K. JANARDHAN PILLAI & ANR. ETC. ETC.versusUNION OF INDIA & ORS. ETC. ETC.
- Citation
- 1981 INSC 17
- Decided
- 23 January 1981
- Disposal
- Case Allowed
- Bench
- A P SEN
Holding
Raw cashew nut is a foodstuff under the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 and therefore cannot be declared an essential article under the Kerala Act; the declaration and the order are ultra vires and are quashed.
Summary
The Kerala State Government declared raw cashew nut an essential article under the Kerala Essential Articles Control (Temporary Powers) Act, 1961 and issued a procurement and distribution order. Petitioners processing cashew nuts challenged the declaration under Article 32, arguing that raw cashew nut is a "foodstuff" within the meaning of section 2(a)(v) of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, and therefore cannot be declared an essential article under the Kerala Act. The State contended that "foodstuff" meant only items consumable without processing and that raw cashew nut was an industrial raw material. The Court examined the statutory definitions, the rule of noscitur a sociis, dictionary meanings, and precedent, concluding that "foodstuff" includes raw articles that become edible after processing. Consequently, raw cashew nut is a foodstuff and an essential commodity, making the State's declaration ultra vires. The declaration and the procurement order were quashed.
Issues considered
- Whether raw cashew nut qualifies as a "foodstuff" under section 2(a)(v) of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955.
- Whether a commodity classified as an essential commodity under the Central Act can be declared an "essential article" under the Kerala Essential Articles Control (Temporary Powers) Act, 1961.
- Whether the Kerala Government's declaration and subsequent order are ultra vires the Kerala Act.
Legislation cited
- Constitution of Indias. Article 254, s. Article 32, s. Article 369, s. Entry 26 List II, s. Entry 27 List II, s. Entry 33 List III
- Essential Commodities Act, 1955s. 2(a)(v)
- Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946s. 2(a), s. 2(e)
- India (Central Government and Legislature) Act, 1946s. 2(1)(a)
- Kerala Essential Articles Control (Temporary Powers) Act, 1961s. 2(a), s. 3
Subjects
Judgment
676
K. JANARDHAN PILLAI & ANR. ETC. ETC.
v.
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. ETC. ETC.
January 23, 1981
B [A. P. SEN AND E. S. VBNKATARAMIAH, JJ.]
Kerala Essential Articles Control (Ten1porary Powers) Act, 1961-Section
2(a) and Section 3-Raw cashewnuts-Whether "foodstuff" within the meaning
of section 2(a) (v) of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955-State Government,
if co1npetent to declare raw cashewnuts as essential article-Declaratio1t, whether /
contravenes section 2(a) of the Kera/a Act. ,_.,,-.
By an order made on March 20, 1976 the Kerala State Government declared
that raw cashewnut was an essential article under section 2(a) of the Kersla
Essential Articles Control (Temporary Powers) Act, 1961 and thereofter
pro.qiulgated the Kerala Raw Cashewnuts (Procurement and Distribution) Order
1977 under section 3 thereof, regulating the procurement and distribution of raw
cashewnuts in the State of Kerala. The expression "essential article" ii defined
D in section 2(a) of the Kerala Act as "an article (not being an essential con1-
111odity a.~ defined in the Essential Co1nmoditie~ Act, 1955) which may be declared
by the Government by a notified order to be an essential article". Under
Section 2(a) (v) of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 essential commodity
means "foodstuffs, including edible oilseeds and oils."
In their petitions under Art. 32 of the Constitution the petitioners who were
E engaged in the· processing of raw cashewnuts urged that raw cashewnut being a
foodstuff, which was an essential commodity under the Central Act, the State
Government could not make a declaration that it was an essential article under
sectiein 2(a) of the State Act and that for this reason the declaration and the
impugned order were ultra vires the State Act.
On behalf of the State Government it was contended that the expression
F "foodstuffs" meant only those articles which could be directly consumed \Vithout
any kind of processing since the order regulated only the procurement and
distribution of raw cashewnut5 which were used as industrial raw material, they
could not be called foodstuffs in the strict sense and were not an "essential .! ,_
commodity" within the meaning of that term under the Central Act.
1~11owing the petitions,
G HELD: Raw cashewnut is a foodstuff under section 2(a) (v) of the Central
Act and hence cannot be declared as an essential article under section 2(a)
of the Kerala Act. No order could therefore be made by the State Government t
under section 3 thereof in respect of raw cashewnuts. Therefore the declaration
made by the State Government to the effect that raw cashewnut is an essential
article under the Kerala Act and the impugned order made thereunder are liable
tc be quashed. [694 B-C]
B
The words in parenthesis in section 2(a) of the State Act makt; it clear that
the State Government can declare as an essential article under the State Act
K. J. PILLAI v. UNION 677
only .., article which is not an essential commodity under the C,,ntra! Act. It A
is a well known rule of interpretation th.at associated words take their meaning
from one another and that is the meaning of the rule of statutory construction
noocltur a .sociis. When the term 'foodstuffs' is associated with edible oilseeds
which have to be processed before the oil in them can be consumed, it is
.appropriate to interpret 'foodstuffs' in the wider sense as including nil articles
of food which may be consumed by human beings after processing. [687 C]
B
Having regard to the fact that the object of the Central Act is to regulate
production, supply and distribution of essential commodities amongst the people,
the expression 'foodstuffs' should be given a wider meaning as including even
raw materials which ultimately result in edible articles. [687 D-E]
The dictionary meaning of 'foodstuff' is 'a substance with food value' and
~the raw material of food before or after processing'. Therefore 'foodstuff' C
need not necessarily mean only the final food product which is consumed. It
,also includes raw food articles which may, after processing, be used as food by
human beings. [688 F]
Srate of Bombay v. Virkun1ar Gulabchand Shuh !1952] S.C.R. 877 and Tiktl
Ram;i & Ors. etc. v. The State of Uttar Pradc.1h S: Ors. fl956] S.C.R. 393 at
418 referred to. D
Although as a result of large exports of cashewnut it is now in short supply
and its price is beyond the reach of the common man, it is an article of food
eaten in raw form and is used in various preparations. It is eaten in all parts
,of the country though it is grown in a few States. It i_s exported as foodstuff.
