Holding

The tenants were not wilful defaulters; the proviso to Section 10 applied, the landlord waived his Section 11 rights, and the eviction proceedings must be dismissed.

Summary

The appellants, tenants, owed rent for July‑December 1988 and, after a grievance about missing receipts, sent a bank draft covering the full arrears on 2 February 1989, before the landlords filed an eviction petition on 6 February 1989 alleging wilful default under Section 10(2)(i) of the Andhra Pradesh Building (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960. The Supreme Court held that the tenants had not committed wilful default because the arrears were tendered and realised before the eviction proceedings commenced, invoking the proviso to Section 10 which requires a reasonable time to pay when default is not wilful. Consequently, the eviction proceedings became infructuous and the landlord’s statutory right under Section 11 to stop proceedings was deemed waived. The Court set aside the earlier eviction order and dismissed the proceedings. The appeal was allowed.

Issues considered

Whether the tenants were wilful defaulters in payment of rent under Section 10(2)(i) of the Act.
Whether the proviso to Section 10 applies when the tenant has tendered full arrears before the eviction petition is filed.
Whether the landlord’s right under Section 11(1) and 11(4) to stop further proceedings was waived by accepting the payment.
Whether the eviction proceedings should be dismissed on the basis of the above.

Subjects

evictionwilful defaultrent arrearsSection 10Section 11landlord-tenantwaiverprovisorent receipt

Judgment

A K.A. RAMESH AND ORS.
v.
SMT. SUSHEELA BAI AND ORS.

FEBRUARY 13,1998

B [S.B. MAJMUDAR AND S.P. KURDUKAR, JJ.]

Andhra Pradesh Building (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act,
1960:

C Section 10(2)(i)-Proviso-Section I I-Applicability of

Rent-Wilful default in payment of -Decree passed for-Validity a/-
Arrears of rent-Tenant's grievance that receipts not issued for rent paid-
Telegram sent by tenant to landlord for issue of receipts-Landlord's denial-
D Thereafter tenant sent a bank draft for the entire arrears-Draft sent before ,._
filing of eviction petition-Accepted and realised by landlord during the
eviction proceedings-Held there was no default in payment of rent much
less wilfal default-Eviction proceedings became infructuous and liable to
be dismissed.

E Rent-Failure to pay during pendency of proceedings-Right of
landlord to get further proceedings stopped-Held on facts the landlord
waived his right to enforce his statutory right under sections 11 (/)
and (4).

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.826of1998.
F
From the Judgment and Order dated 19.8.97 of the Andhra Pardesh High
Court in CRP I 028 of 1997.

K. Ramakrishna Reddy, P.S. Narasimha and V.G. Pragasam for the
Appellants.
G
Subodh Markandaya, Ashok Kumar Sharma, Alok Singh and Mrs. Chitra
Markandaya for the Respondents.

The following Order of the Court was delivered :
H Leave granted.
892
K.A. RAMESH v. SUSHEELA BAI 893
With the consent of learned counsel for the parties the appeal was A
finally heard today and is being disposed of by this order.
.--<

·-· The appellants are the tenants in the premises situated at Secunderabad
in Andhra Pradesh. Provisions of A.P. Building (Lease, Rent & Eviction)
Control Act, 1960 ['the Act' for short] govern the relationship between the

., appellants tenants and the respondent-landlords .

The short question is whether the appellant-tenants were wilful
defaulters in payment of rent on which ground the decree for possession has
B

been passed by the courts below under Section 10 of the Act. The arrears
ofrent were from July 1988 to Dec;_ember 1988. The appellants sent a telegram
dated 17th December 1988 to the respondent-landlords calling upon them to c
issue receipts for the rent which they had already paid apprehending that the

-
respondent many make out a case for default in payment of rent for these
relevant months. The landlords responded by giving reply dated 19th December
1988 stating that the rent was not paid and it was not correct to say that the
receipts were not issued despite payment of rent for the relevant months. D
--< Under these circumstances the appellant sent a bank draft for the entire
_,
arrears on 02nd February 1989. Presumably having knowledge that the bank
draft was being sent to them, the respondents filed an Eviction Petition on
06th February 1989 and it appears that on the next date the bank draft reached
them. They got it encased. On the ground that the appellants had committed
wilful default in payment of rent for the relevant months the eviction proceedings E
., were prosecuted by the respondents before the authority. These eviction
proceedings were under sub-section (2) (i) of Section 10 of the Act. The said
provision reads as under:

', "IO. Eviction of tenants:-
F
:r (1)................

(2) A landlord who seeks to evict his tenant shall apply to the
Controller for a direction in that behalf. If the Controller, after giving
the tenant a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the
application, is satisfied- G
(i) that the tenant nor paid or tendered the rent due by him in respect
./'
J- of the building within fifteen days after the expiry of the time fixed in
the agreement of tenancy with his landlord or in the absence of any
such agreement, by the last day of the month next following that for
which the rent is payable; or H
894 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] l S.C.R.

A (ii) ............. ..

(iii) ............ ..

(iv).............. .
..
(v) ............... .
B
(vi) ............. ..

