Holding

The CBSE Examination Byelaws are a law with binding force, but the post‑result embargo on name changes is an unreasonable restriction and must be struck down, and CBSE must allow reasonable corrections and changes in accordance with school records or verified public documents.

Summary

The Supreme Court examined a batch of petitions challenging the Central Board of Secondary Education (CBSE) Examination Byelaws, particularly their restrictions on correcting or changing names and dates of birth in certificates. It held that the Byelaws, framed by a body that functions as a State instrumentality, have the force of law and are enforceable, but the provision barring any name change after result publication is an unreasonable restriction on Article 19 rights. The Court clarified that CBSE must honor corrections that align certificates with school records or verified public documents, and may impose reasonable conditions such as affidavits, fees, and captioning of changes. It ruled that the applicable Byelaws are those in force on the date of result declaration, and any correction is prospective, not retroactive. The Court also rejected the issuance of mandamus that contravenes explicit Byelaw provisions without a substantive validity test. Consequently, the Court directed CBSE to process pending and future correction or change applications per the outlined procedure and to amend its Byelaws accordingly.

Issues considered

Whether the CBSE Examination Byelaws have the force of law under Article 13 of the Constitution.
Whether the Byelaws impose reasonable restrictions on the exercise of rights under Article 19(1)(a) and (g).
Whether CBSE is obliged to effect corrections or changes in certificates based on public documents that enjoy a statutory presumption of genuineness.
Which date determines the applicable Byelaws – the date of examination/result declaration or the date of the application for correction.
Whether the effect of a correction or change is retrospective or prospective.
Whether a writ of mandamus can be issued to compel CBSE to act contrary to its Byelaws without examining their validity.
Whether the prohibition on name change post‑publication of results is constitutionally valid.

Legislation cited

Aadhaar (Targeted Delivery of Financial and Other Subsidies, Benefits and Services) Act, 2016
Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 76, s. 79, s. 80, s. 81
Passports Act, 1967
Registration of Births and Deaths Act, 1969
Right to Education Act, 2009
Specific Relief Act, 1963s. 41(g), s. 41(i)

Subjects

CBSEExamination ByelawsCertificate correctionName changeArticle 12Article 13Article 19Public authorityWrit of mandamusFundamental rightsIdentity

Judgment

1100 [2021]REPORTS
SUPREME COURT 4 S.C.R. 1100 [2021] 4 S.C.R.

A JIGYA YADAV (MINOR)
(THROUGH GUARDIAN/FATHER HARI SINGH)
v.
C.B.S.E. (CENTRAL BOARD OF
SECONDARY EDUCATION) & ORS.
B
(Civil Appeal No. 3905 of 2011)
JUNE 03, 2021
[A. M. KHANWILKAR, B. R. GAVAI AND
KRISHNA MURARI, JJ.]
C
Education/Educational Institutions: Central Board of
Secondary Education (CBSE) – Examination Byelaws of the Board,
if having the force of law – Held: The CBSE Examination Byelaws
are couched in the form of a code – They provide for all essential
aspects relating to formal education of a student including
D admission, examination, migration, transfer, curriculum, fee for
various services, issuance of verified certificates, modifications in
certificates etc. – The Byelaws, therefore, bind the parties and are
duly enforceable in a court of law, even by way of writ remedies –
The Byelaws of the Board have the force of law and must be regarded
as such for all legal purposes – It would serve no meaningful
E
purpose to hold these authoritative set of rules originating from an
instrumentality of the State as mere contractual terms despite there
being overwhelming public interest in their just application –
Arguendo, the Examination Byelaws are not “law” under Art.13, it
would not affect the power of the Court to scrutinize them in reference
F to Part-III of the Constitution of India as CBSE is “State” within the
meaning of Art.12 and all its actions are consequently subject to
Part-III – Constitution of India – Part III – Arts. 12 and 13 – Central
Board of Secondary Education (CBSE) Examination Byelaws of
2007.
G Education/Educational Institutions: Central Board of
Secondary Education (CBSE) – Correction/change in certificates
issued by the Board – Scope of permissible corrections/ changes –
The CBSE Examination Byelaws restrict, both qualitatively and
quantitatively, the corrections/changes that can be carried out in
the certificates issued by the Board – Test of rationality – Whether
H
1100
JIGYA YADAV (MINOR) (THROUGH GUARDIAN/FATHER 1101
HARI SINGH) v. C.B.S.E. (CBSE)

Examination Byelaws of CBSE / Board impose reasonable A
restrictions – Held: The identity of an individual is one of the most
closely guarded areas of the constitutional scheme in India – Name
can be regarded as one of the foremost indicators of identity – Going
by the very nature of rights under Article 19, the right to get changed
name recorded in the official (public) records cannot be an absolute
B
right and as a matter of public policy and larger public interest
calls for certain reasonable restrictions to observe consistency and
obviate confusion and deceptive attempt – On facts, the Byelaws
permit change of name only if permission from the Court has been
obtained prior to the publication of result – The provision is
problematic on certain counts – There can be numerous C
circumstances wherein change of name could be a legitimate
requirement and keeping the ultimate goal of preserving the standard
of education in mind, the Board must provide for a reasonable
opportunity to effect such changes – Balance of convenience would
tilt in favour of students for, they stand to lose more due to
D
inaccuracies in their certificates than the Board whose sole worry
is increasing administrative burden – CBSE maintains its official
records in respect of candidates on the basis of foundational
documents being the school records – Therefore, CBSE is obliged
to carry out all necessary corrections to ensure that CBSE certificate
is consistent with the relevant information furnished in the school E
records as it existed at the relevant time and future changes thereto
including after the publication of results by the CBSE – However,
when it comes to recording any information in the original certificate
issued by the CBSE which is not consistent with the school records,
it is essential that the CBSE must insist for supporting public
F
document which has presumptive value and in the given case
declaration by a Court of law to incorporate such a change – In
that regard, the CBSE can insist for additional conditions to reassure
itself and safeguard its interest against any claim by a third party/
body because of changes incorporated by it pursuant to application
made by the candidate – Central Board of Secondary Education G
(CBSE) Examination Byelaws of 2007 – Constitution of India –
Art.19.
Education/Educational Institutions: Central Board of
Secondary Education (CBSE) – Correction/change in certificates
issued by the Board – Whether the CBSE / Board is obliged to carry H
1102 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 4 S.C.R.

A out corrections/changes in the certificates issued by it owing to
correction/updation of public records/ documents which have
statutory presumption of genuineness – Held: There is no reason
for the CBSE Board to not take notice of the public documents relied
upon by the candidate and to record change on that basis in the
certificate issued by it, for being consistent with the relied upon
B
public documents – It matters not if the information furnished in the
public documents is not entirely consistent with the school records
of the incumbent – CBSE while accepting those documents as
foundational documents for effecting changes consistent therewith
may insist for additional conditions and at the same time while
C retaining the original entry make note in the form of caption/
annotation in the fresh certificate to be issued by it while calling
upon the incumbent to surrender the original certificate issued by it
to avoid any misuse thereof at a later point of time – It would be
permissible for the CBSE to insist for a sworn affidavit to be given
by the incumbent making necessary declaration and also to
D
indemnify the CBSE – The fresh certificate to be issued by the CBSE
may also contain disclaimer of the Board clearly mentioning that
change has been effected at the behest of the incumbent in light of
the public documents relied upon by him – In addition, the incumbent
can be called upon to notify about the change in the Official Gazette
E and by giving public notice as precondition for recording the change
by way of abundant precaution – When a student applies to a Court
of law for prior permission and/or declaration and produces public
document(s), the Court would enter upon an inquiry wherein the
legal presumption would operate in favour of the public document(s)
and burden would shift on the party opposing the change to rebut
F
the presumption or oppose the claim on any other ground – The
question of genuineness of the document including its contents would
be adjudicated in the same inquiry and the Court of law would
permit the desired change only upon verifying the official records
and upon being satisfied of its genuineness – At the same time, the
G question of justiciability of the requested changes would be
considered and only upon being satisfied with the need demonstrated
by the student, the Court would grant its permission – The said
permission can then be placed before the Board along with copy of
publication in the official gazette and requisite (prescribed) fee (if
any) – The Board would then have no locus to make further enquiry
H
JIGYA YADAV (MINOR) (THROUGH GUARDIAN/FATHER 1103
HARI SINGH) v. C.B.S.E. (CBSE)

nor would be required to enter upon any further verification exercise A
– While considering requests for changes in certificates, CBSE
cannot act as a court and it cannot effectively consider any request
over and above those requests that merely require bringing the
certificates in conformity with the school records or public
documents, as the case may be – Central Board of Secondary
B
Education (CBSE) Examination Byelaws of 2007.
Education/Educational Institutions: Central Board of
Secondary Education (CBSE) – Examination Byelaws of the Board
– Corrections/changes in certificates issued by the Board – Period
of limitation for correction of the certificates – Whether the
Examination Byelaws in force on the date of examination conducted C
by CBSE or the date of consideration of the application for
recording correction/change would be relevant – And, whether the
effect of correction or change, as the case may be, will have
retrospective effect from the date of issue of the original certificate
– Held: The Byelaws existing on the date of declaration/publication D
of result and issue of certificate would be relevant for the purpose
of effecting changes in the certificates – If the limitation of
applicability of Byelaws was to be reckoned from the date of
application for correction/change and not the date of result of the
examination conducted by CBSE, that would be leaving things to a
state of uncertainty – Once changes are permitted in the documents E
of CBSE, it does not ipso facto mean that the changes are given a
retrospective effect – The changes are indeed prospective and to
signify that a remedial measure is provided in the Byelaws, as existing
presently – They provide for the requirement of adding a caption/
annotation with the date of such change along with the changed F
particulars so as to indicate within the certificate that the changes
have been made on a date subsequent to the date of publishing the
certificates – The requirement of caption/annotation is indeed a
sufficient safeguard to prevent the usage of subsequently altered
documents as unchanged original records – Central Board of
Secondary Education (CBSE) Examination Byelaws of 2007. G

Education/Educational Institutions: Central Board of
Secondary Education (CBSE) – Correction/change in certificates
issued by the Board – Whether writ of mandamus issued for effecting
corrections in CBSE certificates can be in the teeth of explicit
H
1104 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 4 S.C.R.

A provisions in the examination byelaws, without examining validity
of the byelaws – Held: The High Courts, being constitutional Courts,
are duly vested with the power to review any law in light of Part-III
– There cannot be mechanical directions by way of mandamus to a
public authority without going into the veracity of the claims and
without sufficiently explaining why the case demands extraordinary
B
treatment – The Courts need to be extra cautious and alive to the
immediate factual position before permitting changes – No two
requests for change of name or change in date of birth can be
viewed with the same judicial eye – Sometimes, change of name
could be a necessity, sometimes it could be a pure exercise of freewill
C without any need – As long as Byelaws or the applicable rules permit
so, there is no occasion for any court to deny such relief – But
when Byelaws do not permit for the same, the Court must be
circumspect before issuing directions, that too without commenting
upon the validity of the Byelaws and without demonstrating the rights
which are at stake – constitutional or legal – Central Board of
D
Secondary Education (CBSE) Examination Byelaws of 2007 –
Constitution of India – Part III.
Education/Educational Institutions: Central Board of
Secondary Education (CBSE) – Correction/change in certificates
issued by the Board – Nature of correction or change, as the case
E may be, permissible to be carried by the CBSE at the instance of the
student including past student – Held: Broadly, two situations would
arise – The first is where the incumbent wants “correction” in the
certificate issued by the CBSE to be made consistent with the
particulars mentioned in the school records – There is no reason
F for the CBSE to turn down such request or attach any precondition
except reasonable period of limitation and keeping in mind the
period for which the CBSE has to maintain its record under the
extant regulations – CBSE cannot impose precondition of applying
for correction consistent with the school records only before
publication of results – Such a condition would be unreasonable
G and excessive – However, if the request for recording change is
based on changed school records post the publication of results
and issue of certificate by the CBSE, the candidate would be entitled
to apply for recording such a change within the reasonable limitation
period prescribed by the CBSE – As regards request for “change”
H of particulars in the certificate issued by the CBSE, it presupposes
JIGYA YADAV (MINOR) (THROUGH GUARDIAN/FATHER 1105
HARI SINGH) v. C.B.S.E. (CBSE)

that the particulars intended to be recorded in the CBSE certificate A
are not consistent with the school records – Such a request could be
made in two different situations – The first is on the basis of public
documents like Birth Certificate, Aadhaar Card/Election Card, etc.
and to incorporate change in the CBSE certificate consistent
therewith – The second possibility is when the request for change is
B
due to the acquired name by choice at a later point of time – That
change need not be backed by public documents pertaining to the
candidate – Reverting to the first category, there is a legal
presumption in relation to the public documents as envisaged in the
1872 Act – Such public documents, therefore, cannot be ignored by
the CBSE – Taking note of those documents, the CBSE may entertain C
the request for recording change in the certificate issued by it –
This, however, need not be unconditional, but subject to certain
reasonable conditions to be fulfilled by the applicant as may be
prescribed by the CBSE – The fresh certificate may contain disclaimer
and caption/annotation against the original entry (except in respect
D
of change of name effected in exercise of right to be forgotten)
indicating the date on which change has been recorded and the
basis thereof – However, in the latter situation where the change is
to be effected on the basis of new acquired name without any
supporting school record or public document, that request may be
entertained upon insisting for prior permission/declaration by a E
Court of law in that regard and publication in the Official Gazette
including surrender/return of original certificate (or duplicate
original certificate, as the case may be) issued by CBSE and upon
payment of prescribed fees – Evidence Act, 1872 – ss.76 r/w ss.79,
80 and 81.
F
Disposing of the cases with directions to the CBSE, the
Court
HELD:
Whether the Central Board of Secondary Education (CBSE)
Examination Byelaws of 2007 have the force of law. G
1.1. For the nature of activities undertaken by the CBSE/
Board including the powers and functions of the Board, it can be
safely assumed that the Board is a State within the meaning of
Article 12 of the Constitution of India and as a corollary thereof,
H
1106 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 4 S.C.R.

A its actions would be amenable to Part-III of the Constitution of
India. The fact that the Board can be treated as a State within the
meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution does not mean that the
byelaws framed by it would necessarily become law within the
meaning of Article 13 of the Constitution of India. Only a “law”
under Article 13 can be reckoned as a restriction in respect of
B
rights guaranteed under Article 19 of the Constitution. [Para
101][1155-C-E]
1.2. The underlying purpose of defining “law” under Article
13 is to encompass a practical administrative reality that there
can be laws other than ordinary statutory laws. It, therefore, takes
C within its sweep those matters (declaration in the form of Byelaws
in this case) as having the “force of law” albeit not enacted by the
legislature as such. For, it defines “law” to include ordinances,
orders, byelaws, rule, regulation or notification issued/made by
the State. The precise meanings of these terms cannot be confined
D in the rigidity of language and the same is neither desirable nor
required in the present case. [Paras 103, 104][1156-E-G]
1.3 Law made by State refers to a body of rules which shapes
the rights and liabilities of persons in a universal sense as opposed
to a private transaction between parties. Such law has the ability
E to bind people by providing for all prominent aspects of their
conduct as the subjects of law. Therefore, any rule/notification/
order/byelaw issued/made by the State or its instrumentalities
would have the force of law and bind all entities subjected to it
and operates as a code of conduct to regulate their functioning.
Yet another crucial characteristic would be enforceability in a court
F of law. [Para 105][1157-A-B]
1.4 CBSE, despite being packaged as a registered society,
is performing an essential public function for the government
since its establishment in 1929. The principles associated with a
public function can be illustratively culled out as follows: a.
G Extension of collective benefit to public by a public authority; b.
Participation in social or economic affairs including health,
education, social services etc.; c. Private bodies or charitable
institutions performing public functions could also be regulated
in the same manner as a public authority. In the school education
H
JIGYA YADAV (MINOR) (THROUGH GUARDIAN/FATHER 1107
HARI SINGH) v. C.B.S.E. (CBSE)

structure as we have it, there are state government boards limited A
to respective states. There are central boards having its area of
operation throughout India, namely, Council for the Indian School
Certificate Examinations (ICSE), a private board; International
Baccalaureate (IB), formerly known as International
Baccalaureate Organization (IBO) a non-profit foundation/
B
organization having headquarter in Geneva, Switzerland; and
CBSE. [Para 106][1157-D; 1158-E-H]
Binny Ltd. & Anr. v. V. Sadasivan & Ors. (2005) 6 SCC
657 – relied on.
1.5 CBSE is the only central body for conducting C
examinations in the country created by a resolution of the Central
Government. All the bodies constituted at various levels are
working in the direction of just educational governance. Article
41 of the Constitution, couched as a directive, is the source behind
the basic functioning of the CBSE Board as it secures nothing
but right to education. It is participating in educational affairs D
which form an intrinsic part of social affairs. The CBSE Board is
a public authority functioning in public interest for the performance
of a public function. [Para 107][1159-A-B]
1.6 The constitution of the CBSE/Board reaffirms the public
character of the Board as the ultimate control over the functioning E
of the Board is exercised by the Ministry of Education (now
Ministry of Education & Social Welfare). Reverting to the CBSE
Examination Byelaws, the same are couched in the form of a code.
They provide for all essential aspects relating to formal education
of a student including admission, examination, migration, transfer, F
curriculum, fee for various services, issuance of verified
certificates, modifications in certificates etc. This Byelaws,
therefore, bind the parties and are duly enforceable in a court of
law, even by way of writ remedies. To put it differently, the
Byelaws of the Board have the force of law and must be regarded
as such for all legal purposes. It would serve no meaningful G
purpose to hold these authoritative set of rules originating from
an instrumentality of the State as mere contractual terms despite
there being overwhelming public interest in their just application.
[Paras 108, 109, 110][1159-C; 1159-F-G; 1160-A]
H
1108 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 4 S.C.R.

A 1.7 The argument that Byelaws of the Board are contractual
elements as CBSE is a registered society unbacked by a statute
cannot be accepted for at least four reasons – first, CBSE is not a
private corporate body. It is a juristic person and a “State” within
the meaning of Article 12, which in itself warrants its amenability
to the courts including constitutional writ courts; second, the
B
functions performed by the CBSE Board are public functions and
not private functions; third, the test of “force of law” takes within
its sweep the nature of rule, its authoritative impact on the
subjects, nature of function performed by the rule making body,
the origin of the body, the binding value of the rules, existence of
C any competing set of rules and fourth, absence of statute does
not automatically render the rules to be contractual terms. [Para
111][1160-B-C]
1.8 As in the ultimate analysis, the Byelaws operate as law,
the scrutiny of this Court cannot be undermined by giving them
D an artificial colour. For a student enrolled with the CBSE, there
is no other body of rules but the subject Byelaws for dealing with
all significant aspects of her education. By now it is an established
tenet that even body corporates, co-operative societies,
registered societies etc. can be declared as instrumentalities of
the State, for the only reason that the outer form of organization
E must not be allowed to defeat the ultimate constitutional goal of
protection of fundamental rights as and when they suffer at the
hands of the State, directly or indirectly. The Court ought to
intervene with circumspection even when the public body derives
its authority from a government resolution. [Para 112][1160-D-
F F]
1.9 One says so because there is an evolving body of
jurisprudence enunciating that the principle of presumption of
constitutionality attached with statutes ought not to be extended
to subordinate legislations with the same vigour. For, the
G legislature enjoys the sacred backing of people’s will and naturally,
every act of legislature is presumed to be constitutional. In other
words, the Courts generally do not look upon duly enacted laws
with suspicion at the first glance as they enjoy legal presumption
of its validity. Nevertheless, circumspect intervention on the part
of the Court is to advance constitutional protection for guarantees
H
JIGYA YADAV (MINOR) (THROUGH GUARDIAN/FATHER 1109
HARI SINGH) v. C.B.S.E. (CBSE)

under Part-III of the Constitution. Arguendo, the Examination A
Byelaws are not “law” under Article 13, it would not affect the
power of the Court to scrutinize them in reference to Part-III of
the Constitution of India as CBSE is “State” within the meaning
of Article 12 and all its actions are consequently subject to Part-
III. [Paras 113, 114][1160-F-H; 1161-A]
B
Whether examination byelaws of CBSE / Board impose
reasonable restrictions on the exercise of rights under Article
19 of the Constitution including fail the test of rationality for
excessively restricting the scope of permissible corrections/
changes?
C
2.1 The core existence of an individual is not exemplified
by her outer characteristics but by her inner self-identification
and also about the significance of the acquired identity in the
form of name. The identity of an individual is one of the most
closely guarded areas of the constitutional scheme in India. The
sanctity of identity has been recognized by this Court in a plethora D
of cases. The core existence of an individual is not exemplified
by her outer characteristics but by her inner self-identification.
[Para 115][1161-B-D]
National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India &
Ors. (2014) 5 SCC 438 : [2014] 5 SCR 119; Navtej E
Singh Johar & Ors. v. Union of India through Secretary,
Ministry of Law and Justice (2018) 10 SCC 1 : [2018]
7 SCR 379; K.S. Puttaswamy and Anr. v. Union of India
& Ors. (2017) 10 SCC 1 : [2017] 10 SCR 569 – relied
on. F
2.2 Identity is an amalgam of various internal and external
including acquired characteristics of an individual and name can
be regarded as one of the foremost indicators of identity. And
therefore, an individual must be in complete control of her name
and law must enable her to retain as well as to exercise such G
control freely “for all times”. Such control would inevitably include
the aspiration of an individual to be recognized by a different name
for a just cause. Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution provides for
a guaranteed right to freedom of speech and expression. This
freedom would include the freedom to lawfully express one’s
identity in the manner of their liking. In other words, expression H
1110 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 4 S.C.R.

A of identity is a protected element of freedom of expression under
the Constitution. [Para 116][1162-B-D]
2.3 Any change in identity of an individual has to go through
multiple steps and it cannot be regarded as complete without
proper fulfilment of those steps. An individual may self-identify
B oneself with any title or epithet at any point of time. But the change
of identity would not be regarded as formally or legally complete
until and unless the State and its agencies take note thereof in
their records. After all, in social sphere, an individual is not only
recognized by how an individual identifies oneself but also by
how his/her official records identify him/her. For, in every public
C transaction of an individual, official records introduce the person
by his/her name and other relevant particulars. [Para 118][1162-
F-G]
2.4 Going by the very nature of rights under Article 19, the
right to get changed name recorded in the official (public) records
D cannot be an absolute right and as a matter of public policy and
larger public interest calls for certain reasonable restrictions to
observe consistency and obviate confusion and deceptive attempt.
The test of reasonableness requires that the impugned law is
intelligently crafted in such a manner that it is able to justify the
E ultimate impact of the law on its subjects. If it restricts, it must
restrict on the basis of reason and if it permits, it must permit on
the basis of reason. Similarly, if a law draws a classification, it
must classify intelligently i.e., backed by reason. Reason is the
foundation of all laws and their validity is immensely dependent
on the availability of sound reason. Equally crucial is the
F availability of a legitimate object. Reasonableness is adjudged in
the specific context of the case and is not confined to the words
of a definition. [Paras 120, 122][1163-B, D-E]
Om Prakash & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Ors. (2004) 3
SCC 402 : [2004] 2 SCR 900; State of Madras v. V. G.
G Row, AIR 1952 SC 196 – relied on.
2.5 The Byelaws permit change of name only if permission
from the Court has been obtained prior to the publication of result.
It puts a clear embargo on any change of name sans prior
permission before the publication. The provision is problematic
H
JIGYA YADAV (MINOR) (THROUGH GUARDIAN/FATHER 1111
HARI SINGH) v. C.B.S.E. (CBSE)

on certain counts. Firstly, it is not a mere restriction on the right, A
it is a complete embargo on the right post publication of result of
the candidate. It fails to take into account the possibility of need
for change of name after the publication of result including the
uncertainty of timeline required to obtain such declaration from
the Court of law due to law’s delay and upon which the candidate
B
has no control whatsoever. Whereas, while amending the Byelaws
in 2007, the CBSE itself had noted that children are not of mature
age while passing school examinations and they may not be in a
position to decide conclusively on issues concerning their identity.
The Byelaws completely overlook this possibility when it ordains
seeking declaration from the Court prior to the publication of C
results of the concerned examination conducted by it. [Para
123][1164-F-H; 1165-A]
2.6 The overriding state interest, as per the Board, to retain
this stringency is nothing but efficiency of administration.
Administrative efficiency, despite being a crucial concern, has D
not been and cannot be elevated to a standard that it is used to
justify non-performance of essential functions by an
instrumentality of the State. To use administrative efficiency to
make it practically impossible for a student to alter her identity
in the Board certificates, no matter how urgent and important it
is, would be highly disproportionate and can in no manner be E
termed as a reasonable restriction. Reasonableness would
demand a proper balance between a student’s right to be identified
in the official (public) records in manner of her choice and the
Board’s argument of administrative efficiency. To sustain this
balance, it would be open to the Board to limit the number of F
times such alterations could be permitted including subject to
availability of the old records preserved by it as per the extant
regulations. But to say that post the publication of examination
results and issuance of certificates, there can be no way to alter
the record would be a case of total prohibition and not a reasonable
restraint. [Para 124][1165-B-D] G

2.7 The limitation as regards maximum period upto which
changes can be permitted also requires a different approach.
Upon receiving the certificates, the student would naturally be
put to notice of the particulars of certificates. Due to young age
H
1112 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 4 S.C.R.

