Holding

A court may initiate suo motu proceedings in rare public‑interest cases but cannot, under Article 226, raise and stay a specific statutory provision without a proper challenge; thus the High Court’s stay of s.3(2)(a) of the Meghalaya Lokayukta Act was impermissible.

Summary

The Joint Secretary, Political Department, Government of Meghalaya filed a suo motu writ petition under Article 226 seeking to give effect to the Meghalaya Lokayukta Act, 2014 and to bring the Lokayukta institution into existence. The High Court, on its own motion, stayed the eligibility clause (s.3(2)(a)) of the Act and also issued directions concerning the appointment of members of the State Human Rights Commission. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether a court can, suo motu, raise and stay a specific provision of a statute without a proper challenge and whether such action falls within the scope of Article 226. The Court held that while courts may initiate suo motu proceedings in rare public‑interest matters, they cannot, under Article 226, scrutinise and stay an individual provision of a law absent a specific challenge. Consequently, the High Court’s order relating to the provision of the Lokayukta Act and the stay order were set aside, while the direction for the State Human Rights Commission to become functional by June 2016 was upheld. The appeal was partly allowed.

Issues considered

The High Court’s jurisdiction to entertain a suo motu writ petition under Article 226 for giving effect to the Meghalaya Lokayukta Act, 2014.
Whether a court can, suo motu, raise and stay a specific provision of a statute (s.3(2)(a) of the Act) without a substantive challenge.
The scope and limits of suo motu public interest litigation by the judiciary.

Legislation cited

Subjects

suo motupublic interest litigationArticle 226LokayuktaMeghalayastay orderconstitutional validityjudicial reviewwrit jurisdiction

Judgment

[2016] 2 S.C.R. 376

A JOINT SECRETARY, POLITICAL DEPARTMENT,
GOVERNMENT OF MEGHALAYA, MAIN SECRETARIAT,
SHILLONG
v.
HIGH COURT OF MEGAHALAYA THROUGH ITS REGISTRAR,
B SHILLONG
(Civil Appeal No.2987 of2016)
MARCH 18,2016
[DIPAK MISRA AND SffiVA KIRTI SINGH, JJ.]
c Constitution ofIndia, 1950-Art.226- Suo motu petition under
- For giving effect to Meghalaya Lokayukta Act, 2014 by bringing
the institution into existence - The Court also scanned the anatomy
of the provisions u!s. 3 (2j{a) of 2014 Act and granted stay of
operation of a portion of s.3 (2){a) - On appeal, held: The court
D can initiate suo motu proceedings in very rare circumstances
depending of the nature of legislation and collective benefit - But
in such case also the Court cannot raise the issue relating to any
particular provision and seek explanation in exercise ofjurisdiction
u!Art.226 - The High Court has wrongly scanned the anatomy of
the provision and passed an order in reltition to it as if the provision
E
is obnoxious or falls foul of any constitutional provision - High
Court also could not have granted stay - Therefore, the part of the
impugned order which deals with the provision of the Act is set
aside - The direction pertaining to stay is also set aside - The
executive is required to see that the institution of Lokayukta is in
F place - Meghalaya Lokayukta Act, 2014 - s.3(2){a).
Public Interest Litigation - Suo motu initiation of PIL - When
- Held: Court can initiate suo motu proceedings in respect pf certain
issues which come within domain of public interest - But it depends
upon the nature of the issue involved - There cannot be uncontrolled
G or unguided exercise of epistolary jurisdiction.
Judiciary - Limitations of adjudication - Discussed.
Partly allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1. There can be no doubt, the court can initiate suo
H motu proceedings in respect of certain issues which come within
376
J. S., POLITICAL DEPT., GOVT. OFMEGHALAYA, MAIN SECRETARIAT, 377
SHILLONG v. H. C. OF MEGAHALAYA TH. ITS REGISTRAR