It is, therefore, a foodstuff and must be classified as an es.scntial commodity.
[692 M-G]
E
There is no substance in the argument that cashewnuts can be treated a<; an
essential article only for the purposes of export and not an essential commodity
under the Central Act. The Central Government can make an Order w1der
the Central Act even when an essential commodity is used for industrial purposes
·or for purposes of export. Essential commodities do not cease to be essential
commodities under the Central Act merely because they are exported after they
are processed in India. [693 Bl F
The argument that so long as the Central Government had not 1nade an
order in respect of raw cashewnuts the State Government can pass an order
is not available in the circumstances by reason of the definition of essential
article in the Kerala Act. [693 El
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition Nos. 116, 186-189/77, G
. 3935-63/78 3922-24/78, 1221/77, 3821-27 /78, 3828-31 /78, 44-50/
77, 4237;'78, 4400/78, 92-97 /;77.
(Under Article 32 of the Constitution)
F. S. Nariman, R. N. Banerjee, J. B. Dadachanji and K. J. John,
H
for the Petitioners in W.P. No. 116/77.
R. M. Poddar for Respondent No. 1 in W.P. No. 116/77.
678 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1981) 2 S.C.R.
A Lal Narain Sinha Attorney Genl., P. K. Pillai and T. P. Soundara
Rajan, for Respondents 2-3 in W.P. No. 116/77.
N. M. Abdul Khader,, M. A. Feroze and K. M. K. Nair, for the
Respondent.
R. N. Banerjee, J. B. Dadachanji and K. J. John, for the Peti-
B
tioners in W.P. Nos. 186-189/77.
Lal Narain Sinha Att-Genl. and R. M. Poddar, for Respondent No.
1 in W.P. Nos. 186-189/77.
P, K. Pillai and T. P. Saundra Rajan, for Respondents 2-3 in W.P.
C Nos. 186-189/77.
N. M. Abdul Khader, M.A. Feroze and K. M. K. Nair, for the
State.
F. S. Nariman, R. N. Banerjee, J. B. Dadachanji and K. J, John,
for the Petitioners in W.P. Nos. 3935-63/78.
D
N. M. Abdul Khader, M. A. Feroze and K. M. K. Nair, for Res-
pondent No. 1 in W.P. Nos. 3935-63/78.
A. S. Nambiar and P. Parameswaran, for Respondents 2-3 in W.P.
Nos. 3935-63 /78.
E P. Govindan Nair and K. Sukumaran, for the Petitioners in W.P.
Nos. 3922-24/78.
K. M. K. Nair, for the Respondent in W.P. Nos. 3922-24/78.
R. N. Banerjee, J. B. Dadachanji and K. J. John, for the Petitioner
in W.P. No. 1221/77.
F K. M. K. Nair for Respondent No. I.
A. S. Nambiyar for Respondent No. 2.
Miss A. Subhashini for Respondent No. 5.
P. Govindan Nair and K. Sukumaran for the Petitioners in W.P.
G Nos. 3821-27 /78.
K. M. K. Nair for Respondent No. 1 in W.P. Nos. 3821-27 /78.
A. S. Nambiar and P. Parameswarmz for Respondents 2-3 in W.P. '
Nos. 3821-27 /78.
H P. Govindan Nair and K. Sukumaran for the Petitioner in W.P. Nos.
3828-31/78.
K. M. K. Nair for Respondent No. I in W.P. Nos. 3828-31/7.8.
K. J. PILLAI v. UNION (Venkataramiah, J.) 679
A. S. Nambiar and P. Parameswaran for Respondent No. 2 in W.P.
Nos. 3828-31/78.
• R. N. Banerjee, J. B. Dadachanji and K. J. John for the Pet.itioners
in W.P. Nos. 44-50/77.
·Miss A. Subhashini for Respondent No. 1 in W.P. Nos. 44-50;77.
B·
. K. M. K. Nair for Respondent No. 2 in W.P. Nos. 44-50/77.
P. Gcvindan Nair, Mrs. Baby Krishnan and Mrs. V. ID. Khanna,
. for the Petitioners in W.P. Nos. 4237 /78 .
K. M. K. Nair for the Respondent in W.P. No. 4237 /78.
D. Govindan Nair and Mrs. Baby Krishnan for the Petitioners in e
W.P. No. 4400/78.
K. M. K. Nair for the Resipondent in W.P. No. 4400/78.
R. N. Banerjee, J. B. Dadachanji and K. J. John for the Petitioners
in W.P. Nos. 92-97/77.
D
fl:!iss A. Sub.hashini for Respondent No. 1 in W.P. Nos. 92-97,'77.
K. M. K. Nair for Respondent No. 2 in W.P. Nos. 92-97 /77.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
VF.NKATARAMIAH, J. The common question which arise for
coosideration in the above writ petitions under Article 32 of
the Constitution of India relates to the validity of the declaration
made by the State Government of ~orala on March 20, 1976 dec:ar-
ing that raw cashewnut was an essential article, in exercise of the
power under clause (a) of section 2 of ti>~ Kerala Essential Articles F.
