K. SURESHversusNEW INDIA ASSURANCE CO. LTD. AND ANR

                       (2012) 11 S.C.R. 414


A                           K. SURESH
                                 v.
         NEW INDIA ASSURANCE CO. LTD. AND ANR.
               (Civil Appeal No. 7603 of 2012)
                       OCTOBER 19, 2012
B
       [K.5. RADHAKRISHNAN AND DIPAK MISRA, JJ.]
                                                       .
      Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 - s.168 - Determination of
  compensation - Just compensation - Concept of -
C Explained.
        Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 - ss.166 and 168 - Accident
  with auto resulting in multiple grievous injuries and fractures
  all over the body of the appellant - Held: Victim-appellant
D entitled to compensation for loss of earning capacity as well
  as for permanent disability - View of High Court that no
  compensation can be granted towards permanent disability
  once compensation is computed for the loss of earning
  capacity and loss of future earnings is unsustainable - On
E facts, appellant entitled to compensation on the headings:
  transport charges, extra-nourishment, medical expenses,
  additional medical expenses, additional transport charges,
  pain and suffering, loss of earning capacity and permanent
  disability and accordingly awarded total compensation of
  Rs.13.48 lakhs with interest@ 7.5%.
F
       The appellant was hit by an auto driven in a rash and
  negligent manner causing multiple grievous injuries and
  fractures all over his body. The tribunal assessed the
  permanent disability of the appellant at 75% and awarded
G Rs.25,00,0001· under various heads, namely, transport
  charges, extra nourishment, medical expenses, additional
  medical expenses, pain and sufferings suffered by family
  members of the claimant, mental agony, additional
  transport charges, inability of the appellant to participate
H                             414
 K. SURESH v. NEW INDIA ASSURANCE CO. LTD.             415
                 AND ANR.
in public functions, loss of marital life, pain and suffering, A
permanent disability and loss of earning capacity. Before
the High Court as serious objections were raised
pertaining to percentage of disability, the appellant was
referred to the Medical Board and it was found that he had
compression fracture which had healed with persistence B
of pain in the back with root involvement causing grade
IV power in left lower limb and, accordingly, the Board
 fixed the permanent disability at 40"/o. The High Court
adverted to the concept of "just compensation" and
 opined that the quantum of damages fixed should be in c
 proportionate to the injuries caused. It opined that
 Rs.2,00,000/- towards medical expenses, Rs.5,000/- each
 for transport charges and extra nourishment, Rs.2,50,000/
    towards pain and suffering, Rs.50,000/- for medical
 expenses and Rs.4,68,000/- towards loss of earning D
 capacity would be the just amount of compensation and
 thus, reduced the total amount of compensation to
 Rs.9,78,000/-. The High Court also reduced the interest to
 7.5"/o from 9% as granted by the tribunal.

     In the instant appeal, the appellant contended that      E
the High Court had erroneously held that there cannot be
grant of compensation under two heads, namely,
"permanent disability" and "loss of earning power"; that
the tribunal had correctly appreciated the evidence on
record and fixed certain sum under various heads but the      F
High Court on unacceptable reasons deleted the same
and also that the High Court without ascribing any cogent
reasons reduced the expenses for continuous treatment
from Rs.2,00,000/- to Rs.50,000/- as a result of which the
amount had been substantially reduced and the concept         G
of "just compensation" lost its real characteristics.

    The question which therefore arose for consideration
was whether the analysis made by the High Court in not
granting compensation under certain heads and further         H
    416      SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2012] 11 S.C.R.


A reducing the amount on certain scores, was justified.

          Partly allowing the appeal, the Court

       HELD: 1.1. Despite many a pronouncement in the
  field, it still remains a challenging situation warranting
B sensitive as well as dispassionate exercise how to
  determine the incalculable sum in calculable terms of
  money in cases of personal injuries. In such assessment
  neither sentiments nor emotions have any role. There
  cannot be actual compensation for anguish of the heart
C or for mental tribulations. The quintessentiality lies in the
  pragmatic computation of the loss sustained which has
  to be in the realm of realistic approximation. Therefore,
  Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 stipulates that
  there should be grant of "just compensation". Thus, it
D becomes a challenge for a court of law to determine "just
  compensation" which is neither a bonanza nor a windfall,
  and simultaneously, should not be a pittance. [Para 2]
    [423-G-H; 424-A-B]

E      1.2. While assessing the damages there is a command
  to exclude considerations which are in the realm of
  speculation or fancy though some guess work or some
  conjecture to a limited extent is inevitable. Thus, some
  guess work, some hypothetical considerations and some
F sympathy come into play but, a significant one, the ultimate
  determination is to be viewed with some objective
  standards. Neither the tribunal nor a -::iurt can take a flight
  in fancy and award an exorbitant sum, for the concept of
  conventional sum, fall of money value and
  reasonableness are to be kept in view. Ergo, in conceptual
G eventuality "just compensation" plays a dominant role.
  The conception of "just compensation" is fundamentally
  concretized on certain well established principles and
  accepted legal parameters as well as principles of equity
  and good conscience. [Paras 6 and 7]
H
 K. SU RESH v. NEW INDIA ASSURANCE CO. LTD. 417
                  AND ANR.
     1.3. An adjudicating authority, while determining A
quantum of compensation, has to keep in view the
sufferings of the injured person which would include his
inability to lead a full life, his incapacity to enjoy the
normal amenities which he would have enjoyed but for
the injuries and his ability to earn as much as he used to B
earn or could have earned. Hence, while computing
compensation the approach of the tribunal or a court has
to be broad based. It would involve some guesswork as
there cannot be any mathematical exactitude or a precise
formula to determine the quantum of compensation. In c
 determination of compensation the fundamental criterion
 of "just compensation" should be inhered. [Para 10] [428-
 E-G]
     Jai Bagwan v. Laxman Singh and others (1994) 5 SCC
5; Nagappa v. Gurudayal Singh and others (2003) 2 SCC D
274: 2002 (4) Suppl. SCR 499; C.K. Subramania Iyer v. T.
Kunhikuttan Nair AIR 1970 SC 376: 1970 (2) SCR 688;
Yadav Kumar v. Divisional Manager, National Insurance
Company Limited and another (2010) 10 SCC 341: 2010
(10) SCR 746; Concord of India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nirmala E
Devi (1979) 4 SCC 365: 1979 (3) SCR 694; Mrs. Helen C.
Rebello and others v. Maharashtra State Road Transport
Corpn. and another AIR 1998 SC 3191: 1998 (1) Suppl. SCR
684 and State of Haryana and another v. Jasbir Kaur and
Others (2003) 7 sec 484: 2003 (2) Suppl. SCR 245 - relied F
on.
     Davies v. Powell Duffryn Associate Collieries Ltd. 1942
AC 601; H. West & Son, Ltd. v. Shephard (1963) 2 All ER
625; Lim Poh Choo v. Camden and Islington Area Health          G
Authority (1979) 1 All ER 332 and Ward v. James (1965) 1
All ER 563 - referred to.
     Clerk and Lindsell on Torts (16th Edn.) - referred to.

