K. V. MUTHUversusANGAMUTHU AMMAL

A                               K. V. MUTHU
                                      v.
                             ANGAMUTHU AMMAL


                               DECEMBER 17, 1996
B
               [KULDIP SINGH AND S. SAGHIR AHMAD, JJ.)


         Tamil Nadu Building (Lease andRent Control) Act, 196fr-Ss.10(2)(1),
  10(3)(a)(iii), 2(6A~Application for eviction filed by the landlady on the
C ground that the premises required for canying on the business of her deceased
  husband by her and the faster son-Objection that a faster son would not be
  a "member of family" of the landlord-Foster son brought up and reared by
  his uncle-Will created by the uncle-/aster father bequeathing the business
  jointly to his wife (respondent) and his foster son and specifying that after his
D wife's death the business would be canied on by his foster son-He is not
  only an heir under Mitakshara law but also under Hindu Succession
  Act--Held, Foster son can be a 'member of family' but it depends upon the
  facts and circumstances of a particular case-Hence, the foster son in present
  case is a member of the family and the application.for eviction stand main-
   tainable under bonafide requirement of land-Hindu Succession Act, 1956.
E
         Interpretation of Statute-Definition clause-Definition containing the
  teml' "means" is conclusive-But if the provision begins with "unless the context
  otherwise requires" then contextual meaning will prevail-Purposive construc-
  tion to definition clause to be adopted and a word or a phrase to be construed
F in the light of the context, scheme and object of the Act.

            The respondent filed an application for eviction against the appel-
     lant from a non-residential building on the ground of personal need and
     wilful default. The said building was required for carrying on the lime-shell
     business of the respondent and her son A. A despite being a foster son
G    acquired the right to carry on the lime-stone business through the Will of
     the respondent's husband. The appellant contested the application that A
     was not a natural son of the respondent, consequently not a "member _of
     the family" within the meaning of Sec. 2(6-A) of the Act; the petition was
     not maintainable and as the appellant had not committed any wilful
H    default in the payment of rent, he was not liable to be evicted.
                                          188
                         KV. MUTIIU v. ANGAMUTIIU AMMAL                          189
              The Rent Controller on the observation that A was the son of the          A
        respondent allowed her petition on the ground of bona fide need, though
        the appellant was not wilful defaulter. But the appellate authority reversed
        the decision merely on the ground that A being a foster son, he would not
        be a member of the family of the respondent.·

    /         In appeal, Division Bench of the High Court held that a "foster son" B
    'would be a member of the family within the meaning of the Sec. 2(6-A) of
     the Act and so the petition of the respondent was maintainable. Hence, this
     appeal.

             The appellant contended that "family" had to be given a meaning            C
      which would be commonly understood by an ordinary man and it would
      include only a natural son, not a foster son. On the other hand, respondent
      contended that the word "family" was a word of great flexibility and had to
    . be interpreted in the context of the Act with the result that not only those
      who were related by blood or marriage, but others also would be included
      in it.                                                                            D

              Dismissing the appeal, this Court

               HELD : 1. The definition of "family" in Sec. 2(6A) of the Tamil Nadu
        Rent Control Act appears to be conclusive. But Sec. 2 of the Act opens with     E
        the words "in this Act, unless the context othernise requires" which indicate
        that the definitions though indicated io be conclusive, but would not he
        treated to be conclusive, if it was otherwise required by the context. So the
        definition, like any other word in a statute has to be read in the light of
        the context, scheme and object of the Act and its interpretation should be
        such as would achieve the purpose which is sought to be served by the Act.      F
        It is also established that the word "family" is word of greater flexibility
        and is capable of different meanings. [193-C-F; 194-D]

