Holding

The abolition of part‑time village officer posts by the Tamil Nadu Act, 1981 is constitutionally valid and does not infringe Articles 19(1)(g), 14 or 311(2).

Summary

The petitioners, former part‑time village officers in Tamil Nadu, challenged the Tamil Nadu Abolition of Posts of Part‑time Village Officers Ordinance, 1980 and the subsequent Act, 1981, alleging violations of Articles 19(1)(g), 14 and 311(2) of the Constitution. The State argued that the posts were obsolete, feudalistic and needed to be replaced by full‑time village administrative officers for efficiency and economy. The Court held that the power to create and abolish civil posts is inherent in the State and, when exercised in good faith, does not contravene the Constitution; the abolition did not amount to a punitive dismissal and therefore did not attract Article 311(2). It also found that the legislation did not infringe the right to pursue any occupation under Article 19(1)(g) and that the classification of posts satisfied the tests of intelligible differentiation and reasonable nexus, so Article 14 was not violated. Finally, the Court ruled that the amendment of service conditions under Section 43 of the Andhra Pradesh and Madras (Alteration of Boundaries) Act did not apply, and dismissed the writ petitions while ordering re‑employment of eligible officers and adjustment of compensation.

Issues considered

The Tamil Nadu Abolition Ordinance and Act violate Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution
The legislation contravenes Article 311(2) by terminating service without due process
The classification of abolished posts breaches Article 14's equality clause
Whether the State needed prior Central Government approval under Section 43 of the Andhra Pradesh and Madras (Alteration of Boundaries) Act, 1959

Legislation cited

Subjects

abolition of postspart‑time village officersconstitutional validityArticle 14Article 19(1)(g)Article 311civil service reformTamil Nadu

Judgment

A 628

K. RAJENDRAN & ORS. ETC. ETC.
v.

B STATE OF TAMIL NADO & ORS.
•
April 15, 1982·

[S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI, E.S. VENICATARAMIAH AND
A. VARADARAJAN, JJ.)
c
Constitution of India 1950, Article1 14. 19 (I) (g), 32 and 311 (2) & Tamil ~
Nadu Abolition of posts of part-time Village Officers Act 1981, Ss,2 (•), 3 and 5.

State enactment-Abolition of civil po1ts-Posts of'part-time' village offictr1
abollshtd-lntroduction of whole-time village administrative o.ffictr1-Whethtr valid
.D and legal.

Civil Servic~Civil post-Abolition ~f Polt-Whether 'govtrnmen.t has a
right-Abolition of post and abolttion of cadrt-Di.stinction-Rights of the incum·
bent of the post.

In the State of Tamil Nadu the administration was carried on at the village
E level by 3. chain bf officers in regular gradation one above the Other since the
comlnencement Or the Christian era. This system .known as the barabaluti system
consisted of twelve functionaries : (i) headman, (2) kamam or acc®ntant, (3)
shroff or notazar; ( 4) nirganti, (5) toty or taliary, (6) potter, (7) smith, (8) ieweller..
(9) carpenter, (!O) barber, (II) washerman and (12) astrologer. The first five
rendere.d service to the Government. By the end of the ninCteenth century, two

-
Acts were enacted for the purpose of regulating the work of these village
offices.

The Madras Proprietary States' Village Service Act, 1894 (Madr's Act
No.11of1894) dealt.with three classes of vihage officers viz. village accountants,
village headman and yiJlage watchman. It provided for their appointment,
remuneration and summary punishment of misconduct or neglect of duty. The
G Madras Hereditary Village Offices· Act 1895 (Madras Act No. Ill of 1895)
regulated the succession to certain other hereditary village offices and provided
for the appointment of persons to bold such offices and the control or the holders
thereof. Under both these statutes, the village offices devolved on a single heir
according to the general custom and rule of primogeniture governing succession
to i(l)partible zamidaris. Io cases to which the aforesaid two 'Statutes. were
H inapplicable provision was made by the Standing Orders promulgated by the
Board of Reveoile, which were known as the Board's Standing Orders for
appointing village offi:ers on a hereditary basis.
k. RAIENDRAN V. TAMIL NAbU (Venkataralniah, J.) 629

• The distinctive features of the service conditions of the village officers A
appointed under the a:foresaid two Acts or the Board's Standing Orders were
that they were part~time employees of th~ Government, tbey fiCre appointed
direct1y by the Revenue Officer, the records maintained by them could be
retained in their frouses, no fixed hours of duty were prescribed, they were not
• constituted into any distinct service, could not be transferred outside their
district, and that they were paid honorarium for the services that they dis~
charged. The Fundamental Rules applicable to all other State Government B
employees, the Pension Rules, and the Leave Rules were not applicable. to these·
village officers.

This Court in Gazula Daaaratha Rama Rao v. The State of Andhra Pradesh
& Ors. [1961] 2 SCR 931 having held that section 6 (1) of the Madras Act No. 3
of 1895 was void as it contravened Article 16 (2) of the Constitution, instructions
.,.were issued by the Board of Revenue on March 12, 1962 that -in respect of
c
future vacancies in village offices governed by the Madras Act No. 2 of 1894, and
the Madras Act No., 3 of 1895, the appointments should be made on a
temporay basis, and the State Legislature enacted the Madras Pro-
prietary Estates' Village Service and the Madras 'Hereditary Village
Offices '(Repeal) Art, 1968 repealing the 1894 and 1895 Acts. Pur-
suant to section 3 of this Act, the State Government promulgated that Tamil D
Nadu Village Officers Service Rules, 1970 which provided for tbe constitution of
the Tamil Nadu Village Officers Service, consisting of (i) Village ileadman,
additional village headman, (ii) village kamam, additional village karnam, and
(iii) taJayari and nirganti and the method of recrUitment to the said posts.

In the year 1973, the Administrative Reforms Commission set up by the
State Government recommended that the existing part-time village officers should E
_l-- be replaced by regular whole-time transferable public servants who should form
part of the Revenue hierarchy. The State Government accepted this recom-
menda1ion and promulgated on May 17, 1975 tho Tamil Nadu ViJlage Officers
(appoirited under B,S, Os) Service Rules 1974. Thereaf1er on October 9, 1978 the
- Tamil Nadu Village Officers (appointed under B.S.Os) Service Rules 1978 were
~ issued fixing the age of retirement of village of6cCrs at 60 years.
~.
F
On November 13, 1980, the Tamil Nadu Abolition of posts of part-time
Village Officers Ordinance, 1980 was promulgated abolishing the posts of part-
time village officers in the State. The Ordinance was later replaced by the Tamil
Nadu abolition of posts of part-time Village Officers 'Act 1981, which provided
for _the d.Ppointmcnt of Village Administrative Officers. By section 3 of the Act,
the posts of part-time village officers were abolished with eff~ct from November
14, 1980.and every officer holding a post so abolished ceased to hold such post,
G
and secl!On 5 provided for payment of compensation to those who ceased to be
part-time villas• officers.

The petitioners in their writ petition to this Court contended that the
-'-.. Ordinance and the Act were violative of Article 19 (1) (g); Article 311 (2), and H
·contravened Article 14 of the Con,titution, The State Government contested the
p6titions and contended that the State, Government being of the opinion that the
63() 8ln>IU!Mli .couat REJ.'Oat~ !l 9S2i 3 s.c.t\..
system of part·time Village-Officers was out·moded and did not fit in with the
modem needs of village administration, after careful consideration taken the
policy decision to abolish all tho posts· of part•time village offii:ers on
grounds of administrative necessity and to introduce a system of whole-time
officers to be incharge of the village administration. To achieve this,
the Ordinance was promulgated on November J4, 1980 which was later, •
B , replaced by the Act. It Was further contended, that since b)"tho Ordinance and
the Act, certain posts had· been abolished, the petitioners who were incumbents
of tho abolished posts could nottaiso any of the grounds raised by thorn •.

Dismissing the petitions.

HELD : 1. (I) Tho power to abolish a civil post is inherent in tho
c right to create it. The Government bas always- the power, subject to the consti·
tutional provisions to reorganise a department to provide cfficiency1 and to bring
about economy. It can .abolish an office or post in gopd faith. The action to
abolish a post should not be just a pretence taken to got rid of an inconvenient
incumbent, (643 OJ

American Jurisprudene1 2d vo/.63 p, §48·649: H. Eliot Kap/a,,....,The Law of
D Civil Service pp 214-215 referred to.

In
tho instant case tho abolition of the posts of village officers 'was sought
to be achieved by a piece of legislation passed by the State Legislature, namely
tho Tamil Nadu.Abolition of posts of part-time Village Officers Act, 1981. Want
of good faith or ma!afides cannot be attributed to tho Legislature. (646 A]

(ii)· Tho Act is ~ot violative or Article 19 (I) (g) as it does not affect
the rfght of any of the incumbents of the posts to carry on any oecupation of
their choice oven though they may not be able to stick on to tho posts which they
wore holding. (647 CJ

/
Fertilizer Corporation Kamgar Union (Regd.} Sindri & Ors. v. Union of
lnilia & Ors, (1981] 2 SCR 52, referred to.

2. (i) The doctrine of pleasure incorporated in Article 310 cannot be con·
,.,,.-·
•
-
trolled by any legislation; but the exercise of that power by the President or tho _,.._
Governor, is however made subjecl to the other provisions of the Constitution,
one of them being Article 31 t, which is not made subject to any other provision
of tho Constitution and is paramount in tho field occupied by it. (648 D-BJ
.G \ .
(ii) The terminatiOn of service of a Government servant consequent upon
the abolition of posts does not involve punishment at all and therefore doeA not
attract Article 311 (i). (654 B; 654·B] ·

H Parashotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India (1958] SCR 828 at 841, Motl ).-
Ram Dtka ttc. v. Gt1,1tral Manag1r, N.E.F., Railw~y1, Maligaon, Pandu 1tc.
It. kAlilNbRAN v. tAMli.'NAbu {tlenkatariimiah, J.) 63t
[1964]SSCR683andP.V. Naik & Ors. v. State ofMaharashtra&Anr.,AIR A'
,, 1967 Born, 482, referred to.

(iii) If a post is not a special post and Its incumbent is a member of a
cadi-e his rights as a member of the cadre should be considered before deciding
whether he has ceased to be a government empioyee on· the abo!ition of the post..
On such scrutiny it is likely that.the services of .another member of the·· cadre
may have to be terminated or Some other member of the cadre may have to· be If
reverted to a lower post from which hC may have been promoted to the cadre in
question by the application of the principle of 'last come, first go'. If, however,
where the post abolished i,"a special post or where an entire cadre is abolished
and there is no lower cadfe to which the members of the abolished cadre can.
reasonably be reverted, the application· Of this principle may not ~rise at all.
[6S3 C,DJ

State of Mysore'v. H. Papanna Gowda & Anr. etc. [1971) 2 S.C.R. 831,
--r-- referred to.