Control (Temporary Powers) Act, 1961 (Act 3 of 1962) (hereinafter
.. .. -
referred to as 'the Kerala Act') and the Kerala Raw Cashewnuts (Pro-
curement and Distribution) Order, 1977 (hereinafter referred to as
'the Order') made by the State Government of Kerala in exercise of
the powers conferred by section 3 of the Kerala Act regulating the
procurement and distribution of raw cashewnnts grown in the State of G
KeraJa. The petitioners are persons engaged in the cashewnut pro-
• cessing industry in the State of Kerala. Since the impugned declara-
tion and the Order seriously interfered with the right of the petitio'ners
to purchase sufficient quantities of raw ca,hewnuts for processing in
their factories and imposed several other restrictions on them, they
have filed the above petitions. Although the validity of several other It
Orders was also questioned in the present petitions, the petitioners
. confine-0 their chal:e'nge only to the impugned declaration and the
680 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981] 2 S.C.R.
Order in the course of the arguments since according to them it was
not necessary to urge thl"ir contentions as against those orders.
•
The recital in the preamble to the Order stales that it was
being made in order to ensure the maintrnance of supplies of raw
casbewnuts which was considered to be essential for the continued
B
employment of a large number of workmen in the State of Kerala and
for their equitable distribution and availabi;ity at fair prices. It ill fur-
ther recited that the Order was being made as the State Govern-
ment felt a doubt about the question whether the Kcrala Raw Cashew- ....
nuts (Marketing and Distribution) Onler, 1976 issu~d under the
Defence and Internal Security of India Rules, i 971, for the very same
purpose would continue to remain in force.
-
The main provisions of the Order broadly related to the prohi-
bition of sale of raw cashewnuts to any person other than an agent
authorised to purchase by c:ause 3 thereof, appointment of Co-ope-
D rative Societies as sub·agents, imposition of rcstrictio'ns on processing
or conversion of raw cashewnuts and their distribution amongst the
occupiers of cashewnut processing factories, appointment and powers
of Cashew Special Officer and other incidental and ancillary matters.
The explanatory 'note attached to the Order stated that it was intended
to regulate the procurement and distribution of raw cashcwnuh by the
State Government.
The Order is issued by the State Government of Kerala umler
section 3 of the Kerala Act, the object of which is to provide, in the
intepost of the general public, for the control of the production, supply
F and distribution of, a'nd trade and commerce in certain articles which,
as the title of the Act indicates, are considered to be essential for the
community. Th•o Kerala Act as originally enacted was intended to
be in force for a period of five years from the date of its commence-
ment. By successive amendments, its life is extendc<l to twenty years
from the commencement of the Act. Although it makes provision for
..
-G conferring power on the State Government to make appropriate <>rders
regarding regulation of production, supply and distribution of ess-
ential articles substantially on the lines on which the Essential Com- •
modities Act, 1955 (Act 10 of 1955) (hereinafter derrcd to as 'the
Central Act') passed by the Parliament provides for the regulation of
production, supp:y and distribution of essential commodities as defined
Jf in the Oontral Act, the Kerala Act does not itself specify any article
as an essential article. But the expression 'essential article' is defined
by section 2 (a) of the Kerala Act thus :
K. J. PILLAI v. UNION (Venkataramiah, J.) 681
.. 2. Definition.-In this Act, unless lhe context otherwise requires, Al
(a) "essential article" means any article (not being an
essential commodity as defined in lhe Essential Commodities
Act, 1955) which may be declared by lhe Government by
notified order to be an essential article."
From the above defihition it is clear lhat the State Government can B
declare as an essential article under the Kerala Act only an article
which i• not an essential commodity as defined in the Central Act.
When such a declaration is made in respect of any article, lhe State
•, Government acquires the .power to make an order u'nder section 3
thereof in respect of such artiele. The State Government is, how-
ever, precluded from deelaring any article which is an essential com-
c
modity under the Central Act as an essential article and from making
an order for the purpose of controlling its production, supply and
distribution. This is obvious from the words in the parenthesis in
section 2 (a) of the Kerala Act defining the word 'essential article'.
That the object of the Kerala Act is only to provide for regulation of I)
production, supp:y and distribution of a'n article which is not an
essential commodity as defined under the Central Act is also clear
- from what is stated by the Kerala Government in lhe letter dated
December 5, 1961 addressed by the Law Secretary, Government of
Kerala to the Oentral Government seeking the assent of lhe
President to the Bill passed by the Kerala Legislature. The rele- E
vant part of the letter reads :
" •••••••••••••••••• ! •••••••
Sub : The Kera/a Essential Articles Control (Tempor-
ary Powers) Bill 1960.
F
I am to forward herewith two copies-- of the Kerala Essen-
• ~ tial Articles Control (Temporary Powers) Bill, 1960, as pass-
ed by the Legislative Assembly and reserved by the Governor
for the consideration of the President.
2. The Madras Essential Articles Control and Requisition- G
ing (Temporary Powers) Act, 1949, as amended by the
Kerala Acts 24 of 1958 and 3 of 1959, was in force in the
Kerala State till 25-1-1960 when it expired by efflux of time.
The Essential Commodities Act, 1955 (Central Act 10 of
1955) applies only in the case of essential commodities speci-
fied in lhat Act. At present there is no law in the State to
control the production, supply and distribution of, and trade
• and co=erce in, essential articles required for industrial
1
682 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981] 2 S.C.R.
A and other purposes, which do not fall within the ambit of · ..
the Central Act. For the implementation of the scheme
under the programme of industrialisation during the Third
Five Year Plan it may become necessary to control the pro- •
duction, supply and distribution of, and trade and commerce
in, articles which are not essential commodities and unless
.B the Govt. have such powers, difficulties arc likely to arise.
