Holding

The reduction of the retirement age to 55 years is a reasonable policy measure within the legislative competence of the State and does not violate constitutional provisions.

Summary

The Andhra Pradesh government, after coming to power in 1983, reduced the superannuation age for most government employees from 58 to 55 years by issuing an order and two notifications, claiming it would create employment opportunities for youth. Over 28,000 employees were forced to retire, prompting writ petitions challenging the measure as arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of Articles 14, 16, 21 and 300A of the Constitution. The State argued that the reduction was a legitimate policy decision aimed at alleviating unemployment and was not bound by earlier Pay Commission recommendations. The Supreme Court held that the fixation of retirement age is a matter of policy left to the legislature and executive, provided it is reasonable and bears a nexus to public interest, and that the ordinance was a valid exercise of legislative power. The Court found the reduction fell within the permissible range of 55‑58 years accepted across Indian states and was not arbitrary or irrational. Consequently, the petitions were dismissed, upholding the reduction of the retirement age.

Issues considered

Whether the reduction of the superannuation age from 58 to 55 years is arbitrary, unreasonable or violative of Articles 14, 16, 21 and 300A of the Constitution.
Whether the amendment of the Fundamental Rules and the issuance of the ordinance fall within the legislative competence of the State under Articles 309 and 313.
Whether the reduction of retirement age amounts to a 'removal' of service within the meaning of Article 311(2).
Whether the State’s policy decision required prior notice or consideration of vested rights of employees.

Legislation cited

Andhra Pradesh Fundamental Ruless. Rule 2, s. Rule 56
Andhra Pradesh Public Employment (Regulation of Conditions of Service) Ordinance, 1983
Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Ruless. 1930
Civil Services (Governors' Provinces) Delegation Ruless. 1926
Constitution of Indias. Article 14, s. Article 16, s. Article 21, s. Article 213, s. Article 300A, s. Article 309, s. Article 311(2), s. Article 313
Hyderabad Civil Service Ruless. Rule 231

Subjects

retirement agesuperannuationpublic policyconstitutional validityarbitrarinessArticle 14Article 16Article 21Article 300AArticle 311legislative competenceordinanceemploymentunemployment

Judgment

579
A

K. NAGARAJ & ORS. E\C. ETC.,
V,
B

STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH & ANR. ETC.
January 18, 1985

[Y.V. CHANDRACHUD, C.J, R.S. PATHAK AND
SABYASACHI MuKHARJI, JJ.]
c
Civil Service-A~e of superannuation-Age reduced to 55 years
for all Government employees, other than those in last grade service, in
accordance with the election marzifesto, to provide grea•er employ111ent opportu-
nilies to th'! youths-Whether the order and iVotifications are unreasonable,
arbitrary and violative articles 14, 16, 21 and 300-A. of the Constitutio11-G O"Ms•.
D
35 (GAD1 dated 8.2 83 and Notification read with the Artdhra Pradesh Public
Employment (Regu!atian of Conditions of Service) Ordinance, 1983 omitting Pro·
~1 1so to Rule 2, 56 of the AP Fundamental Rules and Rufe 231 of the Hyderabad
Civil Service Rule-"Retirement be,ze[tts" n1eas11ring (If-Limits of judicial
Re~1 iew of Paf;cy decisions of the State-Mala fidex, b11rden of proof-Trans~'1»
/erred A1alice is u11know.1 in the field of legis.1atio11.
A new political party called Tdugu Desam swept to power .in the 1983 E
Andhra Pradesh Assembly elections, within a month of assuming office, the new
I~ Government of Andhra Pradesh, passed an order No. G.O.M.S. 36 GAD
Services dated 8.2.83 (appending two Notifications) stating that in order to
provide greater employment opportunities to the youths it had decided to reduce
the age of superannuation of all Government employees, other than those in the
last grade service, from 58 to 55 ye:irs with effect from February 28, 1983.
Over 18,000 employees and 10,000 publi,: sector e:11ployees were superannuated, F
as a result of the order.
The aggreived employees, therefore filed writ petitions and challenged
the constitutiC'nal validity of the said order and Notifications under Articles 14,
) 16, 21 and 300A of the Constitution. According to the petitioners: (i) there
was no basis at all for reducing the age of retirement from 58 to 55, as nothing
had happened since October 29, 1979 on which date the age lin1it was raised
from 55 to 58 years ; (ii) providing employment opportunities to the youths has
G
no relevance on the question of fixing the age of retirement; (iii) the government
had exercised its power arbitrarily without having regard to factors which are
relevant on the fixation of the age of retirement; (iv) the government had acted
unreasonably in not giving any previous notice to the employees which would
have enabled them to arrange their affairs on_ the eve of retirem~nt; (v) the
governm,nt was estopped from reducing the age of retirement to 55 since the
employees had acted on the representations made to them in 1979 by increasing
the age of retire1nent from 55 to 58; (vi) as a result of the increase in the age of
retirement from 55 to 58 years in 1979, a vested rtght had accrued to the II
580 SUPREME COURT R~PORTS (1985] 2 S.C.R.
A employees, which could be taken away if at a11,on1y from fnture entrants to the
government service ; (vii) retirement of experienced and mature persons from
government service will result in grave detriment to public services of the State ·
(viii) the decision of the government is bad for a total non-application of th;
mind to the relevant facts and circun1stances bearing on the question of age of
retirement like increased longevity ; and (ix) the government had not even
considered the enormous delay which would be caused in the payment of
B
pensionary benefits to employees who were retired from service without [any pre
thought.

The respondent State filed two affidavits traverssing each and every
ground of challenge and asserted that the age of retirement was reduced because
"it is the duty of the State, within the limits of its economic capacity and deve-
lopment to make effective provisions to solve the unemployment problem which
has gone upto 17,84,699 by December 31, 1982. The contentions of the State
were: (i) the question of the age of superannuation was not referred to the
c One-roan Pay Commission and therefore, its_ recommendations to increase the
age from 55 to 58 was only casual not based -on relevant criteria and has no
relevance to the present decision of the State to reduce the age of retirement; (ii)
as a result of the unwarranted increase in the age of superannuation from 55 to 58
not only was there a one-third increase in the number of unemployed youths but
also the chances of promotion of the service personnel h:td deteriorated resulting
in wide spread frllstration and unemployment; (iii) the age of retirement was
D reduced because it is the duty of the State, within its limits of economic capacity
and development, to make effective provision to solve the unemployment prob-
lem ; (iv) the fact that the average expectation of life is about 70 years is not
a ground for increasing the age bf retirement 9f Government employees; (v)
the general trend was for reducii:ig the age of rctir~n1ent ; (vi) the Government
of Kerala and Karnataka had reduced the age of retire1nent of ti)eir employees
to 55 and in some other States in India also the age of retir·~1nent is 55 ; (vii)
E the present decision was taken by the Govcrnm~.1t i11 order to fulfil its commit-
ment that it will make welfare measures in order to improve the lot of the
common man, and particularly, in order to afford opportunity to qualified and
talented unemployed youths whose number was increasing enormously due to
expansion of educational facilities ; (viii) the present measure was intended
to have a salutary effect on the creation of incentives to the deserving em-
ployees ; and (ix) the question as regards the age of retirement is a pure
F question of government.11 Policy affording no cause of action to the petitioners
to file the writ petitions.
Rule Nisi was issued on the writ petitions by the court on February
25, 1983. The Legislative Assembly of Andhra Pradesh was prorogued on
April 9, 1983. On the very next dav, i.e. April 10, 1983 the Governor promul-
gated Ordinance No. 5 of 1983 called the Andhra Pradesh Public E1nployment
(Regulation of conditions of Service) Ordinance, 1983 by which proviso to Rule
G 2 and Rule 56 of the Andhra Pradesh Fundamental Rules and Rule 231 of
the l-lyderabad Civil Service Rules-the rule governing the age of retirement-
were omitted.

Dismissing the petitions, the Court
HELD : t.1 Public interest den1ands that there ought to be an age of retire·
ment in public services. The poin of the peak level of efficiency is bound to differ
H
IC. NAGARAJ V. ANDHRA PRADESH 581
from individual to individual for that reason. A common scheme of general A
application governing superannuation has, therefore, to be evolved in the light
of experience regarding performance levels of employees, the need to provide
employment opportunities to the younger ·sections of society and the need to
open up promotional opportunities to employees at the lower levels early in
their career. Inevitably, the public administrator has to counterbalance conflict-
ing claims while determining the age of superannuation. On the one hand,
public services cannot be deprived of the benefit of the n1ature experience of
senior employees ; on the other hand, a sense of frustration and stagnation
cannot be allowed to generate in the minds of the junior members of tl':e services
B
and the younger sections of tbe society. The balancing of these conflicting
claims of the different segments of society involves minute questions of policy
and considerations of varying vigour and applicability which must, as far as
possible. be left to the judgment of the executive and the legislature.
[ 90F-H; 591A·B]

