Holding

The bifurcation of Grade I officers based on the 31‑12‑1972 confirmation cut‑off, as made under the 1979 Conditions of Service Order, is a reasonable classification with a rational nexus to the objective of standardisation and does not infringe Article 14.

Summary

The Supreme Court examined the State Bank of India's 1979 Conditions of Service Order, which placed Grade I officers confirmed before 31‑12‑1972 in Middle Management Grade Scale II and those confirmed after that date in Junior Management Grade Scale I. Petitioners argued that this bifurcation was arbitrary, amounted to demotion and violated Article 14 of the Constitution. The Bank contended that the classification was based on rational criteria such as probation periods and six‑year service requirements, and that the order was a statutory exercise of power under Section 43 of the State Bank of India Act, 1955. The Court applied the two‑fold test for permissible classification under Article 14, finding an intelligible differentia and a rational nexus to the objective of standardisation. It held that the classification was reasonable and not discriminatory, and that the delay in filing the writs did not, by itself, bar relief. Consequently, the petitions were dismissed.

Issues considered

The classification of Grade I officers based on the date of confirmation violates Article 14.
Whether the bifurcation constitutes arbitrary discrimination or demotion.
Whether the delay in filing the writ petitions amounts to laches warranting dismissal.
Whether the court can interfere with a statutory order made under Section 43 of the State Bank of India Act, 1955.

Legislation cited

State Bank of India Act, 1955s. 43(1)

Subjects

Article 14classificationdiscriminationlachesservice conditionsState Bank of Indiapublic serviceplacementprobationconstitutional lawcivil service

Judgment

A K. THIMMAPPA AND ORS.
v.
CHAIRMAN, CENTRAL BD. OF DIRS. SB! AND ANR.

DECEMBER 5, 2000

B [G.B. PATTA~AIK AND B.N. AGRAWAL. JJ.]

Service Luw :

Uniformity and standardisation in the conditions of service -Held.
C placemen/ of grade I officers in two different grades, on the basis of their
confirmation, is not discriminatory and violative of Article 14- -[State Bank
of India Officers (Determination of Terms und Conditions of Service) Order,
1979}-Constitution of India-Article 14.

Constitution of India-'-Article 226 - Dismissal of Writ petitions on the
D ground of laches---Held, dismissal possible when there is no infraction of
fundamental rights under the Constitution.

In 1973 the Central Government appointed a Committee, calied Pillai
Committee for bringing about uniformity and standardisation in the conditions
of service of officers of various Nationalised Banks. The recommendations
E of the Committee was adopted by Respondent State Bank of India, with the
passing of State Bank of India Officers (Determination of Terms and
Conditions of Service) Order, 1979 (Conditions of Service Order) which came
into effect from 1.10.1979. The Conditions of Service Order deals with re-
structuring and placement of existing officers on the appointed date
F (1.10.1979) in corresponding grades and scale as per Schedule I to the Order.
This resulted in bifurcation of Grade I officers int.u two categories, i.e. officers
confirmed before 31.12.1972 and officers ~onfirmed after 31.12.1972.
Officers confirmed before 31.12.1972 were placed in Middle Management
Grade Scale II in the scale of pay of Rs. 1200-2000 while the officers confirmed
after 31.12.1972 were placed in the Junior Management Grade Scale I in the
G scale of pay of Rs. 700-1800 along with officers of Grade II prior to the
1.10.1979. The petitioners challenged the bifurcation under the Conditions
of Service Order by filing Writ Petitions in different High Courts, which
were transferred to this Court.

The petitioners contended that bifurcation of Grade I officers on the
H 368
K. THIMMAPPA v. CHAIRMAN, CENTRAL BD. OF DIR. 369
basis of the date of confirmation is wholly irrational and choosing the date A
as 31.12.1972 without reasonable nexus with the object sought to be achieved
is arbitrary and must be held to be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution
which must be struck down. They contended that placement of some officers
of Grade I with the officers of Grade II in Junior Management Grade Scale
I after I. I 0. 79 is demotion in service, which is discriminatory and arbitrary. B
The respondent-bank contended that Conditions of Service Order, 1979,
is a statutory order made under the provisions of the State Bank of India Act,
1955 and the said order purports to rationalise and standardise the
administrative set up of the Management cadres by restructuring and
placement taking relevant and germane materials into consideration which C
is not liable to be interfered with by a Court of law. The cut off date viz.
31.12.1972 had been fixed after taking into account the probation period,
entitlement of confirmation after completion of probation period, minimum
requirement of six years service in the Grade and requirement of placement
to be made on 1.10.1979. Unless a strong case is made out for malafides or
for infraction of a constitutional provision, the bifurcation of officers should D
not be treated as discriminatory under Article 14 of Constitution. The
respondent-bank further contended that the Writ Petitions filed by the
petitioners should be dismissed on account of laches and should not be allowed
to make stale claims and try to unsettle settled matters.

Dismissing the transfer petitions, the Court E
HELD: 1.1. Article 14 of the Constitution prohibits class legislation
and not reasonable classification for the purpose of legislation. If the Rule
Making Authority takes care to reasonably classify persons for a particular
purpose and if it deals equally with all persons belonging to a well-defined
class then it would not be open to the charge of discrimination. To pass the F
test of permissible classification, two conditions must be fulfilled : (a) that
the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which
distinguishes persons or things which are grouped together from others left
out of the group and (b) that the differentia must have a rational relation to
the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question. The classification G
may be founded on different basis and what is necessary is that there must
be nexus between the basis of classification and the object under consideration.
Article 14 of the Constitution does not insist that the classification should
be scientifically perfect and a Court would not interfere unless the alleged
classification results in apparent inequality. When a law is challenged to be
discriminatory essentially. on the ground that it denies equal treatment or H
370 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] SCPP. 5 S.C.R.

