Holding

The appellant was not a juvenile as his age as on 1 April 2001 was above 18 years, and the appeal was dismissed.

Summary

The appellant Jyoti Prakash Rai was convicted of murder under Section 302 IPC for killing a schoolmate on 12 May 2000. At the time of the offence the trial magistrate estimated his age to be about 17 years, but the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 came into force on 1 April 2001, raising the question of whether he could be treated as a juvenile. Two medical boards examined him in 2001 and both concluded that his age was between 18 and 19 years; the appellant’s documentary evidence of a school certificate and horoscope was found to be forged. The Supreme Court held that the age must be determined as on 1 April 2001, applying Section 20 of the 2000 Act, and that the medical reports, together with the forged documents, showed he was above 18 years, so the benefit of the juvenile legislation could not be invoked. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.

Issues considered

Whether the appellant was a juvenile at the time of the offence for the purposes of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000
Whether age should be determined as on the date of the offence or as on 1 April 2001 under Section 20 of the Act
The evidentiary value of medical board reports and forged documentary evidence in ascertaining age
Applicability of Section 20 of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000 to pending criminal proceedings

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 313
Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 35
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 302
Juvenile Justice Act, 1986
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000s. 16, s. 20

Subjects

Juvenile Justice Actage determinationmedical board reportforged documentsSection 20pending criminal casebeneficial legislationevidence Actmurdercriminal appeal

Judgment

[2008] 3 S.C.R. 818

I' .....
A JYOTI PRAKASH RAI @ JYOTI PRAKASH
v. •
STATE OF BIHAR
(Criminal Appeal No. 440 of.2008)
MARCH 4, 2008
8
(S.B. SINHA AND V.S. SIRPURKAR, JJ.)

~ ""
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act,
2000:
c s.20 rlw s.16 - Special provision in respect of pending
cases - Determination of age of accused as on 1.4.2001 -
Two medical boards constituted on different dates, opining the
age of accused to be more than 18 years as on 1.4.2001 -
Additional Sessions Judge and High Court holding age of
D accused to be above 18 yeas as on 1.4.2001 - HELD: No
exception can be taken to such findings - Juvenile Justice <:~I

Act, 1986. '
Evidence Act, 1872:

E s. 35 - Relevancy of entry in public record -
Determination of age - Relevant factors to be taken into
account - Accused producing large number of documents to
prove his age - School certificates produced found to be forged
and fabricated - Criminal case directed to be instituted against <·
F Head of Institution - Effect of - Juvenile Justice (Care and
Protection of Children) Act, 2000.
The appellant was prosecuted for an offence
punishable uls 302 IPC, as he was stated to hav.e killed
his schoolmate by stabbing him several times on
G 12.5.2000. The Magistrate estimated his age to be about
17 years on the said date. On coming into force of the
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act,
2000 w.e.f. 1.4.2001, in order to consider the claim that the 1" •
appellant was a juv-enile, tlNo medical boards were
H 818
JYOTI PRAKASH RAI @ JYOTI PRAKASH v. 819
STATE OF BIHAR
'
"
' onconstituted.
24.4.2001
The first Board, which examined the appellant A
opi~d
his age to be 18 years 5 months and
8 days and the second medical board constituted on
29.6.2001, also opined his age between 18-19 years. The
Additional Sessions Judge held that the appellant was
above 18 years of age as on 1.4.2001. The High Court B
affirmed the order.
r' '·-.. In the instant appeal it was contended for the
appellant that both the courts below failed to take into
consideration that on 12.5.2000, the date of commission
of offence, age of the appellant had been determined to c
be 17 years and thus on 1.4.2001, he was below 18 years.
Dismissing the appeal, th-: Court
HELD: 1.1 The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection

.. (
of Children) Act, 2000 is indisputably a beneficial D
legislation. Principles of beneficial legislation, however,
are to be applied only for the purpose of interpretation of
the statute and not for arriving at a conclusion as to
whether a person is juvenile or not. Whether an offender
was a juvenile on the date of commission of the offence E
or not is essentially a question of fact which is required
to be determined on the basis of the material brought on
record by the parties. In the absence of any evidence
~ ). which is relevant for the purpose as envisaged under
section 35 of the Evidence Act, the same must be F
determined keeping in view the factual matrix involved in
each case. For the said purpose, not only relevant
materials are required to be considered, the orders passed
by the court on earlier occasions would also be relevant.
[para 9] [825-E-H; 826-A]
G
1.2 The court has to determine the age keeping in
view a large number of factors. A medical report
, \,._
determining the age of a. person has never been
considered by the courts of law as also by the medical
scientists to be conclusive in nature. After certarn age it is H
820 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 3·S.C.R.

#
.....
A difficult to determine the exact age of the person
concerned on the basis of ossification test or other tests. •
·~
[para 10,15) [828-F; 826-A, B]
Vishnu vs. State of Maharashtra [2006) 1 SCC 283; Birad
Mal Singhvi vs. Anand Purohit [1988) Supp. SCC 604; Sushi/
B Kumar vs. Rakesh Kumar [2003) 8 SCC 673; Ravinder Singh
Gorkhi vs. State of U.P [2006) 5 SCC 584; and Jitendra Ram
vs. State of Jharkhand [2006) 9 SCC 428 - relied on.
•
,, "~
1.3 In a case of this nature, where the delinquent was
c examined by two different medical boards on two different
dates and both having reached two different conclusions,
a greater difficulty arises for the court to arrive at a correct
decision. For the said purpose, the court may resort to
some sort of hypothesis, as no premise is available on
the basis whereof a definitive conclusion can be arrived
D
at. In the facts and circumstances of the Instant case, the
test which may be al?plied, would be to take the average
of the age as opined by both the medical boards. Even
applying that t.est, the age of the appellant as on 1.4.2001
\
-
would be above 18 years. However, this method would
E be only for the purpose of this case and not to lay down
any general proposition of law in this behalf. [para 11-12)
[826-E-H; 827-A]
Pratap Singh vs. State of Jharkhand [2005) 3 SCC 551;
.( . '
F Bihar State Electricity Board vs. Bihar Power Workers Union
& Ors. Civil Appeal No. 420 of 2001 decided on 6.3.2002;
and Amit Das vs. State of Bihar [2000) 5 SCC 488 - referred
.,
to.
1.4 It has ·also been taken into consideration that the
G appellant had filed documents in support of his claim that
he was a juvenile but the same were found to be forged
and fabricated which is itself a factor to show that he was
making attempts to obtain a benefit, which he might not 1 ~
have been entitled to. The appellant had produced a large
H number of documents to prove his age purported to be
JYOTI P.RAKASH RAI @ JYOTI PRAKASH v. 821
STATE OF BIHAR [S.S. SINHA, J.]

as on the date of commission of the crime. The A
genuineness of the school certificate and the horoscope
had been questioned. The school certificate produced by
the appellant was found to be forged and, fabricated and,
as a matter of fact, a criminal case was directed to be ·
Instituted against the Head of the Institution. The court, B
therefore, had no other option but to determine the age
on the basis of the Medical Reports. The courts have
considered this aspect of the matter on earlier occasions
also. If, thus, on the basis of several factors including the
fact that school leaving certificate and the horoscope C
produced· by the appellant were found to be forged and
·fabricated and having regard to two medical reports, the
courts below have found .the age of the appellant as on •·
1.4.2001 to be above 18 years, no exception thereto can
be taken. [para 12 and 19·21] [827-B; 832-A, C, Dl D
/
CRIMINALAPPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
No. 440 of 2008.
From the Judgment and Order dated 4.5.2007 of the High
Court of Judicature at Patna in Crl. Revision No. 778/2005. E
Nagendra Rai, Jayesh Gaurav, S. Sagar, Vishnu Sharma,
Yun us Malik and Ansul for the Appellant.
-, Anukul Raj and Gopal Singh for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by F

S.B. SINHA, J. 1. Leave granted.
2. Appellant herein is said to be a delinquent juvenile. He
was accused of commission of an offence under Section 302
of the Indian Penal Code for killing one of his school mates. He G
is said to have stabbed the deceased several times. The
incident took place on 12.05.2000. His age was estimated at
about 17 years a~ on the said date by the learned Magistrate
before whom he.was produced.
H
822 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 3 S.C.R.