3. The object of the present legislation is to take power
for the control of essential articles which are not essential
commodities within the meaning of the Central Act. It
empowers Govt. to declare any article, not being an essential
commodity within the meaning of Essential Commodities
Act, 1955, to be an "essential article" and to control, by
notified order, the production, supply and distribution of,
and trade and commerce in, any such article. This is an
enabling measure and is modelled on the Central Essential
Commodities Act. It is intended to be in force only for a
D period of five years.
4. The subject-matter of the legislation falls within the
scope of entries 26 and 27 of the State List in the Seventh
Schedule to the Constitution, namely : - •
26. Trade and commerce within the State subject to
the provisions of entry 33 of List III.
27. Production, supply and distribution of goods subject
to the provisiQns of entry 33 of List III.
Hence the State Legislature is competent to enact the
measure. ·1
·F 5. The provisions of the Bill may attract Articles 301
and 304(b) of the Constitution as imposing a reasonable
restriction on the freedom of trade and commerce. Accor-
dingly the previous sanction of the President for the intro-
duction of the Bill in the State Legislature has been
obtained as required by the proviso to article 304 (b) in the
-
·G letter of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry referred
to as third paper above".
One of the grounds urged on behalf of the petitioners in support
of these petitions is that raw cashewnut being a foodstuff (which is an
essential commodity under the Central Act), the State Gt>vernment
'li of Kerala could not make a declaration to the effect that it was an
essential article under section 2(a) of the Kerala Act and consequently
the impugned Order was outside the scope of the Kerala Act. On
K. J. PILLAI v. UNION ( Venkataramiah, J.) 683
behalf of the State Government, it is contended that raw cashewnut A
is not a foodstuff and even if it is held to re a foodstuff having regard
to the nature and object of the Order, it should be treated as being
within the competence of the State Gowrnment. The relevant part
of section 2(a) of the Central Act containing the definition of the
expression 'essential commodity' reads thus :
B
"2. In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,-
(a) "essential commodity" means any of the following
classes of commodities : -
(i) cattle fodder, including oilcakes and other concen-
trates;
c
(v) foodstuffs, including edible oilseeds and oils;
,,
Since it is argued on behalf of the State Government that 'foodstuffs' o
only mean those articles which can be directly consumed without any
kind of processing and that raw cashewnuts which are intended to be
used as industrial raw material cannot, therefore, be called as 'food-
stuffs' in the strict sense, it is necessary to examine the history of
legislation relating to the trade and commerce within a State and pro-
duction, supply and distribution of goods in India. E
Under the Government of India Act, 1935, entries 27 and 29 of
List II in the Seventh Schedule read as follows :
"27. Trade and commerce within the Province; markets
and fairs; money lending and money lenders.
29. Production, supply and distribution of goods; deve- F
lopment of industries, subject to the provisions of List
•
' I with respect to the development of certain indust-
ries under Federal control."
Entry 34 of List I read as :
"34. Development of industries where development,
under a Federal control is declared by Federal law
G
to be expedient in the public interest."
From the above entries it is clear that the subject of trade and
commerce within the Province and subject to entry 34 of List I, the
subject of production, supply and distribution of goods were with;n B
the competence of the Provincial Government. As a result of the
emergency proclaimed by the Governor-General under section 102 of
684 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981) 2 S.C.R.
A
the Government of India Act, 1935 on the outbreak of the Second
World War the Federal Legislature acquired the power to make laws
on all the subjects in the Provincial List. The laws made by the
Federal Legislature on the provincial subjects after the Prochrnation
of Fmergency were to cease to have effect on the expiration of a period
of six months after the Proclamation of Emergency had ceased to
B operate except as respects things done or omitted to be done before
the expiration of the said period. The Proclamation of Emergency
was revoked on April 1, 1946. Consequently all laws made by the
Federal Legislature on the subjects in the Provincial List were to
cease to have effect after the expiry of September 30, 1946. During
the period of emergency the Federal Legislature bad passed a Jaw
c
enabling the F<:<leral Government to issue Orders with respect to trade
and commerce within the Provinces and the production, supply and
distribution of several commodities which were considered to be essen-
tial and those Orders were also to cease to have effect on the expiry
of September 30, 1946. Since it was felt that the Federal Legislature
should continue to have power to make Jaws on the subject of pro-
D
duction, supply and distribution of certain essential commodities, on
March 26, 1946 the British Parliament passed the India (Central
Government and Legislature) Act, 1946 (9 & 10 Geo. 6, Chapter 39)
amending, among others, sub-section (4) of section 102 of the Govern-
ment of India Act, 1935 as to the effect of Jaws passed by virtue of the
Proclamation of Emergency. The relevant part of that Ar.t read :
E
"2. (1) Notwithstanding anything in the Government
of India Act, 1935, the Indian Legislature shall during the
period mentioned in section four of this Act have power to
make Jaws with respect to the following matters-
F
(a) trade and commerce (whether or not within a Pre>-
vince) in, and the production, supply and distribution of
cotton and woollen textiles, papers (including newsprint).
foodstuffs (including edible oil se'~ds and oils) petroleum and
petroleum products, spare parts of mechanically propelled
G vehicles,. coal, iron, steel and mica; and
(b) ............... ._ .................. .
(c) .................................. .
but any law made by the Indian Legislature which that
H Legislature would not but for the provisions of this section,
have been competent to make shall, to the extent of the
"
incompetency, cease to have effect on the expiration of the
K. J. PILLAI v. UNION (Venkalaramiah, !.) 685
said period except as respects things done or omitted to be A
done before the expiration thereof."