     2.1. The incapacity or disability to earn a livelihood    H
    418    SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [2012] 11 S.C.R.

A would have to be viewed not only in praesenti but in
   futuro on reasonable expectancies and taking into
   account deprival of earnings of a conceivable period. This
   head being totally different cannot overlap the grant of
   compensation under the head of pain, suffering and loss
B of enjoyment of life. One head relates to the impairment
   of person's capacity to earn, the other relates to the pain
   and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life by the person
   himself. It is true that compensation for loss of earning
   power/capacity has to be determined based on various
c aspects including permanent injury/disability, but at the
  same time, it cannot be construed that that compensation
  cannot be granted for permanent disability of any nature.
  In a case of a non-earning member of a family who has
  been injured in an accident and sustained permanent
  disability due to amputation of leg or hand, it cannot be
0
  construed that no amount needs to be granted for
  permanent disability. It cannot be disputed that apart from
  the fact that the permanent disability affects the earning
  capacity of the person concerned, undoubtedly, one has
  to forego other personal comforts and even for normal
E avocation they have to depend on others. Thus, the view
  of the High Court that no compensation can be granted
  towards permanent disability once compensation is
  computed for the loss of earning capacity and loss of
  future earnings is unsustainable. As is perceivable, the
F High Court has computed the loss of earning power at
  Rs.4,68,()00/- instead of Rs.5,00,000/- as determined by the
  tribunal and deleted sum of Rs.3,00,000/- that was
  awarded by the tribunal towards permanent disability.
  The total deletion is absolutely unjustified and, in fact,
G runs counter to the principles laid down by this Court in
  Ramesh Chandra and B. Kothandapani. Grant of
  compensation towards permanent disability is
  permissible. Regard been had to the totality ,of the facts
  and circumstances, compensation of Rs.2,50.,000/- should
H be granted towards permanent disability and R~2,00,000/
 K. SURESH v. NEW INDIA ASSURANCE CO. ,LTD.             419
                 AND ANR.             '
- towards pain and suffering. It is being so held as the A
injury is of serious nature and under the heading of non-
pecuniary damages compensation is awardable under
the headings of pain and suffering and damages for loss
of amenities of life on account of injury. If the victim of
an accident suffers permanent or temporary disability, B
then efforts should always be made to award adequate
compensation not only for the physical injury and
treatment, but also for the pain, suffering and trauma
caused due to accident, loss of earnings and victim's
inability to lead a normal life and enjoy amenities, which c
 he would have enjoyed but for the disability caused due
 to the accident. [Paras 18, 19, 20 and 28] [432-D-E-F-H;
 433~A-C; 437-H; 438-A-B-D]

     2.2. It is obligatory on the part of the court or the
tribunal to assess the damages objectively and exclude D
from consideration any speculation or fancy, though
some conjecture with reference to the nature of disability
and its consequences, is inevitable. A person is not only
to be compensated for the physical injury, but also for
the loss which he suffered as a result of such injury. He E
is to be compensated for his inability to lead a full life, his
inability to enjoy those normal amenities which he would
have enjoyed but for the injuries, and his inability to earn
as much as he used to earn or could have earned. [Para
23] [434-G; 435-A-B]                                            F

     2.3. Permanent disability can be either partial or total
and the assessment of compensation under the heads
of loss of future earnings would dep~nd upon the factum
and impact of such permanent disability on his earning G
capacity. The tribunal should not mechanically apply the
percentage of permanent disability as the percentage of
economic loss or loss of earning capacity. In most of the
cases, the percentage of economic loss, i.e., the
percentage of loss of earning capacity, arising from a H
permanent disablllty will be different from the percentage
    420    SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [2012] 11 S.C.R.

A of permanent disability. However, in some cases on
  appreciation of evidence and assessment the percentage
  of loss of earning capacity as a result of the permanent
  disability would be approximately the same as the
  percentage of permanent disability in which case, of
B course, the court or tribunal would adopt the said
  percentage for determination of compensation. [Para 25]
  [436-D-H]

       2.4. In the case at hand the High Court has
C determined the loss of earning capacity on the base of
  multiplier method and reduced the quantum awarded by
  the tribunal from Rs.5,00,000/- to Rs.4,68,000/-. Applying
  the ratio in Yadav Kumar and Arvind Kumar Mishra and also
  Raj Kumar and regard being had to the serious nature of
  injury, no error is found in the said method of calculation
D and, accordingly, the method of computation as well as
  the quantum is upheld. [Para 26] [437-A-B]