, ,...
A At that point of time, the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 (for ..
short "the 1986Act") was in force. In terms of the provisions of
the 1986 Act, "juvenile" meant a boy who had not attained the
age of sixteen years.
The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act,
B 2000 (for short "the 2000 Act") came into force with effect from
1.04.2001. "Juvenile" has been defined in the 2000 Act to mean ,..-
a person who has not completed eighteen years of age. Section ii
16 of the 2000 Act, as it stood then, provides for a non-obstante
clause prohibiting imposition of sentence to death or life
c imprisonment or commitment to person in default of payment of
fine or in default of furnishing security, on a delinquent juvenile.
3. Section 20 of the 2000 Act, as it stood then, reads as
under:
D "20. Special provision in respect of pending cases .-
Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, all
proceedings in respect of a juvenile pending in any court
in any area on the date on which this Act comes into force
\
-
in that area, shall be continued in that court as if this Act
E had not been passed and if the court finds that the juvenile
has committed an offence, it shall record such finding and
instead of passing any sentence in respect of the juvenile,
forward the juvenile to the Board which shall pass orders
. in respect of that juvenile in accordance with the provisions ,(' <

F of this Act as if it had been satisfied on inquiry under this
Act that a juvenile has committed the offence."
4. For examining the claim of the appellant that he was a
juvenile as on the date of commission of the offence, two medical
boards were constituted. The first medical board which
G examined him on 24.04.2001, opined his age to be between
18 to 19 years. The second medical board which was constituted
on 29.06.2001 also opined similarly.
~ "
5. Before the learnedACJM, Buxar, some documents were
also produced. However, .the same were not taken into
H
~