E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil :Vadu, [1974] 2 SCR 3~8 referred to.
c
1.2 While resolving the validity of policy issues like the age of retfr~
ment, it is not proper for the Court to put the conflicting claims in a sensitive
judicial scale and decide the issue by finding out \vhich way the balance tilts.
That is an exercise whfrh the adminisrrator and the legislature have to under-
take. This is so because often, the Court has no satisfactory and effective
means to decide which alternative, out of the many competing ones, is the
best in the circumstances of a given case. [591E; CJ
D
1.3 Tt i~ not that every question of policy h out:-.ide the scope of judicial
review or that, necessarily, there are no manageable standarc!s for reviewing any
and every question of po icy. If the age of retirement is fixed at an unreason-
ahly low level so as to make it arbitrary and irrational, the Court's interfe-
rence would be called for though not for fixing the age of retirement bUt for
mandating a closer consideration of the 1natter. [59!C·D] E
2. Fixing the age of superannuation by reducing it from 58 to 55 would be
unreasPnable or arbitrary if it does not accord with the principles which are
relevant for fixing the age of retirement or if it does not subserve any public
interest. On the other hand, the Ordinance shall have to be held valid, if the
fundamental premise upon which it proceeds has been accepted as fair and
reasonable in comparable situations, if its provisions bear nexus with public
interest and if it does not offend against the Constitutional limitations either on F
legislative competence or on the legislative power to pass laws which bear on
fundamental rights. [59!G-H; 592A]
3.1 The report of the _One-man Pay Co1nmission has to be kept out
of consideration in so far as the question of the age of retirement is concerned.
The contention that the reversal of the well considered decision of the G
Comn1ission to raise the age to 58 within a short span tof less than three
years and a half, as nothing had happened in between warranting a departure
from it, is fallicious because the question, as to whether the age of retirement
should be raised which was then 55, was not referred to the Commission at all in
the terms of reference. Further the decision which the Government took later
to increase the age of retirement from 55 to 58 years was not based on the
recommendation of the Commission. [595D; C] H
582 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1985] 2 S.C.R.
A 3.2 The Power of a Commission to inquire into a question must depend
upon the terms of the reference and not upon the statements ·made on 'the floor
of the House. [595A]
3.3 A review of retirement benefits would undoubtedly cover the exami~
nation of the rules or schemes relating to pension, provident fund, gratuity.
encashment of leave etc., but it cannot include the power to examine the question
as regards the fixation of the age of retirement. Therefore, paragLaph 9.42 of
the report of One-man Pay Commission which begins by saying that "since the
n tern1s of reference of the Commission cover the revie\v of the existing retirement
benefits, the reference would naturally include the age of retiretnent" was an
erfoneous and unwarranted reading of the terms of the reference. [594F; E]
4.1 No law can be said to be bad because it is passed immediately on
the assumption of office by a new Governn1ent. Wete this so, every decision
taken by a new Government soon after assumption of office shall have to be
regarded as arbitrary. [;95E]

c 4.2 The reasonableness of a decision in any jurisdiction, does not depend
upon the time which it takes. A delayed decision of the Executive can also be
bad as offending ·against the provisions of the Constitution and it can be no
defence to the charge of unconstitutionality that the decision was aken !after
the lapse of a long time. Conversely, decisions which are taken promptly -cannot
be as-;umed to be b:id because they are taken promptly. [595F-GJ
4.3 Every decision has to be ex~unined on its own 1nerits, in order to
detennine whether it is arbitrary or unreason:ible. Here, the State Government
D had the relevant facts as also the reports of the various Central and State Pay
Commissions before it, on the basis of which it had taken a reasonable decision
to reduce the age of r~tir0merit from 58 to 55. The aid and assistance of a well-
trained bureaucracy which notoriously, plays an important part not only in the
implementation of policies but in their making was also available to the Govern-
ment. Th~refore, the speed with which the decision was taken cannot, without
E more, invalidate it on the ground of arbitrariness. [ 59_ G; 596A ·BJ
5.1 By and large, in the forn1ulation of 1natters of legislative policy, the
government of the day must be allowed a free, though fair play and there need
not necessarily be a uniform age of retirement all over .lndia. Though immutable
considerations which are generally or universally true like increased life expecta-
tion are as much valid for Jam1nu and Kashmir as for Tamil Nadu, that cannot
justify the conc\u:;ion th1t fixation of th~ r~tirement age at 55 in Jammu and
F Kashmir is invalid since the State of Tamil Nadu has fixed it at 58 or that the
age limit should be fixed at 62 or 65. There is no one fixed or focal point of
reasonableness. There can b~ a ttrge and wide area within which the adminis-
trator or the Jcgisl.ator can act, without violating the constitutional n1andate of
reasonableness. That is fhe area which permits free play in the joints. [596C-D; F]
5.2 The area between the ages of 55 and 58 is regarded in our country
G as a permissible field of operation for fixing the age of retirement. Neither the
American nor the English notions or norn1s for fixing the retirement age can
render invalid the r.asis which is widely accepted in our country as reasonable
for that purpose. [597D-E]
5.3 On the basis of the data furnished in the White Paper presented to
the State Legis1ative Assembly in· March 1983 on the question of "reduction in
K. NAGARAJ v. ANDHRA PRADESH 583
A
th~ age of .~superannuation from 58 years to 55 years" by the new Telugu Desam
Party controlled State Government, the reduction of the age of retirement from
58 to 55, in the instant case is not hit by Article 14 or 16 of the Constitution
and the State Government or the Legislature has not acted arbitrarily or
irrationally. The precedents within our country itself for fixing the retirement
age at '5 or for reducing it from 58 to 55 and their acceptance depending upon
the employment policy of the Government of the day make it in1possible to lay B
down an inflexible rule that 58 years is a reasonable age for retiren1ent and 55 is
not. If the policy adopted for the time being by the Government or the Legis-
-lature is shown to violate recognised norms of employment planning, it would
be possible to Say that the policy is irrational since, in that event, it would not
bear reasonable nexus with the object which it seeks to achieve. The reports
of the various Commissions show that the creation of new avenues of employ.
ment for the youth is an integral part of any policy governing the fixation of
retirement age. flere, the impugned policy is actuated and influenced predomi- C
nantly by that consideration. [604C-F]

However; the question of age of retircm".':nt should always be examined
by the Government with more than ordinary care, more than the State Govern.;
ment has bestowed upon it in this case. The fixation of age of retirement has
minute and multifarious dimensions which shape the lives of citizens. Therefore,
it is vital from the point of view of their well-being that the question should be
considered with the greatest objectivity and decided upon the basis of empirical D
data furnished by scientific investigation. What is vital for the welfare of the
citizens is, of ne;:e-;sity, vital for the survival of the State. Care must also be
taken to ensure that the sta1istics are not perverted to serve a malevolent ·
purpose. [60JF-H]

6. It is \veil settled that Article 311(2) of the Constitution is attracted
p only when a civil servant is reduced in rank, dismissed or removed from service E
' by way of penalty, that is to say, when the effect of the order passed against him
in his behalf is to visit him with evil consequences. The termination of service
of an employer on account of his reaching the age of superannua1ion does not
amount 10 his removal from service within the meaning of Article 311(2). Here
there being no arbi1ra.riness in 1he fixation of reduced retirement age, there is no
violation of Article 311(2) of the Constitution, either. [605C; F]

S ,fi.1/1 Chandrn v. Union of India [1953J SCR 655; Shya1.•1 La( v. State F
nf U.P., [1955] I SCR 26; Stare f Bombay v. Snubhagchand M. Do.,/Ji, [1953]
SCR 571 ; P11r:hoiam Lal Dhit;Rra v. Union of India, [1958] ·SCR 828-.
P. Balakotiah v. Union of India, (1958] SCR 1052 ; Bishun Narain Misra v:
State :fUtlar Prade~h, [1965] I SCR 693, relied on.

Mori Ra111 Deka v. General Manager, North Frontier Railway, [1964] 5
SCR 683 explained. G

7. Though an ordinance can be invalidated for contravention of the
constitutional
. limitations which exist upon the power of the State Jegislatu re t o
pass Iaws 11 cannot be declared invalid for the reason of non-application of mind
... any more 1han any oiher law can be. An executive act is liable to be struck H
584 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1985) 2 S.C.R.
A down on the ground of non-application of mind. Not the act of a Legislature.
The power to issue an ordinance is no_ an executive power but is the power of
the executive to legislate. The power of the Governor to promulgate an
ordinance is contained in Article 2i3 which occurs in Chapter IV of Part VI of
the Constitution. The heading of that ·chapter is ''Legislative Power of the
Governor". This power is plenary within its ~field like the power of the State
Legislature to pass laws and there are no limitations upon that power except
those to which the legisla,ive power of the State Legislature is subject. [607C; A-B]
B
A.K. Roy v. Union of India. [1982] 2 SCR 272 at pp. 282, 291 ; R.K.
Garg v. Union of India, [1982] 1 SCR 947 at pp. 964, 967; High Coun of
Andhra Pradesh v. V V. S. Krishna1nurthy, [1979] 1 SCR 26; Moti1am
Dake v. Gt'neral Manager, /'llorth Frontier Railway, [1964] 5 SCR 683
distinguished.

