JUVERIA ABDUL MAJID PATNIversusATIF IQBAL MANSOORI AND ANR.

                   [2014] 10 S.C.R. 479


              JUVERIA ABDUL MAJID PATNI                         A
                             v.
           ATIF IQBAL MANSOORI AND ANR.
           (Criminal Appeal No. 2069 of 2014)
                 SEPTEMBER 18, 2014.
                                                                B
      [SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA AND
                S.A. BOBDE, JJ.]

    PROTECTION OF WOMEN FROM DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE ACT, 2005:                                             C
    ss.2 (a) and (f) - Expressions 'aggrieved person', and
'domestic relationship' - Explained.

      s. 12 rlw ss. 18 to 23 - Monetary relief to 'person
aggrieved'(wife) - An act of domestic violence once             D
committed, subsequent decree of divorce will not absolve the
liability of the respondent from the offence committed or to
deny the benefit to which the aggrieved person is entitled
under the Domestic Violence Act - Even if it is accepted that
the appellant during the pendency of SLP has obtained ex        E
parte Khu/a (divorce) under Muslim Personal Law from the
Mufti, the petition u/s12 of the Domestic Violence Act, 2005
is maintainable.

    MOHAMMEDAN LAW:                                             F
    'Khu/a' - Explained.

    Allowing the appeal, the Court

    HELD: 1.1. Section 2(a) of the Domestic Violence Act,       G
2005, makes it clear that apart from the woman who is in
a domestic relationship, any woman who has been, in a
domestic relationship with the respondent, if alleges to
have been subjected to act of domestic violence by the
                           479                                  H
    480     SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [2014] 10 S.C.R.


A respondent comes within the meaning of "aggrieved
  person". Section 2(f) defines domestic relationship,
  according to which a person aggrieved (wife), who at any
  point of time has lived together with husband in a shared
  household, is also covered by the meaning of "domestic
B relationship." In view of s.2(s) of the Act, if the 'person
  aggrieved' (wife) at any stage has lived in a domestic
  relationship with the respondent (husband) in a house,
  the person aggrieved can claim a "shared household".
  [para 20] [494-A, B, E; 495-D]
c      1.2. The Monetary relief as stipulated u/s 20 of 2005
  Act is different from maintenance, which can be in
  addition to an order of maintenance u/s 125 of the Cr.P.C.
  or any other law. Such monetary relief can be granted to
  meet the expenses incurred and losses suffered by the
D aggrieved person and child of the aggrieved person as
  a result of the domestic violence, which is not dependent
  on the question whether the aggrieved person, on the
  date of filing of the application u/s 12 is in a domestic
  relationship with the respondent. [para 24] [501-B-C]
E
       1.3. In view of ss.22 and 23, it is well within the
  jurisdiction of the Magistrate to grant the interim ex parte
  relief as he deems just and proper, if the Magistrate is
  satisfied that the application prima facie discloses that the
  respondent is committing, or has committed an act of
F domestic violence or that there is a likelihood that the
  respondent may commit an act of domestic violence.
  Relief available u/ss 18, 19, 20, 21 and 22 may also be
  sought for in any legal proceeding even before a Civil
  Court and Family Court, apart from the Criminal Court,
G affecting the aggrieved person whether such proceeding
  was initiated before or after commencement of the
  Domestic Violence Act. Even before the Criminal Court
  where the case u/s 498A is pending, if allegation is found
  genuine, it is always open to the appellant to ask for
H
    JUVERIA ABDUL MAJID PATNI v. ATIF IQBAL                481
                  MANSOORI
reliefs u/ss 18 to 22 of the Domestic Violence Act and            A
interim relief u/s 23 of the said Act. [paras 25, 26, 27] [502-
A-D; 503-A-B]
    V.D. Bhanot vs. Savita Bhanot        2012 (1) SCR 867 =
(2012) 3 sec 183 - relied on.
                                                                  B
    /nderjit Singh Grewal vs. State of Punjab and another
2011 (1 O) scR 557 = c2011) 12 sec 588 - held
inapplicable.
     1.4. The 'Khula' is a mode of divorce which proceeds
from the wife, the husband cannot refuse subject only to          C
reasonable negotiation with regard to what the wife has
offered to give him in return. The Mufti gives his fatwa or
advisory decision based on the Shariat of his school.
However, if the matter is carried to the point of litigation
and cannot be settled privately then the Qazi(Judge) is           D
required to deliver a qaza (judgment) based upon the
Shariat. In the instant case, the husband, 1st respondent
has not accepted 'Khula' given by Mufti which is in the
form of fatwa or advisory decision based on the Shariat.
He, however, has not moved before the Qazi (Judge) to             E
deliver a qaza (judgment) based upon the Shariat.
Instead, he has moved before the Family Court, against
the 'Khula' by filing petition. He has also prayed for
restitution of conjugal right. Even if it is accepted that the
appellant during the pendency of the SLP before this
                                                                  F
Court has obtained ex parte Khula (divorce) under the
Muslim Personal Law from the Mufti on 9.5.2008, the
petition u/s12 of the Domestic Violence Act, 2005 is
maintainable. [para 14-15 and 30] [491-B-G-E; 504-F-G]
     Masroor Ahmed vs. State (NCT of Delhi) and Anr., (2007)      G
ILR 2 Delhi 1329; Shamim Ara vs. State of U.P. and
                                =
Anr. 2002 (3) Suppl. SCR 19 (2002) 7 SCC 518 referred
to.
    1.5. An act of domestic violence once committed,
subsequent decree of divorce will not absolve the liability       H
               '
    482      SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2014] 10 S.C.R.


