K. SRINIVAS RAOversusD.A. DEEPA

                        [2013] 2 S.C.R. 126


A                        K. SRINIVAS RAO
                                  v.
                            D.A. DEEPA
                  (Civil Appeal No. 1794 of 2013)
                       FEBRUARY 22, 2013
B
     [AFTAB ALAM AND RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, JJ.]

        Hindu Marriage Act, 1955:

c      ss.13(1)(i-a) and (b) - Petition for dissolution of marriage
  on grounds of cruelty and desertion - 'Cruelty' - Explained -
  Held: In the instant case, the conduct of respondent-wife in
  filing a complaint making unfounded, indecent and
  defamatory allegation against her mother-in-law, in filing
0 revision seeking enhancement of the sentence awarded to the
  appellant-husband, and filing and pursuing litigations against
  appellant-husband and his parents indicates that she made
  all attempts to ensure that he and his parents are put in jail
  and he is removed from his job - There is no manner of doubt
E that this conduct has caused mental cruelty to appellant-
  husband - The parties are living separately for more than ten
  years - This separation has created an unbridgeable distance
  between the two - The marriage has irretrievably broken down
  - In the circumstances, the marriage between the appel/ant-
  husband and the respondent-wife is dissolved by a decree of
F divorce - Keeping in view the circumstances of both, the
  appellant is directed to pay to the respondent-wife permanent
  alimony.

        Alternative Dispute Resolution:
G
        Mediation - Held: Mediation as a method of alternative
    dispute resolution has got legal recognition - Therefore, at
    the earliest stage i.e. when the dispute is taken up by the
    Family Court or by the court of first instance for hearing, it

H                                126
          K. SRINIVAS RAO v. D.A. DEEPA                    127

must be referred to mediation centres - Matrimonial disputes      A
particularly those relating to custody of child, maintenance,
etc. are preeminently fit for mediation - s. 9 of Family Courts
Act enjoins upon Family Court to make efforts to settle the
matrimonial disputes - Family Courts shall make all efforts
to settle matrimonial disputes through mediation - In             B
appropriate cases, criminal courts should also direct parties
to explore possibility of settlement through mediation - In
suitable cases of non-compoundable offences u/s 498 -A /PC,
parties can approach High Court and get the complaint
quashed - Mediation Centers shall also set up pre-litigation      c
desks/clinics - Fmily Courts Act, 1984 - s.9.

     The marriage between the appellant-husband and
the respondent-wife was solemnized on 25.4.1999 as per
Hindu rites and customs. On the following day disputes
arose between the elders on both sides. On 27.4.1999, D
the respondent was taken by her parents to their house.
On 4.10.1999, the respondent lodged a complaint against
the appellant before the Women Protection Cell alleging
inter alia, that he was harassing her for more dowry. In
the said complaint a defamatory allegation was made E
against the mother of the appellant. The said complaint
and the subsequent protest petitions led to the conviction
of the appellant for the offence punishable uls 498-A IPC.
His parents were, however, acquitted. The appellant filed
an appeal. However, the respondent kept on to pursue F
the proceedings at higher forums. The respondent also
filed a petition uls 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 for
restitution of conjugal rights before the Family Court. The
appellant filed a counter-claim seeking dissolution of
marriage on the ground of cruelty and desertion uls G
13(1)(i-a) and (b) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. The
Family Court dismissed the petition for restitution of
conjugal rights and granted decree of divorce. However,
the High Court allowed the appeal of the wife and set
~'ide the decree of divorce granted in favour of the H
   128      SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [2013] 2 S.C.R.


A husband.

         Disposing of the appeal, the Court
        HELD: 1.1 Under s.13(1)(i-a) of the Hindu Marriage
  Act, 1955, a marriage can be dissolved by a decree of
B divorce on a petition presented either by the husband or
  the wife on the ground that the other party has, after
  solemnization of the marriage, treated the petitioner with
  cruelty. Cruelty is evident where one spouse has so
  treated the other and manifested such feelings towards
C her or him as to cause in her or his mind reasonable
  apprehension that it will be harmful or injurious to live
  with the other spouse. Cruelty may be physical or mental.
  In a given case, while staying away, a spouse can cause
  mental cruelty to the other spouse by sending vulgar and
D defamatory letters or notices or filing complaints
  containing indecent allegations or by initiating number of
  judicial proceedings making the other spouse's life
  miserable. This is what has happened in the instant case.
  [para 10 and 24] [136-G-H; 144-F-G]
E
        V. Bhagat v. D. Bhagat 1993 (3) Suppl. SCR
  796 = 1994 (1) SCC 337; Vijayakumar R. Bhate vs. Nee/a
   Vijayakumar Bhate 2003 (3) SCR 607   = 2003 (6) SCC 334;
  and Naveen Kohli vs. Nee/u Kohli 2006 (3) SCR 53 2006=
F (4) SCC 558 - referred to.

       1.2 The first instance of mental cruelty is seen in the
  scurrilous, vulgar and defamatory statement made by the
  respondent-wife in her complaint dated 4.10.1999
  addressed to the Superintendent of Police, Women
G Protection Cell stating that the mother of the appellant
  asked him to sleep with his father. It is the case of the
  appellant-husband that this humiliation of his parents
  caused great anguish to him. He and his family were
  traumatized by the false and indecent statement made in
H the complaint. His grievance appears to be justified. This
            K. SRINIVAS RAO v. D.A. DEEPA               129


 complaint is a part of the record. It is a part of the        A
 pleadings. That the statement made in the complaint is
 false is evident from the evidence of the mother of the
 respondent-wife. It is well settled that such statements
 cause mental cruelty. By sending this complaint, the
 respondent-wife has caused mental cruelty to the              B
 appellant-husband. [para 22] [143-B-F]

      1.3 The conduct of the respondent-wife in filing a
 complaint making unfounded, indecent and defamatory
 allegation against her mother-in-law, in filing revision      C
 seeking enhancement of the sentence awarded to the
 appellant-husband, in filing appeal questioning the
 acquittal of the appellant-husband and acquittal of his
 parents indicates that she made all attempts to ensure
 that he and his parents are put in jail and he is removed
 from his job. There is no manner of doubt that this           D
 conduct has caused mental cruelty to the appellant-
 husband. [para 23] [144-D-E]
      1.4 It is also to be noted that the appellant-husband
 and the respondent-wife are staying apart since 27/4/         E
 1999. Thus, they are living separately for more than ten
 years. This separation has created an unbridgeable
 distance between the two. As held in Samar Ghosh, if
 court refuses to severe the tie, it may lead' to mental
 cruelty. [para 25] [145-A-B]                                  F

      Samar Ghosh vs. Jaya Ghosh 2007 (4) SCR 428    =2007
 (4) sec 511 - relied on.

