Holding

The Supreme Court held that the claimant is entitled to a 50% calculation of loss of future prospects and a Rs.15,00,000 award for pain and suffering, thereby increasing the total compensation to Rs.1,02,29,241 and allowing the appeal.

Summary

The appellant, K.S. Muralidhar, suffered a severe spinal injury resulting in 100% functional disability after his company vehicle collided with a negligently driven lorry. The Tribunal awarded Rs.58,09,930 plus interest and future medical expenses, while the Karnataka High Court enhanced the award to Rs.78,16,390, calculating loss of future prospects at 40% of income. The appellant challenged the High Court's computation of future prospects and the amount awarded for pain and suffering, seeking a 50% prospect calculation and a higher non‑pecuniary award. The Supreme Court examined the principles of just compensation, the artificial nature of quantifying pain and suffering, and relevant precedents on compensation for total disability. It held that the claimant’s loss of future prospects should be assessed at 50% and that a Rs.15,00,000 award for pain and suffering was justified, raising the total compensation to Rs.1,02,29,241. Consequently, the appeal was allowed and the award modified accordingly.

Issues considered

The appropriate percentage for calculating loss of future prospects for a permanently disabled claimant under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.
Whether the compensation for pain and suffering should be enhanced beyond the High Court's award.
The correct quantum of future medical expenses compensation.
The determination of functional disability as 100% for the purpose of compensation.

Legislation cited

Headnote

Issue for Consideration Matter pertains to the enhancement of compensation towards pain and suffering for a motor accident victim having suffered 100% disability. Headnotes† Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Motor accident – Compensation – Enhancement of – Victim aged company vehicle which collided with container lorry driven rashly and negligently – Victim suffered 90% permanent disability – Tribunal taking the functional disability as 100%, awarded compensation of Rs.58,09,930/- with 6% interest per annum and Rs.1,00,000/- as future medical

Subjects

Enhancement of compensation towards pain and sufferingMotor accidentVictim suffered 100% disabilityCompensationFunctional disability as 100%Future medical expensesLoss of future prospectsPain and sufferingIrreparably wrong in lifeVulnerability and futilityJust compensationConcept of just compensationPrinciple of restitutio ad integrumAward of compensation

Judgment

[2024] 11 S.C.R. 835 : 2024 INSC 886

K.S. Muralidhar
v.
R. Subbulakshmi & Anr.
(Civil Appeal No. 12993 of 2024)
22 November 2024
[C.T. Ravikumar and Sanjay Karol,* JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
Matter pertains to the enhancement of compensation towards pain
and suffering for a motor accident victim having suffered 100%
disability.

Headnotes†
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Motor accident – Compensation –
Enhancement of – Victim aged below 40 years, met with
an accident while traveling in his company vehicle which
collided with container lorry driven rashly and negligently –
Victim suffered 90% permanent disability – Tribunal taking
the functional disability as 100%, awarded compensation of
Rs.58,09,930/- with 6% interest per annum and Rs.1,00,000/- as
future medical expenses – High Court taking loss of future
prospects at @ 40% awarded Rs.78,16,390/- as compensation
with 6% interest per annum – Challenge to:
Held: Injuries sustained by the claimant are serious, and their
effect on his life are long-lasting and even lifelong – Both the
tribunal and the High Court rightly took the disability suffered by
the claimant to be at 100% – In view of the injuries suffered, the
‘pain and suffering’ caused, and the life-long nature of the disability
afflicted upon the claimant, and the statement of the doctor, the
case of the claimant is justified – Rs.15,00,000/- awarded under
the head ‘pain and suffering’, considering the fact that the prayer
of the claimant for enhancement of compensation was by a sum
of Rs.10,00,000/- – Compensation is just, fair and reasonable –
Award given by the High Court modified only on two counts-future
prospects and ‘pain and suffering’ – Compensation to be awarded

* Author
836 [2024] 11 S.C.R.