(iv) in modern administration, it is necessary to recognise the existence of
the poWer with the legislatute Or the Ell:e'cutive to- create or abolish posts in the
civil services-of the State. The volume of administrative work, the measures of
economy and the need .for streamlining the administration to make it more D
1
efficient may induce the State Government to make alterations in the staffing
patterns of the civil service necessitating either the_ increase or the decrease in tbe
number of posts. This power is inherent in the very concept of governmental
administration. To deny that P,owef to the GoverD.ment is to strike at the very
roots' of proper public administration. This power to abolish a post which may' •
result in the holder thereof ceasing to be a Government servant has got to be
recognised; ·but any action legislative or executive taken pursuant to that power Jil
is always subject to judicial review. (,6S6 A J)

M. Ramanatha Pillai v. The State of Kera/a & Anr. (1974) I S.C.R. SIS,
Champaklal Chimanlal Shah v. The Union of India [1964J S S.C.R.- .190, Salish
Chandra Anand v. The Union of India (1953) S.C.R. 6S5, Shyam Lal v. State of
U,P, and Union of India [19SS] l S.C.R. 26, State of Haryana v. Des Raj Sangar
& Anr. [1976] 2 S.C.R. 1034, referred to. F
/
Abdul Khalik Renzu & Ors. v. The State of Jammu and Kashmir ,AJf-. ,
1965 J & K 15. overruled.

In thtl instant case it cannot be said that tho State Act by which the villaie
officers in the' State of Tamil Nadu were abolished; contravenes Article 311, (2).
[657 F] G

(v) The posts of village olfic".'s which were governed by the Madras Act II
of 1894, the Madras Act iii Qf 1895 and the Board's Standing Orders were
feudalistic in character and the appointment to these posts were governed by the
1aw of primogeniture; the family in which the applicant was born, the village H
in which be was born, atid the fact whether be owned any property in the village
or not. Thoee factors are , alien to modern-administrative service and clearly
632 SUPRiiMll COURT RiiP<iats [19S1]'3 s.C.&.
A opposed to Articles 14 and 16. The Administrative Reforms Commission rightly
recommended their abolition and reorganisation of the village service.
. [657 µ; 658 AC] \

(vi) Having regard to the abolition of similar village offices in the neigh-
bouring States of Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh and the agitation in the State
of Tamil Nadu for reorganisation of vilJage service, the decision to aboliSh the
B village offices which wcr~ feudalistic in character ~nd a~ anachronism in the
modern age cannot be said to be arbitrary or unreasonable. [660 CJ

\
BR. Shankaranarayana & Ors. v. The State OJ. Mysore & Ors. A.l.R. 1966
S.C. 1571, B.H. Honnalige Gowda v. State of Mysore & Anr., A.LR. 1964 Mysore
84, referred to.
c
3. (i) Any classification under Article 14 should satisfy two tests : (i) that
there exists an intelligibJe differentia between those who are grouped together and
those who are not included in the group, and (ii) that there exists a reasonable
nexus between the differentia and the object for which c1ussification is made.
[662 I'] •
D
(ii) Upto December 16, 1970 all appointments to Village Officen were
being made under the two Madras Acts and the Board's Standing Orders on the
basis of factors dealt with therein, but after December 16, 1970 recruitment was
made in accordance with the Tamil Nadu Village Officers Service Rules 1970. By
these rules a new service of part-time Village Officers was constituted and· the
persons who were appointed were paid a fixed amount every month by way of
remuneration. Under the Act of 1981 and the Rules framed thereunder the
Village Administrative Officers were to be appointed and to be recruited directly.
The posts were no longer treated as Part-time posts and holders thereof were full
time goverr.ment officials entitled to draw salary every month. Even though the
Viilage Officers appointed after December 16, 1970 were in a way different from
the village officials appointed prior to that date the two cannot be equated with
the new Village Officers who were to be appointed under the 1981 Act and the · •
F rules made thereunder. It cannot therefore be stated that Article 14 of the Cons..
titution has been violated in abolishing the posts held by those appointed after ·
December 16, 1970. [662 H; 663 A-E; 663 H; 664A] •
4 (i) The State Government will give effect to the memorandum filed on
its behalf in the case/of those who possess.the minimum gen_eral qualification pres-
cribed under the Att and the Rules. The State Governmen.t shall re-employ
G all such persons who have not crossed the age or' superannuation and who are
selected in the new cadre. UntiJ they are so selected they wiJI not be paid any
remuneration. Even if they are re-employed the amount paid to them pursuant to
the interim orders will not be recovered. [668 G-H; 669 A)

(ii) The compensation, if any payable by the State G_overnment under section
H S of the Act to those who cease ·to be village officers shall be adjusted against the
amount paid pursuant to the interim orders, and any amount in. ex~ss of the
compensation, shall not be recoverable. [669 B-C]
)

It, Jl.AJ6NDll.AN v, 'fAMIL NADU (Venkataramiah, J.) 63~

ORIGINAL JURJ~DICTION: Writ Petition Nos. 5880-82, 6176- A
77. 5921, 5922, 6220, 6426-27, 6355-56, 6264-70,6276, 6178-79, 6191,
1718 of 1980 arid 220-22, 2113 of 1981.

(Under Article 32 of the Constitution)
•
K. K. Venugopal, (6355-56 of 1980) (In W.P. Nos. 6212, 6427 8
& 5880-82/80), F.S. Nariman, (In W.P. Nos. 6264-70/80) R.K. Gargo,
(In W.P. Nos. 6191 & 6426/80), S.N. Kackar, (In W.P. Nos. 5921/80
& 220/81 and G.L. Sanghi, (In W.P. No. 1718/81) for the Petitioners.

C.S. Vaidyanathan, Vlneet Kumar, B Parthasarathi, A.T.M.
Sampath, Miss Lily Thomas, N.A. Subramanium, Naresh Kumar, c
Mahabir Singh and S. Srinivasan for the Petitioners.

Lal Narayan Singh, Attorney General (In W.P. No 5880/80) .
M.K. Banerjee, Addi. Solicitor General (In W.P. No. 6355/80)
R. Krishnamoorthy, Adv. Genl. T.N. (In W.P. Nos. 1718 & 6276/
1980) for the Respondents. D

Dr. Y.S. Chitale, (In W.P. No. 6426/80), L. M. Singhvi, (In
W.P. 6264/80) Mr. Laxmi Kant Pandey and S.S. Ray, (In W.P. 6212
.of 1980) for the Respondents ..

A. V, Rangam, (In all matters) for the Respondents. E
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

VENKATARAMIAH. J, In these writ petitions, the petitioners
who were holders of posts of part-time village officers in the St'\'te of
Tamil Nadu or associations of such persons have questioned the cons- F
·'-... titutional validity of the Tamil Nadu Abolition of posts of parttime
Village Officers Ordinance, 1980 Tamil Nadu Ordinance No. IO of
1980) (hereinafter referred to as 'the Ordinance') and the Tamil
Nadu Abolition of posts of part-time Village Officers Act, 1981
(Tamil Nadu Act No. 3 of 1981) (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act)
which replaced the Ordinance. The total number of posts abolished G
•
by the Act is 23,010.

In Tamil Nadu, as in other parts of India, the village has been
the basic unit of revenue administration from the earliest times of
which we have any record. The administration was being carried H
on at the lowest l.evel by a chain of officers in regular gradation one
above the other at the commencement of the Cluistian era. The
{i982] 1 s.c.i.
A same system has been in vogue uptil now. It was generally known
as the borabaluti system ordinarily consisting of twelve functionaries.
In Tamil Nadu, these. functionarie> were known as (I) headl\lan,
(2) karnam or accountant, (3) shroff or notaiar, (4) nirganti, (5)
toty or taliary, (6) potter, (7) smith, (8) jeweller, (9) carpenter, (10)
barber, (II) washerman and (12) astrologer. Of them, the first five
8 only rendered service to Government.

The headman who goes. by various names such as monigar,
potail, naidoo, reddy, peddakapu etc. i2 an important officer. He
represented the Government in the village, collected the revenue and
c had also magisterial and judicial powers of some min or nature.· As
a magistrate he could punish persons for petty offences and as a
Judge could try suits for §Ums of money or other personal property
upto Rs. 10/- in value, there being no appeal against his decision.
With the consent of the parties, he could adjudicate civil claims
upto Rs. JOO/- in value. The headmati has been generally one of
0 the largest landholders in the village having considerable influence
over its inhabitants. The karnam or the village accountant maintained
all the village accounts, inspected all fields in the village for purposes
of gathering agricultural statistics, fixation of assessment and
prevention and penalisation of encroachments, irregular use of
water and verification of tenancy and enjoyment. The nirgantis
E guarded the irrigation sources and regulated the use of water. The
toty or taliary assisted the village acc0untant in his work. By the
end of the ninetellllth century', two Acts Were brought into force
in the Presidency of Madras for the purpose of regulating the
work· of som·e of the village officers. The Madras Proprietary
Estates' Village Service Act, 1894 (Madras Act No. II of 1894)
F dealt with three classes of village officers viz. village accountants,
village headmen and village watchmen or police officers in perma- ,
nently settled estates, in unsettled palaiyams and in inam villages.
It provided for their appointment and remuneration and for the
prevention and summary punishment of misconduct or neglect of
duty on their part and generally for securing their efficiency. The
G Madras Hereditary Village Offices Act, 1895 (Madras Act No. III of
1895) regulated· the succession to certain other hereditary village
offices in the Presidency of. Madras; for the hearing and disposal
of claims to such offices or the emoluments annexed thereto; for the
appointment of persons to hold such offices and the control of the
H holders thereof. The village officers dealt with by this Act were (i). )<
. It. 11.AlllNDRAW v, TAMIL NADU (Venkataramiak, J,) 6JS
village munsifs, ·(ii) potels, monigars and peddakapus, (iii) karnams, A
(iv) nirgantjs, (v) vettis, totis and tar dalgars and (vi) talayariS in-
ryo'twari villages or inam villages, which for the purpose of village
administration, were grouped with. ryotwari villages.
• Under both these statutes, the village offices· were considered
as hereditary in character and the succession to all hereditary village 8
offices devolved on a single heir according to the general ci.stom
and rule of primogeniture governing succession to impartible zamin· .
daris in Southern india. When the person who would otherWise be
entitled to succeed to a hereditary village office was a minor, such
minor was being registered· as the heir of the last holder and some
other person qualified · u11der the statutes in question to discharge c
the duties of the office was being appointed to discharge the duties
of the office until the person registered as heir on attaining majority
or within three years thereafter was qualified to discharge the duties
of the office himself when he would be appointed thereto. If the
person registered as heir remained otherwise disqualified for three
years after attaining majority, he would be deemed to have forfeited D
his rii/ht to office and on such forfeiture or on ·his death, the vacancy
had to be filled up in accordance with the provisions of the statute~
as if he was the last holder of,the office. It is stated that in cases to
which the above two statutes were inapplicable, provision had been
tt1ade by the Standing Orders promulgated by the Board of Revenue
which were known as the Board's Standing Orders tor appointing E
village officers again generally on a hereditary basis. Some of the
other distinct features of the service conditions of the village officers
appointed under the Madras Act No. II of 1894 of the Madras Act
No. III of 1895 or the Board's Standing Orders were that they were
part-time employees of the Government; that the rt!cords maintained
by them were allowed to be retained in their houses that there was no F
, attendance register and no fixed hours of duty were prescribed in their
case. They were appointeCI directly by the Revenue Division8' Officer
and against his order, an appeal lay to the District Revenue Officer
and then a revision to the Board of Revenue and a second revision
to Government. They were not constituted into any distinct service,
There was no provision for reservation of posts of village officers · G
for Scheduled Castes/SCheduled Tribes and backward classes. There
was no miniinum general qualification (prescribed ptior to the year
1970 for persons to be appointed as village officers under the said
statutes or the Board's St~nding Orde~s. It was enough if they
were able to read and to write. No period of probation was pres- u
636 SlJ!>kEME cotJkr REPORTS [198.2] 3 s.c.k.
.>-

cribed after they were appointed. The Fundamental Rules appli·
cable to all other State Government servants, the Pension Rules and
the Leave Rules were not applicable to these village officers. They
could take up part-time work ot occupation after securing necessary
permission Jrom the concerned Revenue authorities. There was no
age of superannuation fixed in their case and they were not entitled
8 to retirement benefits such as gratuity .and 'pension. All village head·
men including those who belonged to Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes had to furnish security in the form of property or
cash the estimated value of which was not less than half the amount
of land revenue and loan demand of the village. They could not be
transferred outside their district. In fact "very rarely they were
c transferred. During the period of leave, no honorarium was paid
to them and during the period of suspension, no subsistence
allowance was paid. The honorarium paid to them was a fixed
amount with no element .of dearness allowance.

