K.M. MATHEW ETC.versusK.A. ABRAHAM AND ORS. ETC.
- Citation
- 2002 INSC 348
- Decided
- 23 August 2002
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Bench
- U C BANERJEE
Holding
There is no statutory immunity for managing, chief or resident editors; the presumption under Section 7 is rebuttable and they can be held liable for defamatory publications.
Summary
Criminal complaints were lodged against the managing editor, chief editor and resident editor of several newspapers alleging publication of defamatory material. The magistrate took cognizance under IPC sections 319 and 500 and issued summons. The accused filed petitions under CrPC s.482 seeking quash of the proceedings, contending that only the person named as "Editor" in the newspaper could be prosecuted under the presumption in Section 7 of the Press and Registration of Books Act, 1867. The Supreme Court held that the presumption in Section 7 is rebuttable and that no statutory immunity exists for managing, chief or resident editors who exercise control over the publication. The Court ruled that the complainant may prove the knowledge and responsibility of these officers, and therefore the criminal proceedings should not be quashed. The appeals were dismissed and the cases were ordered to continue.
Issues considered
- Whether Section 7 of the Press and Registration of Books Act, 1867 creates a statutory immunity for persons other than the named "Editor" from prosecution for defamation.
- Whether the presumption that the person whose name appears as editor is the editor is rebuttable.
- Whether the criminal proceedings against managing, chief and resident editors can be quashed under CrPC s.482.
Legislation cited
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 319, s. 482
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 319, s. 500
- Press and Registration of Books Act, 1867s. 5, s. 7, s. 8A
Subjects
Judgment
A K.M. MA THEW ETC.
v.
K.A. ABRAHAM AND ORS. ETC.
AUGUST 23, 2002.
B [U.C. BANERJEE AND K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, JJ.]
Press and Registration ofBooks Act, 1867-Section 7-Complaint against
Managing Editor, ChiefEditor and Resident Editor ofnewspaper publications-
C Publication of defamatory matter within their knowledge alleged-Magistrate
taking cognizance and issuing summons-Appellants filing petitions for
quashing proceedings on the ground that Editor whose name printed in such
publication alone can be prosecuted-High Court dismissing the petition-On
appeal held, there is no statutory immunity against the appellants who had
control over such publication-Thus there is no convincing reason to quash
D criminal proceedings initiatedagainst appellants-Penal Code, 1860, Sections
319 and 500-Code of Criminal Procedure, I 973, Section 482.
Criminal complaints were filed against appellants who are either
Managing Editor, Chief Editor or Resident Editor of the Newspapers
published by them. It was alleged that defamatory matter was published
E in appellant's Newspaper, which was within their knowledge and thus they
committed offence of defamation. Magistrate took cognizance and issued
summons. Appellants filed petitions for quashing the proceedings on the
ground that they were not liable to be prosecuted for the offence of
defamation for the alleged libellous publication as they were not the
F Editors of such publications. High Court dismissed the petitions. Hence
these appeals.
