K. ACHUTA BHATversusVEERAMANANI MANGA DEVI

A                             K. ACHUTA BHAT
                                         v.
                      VEERAMANANI MANGA DEVI

                             SEPTEMBER 23, 1988

B             [R.S. PA1HAK, CI. AND S. NATARAJAN, J.]

          Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Con-
    trol Act, 1960. Section JO-Tenant-Eviction on ground of sub-lett-
    ing-Transfer of managing rights of the business and transfer of
    business in toto with right to occupy the leased premises-Ascertain-
c · mentof.
          The appellant had taken the demised premises on lease in 1953 for
    running a hotel. In August 1969 the hotel came to be run by the second
    respondent. Thereupon, the landlady-1st respondent terminated the
D tenancy as she had reasons to believe that the appellant had either
    transferred his rights under the lease or sublet the ·premises. On the
    appellant refusing to vacate, the first respondent filed petition under
    section fl) ol' the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction)
    Control Act, 1960 seeking eviction on the ground of sub-letting. Tlie
    Rent Controller ordered eviction. The appeals before the Appellate
IF. Authority failed. The High Court, in revision, affirmed the finding of
    sub-letting.                              ·

           Before this Court, it was contended on I.he basis of the terms of the
     agreement entered into between the appellant and the second respon-
     dent, that the appellant transferred only the management rights of the
JI   hotel and had retained his rights under the lease. It was urged that the
     courts must look at the dominant intention of the parties. On the other
     hand, the first respondent contended that the true nature of the trans-
     action was the handing over of the hotel on a permanent basis together
     with the tenancy rights of the appellant.

G          Dismissing the appeal, it was,                                          Ii
        HELD: (1) On a conspectus of all the terms of the agreement the
  High Court was fully justified in taking the view that the appellant and
  the second respondent had used all the ingenuity at their command to
  camouflage the real nature of the transaction and made it appear that
H there was only a transfer of the managing right• ofthe business and not
                                         200
                . ,._.,:




                           K A. BHAT v. VEERAMANANI                   201

a transfer of the business in toto together with the right to occupy the     A
leased premises. [208G-H]                                      ·

    (2) It was patent that the burden of paying the rent had been
passed on to the second respondent and this could occur only if the
premises had been sublet to him. 12088]
                                                                             B
      (3) Though the agreement was initially for 11 months, the
renewal clause would enable its extension for any length of time
which was binding upon the heirs, successors, and assigns of the
parties. [207G] .

     (4) The agreement conferred proprietary rights on the second
respondent over the hotel business inasmuch as he was made the sole          c
authority to appoint the staff as well as terminate their services and
empowered him to run the business on his own account and res-
ponsibility. {2088-C]

      (5) Besides the agreement, the manner in which the second
                                                                             D
respondent had been conducting the business would also show that he
was not a transferee .of the managing rights alone but was a transferee of
the business together with the appellant's interest in the leased premises
also. [209C I

     Dwarka Prasad v. Dwarka .Das Barar, [1976] .I SCR 277; Md.
                                                                             E
Salim v. Ma: Ali, [1987] 4 SCC 270, distinguished.

    M. Rodgers v. N. Prakash Rao Naidu, [1969] 1 MLJ 352 and
Bhagwan Das v. S. Rajeev Singh, [1971] 3 S.C.C. 852, referred to.

      (6) At the end of the arguments In the case It was represented at
                                                                             F
the Bar that the second respondent has since vacated the premises and
handed over the business to the appellant and that the appellant himself
was now running the hotel through his son. The changed circumstances
could not, In the Court's opinion, affect the rights of the first respon-
dent In any manner to have the appellant evicted on the ground of
subletting. [211C-DJ
                                                                             G
      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICllON: Civil Appeal No. 2468
of 1982.

     From the Judgment and Order dated 8.3.1982 of the High Court
of Andhra Pradesh in C.R.P. Nos. 3726, 3727, 3910 and 4883 of 1979.          H
       202          SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [ 1988] Supp. 3 S.C.R.