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stood at Rs.87,29,241/- – Thus, the total amount payable is
Rs.1,02,29,241/-. [Paras 11, 12, 15, 16]

Words and Phrases – Definition of pain and suffering –
Explanation:
Held: While each discipline such as bioethics, medical ethics,
psycho-oncology, anaesthesiology, philosophy, sociology etc,
has its own conception of the meaning of pain/suffering, within
its confines, the commonality that emerges is that a person's
understanding of oneself is shaken or compromised at its very
root at the hands of consistent suffering – Sense of something
being irreparably wrong in life; vulnerability and futility, is present
and such a feeling will be present for the remainder of his natural
life. [Para 13]

Motor Accident – Compensation – Just compensation –
Concept of:
Held: Concept of just compensation rests on the principle of
restitutio ad integrum which means restoration to the original
condition, as far as possible, taking the person to whom damages
are awarded, to a position as if the incident or in this case, the
accident, had never occurred – It has certain limitations – Award
of compensation, however much it may be, does not give back to
the person who affected their life but only alleviates the worry of
being able to secure the required amenities. [Para 1]

Case Law Cited
National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi [2017] 13 SCR 100 :
(2017) 16 SCC 680; Benson George v. Reliance General Insurance
Co. Ltd. & Anr. [2022] 1 SCR 653 : (2022) 13 SCC 142; Parminder
Singh v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. [2019] 8 SCR 986 : (2019)
7 SCC 217; Lalan D. v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. (2020) 9 SCC
805; R.D Hattangadi v. Pest Control (India) (P) Ltd. [1995] 1 SCR
75 : (1995) 1 SCC 551; Sidram v. United India Insurance Company
Ltd. [2022] 8 SCR 403 : (2023) 3 SCC 439; Karnataka SRTC v.
Mahadeva Shetty [2003] Supp. 2 SCR 14 : (2003) 7 SCC 197;
Kajal v. Jagdish Chand [2020] 3 SCR 622 : (2020) 4 SCC 413;
Ayush v. Reliance General Insurance [2022] 1 SCR 831 : (2022)
7 SCC 738 – referred to.
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 837

K.S. Muralidhar v. R. Subbulakshmi & Anr.

Hassam and Anr. v. Rabot and Anr. (2024) UKSC 11; Heil v. Rankin
[2001] QB 272; Attorney General of St. Helena v. AB & Ors., Privy
Council Appeal No. 0034 of 2018 – referred to.

Books and Periodicals Cited
P. Ramanatha Iyer’s Advanced Law Lexicon 3rd Edition reprint
2009; Eric Cassell, Lexis Nexis, Butterworths Wadhwa, page
3441; Noe-Steinmüller et.al, (2024) 165 (7) : p1434-1449 –
referred to.

List of Websites
http://www.ericcassell.com/bio.html; https://med.uth.edu/
o e p / m e m b e r s - 2 / e u g e n e - v - b o i s a u b i n - m d /; h t t p s : / / s p s .
columbia.edu/faculty/arthur-w-frank-phd; https://www.mun.ca/
medicine/faculty-and-staff-resources/faculty-a-z/pullman-daryl.
php – referred to.

List of Acts
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988; Penal Code, 1860.

List of Keywords
Enhancement of compensation towards pain and suffering;
Motor accident; Victim suffered 100% disability; Compensation;
Functional disability as 100%; Future medical expenses; Loss
of future prospects; Pain and suffering; Irreparably wrong in
life; Vulnerability and futility; Just compensation; Concept of
just compensation; Principle of restitutio ad integrum; Award of
compensation.

Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 12993
of 2024
From the Judgment and Order dated 12.11.2020 of the High Court
of Karnataka at Bengaluru in MFA No. 2573 of 2016

Appearances for Parties
Rohan Thawani, Ms. Pooja Dhar, Advs. for the Appellant.
T. Mahipal, Rohit Kumar Sinha, Sanjay Kumar Singh, Advs. for
the Respondents.
838 [2024] 11 S.C.R.

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Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

Sanjay Karol, J.