       1.5 This Court is also satisfied that the marriage
  between the parties has irretrievably broken down.           G
  Irretrievable breakdown of marriage is not a ground for
· divorce under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. But, where
  marriage is beyond repair on account .of bitterness
  created by the acts of the husband or the wife or of both,
  the courts have always taken irretrievable breakdown of      H
    130     SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [2013] 2 S.C.R.


A marriage as a very weighty circumstance amongst others
  necessitating severance of marital tie. Dissolution of
  marriage will relieve both sides of pain and anguish. In
  this Court the respondent-wife has expressed that she
  wants to go back to the appellant-husband, but, that is
B not possible now. The appellant-husband is not willing
  to take her back. Besides, the claim of the wife appears
  to be too desolate, merely born out of despair rather than
  based upon any real, concrete or genuine purpose or
  aim. [para 26, 28 and 29] [145-8-C; 146-8-C-E]
c      1.6 While this Court is of the opinion that decree of
  divorce must be granted, it is alive to the plight of the
  respondent-wife. The appellant-husband is getting a
  good salary. The respondent-wife fought the litigation for
  more than 10 years. She appears to be entirely
D dependent on her parents and brother. Therefore, her
  future must be secured by directing the appellant-
  husband to give her permanent alimony. In the result, the
  impugned judgment is set aside. The marriage between
  the appellant-husband and the respondent-wife is
E dissolved by a decree of divorce. The appellant-husband .·
  shall pay to the respondent-wife permanent alimony in
  the sum of Rs.15,00,000/-, in three instalments. [para 30]
  [146-F-G; 147-A-B]

F      2.1 In the instant case, the matrimonial dispute started
  with a quarrel between the elders of both sides. The ego
  battle of the elders took an ugly turn. Parties were
  dragged to the court and relations between the two
  families got strained. Even the efforts of this Court could
G not bring about a settlement. [para 8] [136-A-B]
       2.2 Quite often, the cause of the misunderstanding
  in a matrimonial dispute is trivial and can be sorted.··
  Mediation as a method of alternative dispute resolution
  has got legal recognition. Therefore, at the earliest stage
H i.e. when the dispute is taken up by the Family Court or
          K. SRINIVAS RAO v. D.A. DEEPA             131


by the court of first instance for hearing, it must be A
referred to mediation centres. Matrimonial disputes,
particularly, those relating to custody of child,
maintenance, etc. are preeminently fit for mediation.
Section 9 of the Family Courts Act enjoins upon the
Family Court to make efforts to settle the matrimonial B
disputes and in these efforts, Family Courts are assisted
by Counsellors. Though a complaint u/s 498-A IPC
presents difficulty because the said offence is not
compoundable except in the State of Andhra Pradesh, in
suitable cases, parties can approach the High Court and c
get the complaint quashed. This Court has always
adopted a positive approach and encouraged settlement
of matrimonial disputes and discouraged their escalation.
Accordingly, directions are issued in the judgment to
settle matrimonial disputes through mediation and to deal 0
with complaints involving offences punishable u/s 498-
A IPC; as also to set up pre-litigation desks/clinics.
[para 32, 34, 35 and 36] [148-B-C-E, 149-A-B-D; 150-H;
151-E-H; 152-C]
    Ramgopal & Anr. v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr.      E
                 =
2010 (9) SCR 354 2010 (13) sec 540; G. v. Rao v. L.H. V.
                               =
Prasad & Ors. 2000 (2) SCR 123 2000 (3) SCC 693, B.S.
Joshi & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Anr. 2003 (2)
          =
SCR 1104 2003 AIR 1386; Gian Singh v. State of Punjab
& Anr. 2012 (10) SCC 303- referred to.                     F
    G. V.N. Kameswara Rao vs. G. Jabilli 2002 (1) SCR
    =
153 2002 (2) SCC 296; Parveen Mehta vs. lnderjit Mehta
 2002 (5) SCC 706; and Durga Prasanna Tripathy vs.
                                              =
Arundhati Tripathy 2005 (2) Suppl. SCR 833 2005 (7)
sec 353~ cited                                             G

                   Case Law Reference:
  2002 (1) SCR 153            cited           para 6
  2002 (5) sec 706          . cited           para 6       H
    132       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2013] 2 S.C.R.


A     2003 (3) SCR 607                 referred to       para 6
      2005 (2) Suppl. SCR 833          cited             para 6
      2006 (3) SCR 53                  referred to       para 6
      2007 (4) SCR 428                 relied on         para 6
B
      1993 (3) Suppl. SCR 796          referred to       para 12
      2010 (9) SCR 354                 referred to       para 34
      2000 (2) SCR 123                 referred to       para 34
c     2003 (2) SCR 1104                referred to       para 34