8. If a rule of .retirement can be deemed to deprive a person of his
C right to livelihood, it will be impermissible to provide for an age of retirement
at all. That will be contrary to public interest because the State can~ot afford
the 1uxury of allowing its employees :o continue in service after they have
passed the point of peak performance. Rules of retirement do not take away the
right ofa person to/his livelihood: they limit his right to :hold office to a stated
number of years. [608D-El
9.1 The burden to establish malafides is a heavy burden to discharge.
Vague and casual allegations suggesting that a certai11 act was done with an
D ulterior motive cannot be accepted without proper pleadings and adequate
proof, both of which are conspicuously absent ill these writ petitions. Besides,
the ordinance making power being a legislative power, the argument of ma/a
jides is misconceived. The legislature, as a body, cannot be accused of having
passed a Jaw for an extrane0us purpose. If no reasons are so stated as appear
from the provisions enacted by it. Its reasons for passing a law or those that
are stated in the Objects and Reasons. Even assuming that the executive, in a
E
given case, has an ulterior motive in moving a legislation, that motive cannot
render the passing of the law ma la fide. This kind of 'transferred malice' is
unknown in the field of legislation. [608G-H; 609A-B]
9.2 The amendment made to the Fundamental Rules in the exercise of
power confeITed by Articles 309 by which the proviso to Rule 2 was deleted
reirospectively, with effect from. February 23, 1983 by G.O.M.S. dated
Ji' 17-2-83 was a valid exercise of legislative power. The rules and amendments
made under the proviso to Article 309 can be altered or repealed by the Legisla-
ture but until that is done the exercise of the power cannot be challenged as
lacking in authority. [6IOB-C]
9.3 It is well-settled that the service rules can be as much amended, as
they can be mader, under the proviso to Article 309 and that, the power to
amend these rules carries with it the power to amend them retrospectively. The
G power conferred by the proviso to Article 309 is of a legislative character and is
to be distinguished from an ordinary rule making power. The power to legis-
late is of a plenary nature within the field demarcated by the Constitution and it
includes the power to legislate retrospectively. [609H; 610A-BJ
B.S. Vaderav. Unian of India, [1968] 3 S.C.R. 575 582-55, Raj Kumar
H v. Union of India [ 1975] 3 S.C.R. 963, 965, followed.
K. NAGARAJ v. ANDHRA PRADESH (Chandrachud, C.J.) 585

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition Nos. 1073-1100, A
1117-!9, 1229-95, 142°-1554, 1746-2140, 2155-2271, 2396-2459.
11~8-1217, 1302-12, 1314-15, 1566-1641, 1140-70, 2360-95, 1643-
172', 2272-2329, 2152, 2331, 2339, 2491, 34,•6-89, 2498-2521, 2522,
2533-74, 2611-2638 and 2531of1983.
B
(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India)

AND

Writ Petition Nos. 4218, 4571 and 5266-5280 of 1983
c
(Under article 32 of the Constitution oflndia)

AND

Transfer Case Nos. 44-339 of 1983
D
K.K. Venugopal S.S Ray, P.P. Rao, V.M. Tarkuade and
R.K. Garg, V. Jogayya Sharma, M.P. Rao, Sudarsh Menon, T.V.S.N.
Chari, G. Narasimhulu, A. Subba Rao, M.K.D. Namboodiry, H.S. Gwru
Raj Ra,,, S. Markandeya, A.T.M. Sampath, D.K. Garg, Nikhil Ch9ndra
and A K Panda for the Petitioners.

r
E
L.N. Sinha, Attorney General, Ani/ B. Divan,B. Parthasarthl and
K.R. Chaudhary for the Respondents.

G.N. Rao for the State.

Miss A. Subhashinl for the Union.

•
F
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

CnANDRACHUD, C. J. In the elections held to the Legisla-
tive Assembly of Andhra Pradesh in January 1983, a new political
party called Telugu Desam was swept to power. It assumed office G
on January 9, 1983. On February 8, 1983 an Order (G.O. Ms.
No. 36) was issued by the Government of Andhra Pradesh stating
that it had decided to reduce the age of superannuation of all Govern-
ment employees, other than in the last Grade Service, from 58 to 55
years. Two notifications issued in exercise of the power conferred H
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1985] 2 S..C.R.
A by the Proviso to Article 309 read with Article 313 of the Constitu-
tion was appended to tha.t order. The relevant Fundamental Rules
were amended by the first notification, while the corresponding rules
of the Hyderabad Civil Services Rules were amended by the second
notification. By these notifications, every Government servant,
whether ministerial or non-ministerial but not belonging to the last
B Grade Service. who had already attained the age of 55 years was to
retire from service with effect from February 28, 1983. Speaking to
the Government employees in the Secretariat premises the next day,
the Chief Minister justified the reduction of the retirement age from
58 to 55 years on the ground that it had become necessary to provide
greater employment opportunities to the youths. Over 18,000 Govern-
ment employees and 10,000 public sector employees were superan-
c nuated as a result of the order.

These writ petitions were filed by the Andhra Pradesh Govern-
ment employees to challenge the aforesaid order and the notifications
on the ground that they violate Articles 14, 16, 21 and 300A of the
Constitution. The case of the petitioners as laid in the writ petitions
D is that there was no basis at all for reducing the age of retirement
from 58 to 55 ; that the age of retirement was increased from 55 to
58 by the Govornment of Andhra Pradesh by a notification dated
October 29, 1979 and nothing had happened since then tu justify
reduction of the age of retirement again to 5 i ; that providing emp-
loyment opportunities to the youths has no relevance on the question
E of fixing the age of retirement ; that the Government had exercised
its power arbitrarily without having regard to factors which are
relevant on the fixation of the age of retirement ; that the Govern-
ment had acted unreasonably in not giving any previous notice to the
employees which would have enabled them to arrange their affairs on
the eve of retirement ; that the Government was estopped from
·F reducing the age of retirement to 55, since the employees had acted
on the representation made to them in 1979 by iccreasing the age of
retirement from 55 to 58 ; that as a result of the increase in the age
of retirement from 55 to 58 years in I 976, a vested right had accrued
to the employees, which could be taken away, if at all, only from
G future entrants to the Government service ; that retirement of ex-
perienced and mature persons from Government service will result in
grave detriment to public services of the State ; and that, the decision
of the Government is bad for a total non-application of mind to the
relevant facts and circumstances bearing on the question of the age of
retirement, like increased longevity. The petitioners aver that the
:. fl Government had not even considered the enormous delay which
K. NAGARAJ v. ANDHRA PRADESH (Chandtachud, C.J.) 587

would be caused in the payment of pensionary benefits to employees A
who were retired from service without any pre-thought.

A counter-affidavit was filed on behalf of the State of Andhra
Pradesh by Shri R. Parthasarathy, Joint Secretary in the Finance
Department of the State, at the stage of admission of the writ peti-
B
tions. It is stated in that affidavit tbat the recommendation of the
one Man Pay Commi,sion appointed by the Government of Andhra
Pradesh, after which the age of retirement was increased to 58 in
1979, has no relevance to the present decision of the State to reduce
the age of retirement ; that the fact that the average expectation of
life is about 70 years is not a ground for increasing the age of retire- c
ment of Government employees ; that the general trend was for
reducing the age of retirement ; that the Government of Kerala and
Karnataka had reduced the age of retirement of their employees to
55, though it was earlier increased from 55 to : 8 ; that in some
States in India the age of retirement is 55 and not 58 ; the present
decision was taken by the Government in order to fulfil its commit- D
ment that it will take welfare measures in order to improve the lot of
the common man, and, particularly, in order to afford opportunities
to qualified and talented unomployed youths whose number was in-
creasing enormously due to expansion of educational facilities ; that
the Government employees was stagnated in the lower positions due
to the increase in the age of retirement from 55 to 58 : and that, the E
present measure was intended to have a salutary effect on the creation
of incentives to the deserving employees The affidavit says further
that the question as regards the age of retirement is a pure question
of Governmental policy affording no cause of action to the petition_ers
to file the writ petitions. The affidavit asserts that the Government
had reviewed the situation arising out of the enhancement of the age
of retirement from 55 to 58 in l 979 and that it was revealed that on F
account of the enhancement of the age of retirement, the chances of
promotion of the service personnel had deteriorated resulting in wide:
spread frustration and unemployment. The inconvenience alleged by
the petitioners in the matter of payment of their pension and other
retirement benefits was imaginary, since the Government was making
extensive arrangements to disburse such benefits expeditiously. By G
the counter-affidavit, the Government of Anclhra Pradesh denied that
any of the provisions of the Constitution were violated by the
impugned decision to reduce the age of retirement.

Another affidavit was filed on behalf of the Governme11t of
Andhra Pradesh, after the· rule nisi was issued in the writ petitions. H
588 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1985] 2 S.C.R.
A The affidavit is sworn by Shri A. K. Sharma, Deputy Secretary to
Government of Aodhra Pradesh, Finance and Planning. It is stated
in that affidavit that the question of the age of superannuation was
not referred to the one Man Pay Commission of Shri A. Krishna-
swamy, which was appointed by the Andhra Pradesh Government on
November 3, 1977 ; that the recommendation made by the Pay
Commission was casual and was not based on relevant criteria ; that
as many as 12,04,008 educated youths were left without employment
on September 30, 1979 as a result of the unwarranted increase in the
age of superannuation from 55 to 58 ; that the number of unemp-
loyed youths had grown to 17,84,699 by December 31, 1982; and
c that, the age of retirement was reduced becaa&e it is the duty of the
State, within the limits of its economic capacity and development to
make effective provision to solve the unemployment problem. The
rest of the averments in this affidavit are on the same lines as in the
affidavit of Shri R. Parthasarathy.
D
Rule Nisi was issued on the writ petitions by this Court on
February 25, 1983. The Legislative Assembly of Andhra Pradesh
was·prorogued on April 9, 1983. On the very next day, that is, on
April 10 the Governor of Andhra Pradesh promulgated Ordinance
No. 5 of 1983 called 'The Andhra Pradesh Public Employment
(Regulation of Conditions of Service) Ordinance.' The Ordinance
was passed "to regulate the recruitment and conditions of service of
persons appointed to Public Services and posts in connection with
the affairs of the State of Andhra Pradesh and the officers and
servants of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh". We are not con-
cerned in these writ petitions with clauses 3 to 9 of the Ordinance
which mostly regulate conditions of service. Clause IO(l) of the
F Ordinance prescribes that every Government employee, not being a
workman and not belonging to Last Grade Service shall retire from
service on the afternoon of the last day of the month in which he
attains the age of 55 years. Clause 10(2) provides that e;ery
Government employee, not being a workman but belonging to the
Last Grade Service, shall retire from service on the afternoon of the
G last day of the month in which he attains the age of 60 years.
Clause 10(3) provides that every workman belonging to the Last
Grade Service or employed on a monthly rate of pay in any service
notified as Inferior, shall retire from service on the afternoon of the
last day of the month in which he attains the age of 60 years. Work-
men belonging to Ministerial Service or any service other than the
Last Grade Service notified as Inferior have to retire on the afternoon
H of the last . day of the month in which they attain the age of 55
K. NAGARAJ v. ANDHRA PRADESH (Chandrachud, C.J.) 589