Leave granted.
2. The concept of just compensation rests on the principle of restitutio
ad integrum which means restoration to the original condition, as far
as possible, taking the person to whom damages are awarded, to
a position as if the incident or in this case, the accident, had never
occurred. While this is a well-recognized and positive principle of law,
we must also recognize its limitations. The award of compensation,
however much it may be, does not give back to the person who
affected their life but only alleviates the worry of being able to secure
the required amenities.
3. In awarding non-pecuniary damages, this Court has often highlighted
the difficulty in computation, for there is no manner in which such
determination lends itself to formulaic ciphering. Every person in
life has undertaken certain steps towards the realization of dreams,
held goals and aspirations, and when they land up in such an
unfortunate situation, where, for no fault of theirs, the trajectories
of their lives are forever altered. Although, abstract in the written
word, these factors form a large part of the ‘pain and suffering’
one undergoes apart from the manifested disability, which may be
visible to another person.
4. This appeal arises from the final judgment and order dated 12th
November 2020 passed by the High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru
in M.F.A.No.2573 of 2016 (MV). This Miscellaneous First Appeal, in
turn, was filed against the Award dated 17th April 2015 passed in
M.V.C. No.3955 of 2009 by the Court of IX Additional Senior Civil
Judge, Small Causes Court, at Bangalore.1
5. Certain past events require recall for adjudication of the present
dispute.
5.1 On 22nd August 2008, the appellant was travelling in his Company
vehicle, bearing registration No. KA-02-D-9626, towards his

1 hereinafter referred to as ‘Tribunal’
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 839

K.S. Muralidhar v. R. Subbulakshmi & Anr.

place of employment, situated at Kasaba Industrial Area,
Hoskote. On the way, the vehicle collided with a container lorry
bearing registration No.TN-04-D-1047, which was allegedly
being driven rashly and negligently.
5.2 The injuries sustained were to the extent of 90% permanent
disability (as per the case put forward by the claimant-appellant
before the Tribunal), i.e.,
“1. Fracture co-vertebra with anterior dislocation
over C7
2. Cervical Spine revealed dislocation of C-6
over C-7.
C-7 Bilateral transverse process fracture and
3. C-6 fracture both laminae and body.”
5.3 The Hoskote Police have registered a case bearing Crime
No.414 of 2008 for the offences punishable under Sections
279, 337 and 338 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860,2 against
the driver of the lorry.
5.4 It was contended before the Tribunal that the claimant-appellant
was employed as a workman in L.M. Glassfibre (India) Pvt. Ltd.,
Hoskote, earning a gross salary of Rs.28,221/- per month. Apart
from being so employed, he was also an agent with the Life
Insurance Corporation of India earning an annual commission
between Rs.30,000/- to Rs.40,000/- per annum.
5.5 Having heard arguments, the Tribunal framed two issues,
one relating to rash and negligent driving of the lorry and the
second regarding the quantum of compensation and by whom
it will be payable.
5.6 The Tribunal3 concluded that the lorry was indeed being driven
rashly and negligently and qua compensation it was held that
respondent No.2 therein (New India Assurance Company Limited)
would be liable to pay a sum of Rs.58,09,930/- with 6% interest

2 IPC for short
3 It is to be noted that this determination of compensation was made after the High Court remitted the
matter vide order dated 12th August 2014 for consideration afresh, on appeal from award dated 10th
February 2011 passed by the IXth Additional Senior Civil Judge, member, MACT-7, Court of Small
Causes, Bangalore
840 [2024] 11 S.C.R.

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per annum on the above said sum (excluding future medical
expenses of Rs.1,00,000/-) from the date of Petition till payment.
6. Aggrieved by the order, both, the Insurance Company and the
claimant-appellant, approached the High Court.
6.1 The Court held that the Tribunal had rightly taken functional
disability to be 100% and was correct in not deducting
compensation of Rs.6,61,371/- paid by his employer to the
claimant-appellant.
6.2 On the aspect of loss of future income, it was held that the
claimant-appellant, since he was below the age of 40, was
entitled to 40% under this head. The amount was calculated
to be Rs.70,22,520/-. In conclusion, considering other heads
as well, the amount of compensation arrived at was a total of
Rs.78,16,390/- as opposed to Rs.58,09,930/- awarded by the
Tribunal.
6.3 The Insurance Company was directed to deposit the amount
within four weeks, excluding interest, for the compensation
awarded under the heading future medical expenses. The
interest rate was maintained at 6%.
7. Further, aggrieved by the final judgment and order of the High Court,
the claimant-appellant is before us.
8. During the course of arguments, it was submitted by the learned
counsel for the claimant-appellant, that :-
(i) The High Court erred in taking future prospects at @ 40%
instead of 50% in accordance with National Insurance Co.
Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi;4
(ii) Under the head ‘pain and suffering’, the compensation awarded
by the High Court is insufficient given the 100% functional
disability. In arguing that the compensation should be increased
to Rs.10,00,000/-, reliance is placed on a judgment of this Court
in Benson George v. Reliance General Insurance Co. Ltd.
& Anr.,5 and, in particular, para 20 thereof, wherein it was held