A protection, the question for determination by Court is not whether it has
resulted in inequality but whether there is some difference, which bears a
just and reasonable relation to the object of legislation. Mere differentiation
does not per $e amount to discrimination within the inhibition of the equal
protection clause. To attract the operation of the clause it is necessary to
B show that the selection or differentiation is unreasonable or arbitrary; that
it does not rest on any rational basis having regard to the object, which the
legislature has in view. If a law deals with members of well-defined class then
it is not obnoxious and it is not open to the charge of denial of equal protection
on the ground that it has no application to other persons. It is for the Rule
Making Authority to determine what categories of persons would embrace
C within the scope of the rule and merely because some categories which would
stand on the same footing as those which are covered by the rule are left out
woulrl not render the Rule or the Law enacted in any manner discriminatory
and violative of Article 14. It is not possible to exhaust the circumstances
or criteria, which may afford a reasonable basis for classification in all
cases. It depends on the object of the legislation, and what it really seeks to
...
D achieve. [378-G, H; 379-A, B, C, D, E[

1.2. It is well settled that even if a classification would be permissible,
but unless there is any rational basis for the same, the very basis would be
hit by Article 14 of the Constitution. The stand of the bank is that after
E taking into account the fact that the period of probation is either one year
to two years in case of promotees or direct recruits and that successful
completion of the probation period entitles the employee to be confirmed and
minimum six years of service in the Grade, is required for being placed in
Middle Management Grade Scale II, as per the guidelines issued and since
placement was required to be made on 1.10.1979, which is the appointed date
F in the Conditions of Service Order, the Competent Authority of the bank,
namely, the Central Board of the Stat~ Bank of India, i.as determined the
date as 31.12.1972. In view of the explanations offered by the bank, it cannot
be said that the date 31.12.1972 is an arbitrary date and has no rational
nexus with the placement of the officers of Grade I in Middle Management
G Grade Scale II. If the Competent Authority on relevant and all germane factors,
takes a decision in the matter of placement or fitment, whenever a
restructuring of the cadre is made, then the Court will not be justified in
examining the ba•is of such placement or fitment in a mathematical scale
and would not ordinarily interfere with such decision, unless it is established
beyond doubt that the decision is totally arbitrary or malajide. Placement of
H the existing officers in the new grades, as provided in Schedule I, made in
K. THl\1MAPPA v. CHAIRMAN. CENTRAL BO. OF DIR. 371
paragraph 7 of the Conditions of Service Order and placement made in respect A
of officers Grade I, confirmed on or before 31.12.1972 in Middle Management
Grade Scale II and others in Junior Management Grade Scale I, is not hit
by Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 1381-A-E; 382-CJ

1.3. It is no doubt true that prior to the new structuring of the B
management, persons from officers Grade II were being promoted to Officers
Grade I. But in suggesting restructure of the entire managerial cadre by
way of standardisation, when less category of grades have been evolved,
necessarily, there would be merger of different pre-existing grades, but such
merger will neither amount to demotion in any manner nor would it amount
to treating unequals as equals. It is in fact a part of exercise of cadre C
adjustment process, after taking the decision of minimising the number of
grades and, consequently, such a decision having been taken by adopting the
decision of expert body i.e. Pillai Committee's Report it cannot be said that
, the Central Board of the State Bank of India in making the Conditions of
Service Orders 1979, treated the officers of Grade I, who had not been
confirmed on or before 31.12.1972 with hostile discrimination. (382-F, G) D
1.4. The concept of categorisation, placement and fitment in the new
scale of pay are three different concepts, provided in paragraphs 6, 7 and 8
of the Conditions of Service Order. If these concepts are borne in mind and
the provisions contained in Schedule I is examined, there is no infirmity in E
placing Officers Grade I not confirmed till 31.12.1972 in Junior Management
Grade Sc3le I, nor can it be said that it would violate the mandate contained
in paragraph 6 of the Conditions of Service Order. 1385-B, CJ

New Bank of India Employees' Union & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.,
11996) 8 SCC 407 and Tars em Lal Gautam v. State Bank of Paliala, [ 1989) F
I SCC 182, relied on.

Patwardhan, (1977) 3 SCC 399 and Direct Recruit Class If Engineering
Officers' Association v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., (1990) 2 SCC 715,
distinguished. G

2. I. These cases should not be thrown out on the ground of laches
alone, as the placement made on I. 10.1979 was assailed in the year 1988
at the earliest and 1998 at the latest, but the same may not be brushed aside,
particularly, when infraction of any fundamental right of the petitioners
i?Uaranteed under the Constitution has not been found out. (384-EI H
372 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A P.S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of Tamil Nadu, [1975) 1 sec 152, relied
on.

Ramchandra Shankar Deodhar & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors.,
[1974) 2 SCR 216 and B. Prabhakar Rao & Ors. v. State ofAndhra Pradesh
& Ors. etc. etc., [1985) Supp. 2 SCR 573, referred to.
B
Bradbury & Ors. v. London Borough of Enfield, (1967) 3 All England
Law Reports Page 434, referred to.

CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Transfer Case (C) No. 25 of
1998.
c
Under Article 139 A (I) of the Constitution of India.

WITH

Transfer Petition (C) Nos. 665-668/98, Transferred Case (C) No. 30/98,
D 38/98 and 67/99.
R.K. Jain, P.P. Rao, S.B. Sanyal, Kapil Sibal, Shanti Bhushan, Suresh C.
Gupta, A. Guneshwar Sharma, Ms. Rekha Pandey, Sanjay Kapur, Raj iv Kapoor,
Ms. Shubhra Kapur, Ashok K. Mahajan, Mamita Verma and Kamal Mohan
Gupta for the appearing parties.
E
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

PATTANAIK, J. These Transferred Cases from different High Courts
relate to the common question, namely, in the matter of placement of existing
officers in the new grades and scale in the State Bank of India made under
F State Bank of India Officers (Determination ..,f Terms and Conditions of Service)
Order 1979, (hereinafter referred to as 'The Service Order'), under Paragraph
7 of the said Order is discriminatory in nature, so far as it deals with the
Officers Grade I. The Central Board of the State Bank of India in exercise of
power conferred by sub-section (I) of Section 43 of the State Bank of India
G Act 1955 made the condition of Service Order which came into force with
effect from I.I 0.1979. Paragraph 7 deals with the placement of the existing
officers on the appointed date in the corresponding grades and scale as per
the table given in Schedule I and Paragraph 8 deals with the fitment of the
said existing officers in the new grade and scale of pay. Prior to coming into
force of the condition of Service Order, in the State Bank of India there were
H different grades of officers in the organisational structure and so also in other
K. THIMMAPPA v. CHAJR:vlAN, CENTRAL BD. OF DIR. [PATTANAIK.J.) 373
Nationalised and Subsidiary Banks. In the year 1973 the Government of India A
appointed a Committee, called Pillai Committee for bringing uniformity and
standardisation in the conditions of service of the officers of various
Nationalised Banks. The said recommendations of the Pillai Committee was
later on applied to the State Bank of India and its Associate Banks with
suitable modification having regard to their special features. So far as the
State Bank of India is concerned, the entire re-structuring of its officers was B
made by passing the conditions of Service Order which came into force on
1.10.1979. Paragraph 6 of the Order deals with categorisation. Paragraph 7 of
Order deals with the placement of existing officer on the appointed date in
corresponding grades and scales. Paragraph 8 deals with fitment in the new
scales of pay. The aforesaid 3 paragraphs are quoted herein-below in extenso:- C
"Categorisation

6. {I) Having regard to the responsibilities and functions exercisable,
every post of an officer in the Bank shall be categorised by the
Central Board or the Executive Committee or the competent authority D
as falling in any one of the grades or scales mentioned in paragraph
4 and such categorisation may be reviewed from time to time by the
Central Board or the Executive Committee or the competent authority.

Pmvided that the categorisation of the posts in existence on the
appointed date shall be done before the expiry of two years from that E
date and shall, in respect of the posts in the senior management and
top executive grades, be done by a committee appointed for the
purpose by the Chairman of the Bank.

(2) For the purpose of categorisation of posts under sub-paragraph
(I), every branch or office of the Bank shall be classified by the Bank F
in accordance with the criteria to be approved by the Central Board
or the Executive Committee as small, medium, large, very large or
exceptionally large category.

Placement of existing officers on the appointed date in corresponding
grades and scales. G
7. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 6, existing officers serving
in the grades and scales of pay mentioned in column 1 of the table
given in Schedule I to this order shall be placed as on the appointed
date in the grade and scale specified there-against in column 2 of the
said schedule. H
374 SUPREME COCRT REPORTS (2000] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A Provided that any difficulties or anomalies arising out of the
above placement shall be referred to a committee of such persons as
the Chairman of the Bank may appoint and the decision of that
committee in this regard shall be final.

Fitment in the new scales of pay.
B
8. (l) Every existing officer placed in any of the new grades and scales
of pay in accordance with paragraph 7, shall be fitted at such stage
in the new scale of pay corresponding to the existing grade and scale
as specified in Schedule II to this order.

C (2) Subject to sub-paragraph (3 ), on being so fitted in the new scale
of pay, such officer shall be eligible to draw the next increment, if any,
in such new scale on the first day of the month in which he would
have been eligible to draw increment in terms of the provisions in this
behalf prior to the appointed date.

D (3) Where two or more officers having different seniority in the scales
of pay immediately before the appointed date are fitted at the same
stage in the new scale of pay, different months may be fixed for the
eligibility of such officers for the next increment in the new scale of
pay.
E
(4) the mere fact that on the appointed date an officer happens to be
posted in a post categorised as that of a grade or scale higher than
the one in which he is placed in accordance with the provisions of
paragraph 7 will not by itself entitle that officer to any higher placement
or fitment."
F
In accordance with Paragraph 7 of the Order Schedule I has been drawn
up which indicates the grade and scale immediately before the appointed date
in which the officer was there and the grade and scale in which he is placed
on the appointed date. In the case in hand we are concerned with officers
G described in Items 8 and 9 of the aforesaid Schedule. The same is extracted
herein-below in extenso:-