the domain of public interest. Suo motu public interest litigation A
can be initiated to ameliorate the conditions of a class of persons
whose constitutional or otherwise lawful rights are affected or
not adequately looked into. The Court has adopted the said tool
so that persons in disadvantaged situation because of certain
reasons - social, economic or socio-economic - are in a position
B
to have access to the Court. The constitutional courts can also
entertain letter petitions and deal with them as writ petitions.
But it will depend upon the nature of the issue sought to be
advanced. There cannot be uncontrolled- or unguided exercise
of epistolary jurisdiction. [Paras 11, 12 and 15) [384-B; 385-G-H;
384~G-H] c
Nirmal Singh Kah/on v. State of Punjab & others 2008
(14) SCR 1049 : (2009) 1 SCC 441; Raju Ramsing
Vasave v Mahesh Deorao Bhivapurkar 2008 (12) SCR
992 : (2008) 9 sec 54 - relied on.
Budhadev Karmaskar (1) v. State of WB. 2011 (2) SCR D
925 : (2011) 11 SCC 538; Ram/i/a Maidan Incident, In
Re 2012 (4) SCR 971 : (2012) 5 SCC 1 - referred to.
2. In the instant case, the legislature has passed the
·legislation in its wisdom. There was no challenge to the
constitutional validity of the provisions of the Act. The suo motu E
petition was registered for giving effect to the Act by bringing
the. institutions into existence. This may be thought of in very
rare circumstances depending on the nature-Of legislation and
. the collective benefit but in that arena also the Court .cannot raise
the issue relating to any particular provision and seek explanation F
in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.
In the case at hand, the High Court has, with an erroneous
understanding offlindamental principle oflaw, scanned the anatomy
of the provision and passed an order in relation to it as if it is
obnoxious or falls foul of any constitutional provision. ··The same
is clearly impermissib.le. A person aggrieved o.r with expanded G
concept of locus st(lndi could have assailed the provisions. But
hi that event there are cert.ain requirements and need for certain
compliances. The High Court could not have proceeded as if"it
was testing the validity of the provision and granted stay. The
approach is totally fallacious. The part of the order which deals H
378 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 2 S.C.R.

A with the provisions of the Act is set aside. The direction pertaining
to the stay of the provisions of the Meghalaya Lokaynkta Act,
2014 is also set aside. When the State Legislature has introduced
. the legislation to take steps as regards the institution, it shall be
the endeavour of the executive to see that the office of the
B Lokayukta is in place. As this Court has completely dealt with
the matter, the writ petition initiated by the High Court shall be
deemed to have been disposed of. [Paras 16, 2hrnd 22) (386-A-
D; 387-F-G; 388-A-C)
State of Uttar Pradesh v. Kartar Singh AIR 1964 SC
1135 : 1964 SCR 679; State of Andhra Pradesh and
c another v. K. Jayaraman and others (1974) 2 SCC 738
: AIR 1975 SC 633; Union of India v. E.I.D. Parry
(India) Ltd. AIR 2000 SC 831 : 2000 (l) SCR 537 :
(2000) 2 SCC 223; State of Haryana v. State of Punjab
& another 2004 (2) Suppl. SCR 849 : (2004) 12 SCC
D 673 - relied on.
Tata Cellular v. Union of India 1994 (2). Suppl. SCR
122 : (1994) 6 SCC 651; Census Co111111issio11er and
others v. R. Krishnamurthy (2015) 2 SCC 796 - relied
on.
E Case Law Reference
1994 (2) Suppl. SCR 122 relied on. Para2
(201~) 2 sec 796
2011 (2) SCR 925
relied on.
referred to.
--·
Para3
Para 11
2012 (4) SCR 971 referred to. Para 13
F
2008 (14) SCR 1049 relied on. Para 13
20!)8 (12) SCR 992 relied on. Par!l 14
1964 SCR 679 relied on. Para 17
(1974) 2 sec 738 relied on. Para 18.
"a 2000 (0 SCR 537 relied on. Para 19
2004 (2) Suppl. SCR 849 relied on. Para20
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Ch<il Appeal No. 2987
of2016
From the Judgment and Order dated 14.12.2015 in Writ Petition
H Civil No. 319 of 2015 passed by the High ~ourt ofMeghalya at Shillong.
J. S., POLITICAL DEPT., GOVT. OF MEGHALAYA, MAIN SECRETAl{JAT, 379
SHILLONG v. H. C. OF MEGAHALAYA TH. ITS REGISTRAR