A and inadvertence including being casual and indolent, a student
may fail to identify the errors or to understand the probable impact
of those errors and accordingly, may not apply for rectification
immediately. It is also possible that a student may not have to
use the certificates immediately after passing out and by the time
she uses them, the limitation period for correction may elapse.
B
Therefore, a realistic time for permitting corrections is very
important. Indeed, it can be commensurate with the statutory or
mandatory period upto which CBSE is obliged to preserve its
old record. [Para 125][1165-E-G]
2.8 In case of any ordinary civil rights, it is important that
C the action for enforcement of such rights is initiated in prescribed
time and consistency is maintained, but is it permissible to say
the same about fundamental rights? The rights which are
recognised as fundamental under the Constitution are “preferred
or chosen freedoms” and a very sensitive and realistic approach
D has to be taken in such matters. One wonders whether after the
lapse of prescribed time, let us say 3 years, there could be no
reasonable and legitimate circumstances to warrant change of
name. At the same time, there is merit in CBSE’s argument that
frequent changes cannot be permitted as there is scope of abuse
and misuse, apart from administrative burden. This argument
E cannot be lightly brushed aside. The same concerns could apply
to other bodies as well, like Unique Identification Authority of
India and Passport Authority. [Paras 126, 127][1165-G-H; 1166-
A-B]
2.9 As regards the argument of misuse, no doubt, there
F are instances of misuse of provisions that permit change of identity
in criminal matters. However, mere possibility of abuse cannot
deter the Board from fulfilling their essential functions. A
possibility of abuse cannot be used to deny legitimate rights to
citizens. The balance simply does not tilt in favour of such a
G proposition. The course of law cannot choose to change its stream
merely because there are apprehensions of abuse on the way.
The Board’s concern is only to regulate and maintain efficient
educational standards. It is not a penal authority. If any of the
provisions of Byelaws are subjected to misuse or abuse by anyone,
the Board would be well within its rights to approach the
H
JIGYA YADAV (MINOR) (THROUGH GUARDIAN/FATHER 1113
HARI SINGH) v. C.B.S.E. (CBSE)

appropriate body for necessary penal or civil action. As a nodal A
agency made for a specific public purpose, CBSE can only use its
means and resources to put proper safeguards in place while
performing its functions. More so, when it is not even the job of
the Board to verify anything, as changes are made after grant of
permission by a Court of law. There is involvement of judicial
B
application of mind. The Board only has to give effect to the Court
order granting permission, as and when it is so pronounced
irrespective of publication of examination results in earlier point
of time. [Para 128][1166-C-F]
2.10 Administrative efficiency cannot be the sole concern
of CBSE. Every institution desires efficiency in their functioning. C
But it does not mean that efficiency is achieved by curbing their
basic functions. Regulation of standard of education would
empower the Board to take all necessary steps, as permissible
under the Resolution and Regulations, to control all possible
aspects of school education that may have a bearing on its D
standard. Quality of curriculum, services extended to the
students, effective grievance redressal mechanism, oversight
over affiliated schools etc. are some of the essential elements
touching upon the standard of education. Maintenance of those
standards would demand constant upgradation of rules and
services of the Board in tune with changing needs of the students E
and the ultimate goal of education. [Para 129][1166-G; 1167-C-
D]
2.11 One of the primary functions of the Board is to grant
certificates to its students. Effective maintenance and regulation
of standard of education would include complete accountability F
of the Board in grant of such certificates and its duty does not get
extinguished after publication of examination results and issue
of certificates. Rather, it extends to taking care of post-publication
concerns of students as and when they emerge, as students seek
to use their certificates for purposes of higher education and G
career opportunities. A narrow reading of the functions of the
Board would leave glaring gaps in the field of school education
and may jeopardize the welfare of students with legitimate
concerns. [Para 130][1167-E-F]

H
1114 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 4 S.C.R.

A 2.12 The concerned Byelaw has been framed on the
assumption that there can be no situation wherein a legitimate
need for change of name could arise for a student after publication
of results. It is presumed that only typographical/factual errors
could come in the certificates and they can be corrected using
the provision for corrections. The presumption is erroneous,
B
absurd and distances itself from the social realities. There can
be numerous circumstances wherein change of name could be a
legitimate requirement and keeping the ultimate goal of
preserving the standard of education in mind, the Board must
provide for a reasonable opportunity to effect such changes. [Para
C 131][1167-G-H; 1168-A]
2.13 The two parties here – the Board and students – are
not in an equal position of impact. In other words, the balance of
convenience would tilt in favour of students. For, they stand to
lose more due to inaccuracies in their certificates than the Board
D whose sole worry is increasing administrative burden. The
obligation of Board to take additional administrative burden is
no doubt onerous but the propensity of a student losing career
opportunities due to inaccurate certificate is unparalleled. A Board
dealing with maintenance of educational standards cannot
arrogate to itself the power to impact identity of students who
E enrol with it. The right to control one’s identity must remain with
the individual, subject, of course, to reasonable restrictions. [Para
132][1168-B-C, E-F]
2.14 The utility of certificates issued by the Board is not
confined to educational purposes anymore. They serve a social
F purpose today and are often used to cross verify particulars like
name and date of birth while applying for other government
identity documents. They assume immense relevance while
applying for various jobs, both public and private. Interestingly,
CBSE itself has argued at length on the importance and
G authoritative value of their certificates. In such circumstances,
an inaccuracy or denial of change could be fatal to a student’s
future prospects and all these concerns cannot be brushed aside
in the name of administrative exigencies. [Para 133][1168-G-H]

H
JIGYA YADAV (MINOR) (THROUGH GUARDIAN/FATHER 1115
HARI SINGH) v. C.B.S.E. (CBSE)

2.15 Pertinently, the Parliament is also alive to the social A
realities having bearing on identity documents. There are various
statutory enactments wherein detailed provisions are made for
change of identity. The government(s) is cognizant of its duty to
upgrade its identity records in tune with changing requirements
of the citizens. From reasons purely personal to reasons flowing
B
from life events such as marriage, death or migration, the
authorities are responsive to the changing needs of citizens. As
per the nature of identity, changes are permissible. It is bounden
duty of all state instrumentalities to play the role of enablers in
the exercise of rights by the citizens, including to correct their
records owing to purely personal choices of the citizens. Though, C
in an ultimate analysis, this exercise of examining the reasons
has to be left to the court of law empowered to permit changes in
a specific factual scenario. [Paras 134, 136][1169-A-B; 1172-E-
G; 1173-A]
2.16 No doubt, it is true that CBSE certificates are not D
strictly meant to be considered as identity documents, however,
the same are being relied upon for corroborative purposes in all
academic and career related transactions as foundational
document. In fact, the CBSE itself has conceded to this fact that
their certificates are relied for all official purposes, as noted above.
The date of birth in matriculation certificate, in particular, is relied E
upon as primary evidence of date of birth of a citizen. Therefore,
as regards the information contained in a CBSE certificate, the
Board must afford opportunity to the students to modify it subject
to complying with requisite formalities which are reasonable in
nature. If all other State agencies could allow it for the preservance F
of consistency and accuracy, alongside being enablers in free
exercise of rights by the citizens, there is no reason for the CBSE
to not uphold that right of the students. More so, it would be in
the interest of CBSE’s own credibility that their records are
regarded as accurate and latest records of a student worthy of
being relied upon for official purposes. Therefore, this approach G
would serve twin purposes – enabling free exercise of rights and
preservance of accuracy. However, the justiciability of the
requested changes can of course be gone into. Law gives no
recognition to an act of shunning essential duties by an entity of
H
1116 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 4 S.C.R.

A the State. A body entrusted with essential public functions cannot
unduly put fetters on its powers. [Paras 137, 138, 139][1173-B-
E; G]
Indian Aluminium Company v. Kerala State Electricity
Board (1975) 2 SCC 414 : [1976] 1 SCR 70; J.K.
B Aggarwal v. Haryana Seeds Development Corporation
Ltd. & Ors. (1991) 2 SCC 283 : [1990] 3 Suppl. SCR
13 – relied on.
2.17 There are no restrictions on the power of CBSE to
permit change of name. The Constitution, Resolution and
C Regulations are functional documents of the Board and none of
these documents provide for any such fetters. Therefore, in the
exercise of its discretion, the Board cannot put fetters on its
duties so as to cause grave prejudice to the students with
legitimate causes for changing their certificates. The exercise of
discretion in this negative manner would be arbitrary and
D unreasonable, at best. [Para 139][1175-C]
2.18 The provision regarding change of name “post
publication of examination results” is excessively restrictive and
imposes unreasonable restrictions on the exercise of rights under
Article 19. [Para 140][1175-D]
E
2.19 On perusal of the examination byelaws from 1995 to
2018, as they sailed through multiple amendments over the course
of time, it is seen that there is hardly any consistency in the
Examination Byelaws operating during the relevant period, either
in the scope of permissible changes or in the timelines provided
F for effecting such changes. Presumably, drawing upon experiences
and judicial pronouncements, the Board had to carry out frequent
amendments in the Byelaws, sometimes to do a somersault and
go back to the earlier position. By and large, the impression
gathered from the analysis is that the Board has been groping in
G the dark without having an all-purpose long term objective policy
in place as regards permissible changes. [Paras 141, 143][1175-
E-F; 1177-A-B]
3. The CBSE maintains its official records in respect of
candidate on the basis of foundational documents being the school
H
JIGYA YADAV (MINOR) (THROUGH GUARDIAN/FATHER 1117
HARI SINGH) v. C.B.S.E. (CBSE)

records. Therefore, the CBSE is obliged to carry out all necessary A
corrections to ensure that CBSE certificate is consistent with
the relevant information furnished in the school records as it
existed at the relevant time and future changes thereto including
after the publication of results by the CBSE. However, when it
comes to recording any information in the original certificate
B
issued by the CBSE which is not consistent with the school
records, it is essential that the CBSE must insist for supporting
public document which has presumptive value and in the given
case declaration by a Court of law to incorporate such a change.
In that regard, the CBSE can insist for additional conditions to
reassure itself and safeguard its interest against any claim by a C
third party/body because of changes incorporated by it pursuant
to application made by the candidate. [Para 150][1179-E-H]
Whether the CBSE / Board is obliged to carry out
corrections/changes in the certificates issued by it owing to
correction/updation of public records/ documents which have D
statutory presumption of genuineness?
4.1. The Byelaws provide for a two-tier mechanism for
recording change of name or other details. One of them is prior
permission or declaration by a Court of law to be obtained. As
regards public documents like Birth Certificate, Official Gazette, E
Aadhaar Card, Election Card, etc., the same enjoy legal
presumption of its correctness in terms of explicit provisions
contained in Chapter V of the 1872 Act. The 1872 Act extends
such presumption in terms of Section 76 read with Sections 79
and 80 of the 1872 Act and as in the case of Official Gazette under
Section 81 of the same Act. Even other legislations concerning F
public documents attach equal importance to the authenticity of
such documents including while making changes in their
certificates to which we have alluded to in this judgment.
Understood thus, there is no reason for the CBSE Board to not
take notice of the public documents relied upon by the candidate G
and to record change on that basis in the certificate issued by it,
for being consistent with the relied upon public documents. It
matters not if the information furnished in the public documents
is not entirely consistent with the school records of the incumbent.

H
1118 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 4 S.C.R.

A The CBSE while accepting those documents as foundational
documents for effecting changes consistent therewith may insist
for additional conditions and at the same time while retaining the
original entry make note in the form of caption/annotation in the
fresh certificate to be issued by it while calling upon the incumbent
to surrender the original certificate issued by it to avoid any
B
misuse thereof at a later point of time. It would be permissible
for the CBSE to insist for a sworn affidavit to be given by the
incumbent making necessary declaration and also to indemnify
the CBSE. The fresh certificate to be issued by the CBSE may
also contain disclaimer of the Board clearly mentioning that
C change has been effected at the behest of the incumbent in light
of the public documents relied upon by him. In addition, the
incumbent can be called upon to notify about the change in the
Official Gazette and by giving public notice as precondition for
recording the change by way of abundant precaution. [Para
152][1180-D-H; 1181-A-B]
D
CIDCO v. Vasudha Gorakhnath Mandevlekar (2009)
7 SCC 283 : [2009] 9 SCR 427 – relied on.
4.2. When a student applies to a Court of law for prior
permission and/or declaration and produces public document(s),
E the Court would enter upon an inquiry wherein the legal
presumption would operate in favour of the public document(s)
and burden would shift on the party opposing the change to rebut
the presumption or oppose the claim on any other ground. The
question of genuineness of the document including its contents
would be adjudicated in the same inquiry and the Court of law
F would permit the desired change only upon verifying the official
records and upon being satisfied of its genuineness. At the same
time, the question of justiciability of the requested changes would
be considered and only upon being satisfied with the need
demonstrated by the student, the Court w ould grant its
G permission. The said permission can then be placed before the
Board along with copy of publication in the official gazette and
requisite (prescribed) fee (if any). The Board would then have no
locus to make further enquiry nor would be required to enter
upon any further verification exercise. While considering requests
for changes in certificates, CBSE cannot act as a court and it
H
JIGYA YADAV (MINOR) (THROUGH GUARDIAN/FATHER 1119
HARI SINGH) v. C.B.S.E. (CBSE)

cannot effectively consider any request over and above those A
requests that merely require bringing the certificates in conformity
with the school records or public documents, as the case may be.
[Paras 156, 157][1183-B-D; 1184-B-C]
Subin Mohammed v. Union of India 2016 (1) KLT 340
– referred to. B
Whether the examination byelaws in force on the date of
examination conducted by CBSE or the date of consideration of
the application for recording correction/change would be relevant?
And, whether the effect of correction or change, as the case may
be, will have retrospective effect from the date of issue of the C
original certificate?
5.1. Considered in the context of the Byelaws, the
controversy is actually simple in nature. The Byelaws consistently
provide that the period of limitation is to be calculated from the
date of declaration of the result and issue of certificate. It means D
that the period of limitation begins to run against the student
after declaration of result and publication of certificates as the
student is put to notice of the contents of the document, upon its
issue. The student can now be said to be in a position to verify
the correctness of the certificate(s). The irresistible outcome of
this legal position is that the Byelaws existing on the date of E
such declaration/publication of result and issue of certificate would
be relevant for the purpose of effecting changes in the certificates.
The express language of the Byelaws would be defeated if one
says that the law existing on the date of application for recording
change would be relevant. That would negate the very importance F
of having a period of limitation for correction of the certificates.
[Para 159][1185-F-H; 1186-A]
Kalpana Thakur & Anr. v. Central Board of Secondary
Education & Anr. (2015) SCC OnLine Del 12156 and
Vyshnav @ Vishnu Viswam V. v. Central Board of G
Secondary Education & Ors. (2017) SCC OnLine Ker
39806 – referred to.
5.2. If the limitation of applicability of Byelaws was to be
reckoned from the date of application for correction/change and
not the date of result of the examination conducted by CBSE,
H
1120 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 4 S.C.R.

A that would be leaving things to a state of uncertainty. [Para
160][1186-B]
5.3. Once changes are permitted in the documents of CBSE,
it does not ipso facto mean that the changes are given a
retrospective effect. The changes are indeed prospective and to
B signify that a remedial measure is provided in the Byelaws, as
existing presently. They provide for the requirement of adding a
caption/annotation with the date of such change along with the
changed particulars so as to indicate within the certificate that
the changes have been made on a date subsequent to the date of
publishing the certificates. The requirement of caption/annotation
C is indeed a sufficient safeguard to prevent the usage of
subsequently altered documents as unchanged original records.
[Para 161][1187-A-C]
Rayaan Chawla v. University of Delhi & Anr. 275 (2020)
DLT 314 – referred to.
D
Whether writ of mandamus issued for effecting corrections
in CBSE certificates can be in the teeth of explicit provisions in
the examination byelaws, without examining validity of the
byelaws?

E 6.1. The High Courts, being constitutional Courts, are duly
vested with the power to review any law in light of Part-III.
Despite being called upon to do so, if they choose not to do it,
the same cannot be countenanced. There cannot be mechanical
directions by way of mandamus to a public authority without going
into the veracity of the claims and without sufficiently explaining
F why the case demands extraordinary treatment. [Para 165][1190-
D]
6.2. The Courts need to be extra cautious and alive to the
immediate factual position before permitting changes. No two
requests for change of name or change in date of birth can be
G viewed with the same judicial eye. Sometimes, change of name
could be a necessity, sometimes it could be a pure exercise of
freewill without any need. As long as Byelaws or the applicable
rules permit so, there is no occasion for any court to deny such
relief. But when Byelaws do not permit for the same, the Court
H
JIGYA YADAV (MINOR) (THROUGH GUARDIAN/FATHER 1121
HARI SINGH) v. C.B.S.E. (CBSE)

must be circumspect before issuing directions, that too without A
commenting upon the validity of the Byelaws and without
demonstrating the rights which are at stake – constitutional or
legal. [Para 166][1191-A-B]
DIRECTIONS TO CBSE
7.1. In the ultimate analysis the real dispute requiring B
resolution is about the nature of correction or change, as the
case may be, permissible to be carried by the CBSE at the instance
of the student including past student. Broadly, two situations
would arise. [Para 169][1194-E-F]
7.2. The first is where the incumbent wants “correction” C
in the certificate issued by the CBSE to be made consistent with
the particulars mentioned in the school records. There is no
reason for the CBSE to turn down such request or attach any
precondition except reasonable period of limitation and keeping
in mind the period for which the CBSE has to maintain its record D
under the extant regulations. While doing so, it can certainly insist
for compliance of other conditions by the incumbent, such as, to
file sworn affidavit making necessary declaration and to indemnify
the CBSE from any claim against it by third party because of such
correction. The CBSE would be justified in insisting for
surrender/return of the original certificate (or duplicate original E
certificate, as the case may be) issued by it for replacing it with
the fresh certificate to be issued after carrying out necessary
corrections with caption/annotation against the changes carried
out and the date of such correction. It may retain the original
entries as it is except in respect of correction of name effected in F
exercise of right to be forgotten. The fresh certificate may also
contain disclaimer that the CBSE cannot be held responsible for
the genuineness of the school records produced by the incumbent
in support of the request to record correction in the original CBSE
certificate. The CBSE can also insist for reasonable prescribed
fees to be paid by the incumbent in lieu of administrative expenses G
for issuing fresh certificate. At the same time, the CBSE cannot
impose precondition of applying for correction consistent with
the school records only before publication of results. Such a
condition would be unreasonable and excessive. If the application
for recording correction is based on the school records as it H
1122 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 4 S.C.R.

A obtained at the time of publication of results and issue of certificate
by the CBSE, it will be open to CBSE to provide for reasonable
limitation period within which the application for recording
correction in certificate issued by it may be entertained by it.
However, if the request for recording change is based on changed
school records post the publication of results and issue of
B
certificate by the CBSE, the candidate would be entitled to apply
for recording such a change within the reasonable limitation period
prescribed by the CBSE. In this situation, the candidate cannot
claim that she had no knowledge about the change recorded in
the school records because such a change would occur obviously
C at her instance. If she makes such application for correction of
the school records, she is expected to apply to the CBSE
immediately after the school records are modified and which ought
to be done within a reasonable time. Indeed, it would be open to
the CBSE to reject the application in the event the period for
preservation of official records under the extant regulations had
D
expired and no record of the candidate concerned is traceable or
can be reconstructed. In the case of subsequent amendment of
school records, that may occur due to different reasons including
because of choice exercised by the candidate regarding change
of name. To put it differently, request for recording of correction
E in the certificate issued by the CBSE to bring it in line with the
school records of the incumbent need not be limited to application
made prior to publication of examination results of the CBSE.
[Para 170][1194-F-H; 1195-A-H]
7.3. As regards request for “change” of particulars in the
F certificate issued by the CBSE, it presupposes that the particulars
intended to be recorded in the CBSE certificate are not consistent
with the school records. Such a request could be made in two
different situations. The first is on the basis of public documents
like Birth Certificate, Aadhaar Card/Election Card, etc. and to
incorporate change in the CBSE certificate consistent therewith.
G The second possibility is when the request for change is due to
the acquired name by choice at a later point of time. That change
need not be backed by public documents pertaining to the
candidate. [Para 171][1196-A-B]

H
JIGYA YADAV (MINOR) (THROUGH GUARDIAN/FATHER 1123
HARI SINGH) v. C.B.S.E. (CBSE)

7.4. Reverting to the first category, there is a legal A
presumption in relation to the public documents as envisaged in
the 1872 Act. Such public documents, therefore, cannot be ignored
by the CBSE. Taking note of those documents, the CBSE may
entertain the request for recording change in the certificate issued
by it. This, however, need not be unconditional, but subject to
B
certain reasonable conditions to be fulfilled by the applicant as
may be prescribed by the CBSE, such as, of furnishing sworn
affidavit containing declaration and to indemnify the CBSE and
upon payment of prescribed fees in lieu of administrative
expenses. The CBSE may also insist for issuing Public Notice
and publication in the Official Gazette before recording the change C
in the fresh certificate to be issued by it upon surrender/return
of the original certificate (or duplicate original certificate, as the
case may be) by the applicant. The fresh certificate may contain
disclaimer and caption/annotation against the original entry
(except in respect of change of name effected in exercise of right
D
to be forgotten) indicating the date on which change has been
recorded and the basis thereof. In other words, the fresh
certificate may retain original particulars while recording the
change along with caption/annotation referred to above (except
in respect of change of name effected in exercise of right to be
forgotten). [Para 171][1196-C-F] E
7.5. However, in the latter situation where the change is to
be effected on the basis of new acquired name without any
supporting school record or public document, that request may
be entertained upon insisting for prior permission/declaration by
a Court of law in that regard and publication in the Official Gazette F
including surrender/return of original certificate (or duplicate
original certificate, as the case may be) issued by CBSE and upon
payment of prescribed fees. The fresh certificate as in other
situations referred to above, retain the original entry (except in
respect of change of name effected in exercise of right to be
forgotten) and to insert caption/annotation indicating the date on G
which it has been recorded and other details including disclaimer
of CBSE. This is so because the CBSE is not required to
adjudicate nor has the mechanism to verify the correctness of
the claim of the applicant. [Para 171][1196-G-H; 1197-A-B]
H
1124 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 4 S.C.R.