       2.5. The High Court has reduced the additional
  medical expenses from Rs.2,00,000/- to Rs.50,000/-. The
E same is not correct as there is ample evidence on record
  as regards the necessity for treatment in future. It is
  demonstrable that pedicle screws were passed into
  pedicles of 011 vertebra; pedicle screws were passed
  into pedicles of L1 vertebra; and two screws on left thigh
F were connected using a rod each. That may be required
  to be removed or scal'!ned from time to time depending
  upon other aspects. That apart, there is persistent pain
  and as medically advised physiotherapy is necessary and
  hence, continuous treatment has to be availed of. Thus,
G the High Court was not justified in reducing the said
  amount. [Para 27] [437-C-E]
      2.6. The High Court maintained the award in respect
  of transport charges, extra nourishment, medical
  expenses and, accordingly, they are maintained. The
H High Court deleted the additional transport charges.
 K. SURESH v. NEW INDIA ASSURANCE CO. LTD. 421
                      AND ANR.
While availing treatment the said expenses would be           A
imperative. Hence, there was no justification to reduce the
same and, accordingly, it is restored. [Paras 28, 29] [437-
F; 438-F]

     2.7. The High Court deleted the amount awarded           8
under the head of pain and suffering by family members
of the claimant and the amount granted towards loss of
marital life. There is no iota of evidence with regard to
loss of marital life, hence, there is no error in the said
deletion. As far as grant of compensation on the score        C
of pain and suffering suffered by the family members of
claimant is concerned, the same is not permissible and,
accordingly, it was correctly deleted. [Para 30] [438-G-H;
439-A]

     2.8. The High Court deleted an amount of Rs.3,00,000/ D
- and a sum of Rs.2,00,000/- towards mental agony and
inability on the part of the claimant to participate in public
functions respectively. Since this Court has already
determined Rs.2,00,000/- under the heading of pain and
suffering already suffered and to be suffered and E
Rs.2,50,000/- under the heading of permanent disability
and hence, no different sum need be awarded under the
heading of mental agony. As far as participation in public
functions is concerned, there is no evidence in that
regard and, therefore, the finding of the High Court on F
that score is totally justified and does not call for any
 interference. [Para 31] [439-B-D]

     2.9. Calculated on the aforesaid base, the
 compensation would be payable on the headings,
 namely, transport charges, extra-nourishment, medical G
 expenses, additional medical expenses, additional
 transport charges, pain and suffering, loss of earning
 capacity and permanent disability and the amount on the
 aforesaid scores would be, in toto, Rs.13,48,000/-. The
 said amount shall carry interest at the rate of 7.5% from H
    422    SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2012] 11 S.C.R.


A the date of application till the date of payment. [Para 32)
  [439-E-F]

       Ramesh Chandra v. Randhir Singh (1990) 3 SCC 723:
  1990 (3) SCR 1; B. Kothandapani v. Tamil Nadu State
B Transport Corporation Ltd. (2011) 6 SCC 420: 2011 (6) SCR
  791; R.D. Hattangadi v. Pest Control (India) Pvt. Ltd. and
  others (1995) 1 SCC 551: 1995 (1) SCR 75; Arvind Kumar
  Mishra v. New India Assurance Company Limited and
  another (2010) 10 sec 254: 2010 (11) SCR 857; Kera/a
  SRTC v. Susamma Thomas (1994) 2 SCC 176; Raj Kumar
C v. Ajay Kumar and Another (2011) 1 sec 343: 2010 (13)
  SCR 179; Yadav Kumar v. Divisional Manager, National
  Insurance Company Limited and another (2010) 10 SCC
  341: 2010 (10) SCR 746 and Laxman v. Divisional Manager,
  Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. and another 2012 ACJ 191 -
D relied on.

        Cho/an Roadways Corporation Ltd. v. Ahmed Thambi
    (2006) 4 CTC 433 (Mad) - referred to.

E        Baker v. Willoughby 1970 AC 467: (1970) 2 WLR 50 -
    referred to.

                        Case Law Reference:
      1942 AC 601                referred to    Para 2
F    (1994) 5 sec 5              relied on     Para 3
     (1963) 2 All ER 625         referred to   Para 3
     2002 (4) Suppl. SCR 499     relied on     Para 4

G    (1979) 1 All ER 332         referred to   Para 4
     (1965) 1 All ER 563         referred to   Para 5
     1970 (2) SCR 688            relied on     Para 6, 23
     2010 (10) SCR 746          relied on      Para 7, 25, 26
H
K. SURESH v. NEW INDIA ASSURANCE CO. LTD.                423
                AND ANR.
 1979 (3) SCR 694              relied on      Para 8              A
 1998 (1) Suppl. SCR 684       relied on      Para 9
 2003 (2) Suppl. SCR 245       relied on      Para 9
 2011 (6) SCR 791              relied on      Para 17, 20
                                                                  B
 (2006) 4 CTC 433 (Mad)        referred to    Para 17
 1990 (3) SCR 1                relied on      Para 15, 18, 20
 1995 (1) SCR 75               relied on      Para 21,23
 2010 (11) SCR 857              relied on     Para 22, 25, 26     c
 (1994) 2 sec 176               relied on     Para 22
 2010 (13) SCR                  relied on     Para 23, 26
 (1970) 2 WLR 50                referred to   Para 20
 2012 ACJ 191                   relied on     Para 28             D

    CiVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTIOf:il : Civil Appeal No.
7603 of 2012.
    From the Judgment and Order dated 27.01.2010 of the
High Court of Judicatu~e at Madras in Civil Miscellaneous         E
Appeal No. 1989 of 2005.

      Vipin Nair, Udayaditya Banerjee (For Temple Law Firm)
for the Appellant.                           ·        ·

   Aishwarya Bhati, Sanjay Mittal, Aditya Dhawan, Chander             F
Shekhar Ashri for the Respondents.