• Section• 4 of that Act specified the duration of the legislative power
conferred on the Federal Legislature by sect10n 2 and section 5 pres-
cribed the duration of laws passed by virtue of a Proclmnation of
B
Emergency. It is seen from section 2(1) (a) of the above British
Act that for the first time, the subject of foodstuffs (including edible
oil seeds and oils) was dealt with separately in a constitutional
document. The Governor-General in exercise of the extended legis-
lative power granted by the British Act promptly issued within the
specicd period the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Ordinance
c
1946 (XVIII of 1946) extending the controls in respect ol' certain
essential commodities including foodstuffs beyond the fits! day of
October, 1946 and the said Ordinance was repealed and replaced by
the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946 (Act No. XXIV
of 1946) enacted by the Federal Legislature in November, 1946.
· Section 2(a) of that Act defined the expression 'essential commodity' D
as meaning 'foodS'iuffs' and certain other articles mentioned therein.
Section 2(e) defined 'foodstuffs' as ·111c1uding edible oil seeds and oils.
The operation of the said Act was extended by competent legislative
acts upto March 31, 1950. Since by Entries 26 and 27 of List II of
the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, the subject of trade and
commerce within ~he State subject to the provisions of Entry 33 ef E
List III and the subject to production, supply and distribution of goods
subject to the provisions of Entry 33 of List JTJ had been assigned
to the Svcs :·nd Entry 33 of List III only dealt \\oth trade and
commerce in, and the production, supply and distribution of the
products of industries where the control of such industries hy the Union
was declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in the public F
interest, having regard to the then existing conditions, Article 369 was
l enacted as a temporary and transitional measure conferring legislative
' power on the Parliament during a; period of five years from the com-
mencement of the Constitution to make 1'aws with respect to the
following matters as if they were enumerated in the Concurrent List,
namely: G
(a) trade and commerce within a State in, and the pro-
duction, supply and distribution of, cotton and woollen
textiles, raw cotton (including ginned cotton and unginncd
cotton or kapoas), cotton seed. paper (including newsprint),
foodstuffs (including edible oilseeds and oil), cattle fodder H
(including oil-cakes and other concentrates). coal (including
coke and derivatives of coal), iron, steel and mica;
11 -l52SCT/81
686 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981] 2 S.C.R.
(b) offonces against Jaws with respect to any of the
matters mentioned in clause (a), jurisdiction and powers of
all courts except the Supreme Court with respect to any of
those matters, and fees in respect of any of those matters •
but not including fees taken in any court.
B It was provided that any law made by Parliament which
Parliament would not but for the provisions of Article 369 of the
Constitution have bee'n competent to make would, to the extent of the
incompetency, cease to have effect on the expiration of the period of
five years from the co=encement of the Constitution except as res-
c
pects things done or omitted to be done before the expiration thereof.
It may be noticed that clause (a) of Article 369 of the Constitution
specifically referred to foodstuffs (including oilseeds and oil) and
-11
j
cattle fodder (including oil-cakes and other concentrates). Ily virtue
of the power under Article 369, the Parliament extended the life of
the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946 till January
26, 1955. As the subjects referred to in Article 369 of the Constitn-
D tion were of national importance and it was thought that it was clesira-
ble that the Parliament should also have concurrent power to make
Jaws with respect to them, the Constitution (Third Amendment) Act,
1954 was enacted on February 22, 1955 substituting Entry 33 of List
Ill by the following new Entry :
E "33. Trade and co=erce in, and the production, supply
and distribution of,-
( a) the products of any industry where the control of
such industry by the Union is declared by Parliament by law
to be expedient in the public interest, and imported goods of
the same kind as such products;
F
(b) foodstuffs, including edible oilseeds and oils;
(c) cattle fodder, including oilcakes and other concen-
trates;
(d) raw cotton, whether ginned or unginned, and
cotton seed; and
G
(e) raw jute."
It was pursuant to the new Entry 33 of List III of the Seventh
Schedule to the Constitution that Parliament enacted the Central Act
(i.e. the Essential Commodities Act, 1955).
H It is not disputed by the State Government that if raw cashewnut
is foodstuff within the meaning of the Central Act, it cannot be dec-
lared as an essential article under the K~rala Act. What is, however,
K. L. PILLAI v. UNION (Venkataramaiah, /.) 687
urged is that since the Order regulates only procurement and dis-
tribution of raw cashewnut as industrial raw material for processing in
the factories it is not being dealt with as foodstuff. Hence it should
• not be treated as an essential commodity under the Central Act. There
are at least two good reasons to reject this contention advanced on be-
half of the State Government-first, the language used in section
2(a) (v) of the Central Act and secondly the purpose of the Ce'ntral
Act. Section 2(a) (v) of the Central Act reads : 'foodstuffs. inclu-
ding edible oilseeds and oils'. It is a well known rule of interpreta-
tion that associated words take their meaning from one another and
that is the meaning of the rule of statutory construction, noscitur
a sociis. When 'foodstuffs' are associated with edible oilseeds which c
have to be processed before the oil in them can be consumed, it is
appropriate to interpret 'foodstuffs' in the wider sense as including all
articles of food which may be consumed by human beings after pro-
cessing. It is in this wider sense that the said term has been under-
stood by Indian courts as can be seen from some of the decisions to
which we shall presently refer. Secondly, having regard to the history D
of legislation relating to foodstuffs dealt with above and the object of
the Central Act which regulates the production, supply and distribu-
tion of essential commodities amongst the poverty stricken Indian
people, the expression 'foodstuffs' should be given a wider meaning
as including even raw materials which ultimately result in edible
articles. Any interpretation that may be given in this case E.
should not be governed by its consequence on the impugned Order
but in the light of the importance of the Central Act in the context of
the national economy. A narrow interpretation may result in the
exclusion of several articles from the purview of the Central Act al-
though nobody bas entertained any doubt so far about their being
essential commodities.
