Supreme Court of India
K. BALAKRISHNANversusK. KAMALAM AND ORS.
- Citation
- 2003 INSC 737
- Decided
- 18 December 2003
- Disposal
- Case Partly allowed
- Bench
- Y K SABHARWAL
Holding
A gift to a minor is valid, can be accepted (expressly or impliedly) despite reservation of possession, and is irrevocable under Section 126, so the cancellation deed and will are void.
Summary
The mother executed a registered gift deed in 1945 transferring an 1/8 share of her property to her minor son and daughter, while reserving possession and enjoyment for herself during her lifetime. After the son attained majority, the mother cancelled the gift deed in 1970 and executed a will bequeathing the same property to the daughter. The son sued for declaration of title based on the original gift deed, claiming the cancellation deed and will were void. The Supreme Court held that a gift to a minor is valid, that a minor (or his guardian) can accept the gift either expressly or impliedly, and that reservation of possession does not defeat transfer of ownership. Acceptance was deemed to have occurred, making the gift irrevocable under Section 126 of the Transfer of Property Act, rendering the cancellation deed and will ineffective. Consequently, the appeal was allowed and the lower courts' orders set aside.
Issues considered
- Whether a gift made to a minor is valid and can be accepted by the minor or his guardian under the Transfer of Property Act.
- Whether reservation of possession and enjoyment by the donor defeats the transfer of ownership.
- Whether a donor can revoke a validly executed gift to a minor after acceptance or after the donee attains majority.
- Whether the cancellation deed and subsequent will effectively revoke the earlier gift.
Legislation cited
- Hindu Minority and Guardianship Acts. 6
- Indian Contract Act, 1872s. 11
- Transfer of Property Act, 1872s. 122, s. 123, s. 126, s. 127, s. 6
Subjects
GiftMinorTransfer of Property ActAcceptanceRevocationReservation of possessionIrrevocabilityGift deedCancellation deedWill
Judgment
K. BALAKRISHNAN A
v.
K. KAMALAM AND ORS.
DECEMBER 18, 2003
[Y.K. SABHARWAL AND D.M. DHARMADHIKARI, JJ.] B
Transfer of Property Act, 1872: Section 127.
Gift-Acceptance of-By minor-Transfer ofproperty by-Validity-
Mother gifted a portion of her property to her minor son by registered gift- C
deed-Subsequently, she cancelled the gift-deed and executed a Will
bequeathing the said property to her daughter-Minor son on 'attaining
majority filed a suit for declaration ofhis title to the gifted property-Trial
court dismissed the suit holding that the donee was a minor and no one
accepted the gift on his behalf-First appellate court allowed the appeal
holding that a minor was not disqualified from receiving the gift and that D
acceptance could be e:>..press or implied-But High Court held that the gift-
deed was invalid because the donor had reserved to herself the possession
and enjoyment of the property gifted-Correctness of -Held: There is no
prohibition in law that ownership in property could not be gifted without
, the possession and right of enjoyment-A minor is not incapable of E
receiving property-When a gift is made to a minor generally there is
presumption of its acceptance-Express acceptance of a gift by a minor
not possible and implicit acceptance could be expected-Hence, gift-deed
valid-High Court's order set aside.
F
The appellant's deceased mother (donor) executed a registered
gift-deed of 1/8th share of her property in favour of the appellant, who
was a minor then and the first respondent-daughter. Under terms of
the gift-deed ownership of the property, half-anii-half, to each of the
two donees was transferred but the donor retained during her lifetime G
the possession and enjoyment of the property.
After the appellant had attained majority the donor executed a
cancellation-deed whereby she cancelled the gift-deed and thereafter
executed a Will bequeathing the same property comprising her lf8th
share in favour of her daughter, the first respondent. H
1097
1098 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2003] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.
A Thereafter, the appellant-donee filed a suit for declaration of his
title to the suit property based on the gift-deed and for a further
declaration that the cancellation-deed and the Will were ineffective
and void in law. The trial court dismissed the suit holding that the
appellant was a minor at the time of execution of the gift-deed and !hat
B no one had accepted the gift on his behalf. It, therefore, held that the
gift-deed was invalid and passed no title to the donee.