      2012 (10) sec 303                referred to       para 34
      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
D 1794 of 2013.
        From the Judgment & Orders dated 08.11.2006 of the
    High Court of Judicature, Andhra Pradesh ar Hyderabad in
    A.A.0. No. 797 of 2003/C.M.A. No. 797 of 2003.
          Jayanth Muth Raj (for C.K. Sasi) for the Appellant.
E
        D. Rama Krishna Reddy (for D. Bharathi Reddy) for the .
    Respondent.
          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
F       (SMT.) RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J. 1. Leave
    granted.
       2. This appeal, by special leave, has been filed by the
  appellant-husband, being aggrieved by the judgment and order
  dated 8/11/2006 passed by the Andhra Pradesh High Court
G in Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No.797/03, setting aside the
  decree of divorce granted in his favour.
       3. The appellant-husband is working as Assistant Registrar
  in the Andhra Pradesh High Court. The marriage between the
H appellant-husband and the respondent-wife was solemnized on
             K. SRINIVAS RAO v. D.A. DEEPA                      133
             [RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J.]
 25/4/1999 as per Hindu rites and. customs. Unfortunately, on A
 the very next day disputes arose between the elders on both
 sides which resulted in their abusing each other and hurling
 chappals at each other. As a consequence, on 27/4/1999, the
 newly married couple got separated without consummation of
 the marriage and started living separately. On 4/10/1999, the B
 respondent-wife lodged a criminal complaint against the
 appellant-husband before the Women Protection Cell alleging
 inter alia that the appellant-husband is harassing her for more
 dowry. This complaint is very crucial to this case. We shall
 advert to it more in detail a little later. Escalated acrimony led c       ·
 to complaints and counter complaints. The respondent-wife
 filed a petition under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955
 for restitution of conjugal rights before the Family Court,
 Secunderabad. The appellant-husband filed a counter-claim
 seeking dissolution of marriage on the ground of cruelty and 0
 desertion under Section 13(1)(i-a) and (b) of the Hindu Marriage
 Act, 1955.
        4. The Family Court while dismissing the petition for
  restitution of conjugal rights and granting decree of divorce inter
  alia held that the respondent-wife stayed in the appellant-           E
  husband's house only for a day, she admitted that she did not
  have any conversation with anyone and hence any amount of
· oral evidence adduced by her will not support her plea that she
  was harassed and driven out of the house; that the story that
  the appellant-husband ·made a demand of dowry of·                     F
  Rs.10,00,000/- is false; that by filing false complaint against the
  appellant-husband and his family, alleging offence under
  Section498-A of the IPC in the Metropolitan Magistrate Court,
  Hyderabad and by filing complaints against the appellant-
  husband in the High Court where he is working, the respondent-        G
  wife caused mental cruelty to the appellant-husband and that
  reunion was not possible. The Family Court directed the
·appellant-husband to repay Rs.80,000/- given by the
  respondent-wife's father to him with interest at 8% per annum
  from the date of the marriage till payment.                           H
    134       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2013] 2 S,C.R.


A       5. By the impugned judgment the High Court allowed the
  appeal carried by the respondent-wife against the said
  judgment and set aside the decree of divorce granted in favour
  of the appellant-husband. The High Court inter alia observed
  that the finding of the Family Court that lodging a complaint with
B the police against the appellant-husband amounts to cruelty is
  perverse because it is not a ground for divorce under the Hindu
  Marriage Act, 1955. The High Court further held that the
  appellant-husband and the respondent-wife did not live together
  for a long time and, therefore, the question of their treating each
c other with cruelty does not arise. According to the High Court,
  the conclusion that the respondent-wife caused mental cruelty.
  to the appellant-husband is based on presumptions and.
  assumptions.

         6. Mr. Jayanth Muth Raj, learned counsel for the appellant-
D husband assailed the conduct of the respondent-wife and
    submitted that it disentitles her from getting any relief from this
    Court. Counsel took us through the complaint lodged by the
    respondent-wife with the Superintendent of Police, Women
    Protection Cell, Hyderabad, making defamatory allegations
E against the mother of the appellant-husband and drew our
    attention to the various legal proceedings initiated by her
    against the appellant-husband and his family. Counsel
    submitted that she also lodged complaints with the High Court
    asking for the removal of the appellant-husband from his job.
F • Counsel submitted that by lodging such false complaints the
   respondent-wife caused extreme mental cruelty to the
   appellant-husband. Counsel submitted that the High Court fell
   into a grave error in observing that because the respondent-
   wife did not live with the appellant-husband for long she could
G not have caused mental cruelty to him. Counsel submitted that
   this observation is erroneous and is contrary to the law laid
   down by this Court. False and defamatory allegations made
   in the pleadings can also cause mental cruelty. Counsel
   submitted that the marriage has irretrievably broken down and,
H therefore, it is necessary to dissolve it by a decree of divorce.
             K. SRINIVAS RAO v. D.A. DEEPA                     135
             [RANJANA PRAKASH bESAI, J.]
  In support of his submissions counsel placed reliance on             A
· G. V.N. Kameswara Rao vs. G. Jabi/Jif, Parveen Mehta vs.
  lnderjit Mehta 2, Vijayakumar R. Bhate vs. Nee/a Vijayakumar
  Bhate 3, Durga Prasanna Tripathy vs. Arundhati Tripathy4,
  Naveen Kohli vs. Neelu Koh/i5 and Samar Ghosh vs. Jaya
  Ghosh 6•                                                             B
        7. Mr. D. Rama Krishna Reddy, learned counsel for the
   respondent-wife, on the other hand, submitted that the father
   of the respondent-wife had given Rs.80,000/- and 15 tolas of
   gold as dowry to the appellant-husband's family. However, they
   demanded additional cash of Rs.10,00,000/-. Because this            C
 · demand could not be met, the respondent-wife and her family
   was humiliated and ill-treated. Therefore, the parents of the
   respondent-wife had to return to their house along with her
   immediately after marriage. The father of the respondent-wife
   made efforts to talk to the appellant-husband's family, but, they   D
I did not respond to his efforts. They persisted with their
   demands and, therefore, the respondent-wi~ had no alternative
   but to lodge complaint against them under Section 498-A of
   the IPC before the Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad. The
   appellant-husband thereafter gave a false assurance that he will    E
   not harass her and, therefore, she withdrew the complaint and
   went to the matrimonial house. However, the approach oHhe
   appellant-husband and his family did not change. She had to
   therefore renew her complaint. Counsel submitted that only
   because of the obstinate and uncompromising attitude of the
                                                                       F
   appellant-husband and his family that the respondent-wife had
   to take recourse to court proceedings. Counsel submitted that
   the respondent-wife values the matrimonial tie. She wants to
   lead a happy married life with the appellant-husband. She had,
 1. c2002i 2 sec 296.                                                  G
 2  c2002i 5 sec 106.
 3. (2003) 6 sec 334.
 4. (2005) 1 sec 353.
 5. (1.000) 4 sec 558.
 6. c2007) 4 sec s11.                                                  H
    136      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2013] 2 S.C.R.