             Dr. Y.S. Chitale and G. Narasimhulu for the Appellant.
 A
            T.S. Krishnamurti Iyer, Krishan Kumar and Rajeshwar Rao for
       the Respondents.

             The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
 B
             NATARAJAN, J. This appeal by special leave by a tenant arises
       out of a common judgment rendered by l the High Court of Andhra
       Pradesh in four Civil Writ Petitions. Two of the Revision Petitioins
       were filed by the appellant herein and the other two were filed by one
       Narsimha Murthy, the second respondent herein. By a commonjudg-
       ment the High Court dismissed all the four revision Petitions. While
c      Narsimha Murthy has not preferred any appeal the appellant has filed
       this appeal by special leave to question the legality and propriety of the
       decree for eviction passed against him on the ground he had
       unauthorisedly sublet the leased premises to the second respondent tor
       running a hotel.
D
              Originally the building bearing door nos. 7-2-606, 607, 617 and
       618 (old door No. 2540) Rashtrapati Road, Secunderabad belonged to
       one Bhima Rao. The appellant took the ground floor of the premises
       on lease in the year 1953 from the said Bhima Rao on a monthly rent of
       Rs.250 for running a hotel in the name and style of Sharada Bhavan. In
·f!'   or about September 1967 Bhima Rao conveyed the premises by means
       of a Deed of Gift to his daughter Manga Devi, the first respondent
       herein and the appellant duly attorned his tenancy and was paying her
       the rent. After A11gust 1969 the· hotel came to be run by the second
       respondent instead of the appellant. As the first respondent had
       reasons to believe that the appellant had either transferred his rights
F      under the· lease or sublet the leased premises to the second respon-
       dent, she terminated the tenancy by means of a notice with effect from
       31st January, 1971 and called upon the appellant to surrender posses-
       sion thereafter. The appellant refused to vacate and sent a reply refut-
       ing the allegations contained in the notice issued to him. This led to the
       first respondent filing a petition under Section 10 of the Andhra
G      Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 (for
       short 'the Act' hereafter) to seek the eviction of the appellant and the
       second respondent on three grounds viz. (1) wilful default in payment
       of rent, (2) unauthorised subletting and (3) causing waste to the pro-
       perty. The Rent Controller ordered eviction on the second and third
       grounds: The appellant and the second respondent preferred seperate
H      appeals to the Appellate Authority and both the appeals were dismis-
                  K.A. BHAT v. VEERAMANANI·(NATARAJAN, J.J                 203

     seci. Thereafter the two affected parties filed two revisions each
                                                                                  A
     against the dismissal of the appeals and the High Court clubbed all the
     four revisions and rendered a common judgment dismissing all the
     revision petitions. The High Court, however, affirmed the finding of
     the courts below only on the ground of sub-letting and consequently,
     the sole question for consideration in this appeal is whether the High
     Court has erred in law in upholding the order for eviction passed by         B
     the first two Courts on the ground of sub-letting.