A 8. In light of the above, in exercise of plenary jurisdiction,
the CBSE is directed to process the applications for correction
or change, as the case may be, in the certificate issued by it in
the respective cases under consideration. Even other pending
applications and future applications for such request be processed
on the same lines and in particular the conclusion and directions
B
recorded hitherto in paragraphs 170 and 171, as may be
applicable, until amendment of relevant Byelaws. Additionally,
the CBSE shall take immediate steps to amend its relevant
Byelaws so as to incorporate the stated mechanism for recording
correction or change, as the case may be, in the certificates already
C issued or to be issued by it. [Para 172][1197-B-C]
Board of Secondary Education of Assam v. Md. Sarifuz
Zaman & Ors. (2003) 12 SCC 408 : [2003] 6 Suppl.
SCR 1273 – distinguished.
State of NCT of Delhi & Anr. v. Sanjeev @ Bittoo (2005)
D 5 SCC 181 : [2005] 3 SCR 151; Sanjeev Kumar Gupta
v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. (2019) 12 SCC 370
: [2019] 9 SCR 735; Somdev Kapoor v. State of West
Bengal & Ors. (2014) 14 SCC 486 : [2013] 10 SCR
452; and State of Kerala & Ors. v. Palakkad Heritage
E Hotels (2017) 13 SCC 672 : [2017] 3 SCR 239 –
referred to.
Dhruva Parate v. CBSE & Anr. ILR 2009 V Delhi 371;
Mazhar Saleem Chandroth (Minor) Thr. Saleem
Chandroth (father and natural guardian) v. Central
F Board of Secondary Education [Decision of Delhi
High Court in LPA 315/2017]; Abhishek Kumar @ Bal
Kishan v. Union of India & Ors. (2014) SCC OnLine
Del 3459; Kabir Jaiswal v. Union of India & Ors. (2020)
SCC OnLine All 1488 – referred to.

G York Corporation v. Henry Leetham & Sons Ltd., (1924)
1 Ch 557; Ayr Harbour’s case, (1883) 8 App 623;
Straffordshire and Worcestershire Canal Navigation v.
Birmingham Canal Navigation, 1866 LR 1 HL 254; and
Southend-on-Sea Corporation v. Hodgson (Wickford)
Ltd., 1961 2 All ER 46 – referred to.
H
JIGYA YADAV (MINOR) (THROUGH GUARDIAN/FATHER 1125
HARI SINGH) v. C.B.S.E. (CBSE)

Case Law Reference A
[2005] 3 SCR 151 referred to Para 9
[1976] 1 SCR 70 relied on Para 9
[1990] 3 Suppl. SCR 13 relied on Para 9
[2019] 9 SCR 735 referred to Para 14 B
[2003] 6 Suppl. SCR 1273 distinguished Para 25
[2013] 10 SCR 452 referred to Para 47
[2017] 3 SCR 239 referred to Para 47
C
(2005) 6 SCC 657 relied on Para 106
[2014] 5 SCR 119 relied on Para 115
[2018] 7 SCR 379 relied on Para 115
[2017] 10 SCR 569 relied on Para 115
D
[2004] 2 SCR 900 relied on Para 122
AIR 1952 SC 196 relied on Para 122
[2009] 9 SCR 427 relied on Para 153
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 3905
E
of 2011.
From the Judgment and Order dated 20.12.2010 of the High Court
of Delhi in Writ Petition No. 3774 of 2010.
With
Civil Appeal Nos. 3572 of 2019, 1822, 1823,1824, 1825, 1826, F
1827, 1828, 1829, 1830, 1831, 1832, 1833, 1834, 1835, 1836, 1837, 1838,
1839, 1840 of 2021 and T.P. (C) Nos. 1139-1140 of 2020.
Ms. Indira Unninayar, Sanjay Jain, Rupesh Kumar, Rajeev Sharma,
Ms. Neelam Sharma, Ms. Pankhuri Shrivastava, Alekshendra Sharma,
Pravesh Bahuguna, Somanatha Padhan, Ms. Archana Pathak Dave, G
Kumar Prashant, Ms. Vanya Gupta, Parmod Vishnoi, Sushil Kumar
Sharma, Pahlad Singh Sharma, Krishna Kant Shukla, Dr. N. Pradeep
Sharma, Kiran Kumar Patra, Ram Lal Roy, G. Prakash, Ms. Priyanka
Prakash, Ms. Beena Prakash, Jishnu M. L., K. P. Rajagopal, Jaimon
Andrews, Piyo Harold Jaimon, Sandeep Thakur, Farid Abbas, Naresh
H
1126 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 4 S.C.R.

A Kumar, Renjith B. Marar, Ms. Lakshmi N. Kaimal, Biju Vigneswar,
Ms. Surabhi Santosh, Arun Poomulli, Ms. Meera M., Aabhas Kshetarpal,
Siddhartha Jha, Gazab Singh Chauhan, P. A. Noor Muhamed, Ms. Giffara
S., Bilal Niamathulla, Ms. Ruxana P. N., Anil Soni, Harish Pandey, Advs.
for the appearing parties.
B The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.
1. “What’s in a name? that which we call a rose by any other
name would smell as sweet”, said Juliet. This quote from William
Shakespeare’s “Romeo and Juliet” is unarguably one of the most iconic
C dialogues in classical literature. It conveys that the natural characteristics
of an individual are more important than his/her artificial/acquired
characteristics. A poetic statement as it certainly is, it does not go in tune
with the significance of a name in marking the identity of an individual in
his/her societal transactions. To put it differently, name is an intrinsic
D element of identity.
2. The seminal issue in these cases is: whether an individual’s
control over such cardinal element of identity could be denied to him/her
by the Central Board of Secondary Education1 on the specious ground
that its Examination Byelaws of 20072 must prevail over the claim of the
E candidate, which are merely intended to regulate such a claim and to
delineate the procedure for correction/change in the contents of
certificate(s) issued by it including regarding maintenance of its office
records?
3. The CBSE Examination Byelaws restrict, both qualitatively and
F quantitatively, the corrections/changes that can be carried out in the
certificates issued by the Board. Various students with need-based
requests approached different High Courts resulting into inconsistent
outcomes leading up to this batch of appeals. Apart from the fact that
the judgments have produced conflicting outcomes, the petitions raise
some peculiar questions on the constitutional validity of CBSE
G Examination Byelaws (as amended from time to time) and interpretation
thereof.
4. The present case involves a batch of 22 petitions wherein
questions relating to correction/change in name/surname/date of birth of
1
for short, “CBSE” or “Board”, as the case may be
H 2
for short, “Byelaws”
JIGYA YADAV (MINOR) (THROUGH GUARDIAN/FATHER 1127
HARI SINGH) v. C.B.S.E. (CBSE) [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

candidates or their parents in the certificates issued by the Board have A
been raised.
5. In order to identify the precise scope of challenge, we may
now delineate the factual matrix in individual petitions.
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3905 OF 2011
B
6. The appellant in this case, Ms. Jigya Yadav, has assailed the
decision of the High Court of Delhi, dated 20.12.2010 in W.P. (C) No.
3774/2010, wherein the High Court rejected the prayer for direction to
the Board to carry out correction of her parents’ name in the marksheets
issued by it. The appellant’s case was that the name of her parents was
incorrectly recorded as “Hari Singh Yadav” instead of “Hari Singh” (as C
recorded in the identity documents of father) and “Mamta Yadav” instead
of “Mamta” (as recorded in the identity documents of mother). Relying
upon Byelaw 69.1 of the CBSE Examination Bye-laws, 2007, the High
Court affirmed the decision of the Board in refusing the desired
corrections/changes. The Court relied upon the nursery application form, D
school admission form and stream allotment form for class XI filled by
the parents of the appellant to conclude that the errors were not
inadvertent, and they had consciously chosen and retained the said names
despite having opportunity to rectify before the X th standard. It observed
thus:
E
“15. From the aforesaid, it is apparent that despite the parents of
the petitioner having mentioned their names as “Hari Singh” and
“Mamta” in the petitioner’s birth certificate, they have consciously
and consistently chosen to record their names as “Hari Singh
Yadav” and “Mamta Yadav” in the school record. Consequently,
we are of the opinion that this Court in the present petition should F
not deal with the challenge of constitutional validity as it is the
petitioner’s parents who are at fault and the error, if any, has been
repeated on a number of occasions by the petitioner’s parents
themselves. In fact, we are of the view that for the fault of the
petitioner’s parents, the impugned Bye-law of the respondent no. G
1 cannot be set aside ...”
The Court, however, made an avoidable observation that in a
country with caste-based reservations, changes in name cannot be
permitted readily. It noted thus:
H
1128 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 4 S.C.R.

A “17. We are also of the view that in a country where there is
reservation on caste and religious grounds, change of names of
parents or ward’s name cannot be allowed at the drop of the
hat.”
The Court then observed that Byelaw 69.1 permits CBSE to carry
B out corrections only to the extent of bringing the record in conformity
with the school record. In paragraph 21, the Court noted thus:
“21. Even if one were to apply the aforesaid test one finds that
the respondent no. 1 essentially records what has been mentioned
in the school records consistently and that too, upto Class X, that
C means, for more than 10 years the child and/or her parents have
the liberty to rectify the record. Consequently, we are of the opinion
that the impugned Bye-law is perfectly reasonable.”
While concluding, the Court observed that the Courts must be
wary of interfering in academic matters and should refrain from giving
D an expansive interpretation to statutory rules/byelaws as it may render
the system unworkable. It noted in paragraph 22:
“22. Moreover, we are of the view that the Court should be
extremely reluctant to substitute its own views as to what is wise,
prudent and proper in relation to academic matters in preference
E to those formulated by professional men possessing technical
expertise and rich experience of actual day-to-day working of
educational institutions and the departments controlling them. It
will be wholly wrong for the Court to take a pedantic and purely
idealistic approach to the problems of this nature, isolated from
the actual realities and grass root problems involved in the working
F of the system and unmindful of the consequences which would
emanate if a purely idealistic view as opposed to a pragmatic one
were to be propounded. It is equally important that the Court should
also, as far as possible, avoid any decision or interpretation of a
statutory provision, rule or bye-law which would bring about the
G result of rendering the system unworkable in practice – as
contended by the respondent no. 1 in its counter affidavit.”
7. Assailing the decision, the appellant contends that Byelaw 69.1
(after 2007 amendment) is invalid as being unreasonable and arbitrary,
thereby violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, as it puts a blanket
embargo on corrections other than those which are necessary for bringing
H
JIGYA YADAV (MINOR) (THROUGH GUARDIAN/FATHER 1129
HARI SINGH) v. C.B.S.E. (CBSE) [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

the documents in conformity with the school record. It is contended that A
the amended byelaw does not address the possibility of error in the school
record itself, and leaves the student with no opportunity to correct the
error committed by the parents in the school records. To buttress this
submission, the appellant has submitted that the resultant hardship caused
to her is infringement of her right guaranteed in Article 19(1)(g), right to
B
freely express one’s identity as per Article 19(1)(a) and right to dignity
in Article 21 of the Constitution.
8. In the written submissions, the appellant has urged that CBSE
certificates are public records of the Board and they carry a presumption
of genuineness which must be respected by preserving the accuracy of
such certificates. It is further urged that the 2007 Byelaws place school C
records above public documents which carry presumption of genuineness
under the Indian Evidence Act, 18723. To buttress this submission, it is
stated that it would be contrary to the objectives of CBSE if it refuses to
correct its documents despite having verified the genuineness of the
supporting public documents (like Aadhar card, Passport, Birth Certificate D
etc.) and continues to perpetuate the obvious errors in the school records.
9. The appellant has further submitted that by amending Byelaw
69.1 in this manner, CBSE has acted in violation of Regulation 10 and
objectives of CBSE by rendering itself incapable of rectifying errors in
the certificates and issuing accurate certificates, which is a basic function E
of the Board. The CBSE has, the appellant submitted, exceeded its
powers by effecting the said amendment as it was never meant to exercise
such authority of putting fetters on its basic duties. Reliance has been
placed upon Dhruva Parate vs. CBSE & Anr.4, State of NCT of Delhi
& Anr. vs. Sanjeev @ Bittoo5, Indian Aluminium Company vs. Kerala
State Electricity Board 6 and J.K. Aggarwal vs. Haryana Seeds F
Development Corporation Ltd. & Ors.7 to urge that CBSE cannot
circumscribe its own powers with a self-imposed limitation in this manner.
10. The appellant has further submitted that the impugned judgment
erroneously connects the subject matter of the case with caste-based
reservations which displays stereotype prejudice of the Court towards G

3
For short, “1872 Act”
4
ILR 2009 V Delhi 371
5
2005 (5) SCC 181
6
1975 (2) SCC 414
7
1991 (2) SCC 283 H
1130 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 4 S.C.R.

A her cause. The appellant also takes exception to the observations
regarding wrongful conduct of the appellant’s parents in failing to get
the records rectified before Xth standard. It is stated that the impugned
judgment overlooked the fact that the parents had no choice of getting
the application form corrected in XIth standard as it necessarily reflected
the details of Xth standard without offering a choice of alteration.
B
11. In response, the Board has relied upon Byelaw 69.1 to submit
that the appellant’s request for rectification was considered and the
certificates were found to be matching with the school records and thus,
no case for rectification was made out. It is submitted that before
amendment Byelaw 69.1 permitted a different procedure for rectification
C – approval by Court of law and notification in the gazette. Under this
procedure, umpteen number of cases were filed, even after more than
ten years of declaration of result, for rectification of name/surname and
Courts were constantly approached for seeking leave to get the
rectification done. As a result, objections were raised by various
D government authorities questioning the power of the Board to carry out
changes in the identity of the students even after they have passed the
examinations conducted by the Board. It is submitted that various Courts
also expressed displeasure and suggested rephrasing of Byelaw 69.1.
Resultantly, the 2007 amendment was effected permitting corrections
only to the extent of bringing the certificates in conformity with the school
E record.
12. To buttress the above submission, it is urged that CBSE, being
an autonomous society registered under the Societies Registration Act,
1860, has the power to make, amend or delete its Rules, Regulations and
Byelaws. Accordingly, Byelaw 69.1 was amended as the basic record
F of a student is kept by the school and the Board has no option but to rely
upon the school record. It is further submitted that the parents of the
appellant had ample opportunity to correct the school record and they
chose not to do so. In fact, the respondent adds, they repeatedly filled
the same particulars of their names in all the school forms from time to
G time.
13. The Board has also filed elaborate written submissions to
support their case. It is submitted that the Examination Byelaws of the
Board are statutory in nature as they were framed in furtherance of the
powers granted to the Board as per Government of India Resolution
H dated 1.7.1929 and deviation cannot be permitted from the Byelaws.
JIGYA YADAV (MINOR) (THROUGH GUARDIAN/FATHER 1131
HARI SINGH) v. C.B.S.E. (CBSE) [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

As regards the argument of violation of fundamental rights, the Board A
has submitted that there may be a fundamental right to be identified as
per the choice of an individual, but there can be no fundamental right to
claim that the changed identity must be operative since birth thereby
compelling all including statutory bodies to carry out changes in documents
issued by them. It is urged that any other view would amount to misuse
B
of liberty and cause serious confusion at different level. Reliance has
been placed upon Rayaan Chawla vs. University of Delhi & Anr.8 to
support this position.
14. The Board has further submitted that the restrictions/conditions
for change of name and date of birth are reasonable as all the details are
supplied by the students/parents at various stages of admissions which C
offers a prima facie guarantee of genuineness. It is submitted that change
of name and date of birth in a reckless manner could have serious
repercussions – misuse for employment, manipulating age of the accused
etc. Reliance has been placed upon Sanjeev Kumar Gupta vs. State of
Uttar Pradesh & Anr.9 to illustrate this. D
15. The written submissions also touch upon the question of relevant
date for the applicability of 2007 Byelaws. It is submitted that the relevant
date would be the date of passing Xth standard examination and not the
date of making application for changes. Lastly, it is submitted that the
remedy of writ petition may not be appropriate for effecting changes in E
CBSE certificates as usually, students come up with independent
documents for supporting their claim and the writ Courts are not expected
to adjudicate disputed facts concerning the relied upon documents. To
buttress this submission, it is stated that despite presumption in favour of
certified copies of public documents, they cannot be accepted at face
value without providing an opportunity to rebut them as per Section 4 of F
the 1872 Act.
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3572 OF 2019
16. In this appeal, the appellant (CBSE) has assailed the judgment
dated 6.2.2019 passed by the High Court of Delhi in L.P.A. No. 128/ G
2017, reversing the order of learned Single Judge in W.P. (C) No. 6996/
2016, wherein the prayer of the respondent (father of the student) to
change the mother’s name in the certificate was rejected. The respondent
8
275 (2020) Delhi Law Times 314
9
(2019) 12 SCC 370 H
1132 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 4 S.C.R.

A had applied to CBSE for the change of mother’s name from “Kiran
Khan” to “Fakiha Khan” stating that “Kiran Khan”, being the nickname
of the mother, was inadvertently recorded in the school record of the
student at the time of her admission in class I in 2005.
17. The Division Bench granted the prayer primarily on the ground
B that the stated change was a mere correction of name and not a change
of name per se as per the language of Rules 69.1(i) and 69.1(ii) of the
Byelaws (as amended in 2015). To reach this conclusion, the Court relied
upon the birth certificate of the student, educational certificates of mother,
passport etc. which revealed that the mother’s name was recorded as
“Fakiha Khan” in all these documents and it was nothing but an
C inadvertent error on the part of parents to have used the nickname of
the mother while filling her school forms. The High Court noted that the
case is neither a change of name as per Rule 69.1(i) nor a correction of
typographical nature as per Rule 69.1(ii). It is relevant to reproduce
paragraph 4 of the impugned judgment, which reads thus:
D “4. Having considered the diverse aspects and the admitted factual
conspectus on record, we find, the case in hand, is not a case of
any change of name, but, a mere correction in the mother’s name
of the child Ms. Filza Khan. Apparently, an inadvertent mistake in
mentioning the mother’s nickname “Ms. Kiran Khan” in the
E admission form in the year 2005, got transmitted by the respondent
No.2 school to the respondent No.1 Board. The application made
by the petitioner was not for any change of name, but, for correction
of an inadvertent mistake in mentioning the name of the mother in
the admission form as “Kiran Khan” instead of “Fakiha Khan”,
which fact, undisputedly, finds support from the birth certificate
F dated 17.12.02, copy whereof forms part of the record as
Annexure-P1. This birth certificate clearly mentions that Ms. Filza
Khan was born to the petitioner and Ms. Fakiha Khan. The
applicant has placed on record other documents, such as the
educational certificates of the mother Fakiha Khan, her passport
G etc., which show that her name always was Fakiha Khan. Thus,
it is not a case of change of name of the mother to Kiran Khan,
from Fakiha Khan, post the filling up of the examination form of
the appellant’s daughter. Pertinently, even in the documents relating
to the daughter of the appellant Filza Khan, such as her Birth
Certificate, the name of the mother is recorded as “Fakiha Khan”
H
JIGYA YADAV (MINOR) (THROUGH GUARDIAN/FATHER 1133
HARI SINGH) v. C.B.S.E. (CBSE) [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

and not “Kiran Khan”. Thus, the case in hand is certainly not a A
case of change of name as contemplated under Rule 69.1(i). It is
also not a case of correction in spelling errors and factual
typographical errors as contemplated under Rule 69.1(ii). The case
in hand is completely founded on the premise of an inadvertent
mistake in mentioning the name of the mother in the admission
B
form, which was filled way back in the year 2005 at the time of
admission of the child in class -I. …”
The Court, relying upon Mazhar Saleem Chandroth (Minor)
Thr. Saleem Chandroth (father and natural guardian) vs. Central
Board of Secondary Education10, also observed that the Examination
Byelaws of the appellant (CBSE) are not of a statutory nature. The C
Court, before parting, further noted that a restrictive and strict approach
is not warranted in matters involving correction or change of name by
the Board merely on ground of administrative inconvenience. It noted
thus:
“6. The adoption of a strict and restrictive approach in the matter D
of change or correction of name of the candidate or his/her parents,
in the certificates issued by the respondent No.1, cannot be justified
on the foundation that such changes, when made later, may be
exploited to mislead all concerned about the identity of the
candidate. Such a strict and restrictive approach cannot be justified E
merely on the ground of some administrative inconvenience. After
all, respondent No.1 charges the fee to cover its costs for
undertaking such an exercise. ...”
Observing that the subject change in the mother’s name would
not result into an alteration of identity of the student as the name “Fakiha F
Khan” was a part of the documents all along, it noted thus:
“6. ...In the present case, there is no possibility of the identity of
the candidate Filza Khan being changed by permitting the change
of name of her mother from “Kiran Khan” to Fakiha Khan”, since
the name of the child/candidate; the name of the father; the date G
and place of birth, continue to remain the same. Even the name of
the mother – which is now sought to be brought on record, is the
real name of the mother which has always remained so and the
same name of the mother is also reflected in the Birth Certificate
10
LPA 315/2017 H
1134 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 4 S.C.R.

A of the child/candidate Filza Khan. In fact, the non-amendment of
the name of the mother of the child/candidate from “Kiran Khan”
to “Fakiha Khan” would, in future, lead to confusion and may mar
the future prospects of the child/candidate while seeking admissions
to institutions of higher education, or employment.”
B 18. The appellant (CBSE), in this appeal, has submitted that the
impugned judgment has incorrectly treated the subject change in mother’s
name as a mere correction born out of an inadvertent error. It is submitted
that the said change is a complete change of name which was continuously
retained in the school records for a period of 11 years. It is urged that
the impugned judgment has failed to give effect to Rules 69.1(i) and
C 69.1(ii) of the Board as such change of name without an order of the
Court and followed by a notification in the official gazette was outrightly
prohibited. Justifying the said Rules, it is submitted that the Board has no
power or independent sources to verify the identity of the students and
owing to the nature of its functioning, it has to rely upon the school
D records to furnish certificates.
19. The appellant (CBSE) further submits that the records were
sent by the school in the academic year 2014-2015 when the student
filled the examination form for submission to the Board and the said
form not only recorded the mother’s name as “Kiran Khan” but also
E carried the signature of the mother in the verification portion of the form.
To buttress this submission, it is urged that the said mistake (if any)
could not have been treated as inadvertent as it was retained as such for
a long period of 11 years. It is added that parents themselves were the
source of information regarding the name and thus, there could be no
reason to regard it as inadvertent.
F
20. The appellant has further submitted that the impugned judgment
is in conflict with another judgment of a co-ordinate bench of the High
Court in Mazhar Saleem Chandroth11 wherein the prayer for addition
of word “Saleem” in the name was not held to be a correction or
typographical error and was rejected stating that such change would be
G inconsistent with the school record and thus, impermissible. It is added
that in such a situation, the Division bench ought to have sent the matter
for consideration by a larger bench.