·~
•
JYOTI PRAKASH RAI @ JYOTI PRAKASH v. 823
STATE OF BIHAR [S.B. SINHA, J.]
... \
j consideration by the courts below. A
6. By an order dated 21.04.2005, the learned Additional·
Sessions Judge [FTC], Bu'.Xar held:
"... On 29.06.2001 the Medical Board was constituted
under the Chairmanship of the Civil Surgeon, Buxar in B
which Jyoti Prakash was adjudged to be between 18 and
...
~ 19 years. The board conducted ossification ti?st and found
' the place of moustache to be black and also found the
ancillary and Public Hair to be developed and on
radiological findings the right wrist, right elbow and the c
chest appeared to be developed.
The m~dical board on 24.04.2001 has also adjudged
the age of the accused Jyoti Prakash Rai to be between
18 and 19 years of age. The incident is dated 12.05.2000
and the medical board was constituted on 24.04.2001, D
...... f which was after 11 months and 12 days from the date of
occurrence. If by the date of occurrence and also the finding
of the medical board of 19 years when 11 months and 12
days are subtracted then the age of the accused is more
than 18 years. The New Act of 2000 and also the judgment E
of the Hon'ble Supreme Court would be applicable only in
the condition when on 01.04.2001 the age of the petitioner
has not crossed 18 years.
. '),
As per the findings of the medical board the petitioner
011 01.04.2001 was around 18 years 10 months and 19 F
, days old. The Counsel for the petitioner has prayed that
the case be sent to the Special Court. In respect of this
there is a clear direction of the Hon'ble Supreme Court
that under Section 25 that if there is a clear direction of the
court that a juvenile offender has committed a crime then G
<:>nly the child offender will be sent before the Board. In
light of the above mentioned facts there is no occasion to
/!'. ~
abide by the directions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court,
which is not applicable in the present case."
H
824 SUPREME COURT REPORTS' [2008] 3.S.C.R
. .
.,#.
A 7. Before. the High Court, It was Inter alla rightly contended
that the decision of this Court In Amit Das v. State of Blhar
[(2000) 5 sec 466] which had laid down the law that the age of
the juvenile should be determined as on the date of his production
. before the Court and not on the date of commission of offence
e has been overruled by a Constitution Bench of this Court In
Pratap Singh v. State of Jharkhand [(2005) 3 sec 551].
In the Impugned judgment, the High Court held:
"7. According to the submission of learned Advocate of
c the petitioner, tho first medical board was constituted on
24.4.2001 and on that date and board was of the opinion
that the petitioner was aged between 16·19 years. He
submitted that If the age of the petitioner Is taken as 16
years on 24.4.2001 then on 1.4.2001, he was definitely
0 below 16 years [I.e. 23 days less In 16 years]. Likewise,
the aecond medical board was constituted on 29.6.2001
and on that date also the board ~sseissed his age as 16·
19 years and, therefore, If the minimum age of the petitioner
lis taken 1111 1a years on 29.6.2001, the net result will be
that the petitioner was le118 then 16 ye ors on 1.4.2001 I.e.
E [two months twenty eight days lellll In attelnlng eighteen
. years].
. B. I am of tho view that this will not bo tho proper way of
eomputln9 tho a11e of petltlonor and tho proper way to
. r . 11:11rn1111 the ase of the petitioner will be that hl11119e 11hould
be fixed In between 16=19 ye1m1 on the dote of examination,
11ecordin9 to which the 119e of the petitioner com ea to 1B
ye11r11 I> month11 ad11y11 on 1.4.:!001 when h@ for the fir11t
"'· tim11 11ppe11rnd b11for@ th@ m11dic11I boord cm :!IHUW01. . .
lhus, th@ net ms ult i11 th11t cm 1.4,:!001 th@ p@titicin@r w1111
definil@ly 11b1w11 .1 B y1i11r11 of 1111@ 11nd mit b@ll'lw 1ll y1111r11
of iilQ@," · ·

. ll Mr. N119@ndr11· R11i, l1i11rn1id 11@nior coun11@l 11pp@11rin9
on b1ih11lf gf th@ 11pp@ll11nt, would 11ubmiUh11t th@ C::l'lYrtl! b@ll'lw
·H eommitt@d 1111@riou11 ill@9111ity in11gf11r 1111 they f11il11d to tak@ into
JYOTI PRAKASH RAI @ JYOTI PRAKASH v. 825
STATE OF BIHAR [S.8. SINHA, J.)
" I
consideration that on 12.05.2000, the age of the appellant having A
been determined to be 17 years, Inevitably his age as on
1.04.2001 would be less than 18 years. It was furthermore
submitted that Amit Das (supra) being no longer a good law,
the learned Trial Judge should have proceeded to determine
the Issue keeping In view the minimum age determined by the · B
Medical Board. Reliance In this behalf has been placed on an
unreported decision of this Court In Bihar State E/ectr/clty Board·
v. Blhar Power Workers Union & Ors [Clvll Appeal No. 420 of
2001 decided on 6.03.2002] wherein It has been held:
"The High Court Is of the view that age determined by the C
Medical Board cannot be accurate and, therefore, It finds
that It would be appropriate to extend the benefit of the
lesser age determined by the Medical Board. We do not
think that that view of the High Court should be upset. The
view of the appellant-Board that It should be only average 0
• I, of the ~axlmum and minimum age, cannot be quite
· accurate, If In fact, tha employee Is of the lesser age as
determined by the Medical Board. In that view, the policy.
adopted by the appellant - Board cannot be stated to be
. without any fault. In that view of the matter, the Interference E
by the High Court Is justified, In the circumstances of the
c1111e. The 11ppeal Is therefore dismissed."
9. The 2000 Act Is Indisputably a beneficial leglslatlon.
Prlnclple:i of beneficial leQlslation, however, <tre to be 11pplied
only for the purpo11e of Interpretation of the 11tatute and not for r
• .orrlvlng 11t a conclusion as to whether a pernon. Ill juvenile or
not. Whether on offender was a juvenile on the date of
comml11:1lon of !1111 ·offence· or not is essentially a quc:::1tlon of
foct which is requir!ld to bii determineci on. the basis of tho
, m11teriol:1 brouQhl on records by thii parties. In absence of ony · G
evidenc@ which iii relevant for the s11ici purpose a~ {lnvi11011ed
under Section 36 of the Indian Evicience Act, the 11ame must be
determined kc::eping in vic::w the factual matrix involvc::d in each
co110. ror the:: 11oid purpo11c::, not only. relc::vant material!! are
rnquired to be con:1idc::red, the orders. pa:1se,d by the court on H
826 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 3 S. C.R.