Appellants contended that they were not shown as Editors in the
publications, their names were printed as either Chief Editor, Managing
Editor or Resident Editor and not as Editor. Thus in view of Section 7 of
G the Press and Registration of Books Act, 1867 there cannot be any prima
facie case against them and only the Editor whose name is printed in such
publications can be prosecuted.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
H 662
K.M. MA THEW v. K.A. ABRAHAM 663
HELD: I. The provisions contained in the Press and Registration of A
Books Act, 1867 shows that there would be a presumption against the
Editor whose name is printed in the newspaper to the effect that he is the
Editor of such publication and that he is responsible for selecting the
matter for publication. Though, a similar presumption cannot be drawn
against the Chief Editor, Resident Editor or Managing Editor,
nevertheless, the complainant can still allege and prove that they had B
knowledge and they were responsible for the publication of the defamatory
news item. Even the presumption under Section 7 of the Act is a rebuttable
presumption and the same could be proved otherwise, which by itself
indicates that somebody other than the Editor can also be held responsible
for selecting the matter for publication in a newspaper. (669-D, E] C
2.1. There is no statutory immunity against Managing Editor,
Resident Editor or Chief Editor against any prosecution for the alleged
publication of any matter in the newspaper over which these persons
. exercise control. [667-G, HJ
D
2.2. In the instant case, the 'Editor' had not come forward and
pleaded guilty to the effect that he was the person responsible for selecting
the alleged defamatory matter published. It is a matter of evidence in each
case. If the complaint is allowed to proceed only against 'Editor' whose
name is printed in the newspaper against whom there is a statutory
presumption under Section 7 of the Act, and in case such 'Editor' succeeds E
in proving that he was not the 'Editor' having control over the selection
of the alleged libellous matter published in the newspaper, the complainant
would be left without any remedy to redress his grievance against the real
culprit. The powers are vested in the Court under Section 319 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure, to proceed against other persons appearing to be F
guilty of offence but such powers are circumscribed by limitations. Thus
there are no convincing reasons to quash the proceedings initiated against
appellants and the proceedings initiated be continued in accordance with
law. [670-E-H]
State of Maharshtra v. Dr. R.B. Chowdhary and Ors., (1967) 3 SCR G
708; Haji CH. Mohammad Kaya v. T.K.S. MA. Muthukoya, [1979] I SCR
664; K.M Mathew v. State of Kera/a and Anr., (1992] I SCC 217,
distinguished.
State of Bihar v. Rajendra Agrawal/a, [1996] 8 SCC 164 and Santosh
De and Anr. v. Archna Gupta and Ors., (1994[ 2 SCC 420, referred to. H
664 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.
A CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 710
of 1998.
From the Judgment and Order dated 9-10-97 of the Kerala High Court
in Cr!. M.C. No. 260 of 1997.
B WITH
Crl. No. 849 and 848 of 2002.
F.S. Nariman, S.K. Dholakia, L. Nageswara Rao, Vijay Bahuguna,
E.M.S. Anam, Fazlin Anam, ~.B. Joshi, Rajshekhar Rao, Ms. Indu Malhotra,
C Sanjeev Sen. D.N. Ray, R.N. Karanjawala, Ms. Malini Poduval, C. Jayaraj,
M.K.D. Namboodiri, A.P. Mayee. Rucha Myee, Nilesh a. Pandya for C.K.
Sasi, Ms. Ruby Singh Ahuja (NP}, Javed Mahmud Rao, Nandini Gore, Arjun
Bobde, Manik Karanjawala, Subhash Sharma, Ms. Lansinglu Rongmei and
Ranji Thomas, for the appearing parties:
D The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
KG. BALAKRISHNAN, J. Leave granted.
Common questions of law arise in these appeals; hence they are being
disposed of by this common judgment. ;\ppellants are either Managing Editor,
E Chief Editor of Resident Editor of their respective newspaper publications.
Separate criminal complaints were filed against the appellants alleging that in
their newspaper publications, libellous matter was published and that these
appellants had knowledge and they were responsible for such publication and
thus they committed the offence of defamation besides other allied offences.
In all these cases, the Magistrate had taken cognizance of the offences and
F issued summons to these appellants. The appellants challenged their
prosecution and contended that in view of Section 7 of the Press & Registration
of Books Act, 1867 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"), they are not liable
to be prosecuted and that the Editor of the newspaper whose name is printed
on it as the "Editor" of that publication alone is liable to be prosecuted for
G any of the offence for such libellous publication.
The appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 701 of 1998 is the Chief Editor
of "Malayalam Manorma" a daily having wide circulation in Kerala and
other places. According to the appellant in this case, he is the Chief Editor
of the "Malayalam MaJ?orma" and that there is also an Editor for this
H publication who alone can be charged for the offence under Section 500 of
K.M. MATHEW v. K.A. ABRAHAM [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, J.] 665
Indian Penal Code in view of the statutory presumption under Section 7 of A
the Act.