We shall now see what cashewnut means. Casbewnut is an edible
t -- seed or nut belonging to the family of anacardiaceae and grows mostly
in tropical and sub-tropical regions where humidity is great. It is
generally grow'n in the States of Kerala, Karnataka and Tamil Nadu,
in India, in East Africa and in the tropics of Central and South G
America. Cashewnut is shaped like a kidney or ~ large thick bean.
'It appears as though one of its ends had been forcibly sunk into the
calyx end of a fleshy pear-shaped fruit, called the cashew apple which
is about three times as large as the nut and of reddish or yellow colour.
The cashew apple is much used where the tree grows, in beverages,
jams and jellies but is unimportant commercially. The nut has two H:
walls or shells, the outer of which is smooth and glass-like over the
surface thin and somewhat elastic but stout and of olive green
688 SUPREME COURT REPORTS !1981] 2 S.C.R.
A colour until mature wheb it becomes strawberry roan. The inner
shell is considerably harder and must be cracked like the shells of other
nuts ...... The fruits are picked by hand and the nuts arc
first detached. then thorouglLy dried in the sun ...... 13y improved •
m~thods of roasting, the nuts pass through large n:volving cyli·nders of
sheet iron with perforated sid". which are made to revolve above
B well-controlled flames. The oil drains into containers below and is
salvaged ...... Later, the inner she:ls are broken open by hand Jab-
our and the kernels given further beating treatment hy which the
skins are removed and the kernels made ready for consumption'.
(Vide Encyclopaedia Britannica 1962 Edn. Vol. 4, pp. 958-959). It
is not disputed that the raw cashewnut with which we arc now con- -
c cerncd is used by the petitioners for processing in their factories in order
to make it fit for human consumption. It is also stated that even
the raw cashewnut kernel is eaten by human beings.
It is well known that the food eaten by human beings consists of
cereals like wheat, rice or other coarse grains, pulses, oilseeds, vege-
D tables, sugar, fruits and nuts, animal foodstuffs and sea food like meat.
beaf, mutton and fish and dairy products like milk, butter, eggs etc.
According to Webster's Third New International Dictionary, the word
'food' means 'fodder' also. One of the meanings of the word 'food' •
given in that Dictionary is 'material consisting of carbohydrates, fats,
protdns and supplementary substances (as minerals. vitamins) that
E
is taken or absorbed into the body of an organism in order to sus-
tain growth, repair, and all vital processes and to furnish energy for all
activity of the orgabism'. In the same Dictionary 'foodstuff' is defi-
ned as 'a substance with food valll'~' and 'the raw material of food be-
fore or after processing'. One of the usages of the said word is given
as 'a bountiful crop of cereal foodstuffs'. Therefore, 'foodstufl' noed
not necessarily mean only the final food product which is con-
sumed. It also includes raw food articles which may after processing
be us•od as food by huma'n beings.
The earliest of the Indian cases cited before us on the interpreta-
tion of the expression 'foodstuffs' is Shriniwas Panrw/a/ Cliocklwni &
G
Ors. v. The Crawn ( 1). In that case the conviction of the appellant of an
offence punishable under section 7 of the Essential Supplies (Tem-
-porary Powers) Act. 1946 had been challenged. The chargo of which •
the appellant had been found guilty by the judgment under appeal was
that he had transported 'bharda' or 'chuni bharda' which was a food-
stuff without the required permit. The contention of the appellant
" was that it was just cattle feed which was not fit for human consump-
-~ - ----~--
(!)
--
A.T.R. 1951 Nag. 226.
K. J. PILLAI v. UNION (Venkataramiah, !.) 68!f
tion and therefore it could not he said that he had violated the !aw on
the footing that the material transported was 'tur dal' a foodstuff th~
transport of which alone without a permit was an offence. The said
argument was rejected by the Nagpur High Court with the following
observations :
"The learned counsel for the appellants further contended
that as the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Ordi-
mnce, 1946 [XVIII (18 of 1946)] and the Essential
Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946 [XXIV ( 24)
of 1946], dealt with "foodstuffs" and not "cattle feed" export
c;if chuni, a cattle feed was not prohibited under the Food-
grains Export Restrictions Order, 1943. The term "food-
c
stuff" has not been defined either in the Ordinance or in the
Act. In common parlance, foodstuffs mean "materials used
as food". The term is not used only for · material
which is immediately fit for human consumption but it also
applies to material which can be used as food after sub- D
jecti'ng it to processes like grinding, cleaning etc. For ins-
tance, paddy as such is not fit for human consumption but
rice in it is, and yet paddy is called foodstuff. So also
• tur. There is no reason to suppose that the word "food
stuffs" is not used, in these Jaws, in this usual sense but is
used in the restricted sense of material which is fit E
for human consumption immediately without subjecting it to
a'ny process. If such a restricted meaning is aco<pted, it
would lead to evasion of the law in question by mixing some
foreign matter with the stnff that is immediately fit for human
consumption. The test is not whether it can be immediately
used for human consumption but whether it can be so used F
after subjecting it to the usual processes. The unclean~d
tnr dal (ie. tur dal without separating from it wastage and
•• foreign matter) which was being exported on 26-12-1946 in
this case was such a foodstuff and comes within the provi-
sions of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Ordi-
nance 1946, and the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) G
Act, 1946". . .
