on a Misc. Application
No.5 of 1919 granting sanction for the sale in favour of Mr. Mohammad
Hajjibhoy.
H
KAIKHOSROU (CHICK) KAVASJI FRAMJI v. UOI 229
[ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.]

6. Mr. Mohammad Hajjibhoy then sold the suit property to one A
Mr. Kaihosrou Sorabji Framji by indenture of conveyance dated
28.11.1923. Mr. Kaihosrou Sorabji Framji then in turn leased out the suit
property on 10.10.1929 to the Government of India for a period of five
years on a rent of Rs.110/- per month.
7. Even after the lease having come to an end by efflux of time, B
the lessee i.e. the Government of India continued to remain in possession
of the suit property. However, Mr. Kaihosrou Sorabji Framji then executed
another lease deed on 19.04.1940 in favour of the Government of India
for a further period of five years. In the year 1939, the lessor i.e. Mr.
Kaihosrou Sorabji Framji applied to the Cantonment Board, Pune for
giving permission to undertake certain building work in the suit property. C
After exchange of some letters, the Cantonment Board granted the
permission to Mr. Kaihosrou Sorabji Framji.
8. On 30.04.1941, Mr. Kaihosrou Sorabji Framji expired leaving
behind his son Mr. Kavasji K Framji who inherited the suit property. By
order dated 08.06.1943, the then Collector, Poona requisitioned the suit D
property under Rule 75 A (i) of the Defense of India Rules and handed
over its possession to the Military Authorities.
9. However, after three years on 23.03.1946, the suit property
was de-requisitioned and the possession was handed over back to Mr.
Kavasji K Framji. On 05.08.1948, the Collector again requisitioned the E
suit property under Section 5 (1) of the Bombay Land Requisition Act,
1948. In this order it was mentioned that Mr. Kavasji K Framji is the
owner of the suit property.
10. Mr. Kavasji K Framji filed Writ Petition No.2783 of 1983 in
the Bombay High Court seeking inter alia a relief for restoration of F
possession of the suit property. By order dated 14.01.1985, the Bombay
High Court allowed the writ petition and directed restoration of possession
of the suit property to Mr. Kavasji K Framji. The Government of India,
however, did not vacate the suit property but undertook to vacate it by
30.04.1985. G
11. Reverting to the events to complete the narration of facts in
chronology, on 21.01.1971, the Union of India issued a resumption notice
in relation to the portion of the suit property (about 22,168 sq. feet). The
notice was founded on the allegations inter alia that the suit property
was held under “old grant” which empowered the Union of India to
H
resume the subject land. The notice contained that on the expiry of 30
230 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 4 S.C.R.

A days period after its service, all private rights, and interest of Mr. Kavasji
K Framji would be ceased. The notice offered to Mr. Kavasji a sum of
Rs.4765/- by way of compensation towards the value of various
structures standing on the subject land. A cheque of Rs.4765/- was sent
to Mr. Kavasiji K Framji by letter dated 23.01.1971 who, in turn, declined
to accept the said amount and sent his reply on 27.01.1971 objecting
B
therein to the notice and its contents.
12. Felt aggrieved by the notice and the letter, Mr. Kavasji K
Framji filed Writ Petition No.364/1971 in the Bombay High Court
challenging both the notice and the letter. The writ petition was filed on
the allegations inter alia that the subject land was a free hold tenure
C and was never held by Mr. Kavasji K Framji under any Grant or Licence
from the Union of India or from any department of the Union of India
and hence it is not resumable at the instance of the Central Government.
13. Besides Mr. Kavasji K Framji, several other persons including
one person namely Mr. PT Anklesaria also got similar notices from the
D Union of India in relation to their land. Mr. PT Anklesaria, Mr. Kavasji
K Framji and others felt aggrieved and they filed writ petitions (SCA
No.1286/1972) in the Bombay High Court questioning the legality and
validity of the notices sent to them by the Union of India.
14. By the judgment/order dated 05.02.1979 in Phiroze Temulji
E Anklesaria vs. H.C. Vashistha, AIR 1980 Bombay 9, the High Court
allowed the writ petition and declared the notice as illegal and issued
without authority of law and accordingly restrained the Union of India
from giving any effect to the impugned notice. The High Court held
inter alia as under:
F “26. On a consideration of all the material that has
been placed before us by the petitioner as well as the
respondents, it is clear to us that there is no evidence
whatsoever of the Government’s right to resume the land
in possession of the petitioners; there is no evidence of
G the terms under which that right of resumption, if any, could
be exercised and most important, there is no evidence
whatsoever of the right or power of the Government to
acquire the structure standing upon the land in question by
determining arbitrarily or unilaterally its compensation. All
these three rights—the right of resumption, the right to
H resume upon particular terms and the right to take
KAIKHOSROU (CHICK) KAVASJI FRAMJI v. UOI 231
[ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.]

