JITENDER TYAGIversusDELHI ADMINISTRATION & ANR.

                       JITENDER TYAGI
                                                                             A
                              v.
                DELHI ADMINISTRATION & ANR.

                           OCTOBER 3, 1989

       [MURARI MOHON DUTT AND K.N. SAIKIA, JJ.]                               B

       National Security Act, 1980: Section 3(2), (3) & (4).

      Preventve Detention-Detention order-Approval of-"No such
order shall remain in force for more than twelve days after the making
of order unless in the meantime approved by the State Govemment"-
Computation of period of twelve days-The day on which order is                c
passed-Whether should be included.

      Detention-Delegation of powers on the Commissioner of
Po/ice-Whether ultra vires-Non-supply of copy of delegation order to
the detenu-Whether prejudicial.                                               D

     Interpretation of Statute-When the language is plain and
simple-The question of ascertaining legislative intent does not arise.

       Sub-section (4) of section 3 of the National Security Act, 1980
provides that no order passed by an officer mentioned in sub-section (3)      E
shall remain in force for more than twelve days after the making thereof
unless, in the meantime, ii has been approved by the State Government.

      The Commissioner of Police, Delhi, in exercise of the powers con-
ferred by sub-section (2) of section 3 of the Act, as delegated to him by
the Delhi Administration, passed an order on 19.1.1989 detaining the          F
petitioner. The order of detention was approved by the Administrator
on 31.I.1989.

        The petitioner filed a writ petition in this Court challenging the
  validity of the detention order contending that (i) the day on which the
  order of detention was passed should be included in the period of com- G
  putation of twelve days and since the order of detention was approved
' on 3 I.1.1989' that is, on the thirteenth day after the expiry-of twelve
  days, it had ceased to be in force; (ii) the non supply of the copy of order
  deiegating the power of detention on the Commissioner of Police has ·
  seriously prejudiced the detenu; and (iii) there was serious non-
  application of mind by the detaining authority.                              H
                                    341
      342         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [1989] Supp. 1 S.C.R. ·

            Dismissing the petition, this Court,
A
            HELD: I. In computing the period of twelve days referred to in
      sub-section (4) of section 3 of the Act, the day on which the order of
      detention was passed should be excluded. Therefore the approval of the
      order of detention was made within twelve days after the making of the
B     order of detention. [3500]

            1.1 Sub-section (4) of section 3 has given a clear indication as to
      the computation of twelve days. It excludes the day on which the order
      is made. The word 'after' in sub-section (4) of section 3 of the Act is
      very significant and clearly excludes any contention that in computing
C:    the period of twelve days the day on which the order of detention is
      passed should be included. The period of twelve days has to he
      calculated 'after' the making of the order of detention, i.e. the day on
      which the cause of action arises has to be excluded in computing the
      period of time. [346E-F; 3490; 348H]

D        1.2 It is true that in sub-section (4) the officer making the order of
   detention shall forthwith report the fact to the State Government, but
   the word 'forthwith' will not be taken into consideration for the purpose
   of computing the period of twelve days inasmuch as there is clear indi-
   cation that the said period shall be computed after the order is made.
   Computation of twelve days including the day on which the detention
IE order is made will be ignoring the direction of the legislature, as given
   in sub-section (4) itself, that the said period of twelve days will com-
   mence after the making of the detention order. [346F-G]

            2. When the language of a statute is plain and simple, the ques-
      tion of ascertaining the intention of the legislature does not arise. [3490]
F
            2.1 Sub-section (4) of section 3 admits of only one interpretation
      regarding the computation of twelve days and, accordingly, the ques-
      tion as to the adoption of the interpretation which enures to the benefit
      of the detenu does not arise. [346H; 347Al

G           T.C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa, [1955) SCR 250; Haru Das Gupta
      v. State of West Bengal, [1972] 3 SCR 329 and Ratcliffv. Bartholomew,
      [1892] 1 QB 161, followed.

           Nillapareddi Chandrasekhara Reddy v. The Government of
      Andhra Pradesh and Anr., [1974] Crl. LJ 158; C. Krishna Reddy and
fl{   Anr. v. Commissioner of Police Hyderab_ad&, Ors., [1982) Cr. LJ 592
                       JITENDER v. DELHI ADMN.                        343

and Gulam Sarwar v. State of Bihar & Ors .• [1973] BLJR 38,
                                                                             A
distinguished.