            Dr. ·Chitale, learned counsel for the appellant took us through
     the terms of the agreement Exhibit R-14 entered into between the
     appellant and the second respondent as well as the relevant portions of
     the judgments of the Courts below and the High Court and argued that
     this was a case where the appellant had only transferred the managing
                                                                                  c
     rights of the hotel to the second respondent and hence there was no
     basis or material for the Rent Controller or the Appellate Court to
     hold that the appellant had sublet the leased premises to the second
     respondent and therefore the High Court too was in error in confirm·
     ing the order of eviction passed agaip.st the appellant and the second       D
     respondent. The learned counsel further contended that neither the
      agreement nor the conduct of the parties afforded any ground for
     taking the view that the appellant had transferred his rights under the
     lease or had sublet the premises to the second respondent, and on the
     other .blind there was adequate material to show that the appellant had
     retained his rights in the leased premises notwithstanding his placing       E
     the hotel business In the hands of the second respondent. To sub·
     stantiate.-these contentions Dr. Chitale laid stress on certain clauses'in
     the agreement which seek to emphasise that the transfer of rights
     pertained to the business alone and not the leasehold rights of the
     appellant in the _leased premises. The clauses referred to are as
     follows. Clause 2 sets out that the first party (the appellant) "has         F
     agreed to allow the second party (the second respondent) to manage
.J   the said Sharada Bhawan with all the furniture etc.". Clause 7
i    interdicts the second party from permitting "the use of the premises
'I   for any purpose other than that for which it is being used viz. as a
     vegetarian restaurant" without the consent in writing of the first party.
     Clause 8 enjoins the second party to "maintain the standard and repu·        G
     tation which the said business has earned and acquired". Clause 9
     prohibits the second party from assigning or underletting or otherwise
     parting with the business without the permission in writing of the first
     party. Clause 11 stipulates that the second party shall observe all the
     rules and regulations governing the licences granted to the first party
     by the Municipality, Police etc. and further sets out that if any breach
     204         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [1988] Supp. 3 S.C.R.

     is committed by the second party he should indemnify the first party.
A
     Under Clause 13 the first party has reserved a right to inspect the
     business at all reasonable times to satisfy himseif that the second party
     was fulfilling the conditions set out in the agreement. Clause 15 pro-
     vides that on the expiry of the agreement the second party should
     "peacefully and quietly surrender and hand over possession of the
B    business to the first party together with all the furniture, fixtures,
     utensils etc." Clauses 16 and 17 are of significance for both parties
     and, therefore, they are extracted in full:

                 "Clause 16-The lease of the premises wherein the said
                 business is being run, shall continue to be enjoyed·exclu-
                 sively by the first party at all times, and first party shall be
c                liable to pay the monthly rent of Rs.250 or any other
                 enhanced rent that may be agreed upon between the first
                 party and the landlord and in such event the second party
                 shall pay to the first party the difference between the pre-
                 sent rent of Rs.250 and the enhanced rent along with the
                 monthly amounts payable vide clause (2) hereof, and shall
                 observe faithfully all terms and conditions of the agreement
                 of tenancy between the first party and the owner of the
                 premises. It is clearly understood and agreed this agree-
                 ment is only with respect to the running of·the said business
                 on a "MUNAFA" basis to the second party and not sublet-
E                ting or underletting of the premises housing the said
                 business.

                 Clause 17-The essence of this agreement is that the
                 second party shall run the said business on his own account
                 making use of the existing property such as furniture, fix-
F                ture, etc. which continue to belong to the first party with-
                 out any proprietory rights or interest to the second party on
                 any of the said property. It is distinctly understood and
                 agreed between the parties here to that the second party
                 shall not be entitled to obtain any credit or accommodation
                 from any third party on t~ security of the said business.
Ci               The parties hereto agree that the second party shall carry
                 on the said business on his own account and responsibility
                 and the first party shall not be liable in any manner or to
                 any extent in respect of the second party's liabilities arising
                 out of his running the said business or otherwise."

H    Placing reliance on these clauses it was seriously canvassed on behalf
             K.A. BHAT v. VEERAMANANI [NATARAJAN, J.]                205

of the appellant that the agreement was explicit in its terms and tnere
                                                                            A
was no ambiguity and as per the terms the transfer effected was only
the business of running the hotel and not the appellant's interest in the
leased property and no sub-tenancy was created in favour of the
second respondent.