11
H supra at Footnote No.10
JIGYA YADAV (MINOR) (THROUGH GUARDIAN/FATHER 1135
HARI SINGH) v. C.B.S.E. (CBSE) [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

CIVIL APPEAL NO(S) 1822/2021 A
(arising out of SLP (C) No(s) 7381/2021
(@ Diary No. 9445/2020)
21. In this appeal, the appellant (CBSE) has assailed the judgment
dated 5.11.2019 passed by the High Court of Kerala in W.A. No. 2225/ B
2019 affirming the decision of learned Single Judge in W.P. (C) No.
5287/2019 dated 28.2.2019. The respondent student had approached
the Board for correction of his father’s name in the CBSE certificate
from “P.P. Abdul Latheef” to Latheef P.A.”. The said request was denied
by the Board citing Byelaw 69.1 of the 2007 Byelaws, as applicable.
The Board stated that the respondent’s case does not meet the conditions C
stipulated in the said byelaw and thus, change in name cannot be
permitted. Aggrieved by this denial, the respondent moved the High Court.
The correction or change of name was then permitted by the High Court
upon payment of Rs. 5,000 by the student to the Board for availing its
service. The Board appealed against that decision. Affirming the decision, D
the High Court observed that the decision is in accordance with the
decision of a co-ordinate bench of the same High Court in Subin
Mohammed vs. Union of India12 wherein a change in date of birth of
a student was permitted by the Court. While recognising that the case at
hand involved the change of father’s name (and not date of birth), the
Court noted the similarity of grounds raised by the appellant before it, E
and relied upon Subin Mohammed13 to reject the same. It observed
thus:
“6. Though the issue relates to correction of the petitioner’s father’s
name in the CBSE certificate, the grounds on which the appellants
had assailed the correctness of the judgment of the writ court are F
more or less similar, based on the bye-law of the CBSE and the
delay in making the application for correction. Except the above,
there is no variance. Though Mr. Nirmal S., learned counsel for
the appellants, made submissions on the grounds extracted supra
assailing the correctness of judgment of the writ court, we are not G
inclined to accept the said contentions for the reason that a Hon’ble
Division Bench of this Court in Subin Mohammed S. v. Union of
India and others reported in 2016 (1) KLT 340, has considered
the said contentions and rejected the same. ...”
12
2016 (1) KLT 340
13
supra at Footnote No.12 H
1136 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 4 S.C.R.

A 22. The impugned judgment relied upon the respondent’s Birth
Certificate dated 25.7.2013 and his father’s Death certificate dated
12.8.2009 to conclude that the father’s name was indeed “Latheef P.A.”
in statutory records and there could be no objection in permitting the said
change.
B 23. In its challenge, the primary ground of the appellant is that the
reliance placed by the High Court upon Subin Mohammed14 is misplaced.
For, the said judgment is inapplicable in the factual matrix of the case. It
is submitted that in Subin Mohammed15, the case involved a change in
date of birth and the Court had recorded a specific finding that CBSE
Byelaws would not permit the said change. It is further submitted that
C the Court failed to acknowledge that CBSE Byelaws, though not strictly
statutory, have a regulatory colour and must bind those who have chosen
to comply with them while participating in the examinations conducted
by the Board.
24. The appellant has further submitted that neither Byelaw 69.1(i)
D nor 69.1(ii) apply to the facts of the case. It is stated that Byelaw 69.1(i)
would apply only when change of name is approved by a Court of law
followed by a notification in the official gazette, that too before the
declaration of result by the Board. To buttress this submission, it is added
that the respondent obtained his birth certificate in 2013, one year before
E the matriculation examination in 2014 and thus, there was no difficulty
for the respondent in applying for the said change as per Byelaw 69.1(i).
According to the appellant (CBSE), the conditions of the aforesaid
Byelaws have not been fulfilled by the respondent and in absence thereof,
no such changes can be permitted.

F 25. The appellant has also urged that the reliance upon Birth
Certificate and Death Certificate is unwarranted as both these documents
were not proved before any Court of law and there is no material on
record to establish that “P.P. Abdul Latheef” and “Latheef P.A.” is the
same person. The appellant has placed reliance upon Board of
Secondary Education of Assam vs. Md. Sarifuz Zaman & Ors. 16 to
G further argue that correction of entries in a certificate duly issued by the
Board cannot be claimed as a matter of legal right and frequent corrections

14
supra at Footnote No.12
15
supra at Footnote No.12
16
(2003) 12 SCC 408
H
JIGYA YADAV (MINOR) (THROUGH GUARDIAN/FATHER 1137
HARI SINGH) v. C.B.S.E. (CBSE) [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

cannot be permitted readily as it would have the effect of rendering this A
power arbitrary, in addition to reducing the credibility of certificates issued
by the Board.
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 1823/2021
(arising out of SLP (C) No(s). 7382/2021
B
(@ Diary No. 9482/2020)
26. The challenge in this appeal is against the judgment dated
20.11.2019 of the Kerala High Court in W.A. No. 2354/2019 affirming
the decision of learned Single Judge in W.P. No. 11876/2018, wherein
the respondent student’s prayer for change in date of birth was granted C
by the Court. The respondent passed her matriculation examination in
2011. The concerned certificate issued by the Board recorded her date
of birth as 28.11.1995. Thereafter, in 2013, the respondent applied for
the issuance of Birth Certificate which was issued on 28.6.2013 bearing
her date of birth as 21.11.1995.
D
27. The respondent applied to the Board for change in date of
birth. It was rejected by the Board. The High Court allowed her prayer
after placing reliance on Subin Mohammed17. The observations of the
High Court are similar to those in civil appeal arising from SLP (C)
No(s). 7381/2021 (@Diary No. 9445/2020) and are not being discussed
again for brevity. E
28. The appellant (CBSE) has assailed the decision on the ground
that the respondent’s case does not fulfil the criteria/conditions for change
in date of birth under Byelaws 69.2 and 69.3 of the 2007 Byelaws, as
applicable. It is submitted that as per Byelaw 69.2, change in date of
birth is permissible only before the same is recorded in the record of the F
Board and despite having sufficient time, the respondent did not approach
the Board for any correction on or before 2011. Afterwards, under Byelaw
69.3, corrections of merely typographical or other similar errors are
permissible to bring the particulars in consonance with the school record.
It is stated that the respondent’s case does not fulfil any of these criteria.
G
29. It is further submitted that the impugned judgment was passed
without granting an opportunity to the appellant for ascertaining the
genuineness of the request for change in date of birth, which is a

17
supra at Footnote No.12 H
1138 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 4 S.C.R.

A mandatory requirement as per Subin Mohammed18. The appellant has
raised a question on the genuineness of the request by stating that even
if the incorrect date of birth is treated as an error, it is inconceivable that
the appellant or her parents could not notice the error for a period of 23
years.
B 30. The submissions regarding the inapplicability of the dictum in
Subin Mohammed19 are similar to those made in civil appeal arising
from SLP (C) No(s). 7381/2021 (@ Diary No. 9445/2020) and are not
being repeated for brevity.
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 1824/2021
C (arising out of SLP (C) No(s). 7383/2021
(@ Diary No. 14737/2020)
31. In this appeal, the appellant (CBSE) has assailed the judgment
dated 13.12.2019 passed by the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan
D in D.B. Civil Special Appeal (Writ) No. 838/2019 confirming the order
of the learned Single Judge in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 18013/2018 in
terms of the Byelaws (as amended in 2015 and as applicable to the
case).
32. The case involves a request for change of mother’s name of
the student in CBSE certificates from “Seema Manak” to “Sanyogeta
E
Manak”. The respondent participated in the matriculation examination
conducted by the Board in May, 2016. In October, 2016, the said request
was made when the mother changed her name. The Board denied the
request for change of name citing their inability under the Byelaws.
Another request was made by the respondent which was met with the
F same response from the Board. The matter went to the High Court by
way of a writ petition and the Court granted the prayer for change of
name by holding that the Board failed to perform its duty in denying the
request for change of name. The Court took note of the birth certificate
of the respondent, copy of passport and copy of Aadhar card of the
mother, and also noted that the requirements of newspaper publication
G
and gazette notification were fulfilled. It then directed the Board to effect
the change. The Court observed that the CBSE rules cannot prohibit an
individual from having his/her identity recognized through the parents

18
supra at Footnote No.12
H 19
supra at Footnote No.12
JIGYA YADAV (MINOR) (THROUGH GUARDIAN/FATHER 1139
HARI SINGH) v. C.B.S.E. (CBSE) [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

and if they are applied for denying such corrections, it would be ultra A
vires the rules as they are not statutory in nature. It observed thus:
“In the opinion of this Court such rules framed by CBSE go contrary
to the basic principles laid down in the circumstances regarding
individual to have his identity recognized from his/her parents, the
CBSE cannot be allowed to force any individual to have his B
mother’s name or his father’s name different from what his/her
mother’s name or father’s name is known in the Society as well
as in the records. If such rules are applied for denying a candidate
from getting correction done in the mark sheet or certificates, the
same have to be declared as ultra vires to the rules since the rules
not statutory.” C

33. In order to assail the above decision, the appellant has relied
upon Byelaws 69.1(i) and 69.1(ii) to contend that Byelaw 69.1(i) provides
for change of name of the student only and change of name of parents
is not envisaged in it. It is submitted that Byelaw 69.1(ii) provides for
corrections and the present case is not one of corrections, rather, it D
involves a material change of name. Similar to the submissions advanced
in previous appeals, it is submitted that the Board cannot act in violation
of their byelaws and permit corrections when the same are not permitted
under them. The appellant has urged that they duly applied their mind to
the request of the respondent twice and there was no occasion for the E
Court to pass an order in complete ignorance of the byelaws.
34. It is further submitted that the impugned judgment holds the
byelaws as ultra vires despite the fact that their validity was not even in
question before the Court. Reliance has been placed by the appellant
upon Md. Sarifuz Zaman20 to urge that there is no vested right to claim F
corrections in certificates at any point of time.
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 1825/2021
(arising out of SLP (C) No(s). 7384/2021
(@ Diary No. 16291/2020)
G
35. The challenge in this appeal is against the decision dated
20.11.2019 passed by the High Court of Kerala in W.A. No. 2340/2019
confirming the order passed by learned Single Judge in W.P. (C) No.
8540/2019, wherein the High Court allowed the prayer for change of the
20
supra at Footnote No.16 H
1140 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 4 S.C.R.

A respondent student’s name from “Mohammed Shafeek” to “Mohammed
Shafeek S.” in terms of the 2007 Byelaws, as applicable. The respondent
passed matriculation examination in 2014. During school, the name of
the respondent was recorded as “Mohammed Shafeek” in accordance
with the birth certificate issued in 2002. After passing matriculation,
another birth certificate was issued in 2017 wherein a different name
B
i.e., “Mohammed Shafeek S.” was recorded. In accordance with the
second birth certificate, the respondent approached the Board for change
of name which was denied by the Board citing failure to fulfil the
conditions envisaged in the Byelaws. The High Court granted the prayer
by placing reliance upon the dictum in Subin Mohammed21.
C 36. The reasoning adopted by the High Court is similar to that in
civil appeals arising from SLP (C) No(s). 7381/2021 (@ Diary No. 9445/
2020) and SLP (C) No(s).7382/2021 (@ Diary No. 9482/2020), and we
are not reiterating the same.
37. Assailing the decision, the appellant’s submissions are largely
D similar to those in previous appeals. Other than grounds already urged
before, the appellant has submitted that the Court failed to consider the
presence of two birth certificates and went on to grant the prayer without
weighing the genuineness of the certificates and without seeking an
explanation from the respondent for bringing two birth certificates on
E record.
38. It is submitted that in 2004, while taking admission in class I,
the respondent’s name was recorded as “Mohammed Shafeek”. The
same name was carried forward while filling the admission form again
in 2008 for a different school. It is further submitted that even at the
F time of filling the form for class XI, the same name was recorded and it
was duly communicated by the school to the Board. The name recorded
in the certificate, therefore, is in complete accordance with the school
record. To buttress this submission, it is urged that the record clearly
shows that there is no possibility of typographical error in the record of
the respondent and a subsequent substantial change of name cannot be
G permitted in the certificates of the Board in this manner.
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1826/2021
(arising out of SLP (C) No. 10927/2020)

21
H supra at Footnote No.12
JIGYA YADAV (MINOR) (THROUGH GUARDIAN/FATHER 1141
HARI SINGH) v. C.B.S.E. (CBSE) [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

39. The challenge in this appeal is against the judgment dated A
24.8.2020 passed by the Delhi High Court in L.P.A. No. 219/2020
confirming the order of learned Single Judge in W.P. (C) No. 10841/
2019 wherein the respondent student’s prayer for addition of surname
was granted in terms of the 2007 Byelaws, as applicable. The respondent
passed the examinations conducted by the Board under the name “Jyoti”.
B
The name was consistently recorded as such in all her school records
and accordingly, the CBSE certificates carried the same name.
Thereafter, she completed her MBBS and applied for education in a
foreign institution. As a part of her application, she was asked to mention
her surname. Since none of her documents carried this information, she
applied to the Board for addition of surname and change her name from C
“Jyoti” to “Jyoti Dalal” in the certificates. The Board refused and the
respondent approached the High Court.
40. The High Court considered the applicability of Byelaws 69.1(i)
and 69.1(ii) and ruled that the said byelaws are inapplicable to the facts
of the case as the respondent’s case is not one for change of name but D
for incorporation of a surname which existed throughout in the records
of her parents and for which no ambiguity could be alleged. It observed
thus:
“8. Looking to the peculiar facts and circumstance of the present
case, we are of the opinion that the same does not fall under the E
ambit of Clause 69(1)(i) of the Examination Bye-Laws as:-
a) This is not a case of change of name, but of incorporation of
the surname of the person concerned,
b) This is not a case where something which was altogether
omitted is to be added, as the parents’ names were available in F
full in the records of the appellant-Board,
c) The respondent (original petitioner) in this case carries the
surname of the father and the mother which she wanted to
mention after her name. There is no dispute about her identity
or confusion about the veracity of the name which she seeks G
to incorporate.”
Before parting, the High Court specifically noted that its decision
must not be treated as a precedent and would operate on the specific
facts of the case.
H
1142 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 4 S.C.R.

A 41. The appellant has assailed the decision by contending that any
request for change of name is to be examined as per Byelaw 69.1(i) and
not beyond it. If such change is not permissible under the said byelaw,
then it would be wholly improper for the Court to direct such changes.
It is contended that there was no challenge to the validity of the byelaws,
and until and unless the byelaws are declared to be invalid, the Court
B
cannot direct any action in complete contravention thereof. As urged in
previous cases, it is added that the respondent’s case failed to fulfil the
condition precedent in the said byelaw – prior approval by a Court of
law followed by publication in gazette – and the impugned order had the
effect of diluting these conditions.
C 42. The appellant has submitted that the relief claimed by the
respondent is highly delayed in time and in law, delay defeats discretion.
It is urged that the respondent was always aware of the absence of
surname in her records and she kept on sleeping on her rights for a
period of seven years and therefore, the loss of limitation must bar any
D legal remedy for her. It is further submitted that such changes cannot be
permitted in a routine manner as the credibility attached with CBSE
certificates would be compromised and subsequent changes would create
anomalies in the record. Reliance has been placed upon Abhishek Kumar
@ Bal Kishan vs. Union of India & Ors.22 to urge that subsequent
issuance of revised certificates would create discrepancy in the record
E and reflect status which did not even exist at the time of making
certificates.
43. The appellant has submitted that exercise of jurisdiction under
Article 226 of the Constitution in this manner is unwarranted as it amounts
to substitution of the views of the Court in the place of byelaws formulated
F on the basis of technical advice. It is urged that the Court must be reluctant
to venture into academic matters in this manner.
CIVIL APPEAL NO.1827/2021
(arising out of SLP (C) No. 10948/2020)
G 44. The challenge in this appeal is against the decision dated
13.7.2020 by the High Court of Kerala in W.A. No. 863/2020 confirming
the order of the learned Single Judge in W.P. (C) No. 21357/2019, wherein
the respondent student’s prayer for change in date of birth was granted
on the basis of the birth certificate in terms of the 2007 Byelaws, as
H 22
(2014) 144 DRJ 8 (DB) : 2014 SCC OnLine Del 3459
JIGYA YADAV (MINOR) (THROUGH GUARDIAN/FATHER 1143
HARI SINGH) v. C.B.S.E. (CBSE) [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

applicable. The observations of the High Court are similar to those in A
civil appeals arising from SLP (C) No(s).7381/2021 (@ Diary No. 9445/
2020), SLP (C) No(s).7382/2021 (@ Diary No. 9482/2020) and SLP
(C) No(s).7384/2021 (@ Diary No. 16291/2020). We are not reiterating
the same for the sake of brevity.
45. On perusal of the submissions, we find that the grounds urged B
for assailing the decision are also similar to those taken in previous appeals
and we are not repeating the same.
46. In addition to grounds already advanced, the respondent has
filed elaborate written submissions and additional written submissions to
which we may make a brief reference. It is submitted that as per Byelaw C
7 of the Examination Byelaws, the admission procedure upto class VIII
is to be regulated by rules/regulations/orders of the concerned State
Government. Accordingly, reference has been made to the Kerala
Education Act, 1958 and Chapter-VI of Rules framed thereunder which
provides that the primary source for determining date of birth is birth
certificate. It is submitted that even under the Right to Education Act, D
the primary proof of age is the birth certificate and therefore, primacy
has to be accorded to birth certificate for determination of correct date
of birth and CBSE’s Byelaws must provide for bringing their certificates
in accord with such official or public documents.
47. In additional written submissions, the respondent has answered E
this Court’s query as to what would be the relevant point of time for
determining the application of byelaws. It is submitted that the relevant
date would be the date of considering the application i.e., the Byelaws in
force at the time of considering the application for recording correction/
change. The date of examination would be irrelevant for this purpose. F
Reliance has been placed upon Somdev Kapoor vs. State of West Bengal
& Ors.23 and State of Kerala & Ors. vs. Palakkad Heritage Hotels24
to advance the legal proposition that rules standing on the date of final
decision by the competent authority would be applicable.
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 1828/2021 G
(arising out of SLP (C) No(s).7385/2021
(@ Diary No. 18711/2020)

23
(2014) 14 SCC 486
24
(2017) 13 SCC 672 H
1144 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 4 S.C.R.

A 48. The challenge in this appeal is against the judgment dated
19.11.2019 passed by the High Court of Kerala in W.A. No. 2328/2019
confirming the order of learned Single Judge in W.P. (C) No. 8465/2019
wherein the respondent student’s request for change in date of birth
was allowed. The case of the respondent is that his date of birth was
recorded as 16.4.1994 instead of 16.4.1995 in the school records. On
B
the basis of the birth certificate and other supporting documents, the
respondent applied for change in date of birth which was rejected by the
appellant Board citing the 2007 Examination Byelaws.
49. The High Court allowed the change on grounds similar to
those in the previous appeals. We are not repeating the same.
C
50. The submissions of the appellant Board are also similar to
those in previous appeals and there is no need to reiterate the same.
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1829/2021
(arising out of SLP (C) No. 10959/2020)
D
51. The appellant Board has assailed the decision dated 3.7.2020
passed by D.B. Special Appeal Writ No. 450/2020 confirming the order
of learned Single Judge in W.P. (C) No. 8808/2019 allowing the
respondent student’s prayer for change of her father’s and mother’s
names in the certificates issued by the CBSE. Citing it as an error, a
E request was made by the respondent for change of name of father from
“Vinod Mittal” to “Vinod Kumar Jain” and mother from “Meenakshi
Mittal” to “Meenakshi Agarwal”.
52. The High Court did not consider the permissibility of this change
under the applicable Byelaws (as amended in 2018) and instead noted
F that no prejudice would be caused to the Board if the said changes are
allowed. It observed thus:
“It is noticed that in the writ petition, respondent seeks only to
amend the surname of her parents and not their names. On a
query by this Court from the counsel for the appellants that on
G account of change of surname, what prejudice was going to be
caused to the appellants, he has failed to give any response.”
53. The submissions advanced by the appellant are substantially
similar to those adopted in previous appeals. Non-applicability of Byelaws,
absence of any typographical error, consonance between school record
H and certificates, and lapse of substantial time despite knowing the alleged
JIGYA YADAV (MINOR) (THROUGH GUARDIAN/FATHER 1145
HARI SINGH) v. C.B.S.E. (CBSE) [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

errors are primary submissions which form the basis of this challenge. A
We are not elaborating upon the same to avoid repetition.
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1830/2021
(arising out of SLP (C) No. 10801/2020
54. The challenge in this appeal is against the judgment dated B
4.6.2020 passed by the Kerala High Court in W.A. No. 697/2020
confirming the order of learned Single Judge in W.P. (C) No. 11791/
2019, wherein the respondent student’s request for change in date of
birth was allowed in terms of the 2007 Byelaws, as applicable. The
respondent’s case was that her date of birth was incorrectly recorded
as 22.3.1990 instead of 21.6.1989. The High Court allowed the prayer C
on grounds similar to those in appeals arising from SLP (C) No(s). 7381/
2021 (@ Diary No. 9445/2020), SLP (C) No(s). 7382/2021 (@ Diary
No. 9482/2020), SLP (C) No(s). 7384/2021 (@ Diary No. 16291/2020)
and SLP (C) No(s). 7385/2021 (@ Diary No. 18711/2020). We are not
reiterating the same. D
55. Having gone through the appeal memo, we note that the
submissions are similar to those in previous appeals and we are not
repeating them.
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1831/2021
E
(arising out of SLP (C) No. 10795/2020)
56. In this appeal, the challenge is against the decision dated
6.8.2020 passed by the High Court of Kerala in W.A. No. 987/2020
confirming the order of learned Single Judge in W.P.(C) No. 25663/
2019, wherein the respondent student’s prayer for change of name of
F
his mother and father was allowed and accordingly, CBSE was directed
to modify the certificates.
57. Originally, the school records and CBSE certificates recorded
the father’s name as “Shaji” and mother’s name as “Jijimol”. These
names were in also in accordance with the old birth certificate of the
respondent dated 27.10.2002. As stated by the respondent, they noticed G
this mistake for the first time in 2018 after CBSE released the
respondent’s Secondary School Examination certificate on 29.5.2018.
Thereafter, the respondent applied for issuance of fresh birth certificate
wherein father’s name was changed from “Shaji” to “Shaji P.” and
mother’s name from “Jijimol” to “Jijimol S.”. It was issued on 27.10.2018 H
1146 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 4 S.C.R.