    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

    DIPAK MISRA, J. 1. Leave granted.                                 G
     2. Despite many a pronouncement in the field, it still
remains a challenging situation warranting sensitive as well as
dispassionate exercise how to determine the incalculable sum
in calculable terms of money in cases of personal injuries. In
such assessment neither sentiments nor emotions have any              H
         424      SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2012) 11 S.C.R.


A role. It has been stated in Davies v. Powell Duffryn Associate
   Collieries Ltd. 1 that it is a matter of Pounds, Shillings and
  Pence. There cannot be actual compensation for anguish of the
  heart or for mental tribulations. The quintessentiality lies in the
  pragmatic computation of the loss sustained which has to be
B in the realm of realistic approximation. Therefore, Section 168
  of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for brevity 'the Act') stipulates
  that there should be grant of "just compensation". Thus, it
  becomes a challenge for a court of law to determine '1ust
  compensation" which is neither a bonanza nor a windfall, and
C simultaneously, should not be a pittance.
       3. In Jai Bhagwan v. Laxman Singh and Others2, a three-
  Judge Bench of this Court, while considering the assessment
  of damages in personal-injury-actions, reproduced the following
  passage from the decision by the House of Lords in H. West
                              3
0 & Son, Ltd. v. Shephard :-
            "My Lords, the damages which are to be awarded for a
            tort are those which 'so far as money can compensate, will
            give the injured party reparation for the wrongful act and
            for all the natural and direct consequences of the wrongful
E           act' [Admiralty Comrs. v. Susquehanna (Owners), The
            Susquehanna 4 ]. The words 'so far as money can
            compensate' point to the impossibility of equating money
           with human suffering or personal deprivations. A money
           award can be calculated so as to make good a financial
F          loss. Money may be awarded so that something tangible
           may be procured to replace something else of like nature
           which has been destroyed or lost. But money cannot renew
           a physical frame that has been battered and shattered. All
           that judges and courts can do is to award sums which
G          must be regarded as giving reasonable compensation. In
           the process there must be the endeavour to secure some
    1.    1942AC601.
    2.    (1994) 5 sec 5.
    3.    (1963) 2 All ER 625.
H   4.    (1926) All ER 124 : 1926 AC 655.
 K. SU RESH v. NEW INDIA ASSURANCE CO. LTD.                425
           AND ANR. [DIPAK MISRA, J.)

    uniformity in the general method of approach. By common         A
    assent awards must be reasonable and must be assessed
    with moderation. Furthermore, it is eminently desirable that
    so far as possible comparable injuries should be
    compensated by comparable awards. When all this is said
    it still must be that amounts which are awarded are to a        B
    considerable extent conventional."

In the said case reference was made to a passage from Clerk
and Lindsell on Torts (16th Edn.) which is apposite to
reproduce as it relates to the awards for non-pecuniary losses:-    C

    "In all but a few exceptional cases the victim of personal
    injury suffers two distinct kinds of damage which may be
    classed respectively as pecuniary and non-pecuniary. By
    pecuniary damage is meant that which is susceptible of
    direct translation into money terms and includes such D
    matters as loss of earnings, actual and prospective, and
    out-of-pocket expenses, while non-pecuniary damage
     includes such immeasurable elements as pain and
    suffering and loss of amenity or enjoyment of life. In respect
     of the former, it is submitted, the court should and usually E
     does seek to achieve restitutio in integrum in the sense
     described above, while for the latter it seeks to award 'fair
     compensation'. This distinction between pecuniary and
     non-pecuniary dam_age by no means corresponds to the
     traditional pleading distinction between 'special' and F
     'general' damages, for while the former is necessarily
     concerned solely with pecuniary losses - notably accrued
      loss of earnings and out-of-pocket expenses - the latter
     comprises not only non-pecuniary losses but also
      prospective loss of earnings and other future pecuniary G
      damage."

      4. In this regard, we may refer with profit the decision of
 this Court in Nagappa v. Gurudayal Singh and others5 wherein
 the observations of Lord Denning M.R. in Lim Poh Choo v.
                                                                    H
     426        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2012] 11 S.C.R.

A Camden and Islington Area Health Authority6 were quoted
  with approval. They read thus:-

           ''The practice is now established and cannot be gainsaid
           that, in personal injury cases, the award of damages is
B
           assessed under four main heads: first, special damages
           in the shape of money actually expended; second, cost of
           future nursing and attendance and medical expenses; third,
           pain and suffering and loss of amenities; fourth, loss of
           future earnings."
c         5. While having respect for the conventional determination
    there has been evolution of a pattern and the same, from time
    to time, has been kept in accord with the changes in the value
    of money. Therefore, in the case of Ward v. James 7 it has been
    expressed thus:-
D
            "Although you cannot give a man so gravely injured much
            for his 'lost years', you can, however, compensate him for
            his loss during his shortened span, that is, during his
            expected 'years of survival'. You can compensate him for
            his loss of earnings during that time, and for the cost of
E
           treatment, nursing and attendance. But how can you
           compensate him for being rendered a helpless invalid? He
           may, owing to brain injury, be rendered unconscious for the
           rest of his days, or, owing to a back injury, be unable to
           rise from his bed. He has lost everything that makes life
F         worthwhile. Money is no good to him. Yet judges and juries
           have to do the best they can and give him what they think
           is fair. No wonder they find it well nigh insoluble. They are
          being asked to calculate the incalculable. The figure is
          bound to be for the most part a conventional sum. The
G         judges have worked out a pattern, and they keep it in line
          with the changes in the value of money."

