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Supreme Court of India

K.N. GOVINDAN KUTTY MENONversusC.D. SHAJI

Citation
2011 INSC 824
Decided
28 November 2011
Disposal
Appeal(s) allowed

Holding

Section 21 of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 deems every Lok Adalat award, even when arising from a criminal reference under Section 138 of the NI Act, to be a decree of a civil court and thus executable.

Summary

The appellant filed a criminal complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, which the magistrate referred to a Lok Adalat for settlement. The parties reached a compromise and the Lok Adalat passed an award, but the respondent failed to honour the payment schedule, leading the appellant to file an execution petition in a civil court. The civil court and the Kerala High Court held that the Lok Adalat award, being the product of a criminal reference, could not be treated as a decree of a civil court and refused execution. The Supreme Court examined Section 21 of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987, which deems every Lok Adalat award to be a decree of a civil court, and found no statutory distinction between civil and criminal referrals. Relying on the language of the statute and several precedents, the Court held that the award is executable as a civil decree. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, the lower courts' orders were set aside, and the execution petition was restored for further proceedings.

Issues considered

  • Whether an award of a Lok Adalat in a case referred by a criminal court under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is deemed a decree of a civil court and therefore executable

Legislation cited

Subjects

Legal Services Authorities ActLok AdalatAwardDecreeExecutionSection 138 NI ActDeeming provisionCivil courtCriminal caseLegal fiction

Judgment

               [2011] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R. 447


             K.N. GOVINDAN KUTTY MENON                        A
                             v.
                        C.D. SHAJI
             (Civil Appeal No. 10209 of 2011)

                  NOVEMBER 28, 2011
                                                              B
     [P. SATHASIVAM AND J. CHELAMESWAR, JJ.]

      Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 - s. 21 -
Interpretation of - When a criminal case filed uls. 138 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act, referred to by the Magistrate     c
Court to Lok Ada/at is settled by the parties and an· award is
passed recording the settlement, can it be considered as a
decree of a civil court and thus executable - Held: In view of
the unambiguous language of s.21 of the Act, every award of
the Lok Ada/at shall be deemed to be a decree of a civil court D
and as such it is executable by that Court - The Act does not
make out any such distinction between the reference made
by a civil court ana criminal court - There is no restriction on
the power1of the Lok Ada/at to pass an award based on the
compromise arrived at between the parties in respect of cases E
referred to by various Courts (both civil and criminal),
Tribunals, Family court, Rent Control Court, Consumer
Redressa/ Forum, Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and other
Forums of similar nature - Even if a matter is referred by a
criminal court u/s.138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, by
virtue of the deeming provisions, the award passed by the Lok F
Ada/at based on a compromise has to be treated as a decree
capable of execution by a civil court- Negotiable Instruments ·
Act, 1881- s.138.

    An important question as to the interpretation of         G
Section 21 of the Legal Services Authorities Act; 1987
arose for consideration in the instant appeal. The
question posed was that when a criminal case filed under
Section 138 of the· Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881
                           447                                H
    448     SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A referred to by the Magistrate Court to Lok Adalat is settled
  by the parties and an award is passed recording the
  settlement, can it be considered as a decree of a civil
  court and thus executable.

          Allowing the appeal, the Court
B
       HELD: 1.1. The Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987
  empowers Legal Services Authorities at Lhe District, State
  and National levels, and the different committees to
  organize Lok Adalats to resolve pending and pre-litigation
c disputes. It provides for permanent Lok Adalats to settle
  disputes involving public utility services. Under the Act,
  "legal services" have a meaning that includes rendering
  of service in the conduct of any court-annexed
  proceedings or proceedings before any authority, tribunal
o and so on, and giving advice on legal matters. The Act
  provides for a machinery to ensure access to justice to
  all through the institutions of legal services authorities
  and committees. These\institutions are manned by
  Judges and judicial officers. Parliament entrusted the
E judiciary with the task of implementing the provisions of
  the Act. [Para 7] [454-G-H; 455-A-E]

       1.2. Section 21 of the Act contemplates a deeming
  provision, hence, it is a legal fiction that the "award" of
  the Lok Adalat is a decree of a civil court. In the case on
F hand, the Courts below erred in holding that only if the
  matter was one which was referred by a civil court it could
  be a decree and if the matter was referred by a criminal
  court it will only be an order of the criminal court and not
  a decree under Section 21 of the Act. The Act does not
G make out any such distinction between the reference
  made by a civil court and criminal court. There is no
  restriction on the· power of Lok Adalat to pass an award
  based on the compromise arrived at between the parties
  in a case referred by a criminal court under Section 138
H of the N.I. Act, and by virtue of the deeming provision it
   K.N. GOVINDAN KUTTY MENON v. C.D. SHAJI              449


has to be treated as a decre~ capable of execution by a        A
civil court. [Paras 8, 14] [45.,-F; 460-G-H; 461-A-B]

    1.3. The "award" of the Lok Adalat does not mean any
independent verdict or opinion arrived at by any decision
making process. The making of the award is merely an           8
administrative act of incorporating the terms of settlement
or compromise agreed by the parties in the presence of
the Lok Adalat, in the form of an executable order under
the signature and seal of the Lok Adalat. [Para 15] [461-
C-D]
                                                               c
   1.4. In conclusion, the following propositions
emerge:

    a) In view of the unambiguous language of Section
    21 of the Act, every award of the Lok Adalat shall be      o
    cleemed to be a decree of a civil court <1nd as such it
    is executable by that Court.

    b) The Act does not make out any such distinction
    between the reference made by a civil court and
    criminal court.                                            E

    c) There is no restriction on the power of the Lok
    Adalat to pass an award based on the compromise
    arrived at between the parties in respect of cases
    referred to by various Courts (both civil and criminal),   F
    Tribunals, Family court, Rent Control Court,
    Consumer Redressal Forum, Motor Accidents Claims
    Tribunal and other Forums of similar nature.

    d) Even if a matter is referred by a criminal court
    under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act,       G
    1881 and by virtue of the deeming provisions, the
    award passed by the Lok Adalat based on a
    compromise has to be treated as a decree capable
    of execution by a civil court. [Para 17] [461-F-H; 462-
    A-Cl                                                       H
                                                         /




    450     SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2011] 15 (ADDL.i S.C.R.


A       ·Subhash Narasappa Mangrule (MIS) and Others vs.
    Sidramappa Jagdevappa Unnad 2009 (3) Mh.L.J. 857 and
    Mis Va/armathi Oil Industries & Anr. vs. Mis Saradhi Ginning
    Factory AIR 2009 Madras 180 - approved.

        State of Punjab & Anr vs. Jalour Singh and Ors. (2008)
8
    2 SCC 660: 2008 (1) SCR 922; B.P. Moideen Sevamandir
    and Anr. v. AM. Kutty Hassan (2009) 2 SCC 198: 2008 (17)
    SCR 905 and P. T. Thomas vs. Thomas Job (2005) 6 SCC
    478: 2005 (2) Suppl. SCR 20 - relied on.
c         Bhavnagar University vs. Pa/itana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd. and
    Others (2003) 2 SCC 111: 2002 (4) Suppl. SCR 517 and
    lttianam .and Others vs. Cherichi @ Padmini (2010) 8 SCC
    612: 2010 (8) SCR 1135 - referred to.
                          Case Law Reference:
D
     2009 (3) Mh.L.J. 857          approved         Paras 10,14

     AIR 2009 Madras 180           approved         Paras 11, 14

     2002 (4) Suppl. SCR 517 referred to            Para 12
E
     2010 (8) SCR 1135             referred to      Para 13

     2008 (1) SCR 922              relied on        Para 15

     2008 (17) SCR 905             relied on        Para 15
F    ]005 (2) Suppl. SCR 20        relied on        Para 16

       CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
    10209 of 2011.

        From the Judgment & Order dated 24.11.2009 of the High
G
    Court of Kerala at Ernakulam in WP (C) No. 33013 of 2009.

       Prashanth P., Prachi Bajpai, S.K. Balachandran, T. Harish
    Kumar for the Appellant.

H         V. Giri (AC) for the Respondent.
 (


     K.N. GOVINDAN KUTTY MENON v. C.D. SHAJI               451


     The Judgment of the Court was delivered by                   A
     P. SATHASIVAM, J. 1. Leave granted.

     2. This appeal raises an important question as to the
interpretation of Section 21 of the Legal Services Authorities
Act, 1987 (in short 'the Act'). The question posed for · B
consideration is that when a criminal case filed under Section
138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 referred to by the
Magistrate Court to Lok Adalat is settled by the parties and an
award is passed recording the settlement, can it be considered
as a decree of a civil court and thus executable?               C

     3. This appeal is directed against the final judgment and
order dated 24.11.2009 passed by the High Court of Kerala
at Ernakulam in Writ Petition (C) No. 33013 of 2009 whereby
the High Court dismissed the petition filed by the appellant
                                                                  0
herein.                                                     '1


     4. Brief facts:

     (a) The appellant herein filed a complaint being C.C. No.
1216 of 2007 before the Judicial 1st Class Magistrate Court       E
No.1, Ernakulam against the respondent herein under Section
138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (in short 'the N.I.
Act'). The Magistrate referred the said complaint to the
Ernakulam District Legal Service Authority for trying the case
for settlement between the parties in the Lok Adalat.             F

     (b) On 08.05.2009, both parties appeared before the Lok
Adalat and the matter was settled and an award was passed
on the same day. As per the award, out of Rs. 6,000/-, the
respondent herein paid Rs.500/- on the same day and agreed
to pay the balance amount of Rs.5,500/- in five equal G
instalments of Rs.1, 100/- per month on or before the 10th day
of every month starting from .iune, 2009 and, in case of default,
the appellant herein can recover the balance amount due froin
the respondent in lump sum.
                                                                  H
    452     SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2011] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A      (c) As the respondent did not pay any of the installments
  as per the settlement, the appellant filed execution petition
  being E.P. No ..... of 2009 in C.C. No. 1216 of 2007 in the
  Court of Principal Munsiff, Ernakulam for seeking the execution
  of the award. On 23.09.2009, the Principal Munsiff Judge,
B Ernakulam dismissed the petition holding that the award
  passed by the Lok Adalat on reference from the Magistrate
  Court cannot be construed as a "decree" executable by the civil
  court.

        (d) Aggrieved by the said order, the appellant filed writ
C petition being Writ Petition (C) No. 33013 of 2009 before the
  High Court of Kerala. The High Court, vide order dated
  24.11.2009, dismissed the writ petition.

        (e) Against the said order, the appellant filed the above
o   appeal by way of special leave before this Court.

        5. The respondent, though duly served by this Court, has
  not chosen to contest the matter either by appearing in person
  or through counsel. Heard Mr. Prashanth P., learned counsel
  for the appellant and Mr. V. Giri, learned senior counsel, who,
E on our request, assisted this Court as amicus curiae.

         6. In order to find out the answer to the question raised, it
    is useful to refer the Statement of Objects and Reasons and
    certain provisions of the Act applicable to the question posed
F   before us.

          "Statement of objects and Reasons.- Article 39-A of the
        Constitution provides that the State shall secure that the
        operation of the legal system promotes justice on the basis
        of equal opportunity, and shall, in particular, provide free
G
        legal aid, by suitable legislation or schemes or in any other
        way, to ensure that opportunities for securing justice are
        not denied to any citizen by reason of economic or other
        disabilities.

H
K.N. GOVINDAN KUTIY MENON v. C.D. SHAJI                 453
           [P. SATHASIVAM, J.]
2. With the object of providing free legal aid, Government A
had, by Resolution dated the 26th September, 1980
appointed the "Committee for Implementing Legal P,id
Schemer.'""\CILAS) under the Chairmanship of Mr. Justice
P.N. Bhagwati (as he then was) to monitor and implement
legal aid programmes on a uniform basis in all the States B
and Union territories. CILAS evolved a model scheme for
legal aid programme applicable throughout the country by
which several legal aid and advice boards have been set
up in the States and Union territories. CILAS is funded
wholly by grants from the Central Government. The i:
Government is accordingly concerned with the programme
of legal aid as it is the implementation of a constitutional ·
mandate. But on a review of the working of the CILAS,
certain deficiencies have comf:t to the fore. It is, therefore,
felt that it will be desirable to constitute statutory legal
                                                                0
service authorities at the National, State and District levels
so as to provide for the effective monitoring of legal aid
programmes. The Bill provides for the composition of such
authorities and for the funding of these authorities by
means of grants from the Central Government and the
                                                                E
State Governments. Power has been also given to the
National Committee and the State Committees to
supervise the effective implementation of legal aid
schemes.

For some lime now, Lok Adalats are being constituted at        F
various places in the country for the disposal, in a
summary way and through the process of arbitration and
settlement between the parties, of a large number of cases
expeditiously and with lesser costs. The institution of Lok
Adalats is at present functioning as a voluntary and           G
conciliatory agency without any statutory backing for its
decisions. It has proved to be very oopular in providing for
a speedier system of administration of justice. In view of
its growing popularity, there has been a demand for
providing a statutory backing to this institution and the      H
     454     SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

           awards given by Lok Adalats. It is felt that such a statutory
           support would not only reduce the burden of arrears of work
           in regular Courts, but would also take justice to the door-
           steps of the poor and the needy and make justice quicker
           and less expensive."
 B
           "2. (aaa) "Court" means a civil, criminal or revenue Court
           and includes any Tribunal or any other authority constituted
           under any law for the time being in force, to exercise
           judicial or quasi-judicial functions;"
c          "2(c) "l~gal service" includes the rendering of any service
           in the conduct of any case or other legal proceeding
           before any Court or other authority or Tribunal and the
           giving of advice on any legal matter;"

D          "2(d) "Lok Adalat" means a Lok Adalat organized under
           Chapter VI."

           "21. Award of Lok Adalat.- (1) Every award of Lok Adalat
           shall be deemed to be a decree of a Civil Court or, as the
           case may be, an order of any other Court and where a
E          compromise or settlement has been arrived at, by a Lok
           Ada lat in a case referred to it under sub-section (1) of
           section 20, the Court-fee paid in such case shall be
           refunded in the manner provided under the Court-Fee Act,
           1870 (7 of 1870).
F
           (2) Every award made by a Lok Adalat shall be final and
           binding on all the parties to the dispute, and no appeal
           shall lie to any Court against the award."
_       7. Free legal aid to the poor and marginalized members,
 8 of the society is now viewed as a tool to empower them to use
     the power of the law to advance their rights and interests as,
     citizens and as economic actors. Parliament enacted the Legal
     Services Authorities Act, 1987 in order to give effect to Article.
     39-A of the Constitution to extend free legal aid, to ensure that
H                                                                      '
     K.N. GOVINDAN KUTIY MENON v. C.D. SHAJI                  455
                [P. SATHASIVAM, J.]

the legal system promotes justice on the basis of equal               A
opportunity. Those entitled to free legal services are members
of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes, women,
children, persons with disability, victims of ethnic violence,
industrial workmen, persons in custody, and those whose
income does not exceed a level set by the government                  B
(currently it is Rs 1 lakh a year in most States). The Act
empowers Legal Services Authorities at the District, State and
National levels, and the different committees to organize Lok
Adalats to resolve pending and pre-litigation disputes. It
provides for permanent Lok Adalats to settle disputes involving       c
public utility services. Under the Act, "legal services' have a
meaning that includes rendering of service in the conduct of any
court-annexed proceedings or proceedings before any
authority, tribunal and so on, and giving advice on legal matters.
Promoting legal literacy and conducing legal awareness
                                                                      0
programmes are the functions of legal services institutions. The
Act provides for a machinery to ensure access to justice to ·all
through the institutions of legal services authorities and
committees. These institutions are manned by Judges and
judicial officers. Parliament entrusted the judiciary with the task   E
of implementing the provisions of the Act.

        8. Section 21 of the Act, which we have extracted above,
  contemplates a deeming provision, hence, it is a legal fiction
  that the "award" of the Lok Adalat is a decree of a civil court.
  In the case on hand, the question posed for consideration           F
  beforli! the High Court was that "when a criminal case referred
1 to 'by the Magis~rate to a Lok Adalat is settled by the parties
  and award is passed recording the settlement, can it be
  considered as a decree of civil court and thus executable by
  that court?" After highlighting the relevant provisions, namely,    G
  Section 21 of the Act, it was contended before the High Court
  that every award passed by the Lok Adalat has to be deemed
  to be a decree of a civil court and as such executable by that
  court. Unfortunately, the said argument was not acceptable by
  the High Court. On the other hand, the High Court has concluded     H
    456    SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A ·that when a criminal case is referred to the Lok Adalat and it
   is settled at the Lok Adalat, the award passed has to be treated
   only as an order of that criminal court and it cannot be executed
   as a decree of the civil court. After saying so, the High Court
   finally concluded "an award passed by the Lok Adalat on
B reference of a criminal case by the criminal court as already
   concluded can only be construed as an order by the criminal
   court and it is not a decree passed by a civil court" and
   confirmed the order of the Principal Munsiff who declined the
   request of the petitioner therein to execute the award passed
c  by the Lok Adalat on reference of a complaint by the criminal
   court. On going through the Statement of Objects and Reasons,
   definition of 'Court', 'legal service' as well as Section 21 of the
  Act, in addition to the reasons given hereunder, we are of the
   view that the interpretation adopted by the Kerala High Court
   in the impugned order is erfOneous.
0
        9. It is useful to refer some of the judgments of this Court
  and the High Courts which have a bearing on the present issue.

        10. In Subhash Narasappa Mangrule (MIS) and Others
E vs. Sidramappa Jagdevappa Unnad, reported in 2009 (3)
  Mh.L.J. 857, learned single Judge of the High Court of Bombay,
  considered an identical question. In that case, on 22.06.2001,
  the respondent filed a Criminal Complaint being S.C.C. No.
  923 of 2001 in the Court of Judicial Magistrate, First Class,
F Akkalkot under Section 138 of the N. I. Act. Later, the said
  criminal case was transferred to Lok Adalat. The matter was
  compromised before the Lok Adalat and an award was passed
  accordingly for Rs. 4 lakhs. The respondent therein filed a
  Darkhast proceeding No. 17 of 2006 in the Court of C.J.J.D.
G for execution of the award passed by the Lok Adalat in the
  criminal case as there was no compliance of the compromised
  order/award. The learned C.J.J.D., issued a notice under Order
  XXVll Rule . 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (in short
  'the Code'). The petitioner therein raised an objection stating
                                                                  .
  that the Darkhast proceeding is not maintainable as the award
H
    K.N. GOVINDAN KUTTY MENON v. C.D. SHAJI                   457
               [P. SATHASIVAM, J.]

has been passed in criminal case. By order dated 18.07.2007,         A
the learned Civil Judge, (Jr. Division) disposed off the objection
and directed to proceed with the execution by the Judgment
and order. Aggrieved by the same, the petitioners therein filed
a revision before the High Court. After adverting to Section 20
and other provisions of the Act, the learned single Judge has        B
concluded thus:-

     "16. The parties were fully aware that under the Act, the
     District Legal Services Authority may explore the possibility
     of holding pre-litigation Lok Adalats in respect of the         C
     cheque bouncing cases. The compromise in such cases
     would be treated as Award having force of a decree. All
     objections as raised with regard to the execution in view
     of above statutory provisions itself is rightly rejected.
     Having settled the matter in Lok Adalat and now after more
     than 3 years raising such plea is untenable. Having             D
     obtained the award from Lok Adalat, the party is not
     permitted to resile from the same. It attains finality to the
     dispute between the parties finally and binds all. Therefore,
     the order in this regard needs no interference.
                                                                     E
     17. Once the parties entered into compromise before the
     Lok Adalat, & at that time no question of any pecuniary
     jurisdiction raised and or required to be considered by the
     Lok Adalat. Therefore, once the award is passed, it is
     executable under C.P.C ..... "                                  F
    11. In Mis Valarmathi Oil Industries &Anr. vs. Mis Saradhi
Ginning Factory, AIR 2009 Madras 180, the admitted facts
were that C.C. No. 308 of 2006 was taken on file by the learned
Judicial Magistrate No. I, Salem on the complaint given by the
respondent therein that the cheque was issued by the second          G
petitioner therein on behalf of the first petitioner as partner of
the firm, however, the same was dishonoured by the bank due
to insufficient funds. According to the respondent, after
issuance of the legal notice to the petitioner, the complaint was
given under Section 138 of the N. I. Act against the petitioners.    H
    458   SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2011] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A· During the pendency of the criminal case, at the request of both
   the parties, the matter was referred to Lok Adalat for settlement
   Both the parties were present before the Lok Adalat and as
   per the award, they agreed for the settlement and accordingly,
   the petitioner/accused agreed to pay Rs. 3,75,000/- to the
B respondent on or before 03.09.2007. It was signed by the
   respondent/complainant, petitioners/accused and their
   respective counsel. In view of the compromise arrived at
   between both the parties, the amount payable was fixed at Rs.
   3,75,000/- towards full quit of the claim and that the petitioners
c  therein agreed to pay the above-said amount on or before
   03.09.2007 and accordingly, the award was passed and
   placed before the Judicial Magistrate Court for further orders.
   When the said award was placed before the learned Judicial
   Magistrate, by judgment dated 17.10.2007, based on the award
   held that the petitioners therein guilty and convicted under
0
   Section 138 of N.I. Act, accordingly, imposed sentence of one
   year simple imprisonment and directed the petitioners therein
   to pay a sum of Rs. 3,75,000/- as compensation to the
   respondent. Aggrieved by which, the petitioners/accused
   preferred appeal in C.S.No.167 of 2007 before the Sessions
E Judge, Salem. Learned Sessions Judge, while suspending the
   sentence of imprisonment till 16.12.2007, directed the
   petitioners/accused to deposit the sum of Rs. 3, 75,000/- before
   the trial court and clarified that in case of failure of depositing
   the amount, the order of suspension of sentence would stand
F cancelled automatically and the petitioners were also directed
   to execute a bond for Rs. 10,000/- with two sureties each for
   the like sum to the satisfaction of the trial court. Aggrieved by
   the same, the accused preferred criminal revision case before
   the High Court. It was contended on behalf of the petitioners
G before the High Court that as per Section 21 of the Act, every
   award of the Lok Adalat shall be deemed to be a decree of a
   civil court and, therefore, after the award passed by the Lok
   Adalat, the respondent/complainant was entitled to execute the
   award like a decree of the civil court, however, in the instant
H case, the learned Magistrate, by his Judgment has found the
   K.N. GOVINDAN KUTTY MENON v. C.D. SHAJI                  459
              [P. SATHASIVAM, J.]
petitioners guilty under Section 138 of N.1. Act and also          A
convicted and sentenced them to undergo simple imprisonment
for one year and to pay the compensation of Rs. 3,75,000/-.
The question formulated by the High Court is whether the
Magistrate can convict the petitioner~/accused under Section
138 of N.1. Act after the award was passed in the Lok Adalat.      B
Learned single Judge, after adverting to Section 21 (1) of the
Act and the order of the learned Magistrate has concluded as
under:-

    "13. Had there been no settlement in the Lok Adalat, the
    learned Magistrate could have proceeded with the trial and     C
    deliver his Judgment, for which, there is no bar. In the
    instant case, as admitted by both the ·reamed Counsel,
    there was an award passed in the Lok Ada lat, based on
    the consensus arrived at between the.Parties. As per the
    award, the petitioners/accused had to pay Rs. 3,75,000/-       D
    to the respondent/complainant on or .before 03.09.2007.
    As it is an award made by Lok Adalat, it is final and
    binding on the parties to the criminal revision and as
    contemplated under Section 21(2) of the Act, no appeal
    shall lie to any court against the award.                      E

     14. In such circumstances, the petitioners could have filed
    the Execution Petition before the appropriate court,
    seeking the award amount to be paid with interest and
    costs. In such circumstances, it is clear that the learned     F
    Judicial Magistrate became functus officio, to decide the
    case after the award passed by Lok Adalat, to convict the
    accused under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act,
    hence, the impugned order passed by the learned
    Sessions Judge is also not sustainable in law, however, it     G
    is clear that the petitioners/accused herein after having
    given consent for Lok Adalat award being passed and also
    the award amount agreed to pay Rs. 3,75,000/- on or
    before 03.09.2007 to the respondent, have riot complied
    with their undertaking made before the Lok Adalat, which       H
    460     SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R


A         cannot be justified. However, the order passed by the
          learned Judicial Magistrate under Section 138 of
          Ne.gotiable Instruments Act has to be set aside, in view of
          the Lok Adalat award passed under Section 20(1)(i)(b),
          20(1)(ii) of Legal Services Authorities Act (Act, 39/1987),
B         as the Judicial Magistrate became functus officio and the
          award is an executable decree in the eye of law, as per
          Section 21 of the Act."

       After arriving at such conclusion, learned single Judge
  made it clear that as per the award passed by the Lok Adalat,
C the respondent/complainant is at liberty to file Execution Petition
  before the appropriate court to get the award amount of Rs.
  3,75,000/- reimbursed with subsequent interest and costs, as
  per procedure known to law.

D        12. In Bhavnc.gar University vs. Palitana Sugar Mill (P)
    Ltd. a"ld Others, (200'.3) 2 SCC 111, it was held that the purpose
    and object of creating a legal fiction in the statute is well known
    and when a legal fiction is created, it must be given its full effect.

E        13. In lttianam and Others vs. Cherichi@ Padmini (2010)
    8 sec 612, it was held that when the Legislature uses a
    deeming provision to create a legal fiction, it is always used to
    achieve a purpose.

        14. A statutory support as evidenced in the statement of
F Objects and reasons of the Act would not only reduce the
  burden of arrears of work in regular courts, but would also take
  justice to the door steps of the poor and the needy and make
  justice quicker and less expensive. In the case on hand, the
  Courts below erred in holding that only if the matter was one
G which was referred by a civil court it coµld be a decree and if
  the matter was referred by a criminal court it will only be an order
  of the criminal court and not a decree under Section 21 of the
  Act. The Act does not make out any such distinction between
  the reference made by a civil court and criminal court. There is
H no restriction on the power of Lok Adalat to pass an award
   K.N. GOVINDAN KUTIY MENON v. C.D. SHAJI                   461
              [P. SATHASIVAM, J.]
based on the compromise arrived at between the parties in a          A·
case referred by a criminal court under Section 138 of the N.I.
Act, and by virtue of the deeming provision it has to be treated
as a decree capable of execution by a civil court. In this regard,
the view taken in Subhash Narasappa Mangru/e (supra) and
Mis Va/armathi Oil Industries (supra) supports this contention       B
and we fully accept the same.

      1S. It is useful to refer the judgment of this Court in Staie
of Punjab & Anr. VS. Jalour Singh and Ors. (2008) 2 sec 660.
The ratio that decision was that the "award" of the Lok Adalat C
does not mean any independent verdict or opinion arrived at
by any decision making process. The making of the award is
merely an administrative act of incorporating the terms of
settlement or compromise agreed by the parties in the presence
of the Lok Ada lat, in the fonn of an executable order under the
signature and seal of the Lok Adalat. This judgment was D
followed in B.P. Moideen Sevamandir and Anr. vs. A.M. Kutty
Hassan (2009) 2 SCC 198.
    16. In P. T. Thomas vs. Thomas Job, (2005) 6 SCC 478,
Lok Adalat, its benefits, Award and its finality has been            E
extensively discussed.

   17. From the above discussion, the following propositions
emerge:

      (1)   In view of the unambiguous language of Section 21        F
            of the Act, every award of the Lok Adalat shall be
            deemed to be a decree of a civil court and as such
            it is executable by that Court.
      (2)   The Act does not make out any such distinction           G
            between the reference made by a civil court and
            criminal court.
      (3)   There is no restriction on the power of the Lok
            Adalat to pass an award based on the compromise
                                                                     H
    462      SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A                arrived at between the parties in respect of cases
                 referred· to by various Courts (both civil and
                 criminal), Tribunals, Family court, Rent Control
                 Court, Consumer Redressal Forum, Motor
                 Accidents Claims Tribunal and other Forums of
B                sjmilar nature.

          (4)    Even if a matter is referred by a criminal court under
                 Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act,
                 1881 and by virtue of the deeming provisions, the
                 award passed by the Lok Adalat based on a
c                compromise has to be treated as a decree capable
                 of execution by a civil court.

       18. In view of the above discussion and ultimate conclusion,
  we set aside the order dated 23.09.2009 passed by the
D Principal Munsiff Judge in an unnumbered execution petition
  of 2009 in CC No. 1216 of 2007 and the order of the High
  Court dated 24.11.2009 in Writ Petition (C) No. 33013 of 2009.
  Consequently, we direct the execution court to restore the
  execution petition and to proceed further in accordance with
E law.

         19. Before parting with this case, we would.like to record
    our deep appreciation for the valuable assistance rendered by
    the learned amicus curiae.

F        20. The civil appeal is allowed. There shall be no order as
    to costs.
    B.B.B.                                          Appeal Allowed.


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