possession of the houses situated on the land which are A
mentioned in the impugned notice — are found to be non-
existing. The impugned notice, therefore, is patently without
any authority of law and is not supportable by the terms of
the grant which itself has not been proved.”
15. The Union of India felt aggrieved and filed appeals before the B
Division Bench of the High Court (Special Civil Application No.364/
1971). The Division Bench dismissed the appeals in the case of Kavasji
Kaikhoshrou Framji vs. D.Krishnamunny with the following
observations:
“5…….The respondents have also raised two preliminary C
contentions as to the maintainability of the petition viz., (1)
that the petitioner had not established his title to the
property to enable him to maintain the petition and (2) that
the petition involved disputed questions of facts and law as
to title and therefore the court should not determine the
same in a petition under Art.226 of the Constitution but D
direct the petitioner to file a suit for that purpose.
We find that in this case all the contentions raised and
submissions made by both the sides are the same as those
made in Special Civil Application No.1286 of 1972. In that
petition, by our reasoned judgment delivered on 5-2-1979, E
we have negatived the respondents’ said contentions and
held accepting the contentions of the petitioner that the
resumption by the Government of the petitioner’s land and
bunglow were without any authority of law and therefore
the impugned notice was invalid. On the very same F
reasoning in this case also we negative all the contentions
of the respondents and uphold the contentions of the
petitioners inter alia that the resumption of the petitioner’s
land by the Government was without any authority of law
and therefore the impugned notice was invalid.”
G
16. In all, 14 special leave petitions were filed by the Union of
India in this Court against the judgment/order of the High Court.
17. It may here be mentioned that in the meantime, Mr. PT
Ankelesaria had also filed civil suits in the Court of District Judge, Poona
in the light of observations made by the Bombay High Court in (AIR
H
232 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 4 S.C.R.

A 1980 Bombay page 9) and prayed for grant of relief of possession of the
subject land. The District Judge, Poona decreed these suits in plaintiff’s
favour. The Union of India felt aggrieved and filed First Appeals in the
Bombay High Court whereas the plaintiff filed cross-objections in these
appeals (608-621/1980). These appeals were later transferred to this
Court at the instance of the Union of India for their disposal and were
B
re-numbered as (67-72/1985 and 11-12/1987).
18. By consent order dated 20.07.1988, this Court remitted the
appeals to the Bombay High Court for their disposal as directed therein.
The order reads as under:
C “2. While considering the case, if the High Court finds that
the trial Court or the first appellate Court has placed reliance
or made any reference to the aforesaid judgment of the
Division Bench, it shall ignore that judgment, to that extent,
and the High Court shall decide the matter afresh in
accordance with law without taking into consideration or
D being influenced by the aforesaid judgment of the Division
Bench.
3. The parties will be at liberty to adduce additional evidence
before the High Court within the period fixed by the High
Court.
E
4. The High Court will make every effort to dispose of the
cases within six months from the date of the receipt of the
record.”
19. The remaining appeals were disposed of by another order
F dated 25.03.1992 of this Court, which reads as under:
“The Appeals are dismissed as infructuous in terms of the
signed order placed on the file.”
20. The aforesaid order dated 25.03.1992 was later recalled by
this Court on a review petition filed by the Union of India by order dated
G 13.01.1995. The Review Petition was allowed by this Court on the
ground that the consent order was passed only in relation to Mr. PT
Ankelesaria’s case by which his appeals alone were remitted to the
High Court for their disposal, whereas the other appeals could not have
been dismissed as having rendered infructuous in the light of the said
order.
H
KAIKHOSROU (CHICK) KAVASJI FRAMJI v. UOI 233
[ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.]