D In M. Ramappa v. Sangappa & Ors.(') where this Court
had to consider whether the officers holding the hereditary village
offices under the Mysore Village Offices Act, 1908 which contained
provisions similar to the provisions of the two Madras Acts referred
to above were qualified for being chosen as members of the State
Legislative Assembly, it was held that such officers who were
E appointed to their offices by the Government, though it might
be that the Government had no option in certain cases but to
appoint an heir of the last holder, held offices of profit under the

F
State Government since they held their office by reason of appoint-
ment made by the Government and they worked under the control
and supervision of the Government and that their remuneration was
paid by the Government out of the Government funds and assets.
-
Accordingly this Court came to the conclusion that such village
officers were disqualified under Article 191 (l)(a) of the Constitu·
tion from contesting at an election to the State Legislative
Assembly.
G
In Gazula Dasaratha Rama Rao v. The State of Andhra Pra·
desh & Ors,(') this Court held .that section 6(1) of the Madras Here·
ditary Village Offices Act, 1895 (Madras Act . No. 3 of 1895) whiCh
provided that in choosing persons to..fill the new village offices of
H
(1) [J959J'2 S.C.R. 1167.
(2) [19611 2 s.c.R.931.
K. RA!ENDRAN '·TAMIL NADU (Venkataramiah, J.) 637
A
an amalgamated village under that Act, the Collector should select
the persons whom he considered to be the best qualified from among
the families of the last holders of the offices in the villages which
bad been abolished as a consequence of such amalgamation was void
as it contravened Article I 6 (2) of the Constitution. After the above
decision, instructions· were iss.ued by the Madras Board of Revenue B
• on March 12, 1962 to the effect that in respect of future vacancies
in village offices governed by 'the Madras Act No.II of 1894 and the
Madras ,Act No. III of 189S, the appointments should be made on
temporary basis only following the procedure prescribed under the
Board's Standing Order No. 156. Since it was felt that the above
two Madras Acts which contained provisions providing for appoint-
ment to village offices on hereditary basis we~ violative of Article
c
16 of ihe Constitution in view of the pronouncement of this Court in
Gazula Dasqratha Rama Rao's case (supra), ·the State Legislature pass·
ed the Madras Proprietory· Estates' Village Service and the Madras
Hereditary Village Offices (Repeal) Act, 1968 (Madras Act No.20 of
1968) repealing the above two statutes viz. the Madras Act )'fo. II of D
1894 and the Madras Act No. III of 1895. The said Act was brou-
ght into force with effect from December l, 1968. It extended to the
whole of the State of Madras, except the Kanyakumari district and
the Shencottah taluk of the Tirunelveli district (vide section 1 (2)
of the Madras Act No. 20 of 1968). Sub-section (3) of Section 2 of
that Act, however, provided that every holder of a village, offiice, E
appointed under the Acts r~pealed by it would, notwithstanding the
repeal continue to bold office subject to such rules as may be made
under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution. Section 3 of
that Act directed that any vacancy arising after the date of the

-
commencement of that Act in the village office referred to in sub·
section (3).. of section 2 thereof should be filled up in accordance
1
F
I
with the provisions of the Rules made under the proviso. to Arti·
cle 309 of the Constitution. On December 1, 1968, the Governor of
• Tamil Nadu promulgated a Rule under the proviso to Article 309
of the Constitution providing that "the Standing Orders of the
Board of Revenue applicable to non hereditary village offices shall
apply to every holder of a village office to which the Madras' G
Proprietary Estates Village Service Act, 1894 (Madras Act No. II
of 1894) or the Ma.;Iras Hereditary Village Offices. Act, 1895
(Madras Act No. III. of 1895) was applicable immediately before
the !st day of December, I 968" on which date the Madras Act
No. 20. of 1968 came into force. Pursuant to ' section 3 of the H
Madras Act No. 20 of 1968, the Governor of Tainil Nadu
638 SUPREME COUltT REPORTS (19821 3 s.c.ll.
A promulgated under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution
the TamiJ Nadu Village officers Servii;e Rules, 1970 providing for
the constitutioµ of the Tamil Nadu Village Officers Service consisting
of (i) village headman, additional village headm11n, (ii) village
karnam, additional village karnam and (iii) tal11yari and nirganti and
the method of recruitment to the said posts~ The said Rules came
B into force on December I 6, 1970 and they extended to the whole of
the· State of Tamil Na<lu except the Kanyakumari District and the
Shenootah taluk of the Tirunelveli district. and. the city of Madras.
Rule I 8 of the said Rules, however, .stated that nothing contained
in them would apply to persons, who on the date of coming into
force of the said Rules, were holding the posts of village lieadman
c or additional village headman, village karnam or additional village
katnam either temporarily or permanently. Consequently the
• said Rules were not applied to the holders of village offices who had
been appointed temporarily or permanently under the two repea- ·
led Acts and under the Board's Standing Orders before the date
D on which the said Rules came into force. These Rules
prescribed that every person who made an application for apppoint-
.meot the post of village headtna11 or' additional village headman
or village kitrnam or additional _village karnam should possess the
following qualifications, namely (i) he sl)ould have completed the
S.S.L.C. Examination held by the Government of Tamil Nadu and (ii)
E he should have secured a pass in the special tests specified in cl. (2)
of the table given in Rule 5 thereof in respect of the posts specified
in column (1) thereof. On the same date, the Tamil Nadu Village
Officers (Classification, Contro.1 and Appeal) Rules, 1970 and the
.)._ .
Tamil Nadu Village Officers Conduct Rules, 1970 promulgated under
the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution by the Governor of
F Tamil Nadu came into force. These Rules were applicable not merely
to the village officers appointed after that date but also to those who
had been appointed under the. repealed Acts and under the Board's
Standing Order prior to December I 6, 1970. The Tamil Nad~ Civil ·
Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules dealt with the
disciplinary proceedings that might be instituted· against the village
G officers governed by the them. The Tamil Na.du Village Officers
Conduct Rules provided that the Tamil Nadu Government Servants
Conduct Rules, 1960 as amended from time to time would apply to
the village officers subject to the modification specified in rule 3
thereof which provided that the village officers being part-time
H Government servants might take up part-time worlc or occupation
K. RAJENDRAN v. TAMIL NADU (Venkataramiah, J.) 639

provided that (I) such part-time work or occupation did not interfere A.
with their legitimate duties as village officers and (2) the previous
permission in writing had been applied for and obtained from the
Revenue Divisional Officer concerned if the work or occupation was
confined to the charge village and from the District Collector con-
cerned if the work or occupation extended beyond the charge vill'age.
.From November l~, 1973 all the three sets of Rules which came into
B
force on December 16, 1970, as stated above, became applicable to
the village officers in the Kanyakumari district and the Shencottah
taluk of the Tirun.elveli district also.They, however, continued to be
inapplicable to the city of Madras.
..,,..,.----- c
.
II
In the year 1973, the Administrative Reforms Commission headed
by Mr. T.A. Verghese,. I.C.S. recommended that the existing part-
time village officers should be replaced by regular whole-time
transferable public servants and that they should form part of
the Revenue hierarchy, disciplined in the tradition of that depart-
ment and motivated by the incentive of career advancement
D
a\'llilable in that department. They also recommended that 16,585
survey. villages in the State of Tamil Nadu should be grouped
into 11,954 revenue groups. The Commission further recommended
that the 11,954 revenue groups should be regrouped into larger
village panchayats with a population of about 5,000 and the
annual panchayat tax demand of the order of Rs. 5,000. The
I
Commission· envisaged .that with some marginal adjustment the
enlarged village panchayat would be of the order of 4,000 in the
State of Tamil Nadu and that there should J>e a village officer, a
village clerk and a village peon in respect of each such enlarged village
panchayat and on appointment to these offices, the holders of F
village offices appointed under the two repealed statutes and the
Board's Standing Orders should be removed and the former village
offices should be abolished since the Commission felt that "the
administration at the grass-root level, provided by the present
generation of village officers with feudal traditions, is inconsistent·
with the egalitarian principles aimed at in our democratic constitu- G
tion". The Commission further felt that "the reform of village
administration has high priority, as it would benefit the whole mass
of rural population." The Commission, however, took note of the
fact in paragraph 2. rI of its Report that the Government had, in
the recent years, attempted to remedy the situation by repealing the H
Madras Hereditary Village Offices Act, 1895 and by framins a]set

.
64() SUPREME COURT REl>ORTS (19.821 3 11.c.a.

A ' of
of new service rules for village establishment under· Article 309
the Constitution. But it was of the opinion that the said Rules,
however, did !lot go far enough as they were not applicable to
the existing set of village officers. It was of the view that full-time
officers could be expected to service a much larger area than the
B existing villages or groups of v!llages and such regroupin11 ofvillages
into larger groups had to be done carefully taking into account
lqcal conditions such as compactness of the grjlup, easy inter·
communications, nature of land, nu~ber of h~ldings etc. The
Commission, however, was of the view that such of those among
the existing village headmen and karnams, who had passed
c th1: S.S.L.C. Examfoation might be considered for the posts
of the village officers and village clerks on their past perfor-
mance. Similarly as regards village officers working in the
Kanyakumari district and the Shencottah taluk of the· Tirunel·
veli district which came over to the State of Tamil Nadu
from Kerala in I 956 on the reorganisation of States, the CommissiQll
D observed that most of the village officers of those trans·
ferred territories who were qualified and full·time Government
servants should be absorbed in the new set up as envisaged by
the Commission; On May 17,1975, the Governor of Tamil Nadu.
promulgated the Tami) Nadu Village Officers (appointed under
B.S. Os) Service Rules, 1974 under the proviso to Rule 309 of the
E Constitution in respect of the village officers appointed prior to
December 16, 1970. The above Rules were, however, kept in
abeyance by an order made on July 1, 1975 on receipt of represen-
tations from the village' officers in regard to the fixation of the
age of superannuation at 55 years. On August 24, 1977, the Chief
Minister of Tamil Nadu announced on the floor of the Legislative
F Assembly that the Government proposed to set up a Committee to .
1:xamine whether the posts of karnams could be dispensed with.
Thereafter on October 9,1978, ihe Tamil Nadn Village Officers
,
(appointed under B.S.Os) Service Rules, 1978 were issued _fixing the
age of retirement of the village officers at 60 years. Sub-rule (2) of
Rule 1 of the said R.ules stated that the said Rules would apply to
G
all village officers holding the posts of village headman or additional
. village headman, village karnam or additional village karnam,
talay ari, vetti or nirganti either permanently or temporarily on
December 16, 1970 provided that at the time of their appointment,
they were qualified under the Board's Standing Orders. The Govern-
H
ment thought that the _said Rules . would be applicable to all village
officers who were holding village offices on December_ 16,1970 refer·
)
'·
K. RAIENDRAN v. TAMIL NADU (Venkataramiah, J.) 641