The first appellant court allowed the appeal holding that a minor
in law was not disqualified from receiving the property under the gift-
deed, that the appellant could accept the gift during his minority, and
C that such acceptance could be express or implied.
Hcwever, the High Court held that there was no transfer of
property; that the entire right in the property gifted was reserved by
the donor to herself and that there was no question of acceptance of
D the gift by the appellant. Hence the appeal.
The following question of law arose before the Court:
Whether the appellant, who was a minor on the date of execution
of the gift-deed, could be held to have legally accepted the property
E gifted to him and the said gift-deed was irrevocable?
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD : I. The donor had very clearly transferred to the donees
ownership and title in respect of her l/8th share in the properties. It
F was open to the donor to transfer by gift, title and ownership in the
property and at the same time reserve its possession and enjoyment
to herself during her lifetime. [1102-H; 1103-A]
2.1. A minor suffers disability from entering into a contract but
he is thereby not incapable of receiving property. The Transfer of
G Property Act, 1872 does not prohibit transfer of property to a minor.
[1104-B]
2.2. The acquisition of property being generally beneficial, a child
can take property in any manner whatsoever either under intestacy or
H by Will or by purchase or gift or other assurance inter-vivos, except
K. BALAKRISHNAN v. K. KAMALAM 1099
where it is clearly to his prejudice to do so. A gift inter-vivas to a child A
cannot be revoked. There is a presumption in favour of the validity of
a gift of a parent or a grandparent to a child, if it is complete. When
a gift is made to a child, generally there is a presumption of its
acceptance because express acceptance in his case is not possible and
only an implied acceptance can be expected. 11106-E-FI B
Halsbwy's Laws of England Vol. 5(2) 4h Edn., Paras 642 & 647,
referred to.
2.3. Section 127 of the Act clearly indicates competence ofa minor
donee to accept the gift, if he is capable of so doing. Such acceptance of C
a gift can be made by himself or on his behalf by someone else. [1106-H)
Firm of Ganeshdas Bhiwaraj v. Suryabhan, (1917) (XIII) Nagpur
Law Reports 18; Munni Kunwar v. Madan Gopal, (1916) (XXXVIII)
ILR All. 62; Firm of Ganeshdas Bhiwaraj v. Suryabhan, (1917) Vol. 39
Indian Cases; Sunder Bai v. Anandi Lal, AIR (1983) All. 23; Ponnuchami D
Servai v. Balasubramanian, AIR (1982) Mad. 281 and Vannathi Valappil
Janaki v. Puthiya Purayil Paru, AIR (1986) Ker. 110, approved.
3. Non-mention of the fact of non-acceptance of the gift by the
donee in the cancellation-deed reinforces the inference that the donor-
mother herself, at the time of cancellation of the gift-deed, never E
assumed that the gift was not accepted and, therefore, it is revocable.
(1109-H; 1110-A)
Shankuntala Devi v. Amar Devi, (1986) HP 109 and Narayani
Bhanumathi v. Lalitha Bhai, (1873) Kerala Law Times 961, approved. F
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1036 of
2000.
From the Judgment and Order dated 6.8.99 of the Kerala High Court
in S.A. No. 671 of 1992.
G
WITH
C.A. No. 4770 of 2001.
Rajiv Mehta, Romy Chacko and M.P. Yinod for the Appearing
parties. H
1100 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.
A The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
DHARMADHIKARI, J. : The only substantial question of law
involved in this appeal is whether the appellant, who was minor on the date
of execution of the gift-deed dated 24.9.1945, can be held to have legally
B accepted the property in suit gifted to him and the said gift-deed was
irrevocable.
