JUMMAN KHANversusSTATE OF U.P.

A                              JUMMAN KHAN
                                        v.
                               STATE OF U.P.

                            NOVEMBER 30, 1990
B
        [S. RATNAVEL PANDIAN AND K. JAYACHANDRA
                                  ~EDDY, JJ.]

         Indian Penal Code, 1860: Section 302-Murder--Death sentence
    Constitutional validity of.

c          Criminal Procedure Code, 1973: Sections 235(2)-Sentence-
    Pre-tf.ecisional opportunity of hearing to accused-Statutory mandate-
    Not a mere formality strict compliance required.

          Sections 368, 413, 414 and 415-Sentence of death-Whether
    open to review-Undue delay in execution-Subsequent supervening
D
    circumstances warranting interference.

         Constitution of India, 1950: Article 21: Capital punishment-
    Constitutional validity of.

         Practice & Procedure: New plea-raising of-For the first time-
E   Permissibility of.

          The petitioner was charged with rape and murder of his neigh-
    bonr's six year old daughter. As per the post-mortem report, the victim
    was hrutually raped and strangulated to death. The Trial Court found
    the petitioner guilty under both the charges and sentenced hbu to
F   undergo life imprisonment under Section 376 IPC and to death under
    Section 302 IPC. On an appeal preferred by him, the High Court con-
    firmed the conviction and sentences passed by the Trial Court.

          Aggrieved by the judgment of the High Court, the petitioner filed
    a special leave petition which was dismissed by this Court. Thereafter        t
G   he presented a mercy petition and the Governor rejected the same. The
    petitioner filed a review petition against the rejection of his mercy peti-   t
    tion. The execution was stayed initially, but the stay was vacated, later.
    The petitioner addressed a mercy petition to the President of India and
    it was rejected. Snbseqnent mercy petition to the President also met the
    same fate.
H

                                        398
                    JUMMAN KHAN v. STATE OF U.P.                       399

       In the present writ petition, the petitioner contended that there      A
was substantial non-compliance with the mandatory provisions of
Section 235(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1973, vitiating the
imposition of the sentence of death; that the constitutional validity of
capital punishment upheld by this Court in Bachan Singh's case [1980]
2 sec 684 deserved to be reviewed by a larger Bench since it was just
and necessary that the vires of Section 302 IPC has to be re-examined         B
taking into account all subsequent decisions of this Court rendered in
the context of Article 21 of the Constitution; that since there has been an
undue delay in consideration of the mercy petitions submitted by the
petitioner praying for clemency both to the President as well as the
Governor, the petitioner was entitled for commutation of the death
sentence to one of imprisonment for life.                                     C

      Dismissing the writ petition, this Court,

      HELD: 1.1. The sentence in every criminal case when confirmed
by this Court is justified and, therefore, normally it is not open for
review or reconsideration. However, this Court on several occasions in        D
appropriate cases, even after the imposition of sentence of death
reached its finality, has commuted the sentence to one of life imprison-
ment by exercising its extraordinary powers when this Court felt that
the execution of that sentence was not justified on account of the subse-
quent supervening circumstances namely, the undue long delay which
has elapsed since the confirmation of this sentence by this Court. This is    E
based on the principle that sentence of death is something and the
sentence of death followed by lengthy imprisonment prior to execution
is another. [406F-H]

      1.2. In the instant case, there is no undue delay and so the sen-
tence of death imposed on the petitioner does not call for interference on    F
the ground of delay in execution of the death sentence. [404E]

      Sher Singh v. State of Punjab, [1983] 2 SCC 344 and Triveniben v.
State of Gujarat, [1989] 1 SCC 678, followed.

      T. V. Vatheeswaran v. State of Tamil Nadu, [1983] 2 SCC 68,             G
referred to.

    2. Death sentence is constitutionally valid. The decision in
Bachan Singh's case needs no reconsideration. [405E-F]

      Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, [1980] 2 SCC 684, aff'trmed.           H
    400          SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [1990] Supp. 3 S.C.R.