red to in Rule I (2). But some of the holders of the village :offices A
who had been appointed under the Madras Act No. III of 1895
prior to the decision of this Court in Gazula Dasaratha Rama Rao's
case (supra) which as rendered on December 6, 1960, filed writ
petitions on the file of the High Court of Madras stating that the
• Tamil Nadu Village Officers (appointed under the B.S.Os) .Service
Rules, 1978 which fixed the age of superannuation of village officers. B
at 60 years were not applicable to them since on a true construction
of the said Rules, they were inapplicable to them. The High Court
of Madras11llowed the said writ petitions by its judgment ·dated
August 18, 1980 holding: "We have already extracted sub-rule (2) of
rule 1 of the rules. That rule expressly states that the rules will
apply to village officers, who, at the time of their appointment, were
c
qualified under the Board's Standing Orders applicable to them and
.their appoi!'.ltment had been made by the authority competent
under the Board' S• Standing Orders. In respect of these peti-
tioners,· who were appointed under the· provisions· of Madras Act 3
of 1895 before 6th December, 1960, there was no question of their 0
being qualified to be appointed to the village office under the Board's
Standing Orders applicable to them, and their qualifications and .
appointment rested solely on the pro'visions contained in Section lO
of the Act. Consequently the petitioners herein. will not answer the
description contained in sub'.rule (2) of rule (I) of the rules. If
they do not answer the description contained in sub-rule (2) of
rules, the rules are not applicable tothem and therefore, they can
not be required to retire under rule 4 (I} of the ru!es.". · ,•
··-
It would appear that some of the other village officers to whom
the said Rules had been made"applicable had also filed writ petitions
on the file of the High Court questioning the validity of the Rules
F
on the ground that the said Rqles made a discrimination betw6en
them and the ' village officers who were holding office prior
to December 16,1970 to whom the said Rules were held to be
inapplicable by the judgment of the High Court delivered on August
18, 1980 and those petilions were posted for hearing during the
G
first week 'of December, 1980. Before the said petitions were
taken up for hearing the Governor of Tamil Nadu issued the
Ordinance on November 13, 1980 abolishing the posts of part-time
village officers in,the State of Tamil Nadu. Immediately after the
promulagation of the Ordinance; steps were taken to take posses·
sion .of all the records with the village officers who were holding H
pJfices on that day and. to replac~ tl!em by'officers appoillted under
. ' .. -~ "
642 SUPREME COURT REPORTS II 982] 3 S.C.R.

A S•ection 14 of the ordinance. Immediately after the promulgation of
the said Ordinance, some of the village officers' who were
affected by it questioned its validity before this Court in Writ
Petitions Nos. 5880•82 of 1980 and 5921 of 1980. The
other connected writ petitions came to be filed thereafter.
fa the meanwhile the Tamil Nadu State Legislature pdssed the
B Act which is impugned in these petitions replacing the Ordinance.
The petitioners have challenged in these writ petitions the Act also
by seeking appropriate amendment of their petitions.

c
The broad features of the Act are these: The object of the
Act is set out in its preamble. Because the State Government was
of the opinion 'that the system of part-time village officers was out-
moded and did not fit in with the modern needs of village administra-
tion and the State Government had after careful consideration taken .
--- -
a policy decision to abolish all the posts of part-time village offi-
cers on grounds of admillistrative necessity and to introduce a sys-
D tem of whole-time officers to be incharge of village admininistration,
the Act came to be enacted• with effect from November 14,
1980 in the place of the Ordinance. The Explanatory Statement
attached to the Ordinance also/ contained a statement to the same
effect indicating the object of the Ordinance. The expression 'part-
time village officers' is defined in section 2 (e) of the Act as village
E h<,adman (including additional village (headman village) karnam
(including chief karnam and additional village karnam) or Triu11e
officer (who was exercising functions of •three different village officers)
appointed under the Madras Act II of'I 894, the Madras Act III of
1895, the Board's Standing Orders, the Tamil Nadu village Service
F
Rules, 1970 Officers Kuvalar, or any other law but does not include;
Orama Kavalar Orama Paniyalar and Pasana Kavalar. Village Ad-
ministrative. Officer means an officer ·appointed under section 4(1) of
the Act. By sec. 3 of the Act, the posts of part-time village officers •
-
wc:re abolished with effect from November 14, 1980 and every officer
holding post so abolished ceased to hold such post. The Act provided
G for appointment of Village Administrative Officers.· Section 5 of the
Ac:t provided for payment of compensation Jo those who ceased to
be part·tinie village officers calculated in accordance with the
formula mentioned in it. Section 10 of the Act provided that the
Act would not apply to the posts of karnams which were held by
H whole-time Government servants in the city of Madras and the posts
. ofvillage officers and village assistants which were held by the whole·
. K. RAIENDRAN v. TAMIL NADU (Venkataramiah,.J.) 643

time Government servaut in the Ka~yakumari district and
A
• Sheitcottah taluli of the Tirunelveli districts .

Three principal points are urged before us by the petitioners in
these petitions (i) that the Ordinance and the Act are violative of
Art.19(J)(g) of the Constitution, (ii) that they are violative of Article B
311 (2) of the Constitution and (iii) that they contravene Article 14
of the Constitution. The State Government contends that since by
the Orpinance and the Act, certain posts have been abolished, the
officials who were incumbents of the abolished posts cannot raise
·-~ _....-.- any of the grounds raised by them •
.
. _./
c
Entry 41 in List-II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution
confers· the power on the State Legislature to make laws with respect
to State public services subject to the provisions of the Constitution.
Article 309 of the Constitution provides that subject to the provi-
. sions of the Constitution, the State Legislature may regulate the D
recruit111ent ancj conditions of service of persons appointed to public
service~a'!d posts in connection with tl!e affairs of the State. Article
311 (2) of the Constitution states that no person who is a member ·
· of a civil service of the Union or an all-India service or a Civil
service of a State or bolds a civil post under the State shall be dis-
missed or removed or reduced in rank except after .an inquiry in E
which be bas been informed of the charges against him .and given a
reasonable opportunity of being beard in respect of those charges.
Article 14 of the Constitution guarantees equality before the law ·
and equal protection of the laws. It is not disputed that any law
- that is passed in relation to-1! Government employee should not
contravene any of these provisions-Article 19 (l)(g), Article 311 (2) F
---.__ and Article 14 of the Constitution. We shall now proceed to exa-
• mine the case with reference to each of, them.

The power to abolish a civil post is inherent in the right to
create it. The Government h.as always the power, subject, of
course, to the ccmstitutional provisions, to re-organise a· department
G
to provide efficiency and to bring about economy. It can abolish
.an office or post in good fa_ith. The action to abolish a post should
not be jus·t a pretence taken to get rid of an inconvenient focumbent.
We have the following statement of the t&w in American lurispru- H
dence 2nd, Vol. 63 at Pages 648-649 ;
f

644 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1982] 3 S.C.R.

A "37. Manner, sufficiency, validity, and effect.

It is not always easy to determine whet~er a public
office has been abolished~!! is not sufficient merely to
declare that a partic~lar office is abolished, if in fact it is
· not abolished, and the. duties thereof are continued. An •
8 office is abolished wlien the act creating it is.repealed. But
.. the repeal of the statute creating an office, accompanied by
the re-enactment of the substance of it, does not abolish
the office. Abolition .of an ofti'ce may also be brought
' i l
about by a constitutional provision, or by a new constitu·
c tion or a constitutional amendment. A nonconstitutional ~
office may be indirectly abolished as by legislating away
the duties and emoluments of the office.

The legislature may not evade constitutional provi-
sions by a sham or .pretended abolition of an office, as
D .where there is mere colorable abolition of the office for the
purpose of getting rid of its incumbent. This may happen
where an office is. abolished in terms and promptly re-
created under the same or a different name, provided the
legislature does not attach duties and burdens to the new
·office of a character such as to make it in reality a different
E office.

Where an office is duly abolished by the legislature
or'tbe people, ·it ceases to exist and the incumbent is no·

F
longer entitled to exercise the functions thereof, or to claim
compensation for so doing; unless be is under contract
with the state so as to come within the protection of the
constitutional inhibition against impairment of the obliga-
tion of contract. Since a de jure offi9e i's generally essential
to the existence· of a de fr.·cto officer, persons cannot act
~··'

•
-~

as de facto officers of an office which has been abolished."
G
H. Eliot Kapla6 writes in bis book entitled "The Law of
Civil Service" at pages 214-115 thus:

"8. "Good Faith" in Abolition of Positions-'-There of
course, is no vested right to employment in the public ser-
H vice. The notion>' much too prevalent, that any one who
bas been appointed :ifter a~ompetitive examination is entit-
/ ' "
k. RAJENl'>RAN I'. TAMIL NADU (Venkataramiah, J.) 64S
'
led td be retained in the service is erroneous. where there is
any reasonable justification for eliminating positions in the
public seivice, even where such abolition of positions may
be subject to judicial review, the inclination of the.Courts
. is not to interfere, avoiding substitution of judicial wisdom
· or judgment for that of the admini~trator.
B

A position is not lawfully, abolished solely because it
has been left vacant for a short period of time and subse-
quently filled by another appointee than the one laid off
and entitled to re-employment.
c
· Good _faith of a head of, department in abolishing a
position on alleged grounds of economy has often been
challenged. Most courts' have held that the issue of good
faith on ihe part of an administrative official.is one of law
solely for 'the court to pass on, and not an issue of fact D
which may be oubmitted to a jury for determination. The
jury may determine the facts, which the court in turn may
find as a matter of law constitute bad faith; but a.verdict
by a jury that a department head had acted in bad faith in
abolishing a positron was set aside as a conclusion of law,
1 and not properly finding of fact. What constitutes· bad E
\ fajth as a matter of law 'in abolishing positions must be
determined by the precise facts in each case .. As a general
rule, where positions are purported to be eliminated and
incumbents laid ,off, and thereafter· identical or similar

-
.
•
positions are re-established and . the positions filled ,by
others not entitled undeflthe civil. service law and rules to
such employments, the' courts will not hesitate to order
re-emplo}ment of the laid off employees;"
F

\ /
The above passages sum up the. law on the question Of aboli-
tion of posts in, civil service as it prevails'.in United States of G
An\erica. .