Ranjan Mukherjee, Subhro Sanyal, Advs., for the appearing A
-earties.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
DIPAK MISRA, J. L New York Times, in the Editorial, "The
Frankfurter Legacy," on September 2, 1962, while stating about the
greatness of Felix Frankfurter, chose the following expression:- B

"History will find greatness in Felix Frankfurter as a justice, not
because of the results he reached but because of his attitude
toward the process of decision. His guilding lights were detachment,
rigorous integrity in dealing with the facts of a case, refusal to
resort to unworthy means, no matter how noble the end, arid c
dedication to the Court as an institution. Because he was human,
Justice Frankfurter did notjllways live up to his own ideal. But he
taught us the lesson that there is importance in the process."
2. Almost two decades and two years back, the Court in Tata
Cellular v; Ul!ion of India' referred, with approval, the following D
passage from Neely, C.J .' :--
"82 .... '-I have very few illusions about my own limitations as a
Judge and from those limitations I generalise to the inherent
limitations of all appellate courts reviewing rate cases. It must be
remembered that this Court sees approximately 1262 cases a year E
with five Judges. I am -not an accountant, electrical engineer,
financier, banker, stock broker, or systems management analyst.
It is the height of folly to expect Judges intelligently to review a
5000 page record addressing the intricacies of public utility
operation.' "
F
3. Regard being had to the directions issued by the High Court,
. this Court in Census Commissioner and otllers v. R. Krisllnamurtlly'
commenced_the judgment in the following manner:-
"The present appeal depicts and, in a way, sculpts the non-
acceptance of conceptual limitation in every human sphere G
. including that of adjudication. No adjudicator or a Judge can
conceive the idea that the sky is the limit or for that matter there

'(1994)6SCC651
2
Bernard Schwartz in A.dministr'atire La1r. 200 Edn .• p. 584
'(2015) 2 sec 796 H
380 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2016] 2 S.C.R.

A is no barrier or fetters in one's individual.perception, for judicial
vision should not be allowed to be imprisoned and have the
potentiality to cover celestial zones. Be it ingeminated, refrain
and restrain are the essential virtues in the arena of adjudication
because they guard as sentinel so that virtuousness is constantly
sustained. Not for nothing, centuries back Francis Bacon 4 had to
B
say thus:
"Judges ought to be more learned· than witty, more reverend than
plausible, and more advised than confident. Above all things,
integrity is their portion and proper virtue .... Let. the Judges also
remember that Solomon's throne was supported by lions on both
c sides: let them be lions, but yet lions under tlie throne."
4. The necessity has arisen again for reiteration of the fundamental
principle to be adhered to by a Judge. It is because tiie order impugned
herein presents a sad sad scenario, definitely and absolutely an
impertnissible and unacceptable one. ·
D
5. Presently, to the facts of the case. A writ petition forming the
subject matter of Writ Petition (Civil) No. 319 of 2015 was registered
under the caption "Suo 1110111 cognizance of appointment of Lokayukta
and failure to constitute Meghalaya State Human Rights Commission".
By the impugned order dated 14.12.2015, the High Court referred to
E clause (a) of sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Meghalaya Lokayukta
Act, 2014 (for brevity, "the Act") and proceeded to deal with the same.
In that context, it has passed the following order:-
"The provision providing such eligibility criterion requires judicial
scrutiny; for: the same eligibility cannot be provided for the
F Chairperson and for a Member other than the Judicial Member of
the Lokayukta. Besides, the Central Lokpal and Lokayukta Act
of2013 does not prescribe any eligibility criteria for Lokayukta
and Up-Lokayukta. That apart, <lther States including State of
Karnataka and State of Madhya Pradesh, looking to adj udicarory
G nature of work, has provided the eligibility criteria like a former ·
Judge of Supreme Court; a Chief Justice of High Court or a Judge
of High Court, whereas, the eligibility criteria provided in the
Meghalaya Lokayukta Act, 2014, inter alia includes a criterion