21. In the meantime, Mr. Kavasji K Framji died and his legal A
representatives (appellants herein) were brought on record of the case
to continue the lis.
22. This Court then by order dated 04.08.1998 disposed of the
aforementioned appeals after recording the statement of the Solicitor
General of India in the following terms: B
“Learned Solicitor General states that the Union of India
would seek dispossession of the respondent-occupants
from the properties involved, in accordance with law and if
need be, through a Civil Court by filing suit. In case such
steps are taken, any observations made by the High Court
which would tend to defeat the remedies sought would not C
stand in its way. On such stance of the Union of India, Civil
Appeals as also the special leave petitions stand disposed
of accordingly.”
23. It is with these background facts which began from 01.03.1920
and ended with the order of this Court passed on 01.08.1998, Respondent D
No.2- Estate Officer issued a notice on 31.07.2001 under Sub-(1) and
Clause (b) (ii) of Sub-Section 2 of Section 4 of the Public Premises
(Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971 (for short “the PP Act”)
to the appellants. The present appeal is concerned with the legality and
correctness of this notice. E
24. The notice in question was founded on the allegations inter
alia that the appellants are in unauthorized occupation of the public
premises mentioned in the schedule in the notice i.e the suit property and
therefore the appellants should vacate the suit property. The contents
of the notice read as under:
F
“Whereas the nature of Holder’s rights on the land is
limited only to its occupancy, therefore, being the property
of the Govt. the land is liable to be resumed, in terms of
conditions obtaining under the old grant terms. Accordingly
the Govt. of India, Ministry of Defence resumed the land
and building after giving one month’s notice vide Order G
no.701/71/L/L & C/70/12030/D (lands) 21 st January 1971
on payment of Rs.4,765/- (Rupees Four Thousand Seven
Hundred Sixty Five only) towards resumption cost of
authorized super structure standing thereon which has been
accepted by you, albeit, under protest.”
H
234 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 4 S.C.R.

A 25. The appellants felt aggrieved by the issuance of the
aforementioned notice to them by Respondent No.2 and filed a writ
petition in the High Court of Bombay questioning its legality and
correctness and sought its quashing. The appellants challenged the notice
on several factual and legal grounds as is clear from the grounds
enumerated in the writ petition.
B
26. The respondents filed their counter and defended issuance of
the notice to the appellants including its contents. By impugned order,
the High Court dismissed the writ petition and upheld the issuance of
notice to the appellants under the PP Act, which has given rise to filing
of this appeal by way of special leave in this Court by the unsuccessful
C writ petitioner.
27. Heard Mr. Darius Khambata, learned senior counsel for the
appellants and Mr. Aman Lekhi, learned ASG for the respondents.
28. Mr. Darius Khambata, learned senior counsel appearing for
D the appellants (writ petitioner) has mainly argued the following eight
points.
29. His first submission was that the High Court erred in dismissing
the writ petition and thereby erred in upholding the impugned notice
issued under Section 4 of the PP Act.
E 30. His second submission was that keeping in view the
backgrounds facts stated above coupled with the orders passed by the
High Court and this Court in judicial proceedings, which emanated from
these facts, it is prima facie clear that respondent No.2 - Estate Officer
had no jurisdiction over the suit property for invoking his powers under
F Section 4 of the PP Act against the appellants for their summary eviction
and treating them to be unauthorized occupants of the suit property.
31. In other words, the submission was that the facts stated above
would, in no uncertain terms, go to show that the suit property never
belonged to the Union of India and on the other hand it all along belonged
to the appellant’s predecessors and then to the appellants and therefore
G
respondent No.2 - Estate Officer had no jurisdiction to treat the suit
property to be belonging to the Union of India for initiating proceedings
against the appellants for their summary eviction under the PP Act.
32. His third submission was that from the facts narrated above,
it is clear that there does exist a “bona fide dispute” between the
H
KAIKHOSROU (CHICK) KAVASJI FRAMJI v. UOI 235
[ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.]

appellants and the Union of India (respondent No.1) in relation to the A
suit property as to who is its real owner - the appellants or the Union of
India.
33. According to the learned counsel, in a situation where there
arises a bona fide dispute between the two rival claimants over a property
about their ownership such as the one which has arisen in the case at B
hand, the remedy of the parties lies in filing a civil suit in the civil court
and seek a declaration of their ownership over the property in accordance
with law but not to take recourse to any summary remedy to evict a
person, such as the one done by the respondents under the PP Act against
the appellants only because one of the rival claimants, i.e., respondent
No.1 happens to be the Union of India. C