A therefore, filed a petition for restitution of conjugal rights which
  should have been allowed by the Family Court. Counsel
  submitted that after properly evaluating all the circumstances
  the High Court has rightly set aside the decree of divorce and
  granted a decree of restitution of conjugal rights. The High
B Court's judgment, therefore, merits no interference.
        8. The matrimonial dispute started with a quarrel between
  the elders of both sides in which initially the appellant-husband
  and the respondent-wife were not involved. The ego battle of
  the elders took an ugly turn. Parties were dragged to the court
C and the inevitable happened. T-he relations between the two
  families got strained. With a fond hope that we could bring
  about a settlement we requested the counsel to talk to the
  parties and convey our wishes that they should bury the hatchet
  and start living together. We also tried to counsel them in the
D court. The respondent-wife appears to be very keen to go back
  to the matrimonial home and start life afresh, but the appellant- .
  husband is adamant. He conveyed to us through his cou.nsel
  that by filing repeated false complaints against him and his
  family the respondent-wife has caused extreme cruelty to them
E and therefore it will not be possible to take her back. In view
  of this we have no option but to proceed with the case.

       9. The High Court has taken a view that since the
  appellant-hus~and and the respondent-wife did not stay
F together, there is no question of their causing cruelty to each
  other. The High Court concluded that the conclusion drawn by
  the Family Court that the respondent-wife caused mental cruelty
  to the appellant-husband is erroneous. We are unable to agree
  with the High Court.
G      10. Under Section 13(1 )(i-a) of the Hindu Marriage Act,
  1955, a marriage can be dissolved by a decree of divorce on
  a petition presented either by the husband or the wife on the-,
  ground that the other party has, after solemnization of the
  marriage, treated the petitioner with cruelty. In a series of
H judgments this Court has repeatedly stated the meaning and
                  K. SRINIVAS RAO v. D.A. DEEPA                137
                  [RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J.]
outlined the scope of the term 'cruelty'. Cruelty is evident where A
one spouse has so treated the other and manifested such
feelings towards her or him as to cause in her or his mind
reasonable apprehension that it will be harmful or injurious to
live with the other spouse. Cruelty may be physical or mental.
                                                                   B
      11. In Samar Ghosh this Court set out illustrative cases
where inference of 'mental cruelty' can be drawn. This list is
obviously not exhaustive because each case presents it's own
peculiar factual· matrix and existence or otherwise of mental
cruelty will have ta be judged after applying mind to it. We must C
quote the relevant paragraph of Samar Ghosh. We have
reproduced only the instances which are relevant to the present
case.
    "101. No uniform standard can ever be laid down for
    guidance, yet we deem it appropriate to enumerate some            D
    instances of human behaviour which may be relevant in
    dealing with the cases of "mental cruelty". The instances
    indicated in the succeeding paragraphs are only illustrative
    and not exhaustive:
                                                                      E
    (i) On consideration of complete matrimonial life of the
    parties, acute mental pain, agony and suffering as would
    not make possible for the parties to live with each other
    could come within the broad parameters of mental cruelty.

    (ii) On comprehensive appraisal of the entire matrimonial         F
    life of the parties, it becomes abundantly clear that situation
    is such that the wronged party cannot reasonably be
    asked to put up with such conduct and continue to live with
    other party.
                                                                      G
    (iii))()()(                  . )()()(            )()()(


    (iv) Mental cruelty is a state of mind. The feeling of deep
    anguish, disappointment, frustration in one spouse caused
    by the conduct of other for a long time may lead to mental
    ~~                                                                H
    138           SUPREME COURT REPORTS              (2013] 2 S.C.R.


A         (v) A sustained course of abusive and humiliating treatment
          calculated to torture, discommode or render miserable life
          of the spouse.
          (vi) Sustained unjustifiable conduct and behaviour of one
          spouse actually affecting physical and mental health of the
B
          other spouse. The treatment complained of and the
          resultant danger or apprehension must be very grave,
          substantial and weighty.

          (vii)   )()()(                )()()(            )()()(
c
          (viii) )()()(                 )()()(            )()()(


          (ix)    )()()(                )()()(            )()()(


          (x) The married life should be reviewed as a whole and a
D         few isolated instances over a period of years will not
          amount to cruelty. The ill conduct must be persistent for a
          fairly lengthy period, where the relationship has··
          deteriorated to an extent that because of the acts and
          behaviour of a spouse, the wronged party finds it extremely
E         difficult to live with the other party any longer, may amount
          to mental cruelty.
                                                                   ,. -:-
          (xi)    )()()(                )()()(            )()()(


          (xii)   )()()(                )()()(            )()()(
F
          (xiii) )()()(                 )()()(            )()()(


          (xiv) Where there has been a long period of continuous
          separation, it may fairly be concluded that the matrimonial
          bond is beyond repair. The marriage becomes a fiction
G
          though supported by a legal tie. By refusing to sever that
          tie, the law in such cases, does not serve the sanctity of
          marriage; on the contrary, it shows scant regard for the
          feelings and emotions of the parties. In such like sit~ations,
          it may lead to mental cruelty."
H
             K. SRINIVAS RAO v. D.A. DEEPA                     139
             [RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J.]
      It is pertinent to note that in this case the husband and wife   A
      had lived separately for more than sixteen and a half years.
      This fact was taken into consideration along with other facts
      as leading to the conclusion that matrimonial bond had
      been ruptured beyond repair because of the mental cruelty
      caused by the wife. Similar view was taken in Naveen             B
      Kohli.

       12. In V. Bhagat v. D. Bhagat7 in the divorce petition filed
  by the husband the wife filed written statement stating that the
. husband was suffering from mental hallucination, that his was C
  a morbid mind for which he needs expert psychiatric treatment
  and that he was suffering from 'paranoid disorder'. In cross-
  examination her counsel put several questions to the husband
  suggesting that several members of his family including his
  grandfather were lunatics. This court held that these assertions
  cannot but constitute mental cruelty of such a nature that the D
  husband cannot be asked to live with the wife thereafter. Such
  pleadings and questions it was held, are bound to cause
  immense mental pain and anguish to the husband. In
  Vijaykumar Bhate disgusting accusations of unchastity and
  indecent familiarity with a neighbour were made in the written E
  statement. This Court held that the allegations are of such
  quality, magnitude and consequence as to cause mental pain,
  agony and suffering amounting to the reformulated concept of
  cruelty in matrimonial law causing profound and lasting
  disruption and driving the wife to feel deeply hurt and F
  reasonably apprehend that it would be dangerous to live with
  her husband. In Naveen Kohli the respondent-wife got an
  advertisement issued in a national newspaper that her husband
                                                                  •
  was her employee. She got another news item issued
  cautioning his business associates to avoid dealing with him. G
  This was treated as causing mental cruelty to the husband.