years. By clause 15, All Rules and Regulations .made under the A
proviso to Article 309 or continued under Article 313 of the Consti·
tution or made under any other law for the time being in force,
governing the recruitment and conditions of service of the Govern-
ment employees, continue to be in force in so far as they are not
inconsistent with the provisions of the Ordinance. Clause 16 of the
Ordinance provides that no amendment to the Fundamental Rules B
• shall be deemed to be invalid merely by reason of the fact that the·
proviso to rule 2 of the Fundamental Rules laid down that the said
rules shall not be modified or replaced to the disadvantage of any
• person already in service. It provides further that all amendments
made to the Fundamental Rules and particularly the amendments
made by the notification dated'February 8, 1983, shall be and shall
c
be deemed always to have been made validly and shall have effect
notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the proviso to
rule 2 of the Fundamental Rules as if the Ordinance was in force on
February 8, 1983. Clause 16 of the Ordinance declares that every
amendment made before or after the commencement of the D
Ordinance to the Fundamental Rules and the Hyderabad Civil
Services Rules, shall be and shall be alv.ays deemed to have applied
to all Government employees whether appointed before or after the
amendment. Clause 18 of the Ordinance provides by sub-clause (i)
that the proviso to rule 2 of the Fundamental Rules shall be and
shall be deemed always to have been omitted. Rule 56 of the
Fundamental Rules is omitted ·by Clause 18(ii) while Rule 231
E
of the Hyderabad Civil Services Rules is omitted by clause 19 of the
Ordinance. The age of retirement was previously governed by these
two Rules.

The arguments advanced before us fall under distinct heads
learned counsel having shared their burden equitably. Shrl
Venugopal challenged the Ordinance on the ground that it is un- F
reasonable. Shri Tarkunde challenged it on the ground that the
superannuation of the employees by reduction of the age of retire-
ment amounts, in the circumstances, to 'removal' of the employees
within the meaning of Article 311. The challenge of Shri
Siddhartha Shankar Ray is based on the ground of a total non-
application of mind. Shri R.K. Garg, who appears in a group of
G
three. Transferred Cases, contends that the Ordinance is bad because
it supersedes all industrjal adjudications and overrules even settle-
ments arrived at between the management and the employees.
Shri P.P. Rao contends that the Ordinance is bad because. whereas
in the case of compulsory retirement a notice of three months is
H
590 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1985] 2 S.C.R.

A required to be given by the Government under the rdevant rules, in
the case of superannuation of employees who had already attained
the age of 55 on February 8, 193 J when the first Order was issued,
the impugned law gives to .the employees a notice of 20 days
only since all such em~1loyees had to retire on February 28, 1983.
Shri PP. Rao also challenges the retrospective deletion of the
8
proviso to Rule 2 of the Fundamental Rules as being arbitrary.
Shri Gururaj Rao challenges the Ordinance on the ground that it
runs into the teeth of the recommendation which the Andhra Pradesh
One Man Pay Revision Commission had made in 1979 in pursuance
of which the age of retirement was raised from 55 to 58. Shri
c A.T.M. Sampath laid stress on the lack of acceptable reasons to
justify the issuance of the Ordinance Like some of the other
learned counsel, he suspects the bonajides of the State Government
in issuing the Order and the Ordinance. It was suggested by the
petitioners, though somewhat in passing. that the object of the
State Government in reducing the age of retirement was to get rid of
D senior members of Government service whose loyalty was thought to
be not above suspicion.

This is the broad outline of the petitioners' case. We will
presently set out the specific contentions advanced before us but,
before doing so. it would be necessary to indicate the approach
which. in our opinion, should be adopted while examining a question
E of the present nature, namely, the fixation of the age o[ retirement.
Barring a few services in a few parts of the world as, for example,
the American Supreme Court, the terms and conditions of every
public service provide for an age of retirement. Indeed, the proposi-
sition that there ought to be "" age of retirement in public serviees
is widely accepted as reasonable and rational. The fact that the
stipulation as to the age of retirement is a common feature of all of
F
our public services establishes its necessity, no less than its reasona-
bleness Public interest demands _that there ought to be an age of
retirement in public services. The point of the peak level of efficiency
is bound to differ from individual to individual but the age of retire-
ment cannot obviously differ from individual to individual for that
reason. A common scheme of general application governing superan-
G nuation has therefore to be evolved in the light of experience regard-
ing performance levels of employees, the need to provide employment
opportunities to the younger sections of society and the need to open
up promotional opportunities to employees at the lowor levels early
in their career. Inevitably, the public administrator has to counter-
H balance conflicting claims while determining the age of superannua-
K, NAGARAJ v. ANDHRA PRADESH (Chandrachud, CJ.) 591

tion. On the one hand, public services cannot be deprived of the A
benefit of the mature experience of senior employees; on the other
hand, a sense of frustration and stangation cannot be allowed to
to generate in the minds of the junior members of the services and the
younger sections of the society. The balancing of these conflicting
claims of the different segments of society involves minut' questions
B
of policy which .r.ust. as far as possible, be left to the judgment of
the executive and the legislature. These claims involve considerations
of varying vigour and applicability. Often, the Court has no satisfac-
tory and effective means to decide which alternative, out of the many
competing ones, is the best in the circumstances of a given case. We
do not suggest that every question of policy is outside the scope of c
judicial review or that, necessarily, there are no manageable standards
for reviewing any and every question of policy. Were it so, this Court
would have declined to entertain pricing disputes covering as wide a
· range as cars to mustard-oil. If the age of retirement is fixed at an
unrarasoably low level so as to make it arbitrary and irrational, the
Court's interference would be called for, though not for fixing the age D
of retirement but for mandating a closer consideration of the matter.
"Where an act is arbitrary, it is implicit in it that it is unequal both
according to political logic and constitutional law and is therefore
violative of Article 14. "(') But, while resolving the validity of policy
issues like the age of retirement, it is not proper to put the conflicting
claims in a sensitive judicial scale and decide the issue by finding out E
which way the balance tilts. Tha.t is an exercise which the adminis-
trator and the legislature have to undertake. As stated in 'The Sup-
reme Court And The Judicial Function'( 2): "Judicial self-restraint is
itself one of the factors to be added to the balancing process, carrying
more or less weight as the circumstances seem to require".

We must therefore· approach the problem before us with a view
to determining whether the age of retirement has been reduced from
58 to 55 unreasonably or arbitrarily. Such a fixation of age would be
unreasonable or arbitrary if it does not accord with the principles
which are relevant for fixing the age of retirement or if it does not
subserve any public interest. On the other hand, the Ordinance shall
have to bo held valid, if the fundamental premise upon which it pro- G
ceeds has been accepted as fair and reasonable in comparable
situations, if its provisions bear nexus with public interest and if it
does not offend against the constitutional limitations either on legis-

(I) E.P Rovappn . Stale of Tan.ii Nadu, [1974] 2 SCR 348.
(2) Edited by Philips B. Kurl.and, Oxford and JBH Publisning Co., Page 13. H
592 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1985] 2 S.C.R.

A Iative competence or o.n the ·legislative power to pass laws which bear
on fundamental rights.

Shri Venugopal, who led the argument on behalf of the petitio-
ners, contends that the provisions of the Ordinance whereby the age
of retirement is reduced from 58 to 55 are arbitrary and irrational
B and hence violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution for the
fO!lowing reasons :

(a) The age of superannuation was increased from 55 to ·
58 years with effect from October 29, 1979 after an
c elaborate and scientific inquiry by a One-Man Pay
Commission ;

(b) The State Government issued the order reducing the
age of retirement within one month of the assumption
of office by it. In the very nature of things, no scientific
D " investigation could have been made, no material gathe-
red and no statistics compiled as regards the number of
employees who will retire, the number of persons who
would get fresh employment and the hardship caused to
the superannuated employees by the delay in the pay-
ment of retirement benefits to them. Neither the social
nor the economic consequences of so grave a decision
could have been or were in fact considered by the
Government ;

(c) The reason given by the Government that promotional
opportunities had deteriorated as a result of the increase
F in the retirement age from 55 to 58 is fanciful and
non-existent. That result is indeed produced by the
impugned action of the State Government. In 1979,
when the age of retirement was increased from 55 to 58
years, promotional opportunities were denied to the
employees because, those who would have retired at the
age of 5 5 got a fresh lease of life for another years.
G Now, when their turn for promotion has come at about
the age of 55, they have been superannuated;

(d) The theory that reduction in the age of retirement pro-
vides employment opportunities to educated youths is
fallacious. The various Pay Commissions have expres-
H u sect the vi~w tlmt persons who are required to retire at
K. NAGARAJ •• ANDHRA PRADESH (Chandrachud, C.J.) 593
A
an early age are compelled by necessity to seek other
employments. Even otherwise, not more than one per
cent of the unemployed educated youths are likely to
get employment as a result of the reduction in the age
of retirement from 58 to 55. That is because, not more
than 18,000 vacancies arose on account of the reduction B
in the age of retirement.