34. His fourth submission was that, respondent No.1 through their
counsel (Solicitor General) having made a statement in this Court on
04.08.1998, that respondent No.1 (Union of India) would take steps in
filing civil suit in the Civil Court against the appellants for their
dispossession from the suit property, and this Court disposing of the D
appeals of the Union of India in the light of such statement, respondent
No.1 is bound by their own statement. It is therefore, urged that the
Union of India must take recourse to the remedy of filing civil suit against
the appellant in relation to the suit property in the civil court, which is
otherwise a proper remedy available in law for claiming the relief. E
35. His fifth submission was that even otherwise, looking to the
nature of documents filed by the appellants and the manner in which the
appellants have traced their title to the suit property, the appellants could
not prima facie be regarded as trespassers in the suit property and nor
could they be regarded as the persons in its unauthorized occupation by F
respondent No.1 (Union of India) so as to empower them to take recourse
to the provisions of the P.P. Act.
36. In other words, the submission was that the documents relied
upon by the appellants prima facie proved that the appellants were/are
and have all along been the owners of the suit property to the exclusion G
of all persons including respondent No.1 (Union of India) and, therefore,
no one has a right to disturb their long established possession over the
suit property except by following the “due process of law”.
37. His sixth submission was that the provisions of the PP Act are
made applicable only to those properties which are admittedly belonging
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236 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 4 S.C.R.

A to the Central Government or the State Government as the case may be
and therefore proceedings under the PP Act can be initiated against any
person when he is found to be in its unauthorized occupation without any
lawful authority from its real owner i.e. the Central/State Government.
Such is not the case here.
B 38. His seventh submission was that, if respondent No.1 (Union
of India) claims themselves to be the owner of the suit property (which
they are not), then as urged earlier, their remedy lies in filing civil suit in
the Civil Court and establish their claim of ownership over the suit property
qua the appellants in terms of the order of this Court dated 04.08.1998
and recover possession of the suit property from the appellants.
C
39. His eighth submission was that since the appellants succeeded
in the High Court in the first round of litigation against respondent No.1
(Union of India) wherein the High Court quashed the resumption notice
dated 21.01.1971 by order dated 05.02.1979 (AIR 1980 Bombay 9), this
order still continues to hold good because none of the finding recorded
D therein are either set aside or modified by this Court by its order dated
04.08.1998.
40. Learned counsel while elaborating his aforementioned
submissions placed reliance on the decisions in Express Newspapers
vs. U.O.I., (1986) 1 SCC 133, State of Orissa vs. Ram Chandra
E Dev, AIR 1964 SC 685, Western Coalfields Ltd. & Anr. vs. Ballapur
Collieries Company & Ors. (judgment dated 11.12.2018 in C.A.
Nos.4487-4488/2009), M/s. Ballapur Collieries Company & Ors.
vs. Estate Officer & Ors. (Judgement dated 22.01.2007 of the Bombay
High Court(Nagpur Bench) in Civil Revision Application No.801 of 2002
F and Civil Revision Application No.803 of 2003, State of U.P. & Anr.
vs. Zia Khan, (1998) 8 SCC 483, State of A.P. vs. Thummala Krishna
Rao, (1982) 2 SCC 134 and State of Rahasthan vs. Padmavatidevi,
1995 Suppl(2) SCC 872.
41. In reply, learned Additional Solicitor, Mr. Aman Lekhi while
G supporting the reasoning and the conclusion of the High Court in the
impugned order contended that none of the submissions urged by the
learned counsel for the appellants have any merit.
42. It was his submission that having regard to the previous factual
history, it does not take away the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer under
the PP Act to issue notice under Section 4 of the PP Act and since the
H
KAIKHOSROU (CHICK) KAVASJI FRAMJI v. UOI 237
[ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.]

suit property belonged to the Union of India, a notice under Section 4 of A
the PP Act could always be issued by respondent No.2 and in such a
situation, the remedy of the appellants would be to submit to the authority
of the Estate Officer and file reply to enable the Estate Officer to proceed
with the matter on merits and pass appropriate order.
43. In other words, his submission was that the Estate Officer B
possesses the jurisdiction to issue notice in question and also possesses
a jurisdiction to hold an inquiry under the Act in relation to the disputes
sought to be raised by the appellants and therefore the appellants should
have submitted to the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer rather than to
pursue the extraordinary remedy of filing the writ petition under Article
226 of the Constitution of India. It is these submissions, which the learned C
Additional Solicitor General elaborated while opposing the appeal.
44. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and on perusal
of the record of the case including the written submissions, we find
force in the submissions urged by the learned counsel for the appellants
(writ petitioners). D

45. Before we examine the facts of the case, it is necessary to
take note of the law, which deals with the issues arising in this Case.
Indeed, if we may say so, it is fairly well settled.
46. This Court (Three Judge Bench) has succinctly dealt with the E
issues arising in this case in Express Newspaper Pvt. Ltd. & Ors.
vs. Union of India & Ors. (1986) 1 SCC 133.
47. Though, in Express Newspaper case (supra) several other
issues relating to Fundamental Rights conferred on the citizens under
Article 19 (1) (a) and (g) of the Constitution and its violation qua State F
fell for consideration and were decided, this Court was also called upon
to decide the legality and correctness of the notice issued by the
Government of India through their officers in their capacity as the lessors
of the land in question demanding therein a right of re-entry under the
terms of the lease deed on the demised land from the lessee (writ petitioner
of the case). G
48. It is this issue, which was extensively dealt in the context of
civil law as also the special laws, which provides for taking recourse to
the summary remedy by the State to take possession of the State land
from its occupants. The learned Judge A.P. Sen J. speaking for the
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238 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 4 S.C.R.