The appellant shall hereinafter be described as 'the donee' and his
deceased mother as the '<loner.' The relevant dates and facts leading to
this appeal preferred against the impugned judgment dated 6.8.1999 of the
C High Court of Kerala, passed in Second Appeal No. 671 of 1992 are thus:-
On 24.9.1945, mother Devyani-donor executed a registered gift-deed
of l/8th share of the property inherited by her from her maternal
grandfather in favour of her minor son aged 16 years being the present
D appellant (donee) and her daughter Kamalam (respondent No. 1 herein)
who was aged four years. The l/8th share of the property gifted is
described in the schedule of gift-deed i.e. one acre and 25 cents of property
in Survey No. 7481 & 7482 with school building in Mayyanad Cherry
in the State of Kerala. Under the terms of the gift-deed ownership of the
property, half and half, to each of the two donees was trahsferred but the
E donor retained during her life time the management of the school and the
income from the property. The original gift-deed is in Malyalam and
rendered into English, it reads thus :-
Gift executed on 8th Kanni 1121 (24-9-1945) Mother Devayani
aged 43, Eznava daughter of Narayanan residing at Kamolayan
F
from CL Mandiram, Eravipuram Pakuthy, Mayyanad Cherry in
favour of her children (I) Ba\akrishnan aged 16 son of Kunju
Pillai and (2) Kamalam aged 4 residing at Kamalalayam, Mayyanad
Cherry.
G You are my children. In consideration of my love and affection
towards you, the under-mentioned properties are given to you by
way of gift. Accordingly from today you shall enjoy the paddy
fields which are obtained my mortgage by being in possession and
payment of tax and you can recover mortgage money by filing
H suit or by receiving it directly after executing a release. You shall
K. BALAKRISHNAN v. K. KAMALAM [DHARMADHIKARI, J.] 1101
also transfer in your name according to law the right in respect A
of the prope1ty in which Mayyanad English School stands as also
the buildings and other movables therein and enjoy the same with
all rights forever. The responsibility to sign in regard to the above
school and to receive the income will be with me during my
lifetime and after my death the above responsibilities will vest in B
the first named donee.
Schedule (Other items omitted)
118 share in I acre 80 cents in property in Sy. No.7481 & 7482
of the Mayyanad Cherry in which the English school is situated, C
the entire school buildings and the entire movables in the above."
On 28.3.1970, the donor executed a cancellation deed whereby she
cancelled the gift-deed dated 24.9.1945 and thereaft~r executed a Will on
30.3.1970 bequeathing the same property comprising her 1/8th share in D
favour of her daughter, first respondent. The donor died on 6.11.1982. The
appellant filed the present suit OS No. 145 of 1986 in the Court of Quilon
claiming declaration of his title to the suit property on the basis of the gift-
deed and a further declaration was sought that the cancellation deed dated
28.3.1970 and the Will dated 30.3.1970 are ineffective and void in law.
E
The trial court dismissed the suit holding inter alia that the donee was
a minor and no one has accepted the gift on his behalf. It, therefore, held
that the gift deed was invalid and passed no title to the donee. It also
recorded a finding that the gift deed was executed by the donor during
pendency of a suit against her for recovery of money with intention to save F
it against execution of the decree which was likely to be passed in that
suit.
The appeal preferred by the present appellant to the first appellate
court was allowed on 21. 7 .1992 by the District Judge, Kollam. The first
appellate court held that a minor in law is not disqualified from receiving G
the property under the gift deed and the appellant could accept the gift
during minority. Such acceptance could be express or implied. The first
appellate court relied on the oral evidence given by the parties and accepted
the version of the donor that after execution of the gift-deed and its
registration, the document was read by him and kept by his father. It was H
1102 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.
A also held that for valid acceptance of gift, delivery of possession of
property was not an essential requirement in law.