7 (e) fhc careful planning by the employees of their impor-
tant affairs of life like the construction of a house, the
mirriage of a daughter or the repaymont of loans, has
been suddonly set at naught by the reduction in the age
c
of retirement ;

(f) Two of the most relevant circumstances bearing upon
the fiX'ltion of the age of retirement have been ignored
by the State Government: increase in longevity and the D
prevailing age of retirement in public sector underta-
kings; and

(g) No consideration was given to the plain and direct con-
sequence of the reduction in the age of retirement,
namely, that the State exchequer would have to find

r
and pay Rs. 70 crores on one single day by way of
retirement henefits, for which no budgetary provision
was made

It would appear from these contentions as also from the con-
tions advanced by the· other learned counsel that the main plank of
the petitioners' case is that the decision to reduce the age of retire•
'
,, ment from 58 to 55 is unconstitutional· because it is arbitrary,
irrational and unconnected with the object which it seeks to
achieve.

In thi~ connection, the first ground of challenge to the reduction
of the age of retirement is that the One-man Pay ·Revision Commis- G
sion appointed by the Government of Andhra Pradesh had
recommended that .. \he age of retirement should be increased from
55 to 58, that the said recommendation was accepted by the State
Government and consequently, the age of retirement was raised to
....
58 with effect from October 29, 1979. It is contended that the
reversal ·of that weH-cons.idered decision within a short. span of less
than three and a half years is patently unscientific an4 arbitrary, H
594 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1985] 2 S.C.R·
A especially since no fresh investigation was undertaken to examine the
validity of the recommendation made by the One-man Pay Commis- ,..i-
sion.

The very foundation of this argument is fallacious By G.O.
· No. 745 dated November 3, 1977 the Government of Andhra
B
Pradesh had appointed Shri A. Krishnaswamy, a retired member of
the I.A.S. as One-man Pay Revision Commission to review the
structure of the different scales of pay, dearness allowance and other
compensatory allowances of all categories of employees of State
Government, local bodies, aided institututions, work-charged
c establishments etc. The terms of reference of the Commission were
enlarged by the Government by an order dated January 28, 1978 so
as to require the Commission to review the existing retirement
benefits available to all categories of employees referred to above
and to examine the question of extension of retirement benefits to the
work-charged establishments. The question as to whether the age of
D retirement should be raised. which was then 55, was not referred to
the Commission. Indeed, its terms of reference show that no
question at all regarding the age of retirement was refe1red to it.
Commission commenced its work on January 1, 1 978 and submitted
its report to the Government, with admirable promptitude, as
Commissions go in 1979. Paragraphs 9 42 to 9.45 of the Report
E deal with the question of the age of retirement. Paragraph 9.42
begins by saying that since the terms of reference of the Commission
cover the review of the existing 'retirement benefits', the reference
"would naturally include the age of retirement." This was an .
erroneous and· unwarranted reading of the terms of reference. A
review of retirement benefits would undoubtedly cover the examina-
tion of the rules or schemes relating to pension, provident fund,
F gratuity, encashment of leave, etc , !:mt it cannot include the power
to examine the question as regards the fixation of the age of retire-
ment. The Commission says in the same paragraph, as a possible
justification of its co:isideration of the question of the age of retire-
ment, that. "'it was mentioned on the floor of the House that this
issue is referred to the Commission". Our attention has been drawn
in this behalf to a statement made in the Andhra Pradesh Legislative
G
Council on September 20, 1976 by the then Finance Minister, Shri
G. Rajaram, to the effect that one of the terms of reference to the
Commission was to review the existing retirement age of Government
employees. We regret to say that the Finance Minister was not
properly briefed when he made that statement. In any case, the
H power of a Commission to enquire into a question must depend
K. NAGARAJ v. ANDHRA PRADESH (Chandrachud, C.J.) 595
A
upon the terms of the Reference and not upon the statements made
on the floor of the House. The fact that the Commission discussed
...,._ the question of the age of retirement in passing shows that it was not
properly seized of that question. The discussion of an important
matter like the age of retirement is done in four brief paragraphs
which occupy less than two pages of the Commhsion's report. We B
do not blame the Commission for this hurried and inadequate
treatment of an important question. That question was not within
, its purview. The State Government is therefore justified in its
,, contention that the question of the age of retirement was not referred
to the Commission and that the decision which the Government took
later to increase the age of retirement from 55 to 58 was not based c
on the recommendation of the Commission. The report of the
Commission has therefore to be kept out of consideration in so far
as the question of the age of retirement is concerned and no argu-
ment can be founded on the fact that the view of the Commission
was ignored or that nothing had· happened since the date of the
D
,.. report to justify a departure from it.
'r
As regards Shri Venugopal's argument at (b) above, the fact
that the decision to reduce the age of retirement from 58 to 55 was
taken by the State Government within one month of the assumption
of office by it, cannot justify the conclusion that the decision is E
arbitrary because it is unscientific in the sense that it is not backed
>. by due investigation or by compilation of relevant data on the

l
subject. Were this so, every decision taken by a new Government
soon after assumption of office shall have to be regarded as arbitrary.
The reasonableness of .a decision, in any jurisdiction, does not
depend upon the time which it takes. A delayed decision of the
executive can also be had as offending against the provisions of the F
Constitution and it can be no defence to the charge of unconstitu-
tionality that the decision was taken aftet the lapse of a long time.
~ Conversely, decisions which are taken promptly cannot be assumed
~ to be bad because they are taken promptly. Every decision has to
examined on its own merits in order to determine whether it is arbi-
trary or unreasonable. Besides, we have to consider the validity of a
G
law regulating the age of retirement. It is unten 1ble to contend that
a law is bad because it is passed immediately on the assumption of
office by a new Government. It must also be borne in mind that the
question as to what should be the proper age of retirement is not a
novel or unprecedented queition which the State Legislative bad to
~ consider. There is a wealth of material on that subject and many a
Pay Commission has dealt with it comprehensively. The State H
596 SUPREMB COURT REPORTS (1985] 2 S.C.R.

A Government had the relevant facts as also the reports of the various
Central and State Pay Commissions before it, on the basis of which
it had to take a reasonable decision. The aid and assistance of !l,.."'i-
well-trained bureaucracy which, notoriously, plays an important part
not only in the .implementation of policies but in their making, was
also available to the Government. Therefore, the speed with which
B the decision was taken cannot, without more, invalidate it on the
ground of arbitrariness.

The contentions of Shri Venugopal which are set out in"'
paragraphs (c) to (gl above and, partly in paragraph (b) itself, are by
and large matters of legislative policy in the formulation of which
c the Government of the day must be allowed a free, though fair play.
Indeed, the acceptance of argument advanced by the various counsel
for the petitioners must lead to the conclusion that there has to be
a uniform age of retirement all over India. If reduction of the
retirement age from 58 to 55 is to be regarded as arbitrary on the
ground that it overlooks the advance made in longevity, fixatio~
of retirement age at 58 is also not likely to sustain the charge of
D arbitrariness. The argument could still be made that improvement
in the expectation of life requires that the age of retirement should be

I
fixed at 60 or 62 or even at 65. Then again, though immutable
considerations which are generally or universally true like increased
life-expectation are as much Jammu and K'1shmir as for Tamil Nadu,
that cannot justify the conclusion that fixation of the retirement age<:
E at 55 in Jam mu and Kashmir is invalid since the State of Tamil Nadu
bas fixed it at 58. Both can fall within the constraints of the
Constitution and neither the one nor the other can be considered to
be arbitrary or unreasonable. There is no one fixed or focal point
of reasonableness. There can be a large and wide area within . which
F the administrator or the legislator can act, without violating the
constitutional mandate of reasonableness. That is the area whic~
permits free play in the joints. The following table will show the.,_
variation in the retirement age which exists at present in the various
States in India :

State Retirem<nt. Age
G
Haryana 58 years
Jammu & Kashmir 55 years
Karnataka 1979-58 years
1981-55 years
Kerala 1907-55 years
H 1968-58 years
K. NAGARAJ v. ANDHRA PRADESH (Chandrachud, C.J.) 597

1969-55 years A
1984-58 years
Madhya Pradesh 58 years ;
Reduced to 55 years 1967 ;
enhanced to 5 years in 1970.
Maharashtra 58 years
B
Orissa Previously 55 years ;
enhanced to 58 years.
Rajas than 55 years
(Reduced from 58 years to
JI 55 years about 12 years back)
Uttar Pradesh 58 years c
(Reduced to 55 years in 1962 ;
enhanced to 58 years)
Tamil Nadu 58 years
(For District Judges, lowered from
58 to 55 years)
West Bengal 58 years (since 1961) D

It is clear from this table that the area between the ages of 55 and .,
58 is regarded in our country as a permissible field of operation for
fixing the age of retirement. Neither the American nor the English
notions or norms for fixing retirement age can render invalid the basis
which is widely accepted in our country as reasonable for that E
purpose.

r On the question of policy regarding the fixation of retirement
age, it will be useful to draw attention to the views expressed upon
that question from time to time by the various Pay Commissions.