-iBacon, '"Essays: Of Judicature in I The Works of Francis Bacon" (Montague, Basil,
H Esq ed .. Philadelphia: A Hart, late Carey & Hart. I 852). pp. 58-59.
J. S., POLITICAL DEPT., GOVT. OF MEGHALAYA, MAIN SECRETARIAT, 381
SHILLONG v. H. C. OF MEGAHALAYA TH. IT~ REGISTRAR [DIPAK
M!SRA,J.]
whereby an eligible non-Judicial person can also be appointed as A
the Chairperson. Hence, issue notice.
During the pendency of this writ petition, the portion of clause (a)
of sub-section (2) of Section 3, which reads as " ... or an eminent
person who fulfills the eligibility specified in clause (b) of sub-
section (3)"; and consequently, "Sub-clause (b) of Sub-section B·
(3) of Section 3" insofar as it provides for the offending criterion
for the appointment of the Chairperson is hereby stayed."
6. After passing the said order, the High Court has proceeded to
deal with the appointment of the Chairperson and Members of the
Meghalaya State Human Rights Commission. Dealing with the said c
facet, it had directed as follows:-
"Now, coming to the appointment ofthe Chairperson and Members
of the Meghalaya State Human Rights Commission, Hon 'ble the
Apex Court has, vide order dated 24.7.2015 in Crl.M.P. No. 16086
ofl 997 in Crl.M.P. No. 420 I of 1997 (Shri Di lip K. Basu v. State D
of West Bengal and Ors) has directed various States including
the State of Meghalaya to set up the State Human Rights
Commission within six months and to fill up the vacancy of
Chairperson and Members of State Human Rights Commission
within 3 (three) months from the date of order. As towards
conlpliance of the aforesaid directions ofHon'ble the Apex Court, E
the State ofMeghalaya has not initiated the process of appointment
of the Chairperson and Members of the State Human Rights
Commission, we direct the Chief Secretary, State of Meghalaya,
to file affidavit showing the status of processing of the file for the
appointment of the Chairperson and other Members of the State F
Human Rights Commission on the next date of hearing. Besides,
we also make it clear, that the State shall specify the name of
Hon 'ble former Judge of Supreme Court and Hon 'ble former Chief
Justice of High Court, who have been offered the appointment as
Chairperson. The State shall also clearly indicate as to who are
the Judges of High Court and other non-Judicial persons who G
have been offered the appoint111ent as the Chairperson/Members
of the Commission. This information is required to maintain
transparen~y in the process of appointment on the posts as
aforesaid." .
H
382 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2016] 2 S.C.R.