     13. In Naveen Kohli the wife had filed several complaints
 and cases against the husband. This Court viewed her conduct
 1.   (1994) 1 sec 337.                                                H
    140       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2013] 2 S.C.R.

A as a conduct causing mental cruelty and observed that the
  finding of the High Court that these proceedings could not be
  taken to be such which may warrant annulment of marriage is
  wholly unsustainable.
       14. Thus, to the instances illustrative of mental cruelty noted
B in Samar Ghosh, we could add a few more. Making unfounded
  indecent defamatory allegations against the spouse or his. or
  her relatives in the pleadings, filing of complaints or issuing
  notices or news items which may have adverse impact on the
  business prospect or the job of the spouse and filing repeated
C false complaints and cases in the court against the spouse
  would, in the facts of a case, amount to causing mental cruelty
  to the other spouse.
        15. We shall apply the above principles to the present
   case. Firstly, it is necessary to have a look at the legal
D proceedings initiated by both sides against each other. The
  facts on record disclose that after the marriage, due to some
   dispute which arose between the elders, both sides abused
   and virtually attacked each other. The respondent-wife was
   taken by her parents to their house. According to the
E respondent-wife, her father made efforts to bring about an
  amicable settlement but the other side did not respond
  favourably and, therefore, on 4/10/1999 she lodged a complaint
  with the Superintendent of Police, Women Protection Cell
  against the appellant-husband and members of his family. In
F our opinion, this complaint is, to a large extent, responsible for
  widening the rift between the parties. In this complaint, after
  alleging ill-treatment and harassment for dowry, it is alleged that
  mother of the appellant-husband asked the respondent-wife to
  sleep with the father of the appellant-husband. When she was
G cross-examined in the Family Court during the hearing of her
  petition for restitution of conjugal rights the respondent-wife
  admitted that she had lodged the complaint. PW-2 her mother,
  in her cross-examination stated that though they had asked ,her
  not to lodge the complaint, the respondent-wife lodged it. She
H told them that she had lodged the complaint because the
            K. SRINIVAS RAO v. D.A. DEEPA                       141
            [RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J.]
 appellant-husband was not listening to her. Thus, it appears A ·
 that this complaint was lodged out of frustration and anger and
 was a reaction to the appellant-husband's refusal to live with
 her. It was, perhaps, felt by her that because of the pressure
 of such a complaint the appellant-husband would take her back
 to his house. Far from helping the respondent-wife, the B
 complaint appears to have caused irreparable harm to her. It
 increased the bitterness. Perhaps, the respondent-wife was
 misguided by someone. But, such evidence is not on record.
 Even in this court, this complaint appears to us to be a major
 factor amongst others impeding settlement. Pursuant to the c
 said complaint, Crime No.8/2000 was registered by C.l.D.,
 Hyderabad, in the Metropolitan Magistrate (Mahila Court),
 Hyderabad against the appellant-husband and his family under
 Section 498-A of the IPC. It is the respondent-wife's case that
 the appellant-husband gave an assurance before the police that 0
 he will not harass her. She, therefore, withdrew the complaint.
 The police then filed a closure report. According to the
 respondent-wife, the appellant-husband did not abide by the
 promise made by him and, therefore, she filed a protest
 petition. The Magistrate Court, Hyderabad, then, took E
 cognizance of the case and renumbered the case as
 C.C.No.62/2002.

        16. In the meantime, the respondent-wife filed O.P.No.88/
  2001 in the Family Court, Secunderabad, for restitution of
  conjugal rights. The appellant-husband filed a counter claim for      F
  divorce on 27/12/2002. The Family Court dismissed the
  petition for restitution of conjugal rights and allowed the counter
  claim for divorce filed by the appellant-husband. The
  respondent-wife challenged the Family Court judgment in the
  High Court. On 8/12/2006 the High Court reversed the Family           G
  Court's order and allowed the petition for restitution of conjugal
. rights. The present appeal is filed by the appellant-husband
  against the said judgment.

      17. According to the respondent-wife, on 17/9/2007 when
 she, along with her mother, came out of the court after a case         H
    142      SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2013) 2 S.C.R.


A filed by her against the appellant-husband was adjourned, the
  appellant-husband beat her mother and kicked her on her
  stomach. Both of them received injuries. She, therefore, filed
  complaint for the offence punishable under Section 324 of the
  IPC against the appellant-husband {C.C.No. 79/2009). It may
B be stated here that on 19/10/2009 the appellant-husband was
  acquitted in this case.

        18. On 24/6/2008 the judgment was delivered by Additional
  Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad in C.C.No. 62/2002.
C The appellant-husband was convicted under Section 498-A of
  the IPC and was sentenced to undergo six months simple
  imprisonment. He and his parents were acquitted of the
  offences under the Dowry Prohibition Act His parents were
  acquitted of the offence under Section 498-A of the IPC. After
  this judgment the respondent-wife and her parents filed a
D complaint in the High Court saying that since the appellant-
  husband was convicted he should be dismissed from service.
  Similar letters were sent to the High Court by the maternal uncle
  of the respondent-wife.

E      19. On 14/7/2008 the appellant-husband filed Criminal
  Appeal No.186/2008 challenging his conviction under Section
  498-A of the IPC before the Metropolitan Sessions Judge. It
  is pertinent to note that the respondent-wife filed Criminal
  Appeal No.1219/2008 in the High Court questioning the
F acquittal of the appellant-husband and his parents of the
  offences under the Dowry Prohibition Act and also the acquittal
  of his parents of the offence punishable under Section 498-A
  of the IPC. This appeal is pending in the High Court. Not
  being content with this, the respondent-wife filed Criminal
G Revision Case No.1560/2008 in the High Court seeking
  enhancement of punishment awarded to the appellant-husband
  for offence under Section 498-A of the IPC.