    5.   c2003) 2 sec 274.
    6.   (1979) 1 All ER 332.
H   7.   (1965) 1 All ER 563.
 K. SURESH v. NEW INUIA ASSURANCE CO. LTD. 427
          AND ANR. [DIPAK MISRA, J.]
      6. While assessing the damages there is a command to A
exclude considerations which are in the realm of speculation
or fancy though some guess work or some conjecture to a
limited extent is inevitable. That is what has been stated in C.K.
Subramania Iyer v. T. Kunhikuttan Nair8. Thus, some guess
work, some hypothetical considerations and some sympathy B
 come into play but, a siQnificant one, the ultimate determination
 is to be viewed with some objective standards. To elaborate,
 neither the tribunal nor a court can take a flight in fancy and
 award an exorbitant sum, for the concept of conventional sum,
 fall of money value and reasonableness are to be kept in view. c
 Ergo, in conceptual eventuality "just compensation" plays a
  dominant role.

     7. The conception of "just compensation" is fundamentally
concretized on certain well established principles and accepted
legal parameters as well as principles of equity and good            D
conscience. In Yadav Kumar v. Divisional Manager, National
Insurance Company Limited and Anothefl, a two-Judge
Bench, while dealing with the facet of "just compensation", has
stated thus: -
                                                                     E
      "It goes without saying that in matters of determination of
      compensation both the tribunal and the court are statutorily
      charged with a responsibility of fixing a "just
      compensation". It is obviously true that determination of
      just compensation cannot be equated to a bonanza. At the       F
      same time the concept of "just compensation" obviously
      suggests application of fair and equitable principles and
      a reasonable approach on the part of the tribunals and the
       courts. This reasonableness on the part of the tribunal and
       the court must be on a large peripheral field."
                                                                     G
      8. In Concord of India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nirmala
      10
 Dev1 this Court has expressed thus:-
 8. AIR 1970 SC 376.
 9.   (2010) 10 sec 341.
  10. (1979) 4 sec 365.                                              H
      428       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2012] 11 S.C.R.


 A          ''The determination of the quantum must be liberal, not
            niggardly since the law values life and limb in free country
            in generous scales."

          9. In Mrs. Helen C. Rebello and Others v. Maharashtra
    State Road Transport Corpn. and Another11 , while dealing with
8
   concept of "just compensation", it has been ruled that the word
   'just', as its nomenclature, denotes equitability, fairness and
   reasonableness having large peripheral field. The largeness is,
   of course, not arbitrary; it is restricted by the conscience which
   is fair, reasonable and equitable, if it exceeds; it is termed as
C unfair, unreasonable, unequitable, not just. The field of wider
  discretion of the tribunal has to be within the said limitations. It
  is required to make an award determining the amount of
  compensation which in turn appears to be "just and
  reasonable", for compensation for loss of limbs or life can
D hardly be weighed in golden scales as has been stated in
  "State of Haryana and Another v. Jasbir Kaur and Others'' 2•

         10. It is noteworthy to state that an adjudicating authority,
   while determining quantum of compensation, has to keep in
E view the sufferings of the injured person which would include
   his inability to lead a full life, his incapacity to enjoy the normal
   amenities which he would have enjoyed but for the injuries and
   his ability to earn as much as he used to earn or could have
   earned. Hence, while computing compensation the approach
F of the tribunal or a court has to be broad based. Needless to
  say, it would involve some guesswork as there cannot be any
  mathematical exactitude or a precise formula to determine the
  quantum of compensation. In determination of compensation
  the fundamental criterion of "just compensation" should be
G inhered.
         11. Keeping in view the aforesaid aspects we shall
     proceed to state the factual score. The factual matrix as

     11. AIR 1998 SC 3191.
H 12. (2003) 1 sec 484.
  K. SURESH v. NEW INDIA ASSURANCE CO. LTD. 429
          AND ANR. [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

unfurled, exposits that on 11.3.2002 about 4.00 p.m. the               A
claimant-appellant (hereinafter referred to as 'the claimant) was
hit from the behind by an auto bearing registration number TN-
9 C 7755 which was driven in a rash and negligent manner and
in the accident he sustained triple fracture in spinal cord,
fracture in left leg neck of femur, fracture in right hand shoulder,   B
deep cut and degloving injury over right left thigh bone and
multiple injuries all over the body.

      12. After the accident the claimant was admitted in M.R.
Hospital where he availed treatment. After the treatment, the C
dislocation of the bones got reduced, pedical screws were
inserted into pedicles of D11 vertebra and pedicle screws were
passed into pedicles of L 1 vertebra. Two screws on left thigh
were fixed using a rod each. That apart, decompression of D12
vertebra was done and bone chips were placed in the
intertransverse area on both sides. He was hospitalized for 28 D
days. The victim had numbness below the knee joint and was
facing difficulty to stand and sit comfortably. As the evidence
on record would reveal he has been constantly availing
 physiotherapy treatment facing difficulty in carrying out his
 normal activities. A disability certificate contained as Ex.P4 was E
 filed before the tribunal which showed permanent disability at
 75%.

      13. The tribunal, as it appears from the award, had also
 assessed the permanent disability at 75% as fixed by PW-4,            F
 Dr. Thiagarajan. It had awarded Rs.25,00,000/- under various
 heads, namely, transport charges, extra nourishment, medical
 expenses, additional medical expenses, pain and sufferings
 suffered by family members of the claimant, mental agony,
 additional transport charges, inability of the appellant to           G
 participate in public functions, loss of marital life, pain and
 suffering, permanent disability and loss of earning capacity.

      14. Before the High. Court as serious objections were
 raised pertaining to percentage of disability, the claimant was
                                                                           H
    430      SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2012] 11 S.C.R.