"8. Officers Grade I confirmed as Middle Management Scale //-Rs.1200-
such on or before 31.12.1972 70-1550-75-2000.
&a/e-Rs.500-40-620-45-755-95-850-
H 50-!050-EB-50-1150-60-1330.
K. THIMMAPPA v. CHAIRMAN, CE!'JTRAL BD. OF DIR [PA TTANAIK, .1.J 375

9. Other Officers Grade l. Scale- Junior Management Grade Scale A
Rs.500-40-62.0-45-755-95-850-50-1050-EB- I. Rs.700-40-900-50-1 l OO-EB-1200-
50-1150 60-1330. 60-1800.
and
Officers Grade II-Scale Rs. 500-40-620-
45-980-50-1030." B
The grievance of the petitioners, who happened to be the officers of Grade
I, prior to the appointed date is that while those of them who had been
confirmed before 31.12.1972 they had been placed in the Middle Management
Grade Scale II in the scale of Pay of Rs. 1200-2000 while the unconfirmed
officers of Grade I prior to 31.12.1972 have been placed in the Junior C
Management Grade Scale I in the scale of pay of Rs. 700-1800 along with
officers of Grade II prior to the appointed date. According to the petitioners,
treating the officers confirmed in Grade I before 31.12.1972 differently from
other officers of Grade I is a hostile discrimination and the so called classification
made on the basis of confirmation made prior to 31.12.1972, with unconfirmed D
hands is not founded on any intelligible differentia and further having the cut
of date at 3 l.l 2.1972 has no rational relation with the object sought to be
achieved, and as such, must be held to be arbitrary. According to the employer
bank, however, taking into account the period on probation which an officer
of Grade I is required to undertake on being recruited, the successful completion
of the period of probation, after which an employee is entitled to be confirmed, E
the guidelines indicated as to the period of service, one must have for holding
a post in the Middle Management Scale Grade II and all other germane
factors, the decision having been taken on the question of placement, that
only those confirmed prior to 31.12. 72 will be placed in MMG Grade Scale II,
whereas others should be placed in Junior Management Grade Scale I cannot F
be held to be arbitrary or irrational.
----.,.
I
Mr. Sanyal, Mr. P.P. Rao and Mr. R.K. Jain, the learned counsel appearing
for the petitioners in different sets of Transferred Petitions, raised the following
contentions, in assailing the legality of Schedule I, drawn in accordance with
paragraph 7 of the Conditions of Service 'order, 1979 in relation to Items 8 and G
9 quoted earlier in this judgment.

(1) In the matter of fitment and placement, bifurcating the officers
of erstwhile Grade I, on the basis of their date of confirmation
is wholly irrational and further, the date chosen as 31.12.1972 has
no basis and is nothing but an arbitrary and capricious exercise H
376 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A of choosing of the date and it has no reasonable nexus with the
object sought to be achieved in the matter of placement and,
consequently, must be held to be violative of Article 14.

(2) Prior to the appointed date on I. !0.1979, the officers of Grade I,
having been promoted from the officers of Grade II and
B subsequent to the appointed date, the very fact of placing some
of the officers of Grade I with the officers of Grade II in Junior
Management Grade Scale I, is on the face of it, arbitrary and
tantamounts to a demotion in case of those, who had already
been in Grade I prior to the appointed date and this placement

c must be held to be arbitrary.

(3) In fixing 31.12.1972, as the cut of date, for the purpose of
placement and fitment, the same has no reasonable nexus for the
differentiation made and at any rate nothing has been indicated
by the employer, and, therefore, even if a classification would be
D permissible, then also such classification would be hit by the ....
provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution.

(4) Paragraph 7 of the Conditions of Service Order is subject to the
provisions of paragraph 6. Necessarily, therefore, categorisation,
having been required to be made in due consideration of the
E responsibility and functions exercisable, it would not be
permissible under paragraph 7 to place officers of Grade I in two
different grades, some in Middle Management Grade Scale II and
others in Junior Management Grade Scale I inasmuch, it would
contravene the mandate engrafted in paragraph 6.

F (5) Confirmation, being one of the inglorious uncertainties of
Government Service, depending neither on efficiency of the •
incumbent nor on the availability of substantive vacancies, as
has been held by this Court in Patwardhan 's case, [ 1977] 3 SCC
399, and reaffirmed in the Constitution Bench decision in Direct
G Recruits case, [1990] 2 SCC 715, if such date of confirmation,
cannot be the basis for the seniority of the employees in a cadre,
there would be no rhyme and reason to have such confirmation
as the basis for the placement of the officers when a restructuring
takes place and the basis of placement being the inglorious
uncertainty of confirmation, the order of placement must be held
H to be invalid and must be struck down.
K. THIMMAPPA v. CHAIRMAN. CENTRAL BD. OF DIR. [PA TT ANAIK, J.] 377