A and in furtherance thereof, the respondent applied to the appellant Board
for changing the certificates in light of the changed names. The Board
refused that request citing the Byelaws (as amended in 2018) and the
matter reached the High Court.
58. The grounds that weighed upon the High Court while granting
B the prayer are substantially similar to those in civil appeals arising from
SLP (C) No(s). 7381/2021 (@ Diary No. 9445/2020), SLP (C) No(s).
7382/2021 (@ Diary No. 9482/2020), SLP (C) No(s). 7384/2021 (@
Diary No. 16291/2020), SLP (C) No(s). 7385/2021 (@ Diary No. 18711/
2020) and SLP (C) No. 10801/2020.
C 59. The grounds urged by the appellant are similar to those in
previous appeals and we are not reiterating the same.
60. The respondent has filed written submissions to submit that
the present case does not involve any delay in applying for change of
name as they took prompt action upon receiving the CBSE certificates
D and realizing the defect, and applied for a new birth certificate so that
changes could be made at the earliest. It is also submitted that it is not a
case of change of name or correcting a mistake in name per se. Rather,
it is a case of merely including initials of mother and father in their
respective names in accordance with a duly modified birth certificate
which leaves no question as regards the genuineness of record.
E
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1832/2021
(arising out of SLP (C) No. 10796/2020)
61. In this appeal, the appellant (Board) has challenged the decision
dated 19.12.2019 passed by the High Court of Kerala in W.A. No. 2513/
F 2019 confirming the decision of learned Single Judge in W.P.(C) No.
14384/2019, wherein the respondent student’s prayer for change of name
from “Vaibhav R.” to “Vaibhav D.” in certificates issued by the Board
was allowed in terms of the 2007 Byelaws, as applicable.
62. The impugned judgment requires no discussion as it is reasoned
G in similar terms, as already delineated above.
63. The grounds urged by the appellant have already been urged
in previous appeals and we need not repeat them.
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 1833/2021

H
JIGYA YADAV (MINOR) (THROUGH GUARDIAN/FATHER 1147
HARI SINGH) v. C.B.S.E. (CBSE) [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

(arising out of SLP (C) No(s). 7386/2021 A
(@ Diary No. 19181/2020)
64. The appellant Board herein has impugned the decision dated
8.11.2019 passed by the High Court of Kerala in W.A. No. 2207/2019
confirming the order of learned Single Judge in W.P. (C) No. 10410/
2019, wherein the respondent student’s prayer for change in his date of B
birth was allowed on the basis of the birth certificate issued by the
appropriate authority in terms of the 2007 Byelaws, as applicable.
65. The impugned judgment requires no elaboration as it is reasoned
in similar terms, as already delineated above.
C
66. The grounds urged by the appellant have already been urged
in previous appeals and we need not repeat them.
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1834/2021
(arising out of SLP (C) No. 11320/2020)
D
67. The appellant (CBSE) has approached this Court for assailing
the decision dated 12.5.2020 passed by the High Court of Punjab &
Haryana at Chandigarh in R.S.A. No. 499/2020 declining to interfere
with the decision of the District Judge, Karnal who upheld the decision
of the Additional Civil Judge (Senior Judge), Assandh in Civil Suit No.
204/2018 wherein, a declaratory relief was granted in favour of the E
respondent student declaring his date of birth as 7.5.2004 instead of
15.2.2001, father’s name as “Joginder” instead of “Joginder Singh” and
mother’s name as “Darshan” instead of “Darshan Devi” (as mentioned
in the CBSE certificate). The declaratory relief was coupled with a
mandatory injunction directing the appellant Board to effect necessary
F
changes in the certificates of the respondent.
68. The High Court referred to the birth certificate issued by the
authorities under the Registration of Births and Deaths Act, 1969 and
noted that correctness of the certificate is not under dispute and thus,
the information recorded in the certificate cannot be questioned. It
observed thus: G

“As far as correctness of the certificate issued by the authorities
under the 1969 Act, identity of the plaintiff as also correctness in
the names of his parents are not disputed.”

H
1148 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 4 S.C.R.

A Noting thus, the High Court declined to interfere with the
concurrent findings of fact by the two Courts below.
69. In addition to the grounds already advanced by the Board in
light of the applicable Byelaws (as amended in 2018), it is submitted that
the relief of declaration and mandatory injunction could not have been
B granted by the Court due to non-joinder of necessary parties in the case.
It is submitted that Registrar of Births and Deaths (owing to change in
date of birth) and the concerned school (owing to changes in their
records) were necessary parties in the case and ought to have been
joined. It is urged that the non-joinder would be fatal.
C 70. It is further submitted that the respondent’s claim was barred
by the principle of estoppel as he was mandatorily required to submit his
birth certificate in school at the time of admission as per Byelaw 6 of the
Examination Byelaws, 1995 so that the school record could be in
consonance with the birth certificate. Since the respondent failed to
produce the same at the time of admission, it is urged, the school record
D carried the information voluntarily supplied in the admission form and no
change can be permitted at this stage.
71. The respondent has further submitted that the relief of
mandatory injunction was barred due to Sections 41(g) and 41(i) of the
Specific Relief Act, 1963 which specifically provide that no such relief
E could be provided if the plaintiff when he/she has acquiesced of rights.
In the instant case, it is stated, the respondent failed to apply for change
in date of birth for 15 years, despite there being a long gap of three years
between the recorded date and modified date, and such conduct must
bar any such relief.
F CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1835/2021
(arising out of SLP (C) No. 11558/2020)
72. The appellant Board has approached this Court in appeal against
the judgment dated 29.7.2020 passed by the High Court of Kerala in
W.A. No. 724/2020 confirming the order of learned Single Judge in W.P.
G
No. 24214/2019, wherein the respondent student’s prayer for change in
date of birth from 30.5.1992 to 23.7.1991 was granted and original record
was held to have recorded an incorrect date. For reaching this conclusion,
reliance was placed by the High Court upon a subsequently obtained
birth certificate.
H
JIGYA YADAV (MINOR) (THROUGH GUARDIAN/FATHER 1149
HARI SINGH) v. C.B.S.E. (CBSE) [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

73. The impugned judgment requires no discussion as it is reasoned A
in similar terms, as already delineated above.
74. The appellant has placed reliance upon the Byelaws (existing
before 2007) to assail the decision. The grounds urged by the appellant
have already been urged in previous appeals and we need not repeat
them. B
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 1836/2021
(arising out of SLP (C) No(s). 7387/2021
(@ Diary No. 21923/2020)
75. The present appeal involves a challenge against the judgment C
dated 13.11.2019 passed by the High Court of Kerala in W.A. No. 2267/
2019 confirming the order of learned Single Judge in W.P.(C) No. 8034/
2019, wherein the respondent student’s prayer for change of name from
“Ganga” to “Ganga S” and father’s name from “Rajendran C” to
“Rajendran Pillai C” was allowed in terms of the Byelaws (as amended D
in 2018).
76. The impugned judgment requires no discussion as it is reasoned
in similar terms, as already delineated above.
77. The grounds urged by the appellant have already been urged
in previous appeals and we need not repeat them. E
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 1837/2021
(arising out of SLP (C) No(s). 7388/2021
(@ Diary No. 25053/2020)
78. In this appeal, the appellant (Board) has assailed the judgment F
dated 26.11.2019 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Madras in
W.A. No. 4077/2019 affirming the order of learned Single Judge with
slight modification. The respondent student had prayed for change of his
father’s name from “Fazal Rehmaan” to “Shaik Fazul Rahiman” which
was permitted by the learned Single Judge. In writ appeal before the G
High Court, the learned counsel for the Board, citing the applicable
Byelaws (as amended in 2018), submitted that appropriate precautions
ought to be taken while issuing such directions for change of name as
there is a possibility of misuse. The High Court observed that such
corrections must not be permitted for ulterior or extraneous reasons. In
H
1150 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 4 S.C.R.

A order to prevent such possibility, the Board was permitted to obtain an
affidavit in the nature of indemnity against any such exigency. It observed
thus:
“2. We find that the request made by the learned counsel to that
extent is appreciable, inasmuch as a person should not be allowed
B to carry out corrections if the same is for any ulterior motive or
for any extraneous considerations that may have itself roots either
in any form of impersonation arising out of any civil or criminal
activity. In this regard, it will be open to the appellant Board to
obtain an affidavit from the candidate in the nature of indemnity
against any such exigency as referred to above and correction be
C carried out subject to such conditions as may be necessary.”
79. As regards cases wherein the request for change of name is
bona fide and there is no scope for prejudice, the decision of learned
Single Judge directing such changes was held to be correct. The Court
observed thus:
D
“3. On the other hand, we find that if correction has been genuinely
and bona fide sought and no prejudice is caused, then in that event
the conclusion arrived at by the learned Single Judge cannot be
said to suffer from any infirmity.”

E 80. The grounds urged by the appellant herein (CBSE) have since
been adverted to and require no reiteration.
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1838/2021
(arising out of SLP (C) No. 15089/2020)
81. The challenge in this appeal is against the judgment dated
F
25.9.2020 passed in W.A. No. 1102/2020 affirming the order of learned
Single Judge wherein the respondent student’s prayer for change in date
of birth from 17.1.1992 to 17.1.1991 was allowed upon payment of cost
of Rs.1000 to the school authority and Rs.5000 to the Board. Like previous
cases, the prayer was granted on the basis of a subsequently obtained
G birth certificate and in light of the applicable 2007 Byelaws.
82. The impugned judgment requires no discussion as it is reasoned
in similar terms, as already delineated above.
83. The grounds urged by the appellant have also been urged in
previous appeals and we need not repeat them.
H
JIGYA YADAV (MINOR) (THROUGH GUARDIAN/FATHER 1151
HARI SINGH) v. C.B.S.E. (CBSE) [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1839/2021 A
(arising out of SLP (C) No. 15124/2020)
84. This appeal involves a challenge to the judgment dated
25.9.2020 passed by the High Court of Kerala in W.A. No. 1037/2020
affirming the order of learned Single Judge, wherein the respondent
student’s prayer for change in date of birth in the certificates issued by B
the Board was allowed upon payment of certain costs to the school and
the Board. Reliance was again placed upon a subsequently obtained
birth certificate for ordering the said changes and on the applicable 2007
Byelaws.
85. The impugned judgment requires no discussion as it is reasoned C
in similar terms, as already delineated above.
86. The grounds urged by the appellant have also been urged in
previous appeals and we need not repeat them.
CIVIL APPEAL NO.1840/2021 D
(arising out of SLP (C) No. 15625/2020)
87. The challenge in this appeal is against the judgment dated
7.9.2020 passed by the High Court of Kerala in W.A. No. 1155/2020
confirming the order of learned Single Judge, wherein the respondent
student’s prayer for change of his father’s name from “Hashim Abdulla” E
to “Hashim A.” and mother’s name from “Shahina Duneera” to “Shahina
Beegum D.S.” was allowed in terms of the applicable Byelaws (as
amended in 2018).
88. In the facts of the case, the respondent obtained the certificate
issued by the Board on 29.5.2018 after passing the Secondary School F
Examination, 2018 wherein the names of his parents were recorded in
accordance with the school records and old birth certificate. Contrary to
the names in these documents, the names of father and mother of the
respondent were recorded as “Hashim A.” and “Shahina Beegum D.S.”
respectively in their school leaving certificates. In light of this conflict,
the respondent applied to the Registering Authority for issue of a corrected G
birth certificate under Section-15 of the Registration of Births and Deaths
Act, 1969 read with Rule-11 of the Kerala Registration of Births and
Deaths Rules, 1999. The High Court permitted the changes in accordance
with this subsequently obtained birth certificate.
H
1152 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 4 S.C.R.

A 89. The impugned judgment requires no discussion as it is reasoned
in similar terms, as already delineated above.
90. The grounds urged by the appellant have also been urged in
previous appeals and we need not repeat them.
91. Apart from grounds already advanced in previous cases, the
B respondents have advanced certain additional grounds in support of the
impugned decision. It is submitted that the CBSE has no jurisdiction or
power to deny correction of records belonging to a student after due
changes by competent public authorities and acceptance of the same by
school. It is further submitted that CBSE is a society and its Byelaws
C cannot be treated as equivalent to a law made by a competent legislature.
Thus, they cannot be invoked to deny the fundamental rights of the
students much less being reasonable restriction.
92. The respondents have further questioned the vires of the
Byelaws on the ground that the government resolution providing for the
D power to frame Byelaws does not permit the Board to impose such
conditions for denying corrections in certificates. Relying upon Sections
76 and 77 of the 1872 Act, it is lastly submitted that the certified copies
of public records are duly admissible and the Board ought to ensure that
their certificates are corrected in light of such updated public records.

E T.P. (C) NOS. 1139-1140 OF 2020
93. The petitioner (CBSE) herein seeks a direction from this Court
to withdraw before itself two proceedings, namely – W.P. (C) No. 5828/
2016 pending before the Jharkhand High Court and L.P.A. No. 423/
2020 pending before the High Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh,
F as similar questions are involved in these proceedings.
94. The former proceeding before the Jharkhand High Court is
for change of name of the student from “Saddam Hussain” to “Sajid
Hussain” on the basis of changes effected in Official Gazette, Passport,
Aadhar card, Driving License and PAN card. The proceeding before
the High Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh is against the decision
G
of learned Single Judge in CWP No. 21388/2018, wherein the student’s
prayer for change of name in the certificates issued by the Board from
“Satish Kumar s/o Rampal” to “Shrey s/0 Rampal” was allowed on the
basis of public notices in two local newspapers, official gazette notification
notifying change of name, Aadhar card and PAN card.
H
JIGYA YADAV (MINOR) (THROUGH GUARDIAN/FATHER 1153
HARI SINGH) v. C.B.S.E. (CBSE) [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

95. The Board submits that it is already contesting multiple cases A
before this Court in which similar questions touching upon the power of
Courts to issue directions for changing particulars in CBSE certificates
is being examined, despite there being a clear prohibition against the
same in the Examination Byelaws. The Board submits that identical
arguments are required to be advanced by it at multiple forums and it is
B
causing grave harm to it including in passing of conflicting directions.
96. Respondent No. 6 (Satish Kumar @Shrey) has filed “Note on
submissions” wherein various grounds have been advanced to question
the prohibitory Byelaws of the Board and support the case for permitting
genuine changes in certificates. It has been submitted that the Byelaws
are not statutory in nature and thus, they cannot be made as “law” within C
the meaning of Article 19(2) of the Constitution and cannot be the basis
to deprive the students of their fundamental right to express their identity
under Article 19(1)(a). Reliance has been placed upon Kabir Jaiswal
vs. Union of India & Ors.25 to support this position.
97. It is then submitted that there is a conflict between Kalpana D
Thakur & Anr. vs. Central Board of Secondary Education & Anr.26
and Vyshnav @ Vishnu Viswam V. vs. Central Board of Secondary
Education & Ors.27 as regards the relevant point of time for determining
the applicability of Byelaws, as amended from time to time. Supporting
the view taken in Vyshnav28, it is urged that the relevant point of time E
ought to be the date of issuance of certificate.
98. Having gone through the elaborate set of submissions and
documents on record in the respective matter, the following broad points
emerge for our consideration:
(i) Whether the CBSE Examination Byelaws have the force of F
law?
(ii) Whether examination byelaws impose reasonable restrictions
on the exercise of rights under Article 19 of the Constitution
including fail the test of rationality for excessively restricting
the scope of permissible corrections/changes? G

25
2020 SCC OnLine All 1488
26
2015 SCC OnLine Del 12156
27
2017 SCC OnLine Ker 39806
28
supra at Footnote No.27 H
1154 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 4 S.C.R.

A (iii) Whether the Board is obliged to carry out corrections/changes
in the certificates issued by it owing to correction/updation
of public records/documents which have statutory
presumption of genuineness?
(iv) Whether the examination byelaws in force on the date of
B examination conducted by CBSE or the date of consideration
of the application for recording correction/change would be
relevant? And, whether the effect of correction or change,
as the case may be, will have retrospective effect from the
date of issue of the original certificate?
C (v) Whether writ of mandamus issued for effecting corrections
in CBSE certificates can be in the teeth of explicit provisions
in the examination byelaws, without examining validity of the
byelaws?
Point No. 1
D 99. Indubitably, the CBSE Board came to be established vide
Government of India resolution dated 1.7.1929 with a view to “enable it
to play a useful role in the field of Secondary Education” and “make the
services of the Board available to various educational institutions in the
country”, as stated in the Constitution of the Board. Article 929 of the
E said Constitution deals with the “Powers and Functions of the Board”,
which include to do all such things as may be necessary for furthering
the objectives of the Board. One of the functions or so to say power of
the Board is to make regulations for giving effect to the afore-stated
resolution as predicated in Article 1630 of the Constitution. Clause (2)
thereof envisages that the Regulation so framed may provide for
F conditions for issuing certificates for examination conducted by the Board.

29
“9. The Board shall have the following powers: -
xxx xxx xxx
(xvi) To do all such or other things as may be necessary in order to further the
G objectives of the Board as a body constituted for regulating and maintaining
the standard of secondary education.”
30
“16.POWERS OF THE BOARD TO MAKE REGULATIONS
xxx xxx xxx
(2) In particular and without prejudice to any generality of the foregoing powers,
the Board may make Regulations for all or any of the following matters, namely:
…..
H (f) The conditions for the award of certificates of the Board;”
JIGYA YADAV (MINOR) (THROUGH GUARDIAN/FATHER 1155
HARI SINGH) v. C.B.S.E. (CBSE) [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

We may also take note of Article 1831 of the Constitution of the Board, A
which makes it amply clear that the byelaws to be framed by the Board
ought to be consistent with and subservient to the Regulations and the
Resolution establishing the Board. This Article also indicates that byelaws
may be made for the purposes referred to in clauses (a) to (c) pertaining
to procedural aspects. Indisputably, the constitution/organisation or
B
structure of CBSE is not backed by a statute. It is, therefore, a misnomer
to characterise byelaws framed by the Board as statutory.
100. The real question is: whether byelaws so framed have the
force of law?
101. To have the force of law, it must qualify the test predicated C
in Article 13 of the Constitution, else it would be mere contractual terms
of engagement. For the nature of activities undertaken by the Board
including the powers and functions of the Board, it can be safely assumed
that the Board is a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the
Constitution of India and as a corollary thereof, its actions would be
amenable to Part-III of the Constitution of India. The fact that the Board D
can be treated as a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the
Constitution does not mean that the byelaws framed by it would
necessarily become law within the meaning of Article 13 of the
Constitution of India. Only a “law” under Article 13 can be reckoned as
a restriction in respect of rights guaranteed under Article 19 of the E
Constitution.
102. Before we proceed to analyse any further, it would be apposite
to reproduce Article 13 of the Constitution of India to answer the point
under consideration. Article 13 of the Constitution reads thus:-
“13. Laws inconsistent with or in derogation of the fundamental F
rights.— (1) All laws in force in the territory of India immediately
before the commencement of this Constitution, in so far as they

31
“18.The Board and its Committees may make Bye-laws, consistent with this
Resolution and the Regulations, for the following purposes, namely:
G
(a) Laying down the procedure to be observed at their meetings and the number
of members required to form a quorum;
(b) Providing for all matters which, consistent with this Resolution and the
Regulations, are to be prescribed by Bye-laws; and
(c) Providing for all other matters solely concerning the Board and its Committees
and not provided for by the Resolution and the Regulations.” H
1156 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 4 S.C.R.

A are inconsistent with the provisions of this Part, shall, to the extent
of such inconsistency, be void.
(2) The State shall not make any law which takes away or abridges
the rights conferred by this Part and any law made in contravention
of this clause shall, to the extent of the contravention, be void.
B (3) In this article, unless the context otherwise requires, —
(a) “law” includes any Ordinance, order, bye-law, rule,
regulation, notification, custom or usage having in the
territory of India the force of law;

C (b) “laws in force” includes laws passed or made by a
Legislature or other competent authority in the territory of India
before the commencement of this Constitution and not
previously repealed, notwithstanding that any such law or any
part thereof may not be then in operation either at all or in
particular areas.
D
(4) Nothing in this article shall apply to any amendment of this
Constitution made under article 368.”
(emphasis supplied)
103. The tenor of Article 13 clearly suggests that it was not enacted
E to restate the obvious proposition that all statutory laws are “laws” in
any legal system. For, it requires no restatement that laws enacted by
the legislature are “laws”. The underlying purpose of defining “law”
under Article 13 is to encompass a practical administrative reality that
there can be laws other than ordinary statutory laws. It, therefore, takes
within its sweep those matters (declaration in the form of Byelaws in
F
this case) as having the “force of law” albeit not enacted by the legislature
as such.
104. For, it defines “law” to include ordinances, orders, byelaws,
rule, regulation or notification issued/made by the State. The precise
meanings of these terms cannot be confined in the rigidity of language
G and the same is neither desirable nor required in the present case.
105. The examination revolves around the expression “having in
the territory of India the force of law”, irrespective of the packaging
in which the said provision is formally couched. The text impels us to
focus on the substance of the provision, and not its form. Broadly speaking,
H
JIGYA YADAV (MINOR) (THROUGH GUARDIAN/FATHER 1157
HARI SINGH) v. C.B.S.E. (CBSE) [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

law made by State refers to a body of rules which shapes the rights and A
liabilities of persons in a universal sense as opposed to a private
transaction between parties. Such law has the ability to bind people by
providing for all prominent aspects of their conduct as the subjects of
law. Therefore, any rule/notification/order/byelaw issued/made by the
State or its instrumentalities would have the force of law and bind all
B
entities subjected to it and operates as a code of conduct to regulate
their functioning. Yet another crucial characteristic would be enforceability
in a court of law. Needless to observe, we are not talking about binding
codes or set of rules decided by parties for themselves as they fall under
the realm of law of contract. We are dealing with rules which flow from
the instrumentality of the “State” during the performance of essential C
public functions.
106. CBSE, despite being packaged as a registered society, is
performing an essential public function for the government since its
establishment in 1929. In Binny Ltd. & Anr. vs. V. Sadasivan & Ors.32,
this Court laid down certain characteristics of public functions thus: D
“11. ...It is difficult to draw a line between public functions and
private functions when they are being discharged by a purely
private authority. A body is performing a “public function” when it
seeks to achieve some collective benefit for the public or a section
of the public and is accepted by the public or that section of the E
public as having authority to do so. Bodies therefore exercise
public functions when they intervene or participate in social or
economic affairs in the public interest. In a book on Judicial Review
of Administrative Action (5th Edn.) by de Smith, Woolf & Jowell
in Chapter 3, para 0.24, it is stated thus:
F
“A body is performing a ‘public function’ when it seeks
to achieve some collective benefit for the public or a section
of the public and is accepted by the public or that section of
the public as having authority to do so. Bodies therefore
exercise public functions when they intervene or participate in
social or economic affairs in the public interest. This may happen G
in a wide variety of ways. For instance, a body is performing a
public function when it provides ‘public goods’ or other collective
services, such as health care, education and personal social

32
(2005) 6 SCC 657 H
1158 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 4 S.C.R.

A services, from funds raised by taxation. A body may perform public
functions in the form of adjudicatory services (such as those of
the criminal and civil courts and tribunal system). They also do so
if they regulate commercial and professional activities to ensure
compliance with proper standards. For all these purposes, a range
of legal and administrative techniques may be deployed, including
B
rule-making, adjudication (and other forms of dispute resolution);
inspection; and licensing.
Public functions need not be the exclusive domain of the
State. Charities, self-regulatory organizations and other nominally
private institutions (such as universities, the Stock Exchange,
C Lloyd’s of London, churches) may in reality also perform some
types of public function. As Sir John Donaldson, M.R. urged, it is
important for the courts to ‘recognise the realities of
executive power’ and not allow ‘their vision to be clouded
by the subtlety and sometimes complexity of the way in
D which it can be exerted’. Non-governmental bodies such as
these are just as capable of abusing their powers as is
Government.””
(emphasis supplied)
The principles associated with a public function deducible from
E the above analysis can be illustratively culled out as follows:
a. Extension of collective benefit to public by a public authority;
b. Participation in social or economic affairs including health,
education, social services etc.;
F c. Private bodies or charitable institutions performing public
functions could also be regulated in the same manner as a public
authority.
In the school education structure as we have it, there are state
government boards limited to respective states. There are central boards
G having its area of operation throughout India, namely, Council for the
Indian School Certificate Examinations (ICSE), a private board;
International Baccalaureate (IB), formerly known as International
Baccalaureate Organization (IBO) a non-profit foundation/organization
having headquarter in Geneva, Switzerland; and CBSE.
H
JIGYA YADAV (MINOR) (THROUGH GUARDIAN/FATHER 1159
HARI SINGH) v. C.B.S.E. (CBSE) [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

107. CBSE is the only central body for conducting examinations A
in the country created by a resolution of the Central Government. All the
bodies constituted at various levels are working in the direction of just
educational governance. Article 41 of the Constitution, couched as a
directive, is the source behind the basic functioning of the CBSE Board
as it secures nothing but right to education. It is participating in educational
B
affairs which form an intrinsic part of social affairs. The CBSE Board is
a public authority functioning in public interest for the performance of a
public function.
108. We may gainfully refer to the Constitution of the Board which
reaffirms the public character of the Board as the ultimate control over
the functioning of the Board is exercised by the Ministry of Education C
(now Ministry of Education & Social Welfare)33. Article 1 states that:
“1. The Board shall conduct examinations at the secondary stage
of the education and such other examinations as it may consider
fit, subject to the approval of the Controlling Authority or as it
may be called upon to conduct by the Government of India, Ministry D
of Education, (now Ministry of Education & Social Welfare) and
do such acts ancillary to the objects as may be necessary.”
Article 4 further reads thus:
“4. The Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of E
Education (now Ministry of Education and Social Welfare) shall
continue to be the Controlling Authority of the Board.”
109. Reverting to the CBSE Examination Byelaws, the same are
couched in the form of a code. They provide for all essential aspects
relating to formal education of a student including admission, examination, F
migration, transfer, curriculum, fee for various services, issuance of
verified certificates, modifications in certificates etc. This Byelaws,
therefore, bind the parties and are duly enforceable in a court of law,
even by way of writ remedies as we have seen in the present batch of
petitions.
G
110. To put it differently, the Byelaws of the Board have the force
of law and must be regarded as such for all legal purposes. It would
serve no meaningful purpose to hold these authoritative set of rules

33
Now known as “Ministry of Human Resource Development” H
1160 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 4 S.C.R.