              Ram Pershad Singh v.Mukand La~, AIR (1952) Punj.189: 6DRL Punj
        251; Puspalata Debi v. Dinesh Chandra Bose, 85 Cal W 74; Syed Shah              G
        Maida/ Islam v. Commer of Wakf, AIR (1943) Cal 635 : 47 cWN 315;
        Sukumar Guba v. Naresh Chander Ghosh, AIR (1968) Cal 4~; Msha Bibi v.
•       Nabissa Sahib, AIR (1957) Mad 583; Ramubai v. Jiyaram \Sharha, AIR
        (1964)· Born 96 : 65 Born LR 647; Gobind Das v. Ku/dip Singh,, AIR (1971)
        Del 151: (1970) Ren CR 511;Abdul Hamid v. Nur Mohd:, AIR (1976) Del
        328 : ILR (1976) 2 Del 250 and Corpn. of the City of Nagpur v. Nagpur           H
    190                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS[l996] SUPP. 10 S.C.R.

A Handloom Cloth Market Co. Ltd., AIR (1963) SC 1192: 66 Born LR 116,
    referred to.

          2. A "foster son" need not be the legitimate child of the person who
    brings him up. He is essentially a child of another person but nursed,
    reared and brought up by another person as his own son. The son so
B   brought up would be the foster son of that person. The devotion with which
    he was brought up, the love and care which he received from that person as
    would have been given to his real son, are significant and in this situation
    the "foster son" would certainly be a member of his family. It is not in every
    case that a son who is not the real son of a person would be treated to be a
C   member of the family of that person but it would depend upon the facts and
    circumstances of the particular case. [196-E; G-H; 197-A; 198-A; 197-B-C]

          Nonnan Estate, Re, (1940) 295 NW 63; Page, Re (1973) 3 OR 903 (Ont
    SC), referred to.

D
          Bromlay's "Family Law", 7th Edition, referred to. [197-D]

        3. In the present case, A is the brother's son of the respondent's
  husband who, therefore, was related to the respondent's husband by blood
  and and was his heir not only under the old Mitakshara Law (as brother's
E son) but also under the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 as a Class II heir. A
  was brought up by the respondent and her husband and he was living all
  along with them. He a_pparently acted as a devoted son to the respondent's
  husband and helped him in all possible ways including the business which
  he carried on. Respondent's husband also acted as a devoted father to A
F in whose favour he also executed a will and after reciting therein that A
  was brought up by him, he bequeathed his business jointly to him and the
  respondent specifying further that after the death of the respondent, the
  business shall be carried on by A. Respondent's husband also, significant- ·
  ly, did not bequeath the1tresidential house absolutely in favour of the
G respondent but created on y a life estate therein for her. The remainder
  was bequeathed to the chil en of A. In view of these facts and circumstan-
  ces, A was clearly a member of the family of the respondent's husband
  within the meaning of Section 2(6-A) of the Act and consequently, the
  respondent could well file an application for eviction of the appellant from
  the premises in question not only for her need but also for the need of her
H "foster son", A. [198-B-G]
    KV. MUTHU v. ANGAMUTHU AMMAL [S. SAGHIR AHMAD, J.]                 191

        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 10538 of A
1983.

     From the Judgment and Order dated 28.6.83 of the Madras. High
Court in C.R.P. No. 4730 of 1981.

        K.K. Mani for the Appellant.                                         B
        A.T.M. Sarnpath for the Respondent.

        The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

        S. SAGIDR AHMAD, J. Whether a "Foster Son" would be a "member C
of family" in relation to a landlord within the meaning of Section Z(6A) of
the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 (for short,
the Act) is the question involved in this appeal which is directed against
the judgment of a Division Bench of the Madras High Court laying down
that a "Foster Son" would, under a given set of facts, be a member of the
landlord's family and thus overruled the Single Judge decision in Hathibudi D
Anandar v. Govindan, (1981) 1 Madras Law Journal 250.