A Bench in his inimitable style of writing answered the question in paras
86/87 as under:
“86. The Express Buildings constructed by Express
Newspapers Pvt. Ltd. with the sanction of the lessor i.e.
the Union of India, Ministry of Works and Housing on plots
B Nos. 9 and 10, Bahadurshah Zafar Marg demised on
perpetual lease by registered lease-deed dated March 17,
1958 can, by no process of reasoning, be regarded as public
premises belonging to the Central Government under
Section 2(e). That being so, there is no question of the lessor
applying for eviction of the Express Newspapers Pvt. Ltd.
C under Section 5(1) of the Public Premises (Eviction of
Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 nor has the Estate
Officer any authority or jurisdiction to direct their eviction
under sub-section (2) thereof by summary process. Due
process of law in a case like the present necessarily implies
D the filing of suit by the lessor i.e. the Union of India, Ministry
of Works & Housing for the enforcement of the alleged
right of re-entry, if any, upon forfeiture of lease due to breach
of the terms of the lease.
87. Nothing stated here should be construed to mean that
E the Government has not the power to take recourse to the
provisions of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised
Occupants) Act, 1971 where admittedly there is
unauthorised construction by a lessee or by any other
person on Government land which is public premises within
the meaning of Section 2(e) and such person is in
F unauthorised occupation thereof.”
49. The other two learned Judges, namely, E.S. Venkataramiah J.
and R.B. Mishra J. also concurred with the reasoning and the conclusion
reached by Justice A.P. Sen on this question and supplemented their
individual concurring reasoning in the following words:
G
“Venkataramiah, J.— I have gone through the judgment
which my learned Brother Justice A.P. Sen has just now
delivered. …………………….....……………………………

H
KAIKHOSROU (CHICK) KAVASJI FRAMJI v. UOI 239
[ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.]

202. The rest of the questions relate truly to the civil rights A
of the parties flowing from the lease-deed. Those questions
cannot be effectively disposed of in this petition under
Article 32 of the Constitution. The questions arising out of
the lease, such as, whether there has been breach of the
covenants under the lease, whether the lease can be
B
forfeited, whether relief against forfeiture can be granted
etc. are foreign to the scope of Article 32 of the Constitution.
They cannot be decided just on affidavits. These are
matters which should be tried in a regular civil proceeding.
One should remember that the property belongs to the
Union of India and the rights in it cannot be bartered away C
in accordance with the sweet will of an officer or a Minister
or a Lt. Governor but they should be dealt with in
accordance with law. At the same time a person who has
acquired rights in such property cannot also be deprived of
them except in accordance with law. The stakes in this case
D
are very high for both the parties and neither of them can
take law into his own hands.
205. I allow the petitions accordingly. The costs of Petitioner
1 shall be paid by the Union Government and the Lt.
Governor of Delhi. There shall be no order as to costs
against the other respondents. The other petitioners shall E
bear their costs.”
“R.B. Misra, J.— I have perused the judgment prepared
by brother Justice A.P. Sen as also the judgment of brother
Justice E.S. Venkataramiah. While I agree that the
impugned notices threatening re-entry and demolition of F
the construction are invalid and have no legal value and
must be quashed for reasons detailed in the two judgments,
which I do not propose to repeat over again. I am of the
view that the other questions involved in the case are based
upon contractual obligations between the parties. These G
questions can be satisfactorily and effectively dealt with in
a properly instituted proceeding or suit and not by a writ
petition on the basis of affidavits which are so discrepant
and contradictory in this case.

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240 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 4 S.C.R.