A     referred to the Medical Board and it was found that he had
      compression fracture which had healed with persistence of
      pain in the back with root involvement causing grade IV power
      in left lower limb and, accordingly, the Board fixed the
      permanent disability at 40%. The High Court adverted to the
B    concept of "just compensation" and opined that the quantum
     of damages fixed should be in proportionate to the injuries
     caused. It referred to certain authorities and opined that
     Rs.2,00,000/- towards medical expenses, Rs.5,000/- each for
     transport charges and extra nourishment, Rs,2,50,000/-
C    towards pain and suffering, Rs.50,000/- for medical expenses
     and Rs.4,68,000/- towards loss of earning capacity would be
     the just amount of compensation. Thus, the total amount as
    determined by the High Court came to Rs.9, 78,000/-. The High
    Court reduced the interest to 7.5% from 9% as granted by the
    tribunal. Be it noted, the said judgment and order dated
0
    27.1.2010 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Madras
    in Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 1989 of 2005 whereby the
    High Court has reduced the compensation granted by the
    Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (II Small Causes Court),
E   Chennai, on an application being moved under Section 166 of
    the Act is the subject-matter of challenge herein.

       15. Mr. Vipin Nair, learned counsel appearing for the
  appellant, has contended that the High Court has erroneously
  held that there cannot be grant of compensation under two
F heads, namely, "permanent disability" and "loss of earning
  power". It is urged by him that the tribunal had correctly
  appreciated the evidence on record and fixed certain sum
  under various heads but the High Court on unacceptable
  reasons has deleted the same. It is also canvassed by him that
G the High Court without ascribing any cogent reasons has
  reduced the expenses for continuous treatment from
  Rs.2,00,000/- to Rs.50,000/- as a result of which the amount
  had been substantially reduced and the concept of "just
  compensation" has lost its real characteristics.
H
 K. SURESH v. NEW INDIA ASSURANCE CO. LTD.              431
          AND ANR. [DIPAK MISRA, J.]
     16. Ms. Aishwarya Bhati, learned counsel appearing for A
the respondent No. 1, supported the order passed by the High
Court contending, inter alia, that the analysis made by the
learned single Judge is absolutely flawless and the interference
in the quantum cannot be faulted inasmuch as the tribunal has
 awarded a large sum on certain heads which are totally B
 impermissible in law. It is also urged by her that certain sums
 had been allowed by the tribunal without any material on record
 and, therefore, the High Court has correctly interfered with the
 award.

      17. The seminal issues that really emanate for C
consideration are whether the analysis made by the High Court
in not granting compensation under certain heads and further
reduing the amount on certain scores, are justified. Regard
being had to the fundamental essence of "just compensation",
we shall presently deal with the manner in which the High Court D
 has dwelled upon various heads in respect of which the tribunal
 had granted certain sums towards compensation. On a perusal
 of the order passed by the High Court, it is manifest that the
 High Court relying on certain authorities of the said court has
 expressed the view that once a particular amount has been E
 awarded towards 'permanent disability', no further amount can
 be awarded relating to 'loss of earning capacity'. The learned
 counsel for the appellant has commended us to the
 pronouncement of this Court in B. Kothandapani v. Tamil Nadu
 State Transport Corporation Ltd. 13, wherein the High Court had F
 placed reliance on the Full Bench decision in Cho/an
 Roadways Corporation Ltd. v. Ahmed Thambi 14 • This Court
 referred to the pronouncement in Ramesh Chandra v. Randhir
 Singh 15 , wherein it has been stated thus:-
                                                                 G
      "With regard to ground 19 covering the question that the
      sum awarded for pain, suffering and loss of enjoyment of
 13. c2011)   s sec 420.
 14. (2006) 4 CTC 433 (Mad).
 1s. (1990) 3 sec 723.                                           H
     432       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2012] 11 S.C.R.


 A          life, etc. termed as general damages should be taken to
           be covered by damages granted for loss of earnings is
           concerned that too is misplaced and without any basis. The
           pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life which is a
           resultant and permanent fact occasioned by the nature of
 B         injuries received by the claimant and the ordeal he had to
           undergo."

       18. In Ramesh Chandra (supra) the learned Judges
  proceeded to address the issue of difficulty or incapacity to
  earn and how it stands on a different footing than pain and
C suffering affecting enjoyment of life and stated as under:-

          "The inability to earn livelihood on the basis of incapacity
          or disability which is quite different. The incapacity or
         disability to earn a livelihood would have to be viewed not
D        only in praesenti but in futuro on reasonable expectancies
         and taking into account depriva! of earnings of a
         conceivable period. This head being totally different cannot
         in our view overlap the grant of compensation under the
         head of pain, suffering and loss of enjoyment of life. One
E        head relates to the impairment of person's capacity to
         earn, the other relates to the pain and suffering and loss
         of enjoyment of life by the person himself."

        19. After referring to the said passage, the Bench
   proceeded to state that it is true that compensation for loss of
F earning power/capacity has to be determined based on various
   aspects including permanent injury/disability, but at the same
  time, it cannot be construed that that compensation cannot be
  granted for permanent disability of any nature. It has been
   mentioned by way of an example that in a case of a non-earning
G member of a family who has been injured in an accident and
  sustained permanent disability due to amputation of leg or hand,
  it cannot be construed that no amount needs to be granted for
  permanent disability. It cannot be disputed that apart from the
  fact that the permanent disability affects the earning capacity
H of the person concerned, undoubtedly, one has to forego other
 K. SU RESH v. NEW INDIA ASSURANCE CO. LTD.                  433
           AND ANR. [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

personal comforts and even for normal avocation they have to          A
depend on others.

     20. In view of the aforesaid enunciation of law, the view of
the High Court that no compensation can be granted towards
permanent disability once compensation is computed for the            B
loss of earning capacity and loss of future earnings is
unsustainable. As is perceivable, the High Court has computed
the loss of earning power at Rs.4,68,000/- instead of
 Rs.5,00,000/- as determined by the tribunal and deleted sum
of Rs.3,00,000/- that was awarded by the tribunal towards             C
 permanent disability. In our considered opinion, total deletion
 is absolutely unjustified and, in fact, runs counter to the
 principles laid down by this Court in Ramesh Chandra (supra)
 and 8. Kothandapani (supra).