A originating from an instrumentality of the State as mere contractual terms
despite there being overwhelming public interest in their just application.
111. The argument that Byelaws of the Board are contractual
elements as CBSE is a registered society unbacked by a statute cannot
be accepted for at least four reasons – first, CBSE is not a private
B corporate body. It is a juristic person and a “State” within the meaning
of Article 12, which in itself warrants its amenability to the courts including
constitutional writ courts; second, the functions performed by the CBSE
Board are public functions and not private functions; third, the test of
“force of law” takes within its sweep the nature of rule, its authoritative
impact on the subjects, nature of function performed by the rule making
C body, the origin of the body, the binding value of the rules, existence of
any competing set of rules and fourth, absence of statute does not
automatically render the rules to be contractual terms, as already observed.
112. As in the ultimate analysis, the Byelaws operate as law, the
scrutiny of this Court cannot be undermined by giving them an artificial
D colour. For a student enrolled with the CBSE, there is no other body of
rules but the subject Byelaws for dealing with all significant aspects of
her education. By now it is an established tenet that even body corporates,
co-operative societies, registered societies etc. can be declared as
instrumentalities of the State, for the only reason that the outer form of
E organization must not be allowed to defeat the ultimate constitutional
goal of protection of fundamental rights as and when they suffer at the
hands of the State, directly or indirectly. The Court ought to intervene
with circumspection even when the public body derives its authority
from a government resolution.

F 113. We say so because there is an evolving body of jurisprudence
enunciating that the principle of presumption of constitutionality attached
with statutes ought not to be extended to subordinate legislations with
the same vigour. For, the legislature enjoys the sacred backing of people’s
will and naturally, every act of legislature is presumed to be constitutional.
In other words, the Courts generally do not look upon duly enacted laws
G with suspicion at the first glance as they enjoy legal presumption of its
validity. Nevertheless, circumspect intervention on the part of the Court
is to advance constitutional protection for guarantees under Part-III of
the Constitution.
114. Arguendo, the Examination Byelaws are not “law” under
H Article 13, it would not affect the power of the Court to scrutinize them
JIGYA YADAV (MINOR) (THROUGH GUARDIAN/FATHER 1161
HARI SINGH) v. C.B.S.E. (CBSE) [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

in reference to Part-III of the Constitution of India as CBSE is “State” A
within the meaning of Article 12 and all its actions are consequently
subject to Part-III.
Point No. 2
115. The question whether Byelaws under consideration impose
reasonable restrictions on the exercise of rights under Article 19 of the B
Constitution of India, may have to be understood in the context of
enunciation of this Court that the core existence of an individual is not
exemplified by her outer characteristics but by her inner self-identification
and also about the significance of the acquired identity in the form of
name. The identity of an individual is one of the most closely guarded C
areas of the constitutional scheme in India. The sanctity of identity has
been recognized by this Court in a plethora of cases including National
Legal Services Authority vs. Union of India & Ors.34, Navtej Singh
Johar & Ors. vs. Union of India through Secretary, Ministry of
Law and Justice35 and K.S. Puttaswamy and Anr. vs. Union of India
& Ors36. In fact, in Navtej Singh Johar37, the Court noted how the D
core existence of an individual is not exemplified by her outer
characteristics but by her inner self-identification. In the context of natural
identity of an individual, this Court in Navtej Singh Johar38 had noted
that:
“5. The natural identity of an individual should be treated to be E
absolutely essential to his being. What nature gives is natural.
That is called nature within. Thus, that part of the personality of a
person has to be respected and not despised or looked down upon.
The said inherent nature and the associated natural impulses in
that regard are to be accepted. Non-acceptance of it by any F
societal norm or notion and punishment by law on some obsolete
idea and idealism affects the kernel of the identity of an individual.
Destruction of individual identity would tantamount to
crushing of intrinsic dignity that cumulatively encapsulates
the values of privacy, choice, freedom of speech and other
expressions. It can be viewed from another angle. An individual G

34
(2014) 5 SCC 438
35
(2018) 10 SCC 1
36
(2017) 10 SCC 1
37
supra at Footnote No.35
38
supra at Footnote No.35 H
1162 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 4 S.C.R.

A in exercise of his choice may feel that he/she should be left alone
but no one, and we mean, no one, should impose solitude on him/
her.”
(emphasis supplied)
116. Identity, therefore, is an amalgam of various internal and
B external including acquired characteristics of an individual and name
can be regarded as one of the foremost indicators of identity. And
therefore, an individual must be in complete control of her name and law
must enable her to retain as well as to exercise such control freely “for
all times”. Such control would inevitably include the aspiration of an
C individual to be recognized by a different name for a just cause. Article
19(1)(a) of the Constitution provides for a guaranteed right to freedom
of speech and expression. In light of Navtej Singh Johar39, this freedom
would include the freedom to lawfully express one’s identity in the manner
of their liking. In other words, expression of identity is a protected element
of freedom of expression under the Constitution.
D
117. Having recognized the existence of this right, the essential
question pertains to the rights that flow due to the change of name. The
question becomes vital because identity, as stated above, is a combination
of diverse set of elements. Navtej Singh Johar40 dealt with “natural
identity” and here we are dealing with name, which can only be perceived
E as an ‘acquired identity’. Therefore, the precise scope of right and extent
of restrictions could only be determined upon deeper examination.
118. To begin with, it is important to explain what we understand
by this right to change of name as a constituent element of freedom of
expression of identity. Any change in identity of an individual has to go
F through multiple steps and it cannot be regarded as complete without
proper fulfilment of those steps. An individual may self-identify oneself
with any title or epithet at any point of time. But the change of identity
would not be regarded as formally or legally complete until and unless
the State and its agencies take note thereof in their records. Afterall, in
G social sphere, an individual is not only recognized by how an individual
identifies oneself but also by how his/her official records identify him/
her. For, in every public transaction of an individual, official records
introduce the person by his/her name and other relevant particulars.
39
supra at Footnote No.35
40
H supra at Footnote No.35
JIGYA YADAV (MINOR) (THROUGH GUARDIAN/FATHER 1163
HARI SINGH) v. C.B.S.E. (CBSE) [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

119. Thus, the essential question is whether the aforesaid right to A
alter name would mean that the State and its agencies are unconditionally
bound to reckon the changed identity of the individual and give recognition
to the same by altering its records, whenever such request is made by
him/her.
120. Going by the very nature of rights under Article 19, the right B
to get changed name recorded in the official (public) records cannot be
an absolute right and as a matter of public policy and larger public interest
calls for certain reasonable restrictions to observe consistency and obviate
confusion and deceptive attempt.
121. We may now examine whether CBSE Byelaws are just and C
reasonable restrictions in the context of rights guaranteed under Part-III
and in the interests of the general public.
122. The test of reasonableness requires that the impugned law is
intelligently crafted in such a manner that it is able to justify the ultimate
impact of the law on its subjects. If it restricts, it must restrict on the D
basis of reason and if it permits, it must permit on the basis of reason.
Similarly, if a law draws a classification, it must classify intelligently i.e.,
backed by reason. Reason is the foundation of all laws and their validity
is immensely dependent on the availability of sound reason. Equally
crucial is the availability of a legitimate object. It is important to note that
reasonableness is adjudged in the specific context of the case and is not E
confined to the words of a definition. In Om Prakash & Ors. vs. State
of U.P. & Ors.41, this Court noted thus:
“32. The concept of “reasonableness” defies definition. Abstract
definition like “choice of a course which reason dictates” as
propounded in the earliest case of this Court in Chintamanrao42 is F
elastic. In the subsequent case of V.G. Row43 therefore, this Court
has observed that “no abstract standard or general pattern” of
reasonableness can be laid down as applicable to all cases. Legal
author Friedmann in his book Legal Theory, 4th Edn., at pp. 83-
85, comments that reasonableness is an expression used to convey G
basically the natural law ideal of “justice between man and man”.
The concept of “reasonable man” is also an application of the

41
(2004) 3 SCC 402
42
Chintamanrao vs. State of M.P., AIR 1951 SC 118
43
The State of Madras vs. V.G. Row, AIR 1952 SC 196 H
1164 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 4 S.C.R.

A principles of natural justice to the standard of behaviour expected
of the citizen. The functional and conceptual implication of the
term “reasonableness” is that it is essentially another word used
for public policy. It means the application of the underlying principles
of social policy and morality to an individual case. Friedmann
further observes that the “test of reasonableness is nothing
B
substantially different from ‘social engineering’, ‘balancing of
interests’, or any of the other formulas which modern sociological
theories suggest as an answer to the problem of the judicial
function”.”
In V.G. Row44, the Court, noting that there can be no general pattern
C of reasonableness, laid down certain factors to be kept in mind while
determining this question thus:
“(15) …It is important in this context to bear in mind that the test
of reasonableness, wherever prescribed, should be applied to each
individual statute impugned, and no abstract standard, or general
D pattern of reasonableness can be laid down as applicable to all
cases. The nature of the right alleged to have been infringed,
the underlying purpose of the restrictions imposed, the extent
and urgency of the evil sought to be remedied thereby, the
disproportion of the imposition, the prevailing conditions at
E the time, should all enter into the judicial verdict. …”
(emphasis supplied)
123. As noted above, the Byelaws permit change of name only if
permission from the Court has been obtained prior to the publication of
result. It puts a clear embargo on any change of name sans prior
F permission before the publication. The provision is problematic on certain
counts. Firstly, it is not a mere restriction on the right, it is a complete
embargo on the right post publication of result of the candidate. It fails to
take into account the possibility of need for change of name after the
publication of result including the uncertainty of timeline required to obtain
G such declaration from the Court of law due to law’s delay and upon
which the candidate has no control whatsoever. Whereas, while amending
the Byelaws in 2007, the CBSE itself had noted that children are not of
mature age while passing school examinations and they may not be in a
position to decide conclusively on issues concerning their identity. The
44
H supra at Footnote No.43
JIGYA YADAV (MINOR) (THROUGH GUARDIAN/FATHER 1165
HARI SINGH) v. C.B.S.E. (CBSE) [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

Byelaws completely overlook this possibility when it ordains seeking A
declaration from the Court prior to the publication of results of the
concerned examination conducted by it.
124. The overriding state interest, as per the Board, to retain this
stringency is nothing but efficiency of administration. Administrative
efficiency, despite being a crucial concern, has not been and cannot be B
elevated to a standard that it is used to justify non-performance of essential
functions by an instrumentality of the State. To use administrative
efficiency to make it practically impossible for a student to alter her
identity in the Board certificates, no matter how urgent and important it
is, would be highly disproportionate and can in no manner be termed as
a reasonable restriction. Reasonableness would demand a proper balance C
between a student’s right to be identified in the official (public) records
in manner of her choice and the Board’s argument of administrative
efficiency. To sustain this balance, it would be open to the Board to limit
the number of times such alterations could be permitted including subject
to availability of the old records preserved by it as per the extant D
regulations. But to say that post the publication of examination results
and issuance of certificates, there can be no way to alter the record
would be a case of total prohibition and not a reasonable restraint.
125. The limitation as regards maximum period upto which changes
can be permitted also requires a different approach. Upon receiving the E
certificates, the student would naturally be put to notice of the particulars
of certificates. Due to young age and inadvertence including being casual
and indolent, a student may fail to identify the errors or to understand the
probable impact of those errors and accordingly, may not apply for
rectification immediately. It is also possible that a student may not have
to use the certificates immediately after passing out and by the time she F
uses them, the limitation period for correction may elapse. Therefore, a
realistic time for permitting corrections is very important. Indeed, it can
be commensurate with the statutory or mandatory period upto which
CBSE is obliged to preserve its old record.
126. However, we need not explore upon the question as to whether G
the exercise of a fundamental right can be foreclosed by prescribing a
rigid period of limitation. In case of any ordinary civil rights, it is important
that the action for enforcement of such rights is initiated in prescribed
time and consistency is maintained, but is it permissible to say the same
about fundamental rights? The rights which are recognised as H
1166 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 4 S.C.R.

A fundamental under the Constitution are “preferred or chosen freedoms”
and a very sensitive and realistic approach has to be taken in such matters.
We wonder whether after the lapse of prescribed time, let us say 3
years, there could be no reasonable and legitimate circumstances to
warrant change of name.
B 127. At the same time, there is merit in CBSE’s argument that
frequent changes cannot be permitted as there is scope of abuse and
misuse, apart from administrative burden. This argument cannot be lightly
brushed aside. We deem it fit to observe that same concerns could apply
to other bodies as well, like Unique Identification Authority of India 45
and Passport Authority.
C
128. As regards the argument of misuse, no doubt, there are
instances of misuse of provisions that permit change of identity in criminal
matters. However, mere possibility of abuse cannot deter the Board
from fulfilling their essential functions. A possibility of abuse cannot be
used to deny legitimate rights to citizens. The balance simply does not tilt
D in favour of such a proposition. The course of law cannot choose to
change its stream merely because there are apprehensions of abuse on
the way. The Board’s concern is only to regulate and maintain efficient
educational standards. It is not a penal authority. If any of the provisions
of Byelaws are subjected to misuse or abuse by anyone, the Board
E would be well within its rights to approach the appropriate body for
necessary penal or civil action. As a nodal agency made for a specific
public purpose, CBSE can only use its means and resources to put proper
safeguards in place while performing its functions. More so, when it is
not even the job of the Board to verify anything, as changes are made
after grant of permission by a Court of law. There is involvement of
F judicial application of mind. The Board only has to give effect to the
Court order granting permission, as and when it is so pronounced
irrespective of publication of examination results in earlier point of time.
129. Administrative efficiency, we must note, cannot be the sole
concern of CBSE. Every institution desires efficiency in their functioning.
G But it does not mean that efficiency is achieved by curbing their basic
functions. Article 9 of CBSE’s Constitution, in point (xvi), instructively
states that CBSE is a body constituted for “regulating and maintaining”
the standard of secondary education. The same is reproduced again for
ready reference:
45
H for short, “UIDAI”
JIGYA YADAV (MINOR) (THROUGH GUARDIAN/FATHER 1167
HARI SINGH) v. C.B.S.E. (CBSE) [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

“9. The Board shall have the following powers:- A
xxx xxx xxx
(xvi) To do all such or other things as may be necessary in order
to further the objectives of the Board as a body constituted for
regulating and maintaining the standard of secondary
education.” B

(emphasis supplied)
The terms “regulation” and “maintenance” are terms of very wide
import and signify that the functioning of the Board is not narrowed
down in any manner whatsoever. Regulation of standard of education C
would empower the Board to take all necessary steps, as permissible
under the Resolution and Regulations, to control all possible aspects of
school education that may have a bearing on its standard. Quality of
curriculum, services extended to the students, effective grievance
redressal mechanism, oversight over affiliated schools etc. are some of
the essential elements touching upon the standard of education. D
Maintenance of those standards would demand constant upgradation of
rules and services of the Board in tune with changing needs of the students
and the ultimate goal of education.
130. One of the primary functions of the Board is to grant
certificates to its students. Effective maintenance and regulation of E
standard of education would include complete accountability of the Board
in grant of such certificates and its duty does not get extinguished after
publication of examination results and issue of certificates. Rather, it
extends to taking care of post-publication concerns of students as and
when they emerge, as students seek to use their certificates for purposes F
of higher education and career opportunities. A narrow reading of the
functions of the Board would leave glaring gaps in the field of school
education and may jeopardize the welfare of students with legitimate
concerns.
131. The concerned Byelaw has been framed on the assumption
G
that there can be no situation wherein a legitimate need for change of
name could arise for a student after publication of results. It is presumed
that only typographical/factual errors could come in the certificates and
they can be corrected using the provision for corrections. The
presumption, we must note, is erroneous, absurd and distances itself
from the social realities. There can be numerous circumstances wherein H
1168 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 4 S.C.R.

A change of name could be a legitimate requirement and keeping the ultimate
goal of preserving the standard of education in mind, the Board must
provide for a reasonable opportunity to effect such changes.
132. It would not be out of place to note that the two parties here
– the Board and students – are not in an equal position of impact. In
B other words, the balance of convenience would tilt in favour of students.
For, they stand to lose more due to inaccuracies in their certificates than
the Board whose sole worry is increasing administrative burden. The
obligation of Board to take additional administrative burden is no doubt
onerous but the propensity of a student losing career opportunities due
to inaccurate certificate is unparalleled. Illustratively, a juvenile accused
C of being in conflict with the law or a victim of sexual abuse whose
identity gets compromised due to lapses by media or the investigative
body, despite there being complete legal protection for the same, may
consider changing the name to seek rehabilitation in the society in exercise
of her right to be forgotten. If the Board, in such a case, refuses to
D change the name, the student would be compelled to live with the scars
of the past. We are compelled to wonder how it would not be a grave
and sustained violation of fundamental rights of the student. In such
circumstances, the avowed public interest in securing rehabilitation of
affected persons would overwhelm the Board’s interest in securing
administrative efficiency. In fact, it would be against the human dignity
E of the student, the protection whereof is the highest duty of all concerned.
A Board dealing with maintenance of educational standards cannot
arrogate to itself the power to impact identity of students who enrol with
it. The right to control one’s identity must remain with the individual,
subject, of course, to reasonable restrictions as observed above and as
F further discussed later.
133. The utility of certificates issued by the Board is not confined
to educational purposes anymore. They serve a social purpose today
and are often used to cross verify particulars like name and date of birth
while applying for other government identity documents. They assume
G immense relevance while applying for various jobs, both public and
private. Interestingly, CBSE itself has argued at length on the importance
and authoritative value of their certificates. In such circumstances, an
inaccuracy or denial of change could be fatal to a student’s future
prospects and all these concerns cannot be brushed aside in the name of
administrative exigencies.
H
JIGYA YADAV (MINOR) (THROUGH GUARDIAN/FATHER 1169
HARI SINGH) v. C.B.S.E. (CBSE) [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

134. Pertinently, the Parliament is also alive to the social realities A
having bearing on identity documents. There are various statutory
enactments wherein detailed provisions are made for change of identity.
The UIDAI allows changes in the Aadhar card upon fulfilment of required
conditions. Section-31 of Aadhaar (Targeted Delivery of Financial and
Other Subsidies, Benefits and Services) Act, 2016 provides for changes
B
in the records. The provision permits both demographic and biometric
changes. It reads thus:
“31. Alteration of demographic information or biometric
information.— (1) In case any demographic information of an
Aadhaar number holder is found incorrect or changes subsequently,
the Aadhaar number holder shall request the Authority to alter C
such demographic information in his record in the Central Identities
Data Repository in such manner as may be specified by regulations.
(2) In case any biometric information of Aadhaar number holder
is lost or changes subsequently for any reason, the Aadhaar
number holder shall request the Authority to make necessary D
alteration in his record in the Central Identities Data Repository in
such manner as may be specified by regulations.
(3) On receipt of any request under sub-section (1) or sub-section
(2), the Authority may, if it is satisfied, make such alteration as
may be required in the record relating to such Aadhaar number E
holder and intimate such alteration to the concerned Aadhaar
number holder.
(4) No identity information in the Central Identities Data Repository
shall be altered except in the manner provided in this Act or
regulations made in this behalf.” F
Schedule II attached with Aadhar (Enrolment and Update)
Regulations, 2016 provides for the list of documents acceptable for the
purpose of verification of identity when a request for changes is made.
Proof of Identity could be verified on the basis of following documents46:
G
a. Passport;
b. PAN Card;
c. Driving License;

46
List is merely illustrative, not exhaustive. H
1170 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 4 S.C.R.

A d. Voter ID
For proof of date of birth, following documents47 are acceptable:
a. Birth certificate;
b. Passport;
B c. Certificate of date of birth issued by Group A Gazetted Officer
on letterhead.
The UIDAI website also notes why such changes could be
required and we feel it relevant to reproduce the same thus:
“Demographic data update, the need could arise from:
C
• Changes in life events such as marriage may lead to
residents changing their basic demographic details such as
name and address. Address and mobile number could also
change due to migration to newer locations. Residents may
also want changes in their relative’s details due to changes in
D
life events such marriage, death of a relative etc. In addition,
residents could have other personal reasons to change their
mobile number, email address etc.
• Changes in various service delivery platforms may lead residents
to declaration request changes and to add mobile number to CIDR
E etc.
• Errors made during the enrolment process wherein the resident’s
demographic data may have been captured incorrectly. Changes
to “DoB/Age” and “Gender” fields are expected primarily due to
enrolment errors.
F
• Since a resident can enrol anywhere in India, it may happen that
a native speaker of language “A” is enrolled by an operator of
language “B” and consequently the resident’s local language of
enrolment is “B”. Later, the resident may want to change the
local language of enrolment to another that he/she prefers. If so,
G then all the demographic information that is printed on the Aadhaar
letter will need to be updated in the new local language.
• UIDAI may also ascertain availability of POI, POA and other
documents collected at the time of enrolment/update and its quality
47
H List is merely illustrative, not exhaustive.
JIGYA YADAV (MINOR) (THROUGH GUARDIAN/FATHER 1171
HARI SINGH) v. C.B.S.E. (CBSE) [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

and decide to notify resident to update their demographic A
information and submit the required document.”
(emphasis supplied)
Apart from changes required due to marriage, migration, death
etc., the authority takes into account the need for permitting changes
due to “personal reasons”. The underlying idea is to ensure accuracy of B
record whilst ensuring free exercise of control by an individual over her
identity.
135. Similarly, Section 24 of the Passports Act, 1967 read with
the Passport Rules, 1980 permit change of name and date of birth on the
basis of certain documents. The Ministry of External Affairs48 permits C
change of name and other information, including signature, of the passport
holder as a part of its passport services. It allows change of name under
three categories:
“Change of name may be allowed to the applicant in the
following events: D
1. Following marriage, divorce or Remarriage or
2. Adding surname (childhood to adulthood) or
3. Change of complete name.”
It permits such changes on the basis of certain documents which E
are listed as:
“Documents required
(i) Prescribed Deed Poll
(ii) Original newspaper cutting announcing the change of name F
published in two leading daily newspapers (in the areas of residence
& permanent residence) – in Indian & local Newspaper
(iii) The applicant has to furnish a Sworn Affidavit(s) for the
purpose quoting the reason for name change.”
G
The Ministry also permits change in signature on the Passport
upon fulfilment of certain conditions which read thus:

48
for short, “MoEA” H
1172 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 4 S.C.R.