' In the State of Bombay v. Virkumar Gulabchand Shah(') this Court
was called upon to decide whether 'turmeric' was 'foodstuff' in a rase
arising under the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powm) Act, 1946.
Vi:vian Bose, J. who delivered the judgment after observing : H
(1) [1952] S.C.R 877.
690 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981] 2 S.C.R.
A "So far as "food" is concerned it can be used in a wide
as well as a narrow sense and, in my opinion, much must
depend upon the context and background. Even in a popular 1
sense, when one asks another, "Have you had your food", one
means the composite preparations which normally go to con-
stitute meal---curry and rice, sweetmeats, pudding, cooked
B
vegetables and so forth. One does not usually think sepa-
rately of the different preparations which enter into their
making of the various condiments and spices and vitamins,
any more than one would think of separating in his mind the
purely nutritive elements of what is eaten from their non-
nutritive adjuncts.
So also, looked at from another point of view, the various
adjuncts of what I may term food proper which enter into its
preparation for human consumption in order to make it palat-
able and nutritive, can hardly be separated from the purely
nutritive elements if the effect of their absence would be to
render the particular commodity in its finished state unsa-
voury and indigestible to a whole class of persons whose
stomachs are accustomed to a more spicely prepared product".
•
held:
€ "As we have seen, turmeric falls within the wider defini-
tion of 'food' and 'foodstuffs' given in a dictionary of inter-
national standing as well as in several English decisions. It
is, I think, as much a Hfoodstuff", in its wider meaning, as
sausage skins and baking powder and tea. In the face of
all that I would find it difficult to hold that an article like
F turmeric cannot fall within the wider meaning of the term
"foodstuffs".
Following the above decision of this Court, the High Court of
Calcutt! held in Atulya Kumar De & Ors. v. The Director of Procure-
ment and Supply & Ors.(') that paddy was foodstuff within the mean-
G ing of that expression used in the Essential Supplies (Temporary
Powers) Act, 1946 even though paddy could not be consumed without
further processing. The relevant part of the decision runs thus :
"The first point taken is that the power conferred by the
'
Act (read with the notification) upon the State of West Bengal
ff is only in relation to foodstuffs and that paddy is not food-
stuff. It is stated that the description of paddy at "Rice in
(1) A.LR. 1953 Cal. 548.
K. J. PILLAI v. UNION (Venkataramiah, J.) 691
the "husk" is a colourable attempt to avoid this difficulty. In- A
'The State of Bombay v. Virkumar Gulabchand Shah' (AIR
1952 S.C. 335), it was held that turmeric is "foodstuff"
• within the meaning of the Spices (Forward Contract Prohibi-
tion) Order 1944" read with S. 2(a) ·of the Act. It was
held that the term "foodstuff" is ambiguous and may have
B
a vide meaning or a narrow one. Whether the term is nsed
in a particular Statute in its wider or narrower sense cannot
b: answered in the abstract but must be answered with due
regard to the background and context. Thus in -'James v.
Jones' [ ( 1894) 1 Q.B. 304], baking powder was held to be
an article of food while in-'Hinde v. Allmond' (1918) 81 c
L.J.K.B. 893, it was held that tea was not. Now the act has
been passed to control the production and distribution of
essential commodities. What can be looked upon more of
an essential commodity than both rice and paddy? In West
Bengal, the two things most essential for the sustenance of
human life are rice and paddy. Mr. Mukherjee admits that
rice is an essential commodity & a foodstuff, but he says that
paddy is not because nobody can eat paddy. But that is a
very narrow view tu take. Paddy is only a stage in the pro-
duction of rice and the one cannot be food without the other
being food as well. Nobody eats the busk in paddy; but
nobody eats the skin of mango or the shell of a egg and yet E
they are unquestionably articles of food. In my opinion
paddy is 'foodstuff' within the meaning of that expression as
used in the Act and the notification."
To the same effect is the decision of the Calcutta High Court in
Nathuni Lal Gupta & Ors. v. The State & Ors.(') in which wheat and F
wheat products were held to be foodstuffs. The High Court of Punjab
4. and Haryana in Sujan Singh Matu Ram v. The State of Haryana( 2 )
and the High Court of Orissa in Bijoy Kumar Routrai & Ors. v. State
of Orissa & Ors. ( 8 ) also lay down the same principle.
In Tika Ramji & Ors. etc v. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.(') G
this Court observed :
"The essential commodities therein comprised inter alia
food>tuffs which would include sugar as well as sugarcane
-----
(!) A.LR. 1964 Cal. 279.
(2) A.IR. 1968 Punjab & Haryana 363.
(3) A.LR. 1976 Orissa 138.
(4) [1956] S.C.R. 393 at 418.
692 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981] 2 S.C.1!,.
A and both sugar and sugarcane therefore came within the
jurisdiction of the Centre."
The above observation makes it manifest that even a raw rr.atcria) •
like sugarcane used in the manufacture of sugar is a 'foodstuff'.
Younus v. Sub-Inspector of Police(') is a case in which the ques-
B
tion whether raw cashewnut was foodstuff or not directly arose for
COl!iideration. The learned Judge who decided the case held :
"The reasoning adopted for holding that wheat and paddy
-11
are foodstuffs applies with equal force in the case of
cashewnuts. There is no scope for doubt that cashew
c kernel is an eatable commodity both in its raw form and
also when fried. It is taken in as part of the food and is
also used in the preparation of food. That its kernel should
be separated from the shell or outer covering or that it
should be processed before use does not make raw cashew-
nuts any-the-less "foodstuff."