(6) The Division Bench Judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High A
Court in case of subsidiary banks as well as the Rajasthan High
Court in case of the State Bank of Bikaner, which also is a
subsidiary bank, having been upheld by this Court in somewhat
similar circumstances and the placement and fitment made in
case of subsidiary banks, having been set aside by the High B
Court, the principles enunciated therein, would apply with equal
force to the case in hand, and, therefore, the placement of
officers of Grade I, those who have not confirmed by 31.12.72
in the Junior Management Grade Scale I along with the officers
of Grade II, must be held to be arbitrary and irrational and must
be struck down. C
Mr. Shanti Bhushan and Mr. Kapil Sibal, learned counsel, appearing for
the bank, on the other hand contended that Conditions of Service Order, 1979,
is a statutory order, made in exercise of powers conferred under sub-section())
of Section 43 of the State Bank of India Act, 1955 and the said order purports
to rationalise and standardise in restructuring the administrative set up of the D
Management cadres and in process of such restructuring, if on consideration
of relevant and germane materials, placement of the officers has been made,
as provided under paragraph 7 of the Conditions of Service Order, then such
placement is not liable to be interfered with by a Court of law, unless a strong
case is made out, either on the ground of ma/a fides or on the ground of E
infraction of a constitutional provision. According to the learned counsel,
when officers of a pre-existing Grade are sought to be placed in the different
grades, which emanated on account of standardisation and re-structuring,
then it may not be possible in a given situation to put all the officers of a
particular grade to be placed in a corresponding grade or scale of pay evolved
in the process of restructuring. This being the position, while grafting of F
these officers in the newly created grade and scale, if there is a bifurcation
of officers of a particular grade into two, based on their period of service,
experience and other relevant factors, such bifurcation would not tantamount
to treating them discriminately, and would not attract the provisions of Article
14 of the Constitution. It was further urged under paragraph 6, what was G
required to be performed is to categorise the officers, on the basis of the
responsibilities and functions exercisable by such officers whereas paragraph
7 deals with the placement and paragraph 8 deals with the fitment in the new
scale of pay and this being the position, notwithstanding paragraph 7 is
subject to paragraph 6, there would be no bar in bifurcating the officers of
a particular grade and placing them in two different grades, as has been done H
~,

:
'
\
378 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A in the present case, if there is any reasonable basis for such bifurcation.
According to the learned counsel, the provision for confirmation, contained
in paragraph 16, would not attract the mischief of inglorious uncertainty of
confirmation in the service and on the other hand, it is the satisfactory
completion of training of the officers, which is determinative of the confirmation
B in service and failure on the part of the officer, who is not found fit for
confirmation by the Competent Authority, would entail termination of service
in case of a direct appointee and reversion to the substantive grade in case
of a promotee. This being the position with regard to confirmation, the ratio
in Patwardhan 's case as well as Direct Recruits' case, on which reliance has
been placed by the counsel, appearing for the petitioners, would have no
C application at all. According to Mr. Shanti Bhushan, the judgment of this
Court in Tarsem Lal Gautam v. State Bank ofPatiala, [1989] l SCC, 182, fully
governs the present batch of cases and as such, there is no infirmity with the
classification that has been made amongst the officers of Grade I on the basis
of their date of confirmation, whether prior to 31.12.1972 or thereafter.
Mr. Sibal, further urged that it would be a sound and wise exercise of discretion
D for the Courts to refuse to exercise their extraordinary powers under Article
226 in the case of persons who do not approach the Court expeditiously for
relief and who stand by and allow things to happen and then approach the
Court to put forward stale claims and try to unsettle settled matters and in
the case in hand, the placement that was made in the year 1979 is now sought
E to be assailed in writ petitions filed in different High Courts, the earliest being
in the year 1988 and the latest being in the year 1998 and such delay in
approaching the Court disentitles the petitioners from invoking the
extraordinary jurisdiction of the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution,
and, therefore, these petitions are liable to be dismissed. In support of this
contention, reliance was placed on the decision of this Court in the case of
F P.S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of Tamil Nadu, [1975] l SCC 152. Before we deal
with the respective contentions of the parties it would be appropriate foi:. us
to notice that what Article 14 prohibits is class legislation and not reasonable
classification for the purpose of legislation. If the rule Making Authority takes
care to reasonably classify persons for a particular purpose and if it deals
G equally with all persons belonging to a well defined class then it would not
be open to the charge of discrimination. But to pass the test of permissible
classification two conditions must be fulfilled:-

(a) that the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia
which distinguishes persons or things which are grouped together
H from others left out of the group; and