     21. At this juncture, we think it seemly to state that it is a   D
case where the victim has suffered serious injuries. As far as
the injuries are concerned, there is concurrence of opinion by
the tribunal as well as by the High Court. The High Court has
only reduced the percentage of permanent disability on the
basis of assessment made by the Medical Board as there was            E
a serious cavil with regard to the said percentage. While
determining compensation payable to a victim of an accident
 the parameters which are to be kept in view have been
 succinctly stated in R.D. Hattangadi v. Pest Control (India) Pvt.
 Ltd. and Others16:-                                                      F
     "9. Broadly speaking while fixing an amount of
     compensation payable to a victim of an accident, the
     damages have to be assessed separately as pecuniary
     damages and special damages. Pecuniary damages are
     those which the victim has actually incurred and which are       G
     capable of being calculated in terms of money; whereas
     non-pecuniary damages are those which are incapable of
     being assessed by arithmetical calculations. In order to

 16. (1995) 1 sec 551.                                                    H
      434       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      (2012) 11 S.C.R.


 A           appreciate two concepts pecuniary damages may include
             expenses incurred by the claimant: (i) medical attendance;
             (ii) loss of earning of profit up to the date of trial; (iii) other
             material loss. So far non-pecuniary damages are
             concerned, they may include (i) damages for mental and
 B           physical shock, pain and suffering, already suffered or likely
            to be suffered in future; (ii) damages to compensate for
            the loss of amenities of life which may include a variety of
            matters i.e. on account of injury the claimant may not be
            able to walk, run or sit; (iii) damages for the loss of
c           expectation of life, i.e., on account of injury the normal
            longevity of the person concerned is shortened; (iv)
            inconvenience, hardship, discomfort, disappointment,
            frustration and mental stress in life."

       22. In Arvind Kumar Mishra v. New India Assurance
D Company Limited and Another17 a two-Judge Bench referred
  to the authority in Kera/a SRTC v. Susamma Thomas' 8 and
  applied the principle of multiplier for future earnings in a case
  of permanent disability. We have referred to this decision solely
  for the purpose that multiplier principle has been made
E applicable to an application preferred under Section 166 of the
     Act.

       23. In this context it is useful to refer to Raj Kumar v. Ajay
  Kumar and Another19 , wherein a two-Judge Bench after
F referring to the award of compensation in personal injury cases
  reiterated the concepts of pecuniary damages (special
  damages) and non-pecuniary damages (general damages).
  The Bench referred to the decisions in C.K. Subramania Iyer
  (supra), R.D. Hattangadi (supra) and Baker v. Wil/oughby2°
G and expressed the view that it is obligatory on the part of the
  court or the tribunal to assess the damages objectively and
     17. (2010) 10 sec 254.
     18. (1994) 2 sec 176.
     19. (2011) 1 sec 343.
H 20. 1970 AC 467: (1970) 2 WLR 50: (1969) 3 All ER 1528 (HL).
 K. SURESH v. NEW INDIA ASSURANCE CO. LTD.                    435
          AND ANR. [DIPAK MISRA, J.]
exclude from consideration any speculation or fancy, though           A
some conjecture with reference to the nature of disability and
its consequences, is inevitable. A person is not only to be
compensated for the physical injury, but also for the loss which
he suffered as a result of such injury. He is to be compensated
for his inability to lead a full life, his inability to enjoy those   B
 normal amenities which he would have enjoyed but for the
 injuries, and his inability to earn as much as he used to earn
 or could have earned.

     24. It is worthy noting that the Bench referred to the           C
pecuniary damages and non-pecuniary damages and opined
thus:-

     "Pecuniary damages (Special damages)

     (i) Expenses relating to treatment, hospitalisation,             D
     medicines, transportation, nourishing food, and
     miscellaneous expenditure.

      (ii) Loss of earnings (and other gains) which the injured
      would have made had he not been injured, comprising:
                                                                      E
      (a) Loss of earning during the period of treatment;

      (b) Loss of future earnings on account of permanent
      disability. ·

      (iii) Future medical expenses.                                  F

      Non-pecuniary damages (General damages)

      (iv) Damages for pain, suffering and trauma as a
      consequence of the injuries.                                    G

      (v) Loss of amenities (and/or loss of prospects of
      marriage).

      (vi) Loss of expectation of life (shortening of normal
      longevity)."                                                        H
     436      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2012] 11 S.C.R.

 A         25. After so stating the Bench proceeded to opine that
     assessment of pecuniary damages under Item (i) and under
     Item (ii)(a) do not pose much difficulty as they involve
     reimbursement of actuals and are easily ascertainable from the
     evidence. Award under the head of future medical expenses-
 B Item (iii)-depends upon specific medical evidence regarding
     need for further treatment and cost thereof. Assessment of non-
     pecu nia ry damages-Items (iv), (v) and (vi)-involves
     determination of lump sum amounts with reference to
     circumstances such as age, nature of injury/deprivation/disability
c suffered by the claimant and the effect thereof on the future life
     of the claimant. It has been observed therein that what usually
     poses some difficulty is the assessment of the loss of future
     earnings on account of permanent disability-Item (ii)(a).
    Thereafter, the Bench adverted to the features which are
    necessary while assessing the loss of future earnings on
0
    account of permanent disability. In the said case it has been
    opined that permanent disability can be either partial or total
    and the assessment of compensation under the heads of loss
    of future earnings would depend upon the factum and impact
E of such permanent disability on his earning capacity. It has been
    laid down that the tribunal should not mechanically apply the
   percentage of permanent disability as the percentage of
   economic loss or loss of earning capacity. It has been further
   observed that in most of the cases, the percentage of economic
   loss, i.e., the percentage of loss of earning capacity, arising
F from a permanent disability will be different from the percentage
   of permanent disability. However, in some cases on
   appreciation of evidence and assessment the percentage of
   loss of earning capacity as a result of the permanent disability
   would be approximately the same as the percentage of
G permanent disability in which case, of course, the court or
  tribunal would adopt the said percentage for determination of
  compensation. To arrive at the said conclusion reliance was
  placed on Arvind Kumar Mishra (supra) and Yadav Kumar
  (supra).
H
 K. SU RESH v. NEW INDIA ASSURANCE CO. LTD.                  437
           AND ANR. [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