The High Couti in the impugned judgment took a contrary view and
confirming the trial coutijudgment dismissed the suit of the donee holding
B inter alia that the terms of the gift-deed do not indicate that any property
was transferred thereunder. The High Court held that when the donor
reserved to herselftht: right to sign the papers with respect to management
of the school and right to take usufruct from the property where the school
is situated, there arose no question of passing over ownership of the
property to the donees which the donees could accept.
c
. The High Comi further went on to hold that the entire right in the
property gifted was reserved by the donor to herself and therefore even
whe.n the father had handed over the documents to the plaintiff there arose
no question of any acceptance of gift made in respect of the school
D property. The High Court further held that the same legal position is in
respect of property gifted to the minor daughter and no question of
acceptance of gift arose in respect of that part of the property as well. The
High Court has observed thus :-
"In other words, in respect of the school properties, Ex.A- I has
E not taken effect. In respect of all foe properties of Devayani other
than those found to be accepted in terms of Ex.A- I, necessarily
Ex.Bl, settlement-deed and Ex.A3 Will govern the matter of
succession."
F On the last finding with regard to properties other than the school
·property, the respondents feel aggrieved and have preferred the connected
Ci vi! Appeal No. 4 771 of 2001 which is being decided with this appeal.
We have heard the learned counsel appearing for the appellant who
has challenged the correctness of the judgment of the High Court. The
G learned counsel appearing for the respondent has tried to support the same.
We have critically examined the contents of the gift deed. To us, it
appears that the donor had very clearly transferred to the donees ownership
and title in respect of her I/8th share in properties. It was open to the
H donor to transfer by gift title and ownership in the property and at the same
K. BALAKRISHNAN v. K. KAMALAM [DHARMADHIKARI, J.] 1103
time reserve its possession and enjoyment to herself during her lifetime. A
There is no prohibition in law that ownership in property cannot be
gifted without its possession and right of enjoyment. Under Section 6 of
the Transfer of Property Act "property of any kind may be transferred"
except those mentioned in clauses (a) to (i). Section 6 in relevant part reads
~~ B
"6. What ma")' be transferred.- Property of any kind may be
transferred, except as otherwise provided by this Act or by any
other law for the time being in force,-
(a) ............. . c
(b) A mere right to re-entry for breach of a condition subsequent
cannot be transferred to any one except the owner of the property
affected thereby.
(c) D
(d) All interest in property restricted in its enjoyment to the
owner personally cannot be transferred by him.
(e) A mere right to sue [***] cannot be transferred.
E
Clause (d) of Section 6 is not attracted on the terms of the gift-deed
herein because it was not a property, the enjoyment of which was restricted
to the owner personally. She was absolute owner of the property gifted
and it was not restricted in its enjoyment to herself. She had inherited it
from her maternal father as a full owner. The High Court was, therefore, F
apparently wrong in coming to the conclusion that the gift-deed was
•
ineffectual merely because the donor had reserved to herself the possession
and enjoyment of the property gifted.
The second question which has been posed by the High Court and
answered against the donor is regarding acceptance of the gift and its G
revocability.
A minor in law suffers from certain specified disabilities. A minor
is not competent to enter into a contract. Section 11 of the Contract Act
states :- H
I 104 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2003] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.
A "11. Who are competent to contract. - Every person is competent
to contract who is of the age of majority according to the law to
which he is subject, and who is of sound mind and is not
disqualified from contracting by any law to which he is subject."
B A minor suffers disability from entering into a contract but he is
thereby not incapable of receiving property. The Transfer of Property Act
does not prohibit transfer of property to a minor. Section 122 of the
Transfer of Property Act defines 'Gift' thus :-
"122. Gift" defined. - "Gift" is the transfer of certain existing
c moveable or immoveable property made voluntarily and without
consideration, by one person, called the donor, to another, called
the donee, and accepted. by or on behalf of the donee.
Acceptance when to be made. - Such acceptance must be made
D during the lifetime of the donor and while he is still capable of
giving.
If the donee dies before acceptance, the gift is void."
[Underlining by the Court}
E Section 123 of the Tr;msfer of Property Act provides the mode of
effecting transfer by gift which reads:-
"123. Transfer how effected. - For the purpose of making a gift
of immovable property, the transfer must be effected by a
F registered instrument signed by or on behalf of the donor, and
attested by at least two witnesses.
For the purpose of making a gift of moveable property, the
transfer may be effected either by a registered instrument signed
as aforesaid or by delivery.
G
Such delivery may be made in the same way as goods sold may
be delivered."