II

(
K. THIMMAPPA v. CHAIRMAN. CENTRAL BD. OF DIR. [PATTANAIK, J.J 379

(b) that the differentia must have a rational relation to the object A
sought to be achieved by the statute in question.
The classification may be founded on different basis and what is
necessary is that there must be a nexus between the basis of classification
and the object under consideration. Article 14 of the Constitution does not
insist that the classification should be scientifically perfect and a Court would B
not interfere unless the alleged classification results in apparent inequa!ity.
When a law is challenged to be discriminatory essentially on the ground that
it denies equal treatment or protection, the question for determination by
Court is not whether it has resulted in inquality but whether there is some
difference which bears a just and reasonable relation to the object of legislation.
Mere differentiation does not per se amount to discrimination within the c
inhibition of the equal protection clause. To attract the operation of the clause
it is necessary to show that the selection or differentiation is unreasonable
or arbitrary; that it does not rest on any rational basis having regard to the
object which the legislature has in view. If a law deals with members of well
defined class then it is not obnoxious and it is not open to the charge of D
denial of equal protection on the ground that it has no application to other
persons. It is for the Rule Making Authority to determine what categories of
persons would embrace within the scope of the rule and merely because some
categories which would stand on the same footing as those which are covered
by the rule are left out would not render the Rule or the Law enacted in any
manner discriminatory and violative of Article 14. It is not possible to exhaust E
the circumstances or criteria which may afford a reasonable basis for
classification in all cases. It depends on the object of the legislation, and what
it really seeks to achieve.
In view of the submissions of the counsel for the parties, the first
question, that arises for consideration is whether merely because the officers F
of Grade I have been placed in two different newly created grades, on the
basis of their confirmation, would constitute discrimination amongst the same
group or not? The petitioners' contention is based upon the observations of
this Court in Patwardhan s case as well as Direct Recruits case, to the effect
that confirmation being one of the inglorious uncertainties of Government G
service, could not have formed the basis for placement in two different
grades. In Patwardhan s case, the inter se seniority between the direct
recruits and promotees was being determined on the basis of the date of their
respective confirmation. Under the rules i11 question, a ratio between the
direct recruits and promotees to the cadre was being maintained at·34:66, and
confirmation, necessarily, depended upon the availability of the posts in the H
380 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2000] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A cadre in the respective quota. Further, the promotees were to depend on the
availability of substantive vacancies and then on the arbitrary discretion of
the Government to confirm or not to confirm them in those vacancies. It is
in that situation, when the rule of seniority was related to the date of
confirmation, the Court had observed that the confirmation being one of the
inglorious uncertainties of Government Service, could not have become a
B reasonable basis for determination of inter se seniority. This decision in
Patwardhan s case was reaffirmed in the Constitution Bench decision in
Direct Recruit Class II Engineering Officers' Association v. State of
Maharashtra and Ors., [ 1990] 2 SCC 715, and the Court reiterated and upheld
the decision of the Court in Patwardhan. But what has been stated in relation
C to a rule for the purpose of detennination of inter ve seniority, may not be
applicable to all contingencies and it cannot be said that the confirmation of
an employee in a particular cadre cannot form a rational basis for any purpose
whatsoever. In the case in hand, under the Conditions of Service Order, a
person appointed as a probationary officer or a trainee officer, is required to
be on probation for a period of two years. An employee of the bank when
D promoted as an officer to the Junior Management Grade is required to be on
probation for a period of one year. In accordance with paragraph 16 of the
said Conditions of Service Order, such officers on probation, shall be confinned
in the service of the bank, if the Competent Authority is of the opinion that
the employee has satisfactorily completed the period of probation. The said
E Competent Authority also has a right to extend the period of probation, if in
his opinion, the officer has not satisfactorily completed the probationary
period. In paragraph 16(3 ), on the end of the period of probation, including
the period of extension, if any, if the Competent Authority is of the opinion
that the officer is not fit for promotion, then the service of the direct appointee
is liable to be terminated and in case of a promotee, he is liable to be reverted
F to his substantive cadre. In view of the aforesaid statutory provision, dealing
with confinnation and probation, the observation made by this Court in
Patwardhan s case or Direct Recruit case, will have no application. The
question of inglorious uncertainties in the matter of confinnation, does not
arise in the case in hand, in view of the aforesaid statutory provisions.
G Consequently, the main argument of the petitioner's counsel and their reliance
on the two decisions, referred to earlier, will have no application and the
contention on this score accordingly fails.

Notwithstanding, the aforesaid conclusion of ours, it still remains to be
examined, as to whether in the matter of placement, prescribing 31.12.1972, as
H the cut of date, can be referred to any rational basis. It is too well settled that

r
K. THIMMAPPA v. CHAIRMAN. CENTRAL BD. OF DIR. (PATTANAIK,J.) 381

even if a classification would be permissible, but unless there is any rational A
basis of the same, the very basis would be hit by Article 14. The stand of
the bank is that taking into account the fact that the period of probation is
either one year or two years in case of promotees or direct recruits and that
successful completion of the probationary period entitles the employee to be
confirmed and minimum six years of service in the Grade, is required for being B
placed in Middle Management Grade Scale II, as per the guidelines issued and
since placement was required to be made on I. I 0.1979, which is the appointed
date in the Conditions of Service Order, the Competent Authority of the bank
namely the Central Board of the State Bank of India, has determined the date
31.12.1972. In view of the explanations, offered by the bank as well as the
averments made in the counter affidavit, we are unable to hold that date C
31.12.1972 is an arbitrary date and has no rational nexus with the placement
of the officers of Grade I in Middle Management Grade Scale II. If the
Competent Authority on relevant and all germane factors, takes a decision in
the matter of placement or fitment, whenever a restructuring of the cadre is
made, then the Court will not be justified in examining the basis of such
placement or fitment in a mathematical scale and would not ordinarily interfere D
with such decision, unless it is established beyond doubt that the decision
is totally arbitrary or has been ma/a fide/y taken. When we examined the
assertions, made by the petitioners in their writ petitions, we do not find any
basis or even any pleadings of ma/a fides. In New Bank of India Employees'
Union and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors., [ 1996] 8 SCC 407, placement of E
officers of a particular bank, after its amalgamation with another bank was the
subject matter of challenge and in that context, this Court had observed:
"The legal position is fairly settled that no scheme of Amalgamation
can be fool-proof and a Court would be entitled to interfere only when
it com.es to the conclusion that either the scheme is arbitrary or F
irrational or has been framed on some extraneous consideration."
What has been observed in the case of amalgamation, would equally
apply to a case of restructuring of the cadre and placement and fitment of the
existing employees in the restructured cadre. In fact in Tarsem Lal Gautam
v. Stc.1te Bank of Patiala, (1989] I SCC 182, this Court was examining the G
legality of classification, based upon their seniority and experience for being
fitted into two different grades, though originally belong to one grade, as in
the present case. While upholding such placement and fitment and while
coming to the conclusion that it would not amount to discrimination or
violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, this Court had taken note of the
fact that when new categories of posts and new scales of pay are created, H
382 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2000] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A while trying to standardise and rationalise the management cadre, some criteria
have to be evolved and applied for the placement and fitment of the existing
officers into the new categories of posts, which may necessitate the pre-
existing cadre of officers to be fitted in two grades and so long as their exists
a reasonable basis for such bifurcation, it would not be a case of discrimination,
B attracting Article 14 of the Constitution. Ultimately, this Court held that the
principle of classification brought about by the statutory re .. ilation, cannot
be said to be unreasonable and arbitrary. The aforesaid dictum, in our opinion,
would apply with full force to the facts of the present case. We are, therefore
of the considered opinion that placement of the existing officers in the new
grades, as provided in Schedule I, made in paragraph 7 of the Conditions of
C Service Order, and more particularly, placement made in respect of officers
Grade I, confirmed on or before 31.12.1972 in Middle Management Grade Scale
II and others in Junior Management Grade Scale I, is not hit by Article 14 of
the Constitution of India.