      2. The appellant is the tenant in respect of a non-residential building
since 1972 when it was owned by one Gnanaswarnbandarn·who on 10.5.1979
transferred the said building in favour of the respondent.                    E
      3. An application under Section 10(2)(i) and 10(3)(a)(iii), of the
Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 was filed by the
respondent for the eviction of the appellant on the ground inter alia of
personal need and wilful default. It was pointed out by the respondent in
her application that her husband Thiruvannamalai Bakthar who carried on F
the lime-shell business had, together with the respondent, brought up one
Arunachala Bakthar as their son and member of their family. Thiruvan-
narnalai Bakthar died leaving behind a will dated 30th November, 1970 in
which it was specified that Arunachala Bakthar who was the son of his real
brother was brought up by him and it was through him that he was carrying
on the lime-shell business. The will created a life estate in favour of the G
respondent in respect of the residential house and the remainder was
vested in the children of Arunachala Bakthar. The will further recited that
the lime-shell business would be carried on by the respondent and
Arunachala Bakthar but after the death of the respondent, Arunachala
Bakthar alone would carry on the business. The premises in occupation of H
    192                  SUPREME COURT REPORTS(1996] SUPP.10 S.C.R.

A   the appellant were said to be required for carrying on the lime-shell
    business for herself and for her son Arunachala Bakthar.

          4. The appellant contested the application and raised the plea that
    Arunachala Bakthar was not the natural son of the petitioner and conse-
    quently he would not be a "member of the family" within the meaning of
B   Section 2(6A) of the Act. The petition, it was contended, was not main-
    tainable and he was not liable to be evicted particularly as he had not
    committed wilful default in the payment of rent.

          5. It was found by the Rent Controller that Arunachala Bakthar was
C the son of deceased Thiruvannamalai Bakthar and, therefore, the petition
    was maintainable for the eviction of the appellant from the premises in
    question of the ground of bona fide need of the resident herself and that
    of Arunachala Bakthar. He consequently allowed the petition on the
    ground of bona fide need, though it was found by him that the appellant
    had not committed wilful default in payment of rent.
D
          6. The appellate authority, however, following the decision of the
    Single Judge of the Madras High Court in Hathibudi Anandar v. Govindan,
    (1981) 1 Madras Law Journal 250 reversed the decision of the Rent
    Controller and held that Arunachala Bakthar was merely a foster son of
E   Thiruvannamalai Bakthar and, therefore, he would not be a member of this
    family.

        7. The respondent challenged this decision in the High Court where
  a learned Single Judge (S. Mohan, J., as he then was) doubted the decision
  in Hathibudi Anandar v. Govindan, (1981) 1 Madras Law Journal 250 and
F referred the matter to a Division Bench for decision on the question
  whether the foster son would be a member of the family of the landlord
  within the meaning of Section 2(6A) of the Act. The Division Bench
  reversed the decision of the Single Judge and held that a "Foster Son"
  would be a member of the family and, therefore, the petition filed by the
G respondent for the eviction of the appellant from the premises in question
  for bona fide need of herself and that of her "Foster Son" Arunachala
  Bakthar was maintainable. It is against this decision that the appellant has
  come up in appeal before this Court.

          8. Learned counsel for the appellant has contended that the "Family"
H has to be given the meaning which is commonly understood by an ordinary
        K.V.MUTHUv. ANGAMUTHUAMMAL (S.SAGHIRAHMAD,J.]                             193

    man and, therefore, "Family" would include only natural sons and not                 A
    "Foster Son~.'. Learned .counsel for the respondent, on the contrary, con-
    tends that since the definition of "Family" as set out in the Act is an artificial
    definition, its natural or common meaning cannot be adopted. "Family", it
    is contended, is a word of great flexibility and has to be interpreted in the
    context of the Act with the result that not only those who are related by            B
    blood or marriage, but others also would be included in it.