     Smt. Manjuli v. Civil Judge, AIR 1970 Born. 1 and In re: V.S.
Mehta, AIR 1970 AP 234, approved.

       3. The expression ''in the meantime'' in sub-section (4) of section   B
3 of the Act clearly indicates that the State Government can approve of
the order of detention even on the day it is passed. The language of
sub-section (4) of section 3 is plain and simple and the question whether
the order of detention can be approved on the day it is passed or not
does not at all arise. [349F]

     Prabhu Narain Singh v. Superintendent, Central Jail, Varanasi,
                                                                             c
ILR 19611 All. 427, disapproved.

      4. The Act does not provide for supplying a copy of an order
under Section 3(3) of the Act. In the instant case, the said order has not
been relied upon by the Commissioner of Police in passing the                D
impugned order of detentfon. It may be that by virtue of the said order
under section 3(3) of the Act, the Commissioner of Police could exercise
the powers of the detaining authority under section 3(2) of the Act. But,
that has nothing to do as to the subjective satisfaction of the· Commis-
sioner of Police in making the impugned order of detention. [3510-E]
                                                                             E
      5. In the instant case, a copy of the application for bail was with
the detaining authority before he made the order of detention. So, it is
not correct to say that the detaining authority proceeded on the basis
that the detenu had made applications for bail in all the cases pending
against him. Accordingly there was no non-application of mind by the
detaining authority. [352A-B & C]                                            F   ,

     CRIMINAL ORIGINAL                JURISDICTION: Writ         Petition
(Criminal) No. 184of 1989.

      (Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India).
                                                                             G
      Kapil Sibbal, K.K. Lahiri; K.R. Nagaraja and R.S. Hegde for
the Petitioner.

    V.C. Mahanjan, T.V.S.N. Chari and Ms. A. Subhashini for the
Respondents.
                                                                             H
    344        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [1989] Supp. 1 S.C.R.

          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
A
          DUTT, J. In this writ petition the petitioner has challenged the
    validity of the detention order dated January 19, 1989 passed under
    the National Security Act, 1980, hereinafter referred to as 'the Act',
    by virtue of which the petitioner has been under detention since the
B   said date. The allegations made in the grounds of detention need not
    be stated, for only legal submissions have been made on behalf of the
    petitioner in challenging the order of detention. The order of deten-
    tion dated January 19, 1989 reads as follows:·

               "WHEREAS, I, Vijay Karan, Commissioner of Police,
               Delhi, am satisfied that with a view to prevent Sh. Jitender
c              Tyagi s/o Sh. Ram Nath Tyagi, R/o Viii. Khajuri, Police
               Station.Kila, Dist!. Meerut {Uttar Pradesh) aged at about
               25/26 from acting in a manner prejudicial to the main-
               tenance of public order, it is necessary to make an order
               directing that the said Sh. Jitender Tyagi may be detained.
D
                     Now, therefore, ·in exercise of the powers conferred
               vide .sub-section (2) of section 3 of the National Security
               Act, 1980 as delegated to me vide Delhi Administration,
               Delhi's order No. F2/l/88-H.P. II, dated 11.1.89 I hereby
               direct that the said Sh. Jitender Tyagi be detained and kept
E              in Central Jail, Tihar, Delhi."

          It, thus, appears from the order of detention that it was passed
    by the Commissioner of Police, Delhi, in exercise of the powers con-
    ferred by sub-section (2) of section 3 of the Act as delegated to him by
    the Delhi Administration. The order of detention was approved by the
F   A<!miriistrator of Delhi by his order dated January 31, 1989. Paragraph
    3 of the said order is in the following terms:

               "3. Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred
               upon him by sub-section (4) of section 3 of the National
               Security Act, 1980, the Administrator hereby approves the
G              order of the Police Commissioner dated 19 .1.1989 detain-
               ing Sh. Jitender Tyagi and further directs that Sh. Jitender
               Tyagi be kept in custody in Central Jail, Tihar, New Delhi.