The next question, that arises for consideration is whether putting
D officers of Grade I, who had not been confirmed on or before 3 I .12.1972 along
with the officers of Grade II in Junior Management Grade Scale I, would per
se be discriminatory inasmuch as prior to the new structurisation of the
management, promotion was being made from Officers Grade II to Officers
Grade I? According to Mr. Sanyal, this tantamounts to un-equals being
E treated as equals, and even demotion of the officers of Grade I who had not
been confirmed before 31.12.1972. We are unable to accept this submission
of the learned counsel for the petitioners. It is no doubt true that prior to the
new structurising of the management, persons from officers Grade II were
being promoted to the officers Grade I. But in suggesting restructure of the
entire managerial cadre by way of standardisation, when less category of
F grades have been evolved, necessarily, there would be merger of different pre-
existing grades, but such merger will neither amount to demotion in any
manner nor would it amount to treating unequals as equals. It is in fact a part
of exercise of cadre adjustment process, after taking the decision of minimising
the number of grades and, consequently, such a decision having been taken
G by adopting the decision of expertised body of Pillai Committee's Report, it
cannot be said that the Central Board of the State Bank C1f India in making
the Conditions of Service Orders 1979, treated the officers of Grade I, who had
not been confirmed on or before 31.12.1972 with hostile discrimination. The
arguments on behalf of the petitioners on this score, therefore stands rejected.

H Mr. Sibal, appearing for the Bank, no doubt has raised the contention
K. THIMMAPPA v. CHAIRMAN, CENTRAL BD OF DIR. [PA TTANAIK,J.] 383

that gross delay on the part of the employees in filing the writ petition, dis- A
entitles them to get any discretionary relief and in support of the same,
reliance has been placed on the decision of this court in P.S. Sadasivaswamy
v. State of Tamil Nadu, [1975] I SCC 152. In the aforesaid case, this Court
observed that even though no period of limitation is provided for the Courts
to exercise power under Article 226, but it would be a sound and wise exercise B
of discretion for the Courts to refuse to exercise their extraordinary powers
under Article 226 in the case of persons who do not approach it expeditiously
for relief and who stand by and allow things to happen and then approach
the Court to put forward stale claims and try to unsettle settled matters.

Mr. Rao, the learned senior counsel, appearing for the petitioners, on C
the other hand, vehi:mently urged that if the treatment meted out to the
petitioners is found to be discriminatory and as such violates Article 14 of
the Constitution, then the Court will not throw away the petitions merely on
the ground of !aches. In support of the contention, reliance was placed on
the Constitution Bench decision of this Court in the case of Ramchandra
I
Shankar Deodhar & Ors. v. The State of Maharashtra and Ors., [1974] 2 SCR D
J 216. In the said case, this Court had observed:

"Moreover, it may be noticed that the claim for enforcement of the
fundamental right or equal opportunity under Article 16 is itself a
fundamental right guaranteed under Article 32 and this Court which
has been assigned the role of a sentinel on the qui vive for protection E
of the fundamental rights cannot easily allow itself to be persuaded
to refuse relief solely on the jejune ground of !aches, delay or the
like."

Mr. Rao also relied upon the observation of this Court in the case of B.
Prabhakar Rao and Ors. etc. v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors. etc. etc.,
F
[1985] Supp. 2 SCR 573, wherein Chinnappa Reddy, J, speaking forthe Court
observed thus:

" ........ the burden of establishing the reasonableness of a
classification and its nexus with the object of the legislation is on the G
State. Though no calamitous consequences were mentioned in any of
the counter-affidavits, one of the submissions strenuously urged before
us by the learned Advocate-General of Andhra Pradesh and the
several other counsel who followed him was the oft-repeated and now
familiar argument of ·administrative chaos'. It was said that there
would be considerable chaos in the administration if those who had H
384 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000J SL:PP. 5 S.C.R.

A already retired are now directed to be re-inducted into service."