A of the respondent from the offence committed or to deny
  the benefit to which the aggrieved person is entitled
  under the Domestic Violence Act, 2005 including
  monetary relief u/s 20, child custody u/s 21,
  Cl5mpensation u/s 22 and interim or ex parte order u/s 23.
B [para 31] [504-H; 505-A-B]
                         Case Law Reference:
          2011 (10) SCR 557          held               para 9
                                     inapplicable
c         (2007) ILR 2 Delhi 1329    referred to        para 13
          2002 (3) Suppl. SCR 19     referred to        Para 16
          2012 (1) SCR 867           relied on          para 28

D       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
    No. 2069 of 2014.

      From the Judgment & Order dated 23.01.2013 of the High
  Court of Judicature at Bombay in Writ Petition No. 4250 of
E 2012.

        Samir A. Vaidya, Shilpa Singh, Pankaj Sharma for the
    Appellant.

        P. Janardanan, Pradeep K.B., Anil Kaushik, Gopal Singh
F   Chauhan, K.C. Dua for the Respondents.

          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

        SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J. 1. Leave
    granted.
G
       2. This appeal has been preferred by the appellant against
  the judgment dated 23rd January, 2013 passed by the High
  Court of Judicature at Bombay in Writ Petition No.4250 of
  2012. By the impugned judgment, the High Court dismissed the
H writ petition preferred by the appellant and upheld the order
  JUVERIA ABDUL MAJID PATNI v. ATIF IQBAL  483
MANSOORI [SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.]
dated 3rd November, 2012 passed by the Additional Sessions         A
Judge, Sewree, Mumbai whereby the Sessions Judge held that
the application filed by the appellant under the Protection of
Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (hereinafter referred
to as the "Domestic Violence Act, 2005") is not maintainable.
                                                                   B
     3. The case of the appellant is that she got married to 1st
respondent according to Muslim rites and rituals on 13th May,
2005. 1st respondent was in the habit of harassing her. She
was subjected to physical abuse and cruelty. For example, 1st
respondent acted with cruelty, harassed her and had banged         C
her against a wall on her back and stomach on 5th January,
2006, due to which she suffered severe low back pain. The 1st
respondent refused her entry into the matrimonial house on 19th
February, 2006 and asked her to stay with her parents. She
delivered a baby boy at Breach Candy Hospital, Mumbai on
10th August, 2006 but the 1st respondent never visited to see      D
the new born baby. Later, the 1st respondent filed a petition
seeking custody of the minor child.

     4. The appellant lodged FIR No.224 of 2007 on 6th
September, 2007 before Agripada Police Station under               E
Section 498A and 406 IPC against the 1st respondent, his
mother and his sister. Against the same, a writ petition was
filed by the 1st respondent bearing Writ Petition No.1961 of
2007 seeking quashing of the FIR. The High Court dismissed
the said writ petition and the same was challenged by the 1st      F
respondent on which this Court issued notice. Subsequently,
this Court by order dated July, 2008 remitted the matter to the
High Court for hearing afresh Writ Petition No.1961 of 2007.
On 4th December, 2008, Writ Petition No.1961 of 2007 was
partly allowed by the High Court quashing the FIR against the      G
1st respondent's mother and sister with the observation that the
prima facie case under Section 498A was made out against
the 1st respondent.

     5. According to the appellant, she obtained an ex parte
                                                                   H
    484      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2014] 10 S.C.R.


A   'Khula' from Mufti under the Muslim Personal Law on 9th May,
    2008. The 1st respondent challenged the 'Khu la' pronounced
    by Mufti before the Family Court, Sandra vide M.J. Petition
    No.B-175 of 2008. He also filed a petition for restitution of
    conjugal right.
B
          6. On 29th September, 2009, the appellant filed a petition
    under Section 12 of the Domestic Violence Act, 2005 against
    the 1st respondent before the ACMM's 46th Court, Mazgaon,
    Mumbai for relief under Section 18 to 23 of the Domestic
    Violence Act, 2005 alleging that he is not providing
C   maintenance for herself as well as for the minor child. The 1st
    respondent filed his reply to the said application which was
    followed by the rejoinder filed by the appellant. The Protection
    Officer appointed by the Magistrate under Domestic Violence
    Act, 2005 filed his report, inter alia, stating that an act of
D   domestic violence was committed by the 1st respondent upon
    the appellant. But the Magistrate was transferred, the Court fell
    vacant and no order was passed. Subsequently, the appellant
    filed an application for interim maintenance and the Magistrate
    by order dated 4th February, 2012 allowed the application
E   directing the 1st respondent to pay interim maintenance of
    Rs.25,000/-. Without paying the maintenance, the 1st
    respondent preferred an appeal before the Sessions Court
    challenging the order of Magistrate dated 4th February, 2012.
    The Sessions Court, Sewree, Mumbai by order dated 3rd
F   August, 2012 condoned the delay in preferring the appeal and
    directed the 1st respondent to deposit the entire amount of
    maintenance prior to the hearing of the appeal. As the 1st
    respondent did not deposit the amount, the appellant filed an
    application for issuance of distress warrant. Accordingly a
G   notice was issued on 1st September, 2012. The counsel for
    the respondent stated across the bar that the 1st respondent
    had deposited the money before the Sessions Court and filed
    two applications on 3rd September, 2012 for recalling the order
    dated 4th February, 2012 and for dismissal of the application
H
  JUVERIA ABDUL MAJID PATNI v. ATIF IQBAL  485
MANSOORI [SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.]
on the ground that the domestic relationship did not exist          A
between the appellant and the 1st respondent.