' England too ther~ is provision for compulsory premature
In
retirement in the public interest on · structural grounds, grounds of H
limited efficiency and redundancy. (Vide paragraph 1303, Vol. 8
Halsbury's Laws of England 4th Edn.)
sbPl1.i!MI! CObkt il.BPoRTS [19821 j s.c.lt.
A In the instant case, the abolition of the posts of village officers
is sought to be achieved by a piece of legislation passed by the State
Legislature. Want of good faith or malafides cannot be attributed
to a Legislature. We have only to see whether the legislation is a
colourable one lacking 'in legislative competenee- or whether · it
transgresses any other constitutional limitation.
B
So far as the. argument based on Article 19 (!) (g) of the .._ I
Constitution is concerned, we are bound by the view expressed by
th~ Constitution Ben9h of this Court in Fertilizer Corporation Kamgar
Union (Regd), Sindri & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors.( 1) in which
c Chandrachud, C.J. has observed at pages 60-61 thus :.

"The right to pursue a calling or to carry on an
occupation is not the same thing as the right to work in a
particular post under a contract of employment. If the
workers are retrenched consequent upon and on account
D of the sale, it will be open to them to pursue their rights
and remedies under the Industrial Liiws. But the point to
be noted is that the closure of an establishment in which
a workman is for the time being employed does not by itself
infringe his fundamental right to carry on an occupation
which is guaranteed by Article 19 (!) (g) of the Constitu-
E tion.· Supposing a law were passed preventing a certain
category of workers from accepting employment in a ferti-
liser factory, it would be possible to contend then that the ·
workers have been deprived of their right to carry on an
occupation. Even assuming that some of the workers may
F
eventually have to be retrenched in the instant case, it will
not be possible to say.. that their right to carry· on· an
occupation has been violated. It would be open to them,
though undoubtedly it will not be easy, to find out other
avenues of employment as industrial workers. Article
-
19 (I) (g) confers a broad and general right which is avail-
ble to all persons to do work of any particular kind and of
G
their choice. It do.es not confer the right whold a parti-
cular job or to occupy a particular post of one's choice.
Even under Article 311 of the Constitution, the right to
continue in service falls with the abolition of the post in

(I) [1981] 2 S.C.R, 52.
k. RAJENbRAN V. tAMIL NADU (Venkataramiah, J.) 641
whicli the person is working. The workers in the instant A
• case can no more complain of the infringement of their
fundamental right under Article 19 (I) (g) than can a
Government servant complain of' the termination of his
employment on the abolition of his post. The choice and
freedom of the workers to work as industrial workers is
not affected by the sale. The sale may at the highest affect B
their locum, but it does not affect their locus, to work as
industrial workers. This is enough unto the day on
Art. 19 (I) (g)."

In view of the above ruling, it is not possible to hold that c
the Act violates Article 19 (I) (g) as it does not affect the right of
any of the incumbents of the posts to carry on any occupation of
their choice even though they may not be able to stick on to the
posts which they were holding. '
\

We shall next examine the argument based on Article 311 (2) D
of the 9onstitution. We have already seen in the Fertili1er Cor-
poration Kamgar Union's case (supra) the observation· to the effect :
'Even under Article 31 t of the Constitution, the right to continue
in service falls with the 'abolition of the post in which the person is
working.' It is said that the 'act of removing a person ·from a chair.
is different from the act of removal of the chair itself' . although the E
incumbent loses the chair in both the cases. Since it is strenuously
urged before us that there is some amount of contradiction in some
of the rulings of this Court, we shall review the legal position' to the
extent ·necessary before reaching ·our own conclusion on . the
question.
F
k
. ,,.
The doctrine that the tenure of a holder of a civil post is
dependent upon, the pleasure of the Crown is peculiar to English
~i
I ,., law.

.
In India Article'3IO of the Constitution of India provides:'
G
":i!O (1) Except as expressly provided by this Cons-
titution, every person who is a member of a defence service
or of a civil service of the Union or ofan all India service
or holds any post connected with defence or any civil post H
under the Union holds office during the pleasure of the
..
President and every person who. is a member of a civil'
'
sUUll!ilE COURT Rlll'ORTS [1982] 3 s.c.tt.

A service of a State or holds any civil post under a State ·
holds office during the pleasure of the Governor of the
State.

( (2) Notwithstanding that a person holding a civil post
under the Union or a State holds office during the pleasure
B of the President or, as the case may be, of the Governor of
the State, any contract. under which a person, not being a
1
member of a defence service or of an all-India service or of
a civil service of the Union or a State, is appointed under
the Constitution to hold such a post may, if the President"
or the Governor, as the case may be, deems it necessary fa
c order to secure the services of ·a person having special
qualifications, provide for the payment to him of compensa-
tion, if before the expiration of an agreed period that
post is abolished or he is, for reasons. not connected with
any misconduct on his part, required to vacate that ·post."
D •
While _ the doctrine of pleasure incorporated in Atticle
310 cannot be controlled by any legislation; the exercise of
that power by the President or the Governor, as the case
may be, is however made subject to the other provisions of the
Constitution, one of them being Article 311, which is, not made
E subject to any other provision of the Constitution and is paramount
in the field occupied by it. The contention urged before us is that
every kiQd of termination of employment under Government would
attract Article 311 (2) of the Constitution_ and a termination on
the abolition of the post cannot be an exception. While construing
•
Article 311 (2) of the Constitution, as it stood then, in Parashotam
F Lal Dhin~ra v. Unfon of India,(') Das, C.J. observed:

"The Government cannot terminate his service unless
it is entitled to do so (I) by virtue of a special term of the·
contract of employment, e.g., by giving the requisite notice
G provided by the contract or (2) by the -rules governing the
conditions of his serVice, e.g., on attainment of the age of
superannuation prescribed by the rules, or on the fulfilment
of rule conditions for compulsory retirement or subject to
certain safeguards, on the abolition of the post or on being
H
(1) (1958] S.C.R. 828 @ 841. ,J.._
I .
It. 1!.AJENDRAN v. TAMIL NADU (Venkatarami/ih, J.) 64<f
· found guilty, after a proper enquiry on notice to him, of A
misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or any other disqualifi-
cation." ' (emphasis added)

Again at pages 857-858 in the same iu,dgment, the learned
Chief Justice observed : B I

"The foregoing conclusion, however, does· not solve
the entire problem, for it bas yet to be ascertained as to
'when an order for the termination of service is inflicted as
and by waY, of punishment and when it is not. It has
already been said that where a person is appointed, substan- · c
lively to a permanent post in Government service, he
normally acquires a right to hold the post until under the .
rules, he attains the age of SU,Perannuation or is compulsorily,
retired and in the absence of' a contract, express or implied,
or a service rule, he cannot be turned out of his post unless
the post itself is abolished or unless he is guilty of miscon- D
duct, negligence, .inefficiency or other disqualifications .and
I
appropriate proceedings are taken under ' the service rules
read with Art. 3 IL (2)." (emphasis added)

It may be mentioned here that the' words "subject to certain E
safeguards" found in the earlier extract are not used with reference
to abolition of posts in the above extract. Later on, Das, C.J.
observed that the Court should apply two tests namely (I) whether
the servant had a right to the post or the rank or (2) whether he
had been visited with evil consequences such as loss of pay and
.._, allowances, a stigma affect.ing his future career in order to determ.irie F
whether the removal of 'an officer from a post attracted Article
311 (2). The decision in Parshotam Lal Dhingra's case (supra)
• was reviewed by a Bench of seven Judges of this Court in Moti Ram
Deka etc. v. General Mavager, N.E.F. Railways, Maligaon, Pandu
etc.(') Io that case the question which. arose for consideration was
whether Rules,.148 (3) and 149 (3) of the Indian Railway Establish- G
. ment Code violated either Art.icle 311 (2), or Article 14 of the Cons-
titution. Sub-rules (I) and (2) of Rule 148 dealt with temporary
railway servants and apprentices respectively. The relevant part of
Rule 148 (3) read thus:
ff
(t) 119641 s s.c.R. 61!3.
65() SUPllEMil COtJkT RaPokrs (19821 3 s.c.ll:

A "148' (3) Other (non-pensionable) railway servant :-
The service of other (non-pensionable) railway servants
shall be liable to termination on notice on either side for
the periods shown below. Such notice is .not however
required in cases of dismissal or removal as a disciplinary
measure after compliance with the provisions of Clause (2)
8 of Article 311 of the Constitution, retirement on attaining
the age of superannuation, and termination of service due
to m·ental. or physical incapacity."

Rule 149 was brought into force in the place of Rule 148 in
c the case of pensionable servants in November, 1957. Here again,
sub-rules (1) and (2) of Rule 149 dealt with temporary railway
servants and apprentices. Rule 149 (3) read thus :

'~149 (3) Other railway servants :-The services of
other railway servants shall be liable to termination on
notice on either side for the periods shown below. Such
D
notice is not however, required in cases of dismissal or
removal as a disciplinary measure after compliance with
the provisions of clause (2) of Article 311 of the Constitu-
tion, retirement on attaining the age of superannuation, and.
termination of service due to mental or.physical incapacity."
E
The majority judgment in this case, however, observed that
• a Government servant on being appointed to a post permanently
acquired a right to hold the post under the. Rules until he attained
the age 1of superannuation or was compulsorily retired or was found
guilty of an act of misconduct in accordance with Article 311(2)
It disapproved the statement found in Parshotam Lal Dhingra's case
(supra) at pages 857-858 to the extent it recognised the removal of
a permanant Government servant under a contract express or imp· ·
lied or a service rule. After referring to one passage at page 841 and. •
another at page 843 in Parshotam Lal Dhingra' s case, Gajendragad·
kar, J. (as he then was), who delivered the majority judgment
G in Moti Ram Deka's case (supra) observed at pages 718-719 thus:

'Reading these two observation.s together, there can
be ·no doubt that with the exception of appointments held
under special contract, the Court took the view that
H wherever a civil servant was appointed to a permanent post
substantively, be bad a right to hold that post until he reach-
ed the age of superannuation or was compulsorjll". retired,
t. RArnNDRAN v. fAMIL. NADU Wenkataramiah,
\
J.) \
651
,A
or. the post was abolished.
I
In all other cases, if the services
.
of the said servant were terminated, they would have to be
•
in conformity with the provisions of Art. 311 (2), because
termination in such· cases amounts to removal. The two
statement; of the law to which we have just referred do
not leave any room for doubt on this point." (emphasis
added) 6

It may be noticed that removal of a Government servant from a
post on its abolition is recognised in the abo've passage as a circnm-
stance not attracting Article 311(2) of the Constitution. The Court
after a review of all the decisions. before lt including tbe decision in c
Parshotam Lal Dhingra's case (supra) held that the above two Rules
148 (3) and 149 (3) which authorised the removal officers holding
the posts substantively by issuing a mere notice infringed Article 311
(2) of the Constitution. The question of abolition of posts did not arise
for consideration in this case. The validity of removal of a Govern-
ment servant holding a permanent post on its abolition was consi- D
dered by Desai; J. and Chandrachud, J. (as he then was) in P. V.
·,Naik & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra & Anr.( 1) The learned Judges
held that the termination of service of a Government servant conse-
quent upon the abolition of posts did not involve punishment at all
and therefore did not attract Article 311(2).
E
Since much reliance is placed by, the petitioners on the decision
of this Court in State of Mysore v. H. Papanna Gowda & Anr. etc,(')
it is necessary to examine that case in some· detail. The facts of
that case were these : The respondent in that case was holding the
post of a chemical assistant in the Agricultural Research Institute,
Mandya in the Department of Agriculture of the State of Mysore.
F,
Under the Mysore University of Agricultural Sciepces Act, 1963
• which came into force on April 24, 1964, the University of Agri-
cultural Sciences was established. Sub-section (5) . of section 7 of
that Act provided: ·
G
"7. (5) Every person employed in any of the colleges
specified in sub-section (I} or in any of the institutions re-
ferred to in sub-section (4) immediately before the appointed

(1) AIR 1967 Bom. 482. ,
(2) [1~71 J 2 s.c,R. 831. .
H
65~ strJ>kllMll cotrR.t klll>OR.ts fl 982) j s.c.lt

day or the date specified in the order under sub-section
(4), as the case may be, shall, as from the appointed day or
the specified date, become an employee of the University on
such terms and conditions as may. be determined by- the
· State Government in consultation with the Board."

8
The Board referred to in the above sub-section was the Board
of Regents of the University. By a notification dated September 29,
1965 issued under section ·7(4) and (5) of that Act, the control and

-
management of a m,unber of research and educational institutions
·under the Department of Agriculture were transferred to the Univer-
c sity. Alongwith them, the Institutdn which the respondent was wor-
king was also transferred to the lfniversity. The result was that the
respondent ceased to be an employee of the State Government and
became an employee of the University. Thereupon he questioned
•he validity of sub-sections (4) and (5) of section 7 of the said Act
on the ground that they contravened Article 311 (2) of the Consti-
0 tution befqre the High Court of Mysore, which upheld his plea. The
. State Government questioned the decision of the High Court before
this Court in the above case. This Court affirmed the deci-
sion of the High Court holding that Artide 311(2) of the Consti-
tution had been contravened as the prospects of the resp·ondent in
Government service were affected. In this case the parties proceeded
E OD the basis that there was no abolition of post as such as can be
seen from the· judgment of the High Court. The only ground was
whether when the post continued to exist though under a different
master, in this case it being the University, it was open to .the
State Government to transfer its employee to the control of a new
master without giving an option to him. to state whether he would
F continue as a Government employee or not. The court was not
concerned about the consequences of abolition of a post as 'such ·
in this case. As can be seen from the judgment of the High
Court in this case (vide Papanna Gowda· v. State of Mysore(')
one serious infirmity about the impugned provisiorls was that.
G whoever was holding the post in any of the institutions trans-
ferred to the University automatically ceased to be the Government
servant. Even if the case was one where abolition of the post was
involved, the law should have made provision for the determition
of the employees in the cadre in question who would cease to he
H
(I) (1969] S.L.R. 50 @ 59.
K. RAJENDRAN v. TAMIL NADU (Venkataramiah, J.) 653

Government employees with ·reference to either the principle of
A
• 'last come, first go' or any other reasonable principle and given them
an option to join the service under the new master instead of just
tr,ansferring all the employees who were then working in the insti-
. tutions to the University. The impugned provisions were not rules
dealing with the age of superannuation or compulsory retirement.
B
Nor the ca5e was dealt with on the principle of ab.olition of posts.
The decision in this case !ilk.es its colour from the peculiar facts
involved in it. One principle that may be deduced from this aecisfon
is that ifa post is not a special post and its incumbent is a member
of a cadre his rights as a member of the cadre should be considered
before decidipg whether he has cased to be a government employee
on the abolition of the post. It is likely that on such scrutiny the1
c
services of another member of the cadre may have to be terminated.
on its ab9lition or some other member of the cadre may have to be
reverted to a lower post from which he may have been promoted
to the cadre in question by the application of the principle of 'last
come,'first go', If, however, where the post abolished is a special post D
or where an entire cadre is abolished ·cadre and there is no lower cadre
to which the members ·of the abolished can reasonably be reverted,
the application of this principle may not arise at all. In the circum-
stances, the petitioners cannot derive' much assistance from this
decision.
E
The question whether Article 311 (2) would be contravened if.
Government servant holding a civil post substantively lost his employ-
meot by reason of the abolition of the post held .by him directly
arose for consideration before this Court in M. Ramanatha Pillai
v. The state of Kera/a & Anr.(1) Two poipts were examined in that
case: (i) whether the Government had a right to abolish a post in a
F
1
service a.nd (ii) whether abolition of a post was dismissal or remo-
• val withinthe meaning of ~rticle 311 of the Constitution. The Court
held that a post could be abolished in good faith but the order
abolishing the post might lose its effective character if it was establi-
shed to have been made arbitrarily, mala fide or as a mask of some
G
penal action within the meaning of Article 311 (2). After consi'
dering the effect of the decisions in Parashotam Lal Dhingra's case
· (supra), Champakial Chiman/a( Shah v. The U~ion of India,('-)

11) [I974J l!S.il.R. 515.
(2) [1964] 5 S.C.R. 190. H

,.
)
'
654 llUPRl!MB COURT REPORTS {1982J R, ,I
t '•
A Motl Ram Deka's case (supra), Satish Chandra Anand v. The ffnion
'
1

of India (') and SI.yam Lal v. State of U.P. and Union of India.(") }his
Court observed in this case at page 526 thus:

"The abolition of post may have the consequence of
ter:nination of service of government servant. Such termi·
8 nation is not dismissal or removal within the meaning of
Article 311 of the Constitution. The opportunity of show-
i'ng cause against the proposed penalty of dismissal or
,removal does not therefore arise in th.e case of abolition of
post. The abolition' of post is not a personal' penalty
against the government servant. The abolition of post is
c an executive policy decision. Whether after a~olition of
the post, the Government servant. who was holding the
post would or could be offered any employment under the
State would therefore be a matter of policy decision of the
Government because the abolitio'n of post does not confer
on the person holding the abolished post any right to hold
D the post.".

The true effect of the decision in Moti Ram Deka' s case (supra)
on the question of applicability of Article 311 (2) of the Constitu·
tion to a case of abolition of post has bee'n clearly explained in this
case and we have very little to say anything further on it. Suffice it
E to say that the Moti Ram Deka's case (supra) is no ·authority for the
proposition that Article 311 (2) would be attracted in such a case.

The above view was followed by this Court in State of Haryana,
v. Des Raj Sa'ngar & Anr.(1) to which one of us (Murtaza Fazal Ali,
•
J.) was a party. Khanna, J. speaking for the Court observed at
F pages 1037-38 thus : .
•
"Whether a post should be retained or abolished is;j
essentially a matter for the Government to decide. As lo~.
as such decision of the Government is taken in good faith '
G the same cannot be set asid~ by the court. It is not open
to the court to go behind the wisdom of the decision and
substitute its own · opinion for that of the Government on
the point as to whether a post should or should not be

H (I) [1953] S.C.R. 655.
(2lj[l955] 1 S.C.R. 26.
.. (3) (1976],2.S.C.R, .10~4.
t
K. RAJENDRAN v. TAMIL NADU (Venkataramlah, J.) 655

.. abolished. The decision to abolish the post should, how-
ever, as already mentioned, be taken in good faith and be
not used as a ·cloak or pretence to terminate the services
A

of a person holding that post. fo case it is found on consi- ·
deration of the facts of a case that the abolition of the post
was only a device to terminate the services of an employee,
the aboliiion of the post would suffer from a serious infir- l.l
mity and would be liable to be set aside. The termination
of a post in good faith and the consequent termination of
the services of the incumbent of that post would not attract
Article 311." ·

c
Before concluding our discussion on this topic, it is necessary
to refer to a decision of the Jammu and Kashmir High Court in
Abdul Kha/ik Renzu & Ors. v, The State of Jammu and Kashmir(') to
.. which one of us · (Murtaza Fazal Ali, J. (as he then was) was a
party in w)lich the validity of the abolition of posts constituting the
special police squad of the State of Jammu and Kashmir was ques- D
tioned. In that case, the High Court while recognising the power
of the State Govetnment to abolish the posts and to terminate the
' .
services of the incumbents of such posts held that such action could
be validly taken only subject to certai'n safegu1;1rds anp in the absence
of any such safeguards the abolition Wa5 bad. The High Court did
not clearly spell out the nature and extent of .safeguards referred to E
therein. The High Court relied on the words 'subject to certain
:>·· safeguards, on the atiolition of posts' in the passage occurring at
page 841 in Parshotam Lal Dhingra's case (supra) which is extracted
• above to reach the conclusion that unless the abolition of posts was
. accompanied by such safeguards, Article 311 would be infringed.
With respect, it should be stated that the High Court did not notice
F
that in another passage at pages 857-858 in the same decision, which
• is also.extracted above, the abolition of posts referred to tkerein,
was unqualified. In this passage there is no reference to any safe-
guards at all. Probably the 'safeguards' referred to in the passage
at page 841 in Parshotam Lal Dhlngra' s case (supra) meant an aboli- G
tion of posts which was in good "faith and not a pretence of abolition
•of a post resorted to in order to get rid of its incumbent and the
creation of tlte same post with a different form or name with a new
incumbent. The above view of the lligh Court of Jammu and
'Kashmir is however, in conflict with the decision in Ramanatha H
(1) AIR 1965 J & K U.
656 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982} 3 s.c.k. I

A /
Pillai' s case (supra) and hence must be considered as having been
overruled by · this ·Court. In modern administrations, it is
necessary to recongnise the existence of the power with the
Legislature or the Executive to create or abolish posts in the civil
service of the State. The volume of administrative work\ the
measures of economy and the need for streamlining the administra-
tion to make it more efficient may induce the State Government
to Il)ake alterations in the staffing patterns of the civU service
necessitating either the increase or the decrease in the, number of
posts. This 1power is inherent in the,-very concept .of governmental
administration. To deny that power to the Government is to
c strike at the very roots of proper public administration. The power . ..____
I
to abolish a post which may result in the holder thereof ceasing
to be a Government servant has got to be recognised. But we
may hasten to add that any action legislative or executive taken ·
pursuant to tha_t power is always subject to judicial review. •
D
It is no\ doubt true. that Art,icle' 38 and Article 43 of the
i Constitution insist that the State, should endeavour to find .sufficient
work for the people so that they may put their capacity to work
into economic use and earn a fairly good living. But these articles
do not mean that every body should be, provided with a job in the
E civil service of the State and if a person is provided with one he
should· not be asked to leave it even for a just cause. If it were not
so, there would be no justification for a small percentage of the
population being in Government service and in receipt of regular
income and a large majority of them . remaining outside with no
guaranteed means of . living. It would certainly be an .ideal state of •
F 1
affairs if work could be found for all the able bodied men and
women and everybody is guaranteed the right to participate in the
production of national wealth and to enjoy the fruits thereof. But
we are today far away from .that goal. The question whether a
person who ceases to be a Government servant according to law
should be rehabilitated by giving an. alternative employment is, as
G the law stands today, a matter of policy on which the Court has
no voice.