A “Change of Signature
For changing signature in the passport, application for new passport
has to be made and the applicant must append his / her old signature
along with new signature on the second page of the passport
application form along with the following documents.
B Requirements:
1. Application form should be completely filled in and signed.
2. 4 (four) passport size (35 mm x 45 mm) identical photographs
showing frontal view of full face with white background.
C 3. The current passport having valid visa or residence permit is
required to be enclosed. In case the latest passport is additional
booklet(s) issued to the original passport, the additional booklet(s)
plus the original passport must be furnished.”
Furthermore, the Ministry also permits change of appearance in
D its records if it has changed significantly over time, thus:
“Change in appearance
If your appearance has changed significantly since your last
passport was made, you can apply for a fresh passport with a
recent photograph.”
E
136. What emerges from the above analysis is that the
government(s) is cognizant of its duty to upgrade its identity records in
tune with changing requirements of the citizens. From reasons purely
personal to reasons flowing from life events such as marriage, death or
migration, the authorities are responsive to the changing needs of citizens.
F As per the nature of identity, changes are permissible. In light of the
clear dicta in National Legal Services Authority 49 and K.S.
Puttaswamy50, it is bounden duty of all state instrumentalities to play
the role of enablers in the exercise of rights by the citizens, including to
correct their records owing to purely personal choices of the citizens.
G For instance, “gender” is an evolving concept which could warrant
changes in identity documents. In such cases, too much insistence on
disclosure of reasons could be invasive to privacy. Though, in an ultimate

49
supra at Footnote No.34
50
H supra at Footnote No.36
JIGYA YADAV (MINOR) (THROUGH GUARDIAN/FATHER 1173
HARI SINGH) v. C.B.S.E. (CBSE) [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

analysis, this exercise of examining the reasons has to be left to the A
court of law empowered to permit changes in a specific factual scenario.
137. No doubt, it is true that CBSE certificates are not strictly
meant to be considered as identity documents, however, the same are
being relied upon for corroborative purposes in all academic and career
related transactions as foundational document. In fact, the CBSE itself B
has conceded to this fact that their certificates are relied for all official
purposes, as noted above. The date of birth in matriculation certificate,
in particular, is relied upon as primary evidence of date of birth of a
citizen. Therefore, as regards the information contained in a CBSE
certificate, the Board must afford opportunity to the students to modify
it subject to complying with requisite formalities which are reasonable in C
nature. If all other State agencies could allow it for the preservance of
consistency and accuracy, alongside being enablers in free exercise of
rights by the citizens, there is no reason for the CBSE to not uphold that
right of the students. More so, it would be in the interest of CBSE’s own
credibility that their records are regarded as accurate and latest records D
of a student worthy of being relied upon for official purposes. Therefore,
this approach would serve twin purposes – enabling free exercise of
rights and preservance of accuracy.
138. We must, however, note that the justiciability of the requested
changes can of course be gone into. Every agency has its own method E
of verification while accepting or rejecting changes in their records. For
instance, some agencies use sworn affidavits for carrying out changes,
some agencies require prior permission by a court of law. The CBSE
itself uses the same mechanism – prior permission by court of law and
publication in official gazette. We may discuss the relevance of prior
permission by court in deciding the questions of justiciability and F
genuineness of requested changes at a later stage.
139. Law gives no recognition to an act of shunning essential
duties by an entity of the State. There is a settled body of cases which
expounds that a body entrusted with essential public functions cannot
unduly put fetters on its powers. In Indian Aluminium Company51, G
this Court noted the proposition thus:
“12. This case was followed by Russell. J. in York Corporation v.
Henry Leetham & Sons Ltd.52. There, the plaintiff-corporation
51
supra at Footnote No.6
52
(1924) 1 Ch 557 H
1174 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 4 S.C.R.

A was entrusted by statute with the control of navigation in part of
the rivers Ouse and Fose with power to charge such tolls within
limits, as the corporation deemed necessary to carry on the two
navigations in which the public had an interest. The corporation
made two contracts with the defendants under which they agreed
to accept, in consideration of the right to navigate the Ouse, a
B
regular annual payment of £600 per annum in place of the
authorised tolls. The contract in regard to navigation of the Fose
was on similar lines. It was held by Russell, J. that the contracts
were ultra vires and void because under them the corporation had
disabled itself, whatever emergency might arise, from exercising
C its statutory powers to increase tolls as from time to time might be
necessary. The learned Judge, after citing Ayr Harbour’s case53
and another case Straffordshire and Worcestershire Canal
Navigation v. Birmingham Canal Navigation54 observed:
The same principle underlies many other cases which show
D the incapacity of a body charged with statutory powers for
public purposes to divest itself of such powers or to fetter
itself in the use of such powers.
13. Finally Lord Parker, C.J. said in Southend-on-Sea Corporation
v. Hodgson (Wickford) Ltd.55:
E There is a long line of cases to which we have not been
specifically referred which lay down that a public authority
cannot by contract fetter the exercise of its discretion.”
(emphasis supplied)

F Similar proposition is enunciated in J.K. Aggarwal56 In the context
of CBSE, the Delhi High Court in Dhruva Parate57 noted how CBSE
has created self-imposed restrictions in its Byelaws by permitting no
change of name. The Court deprecated this exercise of discretion and
noted thus:
“8. The interests of efficiency of an organization ordinarily
G
determine the guidelines that have to be administered; yet when
53
(1883) 8 App 623
54
1866 LR 1 HL 254
55
1961 2 All ER 46
56
supra at Footnote No.7
H 57
supra at Footnote No.4
JIGYA YADAV (MINOR) (THROUGH GUARDIAN/FATHER 1175
HARI SINGH) v. C.B.S.E. (CBSE) [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

they constrain the authorities of the organization, which is meant A
to sub-serve the general public, from doing justice, in individual
cases, the guidelines become self-defeating. In such cases, as in
the present one, the end result would mean that the petitioner
would be left with two certificates with different names and a
whole lifetime spent possibly on explaining the difference – hardly
B
conducive to him, reflecting the inadequacy in the system.”
In light of the above discussion, we must note that there are no
restrictions on the power of CBSE to permit change of name. The
Constitution, Resolution and Regulations are functional documents of
the Board and none of these documents provide for any such fetters.
Therefore, in the exercise of its discretion, the Board cannot put fetters C
on its duties so as to cause grave prejudice to the students with legitimate
causes for changing their certificates. The exercise of discretion in this
negative manner would be arbitrary and unreasonable, at best.
140. We, thus, hold that the provision regarding change of name
“post publication of examination results” is excessively restrictive and D
imposes unreasonable restrictions on the exercise of rights under Article
19. We make it clear that the provision for change of name is clearly
severable from those for corrections in name/date of birth and therefore,
our determination shall not affect them except as regards the condition
of limitation period, in terms of the aforesaid discussion and guidelines E
stated later.
141. Let us now understand the journey of examination byelaws
from 1995 to 2018, as they sailed through multiple amendments over the
course of time.
142. We may begin with Byelaws which were in force upto 2007 F
i.e., upto the 2007 amendment. Byelaw 69 dealt with “Changes in Board’s
Certificate” wherein Byelaw 69.1 covered “Changes and Corrections
in Name” and 69.2 covered “Change/Correction in Date of Birth”. On
an understanding of the language adopted in the Byelaws, we must note
at the very outset that the terms “correction” and “change” are not used G
interchangeably in the Byelaws. Whereas, the term “correction” denotes
spelling errors, factual errors or typographical errors and the term
“change” denotes a complete change of name. For ready reference, a
summary of the development of Examination Byelaws can be tabulated
as follows:
H
1176 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 4 S.C.R.

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H
JIGYA YADAV (MINOR) (THROUGH GUARDIAN/FATHER 1177
HARI SINGH) v. C.B.S.E. (CBSE) [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

143. The aforesaid table depicts that there is hardly any consistency A
in the Examination Byelaws operating during the relevant period, either
in the scope of permissible changes or in the timelines provided for
effecting such changes. Presumably, drawing upon experiences and
judicial pronouncements, the Board had to carry out frequent amendments
in the Byelaws, sometimes to do a somersault and go back to the earlier
B
position. By and large, the impression gathered from the above tabular
analysis is that the Board has been groping in the dark without having an
all-purpose long term objective policy in place as regards permissible
changes.
EXAMINATION OF VALIDITY OF BYELAWS
C
144. At the outset, we note that there are certain characteristics
of changes that students usually apply for being recorded in their
certificates. Change of name of the student/father/mother, correction in
name of the student/father/mother and correction in date of birth are the
primary ones. All these changes cannot be weighed with the same scale.
Even in the Byelaws, all these changes are not subjected to the same set D
of restrictions/conditions and different changes are circumscribed by
different conditions.
145. The conditions regarding “correction” in name or date of
birth are not as stringent as conditions applicable to change thereof. For
correction in name, the 2018 Byelaws provide for a limitation period of E
five years and permit such corrections that can be characterized as
typographical, factual or spelling mistake in comparison with school
records. Understandably, a correction would mean retention of the original
record with slight modification to make it consistent with the school
records. This requirement of modification could be born out of various F
reasons, namely typographical mistake at the time of publishing, spelling
error or factual error i.e., an error of fact as it existed at the time when
the certificate was published. Thus, correction in name is done to bring
unanimity between the school records (as they existed at the time of
sending information to the Board) and CBSE certificates. However, if
school records are altered afterwards and Board is called upon to alter G
its certificates in light of the updated school records, the same cannot be
termed as correction per se but would be in the nature of recording
change. Therefore, substantially deviating from a “correction”, the
Byelaws provide for an option to “change” the name, which is subject to
different conditions. H
1178 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 4 S.C.R.

A 146. Similar provision is available for “correction” in date of birth,
either on the basis of school records or on the basis of order of court.
The word “change” is not used for date of birth as, unlike name, there
can only be one date of birth and there can only be a correction to make
it consistent with school record or order of Court. It cannot be changed
to replace the former with a fresh date of one’s choice. Be it noted,
B
provisions relating to correction in date of birth and name are just and
reasonable and do not impose any unreasonable restriction on
permissibility of corrections. The restriction regarding limitation period
shall be examined later, along with other provisions.
147. The provision for “change” of name is far more stringent
C and calls for a thorough review to settle the correct position. As per the
present law, change of name is permissible upon fulfilment of two prior
conditions – prior permission of the Court of law and publication of the
proposed change in official gazette. These conditions co-exist with
another condition predicating that both prior permission and publication
D must be done before the publication of result. What it effectively means
is that change of name would simply be impermissible after the publication
of result of the candidate even if the same is permitted by a Court of law
and published in official gazette. In other words, once the examination
result of the candidate has been published, the Board would only permit
corrections in name mentioned in the certificate. Further, changing the
E name out of freewill is simply ruled out.
148. Notably, the cases before us pertain to different periods. As
aforesaid, the CBSE byelaws which existed prior to 2007 were different.
The summary of the journey of the examination byelaws from 2007 till
2018 has been tabulated hitherto. The distinction between “correction”
F and “change” was always well-demarcated including prior to 2007. As
regards the correction which could mean to carry out modification to
make it consistent with school record but when it came to request for
change of name of the candidate or his parents, that could be done only
after complying with the pre-conditions specified therefor. However,
G when it came to change in the date of birth that was completely prohibited.
Only correction regarding date of birth was permitted to be made
consistent with the school record. And for which limitation of two years
from declaration of result was specified. The requirement of two years
cannot be considered as unreasonable restriction. The candidate and his
parents are expected to be vigilant and to take remedial measures
H
JIGYA YADAV (MINOR) (THROUGH GUARDIAN/FATHER 1179
HARI SINGH) v. C.B.S.E. (CBSE) [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

immediately after declaration of result of the candidate. That too for A
being made consistent with school record. The Board must follow the
discipline of continuation of entries in the school record as it is vital for
pursuing further and higher education including career opportunities by
the candidate. Significantly, the position as obtained prior to 2007 did not
provide for any time limit within which correction of candidate’s name
B
or of his parents was to be pursued. These restrictions are certainly
reasonable restrictions while recognising the enabling power of the Board
to alter its record in the form of certificates issued to the candidate
concerned to make it consistent with the school records or otherwise.
149. Suffice it to observe that frequent amendments in the Byelaws
have been made providing for different dispensations for the relevant C
period. For the nature of final directions that we propose to issue, it may
not be necessary to dilate on the validity of the concerned Byelaw as
amended from time to time. Broadly, it can be noted that the Byelaw
recognises two different dispensations. First is to carry out modifications
in the original certificate on request for making it consistent with the D
school records of the incumbent. The second is to incorporate particulars
in the original certificate which are different from the school records.
150. Indisputably, the candidate would pursue further education
and explore future career opportunities on the basis of school records
including the CBSE Board. The CBSE maintains its official records in E
respect of candidate on the basis of foundational documents being the
school records. Therefore, the CBSE is obliged to carry out all necessary
corrections to ensure that CBSE certificate is consistent with the relevant
information furnished in the school records as it existed at the relevant
time and future changes thereto including after the publication of results
by the CBSE. However, when it comes to recording any information in F
the original certificate issued by the CBSE which is not consistent with
the school records, it is essential that the CBSE must insist for supporting
public document which has presumptive value and in the given case
declaration by a Court of law to incorporate such a change. In that
regard, the CBSE can insist for additional conditions to reassure itself G
and safeguard its interest against any claim by a third party/body because
of changes incorporated by it pursuant to application made by the
candidate. In the concluding paragraph, we intend to issue directions to
the CBSE Board in light of the discussion in this judgment. For the nature
of uniform directions that we propose to issue so as to obviate any
H
1180 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 4 S.C.R.

A inconsistent approach in the cases under consideration including future
cases to be dealt with by the CBSE Board, it is not necessary for us to
dilate on the question of validity of the respective amendments in the
relevant Byelaws effected from time to time.
Point No. 3
B BINDING VALUE OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS
151. Whether CBSE is obliged to effect changes in the certificates
issued by it upon production of updated public documents (other than
school records), is the next issue for consideration. According to the
Board, it would not be permissible as it has no independent mechanism
C to verify the genuineness of the public documents. Even under the
Byelaws, there is no requirement for the Board to verify the genuineness
of the documents. It is simply not the job of the Board.
152. The Byelaws provide for a two-tier mechanism for recording
change of name or other details (as indicated above). One of them is
D prior permission or declaration by a Court of law to be obtained. As
regards public documents like Birth Certificate, Official Gazette, Aadhaar
Card, Election Card, etc., the same enjoy legal presumption of its
correctness in terms of explicit provisions contained in Chapter V of the
1872 Act. The 1872 Act extends such presumption in terms of Section
E 76 read with Sections 79 and 80 of the 1872 Act and as in the case of
Official Gazette under Section 81 of the same Act. Even other legislations
concerning public documents attach equal importance to the authenticity
of such documents including while making changes in their certificates
to which we have alluded to in this judgment. Understood thus, there is
no reason for the CBSE Board to not take notice of the public documents
F relied upon by the candidate and to record change on that basis in the
certificate issued by it, for being consistent with the relied upon public
documents. It matters not if the information furnished in the public
documents is not entirely consistent with the school records of the
incumbent. The CBSE while accepting those documents as foundational
G documents for effecting changes consistent therewith may insist for
additional conditions and at the same time while retaining the original
entry make note in the form of caption/annotation in the fresh certificate
to be issued by it while calling upon the incumbent to surrender the
original certificate issued by it to avoid any misuse thereof at a later
point of time. It would be permissible for the CBSE to insist for a sworn
H
JIGYA YADAV (MINOR) (THROUGH GUARDIAN/FATHER 1181
HARI SINGH) v. C.B.S.E. (CBSE) [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

affidavit to be given by the incumbent making necessary declaration and A
also to indemnify the CBSE. The fresh certificate to be issued by the
CBSE may also contain disclaimer of the Board clearly mentioning that
change has been effected at the behest of the incumbent in light of the
public documents relied upon by him. In addition, the incumbent can be
called upon to notify about the change in the Official Gazette and by
B
giving public notice as precondition for recording the change by way of
abundant precaution.
153. This Court in CIDCO vs. Vasudha Gorakhnath
Mandevlekar58, has observed that the records maintained by statutory
authorities have a presumption of correctness in their favour and they
would prevail over any entry made in the school register. The Court C
observed thus:
“18. The deaths and births register maintained by the statutory
authorities raises a presumption of correctness. Such entries made
in the statutory registers are admissible in evidence in terms of
Section 35 of the Evidence Act. It would prevail over an entry D
made in the school register, particularly, in absence of any proof
that same was recorded at the instance of the guardian of the
respondent. (See Birad Mal Singhvi v. Anand Purohit59.)”
The same position of law can be extended to the mandate laid
down in Right to Education Act and Chapter-3 of the CBSE Byelaws E
relating to admission of students. Byelaw 6.1 is instructive and relevant
extract thereof reads thus:
“6. Admission: General Conditions:
6.1 (a) A student seeking admission to any class in a ‘School’ will F
be eligible for admission to that Class only if he:
....
....
(iv) produces:
G
...
(c) For the purposes of admission to elementary education, the
age of a child shall be determined on the basis of the birth certificate
58
(2009) 7 SCC 283
59
AIR 1988 SC 1796 H
1182 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 4 S.C.R.

A issued in accordance with the provisions of the Births, Deaths
and Marriages Registration Act, 1886 or on the basis of such
other document, as may be prescribed, as stipulated in section
14(1) of THE RIGHT OF CHILDREN TO FREE AND
COMPULSORY EDUCATION ACT, 2009.
B (d) No child shall be denied admission in a school for lack of age
proof, as stipulated in section 14(2) of THE RIGHT OF
CHILDREN TO FREE AND COMPULSORY EDUCATION
ACT, 2009.”
Therefore, even at elementary education level, there is a clear
C legislative intent to rely on statutory Birth Certificates for the purpose of
date of birth. The authoritative value of these certificates is duly affirmed
in this scheme.
154. There is no difficulty in correcting CBSE record to bring it in
conformity with the school record. The difficulty arises when a statutory
D document is not consistent with the school record. As observed earlier,
the version supported by statutory documents could be reckoned for the
purpose of correction in CBSE certificate to make it consistent with
public documents.
155. Post 2018 amendment of Byelaws, even in case of date of
E birth, corrections are permitted on two basis – to bring in conformity
with school records and in pursuance of court order. The relevant
provision reads thus:
“A. “Correction as per the school records:
i. Corrections to correct typographical and other errors to make
F the certificate consistent with the school records can be made
provided that corrections in the school records should not have
been made after the submission of application form for admission
to Examination to the Board.
...
G ...
B. Correction as per Court Orders.
Applications regarding correction in date of birth of candidates
will be considered provided the correction have been admitted by
H the Court of law. In cases of correction in date of birth in
JIGYA YADAV (MINOR) (THROUGH GUARDIAN/FATHER 1183
HARI SINGH) v. C.B.S.E. (CBSE) [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

documents after the court orders caption will be mentioned A
on the document “CORRECTION ALLOWED IN DATE
OF BIRTH FROM _______ TO ___ ON (DATED) ____
AS PER COURT ORDER NO. ____ DATED ____.”
156. When a student applies to a Court of law for prior permission
and/or declaration and produces public document(s), the Court would B
enter upon an inquiry wherein the legal presumption would operate in
favour of the public document(s) and burden would shift on the party
opposing the change to rebut the presumption or oppose the claim on
any other ground. The question of genuineness of the document including
its contents would be adjudicated in the same inquiry and the Court of
law would permit the desired change only upon verifying the official C
records and upon being satisfied of its genuineness. At the same time,
the question of justiciability of the requested changes would be considered
and only upon being satisfied with the need demonstrated by the student,
the Court would grant its permission. The said permission can then be
placed before the Board along with copy of publication in the official D
gazette and requisite (prescribed) fee (if any). The Board would then
have no locus to make further enquiry nor would be required to enter
upon any further verification exercise.
157. We may now advert to the dictum of the Kerala High Court
in Subin Mohammed60. The same has been relied upon in most of the E
impugned judgments for permitting corrections. In that decision, the Court
discussed the inadequacies in the Byelaws and issued directions to CBSE
to correct date of birth with reference to statutory Birth Certificates
provided the request is found to be genuine. The operative directions
read thus:
F
“41. Hence, to meet the ends of justice, it will be appropriate for
this Court to dispose the Writ Petitions with the following directions:
(i) That CBSE shall correct the entries in the mark sheet
of the petitioners with reference to their corresponding
birth certificates issued by the statutory authority, if the G
request is found to be genuine.
(ii) Genuineness of the birth certificate can be ascertained from
the respective local/statutory authority/Head of the Institution
or such other method, CBSE may deem it fit.
60
supra at Footnote No.12 H
1184 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 4 S.C.R.

A (iii) CBSE can demand in advance a consolidated fee, including
all expenses for processing such applications.
(iv) Each of the petitioners shall pay 5,000/- (Rupees Five
thousand only) as cost to CBSE within a period of one month.”
(emphasis supplied)
B
Thus, the task of determining genuineness of the request was left
to the CBSE, which not only goes contrary to our discussion above but
also fails to take into account the limitations of CBSE as a body. While
considering requests for changes in certificates, CBSE cannot act as a
court and it cannot effectively consider any request over and above
C those requests that merely require bringing the certificates in conformity
with the school records or public documents, as the case may be.
Point No. 4
158. As noticed in the submissions above, there is a conflict of
D opinion amongst the High Courts as regards the point of time which
would determine the applicability of Byelaws. The frequent amendments
carried out by the CBSE had made it imperative for the courts to grapple
with this question. The immediate question is whether the date of
declaration of result or the date of application for changes would be
determinative of the applicable Byelaws. While addressing this question,
E the Delhi High Court in Kalpana Thakur61 took the view that the Byelaws
existing on the date of application would apply, irrespective of amendment.
This view can be discerned from the following paragraphs of the judgment:
“12.2 In my view, the submission of Mr. Bansal that amended
Bye-laws 69.1(i) would apply, is untenable, for a simple reason
F that the amendment to the said bye-law was notified only on
25.06.2015; a date which falls beyond the date on which the
application for change of name was preferred in the instant case.
The argument advanced in support of this submission by Mr. Bansal
that the Office Order was in place prior to the date of the
application, in my view, will not sustain, as the Office Order, is an
G
internal document, which could have no legal validity till the position
taken therein is put in public realm. The very fact that a notification
in respect of the amended Bye-law was issued by respondent no.