    7. The Sessions Judge, Seweree, Mumbai by orderdated
3rd November, 2012 observed and held as follows:

    "14. First I will take the legal point which has been taken     B
    by the learned advocate for the appellant as to whether
    there was domestic relationship between the parties on
    the divorce took place between the parties on 091051
    2008. The learned advocate for the respondent
    submitted that though the divorce is taken place as per         C
    custom, then also it is not confirm by Civil Court.
    Secondly, he argued that non-applicant himself filed a
    proceeding for restitution of conjugal rights after this date
    and also filed proceedings for setting aside that divorce
    obtained by custom and therefore, it cannot be said that        D
    divorce took place between the parties. But this argument
    cannot be accepted because we have to see ple:idings
    of the applicant. She herself came with a case that
    marriage was dissolved by Mufti on 0910512008. She
    herself filed such documents along with application in          E
    which declaration is made about Nikah of the applicant
    with the non-applicant is declared null and void and
   ·therefore, applicant is no more wife of the appellant, after
    period of lddat she was wife of the appellant, after period
    of lddat she was free from any hindrance. She herself           F
    came with a case that she is no more wife of the non-
    applicant after 0910512008. It is further to be noted that
    she herself moved for this customary divorce and
    according to non-applicant same was obtained ex-parte.
    In this background applicant cannot blow hot and cold by        G
    saying that though she took such divorce then also same
    has not been confirmed by Civil Court as well as the non-
    applicant has filed the proceeding for restitution of
    conjugal rights and setting aside of that divorce and
    therefore, she may be treated as his wife.
                                                                    H
    486       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2014] 10 S.C.R.


A         15. So, now a legal question arise as to whether in view
          of divorce took place on 0910512008, the domestic
          relationship between the parties exist on the date of filing
          of this petition on 2910912009 ? and if there is no
          domestic relationship then whether the application is
B         maintainable ?

          20. So, it is the consistent view of Hon'ble Apex Court,
          Hon'ble Bombay High Court and other Hon'ble High
          Court that after divorce domestic relationship between the
          parties was not remain and therefore, application under
c         the Act after date of divorce is not maintainable. In the
          present case also the facts are similar and therefore, the
          law laid down is applicable. In the present case also the
          facts are similar and therefore, the law laid down is
          applicable.
D
          21 ........ So, I conclude that in view of divorce took place
          between the parties on 0910512008 the domestic
          relationship between parties did not remained and
          therefore, this application filed on 2910612009 under the
E         Act is not maintainable and therefore, question of
          granting of any interim relief does not arise because it
          can be said that applicant has no prima-facie case.

          23 ........ Even if I would have held that application is
          maintainable, then in such circumstances it would have
F         remanded back the matter to Lower Court for hearing
          fresh and recording such reasons. But when I am coming
          to a conclusion that as prima facie the application is itself
          not maintainable so applicant has no prima facie case
          and therefore, I told that impugned order is liable to be
G         set aside straight away."

         The Sessions Judge by the aforesaid judgment allowed
    the appeal and set aside the interim order dated 4th February,
    2012 passed by the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate,
H
  JUVERIA ABDUL MAJID PATNI v. ATIF IQBAL  487
MANSOORI [SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.]
46th Court at Mazgaon, Mumbai. By the impugned judgment,             A
the High Court affirmed the aforesaid order.

     8. Before this Court the parties have taken similar pleas
as taken before lower courts. According to the appellant the
cause of action i.e. domestic violence took place much before        8
the divorce, therefore, FIR was filed and hence the appellant
is entitled for the relief under the Domestic Violence Act, 2005.
The Protection Officer has already submitted report holding that
the domestic violence was committed by the 1st respondent
upon the appellant.
                                                                     c
      9. On the other hand, according to the counsel for the 1st
respondent after dissolution of the marriage no relief can be
granted under the Domestic Violence Act, 2005. In his support
reliance was placed on the decision of this Court in lnderjit
Singh Grewal vs. State of Punjab and another, (2011) 12 SCC          D
588.

     10. The questions arise for our consideration are:

     (i) Whether divorce of the appellant and the 1st
     respondent has taken place on 9th May, 2008; and                E
     (ii) Whether a divorced woman can seek for reliefs against
     her ex-husband under Sections 18 to 23 of the Domestic
     Violence Act, 2005.
                                                                     F
     11. For determination of the issue, it is necessary to notice
the relationship between the appellant and the 1st respondent.
It is not in dispute that the appellant got married to 1st
respondent according to the Muslim-rites and rituals on 13th
May, 2005. Since then their relationship was 'domestic
relationship' as defined under Section 2(f) of the Domestic          G
Violence Act, 2005. Both of them had lived together in a
'shared household' as defined under Section 2(s) of the
Domestic Violence Act when they are/were related by marriage.

     12. The appellant had taken plea that she obtained an ex        H
    488       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2014] 10 S.C.R.


A parte 'Khula' from Mufti under the Muslim Personal Law. But
  the 1st respondent has not accepted the same and has
  challenged the 'Khula' obtained by the appellant, before the
  Family Court, Sandra vide M.J. Petition No.B-175.of 2008. The
  respondent has also filed a petition for restitution of conjugal
B rights.

      13. The concept of dissolution of marriage under Muslim
  Personal Law was noticed and discussed by Single Judge of
  the High Court of Delhi in Masroor Ahmed vs. State (NCT of
  Delhi) and Anr., (2007) ILR 2 Delhi 1329. In the said case, the
C High Court noticed different modes of dissolution of marriage
  under the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) and held:

           "15. The question which arises is, given the shariat and
          its various schools, how does a person proceed on an
D          issue which is in dispute? The solution is that in matters
           which can be settled privately, a person need only consult
           a mufti (jurisconsult) of his or her school. The mufti gives
          his fatwa or advisory decision based on the Shariat of his
           school. However, if a matter is carried to the point of
E          litigation and cannot be settled privately then the qazi
           (judge) is required to deliver a qaza (judgment) based
           upon the Shariat(A qazi (or qadi) is a judge appointed
           by the political authority or state. He or she may pass
          judgments in his or her jurisdiction in respect of many
F         legal matters, including divorce, inheritahce, property,
           contractual disputes, etc. Schacht, p. 188. A qaza or kada
           is a judgment, which must be given according to the
          madhab to which the qadi belongs. Schacht, p. 196. More
          information on qazis and qazas can be found at pp. 188-
           198.). The difference between a fatwa and a qaza must
G
           be kept in the forefront. A fatwa is merely advisory
           whereas a qaza is binding. Both, of course, have to be
           based on the shariat and not on private interpretation de
           hors the shariat( Abdur Rahim, p. 172 (in -respect of
           qazis).
H
  JUVERIA ABDUL MAJID PATNI v. ATIF IQBAL  489
MANSOORI [SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.]
   The Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act. 1937         A
   and the various forms of dissolution of marriage
   recognised bv it.

   16. In India, the confusion with regard to application of
   customary law as part of mus/im law was set at rest by
                                                                   8
   the enactment of The Muslim Personal Law (Shariat)
   Application Act, 1937. Section 2 of the 1937 Act reads
   as under:-

   2. Application of Personal Law to Muslims.-
   Notwithstanding any customs or usage to the contrary, in C
   all questions (save questions relating to agricultural land)
   regarding intestate succession, special property of
   females, including persona! property inherited or
   obtained under contract or gift or any other provision of
   Personal Law, marriage, dissolution of marriage, including D
   talaq, i/a, zihar, lian, khula and mubaraat, maintenance,
   dower, guardianship, gifts, trusts and trust properties, and
   wakfs (other than charities and charitable institutions and
   charitable and religious endowments) the rule of decision
   in cases where the parties are Muslims shall be the E
   Muslim Personal Law ( Shariat}.

   The key words are notwithstanding any customs or usage
   to the contrary and ?the rule of decision in cases where
   the parties are muslims shall be the muslim personal law
   (Shariat). This provision requires the court before which       F
   any question relating to, inter-a/ia, dissolution of marriage
   is in issue and where the parties are muslims to apply
   the muslim personal law (shariat) irrespective of any
   contrary custom or usage. This is an injunction upon the
   court (See: C. Mohd. Yunus v. Syed Unnissa:(1962) 1             G
   SCR 67). What is also of great significance is the
   expression - 'dissolution of marriage, including talaq, i/a,
   zihar, /ian, •khula and mubaraat. This gives statutory
   recognition to the fact that under muslim personal law, a
                                                                   H
    490       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2014) 10 S.C.R.


A         dissolution of marriage can be brought about by various
          means, only one of which is talaq. Although is/am
          considers divorce to be odious and abominable, yet it is
          permissible on grounds of pragmatism, at the core of
          which is the concept of an irretrievably broken marriage.
B         An elaborate lattice of modes of dissolution of marriage
          has been put in place, though with differing amplitude and
          width under the different schools, in an attempt to take
          care of all possibilities. Khu/a, for example, is the mode
          of dissolution when the wife does not want to continue with
c         the marital tie. She proposes to her husband for
          dissolution of the marriage. This may or may not
          accompany her offer to give something in return.
          Generally, the wife offers to give up her claim to Mahr
          (dower). Khu/a is a divorce which proceeds from the wife
          which the husband cannot refuse subject only to
D
          reasonable negotiation with regard to what the wife has
          offered to give him in return. Mubaraat is where both the
          wife and husband decide to mutually put an end to their
          marital tie. Since this is divorce by mutual consent there
          is no necessity for the wife to give up or offer anything to
E         the husband. It is important to note that both under khula
          and mubaraat there is no need for specifying any reason
          for the divorce. It takes place if the wife (in the case of
          khula) or the wife and husband together (in the case of
          mubaraat) decide to separate on a no fault/no blame
F         basis. Resort to khula (and to a lesser degree, mubaraat)
          as a mode of dissolution of marriage is quite common
          in India."

       14. From the discussion aforesaid, what we find is that
G 'Khula' is a mode of dissolution of marriage when the wife does
  not want to continue with the marital tie. To settle the matter
  privately, the wife need only to consult a Mufti Ouris co'nsult) of
  her school. The Mufti gives ,his fatwa or advisory decision based
  on the Shariat of his school. Further, if the wife does not want
H to continue with marital tie and takes mode of 'Khula' for
                               ---
  JUVERIA ABDUL MAJID PATNI v. ATIF IQBAL  491
MANSOORI [SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.]
dissolution of marriage, she is required to propose her husband      A
for dissolution of marriage. This may or may not accompany
her offer to give something in return. The wife may offer to give
up her claim to Mahr (dower). The 'Khula' is a mode of divorce
which proceeds from the wife, the husband cannot refuse
subject only to reasonable negotiation with regard to what the       B
wife has offered to give him in return. The Mufti gives his fatwa
or advisory decision based on the Shariat of his school.
However, if the matter is carried to the point of litigation and
cannot be settled privately then the Qazi(Judge) is required to
deliver a qaza Oudgment) based upon the Shariat.                     c
     15. In the present case, the appellant stated that she has
obtained an ex parte 'Khula' on 9th May, 2008 from Mufti under
the Muslim Personal Law. Neither it is pleaded nor it is made
clear by the appellant or the 1st respondent as to whether for
such 'Khula' the appellant made a proposal to husband-1st            D
respondent for dissolution of marriage accompanied by an offer
to give something in return. It has not been made clear that
whether the appellant gave up her claim to Mahr(dower). The
husband, 1st respondent has nQt accepted 'Khula' given by
Mufti Ourisconsult) which is in the form of fatwa or advisory        E
decision based on the Shariat. He, however, has not moved
before the Qazi (Judge) to deliver a qaza Oudgment) based
upon the Shariat. Instead, he has moved before the Family
Court, Sandra against the 'Khula' by filing petition-M.J. Petition
No.B-175 of 2008. He has also prayed for restitution of conjugal     F
right. Therefore, with no certainty, it can be stated that the
divorce was taken on 9th May, 2008.