Chapter XXXVII of the Report of the Second Central Pay F
Commission (1959) deals with the question as to the 'Age of Superan-
nuation'. The history and background of the fixation of age of
superannuation traced in that Chapter make useful reading. Prior to
1917, the superannuation rule applicable to both ministerial and non-
ministerial staff was that a Government servant who had attained the
age of 55 might be required to retire ; but that, in order to avod G
depriving the State of the valuable experience of efficient officers and
adding unnecessarily to the non-effective charges, the rule should be
applied with discretion and, whenver it was applied, reasons should
be recorded. In its general effect, here, the rule favoured the retention
in Government service of officers who had attained the age of 55, and
required inefficiency to be established as the condition of compulsory H
598 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1985] 2 S.C.R.
A retirement. This was considered .injurious to . the efficiency of the
public service, on the ground that most officers lost their keenness
and initiative at the age of 55. The rule was, accordingly, changed so
as to make retirement at 55 the normal practice, and retention in
service beyond that age the exception A distinction was, however,
made between ministerial and non-ministerial officers, presumbly
B because, it was thought that the duties of the former did not suffer
from the effects of advancing age as did those of the others ; and it
was decided, in effect, that, subj~ct to continued efficiency, ILJinisterial
officers should be retained in service till they attained the age of 60.
This distinction was, however, abolished in 1937-38, partly as a
measure of relieving unemployment-which was acute at that time-but
largely in recognition of the invalidity of the distinction and on the
consideration that the uncertainty which attended the service of
c senior men beyond 55 had a disturbing effect on those who were
looking forward to succeeding them.

Paragraph 5 of the Commission's Report mentions that the
Varadachariar Commission had recommended earlier that the age for
D compulsory retirement should be 58 years for all services-pensionable
and non-pensionable-with an option to the Government to retire an
employee on the ground of loss of efficiency, at the age of 55. That
recommendation involved reduction of the age of superannuation in
the case of Class IV servants and in the case of industrial and worli:-
charged staff outside the Railways, as well as raising the age for
E others. But, for some reason or the other, only the latter question
was considered and it was ultimately decided in 1949, that there
should be no change in the position. The main grounds for the deci-
sion were that the majority of persons retiring at the age of 55 were
not capable of rendering efficient service any further; their replace-
ment at the age of 55 by younger men would serve the interests of
II efficiency better ; and that, the retirement age should be so fixed as
would release men at an age when they would still be fit to render
service to the country in other spheres of their choice, even though
not wholly capable of keeping up with the fast tempo of Government
work, or of meeting its other exacting requirements. It was observed
that Government service ages employees quicker and that, the ques-
G
tion was one of balancing limited use to Government of such men
against, perhaps, their better usefulness to the nation at large.

Paragraph 6 of the Commission's Report shows that the ques-
tion was reconsidered in 1963 when, the only additional argument
advanced against an upward change its adverse effect on educated
K. NAGARAJ '· ANDHRA PRADESH (Chandrachud, C.J.) 599

unemployment. It was recognized that its actual effect would A
be small but, importance was attached to its probable impact
on public opinion. The earlier decision to maintain the age of
retirement at 55 was re-affirmed but, in view of the widespread shor-
tage of trained personnel, it was decided that extension of service
beyond that ai:e mii:ht be given liberally on the ground of public
interest, more specially in the case of scientific and technical personel. B
The continuing shortage of trained man-power led to a further
review of the problom in 1958 ; but, apart from laying down the
criteria for grant of extension and re-employment, and re-emphasi-
zing the need to retain technical and scientific personnel beyond the
age of superannuation, the only significant advance on the earlier
decisions was that re-employment or extension might be granted upto
two years at a ti'11e. Thus. notwithstanding the recommendation of c
the Varadachariar Commission, the age of superan.rnation laid down
for the non-ministerial staff more than 40 years e1rlier and for minis-
terial staff more than 20 years earlier, continued to be in force when
the Second Central Pay Commission took up that question for
~,., examination.
D
There was an "extraordinary unan1m1ty of opinion" amongst
Heads of Departments, distinguished retired public servants, public
men and economists who gave evidence before the Cqmmission that
the age of superannua1ion should be raised, the only difference being
)
as to whether it should be raised to 58 or 60 years. The great majo-
rity of the employee3' organisations were also in favour of increasing E
the age of retirement, the only exception being the All India Railway-
men's Federation. Tllat Federation did not consider the age of 55· as
the age of the onset of senile inefficiency, but it was of the opinion that
the aae of superannuation should not be raised in view of the then
prevailin& lar1e-11e&le unemployment. Some of the reasons on which
there was unanimity for increasing the age of retirement were ; the F

r continuing mental and physical efficiency of most of the Government
•ervants at the age of 55 ; the increased expectation of life resulting
from improved public health conditions ; and, the national waste
involved in sending men ~and women into enforced idleness while
they were still capable of rendering efficient service. The Commission
G
found that there was an overall improvement in public health as
shown by the decline in death rate and the increase in expectancy of
life at birth. What was even of greater relevance, the Commission
found that there was improvement in the expectancy of life in the
fifties, that is to say, amongst people in the age group of 50 to 60.
The data supplied to the_ Commission by the Comptroller and Audi- H
iiOO SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1985] 2 S.C.R.

A tor·General showed that, at least in the case of Gazetted and Class
III employees, there was a significant increase in the percentage of
persons who lived for two years or more after superannuation. On
this data, the Commission concluded in paragraph 11 of its Report :
"Thus, however valid may have been the view taken in 1971, and
re-affirmed in 1937-38, that the age of 55 was normally the dividing
line between health and efficiency on the one side, and marked physi-
B
. cal deterioration and decline in efficiency on the other, there is sllfli-
cient reason to think that is no longer so, and that the deviding line
can be safely moved a few years upwards." The Commission then
adverted to the prevailing ages of retirement in foreign countries and
reiterated that whether we go by our own "vital statistics" or by the
age of retirement prevalent in other countries, there was a clear case
c for raising the age of superannuation "substantially" above 55 years.

In paragraph 15 of the Report, the Commission considered the
effect of increasing the age of retirement on the employment situation
and concluded that the likely repercussion of increasing the age of
retirement on educated unemployment would not be substantial.
After taking into account all the relevant considerations, including
D
the fact that most Government servants themselves do not wish to
continue in service until they are worn out and have "one foot in the
grave", the Commission summed up its findings by saying that there
was "much in favour of and very little against raising the age of
superannuation''. The Commission recommended that the age of
E superannuation should be 58 for all cla.ses of public servants inclu-
ding those for whom the retirement age then was 60.

The recommendation of the Second Central Pay Commission
that the age of retirement should be raised from 55 to 58 years was
not accepted by the Government initially because, it felt that raising
F the age of retirement would reduce employment opportunities in the
immediate future. However. the Government reviewed the position
subsequently and raised the age of retirement to 58 years with effect
from December I, 1962. The main considerations which weighed
with the Government in reaching this decision were : The shortage of
experienced and trained man-power which could be met partly by
iG
raising the age of retirement ; the insignificant effect which raising the
age of retirement would have on employment opportunities ; and, the
improved life expectation.

The Third Central Pay Commission (1973) dealt with the ques-
' H ·tion of age of superannuation in Chapter 60 of its Report: Paragraph
K. NAGARAJ Yi ANDHRA PRADESH (Chandrachud, C.J.) 601

3 of that Chapter ihows that whereas some Service Associations A
demanded that the a2e of superannuation should be increased to 60
years on account of increased longevity and on account of the fact
that a large number of Government employees were not free from
family responsibilities until much later in life because of late marri-
ages, some of the Associations suggested that the age of retirement
ahould be reduced again to 55 years mainly with a view to improving II
the promotional prospects and providing increased employment
opportunities to the educated unemployed in the country.

The conclusions of the Third Central Pay Commission can be
summed up thus:- (1) There was a further improvement in the
expectancy of life at birth as revealed by the provisional 1971 Census
figures; (2) There was improvement in the expectancy of life between
the ages of 50 and 55 years, which was of great relevance on the
question of fixation of the age of superannuation ; (3) There was an
appreciable increase since 1950 in the percentage of survivors among
. the Central Government employees during about ten years after
retirement; (4) Though reduction in the age of superannuation to 55
years would result in making about 96,000 additional jobs available,
that factor was counter-balanced by the circumstance that a large
number of retired Government employees are obliged to take up
some employment or the other after retirement, due to the increased
cost of living and the growing family responsibilities. A reduction in
the age of superannuation would not therefore, ipso !facto, improve
the overall employment position for the educated unemployed ; (5)
Any increase in the age of superannuation beyond the age of 58 would
reduce, during the period of the increase, employment opportunities
for a very large number of technical, engineering and professional
•tudents passing out from the universities, technical institutions and
industrial trainin2 institutes ; and, (6) The age of retirement should
not be changed frequently since it has a vital bearing on the career
prospects of and the retirement benefits available to Government
employees and since it is an important factor in the attractiveness of
Government service. For these reasons, the Commission recommen-
ded that the age of superannuation should continue to be 58 years for
the Central Government employees with the modification that the
retirement should take effect from the afternoon of the last day of
tbe month in which the employee attains the age of superannuation.