         The first point that has been strenuously urged by Mr. Kapil
   Sibal, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, is that
.H the order of detention not having been approved within a period of
                 JITENDER v. DELHI ADMN. [DUTT, J.]                  345

twelve days, as provided in sub-section (4) of section 3 of the· Act, it
                                                                            A
had spent its force on the expiry of the said period and, accordingly,
the detention of the petitioner is illegal. Section 3 of the Act provides
for the power to make orders of detention under certain circums-
tances. Sub-section (4) of section 3 reads as follows:

            "( 4). When any order is made under this section by an          B
            officer mentioned in sub-section (3), he shall forthwith
            report the fact to the State Government to which he is
            subordinate together with the grounds on which the order
            has been made and such other particulars as, in his opinion,
            have a bearing on the matter, and no such order shall
            remain in force for more than twelve days after the making
            thereof unless, in the meantime, it has been approved by        c
            the State Government:

                  Provided that where under section 8 the grounds of
            detention are communicated by the officer making the order
            after five days but not later than ten days from the date of    D
            detention, this sub-section shall apply subject to the
            modification that, for the words "twelve days", the words
            "fifteen days" shall be substituted."

       Under sub-section (4) of section 3, "no such order shall remain
in force for more than twelve days after the making thereof unless, in. E
the meantime, it has been approved by the State Government". The
question that arises for our consideration relates to the computation of
the period of twelve days. To be more explicit, the question is whether
in -computing the period of twelve days, the day on which the order of
detention is passed should be included or not. It is submitted on behalf
of the petitioner that the day on which the order of detention was F
passed should be included and the order approving the detention hav-
ing been passed on January 31, 1989, that is, on the thirteenth day
after the expiry of twelve days, it had ceased to be in force.

      On the other hand, it is contended on behalf of the respondents
that the day on which the detention order was passed should be              G
excluded and, accordingly, the detention of the petitioner having been
approved on January 31, 1989, it was quite within the period of twelve
days. Further, it is the case of the respondents that the order of deten-
tion was, as a matter of fact, approved on January 26, 1989 and by the
order dated January 31, 1989, the order of approval was communi-
cated to the authorities concerned.                                         H
    346         SUPREME {;OURT REPORTS               [1989] Supp. 1 S.C.R.

           We may first consider the contention of the respondents that the
    order of detention was duly approved on January 26, 1989. A state-
    ment in that regard has been made in the counter-affidavit of the
    respondents. We are, however, unable to accept the same. We have
    already extracted above paragraph 3 of the order of detention dated
    January 31, 1989 in which it has been categorically stated "the
B   Administ.rator hereby approves the order of the Police Commissioner
    datd 19.1.1989 detaining Sh. Jitender Tyagi .. ". After the said
    categorical statement in paragraph 3, it is difficult to accept the con-
    tention of the respondents that the said order dated January 31, 1989
    was made for the purpose of communicating the approval of the order
    of detention. In our view' there can be nci doiiiit, whatsoever ,tliat the
    order of detention was approved by the said order dated January 31,
c    1989.

          Now, we may consider the question as to the computation of
    twelve days as referred to in sub-section (4) of section 3. Sub-section
    (4), inter alia, provides that when an order is made by an officer
D   mentioned in. sub-section (3), he shall forthwith report the facts to the
    State Government. It is contended on behalf of the petitioner that
    under sub-section (4), the officer has to act forthwith after the making
    of the order in reporting the fact to the State Government and this is
    sufficient indication that the day on which the order of detention is
    made should be included in computing the period of twelve days.
E
        In our opinion, sub-section (4) has given a clear indication as to
  the computation of twelve days. The period of twelve days has to be
  calculated 'after' the making of the order of detention. Thus, it is
  apparent that the period of twelve days comes after the making of the
  order of detention. His true that in sub-section (4), the officer making
F the order of detention shall forthwith report the fact to the State
  Government, but. the word 'forthwith' will not be taken into considera-
  tion for the purpose of computing the period of twelve days inasmuch
  as there is a clear indication that the said period shall be computed
  after the· order is made. In other words, sub-section (4) itself excludes
  the day on which the order is made. Computation of twelve days
G focluding the cfay on Wlilch the-detention order is made will be ignoring
   the direction of the legislature, as given in sub-section (4).itself, that
  the said period of twelve days will commence after the making of the
  detention order. It is, however, submitted that when two interpreta-
   tions are possible, that which enures to the benefit of the detenu
  should be accepted. In our opinion, sub-section (4) admits of only one
H interpretation regarding the computation of twelve days and, accord-
                 JITENDER v. DELHI ADMN. [DUTI, J.]                347

 ingly, the question as to the adoption of the interpretation which
 enures to the benefit of the detenu does not arise.                      A