I
In Criminal Appeal arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 399 of 200I, the
appellant is the Managing Editor of Indian Express, Jansatta and Financial
Express and certain other publication. A criminal complaint was filed against
the appellant and others alleging that on 21th January, I 992 a news item was B
published in "Jansatta" which according to the complainant, was defamatory
and thus the appellant had committed the offence under Section 500 IPC. The
complaint was filed before the Judicial Magistrate, Kota in Rajasthan.
The appellant in the Criminal Appeal arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No.
520 of2000 was the Resident Editor ofa daily, namely, "Hindustan", and the C
complainant therein alleged that some articles published on 7-12-1986 and 8-
12-I 986 in that newspaper ("Hindustan") were defamatory and thereby the
• appellant committed offence under Section 500 IPC.
In all these cases, the respective Magistrate took cognizance of the D
offence alleged in the complaint and issued process to the appellants and the
appellants filed petitions under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
for quashing the proceedings on the ground that they are not liable to be
prosecuted for the offence of defamation for the alleged libellous publication
as they are not the Editors of such publications. The plea raised by the
appellants was not accepted by the High Court and the impugned orders E
passed in those proceedings are challenged before us.
We have heard learned counsel for the appellants as well as counsel for
the respondents. As noticed earlier, the contention of the appellants is that in
view of Section 7 of the Act, there cannot be any prima facie case against
the appellants and the Editor whose name is printed in such publications F
alone can be prosecuted.
Section 7 of the Press & Registration of Books Act, 1867 reads as
follows:
"7 Office copy of declaration to be prima facie evidence.-In any G
legal proceeding whatever, as well civil as criminal, the production
of a copy of such declaration as is aforesaid, attested by the seal of
some Court empowered by this Act to have the custody of such
declarations, or, in the case of the editor, a copy of the newspaper
containing his name printed on it as that of the editor shall be held H
666 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002) SUPP. 1 S.C.R.
A (unless the contrary be proved) to be sufficient evidence, as against
the person whose name shall be subscribed to such declaration, or
printed on such \newspaper as the case may be, that the said person
was printer or publisher, or printer and publisher (according as the
words of the said declaration may be) of every portion of every
newspaper whereof the title shall correspond with the title of the
B newspaper mentioned in the declaration, or the editor of every portion
of that issue of the newspaper of which a copy is produced."
The expression "Editor" has also been defined in Section I of the Act
as under:
C " 'Editor' means the person who controls the selection of the matter
that is published in a newspaper."
It is also relevant to quote Section 5( I) of the Act:
"5. Rules as to publication of newspapers.- No. newspaper shall be
D published in India. Except in conformity with the rules hereinafter
laid down:
(I) Without prejudice to the provisions of section 3, every copy of
every such newspaper shall contain the names of the owner and editor
thereof printed clearly on such copy and also the date of its
E publication.
(2) ............................. "
The preamble to the Act says that it is expedient to provide for the
regulation of printing presses and of newspapers, for the preservation of
p copies of every book and newspaper printed in India and for the registration •·
of such books and newspapers.
Section 5 of the Act prescribes certain rules regarding the publication
of newspapers. It says that the newspaper shall contain the names of the
owner and editor printed clearly on each copy and also the date of its
G publication. Sub-section (2) of Section 5 further says that the printer and the
publisher of every such newspaper shall appear in person before the District,
Presidency or Sub-divisional Magistrate and shall make a declaration that he
was the printer or publisher or printer and publisher of that newspaper.
It is also pertinent to note that Section 8A of the Act provides that if
H any person, whose name has appeared as editor on a copy of a newspaper,
K.M. MATHEW v. K.A. ABRAHAM [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, J.] 667
may, within two weeks of his becoming awaro that his name has been so A
, published, appear before the District Magistrate and make a declaration that
his name was incorrectly published in that issue as the editor thereof, and
the Magistrate empowered in that behalf may conduct an inquiry and on such
inquiry if is found that the said person is not the editor of the newspaper, the
Magistrate may issue a certificate to the effect that Section 7 will not apply B
to him.
A conjoint reading of these provisions will go to show that in the case
of publication of any newspaper, each copy of the publication shall contain
the names of the owner and the editor who have printed and published that
newspaper. Under Section 7 of the Act, there is a presumption that the Editor C
whose name is printed in the newspaper as Editor shall be held to be the
Editor in any civil or criminal proceedings in respect of that publication and
the production ofa copy of the newspaper containing his name printed thereon
as Editor shall be deemed to be sufficient evidence to prove that fact, and as
the 'Editor' has been defined as-the person who controls the selection of the
matter that is published in a newspaper, the presumption would go to the D
extent of holding that he was the person who controlled the selection of the
matter that was published in the newspaper. But at the same time, this
presumption contained in Section 7 is a rebuttable presumption and it will be
deemed as sufficient evidence unless the contrary is proved. Therefore, it is
clear that even if a person's name is printed as Editor in the newspaper, he E
can still show that he was not really the Editor and had no control over the
selection of the matter that was published in the newspaper. Section 7 only
enables the court to draw a presumption that the person whose name was
printed as Editor was the Editor of such newspaper, if the publication produced
in the court shows to that effect.
F
The contention of the appellants in these cases is that had not been
shown as Editors in these publications and that their names were printed
either as Chief Editor, Managing Editor of Resident Editor and not as 'Editor
and there cannot be any criminal prosecution against them for the alleged
libellous publication of any editor in that newspaper. G
The contention of these is not tenable. There is no statutory immunity
against Managing Editor, Resident Editor or Chief Editor against any
prosecution for the alleged publication of any matter in the newspaper over
which these persons exercise control. In all these cases, the complainants
have specifically alleged that these appellants had knowledge of the publication H
668 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.
A of the alleged defamatory matter and they were responsible for such
publication; and the Magistrates who had taken cognizance of the offence
held that there was prima facic case against these appellants. It was under
such circumstances that the summonses were issued against these appellants.
Counsel for the appellants relied on certain decisions to contend for the
B position that under Section 7 of the Act, Editor alone shall be prosecuted for
the publication of any defamatory matter in a newspaper. One of the earliest
decisions relied upon is State of Maharashtra v. Dr. R.B. Chowdhary and
Ors., [ 1967] 3 SCR 708. This was a case where the complaint was filed under
Section 500 IPC against four persons who were members of the Editorial
C Board of a Marathi daily. The Addi. Sessions Judge held that there was a
prima facie case against Respondents 2, 3 and 4, who were members of the
Editorial Board and that they were the makers of the alleged article published
in the daily. These respondents contended that the Editor was one Madane
and when he was questioned under Section 342 Cr. P.C. he unequivocally
admitted that he had written the defamatory article and his name was shown
D as the Editor in the declaration made under Section 5 of the Act. Under such
circumstances, the court held that though the statement of Madnae under
Section 342 was no evidence against these respondents as Madane alone was
shown as Editor, no presumption could be drawn against Respondents 2, 3
and 4. We do not think that this decision has any application to the facts of
E the present case as the decision turned mainly on the point that the Editor had
admitted the fact that he was responsible for the publication.
The next case relied upon is Haji C.H. Mohammad Kaya v. T.K.S. MA.
Muthukoya, [1979] I SCR 664. This case arose out of an election petition.
The election of the appellant to the legislative assembly was set aside on the
F ground of corrupt practices. The allegation against the appellant was that he
was the Chief Editor of a Malayalam daily newspaper, by name, "Chandrika"
in which certain articles and cartoons were published which were intended to
create hatred between two classes of citizens and thus committed corrupt
practices. It was noted by the court that one Aboobaker was the printer,
G publisher and editor of "Chandrika" and in the election petition there was no
averment to the effect that the appellant controlled the selection of the matter
that was published in the newspaper. It was in this background that the court
held that the appellant was not the Editor of the newspaper and the presumption
under Section 7 of the Act could be drawn only against the person who was
the Editor within the meaning of the Act and that there was no justification
H to draw the presumption against the appellant who was the Chief Editor. This
K.M. MATHEW v. K.A. ABRAHAM [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, J.j 669
decision also is of no help to the appellants to contend for the position that A
the appellants cannot be prosecuted for the alleged offence committed in
respect of publication in these newspapers.
Another decision relied upon is K.M. Mathew v. State of Keralq and
Anr., [1992] 1 SCC 217. Here the accused was the Chief Editor and in the
complaint against him there was no averment except the motive attributed to Bl
him. That too was of general nature. This Court held that the appellant who
was the Chief Editor of the daily newspaper in question was responsible for
the general policy of that daily and as the complaint did not contain any
positive averments as to the knowledge of the Chief Editor about the
objectionable character of the matter, the Chief Editor could not be proceeded C
against. Like the first two decisions relied upon by the appellants, this decision
also is of no assistance to them.
The provisions contained in the Act clearly go to show that there could
be a presumption against the Editor whose name is printed in the newspaper
to the effect that he is the Editor of such publication and that he is responsible [
for selecting the matter for publication. Though, a similar presumption cannot
be drawn against the Chief Editor, Resident Editor of Managing Editor,
nevertheless, the complainant can still allege and prove that they had
knowledge and they were responsible for the publication of the defamatory
news item. Even the presumption under Section 7 is a rebuttable presumption
and the same could be proved otherwise. That by itself indicates that somebody I
other than Editor can also be held responsible for selecting the matter for
publication in a newspaper.
It is true that judicial process should not be an instrument of oppression
or needless harassment and the Magistrate while taking cognizance should be
satisfied that there is a prima facie case against the accused and at that he II
should be circumspect and judicious in exercising discretion and should take
all relevant facts into consideration before issuing process and that vindication
of majesty of justice and maintenance of law and order in the society are the
prime objects of criminal justice and it shall not be the means to wreak
vengeance, but, at the same time, "the inherent power of the court under (
Section 482 Cr. P.C. should be very sparingly and cautiously used and on)y
when the court comes to the conclusion that there would be manifest injustice
or there would be abuse of the process of the court, if such power is not
exercised. "So far as the order of cognizance by a Magistrate is concerned,
the inherent power can be exercised when the allegations in the first
information report or the complaint together with the other materials collected I-
670 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.
A during investigation taken at their face value, do not constitute the offence ·
alleged. At that stage, it is not open either to sift the evidence or appreciate
the evidence and come to the conclusion that no prima facie case is made
out. "[See: State of Bihar v. Rajendra Agrawalla, [1996] 8 SCC 134.
"Unless grave illegality is committed, the superior courts should not
B interfere. They should allow the court which is seized of the matter
to go on with it. There is always an appellate court to correct the
errors. One should keep in mind the principle behind Section 465 Cr.
P.C. Any or every irregularity or infraction of a procedural provision
cannot constitute a ground for interference by a superior court unless
such irregularity or infraction has caused irreparable prejudice to the
c party and requires to be corrected at that stage itself. Frequent
interference by superior courts at the interlocutory stage tends to
defeat the ends of justice instead of serving those ends. It should not
be that a man with enough means is able to keep the law at day. That
would mean the failure of the very system." [See: Santosh De and
D Anr. v. Archna Gupta and Ors., [1994] 2 SCC 420.
In the instant appeals, the complainant in each case has alleged that
these appellants who are either Managing Edito~, Chief Editor of Resident
Editor had knowledge and were responsible for publishing defamatory matter
in their respective newspaper P.ublications. Moreover, in none of these cases,
E the 'Editor' had come forward and pleaded ~uilty to the effect that he was the
person responsible for selecting the alleged defamatory matter published. It
is a matter of evidence in each case. If the complaint is allowed to proceed
only against the 'Editor' whose name is printed in the newspaper against
whom there is a statutory presumption under Section 7 of the Act, and in case
p such 'Editor' succeeds in proving that he was not the 'Editor' having control
over the selection of the alleged libellous matter published in the newspaper,
the complainant would be left without any remedy to redress his grievance
against the real culprit. We are not unmindful of the powers of the Court
under Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, but such powers are
circumscribed by limitations.
G
We do not find any convincing reasons to quash the proceedings initiated
against these appellants and the Criminal Appeals are devoid of merits. They
are dismissed and the proceedings initiated against the appellants be continued
in accordance with law.
H N.J. Appeal dismissed.
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