      The appellant's counsel urged that in almost identical cir-           B
cumstances this Court has held in Md. Salim v. Md. Ali, [1987] 4 SCC
270 that the transfer effected was only the right to manage the business
run by the lessee and there was no transfer of any interest of the lessee
In the business premises. It was the further contention of Dr. Chitale
thai in all such cases the Courts must look to the dominant intention of
the parties while effecting the transfer to find out whether the transfer
amounted to a sub-letting of the leased premises. A reference was           c
made to the decision in Dwarka Prasad v. Dwarka Das Saraf, [1976] 1
SCR 277 in this behalf. ·

       Disputing the contention• of Dr. Chi tale Mr. Krishnamurthy
Iyer, learned counse! appearing for the first respondent, stated that       D
the intention of the parties and the true nature of the transaction
 between them was the handing over of the hotel on a permanent basis
to the second respondent together with the tenancy rights of the appel-
lant. Mr. Iyer said .-that for obvious reasons the parties had to
camouflage the real nature of the transaction, by making it appear that
the managing rights of the business alone were transferred but the          E
truth could not be suppressed and hence the lower courts had rightly
held that the transfer had all the trappings of sub-letting and the ap-
pellant was therefore liable for eviction. It was urged that. in view of
the concurrent findings rendered against the appellant by the Rent
Controller and the Appellate Authority, the High Court could -have
very well declined to go into the merits of the findings without re-        F
appraisal of the evidence but even so the High Court had given the ·
appellant the indulgence of a detailed examination of the evidence for
itself and has after such exercise confirmed the findings of the Courts
below and as such, there is no need or _justification for any further
examination the contentions of the appellant. The learned counsel
submitted that if neverthele<s the case of tlte apr,ellant has to be con-   G
 s!Mre~ once ev_er again, then the agreement. though sub.tly worded,
 provided adequate ·material to show that the transfer of the business
had brought about a subletting of the premises also. The manner in
which the hotel had been run by the second respondent, it was added,
afforded, additional material to orove the factnm of sub-letting of the
yremises. Mr. Krishnamurthy Iyer drew our attention to severallierms        H
        206         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [1988] Supp. 3 S.C.R.

A in the agreement, to which we shall advert to in due course, to sub-
  stantiate his contentions. The learned counsel also placed for our con-
  sideration a decision of Alagiriswamy, J., as he. then was, in
  M. Rodgers v. Prakash Rao Naidu, [1969] 1 MU 352 and of this court
  in Bhagwan Das v. Rajeev Singh, [1971] 3 S.C.C. 852.

B              Since both the parties lay emphasis upon the terms of th_e agree-
        ment to support their respective contentions, it is necessary that we
        look .into the terms of the agreement for ourselves. The preamble sets
        out that the terms "first ·party" and "second party", cannoting the
        appe'Hant and the second respondent, will wherever the context
        permits include .their heirs, successors, administrators and assigns. The
C       agreement would say that the first party, as· the owner of the vegeta-
        ri:an irestaurant "Sharada Bhawan" has agreed to allow the second
        party to manage the said hotel with all the furniture etc. The agree-
        ment is for a peifod of eleven months from the 1st day of September
         1969 .and thereafter the same could be renewed or extended for any
        .further period by mutual consent except in the.event of the first party
D       being -evicted, in which event the second party woul.d not be entitled to
        any compensation for any loss or damage caused to him by reason of
        the .eviction. Clause 2 provides that "in consideration of obtaining on
                                                                                    f
                                                                                    .
        hire on munafa basis of the business together with all the furniture etc.
        the second party should pay to the first party a sum of Rs. 750 per
        month during the period of first eleven months and thereafter at the
E       rate of Rs.900 per month during the subsequent renewed or extended
        period." As per Clause 3 the second party should pay all taxes, fees,
        rates and other statutory outgoings in respect of the business and if any
        loss is caused to the first party by non payment, the latter was entitled
        to recover all such charges from the second party and would also be
         entitled to cancel or terminate the agreement forthwith. According to
,F      Clause 4 the second party was responsible for not only payment of all
        expenses and charges relating to the running of the business but also
        for carrying out "repairs to business premises, painting, colour wash,          I
        etc. and the like". The same Clause empowers the second party "to               ,
        appoint, dismiss, promote or otherwise deal with all members of the         ~·c
        staff and employees of all categories" and makes him liable "for all
<G      claims and demands relating to the period covered by the agreement."
        Cl.a use,7 prohibits the second party from using tlie premises for any
        purpose other than for running a vegetarian restaurant without the
        consent of the first ·party. Clause 9 interdicts the second party from
        assigning or under-letting or otherwise parting with the business with-
        out the written permission of the first party. Clause 13 stipulates that
ill!'   the second party should allow the first party to inspect the business at
   ' -~'