A 7. Be it noted, the Division Bench has appointed two counsel as
Amicus Curiae and directed the Registrar General to settle their
professional fee to be paid by the Department of Law, Government of
Meghalaya.
8. Mr. Ranjan Mukherjee learned counsel appearing for the
B appellant has submitted that the State has no cavil over the directions
relating to constitution of the State Human Rights Commission by
appointment of Chairperson and Members. Jn course of hearing, the
learned counsel has submitted that the State shall appoint the Chairperson
and Members of the State Human Rights Commission as per law by end
of June, 2016. That being the concession by Mr. Mukherjee on behalf
c of the State which, we think, is absolutely fair, there is no need to advert
to the said aspect. It is also urged by Mr. Mukherjee that the State
would not have challenged the said part of the order as it understands its
responsibility and further when the High Court has issued the direction,
the State is obliged to respect the same as it is in consonance with the
D legal position. The cavil, Mr. Mukherjee would put it, pertains to the
observations made by the High Court and the stay order passed in respect
of the provision relating to eligibility prescribed under the Act. It is urged
by him that there had been no assail to the constitutional validity of the
said provision and, therefore, the High Court could not have suo motu
taken up the same, especially when the language employed is also similar
E to the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013 passed by the Parliament.
9. To appreciate the submission, it is necessary to note that
Chapter II of the Act deals with Establishment of Lokayukta. Sections
3 reads as follows:-
F "Section 3. Establishment of Lokayukta.-(1) As soon as
after the commencement of this Act, there shall be established,
by notification in the Official Gazette, a body to be called the
"Lokayukta".
(2) The Lokayukta shall consist of-
G ( a) a Chairperson, who is or has been a Chief Justice of the
High Court or a Judge of the High Court or an eminent person
who fulfils the eligibility specified in clause (b) of sub-section
(3); and
(b) such number of members, not exceeding fourout of whom
H fifty percent shall be Judicial Members.
J. S.• POLITJCAL DEPT., GOVT. OF MEGHALAYA, MAJN SECRETARIAT, 383
SHILLONG v. H. C. OF MEGAHALAYA TH. ITS REGISTRAR [DIPAK
MISRA,J.]
(3)Aperson shall be eligible to be appointed,- A
(a) as a Judicial Member ifhe is or has been a Judge of the
High Court or is eligible to be a Judge of the High Court;
(b) as aMemberotherthan a Judicial Member, ifhe is a person
of impeccable integrity, outstanding ability having special
knowledge and expertise of not less than twenty-five years in B
the matters relating to anti-corruption policy, public
administration, vigilance, finance including insurance and
banking, law, and management.
(4) The Chairperson or a Member shall not be -
c
(i) a member of Parliament or a member of the Legislature of
any State or Union territory;
(ii) a person convicted of any offence involving moral turpitude;
(iii) a person ofless than forty-five years of age, on the date of
assuming office as Chairperson or Member, as the case may D
be;
(iv) a member of any Panchayat or Municipality or District
Council;
(v) a person who has been removed or dismissed from service
E
of the Union or a State, and shall not hold any office of trust or
profit (other than his office as the Chairperson or a Member)
or be connected with any political party or carry on any business
or practice any profession and accordingly, before he enters
upon his office, a person appointed as the Chairperson or a
Member, as the case may be, shall, if - F
(a) he holds any office of trust or profit, resign from such office;
or
(b) he is carrying on any business, sever his connection with
the conduct and management of such business; or
G
(c) he is practicing any profession, cease to practice such
profession."
I 0. Section 4 deals with appointment of Chairperson or Members
on recommendation of Selection Committee; and other provjsions of the
Act dwell upon various other facets which we need not refer to.
H
384 SUPREME COURT REPORTS f2016] 2 S.C.R.