       20. According to the appellant-husband on 6/12/2009 the
  brother of the respondent-wife came to their house and
H attacked his mother. His mother filed a complaint and the
             K. SRINIVAS RAO v. D.A. DEEPA                        143
             [RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J.]

 police registered a complaint under Section 354 of the IPC.             A
 The brother of the respondent-wife also lodged a complaint and
 an offence came to be registered. Both the cases are pending.

      21. On 29/6/2010 Criminal Appeal No. 186/2010 filed by
 the appellant-husband challenging his conviction for the offence        8
 under Section 498-A of the IPC was allowed by the
 Metropolitan Sessions Judge and he was acquitted. The
 respondent-wife has filed criminal appeal in the High Court
 challenging the said acquittal which is pending.

      22. We need to now see the effect of the above events.             C
 In our opinion, the first instance of mental cruelty is seen in the
 scurrilous, vulgar and defamatory statement made by the
 respondent-wife in her complaint dated 4/10/1999 addressed
 to the Superintendent of Police, Women Protection Cell. The
 statement that the mother of the appellant-husband asked her            D
 to sleep with his father is bound to anger him. It is his case
 that this humiliation of his parents caused great anguish to him.
 He and his family were traumatized by the false and indecent
 statement made in the complaint. His grievance appears to
 us to be justified. This complaint is a part of the record. It is a     E
 part of the pleadings. That this statement is false is evident
 from the evidence of the mother of the respondent-wife, which
 we have already quoted. This statement cannot be explained
 away by stating that it was made because the respondent-wife
 was anxious to go back to the appellant-husband. This is not            F
 the way to win the husband back. It is well settled that such
 statements cause mental cruelty. By sending this complaint the
 respondent-wife has caused mental cruelty to the appellant-
 husband.

       23. Pursuant to this complaint, the police registered a case      G
  under Section 498-A of the IPC. The appellant-husband and
·'his parents had to apply for anticipatory bail, which was granted
  to them. Later, the respondent-wife withdrew the complaint.
  Pursuant to the withdrawal, the police filed a closure report.
  Thereafter, the respondent-wife filed ·a protest petition. The trial   H
    144      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2013] 2 S.C.R.


A court took cognizance of the case against the appellant-
   husband and his parents (CC No. 62/2002). What is pertinent
  to note is that the respondent-wife filed criminal appeal in the
  High Court challenging the acquittal of the appellant-husband
  and his parents of the offences under the Dowry Prohibition Act
B and also the acquittal of his parents of the offence punishable
   under Section 498-A of the IPC. She filed criminal revision
  seeking enhancement of the punishment awarded to the
  appellant-husband for the offence under Section 498-A of the
   IPC in the High Court which is still pending. When the criminal
c appeal filed by the appellant-husband challenging his conviction
  for the offence under Section 498-A of the IPC was allowed and
   he was acquitted, the respondent-wife filed criminal appeal in
  the High Court challenging the said acquittal. During this period
  respondent-wife and members of her family have also filed
  complaints in the High Court complaining about the appellant-
0
  husband so that he would be removed from the job. The
  conduct of the respondent-wife in filing a complaint making
  unfounded, indecent and defamatory allegation against her
  mother-in-law, in filing revision seeking enhancement of the
  sentence awarded to the appellant-husband, in filing appeal
E questioning the acquittal of the appellant-husband and acquittal
  of his parents indicates that she made all attempts to ensure
  that he and his parents are put in jail and he is removed from
  his job. We have no manner of doubt that this conduct has
  caused mental cruelty to the appellant-husband.
F
        24. In our opinion, the High Court wrongly held that
  because the appellant-husband and the respondent-wife did not
  stay together there is no question of the parties causing cruelty     '-
  to each other. Staying together under the same roof is not a
G pre-condition for mental cruelty. Spouse can cause mental
  cruelty by his or her conduct even while he or she is not staying
  under the same roof. In a given case, while staying away, a
  spouse can cause mental cruelty to the other spouse by sending
  vulgar and defamatory letters or notices or filing complaints
H containing indecent allegations or by initiating number of judicial
            K. SRINIVAS RAO v. D.A. DEEPA                      145
            [RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J.]
proceedings making the other spouse's life miserable. This            A
is what has happened in this case.
     25. It is also to be noted that the appellant-husband and
the respondent-wife are staying apart from 27/4/1999. Thus,
they are living separately for more than ten years. This              8
separation has created an unbridgeable distance between the
two. As hel~ in Samar Ghosh, if we refuse to sever the tie, it
may lead to mental cruelty.

      26. We are also satisfied that this marriage has
irretrievably broken down. Irretrievable breakdown of marriage        C
is not a ground for divorce under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.
But, where marriage is beyond repair on account of bitterness
created by the acts of the husband or the wife or of both, the
courts have always taken irretrievable breakdown of marriage
as a very weighty circumstance amongst others necessitating           D
severance of marital tie. A marriage which is dead for all
purposes cannot be revived by the court's verdict, if the parties
are not willing. This is because marriage involves human
sentiments and emotions and if they are dried-up there is hardly
any chance of their springing back to life on account of artificial   E
reunion created by the court's decree.
      27. In V. Bhagat this Court noted that divorce petition was
pending for eight years and a good part of the lives of both the
 parties had been consumed in litigation, yet the end was not F
 in sight. The facts were such that there was no question of
 reunion, the marriage having irretrievably broken down. While
dissolving the marriage on the ground of mental cruelty this
Court observed that irretrievable breakdown of marriage is not
a ground by itself, but, while scrutinizing the evidence on record
to determine whether the grounds alleged are made out and G
in determining the relief to be granted the said circumstance
can certainly be borne in mind. In Naveen Kohli, where
husband and wife had been living separately for more than 10
yea!'S and a large number of criminal proceedings had been
initiated by the wife against the husband, this Court observed        H
      146     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2013) 2 S.C.R.