A earlier occasions would also be relevant.
10. A medical report determining the age of a perso'n has
never been considered by the courts of law as also by the
medical scientists to be conclusive in nature. After certain age
it is difficult to determine the exact age of the person concerned
8 on the basis of ossification test or other tests.

This Court in Vishnu v. State of Maharashtra [(2006) 1 ...
sec 283], opined:
"20. It is urged before us by Mr Lalit that the determination
c of the age of the prosecutrix by conducting ossification
test is scientifically proved and, therefore, the opinion of
the doctor that the girl was of 18-19 years of age should
be accepted. We are ·unable to accept this contention for
the reasons that the 'expert medical evidence is not binding
D on the ocular evidence. The opinion of the Medical Officer
is to assist the court as he is not a witness of fact and the \ .. -
evidence given by the Medical Officer is really of an
advisory character and not binding on the witness of fact.
21 ... "
E 11. In the aforementioned situation, this Court in a number
of judgments has held that the age determined by the doctors
should be given flexibility of two years on either side.
In a case of this nature, thus, where the delinquent was < ..
F examined by two different medical boards, who on two different
dates have reached the identical opinion, viz, the age of the
appellant between 18 and 19 years, and, thus, resulting in two •
different conclusions, a greater difficulty arises for the court to
arrive at a correct decision. For the said purpose, the court may
G resort to some sort of hypothesis, as no premise is available on
the basis whereof a definitive conclusion can be arrived at.
12. It is in the aforementioned situation, we are of the
opinion that the test which may be applied herein would be to
take the average of the age as opined by both the medical
H boards. Even applying that test, the age of the appellant as on
JYOTI PRAKASH RAI @ JYOTI PRAKASH V. 827
STATE OF BIHAR [S.B. SINHA, J.]
i

. '
·~ 01.04.2001 would be above 18 years. A
We, however, hasten to add that we have taken recourse
to the said method only for the purpose of this case and we do
not intend to lay down any general proposition of law in this behalf
As indicated herei.nbefore, in so doing, we have also taken into
consideration the fact that the appellant had filed documents in 8
support of his claim that he was a juvenile but the same were
~.,

l
found to be forged and fabricated which is itself a factor to show
~
that hewas making attempts to obtain a benefit to which he
might not have been entitled to.
c
13. Applicability of the 2000 Act in relation to a juvenile
who has committed an offence prior to coming into force of the
2000 Act came up for consideration before a Constitution Bench
of this Court in Pratap Singh (supra). It was opined:
"31. Section 20 of the Act as quoted above deals with the D
special provision in respect of pending cases and begins
with a non obstante clause. The sentence "notwithstanding
. anything contained in this Act, all proceedings in respect
a
· of juvenile pending in any court in any area on the date
on which this Act came into force" has great significance. E
The proceedings in respect of a juvenile pending in any
court referred to in Section 20 of the Act are relatable to
proceedings initiated before the 2000 Act came into force
and which are pending when the 2000Act came into force .
.The term "any court" would include even ordinary criminal F
courts. If the person was a "juvenile" under the 1986 Act
the proceedings would not be pending in criminal col. rt.s~ , ·
They would be pending in criminal courts only if the !.<> ~ · •
had crossed 16 years or the girl had crossed 18 y~ars.
This shows that Section 20 refers to cases where a p~son G
had ceased to be a juvenile under the 1986 Act but had
not yet crossed the age of 18 years then the pending case
shall continue in that court as if the 2000 Act has not been
passed and if the court finds that the juvenile has committed
an offence, it shall record such finding and· instead of H
828 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008) 3 S.C.R.

I
A passing any sentence in respect of the juvenile, shall ...
forward the juvenile to the Board which shall pass orders
in respect of that juvenile."
It was furthermore observed:
B "36 . We, therefore, hold that the provisions of the 2000
Act would be applicable to those cases initiated and
c-~
pending·trial/inquiry for the offences committed under the
~
1986 Act provided that the person had not completed 18
years of age as on 1-4-2001."
c It was concluded:
"37. The net result is:

D ( b ) The 2000 Act would be applicable in a pending
proceeding in any court/authority initiated under the 1986
Act and is pending when the 2000 Act came into force
\
....
and the person had not completed 18 years of age as on
1-4-2001."
E 14. Reliance placed by Mr. Rai on the unreported decision
in Bihar State Electricity Board (supra) is misplaced. Therein a
policy decision had been taken. The correctness of the said
policy decision was in question having regard to the
determination of the age by a medical board. The High Court ~ ..
F was of the view that the age determined by the medical board
cannot be accurate. It was, therefore, not a case where any law
was laid down. '
15. The court has to determine the age keeping in view a
large number of factors. It is in that context it was opined in Birad
G Mal Singhvi v. Anand Purohit [1988 Supp SCC 604):

"To render a document admissible under Section 35, three
conditions must be satisfied, firstly, entry that is relied on ., ...
must be one in a public or other official book, register or
record; secondly, it must be an entry stating a fad in issue
H
JYOTI PRAKASH RAI @ JYOTI PRAKASH v. 829
STATE OF BIHAR [S.S. SINHA, J.]
or relevant fact; and thirdly, it must be made by a public A
servant iri discharge of his official duty, or any other person
in' performance of a duty specially enjoined by law. An
entry relating to date of birth made in the school register
is relevant and admissible under Section 35 of the Act but

. .
.,
the entry regarding the age of a person in a school r~ister a
is of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the
person in the absence of the material on which the age
was recorded."
16: In Sushi/ Kumarv. Rakesh Kumar[(2003) 8 SCC 673],
this Court observed: C
"32 . The age of a person in an election petition has to be '
determined not only on the basis of the materials placed
· on record but also upon taking into consideration the
circumstances attending thereto. The initial burden to prove D
the allegations made in the election petition although was
upon the election petitioner but for proving the facts which
were. within the special knowledge of the respondent, the
burden was upon him in terms of ... "
17. In Ravinder Singh Gorkhi vs. State of U.P [(2006) 5 E
sec 584], it was held:-
"21. Determination of the date of birth of a person before
a court of law, whether in a civil proceeding or a criminal
proceeding, would depend upon the facts and
circumstances of each case. Such a date of birth has to F
be determined on the basis of the materials on records.
It will be a matter of appreciation of evidence adduced by
the parties. Different standards having regard to the
provision of Section 35 of the Evidence Act cannot ·be
applied in a civil case or a criminal case." ·G
It was furthermore held :-
"38. The age of a person as recorded in the school register
or otherwise may be used for various purposes, namely,
for obtaining admission; for obtaining an appointment; for H
..
830 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2008] 3 S.C.R.