On a fafr construction of the provisions of ArtiCle 311 (2) of
H the Constitution .and a considetati6n of the judii:ial precedents
having a bearing on the question, we are of the vie\V that it is not
possible to hold that the termination of ~ervi~e llrouiiht about ht '
'
K. RAJBNDRAN v. TA ..IL NADU (Venkataramiah, J.) 657

the abolition of a post effected in good faith attracts Article 311 (2). A
An analysis of Article 311 (2) shows that it guarantees to a person
who is a member of a civil service of the Union or an all-India
service or a civil service of a State or holds a civil post the right to
defend himself in any proceeding leading to his dismissal, removal
or reduction in rank. It requires that in such a case an inquiry
should precede any such action, at that inquiry be should be infor- B
.• med of the charges against him and given a r~asonable opportunity
of being heard in respect of- those charges. Where it is proposed
after such inquiry to impose upon him any such 'penalty, such
penalty may be imposed on the basis of the evidence adduced during
such inquiry and it shall not be necessary to give such person any
opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed. c
The second proviso to Article 311 (2) of the Constitution sets out
the circumstances when that clause would not apply. These provi-
sions show that Article 311 (2) deals with the dismissal, re~oval,
or reduction in rank as a measure of1penalty on proof of an'act of
misconduct on the part of the -official concerned. This fact is
emphasised by the introduction of the words 'an inquiry in which he
0
has been informed of the charges against him' in Art. 311(2) when it
was substituted in the place of the former clause (2) of Article 311 .
by the Constitution (Fifteentb. Amendment) Act, 1963 which came
into force on October 5, 1963. In the cir6umstances, it is difficult to
hold that either the decision in Motl Ram Deka' s case (supra) or the E
decision in Papanna Gowda' s case (supra) lays down that the provi-
sions of Article 3 H (2) should be complied with before the servi-
ces of a Government servant are terminated as a consequence of
the abolition of the post held by him for bona fide reasons. In view
of the foregoing, it cannot be said that the Act impugned in these

- petitions by which the village offices in the State of Tamil Nadu were
abolished contravenes Article 311(2) of the Constitution.

We have now to consider the submission based on Article 14
F

of the Constitution. This aspect of the case bas to be
examined from two angles- (i) whether the ·step taken by
the Legislature to abolish the village offices in question is so
G
arbitrary asto conflict· with Article 14 of the, Constitution and (ii)
whether unequals have been treated as equals by the Legislature.

While dealing with the first point it is to be observed that the H
posts of village officers which were governed by the Madras Act II of
1894, the ~adras Act III qf 1895 ~1!4 the ~o~rd's Standin~ Ord~r~
658 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1982) 3 s.c.R.

A were feudalistic in character and the appointments to those posts
were g_~verned by the law of primogeniture, the family in which the
applicant was born, .the village in which he was born, and the
fact whether he owned any property in the village or
not. 'fhose factors are alien to modern administrative service and
B. are clearly opposed to {\rticles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. No
minimun educational qualifications had. been prescribed. It was
enough if the applicants knew reading and writing in the case of
some of them. The posts were not governed by the regular service
rules applicable generally to all officials in the State service. Rightly
therefore, the Administrative Reforms Commission recommended
c their abolition and reorganisation of the village service. The rele-
vant part of the Report of the Administrative Reforms Commission
reads thus:

"The concept of service was conspicuously absent in this
D relationship. Village officers were part-time employees
and not subject to normal civil service discipline. They do
not function from public offices where they were expected to
receive people and transact public business. All accounts,
survey and registry records were in their private custody.
Villagers had to go to the residences of Village officers and
E await the latter's convenience· for referring to public
records or for getting extracts from them. This reduced the
accessibilty particularly of "high caste" village officers to
the poor farmers of the "backward and untouchable"
communities. Their emoluments for the part-time service,

F
were meagre and appeard to be an honorarium rather than
a living wage. Communications and living conditions
in villages being difficult, subordinate inspecting officers
were dependent on the private hospitality of village officers
during their official visits. These factors led to the village
-
officers developing an attitude of condescension in their
dealings with villagers. Even though the hereditary
G principle was held to be unconstitutional recently,
the members of their famlies still get preferential treatment,
even if informally, in filling up vacant offices. In recent
times, village officers have generally ceased to be leading
and affluent ryots and are reduced to earn their livelihood
H Jar!lely through the misuse. of their position."
K. RAJENDRAN •• TAMIL NADU (Venkataramiah, J.) 659

The problems involved in the reorganisation of Revenue
A
villages in Tamil Nadu were also discussed in the Report of Mr.S.P.
Ambrose, I.A.S. submitted to the State Government in January,
1980. In the ~ourse of the Report, he observed:

B
"4.2 Re-organisation of Revenue Villages·

4.2.1. In view of the considerable increases in the
total beriz of villages, particularly those with extensive
irrigated areas, new rules ,for the regulation and distri-
bution of water in the project ·areas and in old ayacut areas,
and the reduced work and responsibilities of the talayaris
c
on account of the increase in the strength of the regular
Police establishments the norms, for determining the
strength of the villagee establishment, as laid down in B.P.
Ms. No. 324, dated the 9th December 1910, read with B.P.
,Ms. No. 231, dated the 23rd February 1921, no longer D·
held good.
'
4.2.2. The size of the survey villages vary widely; 4.77
hectares is 'the extent of the smallest village and 20,947
hectares is the extent of the biggest village. In terms of
population, the sm~llest has population of 33, while the E
largest has a population of 12, 777. Even though survey
villages have been grouped to form convenient revenue
groups for purposes of village administration, the size

-
of revenue groups also vary widely. With the increases in
the area cultivated, area irrigated (both from Government
and private sources) and the number of pattas the work F
load in most villages has increased considerably now. The
• question for consideration is whether a comprehensive exer-
cise to reorganise the revenue villages into convenient and
viable village administrative units with reference to the
existing work load should be attempted, and thereafter to
revise the strength of the village establishment by laying
G
down fresh norms for determing its strength. This will
be a major administrative exercise. If convenient village
administrative units with, more or less, equal work load are
to be constituted, several factors like area cultivated (gross
H
and net), area irrigated, crop pattern, population, number
of pattadars and beri~ Q§Ve to be taken into acco11nt
'·· • •• ,lo•·, I
660 . SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1982] 3 s.c.R.
0

A Before this is attempted, the major policy issue is whether
to continue the present part-time system of village offi-
cers or· to have regular, transferable Government servants
as Village Officers in charge of bigger administrative
nnits as recommended by the Administrative Reforms
Commission.''
B
Having regard to the abolition of similar village offices in the .,
neighbouring States of Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh and the
agitation in the State of Tamil Nadu for reorgapisation of village
service, it cannot be said that the decision to abolish the village -
offices which were feudalistic in character and' anachronisms in the · ·-.I..~
c modern age was arbitrary or unreasonable. Another aspect of the
same question is whether the impugned legislation is a colourable
one passed with the object of treating the incumbents of village
offices in an unjust way .. A similar contention was rejection by this
Court in B.R. Shankaranarayaiia and Ors. v. The State of Mysore
and Ors.( 1) in which the validity of the Mysore Village Offices Aboli-
D tion Act (14 of 1961) which tried to achieve more or less a similar
object arose for consideration, with the following observation.s at
pages 1575-1576:

"(13) As pointed out by this Court in Gajapati Narayan
E Deo's case, AIR 1953 S.C. 375, the whole doctrine of
colourable legislation .resolves itself into the question of
competency of a particular legislature to enact a particular
Jaw. If the legislature is competent to pass the particular
law, the motives which impel it to pass the law are really
irrelevant. It is open to the Court to scrutinize the law
F to ascertain whether the legislature by device, purports to
make a law which, though in form·appears to be within
its sphere, in effect and substance, reaches beyond it.
+
(14) Beyond attempting the argument that the
G impugned Act is a piece of colourable legislation, learned
Counsel for the appellant has not succeeded in substan-
tiating bis contention that the Act and the rules made there-
under are merely a device for removing the present incum-
bents from their office. The provisions of the Act and the
H
()) AIR 1966 ~.C. !~7!.
k. kAIENbkAN v. TAMIL NAbiJ (Venicataramiah, J,) 661
rules made thereunder plainly provide for the abolition of
hereditary village offices and make those offices stipendiary
posts. The Act makes no secret of its intention to abolish
the hereditary posts.

(15) It is argued that even after abolition, the same
posts are sou.ght to ,be continued. It is no doubt true that
the names of the offices · have not been changed but there
is a basic structura) difference between the posts that have
been abolished. The posts created by the new Act are
stipendiary posts. They carry salaries according to the
grades created by the rules. The incumbents are transfer- c
able and their service is pensionable. Different qualifications
are prescribed for the new posts. From a consideration of
the incidents attaching to the new posts it is clear that the
old posts have been abolished and new posts have been
created and that the whole complexion of the posts has
been changed. · D

(I~) The result is that in our op1mon the impugned
Act cannot be held to be a piece of colourable legislation
and as such invalid." -
. I E
' A learned discussion on all the points raised in the above case
is foqnd in the judgment of the High Court of Mysore in B.H.
Honna/ige Gowda v. State of Mysore and Anr.(1) Hence the above
contention has to be rejected.

.... The next contention of the petitioners which is of some subs-
-..__ tance and which is based again on Artie.le 14 needs to be examined
F

-·here. It is seen from section 2 (e) of the Act that the expression
'part-time village officer' is defined as follows :·

"2. (e) "part-time village officer" means Village G
Headman .(inclu~ing A~ditional Village Headman, Village
Karnam (ll)Cludmg Chief Karnam and Additional Village
Karnam) or Triune Officer appointed under -

H
(I) AIR 1964'Mysore 84
662 .Stll>RllME COURT REPORTS (1982] 3 s.C.R •

A (i) the Madras Proprietary Estates') Village Service Act,
1894 (Madras Act II of 1894) or the Madras. Heredi-
tazy Village Offices Act, 1895 (Madras Act III of
1895) ;

(ii) the Boa.rd's Standing Orders ;
8
(iii) the Tamil Nadu Village Officers Service Rules, 1970 or
any other rules made under the proviso to Article 309

-
of the Constitution ; or

(iv) any other law,
c -- _-.--...._ ~-

but does not include Grama Kuvalar, Grama Paniyalar
and. Pasana Kavalar;"

By section 3 of the Act, the posts held by the part-time village
. officers, as defined above, are abolished. As a consequence of the
D above provision not merely posts of officers appointed under the
Madras Act No. II of 1894, the Madras Act No. III of 1895 and the
Board's Standing Orders prior to December 16, 1970 but also the
posts held by officers appointed after that date under the Rules made
under the proviso to Article ·309 of the Constitution i.e. The Tamil
Nadu Village Officers Service Rules, 1970 or any other rule made by
E the Governor have been abolished. It is argued that the abolition
of posts ofofficials appointed after December 16, 1970 under the
Rules made under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution is
violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. We ha.ve given our

F
anxious consideration to this submission. Any classification should
satisfy two tests-(i) that there exists an inielligible differentia
between those who arc grouped together and those who are not
included in the group and (ii) that there exists a reasonable nexus
between the differentia and the object for which classification is
· made. As stated earlier the object of the impugned legislation is to
•
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abolish posts which were part-time in nature and which had come
G into existence under laws which were feudalistic in character and
to replaceithem by posts held by new incumbents who are recruited
under it. The question for consideration is whether the grouping
together of the part-time posts mentioned in section 2 (e) of the
Act is unconstitutional. There is no dispute that upto Decem -
H ber 16, 1970 all appointments to village offices were being made
under the two Madras Acts referred to above and the Board's
k, llAJEN!>RAN V. TAMIL NAl>U (Venkataramiah, ).) 663