The Third Tamil Nadu Pay Commission (1978) has also dealt
with the question of the age of retirement. The Commission noticed
that the age of retirement was more than 60 in some of the develop-
602 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1985] 2 S.C.R.
A ing countries, the economic development of which was comparable to
that of India. The age of retirement is 70 years in Brazil and Peru, 65
years in Chile, 63 years in Philippines and 64 years in Lebanon. The
Commission examined the co-relationship between increase in the age
of retirement and unemployment amongst the educated youth with
"a deep sense of concern" and observed that the number of jobs
B released by retirement would be very marginal as compared with the
total number of job seekers and that, therefore, it was not fair to.
shift the focus of the problem of unemployment to the age of super-
annuation of the Government employees. In support of this view, it
quoted the International Labour Organisation (The World Employ-
ment Programme) : "The three pillars of a strategy for fuller employ-
c ment are rural development, labour intensive public works program- '
mes and the reduction of capital intensity of industrialisation."
Observing that the dimensions of unemployment problem should not
deter the Government from improving the service conditions of its
employees, the Commission concluded that there was a case for
increasing the retirement age cf the State Government employees to
58 years.
D
Our attention was also drawn to the views expressed on
"Employment Policy" in the Sixth Five Year Plan (1980-85). It is
observed therein that la~ting solutions to unemployment problems had
to be found within tlie framework of a rapid and employment-orien-
E ted economic growth ; that suitable measures had to be evolved in
the short term in a co-ordinated way, particularly for the benefit of
the weaker sections ; and that, since· the dimension and gravity of
educated unemployment vary from State to State, a decentralised
approach should be adopted on the district employment plan. Accor-
ding to the Sixth Five Year Plan, unemployment would not be elimi-
nated within the Sixth Plan unless efforts were immediately made to
F make the current unemployed more employable through short-term
.training and vocational programmes and unless special employment
programmes are directed towards their absorption.

Soon after the assumption of office, the Government of Andhra
Pradesh pressented a White Paper to the State Legislative Assembly
G in March 1983 on the question of reduction in the age of superannu-
ation from 58 years to 55 years in respect of Government employees,
employees of Panchayat Raj Institutions, Local Bodies and aided
Educational Institutions for whom the pensionary liability is borne
by Government". After stating that the Krishnaswamy Commission
H was appointed on November 3, 1977 for the sole purpose of
K. NAGARAJ v. ANDHRA PRADESH (Chandrachud, C.J.) 603
A
examining the question of "retirement benefits" and that the
question of retirement age was not included in its terms of
reference, the White Paper says that although the Government
had accepted the recommendations of the Commission almost in
their entirety, it did not accept its recommendation that the age of
retirement should be increased from 55 to 58 years. By a notification
dated September 17, 1919 the recommendations of the Comm.ission B
in regard to the revision of pay scales were accepted by the GJvern-
ment but, not so the recommendation regarding increasing the age of
retirement from 55 to 58 years. It was later, in October 1979, that the
Government decided on its own to increase the age of retirement
from <5 to 58 years The specific case of the State Government on the
question of reduction of the age of retirement from 58 to 55 years is c
stated thus :

-
" "As a result of revision of the age of superannuation
upwards from 55 years to 58 years, the normal channels of
promotions that would have opened up had the retirements
taken place in the normal course, were choked. Consequen- D
tly the resultant vacancies at the direct recruitment level
which would have arisen in the chain of appointments that
would follow each retirement, were also blocked for 3
years continuously, thereby denying the. promotion oppor-
tunities to inservice personnel and employment opportunities
for the unemployed causing a great deal of frustration all
round. rt is estimated that on an average there would be E
approximately 6,500 retirements each year from Government
departments, Panchayat Raj Institutions and also Aided
Institutions, where pensionary liability is borne by Govern-
ment. )overnment, therefore, decided to revise the age of
' superannuation from 58 years to 55 years so that the nnem- F
p!oyed talented youth who were eagerly awaiting chances of
appointment could get opportunities of employment. Besi-
des, experienced deserving·inservice personnel whose legiti-
mate aspirations for promotion were thwarted could also
now look for this much a waited promotion. Government
were thus able to create promotional avenues to serving G
employees at various levels and create opportunities for
appointment against about I 8,000 posts in Government,
Panchayat Raj and aided educational institutions alone, not
to speak of the opportunities that were created in the various
Corporations etc , owned or controlled by Government." H
604 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1985]'2 S.C.R.

The White Paper explains that in order to ensure that the
employees who bad retired by the end of February 1983 should get
their, pensionary benefits without delay, the Government bad consti-
tuted a special Pension cell in the Finance Department, by a notifi-
cation dated February 16, 1983. The function of that cell is to
"monitor the progress of settlement of pension cases" In addition,
18
it is said, the Government had issued instructions by a notification
dated February 14, 1983 for payment of "anticipatory pension" at
3/lOth of the last pay drawn in all cases wherein the sanction of
pension was delayed.

On the basis of this data, it is difflcul t to hold that in reducing
the age of retirement from 58 to 55, the State Government or
the Legislature acted arbitrarily or irrationally. There are
precedents . within our country itself for fixing the retirements
age at 55 or for reducing it from 58 to 55. Either the one
or the other of these two stages is regarded generally as accept·
able, depending upon the employment policy of the Govern-
ment of the day. It is not pos<ible to lay down an inflexible
rule that 58 years is a reasonable age for retirement and 55 is not. If
the policy adopted for the time being by the Government or the
Legisalture is shown to violate recognised norms of employment
planning, it would be possible to say that the policy is irrational
E since, in that event, it would not bear reasonable nexus with the
object which it seeks to achieve. But such is not the case here. The
reports of the various Commissions, from which we have extracted
relevant portions, show that the creation of new avenues of employ-
ment for the youth is an integral part of any policy governing the
fixation of retirement age. Since the impugned policy is actuated
F and influenced predominatly by that consideration, it cannot be struck
down as arbitrary or irrational. We would only like to add that the
•i.
question· of age of retirement should always. be examined by the
Government with more than ordinary care, more than the State
Government has bestowed upon it in this case. The fixation of age of
retirement has minute and multifarious dimensions which shape the
lives of citizens. Therefore, it is vital from the point of view of their
G
well-being that the question should be considered with the greatest
objectivity and decided upon the basis of empirical data furnished by
scientific investigation. What is vital for the welfare of the citizens is,
of necessity. vital for the survival of the State. Care must also
be taken to ensure that the statistics are not perverted to serve a
H malevolent· purpose.
K. NAGARAJ v. ANDllRA PRADESH (Chandrachud, C.J.) 605

Shri V .M. Tarkunde, who appears for some of the petitioners, A
limited his argument to the contention that arbitrary fixation of
retirement age amounts to "removal" from service and is therefore
violative of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution. This argument has
to be rejected because of our conclusion that the reduction of the
age of retirement from 58 to 55 in the instant case is not hit by
Article 14 or Article 16, since it is not arbitrary or unreasonable in
the circumstances- of the case. But, apart from this position, we
find it difficult to appreciate how the retirement of an employee in
accordance with a law or rules regulating his conditions of service can
amount to his "removal" from service. It is well-settled that Article
311 (2) is attracted only when a civil servant is reduced in rank, c
dismissed or removed from service by way of penally, that is to say,
when the effect of the order passed against him in this behalf is to
visit him with evil consequences. See Salish Chandra v. Union of
India,(') Shyam Lal v. State of UPI) State of Bombay v. Saubhag-
chand M. Doshi,(') Purshottam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India(4) and
P Balakotiah v. Union of India(S). Besides, the point made by Shri D
Tarkunde is concluded by a Constitution Bench decision of this Court
in Bishun Narain Misra v. State of Uttar Pradesh.(6) In that case, the
Government of Uttar Pradesh and raised the age of superannuation
from 55 to 58 years by a Notification dated November 27, 1957
but reduced it again to 55 years by a Notification dated May 25,
1961. The appellant therein, who had attained the age of 55 years E
on December 11, 1960 and was continued in service when the age
of retirement was raised to 58 years, was one of those who had to
retire on December 31, 1961 as a result of reduction of the age of
retirement to 55. It was held by this Court that the termination of
service of an employee on account of his reaching the age of superan-
F
nuation does not amount to his removal from service within the
meaning of Article 311 (2). Learned counsel contends that this
' decision is of doubtful authority since the Court based its opinion on
the majority judgment in Mali Ram Deka v. General Manager, North
Frontier Rai/way('I ), in which the Court was not called upon to
consider and did not consider the validity of a rule of superannuation.
It is true that in Moti Ram Deka, the Court was concerned to G

(1) 11953] S.C.R. 655.
(2) [1955] 1 S.C.R. 26.
(3) [1958] S.C.R. 571.
(4) [j958] S.C.R. 828.
(5) 11958] S.C.R. 1052.
(6) [1965] 1 S.C.R. 693.
(7) ·11964] 5 S.C.R 683. H
606 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1985] 2 S.C.R.
A determine the validity of Rules 148 (3) and 149 (3) of the Railway
Establishment Code which provided for the termination of tbe service
of a permanent servant by a mere notice. But, interestingly, the
judgment in Bis/um Narain Mishra shows that it was the appellant
therein who relied on the decision in Moti Ram Deka in support
of his contention that the rule by which the age of retirement was
B
reduced to 55 years amounted to removal within the meaning of
Article 311 Ul The Court he]j that the decision in Moti Ram Deka
had no application to the case before them since "that· case did not
deal with any rule relating to age of retirement". (See page 696 of
the Report). It was after noticing this distinction that the Court
c observed that the very case, namely, Moti Ram Deka's case on which
the appellant relieJ, contained the observation that the rule as to
supperannuation or compulsory retire.nent resulting in the termina-
tion of service of a public servant did not amount to removal from
service. The Court, in Bishun Narain Misra, came independently to
the conclusion that "as the rule in question only dealt with the age
D of superannuation and the appellant had to retiro because of the
reduction in the age of superannuation it cannot be said that the
termination of his service which thus came about was removal within
the meaning of Article 31 l ".