       The view which we take, is in accordance with the well
 established canons of interpretations. It has been stated in Stroud's
 Judicial Dictionary, Third Edition, Volume I, page 86, as follows:
                                                                          B
            "Where an act has to be done within so many days "after"
            a given event, the day of such event is not to be reckoned
                   "

       In Smt. Manjuli v. Civil Judge, AIR 1970 Born. 1, the provision
 of ~ection 15(1) of the Village Panchayats Act, 1958 came up for
 interpretation before the Niigpur Bench of the Bombay High Court. C
 Section 15(1), inter alia, proviaes_that any person who is qualified to
 vote is entitled to challenge the validity of the election "within 15 days
 after the date of the declaration-of the result of the election". The
 High C6urt in interpreting the provision rightly laid stress on the word
 "after" and held that the day of which the result was declared must be D
 excluded. This Court had also occasion to construe rule 119 of the
 Election Rules framed under the Representation of the People Act in
 T.C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa, [1955] SCR 250. Rule 119 provides, inter
 alia, that an election petition against a returned candidate is to be
 presented at any time after the publication of the name of such candi-
 date under section 67 of the Act, but not later than 14 days from the E
 date of publication of the notice in the official gazette under rule 113.
 Mukherjea, J. (as he than was) speaking for the Bench observed as
 follows:

            "The High Court seems to think that in computing the
            period of 14 dyas the date of publication is to be included. F
            This seems to us to be an unwarranted view to take which is
            opposed to the ordinary canons of construction. Dr. Tek
            Chand appearing for the respondent No. 1, plainly confes-
            sed his inability to support this view and we must hold .
            therefore that there is no question of the Tribunal's enter-
            taining election petition after the prescribed period in the G
            present case."

        In re: V.S. Mehta, AIR 1970 A.P. 234 which is a decision of the
  Andhra Pradesh High Court, relating to the computation of the period
  of three months in section 106 of the Factories Act: Section 106 pro-
. vides that no court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable     H
    348        SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [1989] Supp. 1 S.C.R.

A under the Act unless complaint thereof is made within three months of
  the date on which the alleged commission of the offence came to the
  knowledge of an Inspector. The question before the High Court was
  whether in computing the said period of three months, the day on
  which the offence was alleged to be committed should be excluded or
  not. The Andhra Pradesh High Court has taken the view that the term
a "within three months of the date" in section 106 of the Factories Act
  means 'within three calendar months after the commission of the
  offence came to the knowledge of an Inspector' and, consequently, the
  date of the knowledge, that is, the· date of inspection should be
  excluded in computing the period of three months. That interpretation
  resulting in the exclusion of the date of knowledge should be made as
C the High Court considered the expression "within three months of the
  date on which the alleged commission of the offence came to the
  knowledge of an Inspector" as "within three months after the date on
  which etc ....... ". Thus, what is significant to be noticed is the word
  "after" which the High Court has substituted for the word 'of' in the
  expressi·on "of the date" in section 106.
0
        In Haru Das Gupta v. State of West Bengal, [1972] 3 SCR 329,
  the question was whether under section 12 of the West Bengal (Pre-
  vention of Violent Activities) Act, 1970, the order or decision of the
  State Government confirming the detention order was made within
E three months from the date of detention. In holding that in computing
  the said period of three months, the date of detention shall be
  excluded, this Court has laid down that the effect of defining a period
  from such a day until such a day within which an act is to be done is to
  exclude the first day and to include the last day. This Court has agreed
  to the view expressed by Wills, J. in Ratcliff v. Bartholomew, [ 1892] 1
F Q.B. 161 that a complaint under the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals
  Act filed on June 30 in respect of an act alleged to have been commit-
  ted on May 30 was "within one calendar month after the cause of such
  complaint shall arise". The principle on the basis of which that view
  was expressed by Wills, J. is that the day on which the cause for the
  complaint arose had to be excluded while computing the period within
G which under the Act, the complaint had to be filed.