. Athat the marriage had been wrecked beyond the hope of
   salvage and public interest and interest of all concerned lies in
   the recognition of the fact and to declare defunct de jure what
   is already defunct de facto. It is important to note that in this
   case this Court made a recommendation to the Union of India
 B that the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 be amended to incorporate
   irretrievable breakdown of marriage as a ground for the grant
   of divorce.

           28. In the ultimate analysis, we hold that the respondent-
 C wife has caused by her conduct mental cruelty to the appellant-
     h usband and the marriage has irretrievably broken down.
     Dissolution of marriage will relieve both sides of pain and
     anguish. In this Court the respondent-wife expressed that she
     wants to go back to the appellant-husband, but, that is not
     possible now. The appellant-husband is not willing to take her
 D back. Even if we refuse decree of divorce to the appellant-
     husband, there are hardly any chances of the respondent-wife
     leading a happy life with the appellant-husband because a lot
   . of bitterness is created by the conduct of the respondent-wife.

  E      29. In Vijay Kumar, it was submitted that if the decree of
    divorce is set aside, there may be fresh avenues and scope
    for reconciliation between parties. This court observed that
    judged in the background of all surrounding circumstances, the
    claim appeared to be too desolate, merely born out of despair
                                                                        -
  F rather than based upon any real, concrete or genuine purpose
    or aim. In the facts of this case we feel the same.

        30. While we are of the opinion that decree of divorce must
   be granted, we are alive to the plight of the respondent-wife.
   The appellant-husband is working as an Assistant Registrar in
 G the Andhra Pradesh High Court. He is getting a good salary.
   The respondent-wife fought the litigation for more than 10 years.
   She appears to be entirely dependent on her parents and on
   her brother, therefore, her future must be secured by directing
   the appellant-husband to give her permanent alimony. In the
 H facts and circumstance of this case, we are of the opinion that
           K. SRINIVAS RAO v. D.A. DEEPA                      147
           [RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J.]

the appellant-husband should be directed to pay a sum of              A
Rs.15,00,000/- (Rupees Fifteen Lakhs only) to the respondent-
wife as and by way of permanent alimony. In the result, the
impugned judgment is quashed and set aside. The marriage
between the appellant-husband - K. Srinivas Rao and the
respondent-wife - D.A. Deepa is dissolved by a decree of              B
divorce. The appellant-husband shall pay to the respondent-
wife permanent alimony in the sum of Rs.15,00,000/-, in three
instalments. The first instalment of Rs.5,00,000/- (Rupees Five
Lakhs only) should be paid on 15/03/2013 and the remaining
amount of Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs only) should be            c
paid in instalments of Rs.5,00,000/- each after a gap of two
months i.e. on 15/05/2013 and 15/07/2013 respectively. Each
instalment of Rs.5,00,000/- be paid by a demand draft drawn
in favour of the respondent-wife "D.A. Deepa".

      31. Before parting, we wish to touch upon an issue which        D
needs to be discussed in the interest of victims of matrimonial
disputes. Though in this case, we have recorded a finding that
by her conduct, the respondent-wife has caused mental cruelty
 to the appellant-husband, we may not be understood, however,
 to have said that the fault lies only with the respondent-wife. In   E
 matrimpnial disputes there is hardly any case where one
 spouse is entirely at fault. But, then, before the dispute
assumes alarming proportions, someone must make efforts to
 make parties see reason. In this case, if at the earliest stage,
 before the respondent-wife filed the complaint making indecent       F
allegation against her mother-in-law, she were to be counselled
by an independent and sensible elder or if the parties were sent
to a mediation centre or if they had access to a pre-litigation
clinic, perhaps the bitterness would not have escalated. Things
would not have come to such a pass if, at the earliest,               G
somebody had mediated between the two. It is possible that
the respondent-wife was desperate to save the marriage.
Perhaps, in desperation, she lost balance and went on filing
complaints. It is possible that she was misguided. Perhaps,
the appellant-husband should have forgiven her indiscretion in        H
    148      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2013] 2 S.C.R.


A   filing complaints in the larger interest of matrimony. But, the
    way the respondent-wife approached the problem was wrong.
    It portrays a vindictive mind. She caused extreme mental
    cruelty to the appellant-husband. Now the marriage is beyond
    repair.
B      32. Quite often, the cause of the misunderstanding in a
  matrimonial dispute is trivial and can be sorted. Mediation as
  a method of alternative dispute resolution has got legal
  recognition now. We have referred several matrimonial
  disputes to mediation centres. Our experience shows that
C about 10 to 15% of matrimonial disputes get settled in this Court
  through various mediation centres. We, therefore, feel that at
  the earliest stage i.e. when the dispute is taken up by the Family
  Court or by the court of first instance for hearing, it must be
  referred to mediation centres. Matrimonial disputes particularly
D those relating to custody of child, maintenance, etc. are
  preeminently fit for mediation. Section 9 of the Family Courts
  Act enjoins upon the Family Court to make efforts to settle the
  matrimonial disputes and in these efforts, Family Courts are
  assisted by Counsellors. Even if the Counsellors fail in their
E efforts, the Family Courts should direct the parties to mediation
  centres, where trained mediators are appointed to mediate
  between the parties. Being trained in the skill of mediation,
  they produce good results.

F       · 33. The idea of pre-litigation mediation is also catching up.
    Some mediation centres have, after giving wide publicity, set
    up "Help Desks" at prominent places including facilitation
    centres at court complexes to conduct pre-litigation mediation.
    We are informed that in Delhi Government Mediation and
    Conciliation Centres, and in Delhi High Court Mediation Centre,
G   several matrimonial disputes are settled. These centres have
    a good success rate in pre-litigation mediation. If all mediation
    centres set up pre-litigation desks/clinics by giving sufficient
    publicity and matrimonial disputes are taken up for pre-litigation
    settlement, many families will be saved of hardship if, at least,
H   some of them are settled.
                     K. SRINIVAS RAO v. D.A. DEEPA                      149
                     [RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J.)