     26. In the case at hand the High Court has determined the       A
loss of earning capacity on the base of multiplier method and
reduced the quantum awarded by the tribunal from Rs.5,00,000/
  to Rs.4,68,000/-. Applying the ratio in Yadav Kumar (supra)
and Arvind Kumar Mishra (supra) and also Raj Kumar (supra)
and regard being had to the serious nature of injury we do not       B
find any error in the said method of calculation and, accordingly,
we uphold the method of computation as well as the quantum.

      27. Presently to the grant of compensation on other scores.
It is noticeable that the High Court has reduced the additional C
medical expenses from Rs.2,00,000/- to Rs.50,000/-. In our
considered opinion, the same is not correct as there is ample
evidence on record as regards the necessity for treatment in
future. It is demonstrable that pedicle screws were passed into
pedicles of D11 vertebra; pedicle screws were passed into
pedicles of L 1 vertebra; and two screws on left thigh were D
connected using a rod each. That may be required to be
removed or scanned from time to time depending upon other
 aspects. That apart, there is persistent pain and as medically
 cadvised physiotherapy is necessary and hence, continuous
 treatment has to be availed of. Thus, the High Court was not E
 justified in reducing the said amount.

       28. The High Court has maintained the award in respect
 of transport charges, extra nourishment, medical expenses
 and, accordingly, they are maintained. It has enhanced the F
 award from Rs.2,00,000/- to Rs.2,50,000 on the head of pain
 and suffering, but has deleted the amount awarded on
 permanent disability from the total compensation awarded by
 the tribunal by relying on the decision in Cho/an Roadways
 Corporation Ltd. (supra). As has been stated earlier, the said G
 decision has been considered in B. Kothandapani (supra) and
 is not accepted, and this Court has expressed the view that
 grant of compensation towards permanent disability is
  permissible. Regard been had to the totality of the facts and
  circumstanr.es, we are inclined to think that compensation of H
     438     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2012] 11 S.C.R.

A Rs.2,50,000/- should be granted towards permanent disability
   and Rs.2,00,000/- towards pain and suffering. We have so held
   as the injury is of serious nature and under the heading of non-
   pecuniary damages compensation is awardable under the
   headings of pain and suffering and damages for loss of
B amenities of life on account of injury. In the case of R.D.
  Hattangadi (supra) this Court has granted compensation under
  two heads, namely, "pain and suffering" and "loss of amenities
  of life". Quite apart from that compensation was granted
  towards future earnings. In Laxman v. Divisional Manager,
c Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. and another' it has been ruled
  thus:-

         "The ratio of the above noted judgments is that if the victim
         of an accident suffers permanent or temporary disability,
         then efforts should always be made to award adequate
D        compensation not only for the physical injury and treatment,
         but also for the pain, suffering and trauma caused due to
         accident, loss of earnings and victim's inability to lead a
         normal life and enjoy amenities, which he would have
         enjoyed but for the disability caused due to the accident."
E
    Thus, the deletion by the High Court was not justified. However,
    we have restricted to the amount as stated hereinbefore.

         29. The High Court has deleted the additional transport
F charges. We are disposed to think that while availing treatment
  the said expenses would be imperative. Hence, there was no
  justification to reduce the same and, accordingly, we restore
  it.

      30. It is perceptible that the High Court has deleted the
G amount awarded under the head of pain and suffering by family
  members of the claimant and the amount granted towards loss
  of marital life. There is no iota of evidence with regard to loss
  of marital life, hence, we do not find any error in the said

H 21. 2012 ACJ 191.
 K. SURESH v. NEW INDIA ASSURANCE CO. LTD.                 439
          AND ANR. [DIPAK MISRA, J.]
deletion. As far as grant of compensation on the score of pain A
and suffering suffered by the family members of claimant is
concerned, the same is not permissible and, accordingly, we
hold that that has been correctly deleted.

      31. The High Court has deleted an amount of Rs.3,00,000/
                                                                    8
  and a sum of Rs.2,00,000/- towards mental agony and inability
on the part of the claimant to participate in public functions
respectively. We have already determined Rs.2,00,000/- under
the heading of pain and suffering already suffered and to be
suffered and Rs.2,50,000/- under the heading of permanent
disability and hence, no different sum need be awarded under C
the heading of mental agony. As far as participation in public
functions is concerned, there is no evidence in that regard and,
therefore, we are disposed to think that the finding of the High
 Court on that score is totally justified and does not call for any
 interference.                                                      D

     32. Calculated on the aforesaid base, the compensation
would be payable on the headings, namely, transport charges,
extra-nourishm::!rit, medical expenses, additional medical
expenses, additional transport charges, pain and suffering, loss E
of earning capacity and permanent disability and the amount
on the aforesaid scores would be, in toto, Rs.13,48,000/-. The
said amount shall carry interest at the rate of 7.5% from the
date of application till the date of payment. The same shall be
deposited before the tribunal within a period of two months and F
the tribunal shall disburse 50% of the amount in favour of the
claimant and the rest of the amount shall be deposited in a
nationalized bank for a period of three years. Be it clarified if
the earlier awarded sum has been deposited, the differential
sum shall be deposited within the stipulated time as mentioned G
 hereinabove and the disbursement shall take place accordingly.

      33. Consequently, the appeal is allowed in part leaving the
 parties to bear their respective costs.

 B.B.B.                                   Appeal partly allowed.    H