The theme of Shri Siddhartha Shankar Ray's argument is "non-
E application of mind". He made it cleaf that his argument should
not be construed as a challenge to the power or jurisdiction of the
Governor to issue the impugned Ordinance and that his sole attempt
was to show that the Ordinance was passed in a hurry, as a result of
which, considerations which are relevant to the fixation of retirement
age were ignored. The instances of non-application of mind cited
F by the learned counsel are these : The inclusion of· the employees of
the High Court within the sweep of the Ordinance in violation of the
provisions of Chapters V and VI of the Constitution ; the inclusion '
of the employees of the Legislature Secretariat within the Ordinance ;
the extension of the Ordinance even to the daily rate workers ; and,
finally, the fact that nothing worthwhile is likely to be achieved by
G the passing of the Ordinance since, at the highest, it would create
emyloyment at this point of time only, for about 19,500 employees.
After that point of time passes. the same state of affairs will continue
since the age of retirement will be merely substituted by 58 in place
of 55 years.

It is impossible to accept the submission that the Ordinance
H can be invalidated on the ground of non-application of mind. The
K. NAGARAJ v. ANDHRA PRADESH (Chandrachud, C.J.) 607
A
power to issue an ordinance is not an executive power but is the
power oi the executive to legislate. The power of the Governor to
promulgate an ordinance is contained in Article 213 which occurs
in Chapter IV of Part Vl of the Constitution. The heading of that
Chapter is "Legislative Power of the Governor". This power is
plenary within its field like the power of the State Legislature to pass B
laws and there are no limitations upon that power except those to
which the legislative power of the State Legislature is subject.
Therefore, though an ordinance can be invalidated for contravention
of the constitutional limitations which exist upon the power of the
State Legislature to pass Jaws it cannot be declared invalid for the
reason of non-application of mind, any more than any other law can
c
be. An executive act is liable to be struck down on the ground of
non-application of mind. Not the act of a Legislature.

On the question as to the legislative character of the ordinance-
making power, we may refer to the decisions of this Court in A.K. D
Roy v. Union of India(') and R.K. Garg v. Union of India( 2 ).

Shri Ray raised upon a decision of this Court in High Court of
Andhra Pradesh v. V.V.S. Krishnamurthy,(3 ) which has taken the view
that in regard to the servants and officers of the High Court, Article
E
229 of the Constitution makes the power of their appointment,
) dismi1sal, removal, compulsory retirement, etc., including the power
to prescribe their conditions of service, the sole preserve of the
Chief Justice and no extraneous executive authority can interfere with
the exercise of that power. This decision cannot assist the peti-
tioners since, it deals with the limitations on the executive power of F
the Government to interfere with the power of the Chief Justice
under Article 229. The executive cannot encroach upon that power.
The decision of this Court in Moti Ram Deka which was also cited
by the learned counsel, does not touch the point raised by him.

Though Shri Ray presented his argument in the shape of a
challenge to the Ordinance on the ground of non-application of G
mind, the real thrust of his argument was that the hurry with which
the Ordinance was passed shows the arbitrary character of the action
taken by the State Government. We have already rejected the
contention of haste and hurry as also the argument · that the provi-

(1) [1982) 2 S.C.R. 272 at 282, 291.
(2) (1982) t S.C.R. 947 at 964, 967.
(3) (1979) I S.C.R. 26. H
60S SUPREME COURT RERORTS [1985] 2 s.c.R.
A sions of the Ordinance are, in any manner, arbitrary or unreasonable
and thereby violate Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.

Shri R.K. Garg, who appears in Transfer Cases Nos. 70, 71
and 72 of 1983, challenges the validity of the Ordinance on the
B ground that, casting all established norms aside, it fixes the age of
retirement at 55 years, notwithstanding industrial adjudications and
even settlements arrived at between employers and employees.
Relying upon certain decisions of this Court like Maneka Gandhi v.
Union· of lttdia(') 011'1 S:.te of Madras v. V.G. Row(') in support of his
submission that arbitrariness invalidates Jaws, counsel contends that
c a Jaw which overrules an industrial adjudication or settlement is
fundamentally unreasonable or arbitrary and must, therefore, be
held to be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. It was also
urged by counsel that by reducing the· age of retirement to 55 years, .
the Government employees were deprived of their right to liveli-
0:( hood. There is no substance in this latter argument because, if a
D rule of retirement can be deemed to deprive a person of his right to
livelihood, it .will be impermissible to provide for an age of retire·
ment at all. That will be contrary to public interest because the
State cannot afford the luxury of allowing its employees to continue
iri service after they have passed the point of peak performance.
Rules of retirement do not take away the right of a person to his.
E
livelihood : they limit his right to hold office to a stated number of
years. This argument of the learned counsel can be rejected for
other reasons also, we do Pot propose to deal with these Transferred
Cases since, there is nothing on record to show that there are any
industrial adjunctions or settlements between employers and emp-
loyees providing for an age of retirement for any section of iadustrial
workers. These Transferred Cases will be delinked from the other

.
F
Writ Petitions and wlll be listed for hearing later, so that they can
! -
be dealt with upon their own facts. lf the question raised by Shri
Garg is academic, it will be needless to consider it.

·,)
The argument of ma/a jides advanced by Shri A.T. Sampat,
and adopted in passing by some of the other counsel, is without any
G basis. The burden to establish ma/a ./ides is a heavy burden to
discharge. Vague and casual allegations suggesting that a certain
act was done with an ulterior motive cannot be .accepted without
proper pleadings and adequate proof, both of which are conspi-

(!) (1978] 2 S.C.R. 621 at 659, 685, 689·and 702.
(2) [1952] S.C.R. 597 at 607.
K. NAGARAJ v. ANDHRA PRADESH (Chandrachud, C.J.) 609

cuously absent in these writ petitions. Besides, the ordinance-making A
power being a legislative power, the argument of ma/a ftdes is
misconceived. The legislature, as a body, cannot be accused of
having passed a law for an extraneous purpose. Tts reasons for
passing a law are those that are stated in the Objects and Reasons
and if no reasons are so stated, as oppear from the provisions''enacted
B
by it. · Even assuming that the executive, in a given case, has an
ulterior motive in moving a legislation, that motive cannot render
the passing of the law ma/a fide. This kind of 'transferred malice' is
unknown in the field of legislation.

Finally, there is no substance in the contention that the amend- c
ment to the Fundamental Rules, whereby the proviso to rule 2 was
deleted, is beyond the powers of the ruk. m.1king authority or the
Legislature. The Fundamental Rules and the amendm.cnts thereto
are issued by the State Government under the powers delegated
to it by the Civil Services (Governors' Provinces) Delegation Rules
1926, the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules D
1930, and under the Proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution.
The Fundamental Rules which came in to force with effect from
January I, 1972 were amended earlier by G.O. Ms. No. 128 dated
April 29, \969. By that amendment, a proviso was added to rule 2
which reads thus :

"Provided that the rules shall not be modified or E
replaced to the disadvantage of any person already in
service."

By G.O. Ms. No. 48 dated February 17, 1983 this proviso was
deleted with retrospective effect from February 23, 1979. The
contention of the petitioners is that the proviso which conferred a
benefit upon Government servants by protecting their conditions of
F
service, cannot be amended so as to empower the Government to
alter those conditions to their prejudice and, in any event, they
cannot be amended retrospectively so as to take away rights which
had already accrued to them The simple answer to this argument.is
that the amendment of February 17, 1983 to the Fundamental Rules
was made by the Government of A ndhra Pradesh in exercise of the G
powers conferred by the proviso to Article 309 read with Article 313
of the Constitution. It is well-settled that the service rules can be
as much amended, as they can be made, under the proviso to
Article 309 and that, the power to amend these rules carries with it
the power to amend them retrospectively. The power conferred by H.
610 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1985] 2 S.C.R.
A the proviso to Article 309 is of a legislative character and is to be
distinguished from an ordinary rule making power. The power to
legislate is of a plenary nature within the field demarcated by the
Constitution and it includes the power to legislate retrospectively.
Therefore, the amendment made to the Fundamental Rules in the
B exercise of power conferred by Article 309, by which the proviso
to rule 2 was deleted retrospectively, was a valid exercise of legislative
power. The rules and amendments made under the proviso to
Article 309 can be altered or repealed by the Legislature but until
that is done, the exercise of the power cannot be challenged as lacking
c in authority. (See B.S. Vadera v. Union of India;(') Ra} Kumar v.
Union of India(').

These then are the main points in controversy on which
counsel made their contentions. For reasons aforesaid, we reject I
those contentions and dismiss these Writ Petitions. There will be no
D order as to costs.

S.R. Petitions dismissed.

{

(I) [1968) 3 S.C.R. 575, 582-585.
(2) [1975) 3 S.C.R. 963, 965.