        Thus, it is apparent from the above decision that the day on
  which the cause of action arises has to be excluded in computing a
  particular period of time and, in the instant case, such an exclusion has
  to be made in view of the word "after" in sub-section (4) of section 3 of
H theAct.
                  JITENDER v. DELHI ADMN. [DUTT, J.]                  349

         The petitioner has, however, placed reliance on a few decisions
  which will be stated presently. In Prabhu Narain Singh v. Superinten- A
  dent, Central Jail, Varanasi, ILR (1961) 1 All. 427 the Allahabad High
  Court has, on an interpretation of sub-section (3) of section 3 of the
  Preventive Detention Act, 1950, which is verbatim the same as sub-
  section (4) of section 3 of the Act, with which we are concerned, held
  that in computing the period of twelve days, the day on which the B
  order of detention is passed should be included. One of the reasons for
  the view expressed by the Allahabad High Court, which is strongly
  relied on by the learned Counsel for the detenu, is that if the day on
  which the order is passed is to be excluded from twelve days prescribed
. fol'-the approval of the said order: then iheconsequence of the accep-· -
  tance of this interpretation would befuat it' would not be possible for
  the State Government to approve of the order until after the day on        c
  which it was passed had expired. It has been observed that such an
  unreasonable consequence was not contemplated by the legislature.

       When the language of a statute is_plain and simple, the question
 of ascertaining the intention of the legislature does not arise. In our     D
 opinion, the word 'after' in sub-section (4) of section 3 of the Act is
 very significant and clearly excludes any contention that.in computing
 the period of twelve days the day on which the order of detentiOn is
 passed should be included. The Allahabad High Court has omitted to
 consider the word "after" in the section. We are unable to subscribe to
 the view of the High Court that if the day on which the order of            E
 detention was made is excluded from the calculation of the period of
 twelve days, in that case, the position would be that it would not be
 possible for the State Government to approve of the order of detention
 until after the day on which it was passed had expired. The expression
 "in the meantime" in sub-section (4) of section 3 of the Act clearly
 indicates that the State Government can approve of the order of deten-      F
 tion even on the day it is passed. The language of sub-section (4) of
 section 3 is plain and simple and the question whether the order of
 detention can be approved on the day it is passed or not does not at all
 arise. In our opinion, Prabhu Narain Singh's case (supra) has not
 correctly interpreted the provision of section 3(3) of the Preventive
 Detention Act, 1950 in regard to the computation of the period of           G
 twelve days.

      The-ie_!lrned Counsel for the deten_u h_as placed reliance upon, two
 other decisions, namely, Nillapareddi Chandrasekhra Reddy v. The
 Government of Andhra Pradesh and Another, [1974] Cr!. L.J. 158 and
 C. Krishna Reddy_ and Another v. Commissioner of Police, Hy_derabad         H
    350         SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [1989] Supp. 1 S.C.R.

A and Others, [1982] Cr. L.J. 592, both are of the Andhra Pradesh High
  Court. These two decisions relate to the communication to the detenu
  of the grounds of detention not later than five days from the date of
  detention as provided in section 8(1) of the Maintenance of Internal
  Security Act, 1951. We do not think that we should be justified in
  expressing any opinion as to the correctness or otherwise of the com-
B putation of the said period of five days as made in these two decisions,
  for the language that is used in sub-section (4) of section 3 of the Act,
  with which we are concerned, is different from that used in section 8(1)
  of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1951. Similarly, the deci-
  sion of t~e Patna High Court in Gu/am Sarwar v. State of Bihar and
  Others, [ 1973] B. L.J .R. 38 relied on by the respondents also related to
C the computation of the period of five days, as contained in section 8(1)
  of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1951. In this case, a
  contrary view has been expressed. In our view all these decisions are of
  no help to us having regard to the difference in language of the provi-
  sion with which we are concerned. Be that as it may, we have no
  hesitation in holding that in computing the period of twelve days refer-
0 red to in sub-section (4) of section 3 of the Act, the day on which the
  order of detention was passed should be excluded and, upon such
  computation, it must be held that the approval of the order of deten-
  tion was made within twelve days after the making of the order of
  detention.