The Controller shall make an order directing the tenant to put the
landlord in possession of the building and if the Controller is not so
satisfied, he shall make an order rejecting the application: ........... .
c There is a proviso to the said Section which reads as under:
''Provided that in any case falling under clause (i), if the Controller
is satisfied that the tenant's default to pay or tender the rent was not
willful, he may, notwithstanding anything in Section 11, give the
tenant a reasonable time, not exceeding fifteen days, to pay or tender
D
the rent due by him to the landlord up to the date of such payment
or tender and so such payment or tender, the application shall be
rejected."

It is obvious that if the evidence Jed before the Controller shows that
E the tenant had not committed wilful default in payment of rent during the
relevant time for which grievance is made in the Eviction Petition moved by
the landlord, then despite what is stated in Section 11 a reasonable time has
to be given to the tenant to pay up the amount. On the facts of the present
case, we fail to appreciate how it could be said that the said proviso was not
attracted. it has to be seen that even months before the filing of the Eviction
F Petition the tenants had made a grievance by sending a telegram to the
respondents on 17th December 1988 that though the rent was paid for those
months receipts were not issued. Even that apart, by sending a bank draft on
02nd February 1989 when there was no litigation between the parties, full
payment of arrears was tendered. That was accepted and realised pending the
G eviction proceedings. This clearly shows that there was no default at all much
less wilful default on the part of the tenant in paying the rent for the months
from July 1988 to December 1988. Consequently, the eviction proceedings
were not required to be proceeded any further as the aforesaid proviso shows
that even if the rent was not paid, there was a locus penintentiae with the
appel~ant-tenants to get reasonable time not exceeding fifteen days for paying
H up the arrears by showing that default was not wilful and if during the time
K.A. RAMESH v. SUSHEELA BAI 895
granted by the court the default was made good, the application for possession, A
--<
in that eventually, has to be rejected. In the present case as the bank draft
dated 02nd February 1989 for the entire arrears sent prior to the filing of the
proceedings, was already got encased by the respondent-landlords, the
proviso got clearly complied with and there remained no occasion for the
Controller to again ask the appellants to pay the very same amount twice over.
-~
.... Therefore, the application was required to be summarily rejected. However, it B
was proceeded further and resulted in eviction order which was challenged
in appeal unsuccessfully and further before the High Court in revision, that
too uns,uccessfully and that is how the appellants are before us.

Once.the aforesaid conclusion is reached, on the facts of this case, it
must be held that the eviction proceedings are liable to be dismissed. However,
c
learned counsel for the respondents vehemently contended that even pending
these proceedings there was default on the part of the tenants as they had
not paid rent during the pendency of these proceedings. He heavily relied on
sub-section (I) and (2) of Section 11 of the Act, which read as under:.
-< D
"11. Payment or deposit of rent during the pendency of proceedings
of eviction :- (I) No tenant against whom an application for eviction
has been made by a landlord under Section 10, shall be entitled to
contest the application before the Controller under that Section or to
prefer any appeal under Section 20 against any order made by the
Controller on the application, unless he has paid to the landlord or E
deposits with the Controller, or the appellate authority, as the case
many be, all arrears of rent due in respect of the building up to the
date of payment or deposit and continues to pay or deposit any rent
which may subsequently become due in respect of the building, until
the termination of the proceedings before the Controller or the appellate
J F
authority, as the case may be.

(2) The deposit of rent under sub-section (1) shall be made within the
time and in the manner prescribed."

He submitted that under these circumstances a statutory right arose to
the respondents to get all further proceedings stopped and for a direction to G
i.
'--...--~
the appellant tenants to put the respondent landlords in possession of the
building. In .support of this contention, relfal}Ce was placed on sub-section
(4) of Section 11 which reads as under:

"11 (4). If any tenant fails to pay or to depc(sit the rent as aforesaid, H
896 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] l S.C.R .

A the Controller or the appellate authority, as the case may be, shall,
unless the tenant shows sufficient cause to the contrary, stop all
further proceedings and make an order directing the tenant to put the
landlord in possession of the building."

We fail to appreciate how this contention can be pressed into service
B on the peculiar facts of this case. As we have seen earlier, the eviction
proceedings have themselves become infructuous once the bank draft dated
02nd February 1989 for the full amount of arrears was already got encashed
by the respondents. That apart, even if there was any default pending such
proceedings, it was open to the respondents to enforce the statutory right
C available to them under Section 11(1) read with Section 11(4) of the Act for
getting all further proceedings stopped before the Rent Controller and for
asking immediate decree for possession, and/or in appeal of the appellant-
tenants to request the appellate court to dismiss the appeal and put the
respondent-landlords forthwith in possession on account of such default.
Nothing of this sort was done by the respondent¥ff they had tried to enforce
D this right, the appellants would have got an.llPI>ortunity to show to the Trial
Court or the Appellate Court, as the case may be, that there was sufficient
cause for not passing such an order under Section 11(4) of the Act. That
opportunity never became available to the appellants as the respondents did
not invoke this provision. It can, therefore, easily be said that the respondents
E waived this riiht available to them under the Statute presumably because
they themselves were satisfied on getting full payment of arrears of rent by
encashing the bank draft dated 02nd February 1989, Consequently, even this
contention cannot be of any assistance to the respondents.

In the result, this appeal is allowed. The order passed 'by the Rent
F Controller and as confirmed by the appellate authority as well as by the High '<
l
Court is set aside and the eviction proceedings are dislnissed with no order
as to costs all throughout.

T.N.A Appeal allowed.