A 208. I accordingly allow the writ petitions with costs against
the Union Government and the Lt. Governor of Delhi and
quash the impugned notices.”
50. At this stage, it is necessary to deal with one objection raised
by learned Additional Solicitor General on the aforementioned statement
B of law laid down in Express Newspaper case (supra).
51. The objection of learned counsel for the respondent was that
the view expressed by A.P. Sen J. in Paras 86-87 could at best be regarded
as his own view but not the view of the Court by majority because other
two learned Judges (E.S. Venkataramiah J. and R.B. Mishra J.) did not
C express any opinion on this question. It is for this reason the learned
counsel submits that this Court should not place any reliance on the
statement of law laid down in Paras 86-87.
52. We find no merit in this objection for more than one reason.
We, however, consider it apposite to refer to one classic decision of the
D Queen’s Bench reported in 1889 (Vol. XXIV) page 117 (The Guardians
of the Poor of the West Derby Union vs. The Guardians of the
Poor of the Atcham Union) on this subject which was rightly relied on
by the learned counsel for the appellants in answer to this question.
53. The question arose before the Queens Bench in The
E Guardians case (supra) as to how the Court should read a decision to
find out the ratio decidendi laid down in the decision when such decision
is delivered by the Bench of more than one Judge (as in that case by
four Judges of the House of Lords) and especially when all the Judges
have authored their individual opinions on the subject.

F 54. Lord Esher M.R. in his distinctive style of writing succinctly
explained this question in the following words:
“The question is, what is the true construction of the 35th
section of the Act of Parliament which is before us, and,
when we have got at the true construction, what is the
application of it to this case ? ..........................................The
G
House of Lords heard the cases, and did not give judgment
at once, but considered the matter carefully, and four of the
learned judges in the House of Lords gave judgment. Now
we know that each of them considers the matter separately,
and they then consider the matter jointly, interchanging their
H judgments, so that every one of them has seen the
KAIKHOSROU (CHICK) KAVASJI FRAMJI v. UOI 241
[ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.]

judgments of the others. If they mean to differ in their A
view, they so openly when they come to deliver their
judgments, and if they do not do this, it must be taken that
each of them agrees with the judgments of the others.
We have then four judgments. The most elaborate of these
is, no doubt, that of Lord Watson; but Lord Watson’s B
judgment must have been read by the Lord Chancellor, and
the Lord Chancellor must have discussed with Lord Watson
whether he agreed with or not, and he must have agreed
with it. Lord FitzGerald in terms, says, “I have read the
judgment of Lord Watson, and I agree with it;” that is, he
agrees not only with the result but with the mode in which C
the result is arrived at. Lord Macnaghten had read Lord
Watson’s judgment, and he does not attempt to express
the smallest difference of opinion about it; he adopts the
reasoning of Lord Watson and agrees with it, but he adds
another reason of his own. D
What is import to-day is what is the view taken by the House
of Lords of the interpretation of the third part of the 35th
section. It is plain that Lord Watson has taken a distinct
and clear view, and has stated it clearly, of what is the effect,
to a certain extent at all events, of the third E
clause……………………………………………………..I am
clear that they decided the point which is before us: that
Lord Watson’s judgment deals with it most specifically, that
the judgment is really agreed with by the Lord Chancellor
and by Lord FitzGerals, and by Lord Macnaghten, but that
Lord Macnaghten has also given another reason for coming F
to the same conclusion.”
55. The other two learned Judges Lindley LJ and Lopes LJ agreed
with Lord Esher M.R.
56. Keeping in view the reasoning of Lord Esher M.R., when we G
examine the statement of law laid down in Express Newspaper decision
(supra), we are of the considered view that the reasoning of A.P. Sen J.
contained in Paraa 86-87 is the law laid down on behalf of all the three
Judges. It is a law by majority and is thus a law laid down by the Court
under Article 141 of the Constitution.
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242 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 4 S.C.R.