             K.A. BHAT v. VEERAMANANI [NATARAJAN, J.)                 207 •

all reasonable times to satisfy himself that the second party was fui-        A
filling the conditions governing the agreement. Clause 15 sets out that
"the second party shall on the expiry of the agreement peacefully and
quietly surrender and hand over possession of the said business to the
first party with all the furniture and fixtures, utensils, etc." Clause 16
which has already been extracted states that the tease of the premises
shall continue to be enjoyed exclusively by the first party at all times,     B
and the first party shall be liable to pay the monthly rent of Rs.250 pr
any other enhanced rate that may be agreed upon between thefirst
party and the landlord and in such an event the second party shall pay
to the first party the difference between the present rent of Rs.250 and
the enhance rent along with the monthly amounts payable by him.
There is an explanatory clause stating that the agreement is only with        C
respect to the running .of the business and not to any subletting or
underletting of the premises. Clause 17 stipulates that the business was
to be run by the second party on his own account making use of the
existing property such as furniture, fixture etc. belonging to the first
party without any proprietory rights or interest and that the second
party Was not entitled to obtain any credit or accommodation from any         D
third party on the security of the business and that he was to run the
business on his own account and responsibility. Clause 18 makes the
second respondent solely responsible for any consequences arising out
of non-compliance with the orders passed liy the competent authorltiP<
or for contravention of any of the provisions of the laws in f01 cc.
Clauses 19 and 20 provide for the second respondent furnishing a              E
cash security of Rs.5,000 and the first respondent being entitled to
reimburse himself from out of the deposit amount any loss or damages
suffered by him on account of any default committed by the second
party.

      On a reading of the various provisions of the agreement we are F
unable to accept the contentions of the appellant that what was trans-
ferred was only the hotel business and not the appellant's interest in
the leased premises as a lessee. Though the agreement is initially for a
period of 11 months the renewal clause would enable the parties to go
on extending the lease for any length of time and as per the preamble,
such extensions of lease would be binding upon the heirs, successors, G
administrators and assigns of both parties. The appellant had handed
over the furniture, utensils etc. to the second respondent and received
a sum of Rs.5,000 as security and he was entitled to reimburse himself
for any loss or damage caused to the furniture and the utensils. Though
the agreement states that the appellant will continue to be t!1e lessee of
the property it is obvious that the rent of Rs.250 per month was really H
    208         SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [1988] Supp. 3 S.CR.

  to be paid by the second respondent through the appellant. There is a
  specific provision in Clause 16 that in the event of the landlord enhanc·
  ing the rent, the second respondent should pay "the difference bet·
  ween the present rent of Rs.250 and the enhanced rent along with the
  monthly amounts payable as per clause 2." It is therefore patent that
  the burden of paying the rent has been passed on to the second respon-
B dent  and this can occur only if the premises had been sublet to him.
  The agreement confers proprietory rights on the second respondent
  over the hotel business inasmuch as he is made the sole authority to
  appoint the staff as well as terminate their services and also take disci·
  plinary action against them. He is empowered to run the business on
  his own, account and responsibility so long as he pays the appellant a
  sum of Rs. 750 per month for the first eleven months and thereafter a
c sum of Rs.900 per month. All the taxes, fees, rates and other statutory
  outgoings are to be paid by the second respondent himself. Even the
  cost of effecting repairs to the business premises and painting and
  colour washing etc. are to be borne by him alone. Clauses 7 .and
  although appearing to interdict the second respondent from changing
D the user ot the premises or from assigning or subletting the business,
  really permit him to do so, if he obtains the consent or permission in
  writing of the appellant. If what was transferred to the second respon·
  dent was only the right to manage the hotel business, it is incom·
  prehensible that he would be called upon to effect repairs to the leased
  premises or "IO undertake painting, colour washing etc. at his own
B expense. Similarly the question of the second respondent changing the
  user of the premises or assigning ·or subletting or parting with the
  business with the written, conse.nt or the appellant will not arise if his
  rights under the agreement were restricted to the management of the
  business alone. Clause 15 is curiously worded because it speaks about
  the second respondent "peacefully and quietly surrendeiing and hand-
F ing over possession of the business to the first party with all the furni·
  ture, fixtures, utensils etc." The clause would show that what was
  really meant was surrendering the possession of the building but in           !
  order to conceal matters, the word 'business' has been used in the
  place of 'building'.

G         On a conspectus of all the terms of the agreement we feel that the    \
    High Court was fully justified in taking the view that the appellant and
    the second respo.ndent had used all the ingenuity at their command to
    camaflouge the real nature of the transaction and make it appear that
    there was only a transfer of the managing rights of .the business and not
    a transfer of the business in toto together with the right to occupy the
    leased premises The clauses on which the appellant's counsel placed
             K.A. BHAT v. VEERAMANANI [NATARAJAN, J.]                   209

reliance to project the appellant's case are only make-beueve clauses A
which have been introduced with a design and purpose viz. to conceal
the real nature of the contract so that the landlord may not seek the
eviction of the appellant on the ground of subletting the premises. In
spite of the introduction of a few cleverly worded clauses the other
clauses are self revealing and go to show that the parties were fully·
aware of the vulnerability of their action and the risk of eviction ensu- B
ing therefrom. It is on account of such awareness the appellant has
carefully provided in the agreement that in the event of his being
evicted from the premises he will not be liable to pay any compensa-
tion for any loss or aamage resultfo.g to the second respond~nt.

      Besides the agreement, the manner in which the second respon-
dent had been conducting the business would also show that he was not
                                                                          c
a transferee of the managing rights alone but he was a transferee of the
business together with the appellant's interest in the leased premises
also. The business turnover increased from Rs.200 to 250 per day to
Rs.700 to 800 per day. The second respondent was assessed to income
tax and sales tax in his own name as the proprietor of Sharada Bhawan D
and not as the manager of the hotel. He was recognised as the
proprietor of the hotel and admitted to membership of the .fiotel
Owner's Association. He exercised absolute control over the business.
and over the members of the staff and was the sole authority to appoint
them or terminate their services or take disciplinary action against
them. He was not bound to render accounts to the appellant or share E
with him the profits or losses of the business. He became solely
responsible to bear all the expenses and to pay all the taxes, public
charges etc. Thus even the conduct of the parties afford material to
conclude that what was transferred to the second respondent was much
more than the right to run the hotel business for a limited period. It is
therefore futile for the appellant to say he had not parted with his F
interests in the leased premises to the second respondent.

       As regards the decisions cited by Dr. Chi tale we do not think
that either of them can advance the appellant'S case m any manner. In
Md. Salim v: Md. Ali (supra) the facts were perceptibly different. That
was also a case where the right of management of a shop run by a               G
tenant was conferred on one Md. Salim and it was agreed between the
parties that from out of the amount paid by Md. Salim, the lessee was
to pay the rent to the landlord. The agreement, however, expressly
stated that the transferer will remain the proprietor of the business,
and that the licence for the business should stand in his name and that
after ',a period of two years the transferee will restore tne business•aiong   H
     210         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [1988] Supp. 3 S.C.R.