E       The next point that has been urged on behalf of the detenu is that
  the order dated January 11, 1989 of the Administrator of the Union
  Territory of Delhi, directing that during the period from 19.1.1989 to
  18.4.1989 the Commissioner of Police, Delhi, may also exercise the
  powers of detaining authority under sub-section (2) of section 3 of the
  Act, is ultra vires section 3(3) of the Act. Section 3(3) provides that if,
F having regard to the circumstances prevailing or likely to prevail in any
  area within the local limits of the jurisdiction of a District Magistrate
  or a Commissioner of Police, the State Government is satisfied that it
  is necessary so to do, it may, by order in writing, direct that during
  such period, as may be specified in the order, such District Magistrate
  or Commissioner of Police may also, if satisfied as provided in sub-
0 section (2), exercise the powers conferred by the said sub-section. It is
  contended that as no circumstances, as mentioned in section 3(3) in
  respect of which satisfaction has to be made by the Administrator of
  Delhi, have been stated in the order, nor in the grounds of detention,
  the said order dated January 11, 1989 is illegal and invalid. This point
  has not been taken in the writ petition and, accordingly, the Delhi
H Administration did not get an op_portun~ty_to controvert the allega- _
                  JITENDER v. DELHI ADMN. [DUTI, J.]                      351

tions made for the first time in the argument. The point is not one
                                                                                A
involving only a question of law, but it also involves question of fact.
In the circumstances, we do not think we shall be justified in allowing
the petitioner to take the point for the first time in the argument.

      The next point that has been urged by the learned Counsel for
the petitioner is that the detaining authority, that is, the Commissioner       B
of Police, Delhi, not having supplied to the detenu a copy of the said
order dated January 11, 1989 of the Administrator of Delhi directing
him to exercise the powers of the detaining authority under sub-
section (2) of section 3 of the Act, a serious prejudice has been caused
to the detenu in that, if the copy of the said order had been supplied,
the detenu might have contended that no such circumstances, as con-
templated by sub-section (3) of section 3 of the Act, were prevailing           c   •
and that the delegation of the powers on the Commissioner of Police of
Delhi was illegal and invalid and, consequently, the order of detention
was inoperative and void. The Act does not provide for supplying a
copy of an order under section 3(3) of the Act. The said order has not
been relied upon by the Commissioner of Police in passing the                   D
impugned order of detention. It may be that by virtue of the said order
dated January 11, 1989 passed under section 3(3) of the Act, the Com-
missioner of Police could exercise the powers of the detaining autho-
rity under section 3(2) of the Act. But, that has nothing to do as to the
subjective satisfaction of the Commissioner of Police in making the
impugned order of detention. We do not think there is any substance             E
in the contention made on behalf of the detenu and it is, accordingly,
rejected.

      In the grounds of detention it is, inter alia, stated as follows:

                  "Though Sh. Jitender Tyagi is in judicial custody, it is      F
            reported that application for his bail has been filed in the
            court in case FIR No. 6 dated 7.1.89 uls 25/54/59 Arms
            Act, P.S. Yamuna Vihar, Delhi. 1t is likely that he may be
            released in these cases on bail and again indulge in nefa-
            rious activities of extortion and intimidation. Keeping in
            view his activities, I have issued order for his detention          G
            under section 3(2) of the National Security Act, 1980, so
            that his criminal activities which are prejudicial to the
            maintenance of public order, could be stopped."

     It is urged on behalf of the detenu that only in one case the
detenu has made an application for bail, but in the said statement of           H
    352         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [1989] Supp. 1 S.C.R.

A   the Commissioner of Police in the grounds of detention, he was pro-
    ceeding on the assumption that in all the cases the detenu had made
    applications for bail. Accordingly, it is submitted that this shows com-
    plete non-application of mind by the detaining authority. We are
    unable to accept the contention. Mr. Mahajan, learned Counsel for
    the respondents, has produced before us the records of the detaining
B
    authority from which it appears that a copy of the application for bail
    was with the detaining authority before he made the order of deten-
    tion. So, the contention that the detaining authority proceeded on the
    basis that the detenu had made applications for bail in all the cases
    pending against him is not correct. There is, therefore, no substance in
    this contention.
c
         ·Equally non-meritorious is the contention that a copy of the
    application for bail has not been supplied to the detaining authority for
    his consideration. It is submitted that if such a copy had been supplied
    to the detaining authority, he would have considered the statement of
    the detenu that he was falsely implicated in these cases. The conten-
D   tion is based on erroneous assumption that a copy of the bail applica-
    tion was not supplied to the detaining authority. Indeed, as noticed
    already, a copy of the bail application was with the detaining authority
    before he had passed the order of detention. This contention is also
    rejected.
E         No other point has been urged in this writ petition.

          For the reasons aforesaid, th.e writ petition is dismissed.

    T.N.A.                                                 Petition dismissed. -