4 [2017] 13 SCR 100 : (2017) 16 SCC 680
5 [2022] 1 SCR 653 : (2022) 13 SCC 142
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 841

K.S. Muralidhar v. R. Subbulakshmi & Anr.

that in the attending facts and circumstances, considering the
multiple brain injuries/injuries sustained by the claimant because
of which he was comatose and bedridden, Rs.10,00,000/- was
awarded as enhanced compensation, observing the same to
be reasonable;
(iii) The Tribunal awarded Rs.1,00,000/- in terms of future medical
expenses, which the High Court maintained without any
discussion. Under this head too, it was submitted that the
compensation should be enhanced to Rs.10,00,000/- in view
of Parminder Singh v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd; 6 and
Lalan D. v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.7.
9. The age of the claimant-appellant at the time of the accident was
37 years.8 The computation of future prospects is to be done as per
the law laid down by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Pranay
Sethi (supra) para 59.3, which records the conclusion in this regard,
reads as under :-
“59.3 While determining income, an addition of 50% of
actual salary to the income of the deceased towards
future prospects, where the deceased had a permanent
job and was below the age of 40 years should be made.
The addition should be 30%, if the age of the deceased
was between 40 to 50 years. In case the deceased was
between the age of 50 to 60 years, the addition should be
15%. Actual salary should read as actual salary less tax.”
10. It is submitted that the claimant-appellant’s employment was permanent
in nature, and as such, the loss of future income ought to be calculated,
in terms of the above, at 50%. The High Court, in para 23 of the
judgment, observes that the total income of the claimant-appellant
was Rs.27,867/- per month. 50% thereof is Rs.13,933/-. His income,
therefore, comes to Rs.41,800/- (27,867 + 13,933). Considering the
above-computed income, the compensation under the head loss of
future prospects would be Rs.41,800 x 12 x 15 x 100% = Rs.75,24,000/-
as opposed to Rs.70,22,520/- as calculated by the High Court.

6 [2019] 8 SCR 986 : (2019) 7 SCC 217
7 (2020) 9 SCC 805
8 Claim petition, Annexure A-3
842 [2024] 11 S.C.R.

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The total compensation as it stands at the moment would be
Rs.80,67,870/- + Rs.6,61,371/- = Rs.87,29,241/-.
11. Let us now consider the claimant-appellant’s prayer for enhancement
of compensation under the head ‘pain and suffering’. It cannot
be disputed that the injuries sustained by the claimant-appellant
are serious, and their effects on his life are long-lasting; one may
even say lifelong. The examination of the doctor, namely, Dr. N.C.
Prakash, forming part of record as Annexure P-5, dated 6th October
2010 reads as under:
“5. I further state that recently I examined the patient on
30-9-2010 for assessment of disability. He complains of
the following:
a. No sensation to below the C-7 Dermatome.
b. Lost sensation of bowel and urinary system.
c. No control below the neck.
d. Needs assistance for every activity.
6. On examination I found the following:
At present he is in wheel chair bound with no movements
(Grade 0/5) in both lower limbs, minimal movements in
bilateral upper limb proximally with wrist being very weak
(1/5 power) and grip is not possible. He has no urinary
control, has no sensation of bowels and is on urinary
catheter. He needs help for all his day to day activities. He
was an Assistant Team Leader in LM Glass Fibers India
Pvt. Ltd. and now can’t do any work. He has almost no
chance of further improvement and impairment is likely to
be permanent. All put together he has a disability of about
85% to the whole body.”
12. It is to be noted that both the Tribunal and the High Court have taken
the disability suffered by the claimant-appellant to be at 100%. We
find no ground to take a different view.
13. While acknowledging that ‘pain and suffering’, as a concept escapes
definition, we may only refer to certain authorities, scholarly as also
judicial wherein attempts have been made to set down the contours
thereof.
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 843

K.S. Muralidhar v. R. Subbulakshmi & Anr.