          9. Section 2(6A) provides as under:

             "2 (6-A). "member of his family" in relation to a landlord means
             his spouse, son, daughter, grand-child or dependent parent."                C

          10: ·Apparently, it appears that the definition is conclusive as the
    word "means" has been used to specify the members, namely, spouse, son,
    daughter, grand-child or dependent parent, who would constitute the
    family. Section 2 of the Act in which·various terms have been defined, open
    with the words "in this Act, unless the context otherwise requires" which D
    indi~ates that the definitions, as for example, that of "Family", which are ·
    indicated to be conclusive may not be treated to be conclusive if it was
    otherwise required by the context. This implies that a definition, like any
    other word in a statute, has to be reatl in the light of the context and
-   scJieme of the Act as also the object for which the Act was made by the E
    Legislature.

          11. While interpreting a definition, it has to be borne in mind that
    the interpretation placed on it should not only be not repugnant to the
    context, it should also be such as would aid the achievement of the purpose
    which is sought to be served by the Act. A construction which would defeat           F
    or was likely to defeat the purpose of the Act has to be ignored and not
    accepted.

           12. Where the definition or expression, as in the instant case, is
    preceded by the words "unless the context otherwise requires", the said G
    definition set out in the Section is to be applied and given effect to but this
    rule, which is the normal rule may be departed from if there be something
    in the context to show that the definition could not be applied.

           13. This Court in K Balakrishna Rao & Ors. v. Haji Abdulla Sait &
    Ors., [1980] 1 SCC 321 while considering the defmition clause of this Act H
    194                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS[1996) SUPP.10 S.C.R.

A   which is under our consideration, held :

             "A definition clause does not necessarily in any statute apply in all
             possible contexts in which the word which is defined may be found
             therein. The opening clause of section 2 of the principal Act itself
             suggests ~hat any expression defined in that section should be given
B            the meaning assigned to it therein unless the context otherwise
             requires."

          14. In its ordinary and primary sense, the term "Family" signifies the
    collective body of persons living in one house or under one head or
C   manager or one domestic government. In its restricted sense, "Family"
    would include only parents and their children. It may include even grand-
    children and all the persons of the same blood living together. In its
    broader sense, it may include persons who are not connected by blood
    depending upon the context in which the word is used.

D
         15. There is a consensus among the High Courts in India that the
    word "Family" is a word of great flexibility and is capable of different
    meanings.

        16. In Ram Pershad Singh v. Mukand Lal, AIR (1952) Punjab 189,
E nephews who were brought up by the landlord and were set up in business
                                                                                     ....
  by him and were also married by him, were held to be member of the
  family. The Calcutta High Court in Puspa Lata Debi v. Dinesh Chandra
  Das, 85 Cal. L.J. 74, in Syed Shah Maidal Islam & Ors. v. Commr. of Wakfs
  & Ors., AIR (1943) Cal. 635 and again in Sukumar Guha v. Naresh Chandra
p Ghosh & Anr., AIR (1968) Cal. 49; the Madras High Court in Asha Bibi
  & Ors. v. Nabissa Sahib & Ors., AIR (1957) Madras; the Bombay High
  Court in Mst. Ramubai v. Jiyaram Shanna, AIR (1964) Bombay 96; the
  Delhi High Court in Govind Dass & Ors. v. K.uldip Singh, AIR (1971) Delhi
  151 and again inAbdul Hamid &Anr. v. Nur Mohd., AIR (1976) Delhi 328
  have all held that the word "Family" is a flexible word and it may, in certain
G circumstances, specially in the context in which it is used, may include
  persons who are not directly related by blood.

       17. This Court in Corporation of the City of Nagpur v. The Nagpur
  Handloom Cloth Market Co. Ltd., AIR (1963) SC 1192 while interpreting
H the word "Family'' observed as under :
     KV.MUIBUv. ANGAMUIBUAMMAL [S.SAGHIRAHMAD,J.]                          195.