D
' It is also significant that 'raw cashewnut' is included in the group
of edible fruits in Chapter 8 of section II dealing with vegetable pro-
ducts of the First Schedule to the Customs Tariff Act, 1975.
It was, however, urged that even though cashewnut was an article
I which could be eaten, it was an article which was eaten by very few
persons on rare occasions and hence it is difficult to conceive cashew-
nut as an essential co=odity. It is no doubt true that cashewnu1
having become expensive, it is now more of a luxury. Due to export
of cashewnut on a large scale, it is a commodity which is in short
supply in the country and therefore the price at which it sells is beyond
F
the reach of the common man. But nevertheless it is an article of
food. It is eaten in raw form and after it is fried. It is also commonly
used in various perparations of food like pulav. sweets etc. There
is no basis for the assertion that it is a rnrc commodity outside the
State where it is grown. It is eaten not only in Kera!a but also in
G
other parts of the country. When cashewuut is exported. it is export-
ed as a foodstuff. Now it cannot be that cashewnut eaten abroad is
a foodstuff, and whatever is consumed within the country is not a
foodstuff. It is therefore, a foodstuff and must be classified as an
essential commodity. Its importance as a foodstuff can also be seen
from the statemoots filed in these cases in which it is stated that in the
H State of Kerala in the year 1976-77 the total quantity of raw cashewnut
procured was in the order of 60,000 tonnes, the number of workers
(t) 1978 K.L.T. 427.
K. J, PILLAI UNION (Venkataramiah, J,) 693
engaged in the cashewnut processing industry was about 1,20,000 A
and that th~rc were 269 cashew factories.
It was next urged that cashewnut could be treated as an essential
article only for the purpose of export and not an essential commodity
under the Central Act. This again is not correct. The Central Gov-
ernment can make an Order under the Central Act even when an essen- B
tial conmmdi.ty is used for industrial purpose or for purposes of ex-
port. Essential commodities do not cease to be essential commodi-
ties under the Central Act merely because they are exported after
they are processed in India. Foodgrains (Prohibition of Use in
Manufacture of Starch) Order, 1971, The Fruit Products Order,
1955, The Gur (Regulation of Use) Order, 1968, Pulses, Edible Oil-
c
seeds and Edible Oils (Storage Control) Order, 1977, Rice (Prohibi-
tion of Use in Wheat Products) Order, 1971. Vegetable Oil (Stan-
dards of Quality) Order, 1972, Vegetable Oil Product Producers (Re-
gularion of Refined Oil Manufacture) Order, 1973 and the Essential
Commodities (Regulation of Production and Distribution for puriposes D
of Export) Order, 1966 demonstrate the diverse purposes for which
an Order can be made under the Central Act.
• It was next urged that as long as the Central Government had not
passed an order in respect of the same matter, it was open to the
Government of Kerala to pass the impugned Order. Reliance was E
also placed on the decision of this Court in Tika Ramji's case (supra),
in which U.P. Sugarcane Regulation of Supply and Purchase Order,
1954 was upheld even though sugarcane was an essential commodity
under the Central Act. In that case this Court was concerned with
the question whether there was any repugnancy between a Central Jaw
and a State law. We are not concerned here with such a question. F
If a question of application of Article 254 of the Constitution had
arisen, it would have been open to consider whether there was any.
repugnancy at all between the two laws having regard to the scopo
and exrent of the field occupied by the Central law and the State Jaw.
But the real question which now arises for decision in these petitions
is whether the Kerala Legislature ever intended to treat any article G
which comes within the scope of the Central Act as an essential
article. The language of section 2(a) of the Kcrala Act steers clear
of all essential commodities under the Ce'ntral Act by excluding them
from the operation of the Kcrala Act. The power of the Central
Gowrnmcnt to make an order under the Central Act in respect of
raw cashewnut which is a foodstuff cannot be doubted. If that is so H
the Kerala Act cannot apply to it. The argument that as long as the
Central Government had not made an Order in respect of raw cashew-
694 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1981] 2 S.C.R.
A nut, the Kerala Government can pass an Order is not available in the ,
circumstances by reason of the definition of the 'essential article' in
the Kerala Act. It might have been open to consideration if the said
definition had not contained the words in the parenthesis.
On a careful consideration of the matter, we are satisfied that raw
B casheWnut is a foodstuff failing under section 2(a) (v) of the Central
Act and hence cannot be declared as an essential article under section
2(a) of the Kerala Act. It follows that no Order can be made by
the Government of Kerala under section 3 thereof in respect of raw
cashewnut. The action of the Kerala Government is beyond the
power conferred on it hy the Kerala Legislature.
c
In the result, we hold that the declaration made by the Govern-
1ncnt or J(c-raJa to the effect that raw cashcwnut is an essential article
under the Kerala Act and the impugned Order made thereunder are
liable to be ~uashcd and they are accordingly quashed.
All the other contentions including those relating to the alleged
D
infringement of the fundamental rights of the petitioners raised m
these petitions are left open.
Before concluding, we propose to advert to the last submi'8ion
made before us on behalf of the State Government. It was submitted
that the rashcwnut industry in Kcrala was _a labour-oriented industry
E and if the declaration and the Order were struck down, a number of
workmen would be adversely affected. It was also snbmitted that
the entire economy of the State of Kerala which largely depended on
the export trndc in cashcwnuts would be d'srurted. If any such serious
problem arises, it can always be set right by the competent Legislature
or the appropriate Government taking needful remedial action in the
light of Entry 33 of List III of the Seventh Schedule to the Consti-
tution.
The petitions are accord;ngly allowed. In the circumstances of
the case, there shall he no order as to costs.
P.B.R. Petitions allowed.
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