13.1 The entry recording the term ‘pain and suffering’ in P.
Ramanatha Iyer’s Advanced Law Lexicon9 reads as under:-
“Pain and suffering. The term ‘Pain and suffering’
mean physical discomfort and distress and include
mental and emotional trauma for which damages can
be recovered in an accident claim.
This expression has become almost a term of art,
used without making fine distinction between pain
and suffering. Pain and suffering which a person
undergoes cannot be measured in terms of money
by any mathematical calculation. Hence the Court
awards a sum which is in the nature of a conventional
award [Mediana, The (1900) AC 113, 116]”
13.2 Eric Cassell,10 an American Physician and Bioethicist, defines
‘pain’ not only as a sensation but also ‘as experience embedded
in beliefs about causes and diseases and their consequences’,
and ‘suffering’ as ‘the state of severe distress associated with
events that threaten the intactness of person’.
13.3 In a recent article11 published in the journal of the International
Association for the Study of Pain, it has been recorded that there
is no consensus on what exactly the concept of pain-related
suffering includes, and it is often not precisely operationalised
in empirical studies. The authors in their systematic review
analysed 111 articles across a variety of disciplines such as
bioethics, medical ethics, psycho-oncology, anaesthesiology,
philosophy, sociology etc., we may refer to few of them:
13.3.1 Eugene V. Boisaubin,12 who is currently a Professor at
the University of Texas, at Houston, in a 1989 article
defined it as “Suffering is experienced by individual
and arises from threats to the integrity of the individual
as a complex social and psychological entity.”

9 3rd Edition reprint 2009, Lexis Nexis, Butterworths Wadhwa, page 3441
10 http://www.ericcassell.com/bio.html
11 Noe-Steinmüller et.al, (2024) “Defining suffering in pain: a systematic review on pain-related suffering
using natural language processing.” 165 (7) : p1434-1449
12 https://med.uth.edu/oep/members-2/eugene-v-boisaubin-md/
844 [2024] 11 S.C.R.

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13.3.2 Andrew Edgar, who is currently a Reader Emeritus
in Philosophy at Cardiff University at UK has defined,
in a 2007 article suffering as an “experience of life
never getting better, revealing in the sufferer only
vulnerability, futility, and impotence.”
13.3.3 Arthur W. Frank,13 Professor Emeritus, Department
of Sociology, University of Calgary in his well-known
article “Can We Research Suffering?”, published in
2001, observed that “at the core of suffering is the
sense that something is irreparably wrong with our
lives, and wrong is the negation of what could have
been right. Suffering resists definition because it is
the reality of what is not.”
13.3.4 Daryl Pullman14 who currently serves as University
research Professor, Bioethics at the Memorial
University of Newfoundland, Canada in his 2002
article defined suffering as the “product of [physical],
psychological, economic, or other factors that
frustrate an individual in the pursuit of significant
life projects.”
13.4 The Judicial Studies Board, now known as the Judicial College
in the United Kingdom, produced guidelines in 1992 to produce
greater consistency of awards and make the judicial scale
of values more easily accessible. They have been deduced
from a study of past cases, examining the range of awards
therein. The latest edition of these guidelines was published
in 2021.15 They record the difficulty of computing ‘pain and
suffering’ as under :-
“It is widely accepted that making of an award
of general damages for pain and suffering is a
somewhat artificial task. It involves the Judge seeking
to convert the pain and suffering of a given claimant
into a monetary award which he or she considers

13 https://sps.columbia.edu/faculty/arthur-w-frank-phd
14 https://www.mun.ca/medicine/faculty-and-staff-resources/faculty-a-z/pullman-daryl.php
15 See : Hassam and Anr. v. Rabot and Anr. (2024) UKSC 11
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 845

K.S. Muralidhar v. R. Subbulakshmi & Anr.

