Holding

The three‑month limitation period under Section 28‑A begins on the date of the award of the reference court under Section 18, not on the date of any appellate court decision.

Summary

The appellants sought redetermination of compensation for land acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, filing applications under Section 28‑A after the High Court had altered the reference court's award. The Deputy Collector rejected the applications as time‑barred, contending that the three‑month limitation period began on the date of the appellate court's decision rather than the reference court's award. The Supreme Court examined the plain language of Section 28‑A, which mandates that the limitation period be computed from the date of the award by the court disposing of the reference under Section 18. Relying on the statutory scheme and prior decisions, the Court held that the limitation period starts from the reference court's award, not the appellate judgment, and therefore the applications were indeed time‑barred. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed.

Issues considered

From which date does the three‑month limitation period under Section 28‑A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, commence for filing an application for redetermination of compensation – the date of the reference court's award under Section 18 or the date of the appellate court's decision?

Legislation cited

Land Acquisition Act, 1894s. 11, s. 18, s. 26, s. 28-A, s. 2(d), s. 4, s. 54

Subjects

Land acquisitionCompensationRedeterminationLimitation periodSection 28-AReference courtAppellate courtTime‑barred

Judgment

A JOSE ANTONIO CRUZ DOS R. RODRIGUESE AND ANR.
v.
LAND ACQUISITION COLLECTOR AND ANR.

NOVEMBER 20, 1996

B [A.M. AHMADI, CJI., S.B. MAJMUDAR
AND 8.N. KIRPAL, JJ.]

Land Lall's :

Land Acquisition Act, 189~: Section 211-A.
c
Acquisition of Land-Co111pe11satio11-Redeter111ination of-
Limilation of3 months for making app/icalionfor-Held, mus/ be computed
from dale of all'ard of Reference Court on basis of which redetermination
was sought and not ji-om date of order of appellate Court dealing with
D appeal against award of Reference Court.

A certain parcel of land was acquired for a public purpose by a
notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The
Land Acquisition Officer awarded compensation at different rates
for different plots comprising the land under acquisition. On a
E reference made under Section 18 of the Act the reference court
enhanced the rates of compensation for different plots of land. In
appeal, the High Court fixed an uniform rate for all the plots of
land. Thereafter, the appellant submitted an application under Section
28-A of the Act for redetermination of compensation for his plot of
land. The Deputy Collector dismissed the said application as time-
F barred, having been referred after the expiry of three months
prescribed by Section 28-A of the Act. The question before this Court
was whether the period of three months began to run against the
appellant from the date of the Award of the reference court under
Section 18 of the Act or from the date of the decision of the appeal.
G
Dismissing the appeal, this Court

HELD: I.I. The plain language of Section 28-A of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 prescribes the three months period of limitation
to be reckoned from the date "of the award by the Court disposing of
H the reference under Section 18 of the Act and not the appellate Court
910
JOSEANIDNIOCRUZIXlS R. v. LANDACQN.CDLLECTOR[AHMADl,CJ.] 911

dealing with the appeal against the award of the reference Court. A
•• The period of limitation would start to run from the date of the
reference court's order on the basis whereof the redetermination was
sought on the basis of the reference court's order long after three
months even from the time the last order had elapsed and hence the
applications were clearly time-barred. (914 B-GJ
B
Babua Ram v. State of UP., [19951 2 SCC 689; Union of India v.
Kamai/ Singh, [1995) 2 SCC 728 and Union of India v. Pradeep Kumari,
It 9951 2 sec 736, relied on.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 14637 of C
1996 Etc.

From the Judgment and Order dated 5.7.95 of the Bon:bay High
Court in W.P. No. 471 of 1988.

Dhruv Mehta and S.K. Mehta for the Appellants. D
A.S. Nambiar and Ms. A. Subhashini for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

E
AHMADI, CJI. Special Leave granted.

The question which arises for determination in these two appeals is
whether the period of three months prescribed for making an application
for redetermination of the amount of compensation under Section 28-A
of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter called 'the Act') begins to F
run against the applicant from the date of the Award under Section 18 of
the Act or even from the date of the decision of the appeal, if any, preferred
against the Award. In order to appreciate the point raised, we may at once
read Section 28-A insofar as it is relevant:

G
"28-A. Re-determination of the amount of compensation on
the bas;s of the award of the court (l) Where in an award
under this Part, court allows to the applicant any amount of
compensation in excess of the amount awarded by the
Collector under Section 11, the persons interested in all the
other land covered by the same notification under Section 4, H
912 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [l996J SUPP. 8 S.C.R.