    16. In Shamim Ara vs. State of U.P. and Anr., (2002) 7
SCC 518, this Court considered valid 'Talaq' in Islamic Law.         G
This Court while discussing the correct law of 'Talaq, as
ordained by the Holy Quran observed that Talaq must be for a
reasonable cause and be preceded by attempts at
reconciliation between the husband and the wife by two arbiters
- one from the wife's family and the other from the husband's;       H
    492      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2014] 10 S.C.R.


A   if the attempts fail Talaq may be effected. The Court further held
    that the Talaq to be effective has to be pronounced.

          17. In the said case, the muslim woman claimed
    maintenance under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal
B   Procedure, 1973. The husband - respondent No.2 in his written
    statement filed in proceedings under Section 125, Cr.P.e-.
    alleged his wife, the applicant under Section 125 Cr.P.C. to be
    sharp, shrewd and mischievous and stated that he divorced her
    on 11th July, 1987 being fed up with all such activities
C   unbecoming of the wife. This Court noticed that the particulars
    of the alleged Talaq were not pleaded and even during the trial,
    the husband, examining himself, adduced no evidence in proof
    of Talaq said to have been given by him on 11th July, 1987. It
    was further observed that there were no reasons substantiated
    in justification of Talaq and no plea or proof that any effort at
D   reconciliation preceded Talaq. Subsequently, it was held that
    there is no proof of Talaq for having been taken place on 11th
    July, 1987. What the High Court has upheld as Talaq is the plea
    taken in the written statement and its communication to the wife
    by delivering a copy of the written statement on 5th December,
E   1990. This Court held that a mere plea taken in the written
    statement of a divorce having been pronounced sometime in
    the past cannot by itself be treated as effectuating Talaq on the
    date of delivery of the copy of the written statement to the wife.
    The husband ought to have adduced evidence and proved the
F   pronouncement of Talaq on 11th July, 1987 and if he failed in
    proving the plea raised in the written statement, the plea ought
    to have treated as failed.

       18. In the present case, as noticed that there is no definite
  plea taken either by the appellant or by the 1st respondent that
G 'Khula' become effective in accordance with Muslim Personal
  Law (Shariat). Neither the appellant nor the 1st respondent
  placed any evidence in support of such divorce. No specific
  pleading was made that the appellant proposed to her husband
H - 1st respondent for dissolution of marriage. On the other hand,
   JUVERIA ABDUL MAJID PATNI v. ATIF IQBAL 493
MANSOORI [SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.]
it is clear that the 'Khula' was pronounced by the Mufti ex parte.   A
For the said reason, the 1st respondent challenged the same
by filing M.J. Petition No.B-175 of 2008, before the Family
Court, Sandra. In this background, we hold that the Sessions
Judge, Sewree, Mumbai by order dated 3rd November, 2012
wrongly observed and held that the appellant is no more wife         B
of the 1st respondent. The High Court has also failed to notice
that no evidence was produced in support of the statement
either made by the appellant or by the 1st respondent. It also
failed to appreciate the fact that the 'Khula' was obtained from
the Mufti and not from Qazi and the same was challenged by           c
the 1st respondent before the Family Court, Sandra, Mumbai
and wrongly upheld the finding of the Sessions Judge.
Therefore, with no certainty, it can be stated that the divorce
has taken place on 9th May, 2008, in absence of pleading,
evidence and finding.
                                                                     D
     19. Even if it is presumed that the appellant has taken
'Khula'(divorce) on 9th May, 2008 and the 1st respondent is
no more the husband, the question arises that in such case
whether the erstwhile-wife can claim one or other relief as
prescribed under Sections 18, 19, 20, 21, 22 and interim relief      E
under Section 23 of the Domestic Violence Act, 2005, if
domestic violence had taken place when the wife lived together
in shared household with her husband through a relationship
in the nature of marriage.
                                                                     F
     20. For determination of such issue, it is desirable to
notice the relevant provisions of the Domestic Violence Act,
2005, as discussed hereunder:

     (20.1) Section 2(a) of the Domestic Violence Act, 2005
defines "aggrieved person" as follows:                               G

      "2(a)"aggrieved person" means any woman who is, or
            has been, in a domestic relationship with the
            respondent and who alleges to have been
                                                                     H
    494       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2014] 10 S.C.R.


A                subjected to any act of domestic violence by the
                 respondent;"

        Therefore, it is clear that apart from the woman who is in
    a domestic relationship, any woman who has been, in a
    domestic relationship with the respondent, if alleges to have
8
    been subjected to act of domestic violence by the respondent
    comes within the meaning of "aggrieved person".

          (20.2) Definition of Domestic relationship reads as follows:

c          "2(f)"domestic relationship" means a relationship
                 between two persons who live or have, at any point
                 of time, lived together in a shared household, when
                 they are related by consanguinity, marriage, or
                 through a relationship in the nature of marriage,
D                adoption or are family members living together as
                 a joint family;
       From the aforesaid provision we find that a person
  aggrieved (wife herein), who at any point of time has lived
  together with husband (1st respondent) in a shared household,
E is also covered by the meaning of "domestic relationship"

          (20.3) Section 2(s) defines "shared household"

          "2(s) "shared household" means a household where
          the person aggrieved lives or at any stage has lived in a
F         domestic relationship either singly or along with the
          respondent and includes such a household whether
          owned or tenanted either jointly by the aggrieved person
          and the respondent, or owned or tenanted by either of
          them in respect of which either the aggrieved person or
G         the respondent or both jointly or singly have any right,
          title, interest or equity and includes such a household
          which may belong to the joint family of which the
          respondent is a member, irrespective of whether the
          respondent or the aggrieved person has any right, title
H
  JUVERIA ABDUL MAJID PATNI v. ATIF IQBAL  495
MANSOORI [SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.]
    or interest in the shared household etc." (s) "shared         A
    household" means a household where the person
    aggrieved Jives or at any stage has lived in a domestic
    relationship either singly or along with the respondent
    and includes such a household whether owned or
    tenanted either jointly by the aggrieved person and the       B
    respondent, or owned or tenanted by either of them in
    respect of which either the aggrieved person or the
    respondent or both jointly or singly have any right, title,
    interest or equity and includes such a household which
    may belong to the joint family of which the respondent is     c
    a member, irrespective of whether the respondent or the
    aggrieved person has any right, title or interest in the
    shared household."