              "But the expression 'family' has according to the context in A
          which it occurs, a variable connotation. It does not in the setting
          of the rules postulate the existence of relationship either of blood
          or by marriage between the persons residing in the tenement. Even
          a single person may be regarded as a family, and a master and
          servant would also be so regarded."                                  B
       18. It was further observed as under :

              "The expression 'family' must therefore take colour from the
          expression 'occupy' used in the same rule. In our view the expres-
          sion 'family' in the context in which it occurs, means no m'1fe than C
          a person or a group of persons."

       19. It is in the background of the above discussion relating to the
 cases decided by various High Courts and this Court that it is to be seen
 whether a "Foster Son" would be covered by the word "Family" as defined
 in the Act.                                                               D
        20. "Son" as understood in common parlancr. means as natural son
 born to a person after marriage. It is the direct blood relationship which
 is the essence of the term in which "Son" is usually understood, emphasis
 being on legitimacy. In legal parlance, however, "Son" has a little wider
 connotation. It may include not only the natural son but also son's son, E
 namely, the grand child, and where the personal law permits adoption, it
 also include an adopted son.

     21. Section 3(57) of the General Clauses Act defines "Son" as
 under:
                                                                                  F
          '"son' in the case of any one whose personal law permits adoption,
                 .
          shall mclude             ' son."
                          an adopted

       22. Relying upon this definition, the Lahore High Court in In re Divi
 Dita AIR (1931) Lahore 661, held that where the personal law of the
 parties permits adoption, the word "Son" will include an adopted son. In G
 Adit Narayan Singh v. Mahabir Prasad Tiwari, 48 Indian Appeals 86," the
. Privy Council held that 'Sons' in Mitakshara Chapter II 6(1) include a
  grand son. In the ancient Hindu Law, twelve sons are mentioned by the
  truth-seeing Sages all of whom need not be mer.~ioned here. The attempt
  only is to indicates that the terms "Son" itself is a flexible term and may not H
    196                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS[l996J SUPP.10 S.C.R.

A be limited to the direct descendant. Its true meaning, like the term "Family"
    discussed "above, will depend upon the context in which it is used. Even
    illegitimate son may be treated as legitimate, as for example, the 'Son'
    referr~(j to in Section 16 of Hindu Marriage Act, as originally enacted:
          ...
           .i

          23. Coming now to "Foster Son", it may be pointed out thata "Foster
B Son'' is a son who is not the real son or direct descendant of a person after
    his marriage.

         24. In Shorther Oxford Dictionary, "Foster Son" is defined as "one
    brought up as a son though not a son by birth." The word "Foster", in the
C   same dicqonary , is indicated to mean, to supply with food; to nourish, feed,
    support; to bring up with parental care; to nurse, tend with care to grow.

        25. "Foster Brother" is a male child nursed at the same breast as, or
  reared with, another of different parentage. "Foster Father" is described as
  one who performs the duty of a father to another's child. "Foster ¥other"
D is indicated to mean a woman who nurses and brings up another's child,
  either as an adoptive mother or as a nurse, while "Foster Sister" means a
  female child nursed at the same breast as, or reared with, another of
  different parentage.

           26. These definitions indicate that a "Foster Child" need not be the
E   real legitimate child of the person who brings him up. He is essentially the
    child of another person but is nursed, reared and brought up by another
    person as his own son.

         27. If a child comes to a person or is found by that person as forlorn
p child or the parents of that child, may be, on account of their poverty or
  their family circumstances, bring that child to the other person and request
  him to bring up that child which is accepted ;by that person and such child
  is brought up from the infancy as the own son by that person who loves
  that child as his own, nourishes and brings him up, looks after his education
  in the school, college or university and bears all the expenses, such child
G has to be treated as the son of that person particularly if that person holds
  the child out as his own. Care, therefore, in rearing up the child need not
  always be parental. It can be even that of a "Foster Father", In such a
  situation, the son so brought up would be the "Foster Son" of that person
   and since the devotion with which he was brought up, the love and care
H which he received from that person were like those which that person
      K.V.MUTHUv. ANGAMUTHU AMMAL[S.SAGHIRAHMAD,J.)                           197

 would have given to his real son, the "Foster Son" would certainly be a A
 member of the family.