Standing Orders on the basis of factors pealt w!th above. But A
after December 16, 1970, recruitment was being made in
accordance with the Tamil Nadu Village Officers Service
Rules, 1970 By the said Rules a new service of part-time village
officers was constituted. Rule 5 thereof prescribed the minimum
educational qualification and the tests which an applicant had to be
eligible for being appointed. T.he Rules fixed the age of superannua-
B
• tion at 55 years. But even under these Rules, the persons who were
appointed were part-time village ?fficers who were paid a fixed
amount every month by way of remuneration. The nature of duties
performed by them and the responsibilities they had to discharge
""" >--
/
were also the same. The posts held by them were non pensionable
posts. Under the Act and the Rules framed thereunder, the village
c
administrative officers to be appointed are to be recruited directly.
* No person shall be eligible for appointment to the post of a village
administrative officer unless he possesses the mininium general
educational qualification referred to in Rule 12 (a) (i) of Part II of
the Tamil Nadu State Subordinate Services Rules and prescribed D
Schedule I to the said Part II. Every person appointed to the post has
within a 'period of one year from the date on .which he' joins duty to
undergo the training and pass the tests prescribed by Rule 9 of the
Rules made under the Aci. Every person appointed as -a village
administrative officer is liable to be transferred from one place to
another. The age of superannuation ·is fixed at 58 years. The said E
posts are no longer part-time posts and the holders thereof are full
time Government officials entitled to draw salary every month in
~, the scale of Rs. 350-10-420-15-600 and other allowances and these

L
I ·---._
posts are pensionable posts. It is also to be seen from the recom-
mendations of the Administrative Reforms Commission and other
material placed before us that the revenue village will be reorganised
so as to form viable administrative units which would require the
F

, -------- services of a whole time village administrative officer. The area
under a village administrative officer is much larger than many of
the existing revenue villages. When such reorganisation of the
village administration iS contemplated, it would not be poss,ible to
allow charges of diverse sizes to continue to remain in any pa;t G
of the State of Tamil Nadu. In these circumstanc~s. even though
the village officers appointed after December 16, 1970 are in a way
different from the village officials appointed prior to that date, they
too cannot be equated with the new village administrative officers
who will be appointed under the Act and the Rules made thereunder. H
SUPililME CoUilT ilEl>oil.t~ 11982) 3 s.c.ii..
A
It cannot,-therefore, be held that Article 14 of the Constitution has
been violated in abolishing the posts held by those appointed after
December 16, 1970.

The petitioners in Writ Petitions Nos. 6191, 6355 and 6356 of
B 1980 who are holders of village offices in Tiruttani Taluk and
Pallipatu area have questioned the impugned Act on the ground that
the State Legislature could not pass the law without the previous
approval of Central Government as required by the proviso to
sub:section (4) of section 43 of the Andhra Pradesh and · Madras
(Alteration of Boundaries) Act, 1959 (Cenral Act 56 of 1959). The
c area in which these petitioners were working as vi11age officials forms
part of the transferred territories transferred from Andhra Pradesh
to Tamil Nand under the aforesaid Act. Their contention is that
since they were working as village officials in the said
area prior to the commencement of the above said _Act the con-
ditions of their service could not be altered to their prejudice without
D obtaining the previous approval of the Cen1ral Government.
Section 43 of the Andhra Pradesh and Madras (Alteration of
Boundaries) Act, 1959 reads :

"43. Provisions relating to services -

(I) Every person, who immediately before the appointed
day, is serving in connection with the affairs of Andhra
Pradesh or Madras shall, as from that day, continue so
to serve, unless he is required by general or special

F
order of the Central Government to serve provisionalr
in connection with the affairs of the other State. - / .
(2) As soon as may be after the appointed day, the
Central Government shall by general or special order,
determine the State to which every person provi-
sionally allotted to Andhra Pradesh or Madras shall
G be finally allotted for service and the date from which
such allotment shall take effect or be deemed to have
taken effect.

(3) Every person who is finally allotted under the provi-
H sions of sub·section (2) to Andhra Pradesh or Madras
shall, if he is not already serving therein, be made
It, llAl~NbltAN v. tAMIL NADU (ltenkataramiah, !.) 66S
available for serving in that State from such date as A
' may be agreed upon between the two State Govern-
ments or in default of such agreement ; as may be
determined by the 'Central Government.

(4) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to affect, after B
the appointed day, the operation of the provisions of
Chapter.I of Part XIV_ of the Constitution in relation
to the determination of the conditions of service of
persons serving in connection with the affairs of Andhra
Pradesh or Madras.
c
Provided that the conditions of service applicable
immediately before the appointed day to the case of
* any person provisionally or finally allotted to Andhra
Pradesh or Madras under this section shall not be
varied to his disadvantage except with the previous
approval of the Central Government. D

(5) The Central Government may at any time before or
after the appointed day give such directions to either
State Government as may appear to it to be necessary
for the purpose of giving effect to the foregoing provi- E
sions of this section and the State Government shall
comply with such directions."

The answer of the State Government to the above contention
is that the petitioners in these peiitiops are not allotted under sec-
tion 43 (2) of the above said Act to the State of Tamil Nadu and F
hence the proviso to sub-section (4) of section 43 is not applicable.
The petitioners have not shown any such order of allotment under
section 43 (2). Hence the proviso to sub-section (4) of section 43 is
not attracted. Under section 43 (4) of the above said Act, the State
Government is entitled to deal with all the officials in the areas
transferred to them in accordance with Chapter I of Part XIV of 'the G
Constitution. The above contention is, therefore, rejected.

In the course of the hearing on a suggestfon made by the
Court, the learned Attorney General filed a memorandum which H
reads as follows :
666 SlJPllEMR CbtJllt ltl!Pbb.tS [19S2J 3 s.c.11.

A "All the erstwhile Village Olficers who possess the
minimum general educational qualification as required
under the Abolition Act and irrespective of their age (but
subject to the rule of retirement framed under _the Abolition
Act and the Rules fi'amed thereunder) will be screened
by a Committee to be appointed by the Government.
8 They need not make any application and they need not
also appear for any test conducted by the Tamil Nadu
Public Service Commission for the post of Village Adminis-
trative Officer. Guidelines to the Committee will be a~
follows:-
c (I) Punishment

(2) Physical condition.

All the persons selected by the Committee will be
appointed by the competent authorities and relaxation in
D respect of age will be given. They will be new appointees
under the Abolition Act and will be governed by the pro-
visions of the Act and the rules made thereunder. Com-
pensation will not be available to those who are so
appointed.
E The remaining vaca"cies will be filled up from among
the candidates already selected by the Tamil Nadu Public
Service Commission.''

After the above petitions were filed under the interim order
F passed in these cases all the officials involved in these cases are being
paid the honQrarium by the State Government. Those who fail in
these petitions would have become liable to repay the amount which
they have thus drawn in excess of the compensation, if any, they
may be entitled to. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the
State of Tamil Nadu that the State Government will not take
G steps to recover such excess amount. The above statement is
recorded.

The attitude displayed by the State Government in filing
the memorandum referred to above and in making a statement
,H to the effect that the amount paid pursuant to the interim orders In
in excess of the compensation payable the village officials concerned
· will not be reci>vered is a highly commendable one and we record
It. kAl~NDltAN v. 'tAl.tlL NAOU (Venkataran#ah, J;) 667

our deep appreciation for the laudable stand taken by the Govern- A
ment.

It was, however, strenuously urged by Shri ·R. K. Garg that
those who have to vacate the posts would be without any work and
some of them have large ·families and that compensation, if any,
1 payable to them is very inadequate. He nrged that it was the duty B
of the State Government to make adequate provision pursuant to
Article 38 and Article 43 of the Constitution. These Articles are
in Part IV of the Constitution. They are not enforceable by the
courts but they are still fundamental in the governance of the
country.
c
• relationship that exists or ought to exist
The natnre of the
between the Government and the people in India is different from
* the relationship between the ruler and his subjects in the West. A
study of the history of the fight for liberty \bat has been going on
in the West shows that it has been a continuous agitation of the D
subjects for more and more freedom from a king or the ruler who
had once acquired complete control over the destinies of his subjects.
The Indian tradition or history is entirely different. The attitude of
an Indian ruler is depicted in the statement or Sri1 Rama in the
Ramayana thus :
E

(Ramayana III-W-3)
F
(Kshatriyas (the kings) bear the bow (wield the power)
in order to see that there is no cry of distress (from ar.y
quarter).

The duty of the administrator, therefore, is that he should
promptly take all necessary steps to alleviate the sufferings of the
peopl~ even without being asked to do so. While attending to his
G
duties an administrator should always remember the great saying of
the Tamil saint Tiruvalluvar :

H
668 stri>k~Mil COURT kili>Okts ll98iJ 3 s.C.k.
A Do.nought that soul repe.nting must deplore,
'
If thou hast sinned, 'its well if thou dost sin ·no more.

(Let a minister never do acts of which he would have to
grieve saying, "What is this I have done", (but) should he
B do (them), it were good that he grieved not.)

(No. 655 in Tirukkural : Translation· by Rev. Dr. G.U.
Pope and others (Reprint 1970) P• 175).

An administrator's actions should be such as he is not driven
c to repent for the mistakes he may have committed. But if he has
committed any mistakes in the past he shout!! try to avoid a repe-
tition of such mistakes. It is significant that in Tamil language the
equivalent of the word 'people' is 'Makkal' which is also sometimes
used as the equivalent of 'children'. It is for the State Government
to consider what can be done to those who fail in' the petitions.
D This observation is made particularly in regard to those who were
recruited after December 16, 1970 under the Rules made under the
proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution in view of the fact tha.t
their recruitment was not made on the hereditary principle. Those
who have passed S.S.L.C. examination amongst them come within
the si:ope of the statement made by the learned Attorney General.
E But those who have merely completed S.S.L.C. examination but
not passed it fall outside the scope of that statement even though
they have gained experience while they were in office. We hope and
trust that the State Government will look into this matter purely
from a humanitarian point of view. This is only a ·suggestion and
not a direction.
F
In the result the petitions are dismissed subject to the ·
following:

(i) The State· Government will give 'effect to the memo-
G randum filed on its behalf which is incorporated in this
judgment in the case of those who possess ·.the minimu111
general qualifications prescribed under the Act and
the Rules made thereunder and who were holding the
posts of part-time village officers immediately before
H the Act came into force. The State Government shall
re-employ· ru such persons who have not crossed the
age of superannuation and who are selected as per the
K. RAJENDRAN v. TAMIL NADU (Venkataramiah, J.) 669

memorandum in the new cadre' within four months A
from today. Until they are so selected, they will not
be paid any remuneration. Even if they are re-employ-
ed, the amount paid to them pursuant to the interim
orders will not be recovered from them.

(ii) The
.
compensation, . if any,
I
payable by the State B
Government under sectiop S of the Act to those who
cease to be village officers shall be adjusted against the
amount paid pursuant to the interim orders passed
in these cases. The State Government will not recover
from thein any amount paid to them pursuant to the
interim orders passed. in these cases in ·excess' of the c
compensation, if any, payable to them.
(iii) ·The interim orders stand vacated with effect from
April IS, 1982.
(iv) No costs. ·
D
N.V.K. Petitions dismissed

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