to be reasonable by way of compensation. That is
a difficult task and one which has historically led to
judges making widely varying awards of damages
in respect of relatively comparable injuries a result
which not only offends the principle of equality
before law but results in unnecessary appeals and
the incurring of additional cost, apart altogether from
the burden that such appeals place on the Court’s
own scarce resources.”
13.5 In determining non-pecuniary damages, the artificial nature
of computing compensation has been highlighted in Heil v.
Rankin,16 as referred to in Attorney General of St. Helena
v. AB & Ors.17 as under:-
“23. This principle of ‘full compensation’ applies to
pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage alike. But,
as Dickson J indicated in the passage cited from
his judgment in Andrews v Grand & Toy Alberta
Ltd, 83 DLR (3d) 452, 475-476, this statement
immediately raises a problem in a situation where
what is in issue is what the appropriate level of ‘full
compensation’ for non-pecuniary injury is when the
compensation has to be expressed in pecuniary
terms. There is no simple formula for converting
the pain and suffering, the loss of function, the loss
of amenity and disability which an injured person
has sustained, into monetary terms. Any process of
conversion must be essentially artificial. Lord Pearce
expressed it well in H West & Son Ltd v Shephard
[1964] AC 326, 364 when he said:
‘The court has to perform the difficult and artificial
task of converting into monetary damages the
physical injury and deprivation and pain and to give
judgment for what it considers to be a reasonable
sum. It does not look beyond the judgment to the
spending of the damages.’

16 [2001] QB 272
17 Privy Council Appeal No. 0034 of 2018.
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24. The last part of this statement is undoubtedly
right. The injured person may not even be in a
position to enjoy the damages he receives because
of the injury which he has sustained. Lord Clyde
recognised this in Wells v Wells [1999] 1 AC 345,
394H when he said: ‘One clear principle is that what
the successful plaintiff will in the event actually do
with the award is irrelevant.”
13.6 In the context of the United States, the most important piece
of legal literature regarding ‘pain and suffering’ is an article
titled Valuing Life and Limb in Tort: Scheduling Pain and
Suffering, published in the year 1989. Relevant extracts
thereof read as under :
“Pain and suffering and other intangible or non-
economic losses are even more problematic.
Physical pain and attendant suffering have for
centuries being recognised as legitimate elements
of damages, and “modern” tort law has seen a
marked expansion of the rights to recover for forms of
mental anguish. Some Courts have even permitted
recovery for emotional trauma unaccompanied by
physical injury, including derivative losses stemming
from injuries to family members. The precise
elements of compensable non-economic loss vary
by jurisdiction. Pain and suffering may be used as
a catch-all category for the jury’s consideration of
all non-pecuniary losses in a case of a non-fatal
injury, subsuming other qualitative categories such
as mental anguish and humiliation. More commonly,
though, other non-economic elements – such as
“loss of enjoyment of life” are accorded independent
standing …”
Another important observation is that:
“Whatever the categories of non-economic damages
allowed in a given jurisdiction, the law provides
no objective benchmarks valuing them. As one
commentator notes, “Courts have usually been
content to say that pain and suffering damages should
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 847

K.S. Muralidhar v. R. Subbulakshmi & Anr.

amount to ‘fair compensation’, or a ‘reasonable
amount’, ‘without any definite guide’.”
13.7 Consideration of the above, underlines that while each discipline
has its own conception of the meaning of pain/suffering, within
its confines, the commonality that emerges is that a person’s
understanding of oneself is shaken or compromised at its very
root at the hands of consistent suffering. In the present facts, it
is unquestionable that the sense of something being irreparably
wrong in life, as spoken by Frank (supra); vulnerability and
futility, as spoken by Edgar, is present and such a feeling will
be present for the remainder of his natural life.
14. In respect of ‘pain and suffering’ in cases where disability suffered
is at 100%, we may notice a few decisions of this Court:-
14.1 In R.D Hattangadi v. Pest Control (India) (P) Ltd.18 It was
observed :
“17. The claim under Sl. No. 16 for ‘pain and
suffering’ and for loss of amenities of life under
Sl. No. 17, are claims for non-pecuniary loss.
The appellant has claimed lump sum amount of
Rs.3,00,000 each under the two heads. The High
Court has allowed Rs.1,00,000 against the claims of
Rs.6,00,000. When compensation is to be awarded
for ‘pain and suffering’ and loss of amenity of life,
the special circumstances of the claimant have to
be taken into account including his age, the unusual
deprivation he has suffered, the effect thereof on
his future life. The amount of compensation for
non-pecuniary loss is not easy to determine but
the award must reflect that different circumstances
have been taken into consideration. According to
us, as the appellant was an advocate having good
practice in different courts and as because of the
accident he has been crippled and can move only
on wheelchair, the High Court should have allowed
an amount of Rs.1,50,000 in respect of claim for