A Submission of Mr. Mukherjee is that the High Court could not have suo
motu proceeded to deal with the appointment ofLokayukta and, in any
case, could not have directed stay of the provision.
l I. There can be no doubt, the court can initiate s11<J 1110/u
proceedings in respect of certain issues which come within the domain
B of public interest. In Budlutdev Karmaskur (1) v. State of W.B.-' the
Court, while dismissing an appeal, observed thus:-
"' 14. Although we have dismissed this appeal, we strongly feel
that the Central and the State Governments through Social Welfare
Boards should prepare schemes for rehabilitation all over the
c country for physically and sexually abused women commonly
known as the 'prostitutes' as we are of the view that the prostitutes
also have a right to live with dignity under Article 21 of the
Constitution of India since they are also human beings and their
problems also need to be addressed.
15. As already observed by us, a woman is compelled to indulge
D in prostitution not for pleasure but because of abject poverty. If
such a woman is granted opportunity to avail some technical or
vocational training, she would be able to earn her livelihood by
such vocational training and skill instead of by selling her body.
l 6. Hence, we direct the Central and the State Governments to
E prepare schemes for giving technical/vocational training to sex
workers and sexually abused women in all cities in India. The
schemes should mention in detail who will give the technical/
vocational training and in what manner they can be rehabilitated
and settled by offering them employment. For instance, if a
technical training is for some craft like sewing garments, etc. then
F
some arrangements should also be made for providing a market
for such garments, otherwise they will remain unsold and unused,
and consequently the woman will not be able to feed herself."
The purpose of the initiation in the aforesaid case is self-evident.
G 12. Suo 111otu public interest litigation can be initiated to ameliorate ·
the conditions of a class of persons whose constitutional or otherwise
lawful rights are affected or not adequately looked into. The Court has
adopted the said tool so that persons in disadvantaged situation because
of certain reasons - social, economic or socio-economic -are in a position
to have access to the Court. The Court appoints A111icus Curiae to
H '(2011) 11 SCC538
J. S., POLITICAL DEPT., GOVT. OF MEGHALAYA. MAIN SECRETARIAT. 385
SHILLONG v. H. C. OF MEGAHALAYA TH. ITS REGISTRAR [DIPAK
MISRA,J.]
assist the Court and also expects the executive to respond keeping in A
view the laudable exercise.
13. In Ramlila Maidan Incident, In Re', suo 1110111 probe of
incident was ordered by the Court against imposition of prohibitory order
at night and hasty and forcible evacuation of public on the basis of media
reports and CCTV camera footage. In Nirnwl Singlt Kali/on v. State B
of Panjab & otlters', the Court ~as held:-
"The High Court while entertaining the writ petition formed a prima
facie opinion as regards the systematic commission of fraud. While
dismissing the writ petition filed by the selected candidates, it initiated a
suo motu public interest litigation. It was entitled to do so. The nature of
jurisdiction exercised by the High Court, as is well known, in a private
c
interest litigation and in a public interest litigation is different. Whereas
in the latter it is inquisitorial in nature, in the former it is adversarial. In a
public interest litigation, the court need not strictly follow the ordinary
procedure. It may not only appoint committees but also issue directions
upon the State from time to time:{See Indian Bank v. Godhara Nagrik D
Coop. Credit Society Ltd.& another' and Raju Rainsing Vasave v.
Mahesh Deorao Bhivapurkar 9 .)"
14. In Raju Ramsing Vasave (supra), the Court has observed
that when a question is raised, this Court can take cognizance of a matter
of such grave .importance suo 1110111. It may not treat the special leave E
petition as a public interest litigation, but, as a public law litigation. It is, in
a proceeding of that nature, permissible for the Court to make a detailed
enquiry with regard to the broader aspects of the matter although it was
initiated at the instance of a person having a private interest. A deeper
scrutiny can be made so as to enable the Court to find out as to whether
a party to a !is is guilty of commission of fraud on the Constitution. If F
such an enquiry subserves the greater public interest and has a far-
reaching effect on the society the Court will not shirk its responsibilities
from doing so. ,., ..
15. Be it noted, the constitutional courts can entertain4etter petitions
and deal with them as writ petitions. But it will depend upon the nature G
of the issue sought to be advanced. There cannot be uncontrolled or
unguided exercise of epistolary jurisdiction.
'<2012) 5 sec 1
'(2009) 1 sec 441
'<2008) 12 sec 541
'<2008) 9 sec 54 H
386 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 2 S.C.R.