A 57. It is for the reason that first, though the lead judgment was
authored by A.P. Sen J., the other two Judges concurred with the view
and the reasoning of A.P. Sen J. Second, both the concurring Judges
also expressed their individual views on the question on the same lines
on which A.P. Sen J. expressed his view and the Third, there is no
dissent inter se Lordships on any issue much less on the issue with
B
which we are concerned in this appeal.
58. It is for these reasons, we are of the considered view that law
laid down in the lead judgment in Express Newspaper (supra) is the
law by three Hon’ble Judges who constituted the Bench and thus binds
all the Courts in the country under Article 141 of the Constitution. It
C satisfies the test laid down by Lord Esher M.R. in the case of The
Guardian (supra).
59. The question involved in Express Newspaper case (supra)
in relation to remedy of the State qua person in possession of the land
was again considered by a Bench consisted of three Judges in a case
D reported in State of Rajasthan vs. Padavati Devi [supra].
60. In that case also, the question arose as to whether the State
Government can take recourse to a summary remedy of eviction of a
person under the State Revenue Laws from the land when such person
raises a bona fide dispute about his right to remain in occupation over
E such land. Their Lordship held that in such a situation, the summary
remedy to evict such person under the Act couldn’t be resorted to.
61. Justice S.C. Agrawal speaking for the Bench held in Para 6 in
the following words:
“6. As noticed earlier Section 91 of the Act prescribes a
summary procedure for eviction of a person who is found
F
to be in unauthorised occupation of Government land. The
said provisions cannot be invoked in a case where the
person in occupation raises bona fide dispute about his right
to remain in occupation over the land. Dealing with similar
provisions contained in Section 6 of the Andhra Pradesh
G Land Encroachment Act, 1945, this Court in Govt. of A.P.
v. Thummala Krishna Rao1 has laid down that the summary
remedy for eviction provided by Section 6 of the said Act
could be resorted to by the Government only against
persons who are in unauthorised occupation of any land
which is the property of the Government and if the person
H
KAIKHOSROU (CHICK) KAVASJI FRAMJI v. UOI 243
[ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.]

in occupation has a bona fide claim to litigate he could not A
be ejected save by the due process of law and that the
summary remedy prescribed by Section 6 was not the kind
of legal process which is suited to an adjudication of
complicated questions of title. For the same reasons, it can
be said that summary remedy available under Section 91 of
B
the Act is not the legal process which is suited for
adjudication of complicated questions of title where the
person sought to be evicted as an unauthorised occupant
makes a bona fide claim regarding his right to be in
possession. In such a case the proper course is to have the
matter adjudicated by the ordinary courts of law.” C
62. This view was reiterated in the case reported in State of U.P.
vs. Zia Khan [1998 (8) SCC 483].
63. At this stage we consider apposite to take note of the
Constitution Bench decision of this Court wherein this Court after
examining and upholding the constitutional validity of the PP Act in Kaiser- D
I-Hind Pvt. Ltd. vs. National Textile Corp. (Maharashtra North)
Ltd. [(2002) 8 SCC 182] reiterated the view taken by this Court in an
earlier decision of Northern India Caterers (P) Ltd. vs. State of
Punjab (AIR 1967 SC 1581) that the PP Act does not create any new
right of eviction but it only creates a remedy for a right which already E
exists under the general law. In other words, it was held that it only
provides a remedy which is speedier than the remedy of a suit under the
general law.
64. Keeping in view the statement of law laid down by this Court
in cited decisions supra, when we examine the facts of the case in F
hand, we have no hesitation in holding that the appellants have raised a
bona fide dispute on the question of ownership of the suit property qua
respondent No.1 (Union of India).
65. A fortiori, in such case, respondent No. 2 has no jurisdiction
to invoke the powers under section 4 of the PP Act by resorting to a
G
summary procedure prescribed in the PP Act by sending a notice under
Section 4 of the PP Act for appellant’s eviction from the suit property.
This we say for the following six reasons.
66. First, the facts set out above and the documents filed in their
support, in no uncertain terms, establish that there exists a bona fide
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244 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 4 S.C.R.

A long standing dispute as to who is the owner of the suit property - the
appellants or Respondent No.1 (Union of India).
67. Second, respondent No.1 itself admitted that there exists a
bona fide dispute between the appellants and respondent No.1 (Union
of India) over the suit property involving disputed questions of facts (see
B Paras 7, 8 & 18 of the Review Petition filed by Respondent No.1 in Civil
Appeal Nos.608-612 against the appellants in respect of suit property in
this Court).
68. Third, respondent No.1 (Union of India) itself stated in this
Court in earlier round of litigation while disposing of their Civil Appeal
Nos.609, 611-613, 614 and 621 of 1980 that they would seek dispossession
C of the appellants from the property in question in accordance with law
and, if need be, by filing civil suit in the Civil Court. The respondents
cannot now be permitted to go back from their statement and take
recourse to a remedy of summary procedure under the PP Act, which is
otherwise not available to them.
D 69. Fourth, this Court while granting special leave to appeal on
03.08.2009 had also granted liberty to respondent No.1 (Union of India)
to file civil suit against the appellants, if they are so advised. It was,
however, not resorted to.
70. Fifth, the effect of quashing the resumption notice dated
E 21.01.1971 issued by the respondents by the High Court vide order dated
05.02.1979/06.02.1979 in relation to the suit property was that respondent
No.1 (Union of India) was not entitled to resort to any kind of summary
remedy to evict the appellants from the suit property not only under the
Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948 but also under the PP Act because
the PP Act also provides similar summary remedy of eviction.
F
71. Sixth, the Civil Court alone could try and decide the question
of declaration of ownership of any immovable property between the
parties and such disputes could not be decided in summary proceedings
under the PP Act.
72. This takes us to examine another question raised by the
G respondents as to whether judgment rendered by the Bombay High Court
dated 06.02.1979 stood merged in the order of this Court dated
04.08.1998. In our view, it does not merge.
73. In our view, the principle of merger is fairly well settled. For
merger to operate, the superior court must go into the merits of the
H
KAIKHOSROU (CHICK) KAVASJI FRAMJI v. UOI 245
[ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.]