     Therefore, if the 'person aggrieved' (wife herein) at any
stage has lived in a domestic relationship with the respondent    D
(husband herein) in a house, the person aggrieved can claim
a "shared household".

    (20.4) Definition of "Domestic violence" as assigned in
Section 3 reads:                                                  E
    "3. Definition of domestic vio/ence.-For the purposes
    of this Act, any act, omission or commission or conduct
    of the respondent shall constitute domestic violence in
    case it-"
                                                                  F
    (a) harms or injures or endangers the health, safety, life,
    limb or we/I-being, whether mental or physical, of the
    aggrieved person or tends to do so and includes causing
    physical abuse, sexual abuse, verbal and emotional
    abuse and economic abuse; or                                  G

    (b) harasses, harms, injures or endangers the aggrieved
    person with a view to coerce her or any other person
    related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any dowry
    or other property or valuable security; or
                                                                  H
    496            SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [2014] 10 S.C.R.


A         c) has the effect of threatening the aggrieved person or
          any person related to her by any conduct mentioned in
          clause (a) or clause (b); or

          (d) otherwise injures or causes harm, whether physical or
          mental, to the aggrieved person.
B
          Explanation /.-For the purposes of this section,-

          (i) "physical abuse" means any act or conduct which is
          of such a nature as to cause bodily pain, harm, or danger
c         to life, limb, or health or impair the health or development
          of the aggrieved person and includes assault, criminal
          intimidation and criminal force;

          (ii) "sexual abuse" includes any conduct of a sexual
          nature that abuses, humiliates, degrades or otherwise
D         violates the dignity of woman;

           (iii)    "verbal and emotional abuse" includes-

                    (a) insults, ridicule, humiliation, name calling and
E                   insults or ridicule specially with regard to not
                    having a child or a male child; and

                    (b) repeated threats to cause physical pain to any
                    person in whom the aggrieved person is interested.

F          (iv)     "economic abuse" includes-"

                     (a)   deprivation of all or any economic or
                           financial resources to which the aggrieved
                           person is entitled under any Jaw or custom
                           whether payable under an order of a court
G
                           or otherwise or which the aggrieved person
                           requires out of necessity including, but not
                           limited to, household necessities for the
                           aggrieved person and her children; if any,
                           stridhan, property, jointly or separately
H
  JUVERIA ABDUL MAJID PATNI v. ATIF IQBAL  497
MANSOORI [SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.]
                  owned by the aggrieved person, payment of         A
                  rental related to the shared household and
                  maintenance;

            (b)   disposal of household effects, any
                  alienation of assets whether movable or
                                                                B
                  immovable, valuables, shares, securities,
                  bonds and the like or other property in which
                  the aggrieved person has an interest or is
                  entitled to use by virtue of the domestic
                  relationship or which may be reasonably
                  required by the aggrieved person or her C
                  children or her stridhan or any other
                  property jointly or separately held by the
                  aggrieved person; and

            (c)   prohibition or restriction to continued access    D
                  to resources or facilities which the
                  aggrieved person is entitled to use or enjoy
                  by virtue of the domestic relationship
                  including access to the shared household.

                  Explanation //.-For the purpose of                E
                  determining whether any act, omission,
                  commission or conduct of the respondent
                  constitutes "domestic violence" under this
                  section, the overall facts and circumstances
                  of the case shall be taken into                   F
                  consideration."

     Therefore, apart from 'physical abuse' and 'sexual abuse',
'verbal and emotional abuse' and 'economic abuse' also
constitute 'domestic violence'.                                     G

     21. Chapter IV of the Domestic Violence Act, 2005 deals
with "Procedure for obtaining the orders of reliefs". Section 12
relates to the application to Magistrate, which reads as follows:

     "Section 12. Application to Magistrate.-(1) An                 H
    498      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2014] 10 S.C.R.


A         aggrieved person or a Protection Officer or any other
          person on behalf of the aggrieved person may present
          an application to the Magistrate seeking one or more
          reliefs under this Act:

          Provided that before passing any order on such
B         application, the Magistrate shall take into consideration
          any domestic incident report received by him from the
          Protection Officer or the service provider.

          (2) The relief sought for under sub-section (1) may
c         include a relief for issuance of an order for payment of
          compensation or damages without prejudice to the right
          of such person to institute a suit for compensation or
          damages for the injuries caused by the acts of domestic
          violence committed by the respondent:
D
          Provided that where a decree for any amount as
          compensation or damages has been passed by any
          court in favour of the aggrieved person, the amount, if
          any, paid or payable in pursuance of the order made by
          the Magistrate under this Act shall be set off against the
E         amount payable under such decree and the decree shall,
          notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil
          Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), or any other law for the time
          being in force, be executable for the balance amount, if
          any, left after such set off.
F
          (3) Every application under sub-section (1) shall be in
          such form and contain such particulars as may be
          prescribed or as nearly as possible thereto.

          (4) The Magistrate shall fix the first date of hearing, which
G
          shall not ordinarily be beyond three days from the date
          of receipt of the application by the court.

          (5) The Magistrate shall endeavour to dispose of every
          application made under sub-section (1) within a period
H         of sixty days from the date of its first hearing."
  JUVERIA ABDUL MAJID PATNI v. ATIF IQBAL  499
MANSOORI [SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.]
    22. As per proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 12, the       A
Magistrate before passing any order under Section 12 is
required to take into consideration any domestic incident report
received by him from the Protection Officer or the service
provider.
                                                                   8
    23. The reliefs which can be granted by the Magistrate
under the Domestic Violence Act, 2005 are as follows:

      (i)     Right to reside in a shared household - Section
              17;
                                                                   c
      (ii)    Protection orders - Section 18 ;

      (iii)   Residence orders - Section 19 ;

      (iv)    Monetary relief - Section 20 ;
                                                                   D
      (v)     Custody orders - Section 21 ;
      (vi)    Compensation orders - Section 22 and

      (vii) Interim and ex parte orders - Section 23.
                                                                   E
     24. In the instant case, the appellant sought relief under
Sections 18 to 23 of the Domestic Violence Act, 2005. It
includes Protection order under Section 18, Monetary relief
under Section 20, Custody orders under Section 21,
Compensation under Section 22 and interim relief under             F
Section 23. Relevant provisions read as follows:

    "Section 20.Monetary reliefs.-(1) While disposing of
    an application under sub-section (1) of section 12, the
    Magistrate may direct the respondent to pay monetary
    relief to meet the expenses incurred and losses suffered       G
    by the aggrieved person and any child of the aggrieved
    person as a result of the domestic violence and such
    relief may include but is not limited to-

      (a)     the loss of earnings;                                H
    500          SUPREME COURT REPORTS            [2014] 10 S.C.R.


A          (b)    the medical expenses;

           (c)    the loss caused due to the destruction, damage
                  or removal of any property from the control of the
                  aggrieved person; and
B          (d)    the maintenance for the aggrieved person as well
                  as her children, if any, including an order under
                  or in addition to an order of maintenance under
                  section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
                  1973 (2 of 1974) or any other law for the time
c                 being in force.

          (2) The monetary relief granted under this section shall
          be adequate, fair and reasonable and consistent with the
          standard of living to which the aggrieved person is
0         accustomed.

          (3) The Magistrate shall have the power to order an
          appropriate lump sum payment or monthly payments of
          maintenance, as the nature and circumstances of the
          case may require.
E
          (4) The Magistrate shall send a copy of the order' for
          monetary relief made under sub-section (1) to the parties
          to the application and to the in-charge of the police
          station within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the
F         respondent resides.

          (5) The respondent shall pay the monetary relief granted
          to the aggrieved person within the period specified in the
          order under sub-section (1).

G         (6) Upon the failure on the part of the respondent to make
          payment in terms of the order under sub-section (1), the
          Magistrate may direct the employer or a debtor of the
          respondent, to directly pay to the aggrieved person or to
          deposit with the court a portion of the wages or salaries
H         or debt due to or accrued to the credit of the respondent,
  JUVERIA ABDUL MAJID PATNI v. ATIF IQBAL  501
MANSOORI [SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.]
    which amount may be adjusted towards the monetary                  A
    relief payable by the respondent."

      The Monetary relief as stipulated under Section 20 is
different from maintenance, which can be in addition to an order
of maintenance under Section 125 of the Cr.P.C. or any other
                                                                       8
law. Such monetary relief can be granted to meet the expenses
incurred and losses suffered by the aggrieved person and child
of the aggrieved person as a result of the domestic violence,
which is not dependent on the question whether the aggrieved
person, on the date of filing of the application under Section         C
12 is in a domestic relationship with the respondent.

      25.   "Section 22. Compensation orders.-ln addition
            to other reliefs as may be granted under this Act,
            the Magistrate may on an application being made
            by the aggrieved person, pass an order directing D
            the respondent to pay compensation and
            damages for the injuries, including mental torture
            and emotional distress, caused by the acts of
            domestic violence committed by that respondent.
                                                                       E
            Section 23. Power to grant interim and ex parte
            orders.-(1) In any proceeding before him under
            this Act, the Magistrate may pass such interim
            order as he deems just and proper.

              (2) If the Magistrate is satisfied that an application   F
              prima facie discloses that the respondent is
              committing, or has committed an act of domestic
              violence or that there is a likelihood that the
              respondent may commit an act of domestic
              violence, he may grant an ex parte order on the          G
              basis of the affidavit in such form, as may be
            . prescribed, of the aggrieved person under section
              18, section 19, section 20, section 21 or, as the
              case may be, section 22 against the respondent."
                                                                       H
    502      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2014) 10 S.C.R.


A       Therefore, it is well within the jurisdiction of the Magistrate
  to grant the interim ex parte relief as he deems just and proper,
  if the Magistrate is satisfied that the application prima facie
  discloses that the respondent is committing, or has
  committed an act of domestic violence or that there is a
B likelihood that the respondent may commit an act of domestic
  violence.

       26. It is not necessary that relief available under Sections
  18, 19, 20, 21 and 22 can only be sought for in a proceeding
C under Domestic Violence Act, 2005. Any relief available under
  the aforesaid provisions may also be sought for in any legal
  proceeding even before a Civil Court and Family Court, apart
  from the Criminal Court, affecting the aggrieved person whether
  such proceeding was initiated before or after commencement
  of the Domestic Violence Act. This is apparent from Section
D 26 of the Domestic Violence Act, 2005 as quoted hereunder:

          "26. Relief in other suits and legal proceedings.-(1)
          Any relief available under sections 18, 19, 20, 21 and 22
          may a/so be sought in any legal proceeding, before a civil
E         court, family court or a criminal court, affecting the
          aggrieved person and the respondent whether such
          proceeding was initiated before or after the
          commencement of this Act.

                 (2) Any relief referred to in sub-section (1) may be
F         sought for in addition to and along with any other relief
          that the aggrieved person may seek in such suit or legal
          proceeding before a civil or criminal cowt."

               (3) In case any relief has been obtained by the
G         aggrieved person in any proceedings other than a
          proceeding under this Act, she shall be bound to inform
          the Magistrate of the grant of such relief."

       27. Appellant has filed an F.l.R. against the 1st Respondent
H for the offence committed under Section 498A of l.P.C4 The
  JUVERIA ABDUL MAJID PATNI v. ATIF IQBAL  503
MANSOORI [SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.]
High Court refused to quash the F.l.R. qua 1st respondent on        A
the ground that prima facie case has been made out. Even
before the Criminal Court where such case under Section-498A
is pending, if allegation is found genuine, it is always open to
the appelfant to ask for reliefs under Sections 18 to 22 of the
Domestic Violence Act and Interim relief under Section 23 of        B
the said Act.

     28. In V.D. Bhanot vs. Savita Bhanot, (2012) 3 SCC 183,
this Court held that the conduct of the parties even prior to the
coming into force of the Protection of Women from Domestic
Violence Act, 2005 could be taken into consideration while          C
passing an order under Sections 18, 19 and 20 thereof. The
wife who had shared a household in the past, but was no longer
residing with her husband can file a petition under Section 12
if subjected to any act of domestic violence. In V.D. Bhanot
(supra) this Court held as follows:                                 D

    "12. We agree with the view expressed by the High Court
    that in looking into a complaint under Section 12 of the
    PWD Act, 2005, the conduct of the parties even prior to
    the coming into force of the PWD Act, could be taken into       E
    consideration while passing an. order under Sections 18,
    19 and 20 thereof. In our view, the Delhi High Court has
    also rightly held that even if a wife, who had shared a
    household in the past, but was no longer doing so when
    the Act came into force, would still be entitled to the         F
    protection of the PWD Act, 2005.

     29. In lnderjit Singh Grewal (supra) the appellant-lnderjit
Singh and the respondent no. 2 of the said case got married
on 23rd September, 1998. The parties to !he marriage could
not pull on well together and decided to get divorce and,           G
therefore, filed a case for Divorce by mutual consent under
Section 13-8 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. After recording
the statement in the said case, the proceedings were adjourned
for a period of more than six months to enable them to ponder
over the issue. The parties again appeared before the Court         H
    504      SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2014] 10 S.C.R.


A on second motion and on the basis of their statement, tile
  District Judge, Ludhiana vide judgment and order dated 20th
  March, 2008 allowed the petition and dissolved their marriage.
  After dissolution of marriage, the wife filed a complaint before
  the Senior Superintendent of Police, Ludhiana against lnderjit
B Singh under the provisions of the Domestic Violence Act
  alleging that the decree of divorce obtained by them was a
  sham transaction. It was further alleged that even after getting
  divorce both of them had been living together as husband and
  wife. In the said case, the Superintendent of Police, City I
c conducted the full-fledged inquiry and reported that the parties
  had been living separately after the dissolution of the marriage.
  Hence, no case is made out against the lnderjit Singh. In this
  context, this Court held that Section 12- -'Application to
  Magistrate" under the Domestic Violence Act challenging the
D said divorce was not maintainable and in the interest of justice
  and to stop the abuse of process of Court, the petitions under
  Section 482 Cr.P.C. was allowed. The law laid down in the said
  case is not applicable for the purpose of determination of the
  present case.

E        30. In the present case, the alleged domestic violence took
  place between January, 2006 and 6th September, 2007 when
  FIR No.224 of 2007 was lodged by the appellant under Section
  498A and 406 IPC against the 1st respondent and his relatives.
  In a writ petition filed by 1st respondent the High Court refused
F to quash the said FIR against him observing that prima facie
  case under Section 498A was made out against him. Even if
  it is accepted that the appellant during the pendency of the SLP
  before this Court has obtained ex parte Khula (divorce) under
  the Muslim Personal Law from the Mufti on 9th May, 2008, the
G petition under Section 12 of the Domestic Violence Act, 2005
  is maintainable ..

      31. An act of domestic violence once committed,
  subsequent decree of divorce will not absolve the liability of the
H respondent from the offence committed or to deny the benefit
  JUVERIA ABDUL MAJID PATNI v. ATIF IQBAL  505
MANSOORI [SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.]
to which the aggrieved person is entitled under the Domestic        A
Violence Act, 2005 including monetary relief under Section 20,
Child Custody under Section 21, Compensation under Section
22 and interim or ex parte order under Section 23 of the
Domestic Violence Act, 2005.
                                                                    B
     32. Both the Sessions Judge and the High Court failed to
notice the aforesaid provisions of the Act and the fact that the
FIR was lodged much prior to the alleged divorce between the
parties and erred in holding that the petition under Section 12
was not maintainable.
                                                                    c
     33. For the reasons aforesaid, we set aside the impugned
judgment dated 23rd January, 2013 passed by the High Court
of Judicature at Bombay in Writ Petition No.4250 of 2012, the
order dated 3rd November, 2012 passed by the Additional
Sessions Judge, Mumbai and uphold the order dated 4th               D
February, 2012 passed by the Addi. Chief Metropolitan
Magistrate, 46th Court at Mazgaon, Mumbai. The 1st
respondent is directed to pay the amount, if not yet paid, in
accordance with order passed by the Magistrate. The
Magistrate will now proceed with the matter and finally dispose     E
of the petition under Section 12 of the Domestic Violence Act
after going through the report and hearing the parties.

     34. The appeal is allowed with aforesaid observations and
directions.
Rajendra Prasad                                   Appeal allowed.