A sub-section ( l) and who are also aggrieved by the award of
the Collector may, notwithstanding that they had not made
an application to the Collector under Section 18, by written
.'
application to the Collector within three months from the
date of the award of the Court require that the amount of
compensation payable to them may be re-determined on the
B basis of the amount of compensation awarded by the Court:

Provided that in computing the period of three months within
which an application to the Collector shall be made under
this sub-section the day on which the award was pronounced
and the time requisite, for obtaining a copy of the award
c shall be excluded."

The factual matrix in which the question has to be answered may
now be briefly noticed. By a notification issued under Section 4 of the
Act, dated 3rd October, 1969 and gazetted on the same day, a certain
parcel of land at Cavelossim village, Salcete Taluka in the State of Goa
D was proposed to be acquired for a public purpose, namely, for construction
of an air-to-ground range for the Indian Navy. The possession of the land
was taken by the Government on 2nd April, 1970. The declaration under
-
Section 6 of the Act was made _and published in the gazette on l 0th June,
1971. Thereafter, the Land Acquisition Officer awarded compensation.for
the acquired lands at rates ranging from Rs. 0.75 to Rs. 2.50 per sq.m. for
E different plots comprising the land under acquisition. This award was
made on 2nd August, 1972. A reference was sought and made to the learned
District Judge, LAC No. 420 of 1981, which was disposed of on 24th
June, 1985 whereby the rate for determination of compensation was revised
to Rs. 5 per sq.m. However, in another award made in LAC No. 406 of
F 1981 on 14th October, 1985, compensation was allowed for a different
plot at Rs. 9 per. sq.m. In yet another award, in LAC No. 417 of 1981,
made on the same day, compensation was awarded for another plot at the
rate of Rs. 10 per sq.m. In appeal, the High Court, by its judgment dated
24th February, 1987, reduced the rate to Rs.5 per sq.m. Thereafter, the
appellant in Civil Appe~l arising from S.L.P. No. 24435of1995, applied,
G on 13th May, 1987, under Section 28-A of the Act, for redetermination of
compensation for his plot of land. So also, the appellant in Civil Appeal
arising from S.L.P.No. 24584 of 1995 made a similar application under
Section 28-A of the Act on 28th April, 1987. Both these applications were
dismissed by the Deputy Collector on 3rd September, 1988 as time-barred,
having been preferred after the expiry of the period of three months
H prescribed by the statute. Feeling aggrieved, both the appellants questioned
JOSEANlDN!OCRUZDOSRv.LANDACQN.COLLECTOR[AHMAD~CI.] 913

' . the decision by filing separate writ petitions on 11th February, 1989. The
High Court of Bombay, Goa Bench, by its judgment dated 5th July, 1995
dismissed both the writ petitions upholding the view that the applications
under Section 28-A were time-barred. Hence these appeals by special leave.
A

Before examining the decisions of this Court on which the High
Court has placed reliance, we deem it appropriate to first examine the B
plain language of Section 28-A extracted earlier. Section 28-A was inserted
as the last Section in Part Ill entitled 'Reference to Court and Procedure
thereon' by Act 68 of 1984. Part Ill begins with Section 18 which provides
that if an interested person does not accept the award made by the collector
under Section 11 of the Act, he may by a written application to the Collector,
require that the matter be referred for determination of the court. Section C
2(d) defines the expression 'Court' to mean the Principal Civil Court of
original jurisdiction unless a special Judicial Officer has been appointed.
Therefore, the court referred to under Section 18 can only mean the
Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction. Section 23 then sets out the
matters to be taken into consideration in determining the compensation to
be awarded for the acquired land, and Section 24 indicates the matters to D
be omitted from consideration. Section 26 provides that the award shall
be in writing signed by the judge which shall be deemed to be a decree
within the meaning of clauses (2) and (9) of Section 2 of the Civil Procedure
Code, 1908. Section 27 provides for costs to be awarded and Section 28
provides for payment of interest on excess compensation. We then come
to Section 28-A. The first part of the Section begins with the words 'where E
in an award under this part, Court allows to the applicant any amount of
compensation in excess of the amount awarded by the Collector under the
provision of part III i.e. an award under Section 11' which clearly indicate
that the legislature was talking of an award made under the provisions of
Part III, i.e., an award under section 11 and therefore, in that context,
reference to 'court' can only mean the Court to which a reference is made F
by the Collector under Section 18. This position is further clarified when
the section refers to compensation awarded in excess of the amount awarded
under Section 11 of the Act. The second part of the Section then addresses
'the persons interested in all the other land covered by the same
notification ... and who are also aggrieved by the award' and permits them
to make a written application to the collector 'within three months from G

-- the date of the award of the court' requiring him to redetennine the amount
of compensation on the basis of the amount awarded by the Court,
notwithstanding the fact that they had not sought a reference under section
18 of the Act. Thus, the newly added Section seeks to give the same
benefit, which a person who had sought a reference and had secured the
court's award for a higher amount of compensation had received, to those H
914 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 8 S.C.R.

A who had, on account of ignorance or financial constraints, not sought a
reference under Section 18. In the latter part of the Section also, reference <(_ ...

is to the award under Section 11 and later, to the award of the reference
court under Section 18 of the Act. Therefore, the court referred to therein
is again the court referred to in Section 2(d) of the Act, i.e., the Principal
Civil Court of Ofiginal jurisdiction. The plain language of Section 28-A,
8 therefore, prescribes the three months period of limitation to be reckoned
from the date of the award by the Court disposing of the reference under
Section 18, and not the appellate Court dealing with the appeal against the
award of the reference court.

We may now refer to the case law. A two-judge Bench of this Court
C in Babua Ram v. State of UP., [1995] 2 SCC 689, dealt with this precise
question and held that the period of limitation begins to run from the date
of the first award made on a reference under Section 18 of the Act, and
successive awards cannot save the period of limitation vide paragraphs 19
and 20 of the reporter. This view was reiterated by the same Bench in
Union of India v. Karnail Singh, [J 995] 2 SCC 728, wherein this Court
D held that the limitation of three months for an application for
redetermination of compensation must be computed from the date of the
earliest award made by a civil co1rt, and not the judgment rendered by an
appellate court. This was followed by the decision of a three-judge Bench
in Union of India v. Pradeep Kumari, (1995] i SCC 736, wherein it was
held that the benefit under Section 28-A can be had within three months
E from the date of the award of the reference court on the basis where of
redetermination is sought. The earlier two decisions in the case of Babua
Ram and Karnail Singh were overruled on the limited question that they
sought to confine the right to seek redetermination to the earliest award
made by the court under section 18 of the Act after the introduction of
Section 28-A into the Act. There is, however, no doubt that the period of
F limitation has to be computed from the date of the courts award under
section 18 on the basis whereof redetermination is sought. Admittedly, in
both tlie cases at hand, the applications for redetermination of compensation
under Section 28-A were made long after the expiry of three months from
the date of the award of the Court which constituted the basis for seeking
G redetermination. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the High Court
was right in taking the view that both the applications were time-barred.

However, counsel for the appellants drew our attention to an order
made in the present proceedings by a two-judge Bench on November 13,
1995, reported in (1996] I SCC 88, referring two questions to a five-
H judge Bench, namely:
JOSEANTONIOCRUZOOSRv.LANDACQN.mILECTOR[AHMADiCJ.] 915

A
-· "I. Whether the award of the Court. i.e, civil court made
under Section 26 on reference under Section 18 would also
include judgment and decree of the appellate court under
Section 54?

2. Whether each successive award or judgment and decree
(if answer on question No.I is positive) would give cause of B
action to file application under Section 28-A; if so construed,
does not such a construction violate the language used in
Section 28-A when Parliament advisedly did not use such
expressions?"

So far as the first question is concerned, there is no difference of C
opinion on the question that the period of limitation would start to run
from the date of the reference court's order on the basis whereof the
redetermination is sought. In the present case, the redetermination was
sought on the basis of the reference court's order long after three months
even from the time the last order had elapsed and hence the applications
were clearly time-barred. We, therefore, do not see any need to keep these D
matters pending for decision by a five-Judge Bench.

On the second question, there was a difference of opinion as the
three-judge Bench in Pradeep Kumari's case had departed from the view
taken earlier in two cases by the Two-judge Bench. Ifand when that question
arises in an appropriate case, perhaps a reference to a five-judge Bench E
may become necessary.

For the above reasons, we -see no merit in these appeals and dismiss
the same but with no order as to costs.

v.s.s. Appeals dismissed. F