The other relevant Section 126 specifies circumstances under which
H a gift can be suspended or revoked :-
K. BALAKRISHNAN v. K. KAMALAM [DHARMADHIKARI, J.] 1105
"126. When gift may be suspended or revoked. - The donor and A
donee may agree that on the happening of any specified event
which does not depend on the will of the donor a gift shall be
suspended or revoked; but a gift which the parties agree shall be
revocable wholly or in part, at the mere will of the donor, is void
wholly or in part, as the case may be. B
A gift may also be revoked in any of the cases (save want or
failure of consideration) in which, if it were a contract, it might
be rescinded.
Save as aforesaid, a gift cannot be revoked.
c
Nothing contained in this section shall be deemed to affect the
rights of transferees for consideration without notice."
[Underlining by the Court}
For understanding the provisions on "Gift" contained in Chapter VII D
of the Transfer of Property Act, all the sections therein which are
interrelated have to be read conjointly to understand their import and effect.
Section 127 throws light on the question of validity of transfer of
property by gift to a minor. It recognises minor's capacity to accept the E
gift without intervention of guardian, if it is possible, or through him.
"127. Onerous gifts - Where a gift is in the form of a '.)ngle
transfer to the same person of several things of which one is, and
the others are not burdened by an obligation, the donee can take F
nothing by the gift unless he accepts it fully.
Where a gift is in the form of two or more separate and
independent transfers to the same person of several things, the
donee is at liberty to accept one of them and refuse the others,
although the former may be beneficial and the latter onerous. G
Onerous gift to disqualified person. - A donee not competent to
contract and accepting property burdened by any obligation is not .
bound by his acceptance. But if, after becoming competent to
contract and being aware of the obligation, he retains the H>
1106 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2003] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.
A property given, he becomes so bound. "
[Underlining by the Court]
The last part of Section 127, underlined above, clearly indicates that
a minor donee, who can be said to be in law incompetent to contract under
B Section 11 of the Contract Act is, however, competent to accept .a non
onerous gift. Acceptance of an onerous gift, however, cannot bind the
minor. If he accepts the gift during his minority of a property burdened
with obligation and on attaining majority does not repudiate but retains it,
he would be bound by the obligation ?.ttached to it.
C Section 127 clearly recognises the competence of a minor to accept
the gift. The provision of law is clear and precedents clarify the position.
See the decisions of Judicial Commissioner in the case of Firm of
Ganeshdas Bhiwaraj v. Suryabhan, (1917) XIII Nagpur Law Reports 18;
Munni Kunwar v. Madan Gopal, (1916) (XXXVIII) ILR Allahabad 62 at
D 69 and Firm ofGeneshdas Bhiwaraj v. Swyabhan, (1917) Vol. 39 Indian
Cases 46.
The position in law, thus, under the Transfer of Property Act read
with the Indian Contract Act is that "the acquisition of property being
generally beneficial, a child can take property in any manner whatsoever
E either under intestacy or by Will or by purchase or gift or other assurance
inter vivas, except where it is clearly to his prejudice to do so. A gift inter-
vivos to a child cannot be revoked. There is a presumption in favour of
the validity of a gift of a parent or a grandparent to a child, if it is complete
(See Halsbwy's Laws of England, Vol. 5(2) 4th Edn. Paragraphs 642 &
F 64 7]. When a gift is made to a child, generally there is presumption of
its acceptance because express acceptance in his case is not possible and
only an implied acceptance can be excepted.
Section 122 (quoted above and underlined) covers the case of a minor
G donee being a person under legal disability. The section, therefore, employs
the expression - 'accepted by or on behalf of donee'.
As we have seen above, Section 127 (quoted above and underlined
in its last part) clearly indicates competence of a minor donee to accept
the gift, ifhe is capable of so doing. Such acceptance of a gift can be made
H by himself or on his behalf by someone else.
K. BALAKRISHNAN v. K. KAMALAM [DHARMADHIKARI, J.] 1107
Reverting back to the facts of this case, the mother who is one of A
the guardians of the donee, was herself the donor and the minor was in
her custody living with her in the same house. The minor's father, who
is the natural guardian under Section 6 of the Hindu Minority and
Guardianship Act, was also present and living with the minor in the same
house jointly with other members of the family. The parties belong to B
an educated Kerala family. As is apparent from the :-ec:>rd, the donee was
16 years of age at the time of making of gift and as stated in the witness
box, he understood and had knowledge that her mother had gifted the
property to him and his younger sister. According to him after the
execution of the gift-deed, the document written in Malayalam was brought C
to the house which was read by the donee and he handed it over to his
father. The document has been produced in the court from the custody of
the daughter with whom the father lived at a time of filing of the suit by
the minor. A question was put to the father as to whether he had accepted
the gift on behalf of his minor son. His reply was that the minor son did
not know about execution of the document and the son came to know about D
it only when his sister, on the basis of the deed of revocation, filed a suit
against him for injunction in the year 1985. The father has, however, not
stated that he himself had no knowledge of the execution of the gift-deed
although he denies the version of the donee that the scribe brought the gift-
deed and gave it to his wife and the wife gave it to him for safe custody. E
The father's reply was that the gift-deed remained with the wife. Since the
father lived with the daughter and had ~upported her case, he naturally
denied the version of the minor of his having derived knowledge of the
gift deed, its reading by him and handing over to the father.
Where a gift is made in favour of a child of the donor, who is F
the guardian of the child, the acceptance of gift can be presumed to have
been made by him or on his behalf without any overt act signifying
acceptance by the minor. In the instant case, mother who is the natural
guardian gifted the property to her minor son in the year 1945. The donee
was an educated lad of 16 years of age, capable of understanding and G
living jointly with the donor. Knowledge of the execution of the gift would
have been derived in normal circumstances, by the minor, being benefi-
ciary, sooner or later after its execution. Knowledge of gift deed to both
the parents as natural guardians and the donee is sufficient to indicate
acceptance of gift by the minor himself or on his behalf by the parents. H ,
1108 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.
A The gift deed was revoked by the mother much after its execution as late
as in the year 1970. By that time, the donee had become major and he
never repudiated the gift. We have examined the terms of the gift.:deed.
Non-delivery of possession of the gifted property, non-exercise of any
rights of ownership over it, and failure by the donee, on attaining majority,
B in getting his name mutated in official records are not circumstances
negativing the presumption of acceptance by the minor during his minority
or on his attaining majority. The donor had reserved to herself, under the
terms of gift deed, the right to manage, possess and enjoy the property
during her life time. Since the possession and enjoyment of the property
C including management of the school were retained by the donor during her
life time, the acceptance of the ownership of the property gifted could be
by silent acceptance. Such acceptance is confirmed by its non-repudiation
by his parents and by him on attaining majority. As is the evidence on
record, mother - the donor was herself the natural guardian of the minor
donee. The father was also a guardian and had knowledge of the gift. He
D also did not repudiate the gift on behalf of the donee. The donee himself
was of 16 years of age and could understand the nature of beneficial interest
conferred on him. He also had knowledge of the gift-deed and on attaining
majority did not repudiate it. These are all circumstances which reasonably
give rise to an inference, if not of express but implied acceptance of the
E gift. Where a gift is made by parent to a child, there is a presumption of
acceptance of the gift by the donee. This presumption of acceptance is
founded on human nature. 'A man may be. fairly presumed to assent to
that to which he in all probability would assent if the opportunity of doiilg
so were given to him'. [See Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edition 20
F paragraph 48].
In the case of Sundar Bai v. Anandi Lal, AIR (1983) Allahabad 23,
the donee was a child and in the care of the donor himself. The High
Court held that in such circumstance, express acceptance could not be
i:'isisted upon. In the case of Ponnuchami Servai v. Balasubramanian, AIR
G (1982) Madras 281, the father himself was the donor and execut~ a gift
deed in favour of his minor son. The parties continued to stay tG>gether
in the said property even after the gift. In these circumstances it was held
that the gift in favour of the minor would be deemed to have been accepted
as the father himself was the guardian and had himself executed the gift-
H deed.
K. BALAKRISHNAN v. K. KAMALAM [DHARMADHIKARI, J.] I 109
There is one more relevant fact in the present case. In the judgment A
of the courts below there is a mention that under the contents of the deed
of cancellation dated 28.3.1970, there is no mention by the donor of the
gift having not been accepted by the donee although it is said therein that
'none of the stipulations in the said gift have come into force.' But she
did not revoke the gift deed by specifically mentioning in the recital of the B
cancellation deed that the gift was not complete du~ to non-acceptance and
she was therefore, making some other arrangement for succession to her
property after her death.
In the case of Vannathi Valappil Janaki v. Puthiya Purayil Paru,
AIR (I 986) Kerala I I 0, the donors were real uncles of the donees who C
were minor children. Subsequently the donors revoked the gift on the
ground that the donees were not bestowing proper love and affection on
the donors which might endanger their future safety. The High Court of
Allahabad on these facts inferred and came to the conclusion that the gift
deed in favour of the minor children was definitely accepted or else there D
would have been mention in the revocation deed that the revocation was
necessitated because the children no longer bestowed love and care on the
donors. The relevant observations of the High Court deserve to be quoted:-
"When the gift of immovable property is not onerous, only slight
evidence is sufficient for establishing the fact of acceptance by the E
donee. When it is shown that the donee had knowledge of the
gift it is only normal to assume that the donee had accepted the
gift because the acceptance would only promote his own interest.
Mere silence may sometimes be indicative of acceptance provided
it is shown that the donee knew about the gift. No express F
acceptance is necessary for completing a gift. Where the donors
who were the real uncles of the donees stated in the deed of
revocation that to allow the continued existence of the gift would
endanger their future safety as the donees were not bestowing
proper love and affection towards the donors which was expected G
by the donors from the donees as a recompense for the gift, that
statement is clear indication that the gift had been accepted by the
donees."
In the instant case, non-mention of the fact of non acceptance of
the gift by the donee in the cancellation deed reinforces our inference that H
1110 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003) SUPP. 6 S.C.R.
A the donor mother herself, at the time of cancellation of the gift, never
assumed that the gift was not accepted and therefore it is revocable.
As seen above, in the case of a minor donee receiving a gift from
her parents, no express acceptance can be expected and is possible, and
B acceptance can be implied even by mere silence or such conduct of the
minor donee and his other natural guardian as not to indicate any
disapproval or repudiation of it. [See Shankuntala Devi v. Amar Devi,
(1986) Himachal Pradesh 109 and Narayani Bhanumathi v. Lalitha Bhai,
(1973) Kerala Law Times 961.
C In our considered opinion therefore, the trial court and the High Court
were wrong in coming to the conclusion that there was no valid acceptance
of the gift by the minor donee. Consequently, conclusion has to follow that
the gift having been duly accepted in law and thus being complete, it was
irrevocable under Section 126 of the Transfer of Property Act. Section 126
D prohibits revocation of a validly executed gift except in circumstances
mentioned therein. The gift was executed in 1945. It remained in force
for about 25 years during which time the donee had attained majority and
had not repudiated the same. It was, therefore, not competent for the donor
to have cancelled the gift and executed a Will in relation to the property.
E Consequently, Civil Appeal No. 1036 of 2000 filed by the donee
succeeds and is hereby allowed. The impugned order of the High Court
dated 6.8.1999 passed in Second Appeal No. 671 of 1992 and the judgment
of the trial court dated 27.9.1989 are set aside. Consequently, the judgment
of the first appellate court dated 21.7.1992 is hereby restored.
F
The connected Civil Appeal No. 4770 of 2001 having been
preferred by respondent K. Kamalam only against certain findings and
· observations contained in the impugned judgment of the High Court is
dismissed. In the circumstances, parties shall bear their own costs.
v.s.s. C.A. No. 1036/2000 allowed.
C.A. No. 4770/2001 dismissed.
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