              34. While purely a civil matrimonial dispute can be              A
         amicably settled by a Family Court either by itself or by directing
         the parties to explore the possibility of settlement through
         mediation, a complaint under Section 498-A of the IPC
         presents difficulty because the said offence is not
         compoundable except in the State of Andhra Pradesh where              B
         by a State amendment, it has been made compoundable.
         Though in Ramgopal & Anr. v. State of Madhya Pradesh &
         Anr. 8, this Court requested the Law Commission and the
         Government of India to examine whether offence punishable
         under Section 498-A of the IPC could be made compoundable,            c
         it has not been made compoundable as yet. The courts direct
         parties to approach mediation centres where offences are
         compoundable. Offence punishable under Section 498-A being
         a non-compoundable offence, such a course is not followed in
         respect thereof. This Court has always adopted a positive             0
         approach and encouraged settlement of matrimonial disputes
       , and discouraged their escalation. In this connection, we must
         refer to the relevant paragraph from G. V. Rao v. L.H. V. Prasad
          & Ors. 9, where the complaint appeared to be the result of
         matrimonial dispute, while refusing to interfere with the High        E
         Court's order quashing the complaint, this court made very
,..,     pertinent observations, which read thus:

              "12. There has been an outburst of matrimonial disputes
              in recent times. Marriage is a sacred ceremony, the main
              purpose of which is to enable the young couple to settle F
              down in life and live peacefully. But little matrimonial
              skirmishes suddenly erupt which often assume serious
              proportions resulting in commission of heinous crimes in
              which elders of the family are also involved with the result .
              that those who could have counselled and brought about G
              rapprochement are rendered helpless on their being
              arrayed as accused in the criminal case. There are many
              other reasons which need not be mentioned here for not
        s.   (2010) 13 sec 540.
        9.   (2000) 3 sec 693.                                                 H
            150       SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2013] 2 S.C.R.


        A         encouraging matrimonial litigation so that the parties may
.   '             ponder over their defaults and terminate their disputes
                  amicably by mutual agreement instead of fighting it out in
                  a court of law where it takes years and years to conclude
                  and in that process the parties lose their "young" days in
        B         chasing their "cases" in different courts."
               In 8.S. Joshi & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Anr. 10, after
          referring to the above observations, this Court stated that the
          said observations are required to be kept in view by courts
          while dealing with matrimonial disputes and held that complaint
        C involving offence under Section 498-A of the IPC can be
          quashed by the High Court in exercise of its powers under
          Section 482 of the Code if the parties settle their dispute. Even
          in Gian Singh v. State of Punjab & Anr. 11 , this Court
          expressed that certain offences which overwhelmingly and
        D predominantly bear civil flavour like those arising out of
          matrimony, particularly relating to dowry, etc. or the family
          dispute and where the offender and the victim had settled all
          disputes between them amicably, irrespective of the fact that
          such offences have not been made compoundable, the High
        E Court may quash the criminal proceedings if it feels that by not
          quashing the same, the ends of justice shall be defeated.
               35. We, therefore, feel that though offence punishable under
          Section 498-A of the IPC is not compoundable, in appropriate
          cases if the parties are willing and if it appears to the criminal
        F court that there exist elements of settlement, it should direct the
          parties to explore the possibility of settlement through
          mediation. This is, obviously, not to dilute the rigour, efficacy
          and purport of Section 498-A of the IPC, but to locate cases
          where the matrimonial dispute can be nipped in bud in an
        G equitable manner. The judges, with their expertise, must
          ensure that this exercise does not lead to the erring spouse
          using mediation process to get out of clutches of the law. During
          mediation, the parties can either decide to part company on
            10. AIR 2003 SC 1386.
        H 11. c2012i 10 sec 303.
                K. SRINIVAS RAO v. D.A. DEEPA                    151
                [RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J.]

    mutually agreed terms or they may decide to patch up and stay        A
    together. In either case for the settlement to come through, the
    complaint will have to be quashed. In that event, they can
    approach the High Court and get the complaint quashed. If
    however they chose not to settle, they can proceed with the
    complaint. In this exercise, there is no loss to anyone. If there    B
    is settlement, the parties will be saved from the trials and
    tribulations of a criminal case and that will reduce the burden
    on the courts which will be in the larger public interest.
    Obviously, the High Court will quash the complaint only if after
    considering all circumstances it finds the settlement to be          c
    equitable and genuine. Such a course, in our opinion, will be
    beneficial to those who genuinely want to accord a quietus to
    their matrimonial disputes. We would, however, like to clarify
    that reduction of burden of cases on the courts will, however,
     be merely an incidental benefit and not the reason for sending
                                                                         0
     the parties for mediation. We recognize 'mediation' as an
     effective method of alternative dispute resolution in matrimonial
     matters and that is the reason why we want the parties to
     explore the possibility of settlement through mediation in
     matrimonial disputes.
                                                                         E
         36. We, therefore, issue directions, which the courts
•   dealing with the matrimonial matters shall follow:

          (a}   In terms of Section 9 of the Family Courts Act, the
                Family Courts shall make all efforts to settle the
                matrimonial disputes through mediation. Even ifthe
                                                                         F
                Counsellors submit a failure report, the Family
                Courts shall, with the consent of the parties, refer
                the matter to the mediation centre. In such a case,
                however, the Family Courts shall set a reasonable
                time limit for mediation centres to complete the         G
                process of mediation because otherwise the
                resolution of the disputes by the Family Court may
                get delayed. In a given case, if there is good chance
                of settlement, the Family Court in its discretion, can
                always extend the time limit.                            H
    152          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2013) 2 S.C.R.

A          (b)    The criminal courts dealing with the complaint
                  under Section 498-A of the IPC should, at any stage
                  and particu!arly, before they take up the complaint
                  for hearing, refer the parties to mediation centre if
                  they feel that there exist elements of settlement and
B                 both the parties are willing. However, they should
                  take care to see that in this exercise, rigour, purport
                  and efficacy of Section 498-A of the IPC is not
                  diluted. Needless to say that the discretion to grant
                  or not to grant bail is not in any way curtailed by this
c                 direction. It will be for the concerned court to work
                  out the modalities taking into consideration the facts
                  of each case.

           (c)    All mediation centres shall set up pre-litigation
                  desks/clinics; give them wide publicity and make
D                 efforts to settle matrimonial disputes at pre-litigation
                  stage.

          37. The appeal is disposed of in the aforestated terms.

E R.P.                                            Appeal disposed of.

                                                                             •