61
H supra at Footnote No. 26
JIGYA YADAV (MINOR) (THROUGH GUARDIAN/FATHER 1185
HARI SINGH) v. C.B.S.E. (CBSE) [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

1/CBSE, would show, that the decision to amend bye-law 69.1(i) A
required a public notice.
12.3 Consequently, all applications for change of name which are
filed prior to notification dated 25.06.2015, will be governed, in
my view, by the unamended Bye-law 69.1(i). Therefore, quite
logically, the petitioners, in my opinion, would have to be given the B
reliefs as sought in the writ petition.”
Notably, the question before the Court was slightly different. It
was only whether the unamended Byelaws would continue to apply if
the application was preferred before the date of amendment.
Nevertheless, the Kerala High Court in Vyshnav62 has taken a different C
view of the matter and observed that the Byelaws existing on the date
of passing out would apply. It observed thus:
“5. On an analysis of the said rule and amended provision it is
evident that, the first respondent relied on an incorrect provision
in order to non-suit the petitioner by rejecting the applications D
submitted for change of name. Therefore, Exts.P7 and P9 cannot
be sustained under law, since the same is violative of the rule
provided for the purpose. Petitioner has passed out in the year
2013 and therefore, the law as it stood then has to be taken in to
account, since there is no retrospective operation to the amendment.
Therefore, I quash Exts.P7 and P9, and direct the first respondent E
to re-consider the application submitted by the petitioner based on
Rule 69(1(i), as it stood before as is specified above.”
159. Considered in the context of the Byelaws, the controversy is
actually simple in nature. The Byelaws consistently provide that the period
of limitation is to be calculated from the date of declaration of the result F
and issue of certificate. It means that the period of limitation begins to
run against the student after declaration of result and publication of
certificates as the student is put to notice of the contents of the document,
upon its issue. The student can now be said to be in a position to verify
the correctness of the certificate(s). The irresistible outcome of this G
legal position is that the Byelaws existing on the date of such declaration/
publication of result and issue of certificate would be relevant for the
purpose of effecting changes in the certificates. The express language
of the Byelaws would be defeated if we say that the law existing on the
62
supra at Footnote No. 27 H
1186 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 4 S.C.R.

A date of application for recording change would be relevant. That would
negate the very importance of having a period of limitation for correction
of the certificates.
160. If the limitation of applicability of Byelaws was to be reckoned
from the date of application for correction/change and not the date of
B result of the examination conducted by CBSE, we would be leaving
things to a state of uncertainty. For, a student who could possibly have
surpassed the limitation period under unamended Byelaws would regain
the right to change the certificates if the Byelaws existing on the date of
application permit so and provide for a longer period. Similarly, a student
who had ten years for carrying out changes under the unamended
C Byelaws would lose her right if Byelaws are amended within the ten-
year period so as to provide for a much shorter, say two years, limitation
period. Certainty, consistency and predictability are the hallmarks of any
legal relationship and it is in the interest of public policy that legal
interpretation preserves and protects these hallmarks. This determination,
D however, is only to state the legal position and may not have any immediate
bearing on the cases before us.
161. The CBSE also advanced an argument that no changes can
be permitted in its records as there is no fundamental right to claim that
changed records be operative since birth and any change must only be
E prospective and not retrospective. The crux of the argument can be
traced from paragraph 23 of Rayaan Chawla63 which has been relied
upon to buttress this submission. It reads thus:
“23. The legal position that would follow from the above conspectus
of the judgments noted and cited by the learned Counsel for the
F parties is that normally a person would have a right to have his
name changed subject to fulfilment of appropriate formalities/
procedures to ensure that there is no misuse or confusion created
on account of the change in name. The change of name is
prospective. ...”

G Though a well-meaning argument advanced to minimise the
possibility of misuse, we are not inclined to accept it as something that
could turn the case. The court, in Rayaan Chawla64, accepted that
expression of one’s name in the manner of their choice is indeed a

63
supra at Footnote No.8
64
H supra at Footnote No.8
JIGYA YADAV (MINOR) (THROUGH GUARDIAN/FATHER 1187
HARI SINGH) v. C.B.S.E. (CBSE) [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

fundamental right under Article 19(1)(a), but held that the right is A
prospective and does not extend to permitting changes in the documents
already issued by the Board. It is pertinent to note that once changes are
permitted in the documents of CBSE, it does not ipso facto mean that
the changes are given a retrospective effect. The changes are indeed
prospective and to signify that a remedial measure is provided in the
B
Byelaws, as existing presently. They provide for the requirement of adding
a caption/annotation with the date of such change along with the changed
particulars so as to indicate within the certificate that the changes have
been made on a date subsequent to the date of publishing the certificates.
The requirement of caption/annotation is indeed a sufficient safeguard
to prevent the usage of subsequently altered documents as unchanged C
original records.
Point No. 5
ISSUANCE OF MANDAMUS IN CONTRAVENTION OF
BYELAWS
D
162. The next issue for consideration is whether it is proper for
the High Courts to issue mandamus to the CBSE for correction of
certificates in complete contravention of the Byelaws, without examining
the validity of the Byelaws. For issuing such directions, reliance has
been placed upon Subin Mohammed65, wherein the Court noted that
the case does not involve correction of a typographical nature, as E
permissible in the Byelaws, but went on to uphold the right of the student
to apply for changes on the basis of statutory certificate. It observed
thus:
“35. Therefore, we have to proceed on the basis that the bye law
of CBSE cannot be applied to the fact situation. But to reconcile F
the date of birth entry in the mark sheet with that of the entry in
the statutory certificate, the candidates should not be left without
any remedy. Their right to approach the Court for redressing their
grievance cannot be ruled out.”
The court then delineated the principles for issuance of writ of G
mandamus and noted that in the strict sense, a mandamus would not lie
but considering the damage that the student could face as regards his
career prospects, the permission was granted. In paragraph 39, it noted
thus:
65
supra at Footnote No.12 H
1188 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 4 S.C.R.

A “39. It is contended that the future prospects of the petitioners to
study or get employment abroad, will be substantially affected if
the entry of date of birth in the mark sheet does not tally with that
in the birth certificate. Though a writ of mandamus cannot be
issued in the strict sense, we are of the view that, failure to
exercise jurisdiction may put the petitioners to serious
B
hardship. Hence, to render justice, it is always open for the
Court to pass appropriate orders, taking into account the facts
and circumstances of each case. However, if disputed questions
of fact arises, it will not be appropriate for this Court to entertain
the matter.”
C (emphasis supplied)
The law regarding the writ of mandamus is settled. The foremost
requirement for issuance of mandamus is the existence of a legal right
against a body which is either a public body or a non-public body
performing a public function. In Binny Ltd.66, this Court summed up the
D principle thus:
“29. Thus, it can be seen that a writ of mandamus or the remedy
under Article 226 is pre-eminently a public law remedy and is not
generally available as a remedy against private wrongs. It is used
for enforcement of various rights of the public or to compel public/
E statutory authorities to discharge their duties and to act within
their bounds. It may be used to do justice when there is wrongful
exercise of power or a refusal to perform duties. This writ is
admirably equipped to serve as a judicial control over administrative
actions. This writ could also be issued against any private body or
F person, specially in view of the words used in Article 226 of the
Constitution. However, the scope of mandamus is limited to
enforcement of public duty. The scope of mandamus is determined
by the nature of the duty to be enforced, rather than the identity
of the authority against whom it is sought. If the private body is
discharging a public function and the denial of any right is in
G connection with the public duty imposed on such body, the public
law remedy can be enforced. The duty cast on the public body
may be either statutory or otherwise and the source of such power
is immaterial, but, nevertheless, there must be the public law
element in such action. Sometimes, it is difficult to distinguish
H 66
supra at Footnote No.32
JIGYA YADAV (MINOR) (THROUGH GUARDIAN/FATHER 1189
HARI SINGH) v. C.B.S.E. (CBSE) [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

between public law and private law remedies. According to A
Halsbury’s Laws of England, 3rd Edn., Vol. 30, p.682,
“1317. A public authority is a body, not necessarily a county
council, municipal corporation or other local authority, which
has public or statutory duties to perform and which perform
those duties and carries out its transactions for the benefit of B
the public and not for private profit.”
There cannot be any general definition of public authority or public
action. The facts of each case decide the point.”
In the present case, the question is not whether CBSE was
amenable to writ of mandamus or not. For, we have already held the C
Board being a public body is performing a public function. The question
is whether there was an enforceable legal right in favour of students to
seek such a direction and whether Byelaws have the force of law and
directions can be issued by the court only in conformity thereof.
163. The impugned judgments categorically note that the request D
for changes could not be permitted as per the Byelaws. Thus, there was
no demonstration or inquiry to determine the existence of any legal right
in favour of students. Even if we assume that courts issued directions
purely on the basis of fundamental rights, there is no discussion or inquiry
in this regard. More so, there is no attempt to examine the vires of the E
Byelaws in light of the breach of fundamental rights, as discussed in the
initial part of this judgment. Absent any such adverse determination on
the validity of the applicable rules, the fundamental principle of rule of
law demands that such rules be given their intended effect. Even if a
constitutional Court feels that the case at hand is deserving of an
extraordinary remedy, it may do so using its wide powers under Article F
226 but only upon specific appraisal of the facts of the case and after
duly demonstrating the extraordinary character of the case. Despite
holding that the prayers are impermissible under the Byelaws, the Courts
in the present set of cases went on to issue directions to the Board
without having any regard to the factual circumstances of the case or to G
the nature of changes sought by the students, by mechanically relying
upon the dictum in Subin Mohammed67. We must note that Subin
Mohammed68 is not in challenge before us but must be now understood

67
supra at Footnote No.12
68
supra at Footnote No.12 H
1190 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 4 S.C.R.

A in terms of opinion recorded in this judgment. Our concern is with the
manner in which mechanical reliance has been placed upon the earlier
decision for deciding cases which involved an altogether different set of
changes.
164. Once a Court of law notes that the applicable rules do not
B permit it to grant a particular relief and it still goes on to grant the relief
on sympathetic grounds, such decisions can in no way be treated as
precedents. We are constrained to note that following such decision as
precedent will be in utter disregard of the well-established principle of
“equity acts in personam” and, thus, courts cannot deploy equity in
“rem” by replicating the same order, disregarding the personal
C characteristics of the case at hand. There can be no application of Subin
Mohammed69 to a different set of facts.
165. The High Courts, being constitutional Courts, are duly vested
with the power to review any law in light of Part-III. Despite being
called upon to do so, if they choose not to do it, the same cannot be
D countenanced. There cannot be mechanical directions by way of
mandamus to a public authority without going into the veracity of the
claims and without sufficiently explaining why the case demands
extraordinary treatment.
166. In fact, in Md. Sarifuz Zaman70, a two-Judge Bench of this
E Court noted that such exercise of power in itself would be arbitrary. It
observed thus:
“10. ...People, institutions and government departments, etc.
— all attach a very high degree of reliability, near finality, to
the entries made in the certificates issued by the Board. The
F frequent exercise of power to correct entries in certificates
and that too without any limitation on exercise of such power
would render the power itself arbitrary and may result in
eroding the credibility of certificates issued by the Board. We,
therefore, find it difficult to uphold the contention that the applicants
G seeking correction of entries in such certificates have any such
right or vested right.”
(emphasis supplied)

69
supra at Footnote No.12
70
H supra at Footnote No.16
JIGYA YADAV (MINOR) (THROUGH GUARDIAN/FATHER 1191
HARI SINGH) v. C.B.S.E. (CBSE) [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

Thus, the Courts need to be extra cautious and alive to the A
immediate factual position before permitting changes. No two requests
for change of name or change in date of birth can be viewed with the
same judicial eye. Sometimes, change of name could be a necessity,
sometimes it could be a pure exercise of freewill without any need. As
long as Byelaws or the applicable rules permit so, there is no occasion
B
for any court to deny such relief. But when Byelaws do not permit for
the same, the Court must be circumspect before issuing directions, that
too without commenting upon the validity of the Byelaws and without
demonstrating the rights which are at stake – constitutional or legal.
167. Before proceeding further, we must briefly note that the
dictum of this Court in Md. Sarifuz Zaman71 has been relied upon by C
the Board to contend that it prohibits any change in contravention of the
Byelaws as it does not recognize any legal right to claim such changes
beyond the prescribed conditions. It has also been asserted that
Md. Sarifuz Zaman72 and Subin Mohammed73 contradict each other.
Whether the two judgments are in conflict with each other is an D
examination that is not called for. For, we have not placed any reliance
upon Subin Mohammed74 for deciding this case and also because Md.
Sarifuz Zaman 75 is a judgment of this Court as against Subin
Mohammed76 is a judgment of the Kerala High Court. It requires no
reiteration that even if a conflict exists, the judgment of this Court must
prevail under all circumstances unless there is another judgment of larger E
Bench of this Court which takes a different view.
168. Be that as it may, we must examine the dictum of this Court
in Md. Sarifuz Zaman77. The case involved a request for correction of
clerical nature in date of birth to bring it in conformity with the correct
school records. Paragraph 3 notes thus: F

“3. One of the respondents, a student, having taken his education
in Government Boys Higher Secondary School, passed the
matriculation examination conducted by the Board of Secondary
Education, Assam, in the year 1991. Thereafter, he passed higher
71
G
supra at Footnote No.16
72
supra at Footnote No.16
73
supra at Footnote No.12
74
supra at Footnote No.12
75
supra at Footnote No.16
76
supra at Footnote No.12
77
supra at Footnote No.16 H
1192 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 4 S.C.R.

A secondary examination and then BSc examination in the year 1998.
When he filed the writ petition, he was undergoing a course of
study in computers. At that point of time, on 12-10-1999, he moved
an application to the Board complaining that his date of birth was
wrongly mentioned in the school records as 30-5-1974, while his
actual date of birth was 16-8-1975. The mistaken date of birth, as
B
forwarded by the school, had crept into the admit card issued by
the Board. The writ petitioner student pleaded that he did not
realise the importance of the correct date of birth being entered
into the school records, and therefore, he did not also realise the
implications thereof until he was prompted in moving the
C application. The application moved by the respondent to the
Principal of the school, was forwarded by the latter to the Board.
The Principal indicated that the age of the respondent was entered
as 16-8-1975 in the admission register and other school records,
but it was by mistake that while filling the form of the Board
examination, the date of birth was wrongly entered as 30-5-1974.
D
The Principal described the mistake as “clerical” and recommended
for its correction. As the Board did not take any decision on the
application, the respondent filed a writ petition in the High Court.”
The Court was considering the Regulations framed under the
Assam Secondary Education Act, 1961 which provided for a three years’
E period post the declaration of result for effecting corrections in their
certificates. The student approached the Board after the expiry of three
years and thus, the primary question before the Court was only whether
the three years’ period would be enforced as per Regulations or any
relaxation could be given. The Court refused to give any relaxation stating
F that expiry of limitation would extinguish the remedy. In paragraph 12, it
notes thus:
“12. Delay defeats discretion and loss of limitation destroys the
remedy itself. Delay amounting to laches results in benefit of
discretionary power being denied on principles of equity. Loss of
G limitation resulting into depriving of the remedy, is a principle based
on public policy and utility and not equity alone. There ought to be
a limit of time by which human affairs stand settled and uncertainty
is lost. Regulation 8 confers a right on the applicant and a power
coupled with an obligation on the Board to make correction in the
date of birth subject to the ground of wrong calculation or clerical
H
JIGYA YADAV (MINOR) (THROUGH GUARDIAN/FATHER 1193
HARI SINGH) v. C.B.S.E. (CBSE) [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

error being made out. A reasonable procedure has been prescribed A
for processing the application through the Inspector of Schools
who would verify the school records and submit report to the
Board so as to exclude from consideration the claims other than
those permissible within the framework of Regulation 8. Power
to pass order for correction is vested on a high functionary like
B
Secretary of the Board. An inaccuracy creeping in at the stage of
writing the certificates only, though all other prior documents are
correct in all respects, is capable of being corrected within a period
of three years from the date of issuance of certificate.”
It, then, held the three years’ period to be a reasonable time as it
is sufficient time for a student to notice any error in her certificates. C
Paragraph 13 notes thus:
“13. Three-year period provided by the Regulation, is a very
reasonable period. On the very date of issuance of the certificate,
the student concerned is put to notice as to the entries made in the
certificate. Everyone remembers his age and date of birth. The D
student would realise within no time that the date of birth as entered
in the certificate is not correct, if that be so, once the certificate is
placed in his hands. Based on the certificate the applicant would
seek admission elsewhere in an educational institution or might
seek a job or career where he will have to mention his age and E
date of birth. Even if he failed to notice the error on the date of
issuance of the certificate, he would come to know the same
shortly thereafter. Thus, the period of three years, as prescribed
by Regulation 3, is quite reasonable. It is not something like
prescribing a period of limitation for filing a suit. The
prescription of three years is laying down of a dividing line F
before which the power of the Board to make correction ought
to be invoked and beyond which it may not be invoked. Belated
applications, if allowed to be received, may open a Pandora’s
box. Records may not be available and evidence may have been
lost. Such evidence — even convenient evidence — may be G
brought into existence as may defy scrutiny. The prescription of
three years’ bar takes care of all such situations. The provision is
neither illegal nor beyond the purview of Section 24 of the Act
and also cannot be called arbitrary or unreasonable. The applicants
seeking rectification within a period of three years form a class
H
1194 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 4 S.C.R.

A by themselves and such prescription has a reasonable nexus with
the purpose sought to be achieved. No fault can be found therewith
on the anvil of Article 14 of the Constitution.”
It can be noticed that apart from a wholly different factual matrix,
the Court in Md. Sarifuz Zaman78 was dealing with a very narrow
B question of reasonability of the limitation period for correcting clerical
mistakes under the umbrella of a statutory law. The Court had no occasion
to deal with circumstances wherein a person would want to change her
name out of her freewill in exercise of her guaranteed fundamental rights
under the Constitution. The Court was looking at it as a purely civil
transaction and in fact, treated it like one while speaking of how the
C expiry of limitation would entirely bar the remedy. As already observed
above, we reiterate that we see a difference between rights originating
under the civil laws and rights considered to be fundamental under the
Constitution and protected as such. The exercise of a fundamental right
can, at best, be regulated on reasonable grounds but not entirely foreclosed
D without a strong and legitimate purpose. Except that the dictum in Md.
Sarifuz Zaman79 pertains to the specific facts of its case and also
because no prejudice was actually caused to the student in that case
(the changes were anyway permitted), we say no more.
CONCLUSION AND DIRECTIONS TO CBSE
E 169. Although we have discussed the broad issues canvassed
before us, in the ultimate analysis the real dispute requiring resolution is
about the nature of correction or change, as the case may be, permissible
to be carried by the CBSE at the instance of the student including past
student. As noted earlier, broadly, two situations would arise.
F 170. The first is where the incumbent wants “correction” in the
certificate issued by the CBSE to be made consistent with the particulars
mentioned in the school records. As we have held there is no reason for
the CBSE to turn down such request or attach any precondition except
reasonable period of limitation and keeping in mind the period for which
G the CBSE has to maintain its record under the extant regulations. While
doing so, it can certainly insist for compliance of other conditions by the
incumbent, such as, to file sworn affidavit making necessary declaration
and to indemnify the CBSE from any claim against it by third party

78
supra at Footnote No.16
79
H supra at Footnote No.16
JIGYA YADAV (MINOR) (THROUGH GUARDIAN/FATHER 1195
HARI SINGH) v. C.B.S.E. (CBSE) [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

because of such correction. The CBSE would be justified in insisting for A
surrender/return of the original certificate (or duplicate original certificate,
as the case may be) issued by it for replacing it with the fresh certificate
to be issued after carrying out necessary corrections with caption/
annotation against the changes carried out and the date of such correction.
It may retain the original entries as it is except in respect of correction of
B
name effected in exercise of right to be forgotten. The fresh certificate
may also contain disclaimer that the CBSE cannot be held responsible
for the genuineness of the school records produced by the incumbent in
support of the request to record correction in the original CBSE
certificate. The CBSE can also insist for reasonable prescribed fees to
be paid by the incumbent in lieu of administrative expenses for issuing C
fresh certificate. At the same time, the CBSE cannot impose precondition
of applying for correction consistent with the school records only before
publication of results. Such a condition, as we have held, would be
unreasonable and excessive. We repeat that if the application for
recording correction is based on the school records as it obtained at the
D
time of publication of results and issue of certificate by the CBSE, it will
be open to CBSE to provide for reasonable limitation period within which
the application for recording correction in certificate issued by it may be
entertained by it. However, if the request for recording change is based
on changed school records post the publication of results and issue of
certificate by the CBSE, the candidate would be entitled to apply for E
recording such a change within the reasonable limitation period prescribed
by the CBSE. In this situation, the candidate cannot claim that she had
no knowledge about the change recorded in the school records because
such a change would occur obviously at her instance. If she makes such
application for correction of the school records, she is expected to apply
F
to the CBSE immediately after the school records are modified and
which ought to be done within a reasonable time. Indeed, it would be
open to the CBSE to reject the application in the event the period for
preservation of official records under the extant regulations had expired
and no record of the candidate concerned is traceable or can be
reconstructed. In the case of subsequent amendment of school records, G
that may occur due to different reasons including because of choice
exercised by the candidate regarding change of name. To put it differently,
request for recording of correction in the certificate issued by the CBSE
to bring it in line with the school records of the incumbent need not be
limited to application made prior to publication of examination results of
the CBSE. H
1196 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 4 S.C.R.

A 171. As regards request for “change” of particulars in the
certificate issued by the CBSE, it presupposes that the particulars intended
to be recorded in the CBSE certificate are not consistent with the school
records. Such a request could be made in two different situations. The
first is on the basis of public documents like Birth Certificate, Aadhaar
Card/Election Card, etc. and to incorporate change in the CBSE certificate
B
consistent therewith. The second possibility is when the request for
change is due to the acquired name by choice at a later point of time.
That change need not be backed by public documents pertaining to the
candidate.
(a) Reverting to the first category, as noted earlier, there is a
C legal presumption in relation to the public documents as envisaged in the
1872 Act. Such public documents, therefore, cannot be ignored by the
CBSE. Taking note of those documents, the CBSE may entertain the
request for recording change in the certificate issued by it. This, however,
need not be unconditional, but subject to certain reasonable conditions to
D be fulfilled by the applicant as may be prescribed by the CBSE, such as,
of furnishing sworn affidavit containing declaration and to indemnify the
CBSE and upon payment of prescribed fees in lieu of administrative
expenses. The CBSE may also insist for issuing Public Notice and
publication in the Official Gazette before recording the change in the
fresh certificate to be issued by it upon surrender/return of the original
E certificate (or duplicate original certificate, as the case may be) by the
applicant. The fresh certificate may contain disclaimer and caption/
annotation against the original entry (except in respect of change of
name effected in exercise of right to be forgotten) indicating the date on
which change has been recorded and the basis thereof. In other words,
F the fresh certificate may retain original particulars while recording the
change along with caption/annotation referred to above (except in respect
of change of name effected in exercise of right to be forgotten).
(b) However, in the latter situation where the change is to be
effected on the basis of new acquired name without any supporting
G school record or public document, that request may be entertained upon
insisting for prior permission/declaration by a Court of law in that regard
and publication in the Official Gazette including surrender/return of original
certificate (or duplicate original certificate, as the case may be) issued
by CBSE and upon payment of prescribed fees. The fresh certificate as
in other situations referred to above, retain the original entry (except in
H
JIGYA YADAV (MINOR) (THROUGH GUARDIAN/FATHER 1197
HARI SINGH) v. C.B.S.E. (CBSE) [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

respect of change of name effected in exercise of right to be forgotten) A
and to insert caption/annotation indicating the date on which it has been
recorded and other details including disclaimer of CBSE. This is so
because the CBSE is not required to adjudicate nor has the mechanism
to verify the correctness of the claim of the applicant.
172. In light of the above, in exercise of our plenary jurisdiction, B
we direct the CBSE to process the applications for correction or change,
as the case may be, in the certificate issued by it in the respective cases
under consideration. Even other pending applications and future
applications for such request be processed on the same lines and in
particular the conclusion and directions recorded hitherto in paragraphs
170 and 171, as may be applicable, until amendment of relevant Byelaws. C
Additionally, the CBSE shall take immediate steps to amend its relevant
Byelaws so as to incorporate the stated mechanism for recording
correction or change, as the case may be, in the certificates already
issued or to be issued by it.
173. Accordingly, we dispose of the cases before us with directions D
to the CBSE as noted in paragraphs 170 to 172 above. No order as to
costs.

Devika Gujral Directions issued.
E

F

G

H