A 16. In the instant case, as is evident, the High Court has compared
the provisions pertaining to appointment of Chairperson and Members
under the Act with the provisions of other Acts enacted by different
legislatures. The legislature has passed the legislation in its wisdom.
There was no challenge to the constitutional validity of the provisions of
the Act. The suo motu petition was registered for giving effect to the
B
Act by bringing the institutions into existence. This may be thought of in
very rare circumstances depending on the nature of legislation and the
collective benefit but in that arena also the Court cannot raise the issue
relating to any particular provision and seek explanation in exercise of
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the case at hand, as
c is manifest, the Division Bench of the High Court has, with an erroneous
understanding offundamental principle oflaw, scanned the anatomy of
the provision and passed an order in relation to it as if it is obnoxious or
falls foul ofany constitutional provision. The same is clearly impermissible.
A person aggrieved or with expanded concept of locus standi some
one could have assailed the provisions. But in that event there are certain
D
requirements and need for certain compliances.
17. In State of Uttar Prac/esll v. Kartar Singh 10 , while dealing
with the constitutional validity of Rule 5 of the Food Adulteration Rules,
1955, it has been opined as follows:-
" ..... if the rule has to be struck down as imposing unreasonable
E or discriminatory standards, it could not be done merely on any a
priori reasoning but only as a result of materials placed before the
Court by way of scientific analysis. It is obvious that this can be
done only when the party invoking the protection of Art. 14 makes
averments with details to sustain such a plea and leads evidence
F to establish his allegations. That where a party seeks to impeach
the validity of a rule made by a competent authority on the ground
that the rules offend Art. 14 the burden is on him to plead and
prove the infirmity is too well established to need elaboration."
18. In State of Am/lira Praclesll mu/ mwtlier v. K. Jayaramm1
G and others' 1, it has been ruled thus:-
"It is clear that, if there had been an averment, on behalf of the
petitioners, that the rule was invalid for violating Articles 14 and
16 of the Constitution, relevant facts showing how it was
discriminatory ought to have been set out."
'" AIR 1964 SC 1135
H 11
(1974)2 sec 738: AIR 1975 sc 633
J. S., POLITICAL DEPT., GOVT. OF MEGHALAYA, MAIN SECRETARIAT, 387
SHILLONG v. H. C. OF MEGAHALAYA TH. ITS REGISTRAR [DIPAK
MISRA,J.]
I 9. In Union of India v. E.LD. P(lrry (India) Ltd.", a two- A
Judge Bench of this Court has expressed thus:-
" ... There was no pleading that the Rule upon which the reliance
was placed by the respondent was ultra vires the Railways Act,
I 890. In the absence of the pleading to that effect, the trial Court
did not frame any issue on that question. The High Court of its B
own proceeded to consider the validity of the Rule and ultimately
held that it was not in consonance with the relevant provisions of
the Railways Act, 1890 and consequently held that it was ultra
vires. This view is contrary to the settled law ... "
20. In St(lfe of H(lryrtn(I v. Stme of P111~iab & (lllOt/ier 13 , the
Court emphasizing on the facet of pleading, has opined that:-
c
" ..... It is well established that constitutional invalidity (presumably
that is what Punjab means when it uses the word "unsustainable")
of a statutory provision can be made either on the basis oflegislative
incompetence or because the statute is otherwise violative of the
provisions of the Constitution. Neitherthe reason forthe particular D
enactment nor the fact that the reason for the legislation has
become redundant, would justify the striking down of the legislation
or for holding that a statute or statutory provision is ultra vires.
Yet these are the grounds pleaded in subparagraphs (i), (iv), (v),
(vi) and (vii) to declare Section 14 invalid. Furthermore, merely E
saying that a particular provision is legislatively incompetent [ground
(ii)] or discriminatory [ground (iii)] will not do. At least prima facie
acceptable grounds in support have to be pleaded to sustain the
challenge. In the absence of any such pleading the challenge to
the constitutional validity ofa statute or statutory provision is liable
to be rejected in limine." F

2 I. This being the position in law, the High Court could not have
proceeded as if it was testing the validity of the provision and granted
stay. The approach is totalty fallacious. Having opined aforesaid, we
have no option but to set aside that part of the order which deal.s with the
provisions of the Act. We do not intend to express any opinion with G
regard to validity of any provision contained in the Act. We also do not
think it condign to direct thatthe establishment under the said Act should
become operational within any fixed time. Suffice to say at present that
12
(2000) 2 sec 223 : AIR 2000 SC 831
'' (2004) 12 sec 673 H
388 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 2 S.C.R.

A wl:>en the State Legislature has introduced the legislation to take steps
as regards the institution, it shall be the endeavour of the executive to
see that the office of the Lokayukta is in place. We say no more for the
present.
22. In view of the aforesaid analysis, the appeal is partly allowed
B and the direction pertaining to the stay of the provisions of the Meghalaya
Lokayukta Act, 2014 is set aside. It is directed that State Human Rights
Commission shall become functional by end of June, 2016. As we have
completely dealt with the matter, the writ petition initiated by the High
.Court shall be deemed to have been disposed of. There shall be no order
as to costs.
c
Kalpana K. Tripathy Appeal partly allowed.