A passage from the judgment of lord Denning in Bradbury and Ors.
v. London Borough of Enfield, (1967) 3 All England Law Reports Page 434,
was also pressed into service by Mr. P.P.Rao, which it is worth-while to quote
hereunder:
B
"It has been suggested by the Chief education officer that, if an
injunction is granted, chaos will supervene. All the arrangements have
been made for the next term, the teachers appointed to the new
comprehensive schools, the pupils allotted their places, and so forth.
It would be next to impossible, he says, to reverse all these
c arrangements without complete chaos and damage to teachers, pupils
and the public. I must say this: if a local authority does not fulfil the
requirements of the law, this Court will see that it does fulfil them. It
will not listen readily to suggestions of "chaos". The department of
education and the council are subject to the rule of law and must
D comply with it, just like everyone else. Even if chaos should result, I
still the law must be obeyed; but I do not think that chaos will result.
The evidence convinces me that the "chaos" is much over-stated." l
On consideration of the aforesaid legal position, though, we are inclined
to agree with Mr. P.P. Rao that these cases should not be thrown out on the
E ground of !aches alone, inasmuch as the placement made on I. I 0.1979 was
assailed in the year 1988 at the earliest and 1998 at the latest, yet the same
may not be brushed aside, particularly, when we have not been able to find
out any infraction of any fundamental right of these petitioners, guaranteed
under the Constitution.

F So far as the argument advanced on the interpretation of paragraph 7,
on the ground that it is subject to the provisions of paragraph 6, we are of
the considered opinion that paragraph 6 of the Conditions of Service Order
indicates as to how categorisation has to be made. In fact on the basis of the
adoption of the recommendations of the Pillai Committee, the officers have
G been categorised into four different categories with nine different scales of
pay; Top Executive Grade with three scales, Senior Management Grade with
three scales, Middle Management Grade with two scales and Junior
Management Grade with one scale and categorisation has to be made taking
into account the responsibilities and functions exercisable by the officers
concerned. After such categorisation, as provided in paragraph 6, the officers
H are required to be placed in corresponding grades and scale. In other words,
K. THIMMAPPA v. CHAIRMAN, CENTRAL BD. OFDIR. [PATTANAIK, .1.J 385

in the case in hand, Grade I officers, confirmed on or before 3 l.12.1972 on A
being categorised as Middle Management Grade Scale II, other officers of
Grade I, not confirmed till 31.12.1972 are categorised into Junior Management
Grade Scale I, and further, on categorised as Middle Management Grade, while
officers Grade I are being placed in Scale II thereof but Staff Officers, Grade
Ill, enumerated in Item No. 7 of Schedule I are placed in Middle Management B
Grade Scale III. The concept of categorisation, placement and fitment in the
new scale of pay are three different concepts, provided in paragraphs 6, 7 and
8 of the Conditions of Service Order. If this concept is borne in mind and the
provisions contained in Schedule I is examined, we see no infirmity in placing
officers Grade I not confirmed till 3 l.12.1972 in Junior Management Grade
Scale I, nor can it be said that it would violate the mandate contained in C
paragraph 6 of the Conditions of Service Order. The said contention of Mr.
Rao, therefore, is rejected.

The only other contention that survives for our consideration is the
Division Bench decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court , which was
upheld by this Court as well as the decision of the Rajasthan High Court in D
the State Bank of Patiala's case, which was also upheld by this Court. Both
in the Andhra Pradesh case as well as the Rajasthan High Court case, it was
the officers of the subsidiary bank, who had approached the Court for certain
relief and no doubt the observations made by the learned Judges of the
Andhra Pradesh High Court would support the contention of the petitioners E
in this batch of cases to a great extent. But the judgment of this Court,
dismissing the bank's appeal against the same, does not contain any
discussion, though it cannot be denied that dismissal was on merits. But it
transpires that the earlier judgment of this court in Tarsem Lal Gautam 's case,
[1989] 1 SCC 182, had not been brought to the notice of the Court and when
a Contempt Petition had been filed for non-implementation, when the Bank F
asked for variation of the order and brought to the notice of the Court the
judgment in Tarsem Lal Gautam 's case, [ 1989] 1 SCC 182, the Court observed
that the judgment in Civil Appeal must be confined to its own facts and as
such the judgment of the High Court has now to be implemented. What has
been observed by this Court in disposing of the contempt application, when G
the decision of the Court in Tarsem Lal Gautam 's case had been brought to
the notice, would apply equally to the case in hand, more so, as against a
detailed discussion of law in Tarsem Lal Gautam 's case, there has been no
discussion at all, while dismissing the Bank's appeal against the judgment of
the Andhra Pradesh High Court as well as Rajasthan High Court. Consequently,
we are of the considered opinion that the observations of the Andhra Pradesh H
386 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2000) SUPP.. 5 S.C.R.

A High Court, while disposing of the writ petitions, filed by the officers of the
subsidiary banks will not have any application to the case in hand, as had
already been observed, while disposing of the contempt application, that it
would only be applicable to the facts of that case and more so, in the present
case, when we have already considered the contentions raised by the
B petitioners in detail, and have not been persuaded to accept the same.

In the aforesaid premises, all the contentions raised, having failed, these
transferred cases/petitions, stand dismissed and the writ petiti9ns filed by
different petitioners in different High Courts stand dismissed.

For the grounds stated in the application for condonation of delay in
C filing the substitution application in Transfer Petition (Civil) No. 665-668/98,
in the interest of justice, the delay is condoned and the substitution application
is allowed. The Legal Representatives of the deceased respondent No. 12 are
brought on record.

D B.S. Transferred cases and petitions dismissed.