          Sher Singh v. State of Punjab, [1983] 2 SCC 344; A//audin Mian
A
    v. State of Bihar, [1989] 3 SCC 5 and Triveniben v. State of Gujarat,
    [1989] l sec 678, relied on.             ;'

          3.1. The mandatory provision of Section 235(2) of the Criminal
    Procedure Code, 1973 provides that the accused must be given an
B   apportunity in regard to the sentence and it is only after hearing him
    the Court has to pass the sentence according to law. The strict comp·
    liance of this provision is a statutory mandate but not a mere formality
    and so it must be scrupulously followed in its true spirit. [404D)

          3.2 ln the instant case, the plea that Section 235(2) of the Crimi·
    nal Procedure Code was not complied with, bas been raised for the first
c   time. Since the Trial Court bad in fact heard the petitioner on the
    question of sentence, but of course on the same day, such a new plea
    cannot be accepted at this stage. [404E-F)

          Santa Singh v. State of Punjab, [1977] l SCR 229; Muniappan v.
D   State of Tamil Nadu, [1981] 3 SCR 270 and Allaudin Mian v. State of
    Bihar, [1989] 3 SCC 5, relied on.

         4. On the basis of the relevant records, there is absolutely no
    ground for reconsideration of the orders of the President rejecting the
    mercy petitions in this case. [409F]
E
        Kehar Singh and Another v. Union of India and Another, [1989) 1
    sec 204, referred to.                                                       '
             ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition (Cr!.) No. 493 of
     1988.
F
             (Under Article 32 of the Constitution oflndia).

           R.K. Jain, S.R. Bhat, Ms. Abha R. Sharma and Alok Agarwal
     for the Petitioner.

G         V.C. Mahajan, Dalveer Bhandari, Prashant Chowdhary, Ms.
     Anil Katiyar and Ms. A Subhashini for the Respondent.

             The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

          S. RATNAVEL PANDIAN, J. To be or not to be hanged"-is the
H    tormenting question that comes up for consideration in this present
     Writ Petition.
               JUMMAN KHAN v. _STATE OF U.P. [PANDIAN, J.]              401


           The petitioner, Jumman Khan who is facing the gallows on being
                                                                               A
    condemned to death is seeking issuance of a writ of mandamus com-
    manding the respondent (State of (U .P.) through its Secretary, Home
    Department not to carry out the sentence of death awarded to him in
    case No. 367 /84 by the Additional District and Sessions Judge, Agra as
    confirmed by the judgment and order of the High Court of Allahabad
    as well as the order of this Court dated 20.3.1986, dismissing the         B
    Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 558/86 and also for a direction
    directing the respondent to commute the sentence of death to one of
    imprisonment for life. The indubitable factual matrix leading to the
    filing of the present Writ Petition may be re-capitulated.

          On the fateful day of the occurrence i.e. 22.6.1983 at about 4.00
    P .M. the petitioner went to the house of his neighbour Ausaf Khan
                                                                               c
    while he was away and requested Dulhey Kb~ Begum, wife of Ausaf
    Khan to allow her six years old daughter, Sakina who an unfor!unate
    victim in this case, on the pretext that he wanted her to bring some ice
    from the market. Dulhey Khan begum allowed her daughter to
    accompany the petitioner and fell asleep. When she woke up after           D
    about an hour, she found that her daughter had not returned. Though
    at first, she thought that Sakina might be playing along with other
    children in the neighbourhood outside the house, as time passed by she
    became panicky. Finding the child not returned, she made a futile
    search. When she went to the petitioner's house, it was found locked.
    After her husband returned from work at 7 .00 P .M. an unsuccessful        E
    incisive and frantic search for the child was made in the neighbour-
    hood. Hearing the information of the missing of the child, a crowd
    collected. When Ausaf Khan again went to the petitioner's house in
    search of his daughter, he was told by a neighbour that at about 4.30
    P.M. when he was passing by the petitioner's house he noticed Sakina
    entering that house with ice wrapped in a cloth and the petitioner         F
    taking her inside holding her hands. One of the persons of the locality
    further informed Ausaf Khan that while he was passing the petitioner's
    house, he heard the screaming of a child emanating from the house of
    the petitioner. The irate crowd went to the petitioner's house and
    flashed a torch through the crevice in the door and found a dead body
    lying on a cot wrapped in a veil (burka). Then the public effected entry   G
'   and shcokingly found that it was the dead body of Sakina with exten-
    sive markets of injuries on her body. Ausaf Khan made a written
    report on the basis of which a case was registered under Section 302
    and 376 IPC. The petitioner was arrested at Aligarh on 25.6.1983. The
    post-martem examination of Sakina revealed that she had been brut-
    ally raped and strangulated to death. The police after completing the      H
    402         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [1990] Supp. 3 S.C.R.

    investigatfon filed the charge-sheet. The petitioner took his trial under
A
    charges 376 and 302 IPC. The Trial Court found the petitioner guilty
    under both the charges and sentenced him to life imprisonment under
    Section 376 IPC and to death under Section 302 IPC. The High Court
    on appeal confirmed the conviction and sentences passed by the Trial
    Court, holding as follows:
B
                "Considering the nature and most gruesome and beastly
                act perpetrated by the appellant, the appellant deserves no
                leniency. He had committed premeditated rape on a help-
                less child aged about six years and he had gone to the
                extent of strangulating her to death."
c         Feeling aggrieved by the judgment of the High Court, the
    petitioner filed SLP (Criminal) No. 558/86. This Court by its Order
    dated 20th March 1986 dismissed the SLP observing thus:

                "Although the conviction of the petitioner under Section
D               302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 rests on circumstantial
                evidence, the circumstantial evidence against the petitioner
                leads to no other inference except that of his guilt and
                excludes every hypothesis of his innocence. Apart from the
                circumstances brought out by the prosecution, each one of
                which has been proved, there is no extra-judicial confes-
E               sion which lends support to the prosecution case that the
                child had been raped by the petitioner and thereafter
                strangulated to death.

                Failure to impose a death sentence in such grave cases
                where it is a crime against the society-particularly in cases
F               of murders committed with extreme brutality-will bring to
                naught the sentence of death provided by S. 302 of the
                Indian Penal Code. It is the duty of the Court to impose a
                proper punishment depending upon the degree of crimina-
                lity and desirability to impose such punishment. The only
                punishment which the appellant deserves for having
G               committed the reprehensible and gruesome murder of the
                innocent child to satisfy his lust, is nothing but death as a
                measure of social necessity and also a means of deterring
                other potential offenders. The sentence of death is
                confirmed."

H         The petitioner presented a mercy petition dated 12.4.1986 pray-
                JUMMAN KHAN v. STATE OF U.P. [PANDIAN, J.]               403

    ing for clemency but it was rejected by the Governor on 18,2.1988 as
                                                                                A
    seen from the connected files produced from the Home Ministry. The
    petitioner filed a review petition against the order of rejection of his
    mercy petition. Though initially there was a stay of his execution, the
    stay was vacated on 6/7th November 1988. The mercy petition addres-
    sed to the President of India was received in the Ministry of Home
    Affairs along with the connected papers on 28.3.1988 and the same           B
    was rejected by the President on 10.6.1988. Subsequently, another
    mercy petition dated 15. 7 .1988 addressed to the President was
    received by the Ministry of Home Affairs through the State Govern-
    ment and the same was also rejected in the month of October 1988.
    While it is so, the petitioner filed this Writ Petition. This Court by an
    Order dated 10.11.1988 stayed the execution and thus the sentence of
    death imposed on the petitioner is now under suspension consequent          c
    upon the stay order.

          Mr. Jain, the learned senior counsel, appearing on behalf of the
    petitioner though initially advanced an argument that capital punish-
    ment should not be imposed in a case where the conviction is based          D
    exclusively on circumstantial evidence, did not press that argument
    when it was brought to his notice that such an argument is not available
    to him, in the present case on the face of the dismissal of the S.L.P. by
    this Court confirming the death sentence on the basis of the circum·
    stantial evidence and that judgment is not open for review. However,
    he strongly pressed the following submissions in support of the reliefs     E
    sought for, namely:

          ( 1) There was Substantial non-compliance with the mandatory
          provisions of Section 235(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure
          of 1973, vitiating the imposition of the sentence of death.
                                                                                 F
          (2) Drawing strength on the dissenting judgment of P.N.
          Bhagwati, J (as he then was) Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab,



•
          [ 1982] 3 SCC 24 holding that Section 302 of the Indian Penal
          Code in so far as it provides for imposition of death penalty as an
          alternative to life imprisonment is ultra-vires and void as being
          violative of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution, since it does not G
          provide any legislative guidelines when life should be permitted to
          be extinguished by imposition of death sentence, Mr. Jain pleaded
          that the judgment of the majority in Bachan Singh's case [1980] 2
          SCC 684 deserves to be reviewed by a larger Bench in view of the
          fact that the said decision which upheld the death penalty was
          rendered in the context of a far more restrictive interpretation of H
    404         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [1990] Supp. 3 S.C.R.

          Article 21 and, therefore, it is not only proper, but also just and
A
          necessary that the vires of Section 302 !PC has to be re-examined
          taking into account all subsequent decisions of this Court
          rendered in the context of Article 21, the dimensions of which
          have been truly expanded in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India,
          (1978] 2 SCR 621 and Suni/ Batra v. Delhi Administration, [1979]
B         1SCR392.

          (3) As there has been an undue delay in consideration of the
          mercy petitions submitted by the petitioner praying for clemency
          both to President as well as the Governor, the petitioner is
          entitled for commutation of the death sentence to one of impris-
          onment for life.
c
          Now we shall examine the above submissions in seriatim. The
    mandatory provision of Section 235(2) of the Code provides that the
    accused must be given an opportunity in regard to the sentence and it
    is only after hearing him the Court has to pass the sentence according
D   to law. The strict compliance of this provision is a statutory mandate
    but not a mere formality and so it must be scrupulously followed iii its
    true spirit. See Santa Singh v. State of Punjab, [!977] l SCR 229;
    Muniappan v. State of Tamil Nadu, [ 1981] 3 SCR 270 and Allauddin
    Mian v. State of Bihar, [1989] 3 SCC 5.

E         Admittedly, the present contention that Section 235(2) of the
    Code has not been complied with, was neither raised before the High
    Court nor before this Court in the SLP. Moreover, this plea has not
    been taken initially even in the present Writ Petition, but only in
    additional grounds. Mr. Dalveer Bhandari, learned counsel appearing
    on behalf of the respondent drew our attention to the relevant portion
F   of the judgment and order of the Trial Court whereunder the Trial
    Court after finding the appellant guilty under both the charges made a
    note that the appellant would be heard about the sentence by 2.30
    P.M. In the same judgment, there is another note reading that at 2.30
    P.M. the appellant was heard on the question of sentence and besides
    the learned counsel appearing for the appellant was also permitted to
G   address arguments on that question.

          In addition to that Mr. Dalveer Bhandari stated that the
    petitioner has not been prejudiced in any manner nor any prejudice to
    the petitioner by such a course has been shown now to this Court and
    hence this arugment cannot be countenanced. Having. regard to the
H   facts that this plea is raised only for the first time and that the Trial
            JUMMAN KHAN v. STATE OF U.P. [PANDIAN, J.]               405

Court in fact has heard the petitioner on the question of sentence, but
of course on the same day, we hold that this submission made on             A
behalf of the petitioner does not merit consideration.

       Mr. Jain, advocating the views of abolitionists contended with
vehemence and persistence that death penalty is not only outmoded,
unreasonable, cruel or unusual punishment but also defiles 'the dignity     B
of the individual' within the preamble to the Constitution and also
violates the basic structure of the Constitution. Added to that, the
learned counsel with strong intensity of conviction made a fervent but
inexorable plea that the question of death penalty cannot be fore-
closed for ever on the doctrine of stare decisis and that that question
still needs reconsideration by a larger Bench afresh, especially in view
of the expanding horizon of Article 21 of the Constitution which Arti-      c
cle stands like sentinel over human misery, degradation and oppres-
sion. According to the learned counsel, unfortunately all those deci-
sions upholding the constitutional validity of the sentence of death
becloud more than they clarify the constitutionality of capital
punishment.                                                                 D
       Be it noted, save the dissenting view of Bhagwati, J (as he then
was) in Bachan Singh's case (the majority judgment of which is
reported in [1980) 2 SCC 684 with a dissenting order of Bhagwati, J
and the full text of the dissenting view of the learned Judge is reported
in [ 1982] 3 SCC 24 not even a single decision of this Court which has      E
caused the slightest shadow of doubt on the constitutionality of capital
punishment was brought to our notice. It is pertinent to note that the
submission of the death penalty violates Articles 14 and 21 of the
Constitution was totally negatived by the majority in Bachan Singh's
case (1980] 2 SCC 684. On the other hand Chandrachud, C.J. speaking
for the bench comprised of three Judges in Sher Singh v. State of           F
Punjab, [ 1983) 2 SCC 344 has been assertive in expressing the follow-
ing view with regard to the constitutional validity of death sentence,
which view is as follows:

           "Death sentence is constitutionally valid and permissible
           within the_ constraints of the rule in Bachan Singh. This has G
           to be accepted as the law of the land. We do not, all of us,
           share the views of every one of us. And that is natural
           because, every one of us has his own philosophy of law and
           life, moulded and conditioned by his own assessment of the
           performance and potentials of law and the garnered expe-
           riences of life. But the decisions rendered by this Court H
    406         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [1990] Supp. 3 S.C.R.

                after a full debate have to be accepted without mental
A               reservations until they are set aside."

         The Constitution Bench of this Court in Smt. Triveniben v. State
    of Gujarat, [ 1989] 1 SCC 678 has reaffirmed the constitutional validity
    of death sentence. See also Alluddin's case (albeit). Thus, virtually on
B   every occasion, any challenge touching on the constitutionality of the
    death sentence, it has been asserted affirmatively that the constitution
    does not prohibit the death penalty.

         In A/lauddin's case, this Court has held that "the Judge may visit
    the convict with the extreme punishment provided there exist special
    reasons for so doing" and summarily rejected the plea for setting aside
c   the capital sentence observing:

                "In the face of this statutory provision which is consistent
                with Article 21 of the Constitution which enjoins that the
                personal liberty or life of an individual shall not be taken
D               except according to the procedure established by law, we
                are unable to countenance counsel's extreme submission of.
                death in no case."

          We are in full agreement with the view chronologically expressed
    in Sher Singh's case Bachan Singh's case and Allauddin's case holding
E   that the death sentence is constitutionally valid. In that view, we are of
    the firm opinion that the decision of the majority in Bachan Singh's
    case needs no re-consideration. The submission made by Mr. Jain is
    unpersuasive. In fact, a similar question urged in Ailauddin's case did
    not find favour and it was rejected.

F        The sentence in every criminal case when confirmed by this
    Court is justified and, therefore, normally it is not open for review or
    reconsideration. However, this Court on several occasions in appro-
    priate cases even after the imposition of sentence of death reached its
    finality has commuted that sentence to one of life imprisonment by
    exercising its extaordinary powers when this Court felt that the execu-
G   tion of that sentence was not justified on account of the subsequent
    supervening circumstances namely, the undue long delay which has
    elapsed since the conformation of that sentence by this Court. This is
    based on the principle that sentence of death is something and the
    sentence of death followed by lengthy imprisonment prior to execution
    is another. See Sher Singh's case (albeit).
H
            JUMMAN KHAN >'. STATE OF U.P. [PANDIAN. J.]              407


      The next question that arises for our consideration is whether
                                                                            A
any rigid and inflexible rule can be laid down as to the period of delay
that would be sufficient to justify interference with the sentence
of death and the commutation of that sentence to one of life
imprisonment.
                                               ,
     Chinnappa Reddy, J. ·in T. V. Vatheeswaran v. -State of Tamil          B
Nadu, [1983] 2 SCC 68 while considering the implications of prolonged
delay in execution of sentence of death observed thus:

           "Making all reasonable allowance for the time necessary
           for appeal and consideration of reprieve, we think that
           delay exceeding two years in the execution of a sentence of
           death should be considered sufficient to entitle the person      c
           under sentence of death to invoke Article 21 and demand
           the quashing of the sentence of death."

      The above view was not accepted in Sher Singh's case wherein it
has been held that no hard and fast rule can be laid down as has been       D
done in T. V. Vatheeswaran's case (supra). Further in Sher Singh's case
the following dictum has been laid down:

           ''Therefore, with respect, the fixation of the time limit of
           two years does not seem to us to accord with the common
           experience of the time normally consumed by the litigative       E
           process and the proceedings before the executive.

           Apart from the fact that the rule of two years runs in the
           teeth of common experience as regards the time generally
           occupied by proceedings in the High Court, the Supreme
           Court and before the executive authorities, we are of the        F
           opinion that no absolute or unqualified rule can be laid
           down that in every case in which there is a long delay in the
           execution of a death sentence, the sentence must be sub-
           stituted by the sentence of life imprisonment. There are
           several other factors which must be taken into account
           while considering the question as to whether the death           G
           sentence should be vacated .

            . . . . . Therefore, it is understandable that a convict sen-
           tence to death will take recourse to every remedy which is
           available to him under the law to ask for the commutation
           of his sentence, even after the death sentence is finally        H
    408        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [1990] Supp. 3 S.C.R.

               confirmed by this Court by dismissing his special leave peti-
A              tion or appeal. But, it is, at least, relevant to consider
               whether the delay in the execution of the death sentence is
               attributable to the fact that he has resorted to a series of
               untenable proceedings which have the effect of defeating
               the ends of justice. It is not uncommon that a series of
B              review petitions and writ petitions are filed in this Court to
               challenge judgments and orders which have assumed fina-
               lity, without any seeming justification. Stay orders are
               obtained in those proceedings and then, at the end of it all,
               comes the argument that there has been prolonged delay in
               implementing the judgment or order. We believe that the
               Court called upon to vacate a death sentence on the ground
c              of delay caused in executing that sentence must find why
               the delay was caused and who is responsible for it. If this is
               not done, the law laid down by this Court will become an
               object of ridicule by permitting a person to defeat it by
               resorting to frivolous proceedings in order to delay its imp-
D              lementation. And then, the rule of two years will become a
               handy tool for defeating justice. The death sentence should
               not, as far as possible, be imposed. But, in that rare and
               exceptional class of cases wherein that sentence is upheld
               by this Court, the judgment or order of this Court ought
               not to be allowed to be defeated by applying any rule of
E              thumb."

          The Constitution Bench of this Court in Triveniben's case con-
    sidered in detail the questions relating to, (!) delay in execution of
    sentence of death; (2) what should be the starting pointing for com-
    muting this delay? (3) what are rights of a condemned prisoner who
F   has been sentenced to death but not executed?; and (4) what could be
    the circumstances which could be considered along with the time that
    has been taken before the sentence is executed, and finally recorded
    its conclusion thus:

               "Undue long delay in execution of the sentence of death
G              will entitle the condemned person to approach this Court
               under Article 32 but this Court will only examine the na-
               ture of delay caused and circumstances that ensured after
               sentence was finally confirmed by the judicial process and
               will have no jurisdiction to reopen the conclusions reached
               by the Court while finally maintaining the sentence of
H              death. This Court, however, may consider the question of
            JUMMAN KHAN v. STATE OF U.P. [PANDIAN. i.J                409

            inordinate delay in the light of all circumstances of the case   A
            to decide whether the execution of sentence should be car-
            ried out or should be altered into imprisonment for life. No
            fixed peribd of delay could be held to make tlie sentence of
            death iriexecutable artd to this extent the dedision ill
            Vatheeswatan case cannot be said to lay down the correct
            law and, therefore, to that extent stands overruled.             B

       We shall now examine the submission of Mr. lain and see
Whether thete has been undue delay in the present case which would
be sufficient to justify interference with the sentence of death imposed
on the petitioner. the SLP was disposed of on 28.3.1986. the petition
fot clemency was presented by ihe petitioner on 12.4.1986 which was          C
rejected by the Governor on 18.2.88. It has been stated before us that
the mercy petitioh addressed to the President simultaneously through
the Governor was received in the Ministry of Home Affairs along with
the connected papers on 28.3.8S but the same was rejected by the
President on 10.6.88 i.e. iii less than three months, Meanwhile; on the
review petition presented before the Govefuot, a stay of the execution       D
was granted bUt that stay was vacated on 6/7th November 1988. The
second mercy petition dated 15,7.88 addressed to the President was
also rejected in the month of October 1988. It was only thereafter, he
filed this writ petition on 10.1 L88 and the sentence of death imposed
on him Is kept Under suspension pursuant to the stay order passed by
this Court therefore; the alleged delay when examined in the light of        E
the ptindpies ertliriciated in Triveniben's case we ate constrained to
hold that there is no undue delay and consequently the impugned
sentence of death does not call for irtterference on the ground of delay
In execution of ihe death senterice.          ·

      Lastly, it has been requested by the learned counsel that the F
mercy petitions already rejected by the President tequite .te-consi•
deration as per the ratio in Kehat Singh and Andther v, Union of India
and Another, (1989i 1 sec 204. to examine that request, we sent for
ihe entire file from the Ministry of I-iome Affairs and waded tittougli it
very carefliliy and we are satisfied that there is absolutely no gtound to
accede to this request.                                                    G

      In the tesult; for the above-mentiOiied reasons, we reject ali the
contentions taised ort behalf of the petitioner and dismiss the wtit
petition as devoid of any merit.

                                                      Petition dismissed.    H