18 [1995] 1 SCR 75 : (1995) 1 SCC 551
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‘pain and suffering’ and Rs.1,50,000 in respect
of loss of amenities of life. We direct payment of
Rs.3,00,000 (Rupees three lakhs only) against the
claim of Rs.6,00,000 under the heads “‘pain and
suffering’” and “Loss of amenities of life”.
(Emphasis Supplied)
14.2 This Judgment was recently referred to by this Court in Sidram
v. United India Insurance Company Ltd.19 reference was also
made to Karnataka SRTC v. Mahadeva Shetty 20 (irrespective
of the percentage of disability incurred, the observations are
instructive), wherein it was observed :
“18. A person not only suffers injuries on account
of accident but also suffers in mind and body on
account of the accident through out his life and a
feeling is developed that his no more a normal man
and cannot enjoy the amenities of life as another
normal person can. While fixing compensation for
pain and suffering as also for loss of amenities,
features like his age, marital status and unusual
deprivation he has undertaken in his life have to
be reckoned.”
14.3 In Kajal v. Jagdish Chand 21 considering the facts of the
case, i.e., 100% disability, child being bedridden for life, her
mental age being that of a nine-month-old for life - a vegetative
existence, held that “even after taking a conservative view of
the matter an amount payable for the ‘pain and suffering’ of
this child should be at least Rs.15,00,000/-.”
14.4 In Ayush v. Reliance General Insurance 22 relying on Kajal
(supra) the amount awarded in ‘pain and suffering’ was
enhanced to Rs.10,00,000. The child who had suffered the
accident was five years old and the Court noted in paragraph 2
that :

19 [2022] 8 SCR 403 : (2023) 3 SCC 439
20 [2003] Supp. 2 SCR 14 : (2003) 7 SCC 197
21 [2020] 3 SCR 622 : (2020) 4 SCC 413
22 [2022] 1 SCR 831 : (2022) 7 SCC 738
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 849

K.S. Muralidhar v. R. Subbulakshmi & Anr.

“As per the discharge certificate, the appellant is
not able to move both his legs and had complete
sensory loss in the legs, urinary incontinence, bowel
constipation and bed sores. The appellant was aged
about 5 years as on the date of the accident, hence
has lost his childhood and is dependent on others
for his routine work.”
14.5 In Lalan (supra) cited by the claimant-appellant, the Tribunal
awarded Rs.30,000/- which was enhanced to Rs.40,000/- by
the High Court. Considering the fact that the appellant therein
has suffered extensive brain injury awarded compensation
under ‘pain and suffering’ to the tune of Rs.3,00,000/-.
15. Keeping in view the above-referred judgments, the injuries suffered,
the ‘pain and suffering’ caused, and the life-long nature of the disability
afflicted upon the claimant-appellant, and the statement of the Doctor
as reproduced above, we find the request of the claimant-appellant
to be justified and as such, award Rs.15,00,000/- under the head
‘pain and suffering’, fully conscious of the fact that the prayer of
the claimant–appellant for enhancement of compensation was by
a sum of Rs.10,00,000/-, we find the compensation to be just, fair
and reasonable at the amount so awarded.
16. It stands clarified that we have modified the Award, as given by the
High Court, only on two counts, i.e., future prospects and ‘pain and
suffering’. The amount as enhanced, shall carry interest @ 6%,
from the date of filing of the petition for special leave to appeal.
According to paragraph 10, the compensation to be awarded stood
at Rs.87,29,241/-. Consequent to the above discussion on ‘pain and
suffering’, the total amount now payable is Rs.1,02,29,241/-.
17. The appeal is allowed as aforesaid. Pending applications, if any,
stand disposed of.
18. No costs.

Result of the case: Appeal allowed.

†
Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain