K.B. NAGUR M.D. (AYU.)versusUNION OF INDIA

                   [2012] 1 S.C.R. 1023


                 K.B. NAGUR M.D. (AYU.)                           A
                              v.
                       UNION OF INDIA
            (Writ Petition (Civil) No. 33 of 2009)

                   FEBRUARY 24, 2012
                                                                  B
        [S.H. KAPADIA, CJI, A.K. PATNAIK AND
               SWATANTER KUMAR, JJ.]

    CONSTITUTION OF IND/A, 1950:
                                                                  c
     Arts. 14 and 16 - Held: The concept of equality has to
be patently infringed by a provision before that provision or
any part thereof, can be declared as unconstitutional - The
mere fact that there is some inconvenience arising from the
language of a provision and its due implementation cannot         0
be a ground for declaring a provision violative of fundamental
rights - Besides, presumption of constitutionality is always in
favour of a legislation, unless the contrary is shown - For the
proper interpretation and examination of a provision of a
statute, all bodies must be presumed to act effectively and in    E
accordance with law - In the instant case, s. 7 of the Indian
Medicine Central Council Act, 1970, is neither ultra vires nor
violative of Arts. 14 and/or 16 - Indian Medicine Central
Council Act, 1970 - s. 7.

    IND/AN MEDICINE CENTRAL COUNCIL ACT, 1970:                    F

    ss.3(1)(a)(b), 4 and 7 - CentraJ Council of Indian
Medicine - Term of office of the members and other office
bearers - Held: Is five years - Elections are expected to be
held within the said period of five years to ensure that          G
immediately after expiry of the specific term, the members
holding the office quit and the newly elected members
assume charge - To extend beyond a regular term the tenure
of members, would not only be impermissible in Jaw but would
also be illegal.
                            1023                                  H
    1024    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2012] 1 S.C.R.


A      s. 7 - Continuance by members of Central Council of
  Indian Medicine after expiry of specified period of 5 years -
  Clause, "or until his successor shall have been duly elected
  or nominated, whichever is longer" - Connotation of - Held:
  The clause has been provided to protect a situation where
B elections cannot be held within the prescribed time for valid
  reasons - Since no outer limit has been specified by the
  Legislature for which such previously elected members can
  continue in office, the concept of reasonable time would come
  into play - Courts in the process of interpretation can supply
c the lacuna - Thus, a period of three months would be sufficient
  for completing the election process, if the fresh election could
  not be held within the five years' term of office of previously
  elected members - No elected person shall hold the office of
  President, Vice President or Member beyond the period of
  three months from the expiry of his term - s. 7 or any part
D thereof is neither ultra vires nor violative of Arts. 14 and/or 16
  of the Constitution - Constitution of India, 1950 - Arts. 14 and
  16 - Maxim, 'ut res valeat potws quam pereat' - Applicability
    of.

E      ss.3, 4 and 7 - Central Council of Indian Medicine -
  Obligations of Central Government - Held: Central
  Government has a major role to play in the constitution,
  establishment and activities of the Council - It is expected of
  the Central Government to discharge its functions and duties
F without failure and on time - It is the obligation of Central
  Government to hold election to the Central Council before
  expiry of the term of the Members and other office bearers of
  the Council as provided u/s 7 - Judicial notice.
       The petitioner, an Ayurvedic doctor, filed the instant
G writ petition in public interest alleging that elections to the
  Central Council of Indian Medicines were not held for the
  last 20-25 years. It was stated that as per s.7 of the Indian
  Medicine Central Council Act 1970, though the term of
  members of the Council was five years from the date of
H election/nomination, the latter part of the section
   K.B. NAGUR M.D. (AYU.) v. UNION OF INDIA        1025


stipulating, "or until a successor shall have been duly A
elected or nominated, whichever is longer", caused
serious impediment in the proper functioning of the
Council; that the Central Government did not take proper
steps to hold fresh elections and the persons who had
been elected, took advantage of the provision and B
continued in office far beyond five years as nobody was
duly elected to replace them. It was, therefore, prayed,
inter alia, that the Union of India be directed to hold
elections to the Council and that the last clause of s.7 of
the Act as pointed out, be struck down. During the c
pendency of the writ petitions some other cases stood
transferred to the Court; and Writ Petition No. 249 of 2011
and a number of IAs were also filed.
    Disposing of the matters, the Court
    HELD: 1.1 Art.14 of the Constitution of India, 1950, D
guarantees equality before law whereas Art.16 talks of
equal opportunities in matters of public employment.
This concept of equality has to be patently infringed by
a provision before that provision or any part thereof, can
be declared as unconstitutional. The mere fact that there E
is some inconvenience arising from the language of a
provision and its due implementation cannot be a ground
for declaring a provision violative of fundamental rights.
Besides, presumption of constitutionality is always in
favour of a legislation, unless the contrary is shown. F
Furthermore, a Legislature, in enacting a law, operates on
a presumption, in law and practice, both, that all other
forums and entities constituted under one or other Act
would, in their functioning, act in accordance with law
and expeditiously. For the proper interpretation and G
examination of a provision of a statute, all bodies must
be presumed to act effectively and in accordance with
law. [Para 7-8) [1034-A-C-H; 1035-A)
    1.2 A statute is construed so as to make it effective
and operative as per the principle expressed in ut res      H
    1026    SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2012] 1 S.C.R.


A valeat potius quam pereat. The term of the Members of
   the Central Council, as prescribed u/s 7 of the Indian
   Medicine Central Council Act, 1970, is five years.
   Elections are expected to be held within that period of five
  years to ensure that immediately after expiry of the
B specific term, the members holding the office quit and the
   newly elected members assume the charge. However,
  there can be situations where the elections in the entire
  country or in any part thereof cannot be held within the
   prescribed time and for valid reasons. It is this situation
c which is intended to be protected by the challenged
  words of s.7 of the Act. The legislative intent is clear that
  there cannot be a vacuum in the working of a statutory
  body and it cannot be rendered non-existent even for a
  short period by lapse of membership term or otherwise.
  Thus, to provide a safeguard for the interregnum period,
0
  of the earlier members of the Central Council vacating
  their office and newly elected members assuming their
  office, the provisions of s. 7 have been enacted by the
  Legislature. Whatever be the methods adopted, by
E whichever agency including the Government, to extend
  beyond a regular term the tenure of members, would not
  only be impermissible in law, but would also be illegal.
  [para 7, 9 and 21] [1034-C-G; 1035-C; 1041-D]
       1.3 It cannot be said that the provisions of s. 7 of the
F Act, or any part thereof, suffer from any legal infirmity,
  excessive legislative power or violate any legal right of
  any person, including the petitioner, much less a
  constitutional right. Keeping the principle of strict
  necessity in mind, the courts do not venture to examine
G the constitutional validity of a provision and even strike
  down such provisions, if they are constitutional and a
  court does so only if the situation created by such
  legislation is irremediable or unredeemable. None of
  these circumstances exist in the present case. [para 11]
H [1036-8-C]
    K.B. NAGUR M.D. (AYU.) v. UNION OF INDIA           1027


     1.4 Section 7 of the Indian Medicine Central Council       A
Act, 1970 or any part thereof is neither ultra vires nor
violativP. of Arts. 14 and/or 16 of the Constitution. [para
25(A)] [1043-8-C]

      Dental Council of India and Anr. v. Dr. H.R. Prem         8
                                        =
Sachdeva & Ors. 1999 (4) Suppl. SCR 1 (1999) 8 SCC 471
- followed.

     2. The Central Government is responsible for
nominating such number of members not exceeding 30
per cent of the total members elected u/s 3(1)(a) and C
3(1 )(b) of the Act to the Central Council. The Central
Government has a major role to play in the constitution,
establishment and carrying on of activities by the Central
Council. This is an onerous and significant duty. There
is no reason for the Central Government not to perform D
its statutory duties. The Court would take judicial notice
of the fact that a large number of people depend upon
these systems of medicine for treatment of various
diseases. The Court mandates the Central Government
shall discharge all its duties and functions as E
contemplated u/ss 3, 4 and 7 of the Indian Medicine
Central Council Act, 1970, without default, delay and
within the required intervals. It is the obligation of the
Central Government to hold election to the Central
Council within the period of five years i.e., before expiry F
of the term of office of the President/Vice-President and
Member of the Central Council, as provided u/s 7 of the
Act. [para 17 and 25-8] [1039-C-E; 1043-C-E]

    Kishansing Tamar v. Municipal Corporation of the City
of Ahmedabad and Others 2006 (7) Suppl. SCR 454            = G
(2006) 8 sec 352 - relied on.

    2.1 The provisions of ss. 3, 4, and 7 read together,
make it clear that the legislative intent is that election to
the Central Council should be held within the period of         H
    1028   SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2012) 1 S.C.R.


A five years which is the term of office prescribed for the
  elected and/or nominated members. However, if for any
  reason, the elections are not held and newly elected
  members do not join their office immediately after expiry
  of five years, then the latter part of s.7 comes into play.
B This is an extra-ordinary situation that the elected
  members continue beyond their prescribed term because
  the elections had not been held and newly elected
  members cannot join the Central Council. [para 22) [1041·
    E-G]
c      2.2 Though, no outer limit has been specified by the
  Legislature for which such previously elected members
  can continue in office, but this certainly cannot be for
  indefinite period. For whatever reason, once recourse to
  this exceptional situation becomes necessary, then the
D concept of reasonable time would come into play. It is a
  settled rule of statutory interpretation that wherever no
  specific time limit is prescribed, the concept of reasonable
  time shall hold the field for completing such an action.
  The courts in the process of interpretation can supply the
E lacuna, which would help to achieve the object of the Act
  and the legislative intent and make the provisions
  effective and operative. [para 22] [1041-H; 1042-A-B]

      2.3 Neither the Government, nor the Central Council
F can abjure their obligation to complete the election
  process within five years, or in any case, within a
  reasonable time thereafter. A period of three months
  would be more than sufficient for completing the election
  process in accordance with law. This time limit shall
G operate only and as and when the Central Government
  and the Central Council jointly and severally are not able
  to hold the fresh elections within the term of office of the
  previously elected members, i.e., five years from the date
  on which the members first assumed office. [para 23)
H [1042-C-D]
     K.B. NAGUR M.D. (AYU.) v. UNION OF INDIA              1029


     2.4 In the eventuality of exceptional circumstances,           A
if the Central Government is not able to hold elections
within the period of the prescribed term, it shall complete
the process within a reasonable time thereafter and in no
case, exceeding three months from the date on which the
term of the members in office expires. [para 25-C) [1043"-          B
F]

    2.5 No elected Member, under any of the three
systems of medicine, Ayurveda, Unani or Siddha shall
hold the office of the President, Vice President or Member,         C
beyond a period of three months from the expiry of their
term. [para 25-D] [1043-G-H]

                      Case Law Reference:

     1999 (4) Suppl. SCR 1        followed             Para 12
                                                                    D
     2006 (7) Suppl. SCR 454relied on                 ·Para 5

    CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition (Civil) No.
33 of 2009 etc.

     Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.                 E

                                WITH
I.A. Nos. 1, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 & 11, W.P. (C) No. 249 of 2011.

T.P. (C) Nos. 736, 737 & 738-739 of 2011.
                                                                    F
     H.P. Raval, ASG. Umapathy, S. Gowthaman, S. Selvaraj,
Rakesh K. Sharma, S. Ramasubramanian, R.K. Rathore,
Sunita Sharma, D.S. Mahra, R.K. Rathore, A. Deb Kumar,
Rakesh U. Upadhyay, Aarti Upadhyay, D. Mahesh Babu, Mayur
Shah, Savita Devi, Amit K. Nair, D. Bharathi Reddy, Hemantika       G
Wahi, Rojalin Pradhan, Riku Sharma, Navnit Kumar, Deepika
Ghatowar (for Corporate Law Gruop), Praveen Kumar Pandey,
P. Vijaya Kumar, C.S.N. Mohan Rao, Ajay.Veer Pundir, Gouri
Karuna Das Mohanti, Sanjeev Sharma, Anu Gupta, Anish
Kumar Gupta, Deep Shikha Bharati, R.D. Gupta for the                H
    1030     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2012] 1 S.C.R.


A   appearing parties.

         The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

        SWATANTER KUMAR, J. 1. The Central Council of
   Indian Medicine (for short 'the Central Council') is a statutory
B body, constituted in terms of Section 3 of the Indian Medicine
   Central Council Act, 1970 (for short 'the Act'). Section 4 of the
   Act mandates that election under clause (a) or clause (b) of
   sub-Section (1) of Section 3 of the Act shall be conducted by
   the Central Government in accordance with the rules as may
C be made in this behalf. Where any dispute arises regarding
   any election to the Central Council, it shall be referred to the
   Central Government whose decision shall be final. Sub-section
   (1)(a) of Section 3 provides that the Central Council shall
   consist of such number of members, not exceeding five, as may
D be determined by the Central Government in accordance with
  the provisions of the First Schedule of the Act for each of the
  Ayurveda, Siddha and Unani systems of medicine, from each
   State, in which a State Register of the Indian Medicine is
  maintained, to be elected from amongst themselves, by the
E persons enrolled on that Register as registered practitioners
  of the respective systems. Section 3(1 )(b) of the Act states
  that one member each of the Ayurveda, Siddha and Unani
  systems of medicine from each University were to be elected
  from amongst themselves by the members of the Faculty or
F Department of the respective system of medicine of that
  University. The Central Government could also nominate such
  number of members, not exceeding thirty percent of the total
  members elected, under the above mentioned clauses (a) and
  (b) to the Central Council, from amongst persons having special
G knowledge or practical experience in respect of Indian
  medicine, in accordance with Section 3(1)(c) of the Act. These
  elected members are to elect their President, to be known as
  President of the Central Council and a Vice-President for each
  of the systems of medicine.

H
     K.B. NAGUR M.D. (AYU.) v. UNION OF INDIA              1031
             [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]

     2. This elected Central Council, so constituted, is to         A
discharge various functions and duties as contemplated under
the provisions of the Act, which include the grant of recognition
to medical colleges/courses, maintenance of education
standards, appointment of Inspectors, conduct and supervision
of examinations, and even the withdrawal of recognition, if         B
necessary. A register is to be maintained of the persons
possessing requisite qualification in the type of medicine which
the member is eligible to practice and who have been
registered by the State Board and which register has to be
updated with regard to the qualification attained by members        c
of the respective professions subsequently.

     3. As is evident from the above narrated provisions, the
Central Council discharges very significant and important
functions which would affect not only education in these three
systems but even their practice and treatment of thousands of       D
patients under these systems. The statute places an obligation
upon the Central Government to hold these elections and
ensure that the Central Council works smoothly and in
accordance with the provisions of the Act. Section 7 of the
Act refers to the tenure that an elected member is entitled to      E
enjoy, upon his election to the Central Council. This Section
deals with the term of the Office of the Presid~nt, Vice-
President and the members of the Central Council. The term
of office for all these persons is five years from the date of
election or nomination, as the case may be, or until a successor    F
has been duly elected or nominated, whichever is longer. The
latter part of this Section caused serious impediment in the
proper functioning of the Central Council primarily for two
reasons : (a) the Central Government did not take appropriate
steps to hold fresh elections and (b) the persons who were          G
elected and were interested in continuing as such, took
advantage of this provision and continued in office far beyond
five years as nobody was duly elected to replace them.

     4. The petitioner is an Ayurvedic doctor and holds the
                                                                    H
    1032    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2012] 1 S.C.R.


A degree of Ayurvedic Medicine, namely BAMS, has done his
  post graduation MD (Ayurvedic) degree subsequently. The
  petitioner claims that he held and still holds various offices in
  different organizations dealing with Ayurveda system of
  medicine. He claims to be the General Secretary of the
B Medical Association of India and member of the Governing
  Body of All India Ayurvedic Congress Committee, New Delhi
  and Indian Association of Blood Bank, Delhi. His aim is to
  ensure proper functioning of the Central Council, which has not
  been properly constituted and for which elections have not been
c held for the last 20-25 years. The petitioner, having failed to
  achieve any results at the hands of the Central Government or
  the Central Council, despite the fact that he was holding various
  offices directly connected with the functioning of the Central
  Council, filed a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of
D India, 1950 (hereafter, 'the Constitution') with the following
  prayers :

        "(a) An appropriate writ, order or direction directing the
        Union of India to hold elections to the Central Council of
        Indian Medicines and to constitute the same in accordance
E       with law;

        (b) further direct the Union of India to fill up the posts of
        any member who has completed five years within one
        month;
F
        (c) Strike down and quash the last clause in section 7 of
        Indian Medicine Central Council Act, 1970 reading as "or
        until his successor shall have been duly elected or
        nominated, whichever is longer" as contrary to the very Act,
        unconstitutional and undemocratic and violative of Articles
G       14 and 16 of the Constitution of India."

         5. Obvious from the above prayers is that the petitioner,
  firstly, wants a direction to the Union of India to discharge its
  statutory duty in terms of Section 3 of the Act, to fill up the
H membership of the Governing Body of the Central Council with
     K.B. NAGUR M.D. (AYU.) v. UNION OF INDIA               1033
             [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]

regard to the members who have completed the term of five A
years within the stipulated period and secondly, the striking
down of provision of Section 7 of the. Act as un~onstitutional,
undemocratic and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the
Constitution. It is the contention of the petitioner that the elected
members of the Central Council are adopting delaying tactics B
and even invoking the jurisdiction of the High Courts to stop the
holding of elections or the declaration of result of the elections
wherever held, notwithstanding the fact that there is an
alternative remedy available to them of filing an election petition.
The inaction on the part of the Government borders on                c
complicity and with the passage of time vested interests have
developed. There is a specific averment in the petition that
the Union of India and even the members of the Central Council
are not evincing any interest in the functioning of the Central
Council and a few unelected members, whose term expired
                                                                      0
long back, are squatting for an inordinately long period as being
erstwhiie elected members of the Central Council with the aid
of language of Section 7 of the Act. To contend that the delay
 is prejudicial to the working of the Central Council and is also
 opposed to the spirit of Section 3 of the Act, they rely on the E
decision of this Court in the case of Kishansing Tamar v.
 Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad and Others
((2006) 8 SCC 352], which held that the Election Commission
should take steps by following due process of law, but that too
 should be done in a timely manner and in no circumstances,
 shall such elections be delayed, so as to cause gross violation F
 of mandatory provisions contained in Articles 243-U of the
 Constitution. This buttresses their submission that timeliness
 in conduct of elections is mandatory.

    6. Lastly, challenge has been raised to the following portion    G
of Section 7 of the Act as unconstitutional, violative of Articles
14 and 16 of the Constitution:-

     "or until his successor shall have been duly elected or
     nominated, whichever is longer"
                                                                     H
    1034     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2012] 1 S.C.R.


A         7. First and foremost, we will deal with the contention of
     the provision being ultra vires of Articles 14 and 16 of the
     Constitution of India, raised on behalf of the petitioner. Article
     14 guarantees equality before law whereas Article 16 talks of
     equal opportunities in matters of public employment. This
B    concept of equality has to be patently infringed by a provision
     before that provision or any part thereof, can be declared as
     unconstitutional. The mere fact that there is some
     inconvenience arising from the language of a provision and its
    due implementation, cannot be a ground for declaring a
c   provision violative of fundamental rights. The impugned part
    of Section 7 of the Act is intended to ensure that there is no
    vacuum in the membership of the Central Council. The term,
    as prescribed under Section 7 of the Act, is five years.
    Elections are expected to be held within that period of five years
    to ensure that immediately after expiry of the specific term, the
0
    members holding the office quit and the newly elected members
    assume the charge. However, there can be situations where
    the elections in the entire country or in any part thereof cannot
    be held within the prescribed lime and for valid reasons. It
    may even be because of the situation that is created by the
E   people who are holding the office of the members of the Central
    Council for their personal ends. In such cases also, the
    elections may be delayed. It is the former situation which is
    intended to be protected by the challenged words of Section 7
    of the Act. The legislative intent is clear that there cannot be
F   a vacuum in the working of a statutory body and it cannot be
    rendered non-existent even for a short period by lapse of
    membership term or otherwise. Thus, to provide a safeguard
    for the interregnum period, of the earlier members of the
    Central Council vacating their office and newly elected
G   members assuming their office, the provisions of Section 7
    have been enacted by the Legislature.
       8. Still another aspect is that presumption of
  constitutionality is always in favour of a legislation, unless the
H contrary is shown. Furthermore, a Legislature. in enacting a
     K.B. NAGUR M.D. (AYU.) v. UNION OF INDIA                1035
             [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]

law, operates on a presumption, in law and practice, both, that        A
all other forums and entities constituted under one or other Act
would, in their functioning, act in accordance with law and
expeditiously. As it is a settled precept in the application of
economic principles, that all other things will remain the same
i.e., ceteris paribus, similarly, for the proper interpretation and    B
 examination of a provision of a statute, all bodies must be
 presumed to act effectively and in accordance with law.
    9. A statute is construed so as to make it effective and
operative as per the principle expressed in ut res valeat potius
quam pereat. There is, therefore, a presumption that the               C
Legislature does not exceed its jurisdiction and the burden of
establishing that the Act is not within the competence of
Legislature or that it has transgressed other constitutional
mandates, such as those relating to fundamental rights, is
always on the person who challenges its vagaries.                      D
     10. Here, we may also notice that there are two rules, of
most general application, in construing a written instrument
which are pari materia, applicable to statutes as well. First,
if possible, the written instrument shall be interpreted in light of
the above mechanism and secondly, such a meaning shall be              E
given to it, as may carry out and effectuate, to the fullest extent,
the intention of the parties or the framers of law. Of course,
such interpretation will be subject to the limitations of uniformity
in the meaning given to such expressions etc.
                                                                       F
     11. It is also a settled and deeply rooted canon of
constitutional jurisprudence, that in the process of constitutional
adjudication, the courts ought not to pass decisions on
questions of constitutionality unless such adjudication is
unavoidable. ln this sense, the courts have followed a policy          G
of strict necessity in disposing of a constitutio(lal issue. In
dealing with the issues of constitutionality, the courts are slow
to embark upon an unnecessary, wide or general enquiry and
should confine their decision as far as may be reasonably
practicable, within the narrow limits required on the facts of a
case. From the above discussion, it is clear that question of          H
     1036    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2012] 1 S.C.R.


A constitutionality of a provision is a matter which the courts
  would venture to examine only for valid, proper and sustainable
  grounds. We do not see that the provisions of Section 7 of
  the Act, or any part thereof, suffer from any legal infirmity,
  excessive legislative power or violate any legal right of any
B person, including the petitioner, much less a constitutional right. .
  Keeping the principle of strict necessity in mind, the courts do
  not venture to examine: the constitutional validity of a provision
  and even strike down such provisions, if they are constitutional
  and a Court does so only if the situation created by such
c legislation is irremediable or unredeemable. None of these
  circumstances exist in the present case.
        12. In fact, it is not necessary for us to deliberate on this
   issue at any greater length to notice that in a case under
   Regulation 23 of the Dental Council (Election) Regulations,
D 1952, where it was provided that the President shall, no later
   than 60 days before the date of occurrence of vacancy/
   vacancies, forward a notice by registered post to the Registrar
   of each University concerned, requesting him to hold an
  election not later than the date specified in the notice. These
E regulations are framed under the Dentists Act, 1948. Sections
  6 and 7 of that Act deal with the tenure and election of the
   President, Vice President and the Members of the Dental
  Council of India. Section 6(1) of the Dentists Act further
  provides that, subject to the provisions of that Section, an
F elected or a nominated member wciuld hold the office for a
  term of five years from the date of his election or nomination,
  or until his successor has been duly elected or nominated,
  whichever was longer. The language of that Section is pari
  materia with that of Section 7 of the Act. Challenge was raised
G to the constitutional validity of Section 6(1) of the Dentists Act,
  read with Regulation 23 of the Dental Council (Election)
  Regulations, 1952, framed thereunder. A Constitution Bench
  of this Court repelled the said challenge in the case of Dental
  Council of India and Anr. v. Dr. H.R. Prem Sachdeva & Ors.
H (1999) 8 SCC 471 and held as under:-
K.B. NAGUR M.D. (AYU.) v. UNION OF INDIA               1037
        [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]

"7. A conjoint reading of the various provisions of the Act A
and the Regulations referred to above go to show that the
term of office of the members of the Council is five years
from the date of the election or nomination, as the case
may be. Section 6(1 ), however, also provides that a
nominated or elected member, after the expiry of the term, B
may continue "until his successor has been duly elected
or nominated, whichever is longer". The expression
"whichever is longer" does suggest the continuation after
the expiry of the term. Can it, however, be construed to
 mean that if the authorities fail to act as per clauses (a) to c
 (f) of Section 3, the member concerned can continue to
 remain in office till perpetuity? In our opinion that could not
 be the intention of the law-makers. Regulation 23 (supra)
 does give an indication of what we have said above.

8. A reasonable interpretation of the provisions of the Act    D
and the Regulations would be that elections/nominations
to the Council should normally be held/made once in five
years. However, if for some valid reasons the elections
cannot be held during the term of five years, the same
should be held within a reasonable time thereafter and the     E
continuance in office of the elected/nominated members
should not go on for perpetuity. The continuance in office,
after the expiry of the term, should only be a stopgap
arrangement to avoid a vacuum. The obligation to
nominate/hold elections is of various authorities obliged to   F
elect/nominate members to the Council under clauses (a)
to (f). The Act and the Regulations are silent about the
period during which elections/nominations should be
made/held as also about thP. consequences of not holding
the elections or making nominations within the five-year       G
term or soon thereafter and this lacuna gives rise to
 unnecessary litigation. We hope that the authorities
 concerned shall take appropriate measures by amending
 the provisions of the statute or the Regulations or frame
                                                                H
    1038    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  (2012) 1 S.C.R.


A       appropriate rules so that the ambiguity regarding the
        maximum period, after the expiry of the five-year term
        during which election/nomination should be held/made is
        removed."

         13. For the reasons recorded above, we follow the view
8
    expressed by the Constitution Bench. Therefore, we have no
    hesitation in repelling the challenge raised by the petitioner
    regarding the constitutionality of Section 7 of the Act.

        14. Now, we shall proceed to deal with the other contention,
C that the Central Government is liable to be directed to hold the
  elections to the Central Council, as well as to promptly fill up
  the vacancies occurring in the Central Council due to efflux of
  time. This relief, to a large extent, has become infructuous.
  During the pendency of this writ petition, various orders had
D been passed by this Court, directing the Central Government
  as well as the Central Council to conduct elections in
  accordance with the provisions of the Act. On 3rd July, 2010,
  both the Central Council and the Union of India had agreed to
  complete the election process within a period of six months
E from that date. It took some more time to complete the
  process, but when the matter came up before us for hearing
  on 18th July, 2011, and on subsequent dates, we were
  informed that elections to the Central Council have been
  completed in all the States.
F       15. The election process in regard to Siddha system of
  medicine in the States of Andhra Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh
  and Jammu & Kashmir had not been completed, though elected
  candidates under the Unani and Ayurvedic systems had been
  notified. This was because there were no Siddha practitioners
G in those states. In all other States, the election process in
  regard to the three medicine systems i.e., Ayurveda, Unani and
  Siddha had been completed and the elected candidates duly
  notified.

H
     K.B. NAGUR M.D. (AYU.) v. UNION OF INDIA              1039
             [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]

     16. It was also pointed out before us that the Central        A
Government had not made its nomination in terms of Section
3(c) of the Act, under all the three systems of medicine.
      17. We may notice that this petition has been rendered
infructuous, though to a limited extent. Section 3 of the Act
imposes a statutory obligation upon the Central Government to B
hold elections to the Central Counc:I, in accordance with the
statutory provisions, which we have discussed above.
Furthermore, the Central Government is responsible for
nominating such number of mambers not exceeding 30 per
cent of the total members elected under Sections 3(1 )(a) and C
3(1)(b) of the Act to the Central Council. In other words. the
 Central Government has a major ro'e to play in the constitution,
 establishment and carrying on cf activities by the Central
 Council. This is an onerous and significant duty. We cannot
 understand any reason whatsoever for the Central Government D
 not to perform its statutory duties, particularly when it concerns
 with the systems of medicine catering to a cc:>untry of one billion
 people. The Court would take judicial notice of the fact that a
 large number of people depend upon these systems of
 medicine for treatment of various diseases. The standards of E
 education as well as the professionalism in practice of
 medicine in these fields is bound to suffer a setback, if the
 Central Government fails to exercise its powers and discharge
 its functions and duties in accordance with law. As already
 indicated, the Central Council exercises supervisory, F
 administrative and regulatory powers in relation to education
 and practice of all these three systems.            If the Central
 Government wishes to exercise such control over statutory
 bodies discharging important and diverse functions in the field
 of medicine, then it is undoubtedly expected of the Central G
 Government to discharge its functions and duties without failure
  and on time. It cannot justify its conduct in unduly delaying the
  proper constitution of such bodies in accordance with the
  provisions of the statutes and create faux pas which shall
  prejudicially affect all concerned, including the people at large.
                                                                     H
    1040     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2012) 1 S.C.R.


A      18. We are conscious of the fact that this Court has to
  adopt a purely judicial approach. The Constitution and the Rule
  of Law are the only supreme powers in any democracy and no
  higher duty rests upon this Court, than to enforce, by its decree,
  the will of the Legislature, as expressed in a statute, unless such
B statute is plainly and unmistakably in violation of the Constitution
  or Rule of Law.
         19. In the case of Kishansing Tamar (supra), this Court
   while dealing with the question of revision of electoral rolls by
   the ~tale Election Commission, noticed that the Election
C Commission shall complete the election before the expiration
   of the duration of five years' period as stipulated in Clause (9)
   of Article 243-U of the Constitution and not yield to situations
   that may be created by vested interests to postpone elections
   beyond the stipulated time. The State Election Commission
D shall take steps to prepare the electoral rolls, by following due
   process of law, but that too, should be done in a timely manner
   and in no circumstances, shall the elections be delayed so as
  to cause gross violation of the mandatory provisions contained
   in Article 243U of the Constitution. Further, while drawing a
E distinction between severe man-made calamities such as
  rioting, breakdown of law and order or natural calamities, which
  could distract the authorities from holding elections to the
  Municipality and other reasons for delay, this Court noted that
  the former are exceptional circumstances and under no other
F circumstance would the Election Commission be justified in
  delaying the process of election after consulting the State
  Government and other authorities. This Court laid significant
  emphasis on the independence of the State Election
  Commission and expected all other authorities to fully
G cooperate, and in default, granted liberty to the State Election
  Commission to approach the High Court and/or the Supreme
  Court, as the case may be for relief/directions. However, no
  final or time-bound directions were issued, in the petition above-
  referred, because election to the Ahmedabad Municipal
H Corporation in that case had already been held in the
  meanwhile.
    K.B. NAGUR M.D. (AYU.) v. UNION OF INDIA               1041
            [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.)

     20. Statutory or constitutional independence is a pre-          A
requisite to the proper functioning of such statutory bodies.
Their appropriate constitution, in accordance with the
provisions of the statute is mandatory. All concerned, including
the Central and State Governments have the onus to discharge
their duties and functions effectively and expeditiously, in         B
coordination and within the time specified. No Court can
permit any authority, much less the Central or State Government
to frustrate the statutory requirements of a provision and also
the very object of an Act.

•    21. The language of Section 7 of the Act is intended to         C
provide for a situation which is interregnum by its very
existence. Whatever be the methods adopted, by whichever
agency including the Government, to extend beyond a regular
term the tenure of members, would not only be impermissible
in law, but would also be illegal.                                   D

     22. As already referred above, the provisions of Section
3 are concerned with the constitution of the Central Council by
election and nomination. Section 4 requires the Central
Government to conduct elections in accordance with the Rules.        E
Section 7 provides the term of office. Once these provisions
are read together, it is clear that the legislative intent is that
election to the Central Council should be held within the period
of five years which is the term of office prescribed for the
elected and/or nominated members. However, if for any                F
reason, the elections are not held and newly elected members
do not join their office immediately after expiry of five years,
then the latter part of Section 7 comes into play. This is an
extra-ordinary situation that the elected members continue
beyond their prescribed term because the elections had not           G
been held and newly elected members cannot join the Central
Council. Though, no outer limit has been specified by the
Legislature for which such previously elected members can
continue in office, but this certainly cannot be for indefinite
period. For whatever reason, once recourse to this exceptional
                                                                     H
    1042     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2012] 1 S.C.R.


A situation becomes necessary, then the concept of reasonable
  time would come into play. It is a settled rule of statutory
  interpretation that wherever no specific time limit is prescribed,
  the concept of reasonable time shall hold the field for
  completing such an action. The courts in the process of
B interpretation can supply the lacuna, which would help to
  achieve the object of the Act and the legislative intent and make
  the provisions effective and operative.

        23. Neither the Government, nor the Central Council can
  abjure their obligation to complete the election process within
C five years, or in any case, within a reasonable time thereafter.
  Thus, in our considered opinion, a period of three months would
  be more than sufficient for completing the election process in
  accordance with law. This time limit shall operate only and as
  and when the Central Government and the Central Council
D jointly and severely are not able to hold the fresh elections within
  the term of office of the previously elected members, i.e., five
  years from the date on which the members first assumed office.

        24. The words of Section 7 of the Act are intended to
E operate in an extra-ordinary situation, as the normal course
  should be that the Central Government hold the elections within
  a period of five years from the date of notification of the elected
  candidates for the previous tenure. Even where recourse to
  this exceptional situation becomes necessary, even there, the
F concept of reasonable time would come into play, in a situation
  where no definite period has been prescribed by the
  Legislature itself. The courts can always supply such lacuna
  in the interpretation of provisions of a law so as to achieve the
  object of the Act particularly when such interpretation would be
G in consonance with the legislative object of the statute. Thus,
  in our considered opinion, a period of three months would be
  more than sufficient time for completing the election process,
  in the event of exceptional circumst(jnces and if the elections
  had not been commenced and completed within the period of
  previous tenure of five years, as is the requirement of law, and
H
     K.B. NAGUR M.D. (AYU.) v. UNION OF INDIA                1043
             [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]

the Government cannot abjure its obligation to do so within a         A
maximum period of three months.

     25. For the reasons afore-recorded, we partially allow this
Public Interest Litigation, with the above observations and the
following directions:-
                                                                      B
      (A)   Section 7 of the Indian Medicine Central Council
            Act, 1970 or any part thereof is neither ultra vires
            nor violative of Articles 14 and/or 16 of the
            Constitution of India.
                                                                      c
      (B)   We hereby mandate that the Central Government
            shall discharge all its duties and functions as
            contemplated under Sections 3, 4 and 7 of the
            Indian Medicine Central Council Act, 1970, without
            default, delay and within the required intervals. We      D
            make it clear that it is the obligation of the Central
            Government to hold election to the Central Council
            within the period of five years i.e., before expiry of
            , the term of office of the PresidenWice-President
            and Member of the Central Council, as provided
                                                                      E
            under Section 7 of the Act.

      (C)   In the eventuality of exceptional circumstances, if the
            Central Government is not able to hold elections
            within the period of the prescribed term, it shall
            complete the process within a reasonable time             F
            thereafter and in no case, exceeding three months
            from the date on which the term of the members in
            office expires.

      (D)   l'Jo elected Member, under any of the three systems       G
            of medicine, Ayurveda, Unani or Siddha shall hold
            the office of the President, Vice President or
            Member, beyond a period of three months from the
            expiry of their term.
                                                                      H
    1044     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2012] 1 S.C.R.


A          (E)   We direct the Secretary, Ministry of Health and
                 Family Welfare and the President of the Central
                 Council to circulate copies of this judgment, for
                 strict compliance by all concerned.

          26. During the pendency of this writ petition, another writ
8
    petition being Writ Petition (Civil) No. 249 of 2011, was filed
    with identical prayers. In view of this judgment, that writ petition
    has been rendered infructuous and is liable to be dismissed
    as such.

C      27. I.A. No. 8 is an application for intervention in the
  present writ petition, by one Dr. Vinod Kumar Chauhan. I.A.
  No. 9 is an application by the same party, with the prayer that
  the election to Central Council, held from the State of
  Uttarakhand be set aside and that fresh selection process be
D ordered. I.A. No. 9 is dismissed, with the liberty to that petitioner
  to approach the court of competent jurisdiction, seeking
  appropriate relief and in accordance with law.

       28. In view of the order of I.A. No. 9, I.A. No. 8 does not
E survive and is dismissed as such.

         29. Transfer Petition (Civil) No. 736 of 2011 is also
    dismissed, with liberty to the petitioner to pursue his remedy,
    if the cause of action survives, before the concerned High
    Court.
F
         30. All Transfer Petitions and Interlocutory Applications for
    impleadment are hereby dismissed. Other applications do not
    survive for consideration.

       31. Before we part with this judgment, we would like to
G place on record our appreciation for the valuable and able
  assistance rendered by the learned ASG and all counsel and
  assisting counsel appearing in the present PIL.

    R.P.                                        Matters disposed of.
H