issues decided by the subordinate court and record finding/s one way or A
other on its merits. If this is not done by the superior court, a plea of
merger has no application in such a case and the order of subordinate
court would continue to hold the field (see Shanmugaval Nadar vs.
State of Tamil Nadu [1989 (4) SCC 187].
74. In our view, this court while disposing of the appeals by its B
order dated 04.08.1998, did not go into the merits of the various contentions
which were decided by the High Court in its order dated 06.02.1979 and
disposed of the appeal on the statement made by the respondents through
the Solicitor General that respondent No.1 (Union of India) would take
recourse to the remedy of the civil court by filing a civil suit.
C
75. Indeed, in the light of such statement made by the respondents
(who were appellants in the appeal), which resulted in disposal of their
appeal, the respondents themselves did not call upon this Court to examine
the merits of the issues raised by them in their appeals. In such a situation,
there was no occasion for this Court to apply the mind to the merits
much less to record any finding on any of the issues arising in the appeal. D
In this view of the matter, the principle of merger could not operate.
76. Now coming to another argument, the learned counsel for the
respondents contended that there lies a distinction between the two types
of Tribunals - one which exercises powers only when it is shown that
certain state of facts exist and other which has jurisdiction to determine E
whether the preliminary state of facts exists as well as it has the jurisdiction
to proceed further to do something more as explained in the case reported
in Chaube Jagdish Prasad vs. Ganga Prasad Chaturvedi 1959 (supp)
1 SCR 733 pages 743-744.
77. It is on the basis of this submission, learned counsel contended F
that the Estate Officer has jurisdiction to examine the facts of this case
in Section 4 proceedings under the Act.
78. We do not agree. In our opinion, once the Constitution Bench
in the case of Kaiser-I Hind (supra) after examining the provisions of
the PP Act has laid down the law as to how the PP Act operates and G
needs to be applied, all the issues arising under the PP Act has to be
examined in the light of the law which deals with the PP Act.
79. The law laid down in Chaube Jagdish Prasad (supra) relied
on by the learned counsel for the respondents was entirely on different
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246 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 4 S.C.R.

A context and has no application for deciding the issue involved in this
appeal.
80. Yet, last submission of the learned counsel for the respondents
that the writ petition was not maintainable to challenge the notice issued
under Section 4 of the PP Act has no merit and deserves rejection.
B Suffice it to say, firstly, the High Court having entertained the writ petition
and dismissing it on merits, this objection does not survive for consideration
and second, in the light of long line of decisions on this question, a writ
petition to question the legality and correctness of the notice issued under
any Act is no bar in entertaining the writ petition in appropriate case.
The case at hand was regarded as an appropriate case for entertaining
C the writ petition [see - Siemens Ltd. vs. State of Maharashtra 2006
(12) SCC 33 and Whirlpool Corporation vs. Registrar of Trade
Marks (1998) 8 SCC 1].
81. Before parting, we consider it apposite to mention that we
have set out the facts of the case only for the purpose of appreciating
D and deciding the legal issue arising in the appeal namely - the validity of
issuance of notice under Section 4 of the PP Act and not beyond it. We
have not examined the rival claims of the parties over the property in
question on merits and nor have recorded any finding on the rival claims.
82. In this view of the matter, whenever the question of ownership
E of the rights of the parties will be gone into by the concerned court, it
shall decide the said question/s strictly on the basis of pleadings and the
evidence adduced by the parties in accordance with law uninfluenced
by any observations made by the High Court and this Court.
83. In the light of the foregoing discussion, the appeal succeeds
F and is accordingly allowed. The impugned order is set aside. As a
consequence, the writ petition filed by the appellants is allowed and the
notice dated 31.07.2001 issued by respondent No.2 (Annexure P-34)
impugned in the writ petition is quashed by issuance of writ of certiorari.

G Nidhi Jain Appeal allowed.

H