         28. It would be appropriate at this stage to refer to a case from the
   United States, namely, Re Nonnan's Estate (1940) 295 NW 63 which was
   decided by the Supreme Court of Minnesota in which . the dictionary               B
   defmition of "Foster Mother" or "Father" as a woman or man who had
.. performed the duties of a parent to a child of another by rearing the child
   as the own child was accepted. "Foster Child" in that\~ase was defined ~s
   one who has been cared for by a "Foster Parent".

       29. This decision was considered by the Canadian Court in Re Page             C
 (1973) 3 OR 903 or 903 (Ont SC) in which the learn~~Judge referring to
 the above defmition observed as under :

          "This definition, which commended itself to Minnesota Court, also
          commends itself to me."                                           D
      30. In England, Fosterage is now regulated by statutory laws. In
 Bromley's "Family Law'', 7th Edition, it is indicated as under :

          "Both at common law and under the Children and Young Persons
          Act, 1933 there will be a duty to afford protection. Although there        E
          is no common law. duty to maintain the child, the person with
          control will be criminally liable under the Children and Young
          Persons Act 1933 if he wilfully fails to provide him with adequate
          food, clothing, medical aid or lodging. Similarly, the Education Act
          1944 places him under a duty to see that the child receives full-time      p
          education. So long· as no one else claims the care and control of
          the child, the person who actually has it will be clearly entitled to
          retain it; if thi_s is disputed, the court must be guided by the child's
          welfare in d~termining in whose favour to make an order."

        Bromley in his treatise also indicates that if anyone other than a G
 relative, guardian or custodian, undertakes the care and maintenance of a
 child, he will be subject to the provisions of the Foster Children Act, 1980.
 Fosterage here is essentially a matter of personal inclination, liking and
 devotion towards a child by those, specially, who being childless adopt or
 otherwise rear up a child.                                                    H
    198                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS(1996) SUPP. 10 S.C.R.

A         31. From the above, it would appear that it is not in every case that
    a son who is not the real son of a person would be treated to be a member
    of family of that person but would depend upon the facts and circumstan-
    ces of a particular case.

        32. Analysing the facts of this case in the light of the principles
B enunciated above, it will be seen that Arunachala Bakthar is the brother's
  son of the Appellant's husband who, therefore, was related to the
  appellant's husband by blood and was his heir not only under the old
  Mitakshara Law (as brother's son) but also under the Hindu Succession
  Act, 1956 as a class-II heir. Arunachala Bakthar was brought up by the
C appellant and her husband and was living all along with them. He apparent-
  ly acted as a devoted son to the appellant's husband and helped him in all
  possible ways including the business which he carried on. Appellant's
  husband acted also a a devoted father to Arunachala Bakthar in whose
  favour he also executed a will and after reciting therein that Arunachala
D Bakthar was brought up by him, he bequeathed his business jointly to him
  and the appellant specifying further that after the death of the appellant,
  the business shall be carried on by Arunachala Bakthar. Appellant's hus-
  band also, significantly, did not bequeath the residential house absolutely
  in favour of the appellant but created only a life estate therein for her. The
  remainder was bequeathed to the children of Arunachala Bakthar.
E
           33. In view of the above facts and circumstances, Arunachala Bakthar
    was clearly a member of the family of the ·appellant's husband within the
    meaning of Section 2(6A) of the Act and consequently, the appellant could
    well file an application for eviction of the respondent from the premises in
    question not only for her need but also for the need of her "Foster Son",
F   Arunachala Bakthar.

          34. We do not find any infirmity in the judgment passed by the
    Madras High Court and dismiss the appeal with costs which is quantified
    at Rs. 15, 000.
G B.K.S.                                                     Appeal dismissed.