;f .;..
A contesting election; registration of marriage; obtaining a
separate unit under the ceiling laws; and even for the .
purpose of litigating before a civil forum e.g. necessity of
being represented in a court of law by a guardian or where
a suit is filed on the ground that the plaintiff being a minor
B he was not appropriately represented therein or any
transaction made on his behalf was void as he was a
,..
minor. A court of law for the purpose of determining the
age of a party to the lis, having regard to the provisions of ,.
Section 35 of the Evidence Act will have to apply the same
c standard. No different standard can be applied in case of
an accused as in a case of abduction or rape, or similar
offence where the victim or the prosecutrix although might t
have consented with the accused, if on the basis of the
entries made in the register maintained by the school, a
judgment of conviction is recorded, the accused would be
D
deprived of his constitutional right under Article 21 of the .. r
Constitution, as in that case the accused may unjustly be._ \
convicted.
39. We are, therefore, of the opinion that until the age of
E a person is required to be determined in a manner laid
down under a statute, different standard of proof should·
not be adopted. It is no doubt true that the court must
strike a balance. In case of a dispute, the court may
appreciate the evidence having regard to the facts and
.<! ~

F circumstances of the case. It would be a duty of the court
of law to accord the benefit to a juvenile, provided he is
one. To give the same benefit to a person who in fact is •
.not a.juvenile may cause injustice to the victim. In this
·case, the appellant had never been serious in projecting
his plea that he on the date of commission of the offence
G
was a minor. He made such statement for the first time
.;, . while he was examined under Section 313 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure. -f ~
40. The family background of the appellant is also a
H relevant fact. His father was a "Pradhan" of the village. He
JYOTI PRAKASH RAI @ JYOTI PRAKASH v. 831
STATE OF .BIHAR [S.B. SINHA, J.]
-. ~

~ was found to be in possession of an unlicensed firearm. A
He was all along represented by a lawyer. The court
estimated his age to be 18 years. He was tried jointly with
the other accused. He had been treated alike with the
other accused. On merit of the matter also the appellant
stands on the same footing as the other accused. The B
.. ~
prosecution has proved its case. In fact no such plea coµld
be raised as the special leave petition of the persons
" similarly situated was dismissed when the Court issued
notice having regard to the contention raised by him for
the first time that he was a minor on the date of occurrence." c
18. In Jitendra Ram v. State of Jharkhand [(2006) 9 SCC
428], this Court stated :
"20. We are, however, not oblivious of the decision of this
Court in Bhola Bhagat v. State of Bihar wherein. an
D
" r obligation has been cast on the court that where such a
plea is raised having regard to the beneficial nature of the
socially oriented legislation, the same should be examined
with great care. We are, however, of the opinion that the
same would not mean that a pe·rson who is not entitled to
the benefit of the said Act would be dealt with leniently only E
because such a plea is raised. Each plea must be judgea
on its own merit. Each case has to be considered on the
... .'.\ basis of the materials brought on records."
It was held: F
~
"22. We, therefore, are of the opinion that the determination
of the age of the appellant as on the date of tfle
commission of the offence should be done afresh by the
learned Sessions Judge."
G
19. Appellant herein had produced a large number of
documents to prove his age purported to be as on the date of
,.. +- commission of the crime. The genuineness of the school
certificate and the horoscope had been questioned. The school
certificate produced by the appellant was found to be forged
H
832 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 3 S.C.R.

/
A and fabricated and as a matter of fact a criminal case was "'
directed to be instituted against the Head of the Institution. ~

20. The court, therefore, had no other option but to
determine the age on the basis of the Medical Reports. Both
the medical reports dated 24.04.2001 and 29.06.2001 opined
8 the age of the appellant between 18 and 19 years. In terms of
first medical report, the age of the appellant came to be 18 years
5 months 8 days and in terms of the second medical report, it
came to be between 18 and 19 years. The High Court opined
that the appellant on 1.04.2001 was definitely above 18 years
C of age and not below 18 years of age.
21. The courts have considered this aspect of the matter
on earlier occasions also. If, thus, on the basis of several factors
including the fact that school leaving certificate and the horoscope
D produced by the appellant were found to be forged and
fabricated and having regard to two medical reports the courts
below have found the age of the appellant as on 1.04.2001 to \ .. '
be above 18 years, we are of the opinion that no exception
thereto can be taken.
E 22. For the reasons aforementioned, there is no merit in
this appeal which is dismissed accordingly.
R.P. Appeal dismissed.