     with the articles in good condition to the transferor. The transfer
A
     agreement had been attested by the landlord himself. It was on these
     facts it was decided in that case that there was no transfer of interest in
     the business premises and what was transferred was only the right to
     manage the business. In the present case the ·agreement ,provides for
     the second respondent being allowed to run the business for any length
B    of time as his own proprietory concern and to have all the benefits
     exclusively for himself. In the other case of Dwarka Prasad (supra) the
     court dealt with the application of the "dominant intention" test with
     reference to the facts of that case. The question in there was whether a
     cin.ema theatre equipped with projectors and other fittings and ready
     to be launched as an enterainment house was "accommodation", as
     defined in Section 2(1)(d) of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent
c    ~nd Evicti0n Act, 1947, and if so, whether the Act "barricades evic-
     tion by the landlord because the premises let constitutes an accommo-
     dation''. It was in that context the Court observed that where the lease
      is composite and has a plurality of purpose the decisive test is a domin-
      ant purpose of the demise. There is no occasion in this case for the test
[)    of 'dominant intention' being applied because there was and there can
      be no lease of the managing rights of the hotel business as such and on
      the contrary what was transferred was an outright transfer of the hotel
      together with the furniture, equipment etc. as well as the lease-hold
      right of the erstwhile hotelier in the leased premises. The facts of this
      case bear a close similarity to the facts noticed in Bhagwan Das v.
E     S. Rajdev Singh, (supra). That was a case where the premises let out to
      one Usha Sales was put under ihe occupation of one Bhagwan Das and
     when the landlord sought the eviction of the tenant on the ground of
     sub-letting the plea raised was that Bhagwan Das had been appointed
     .as an agent by Usha Sales for displaying and selling the project of
      U~ha Sales and Bhagwan Das was in the occupation of tlie premises on
F    his own1Jehalf for the purposes of his business as an agent. The Court,
     after perusing the agreement entered into between Usha Sales and
     Bhagwan Das held that the appellant was given complete control and
     supervision of the premises, and that the agreement was a curious
     mixture of inconsistencies and was plainly a clumsy attempt to
     camouflage the sub tenancy which was intended to be created thereby.
G    The facts of the present case, have a striking similarity to the facts
     noticed in that case and, therefore, the same conclusion should be
     reached in this case also. Besides the above said decision Mr. Iyer
     referred us to a decision of the Madras High Court in M. Rodgers v. N.
     Prakash Rao Naidu, (supra) where a tenant who was running a print-
     ing press in a leased building stopped the business and the manager
H    began running the press as the lessee of the machinery with<;mt the
-i               K.A. BHAT v. VEERAMANANI INATARAJAN, J.J                 211

     tenant having any share in the business. On the landlord sueing the A
     tenant for eviction on the ground of subletting, the High Court held
     that since the machinery cannot be run unless it is placed in the pre-
     mises where it is situated, the lessee of the machinery would get the
     advantage of the use of the business premises also and as such the lease
     amount stipulated for the lease of the machinery would also include
     the lease amount payable for the building and hence the transaction
                                                                              B
     would clearly amount to the lessee subletting the building simul-
     taneously with the leasing out of the. machinery. The present case
     warrants the same view being taken especially in the light of the reci-
     tals in the agreement which stipulate that the amount payable by the
     second respondent would comprise in it the rent payable by the appel-
     lant landlord for the leased premises.                                   c
          At the end of the arguments it was represented at the bar thar the
     second respondent has since vacated the premises and handed over the
     business to the appellant and that the appellant himself is now running
     the hotel throu_gh his son. We do not think.the changed circumstances
     can affect the rights of the first respondent in any manner to have the      D
     appellant evicted on the ground of subletting.

           In the light of our conclusions, the appeal fails and is. dismissed.
     However, having regard to the fact that the appellant would require
     some time to find an alternate place to shift his hotel, he is granted six
     month's time from today to vacate the premises subject to his filing an      E
     undertaking within four weeks from today on the usual terms. There
     will be no order as to costs.

     R.S.S.                                                 Appeal dismissed.