Supreme Court of India
JAYASEELANversusSTATE OF TAMIL NADU
- Citation
- 2009 INSC 149
- Decided
- 11 February 2009
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Bench
- ARIJIT PASAYAT
Holding
The High Court was correctly justified in setting aside the trial court's acquittal and upholding the conviction.
Summary
The appellant, A1, was convicted of murder under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC for stabbing the deceased. The trial court acquitted him, citing an alleged delay in lodging the FIR and an unexplained injury on the accused. The Madras High Court set aside the acquittal, held that the FIR was lodged within a reasonable time and that the injury was minor, and imposed a life sentence. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether the delay and the injury could justify acquittal and whether the doctrine of falsus in uno falsus omnibus could be invoked to discard the entire prosecution case. The Court affirmed that there was no undue delay, the injury was superficial, and the maxim has no statutory force in Indian law, thus upholding the High Court's decision. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed and the conviction affirmed.
Issues considered
- Whether a delay in lodging the FIR can be a ground for acquittal.
- Whether an unexplained injury on the accused undermines the prosecution's case.
- Whether the principle of falsus in uno falsus omnibus can be applied to reject the entire body of evidence.
- Whether the High Court was justified in setting aside the trial court's acquittal.
Legislation cited
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 302, s. 34
Subjects
murderIPC s.302delay in FIRfalsus in uno falsus omnibusevidence evaluationconvictionlife imprisonmentappellate review
Judgment
(2009) 3 S.C.R. 200
JAYASEELAN
.
A
v.
STATE OF TAMIL NADU
(Criminal Appeal No. 456 of 2002)
FEBRUARY 11, 2009
B
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT AND ASOK KUMAR
GANGULY, JJ.]
...
Penal Code, 1860: s.302 - Acquittal by trial Court, set
c aside by High Court - Conviction challenged - Held: High
Court rightly interfered with the order of trial Court - There was
no delay in lodging FIR as rightly noted by High Court in view
of factual scenario highlighted - Additionally injuries on
accused were of minor nature and superficial -- Principle of
•
D 'falsus in uno falsus in omnibus' would not be applicable.
Trial court directed acquittal of the two accused on
the ground that there was delay in lodging the FIR and
that the injury on the accused was not explained. High
court did not accept the reasoning of trial court and
E imposed life imprisonment after recording that accused
was guilty of offence punishable under s.302 IPC.
In appeal to this court, appellant-accused contended ,
that there was unexplained delay in lodging the FIR; the
F injuries on the appellant were not explained and also
prayer was made to apply the principle of 'falsus in uno
falsus in omnibus'.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
G HELD: 1. High Court rightly interfered with the
t
judgment of trial Court. [Para 6] [208-D]
2. There was no delay in lodging the FIR as rightly
noted by the High Court in view of the factual scenario
H 200
JAYASEELAN v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU 201
..._
highlighted. Additionally, the injuries on the accused A
were of very minor nature and superficial. [Paras 4 and
6] [206-C]
3.1. The prayer to apply the principle of "falsus in uno
fa/sus in omnibus" (false in one thing, false in everything) B
. .
is clearly untenable. Even if major portion of evidence is
found to be deficient, in case residue is sufficient to prove
guilt of an accused, his conviction can be maintained.
Falsity of material particular would not ruin it from the
beginning to end. The maxim "falsus in uno falsus in
omnibus" has no application in India and the witness or
c
witnesses cannot be branded as liar(s). It is merely a rule
of caution. All that it amounts to, is that in such cases
testimony may be disregarded, and not that it must be
-- , } disregarded. The doctrine merely involves the question
of weight of evidence which a Court may apply in a given D
set of circumstances, but it is not what may be called 'a
mandatory rule of evidence.' [Para 5] [206-D]
Nisar Alli v. The State of Uttar Pradesh AIR (1957) SC
366 and Gurucharan Singh and Anr. v. State of Punjab AIR E
1956 SC 460, relied on.
,,.
3.2. Normal discrepancies in evidence are those
" which are due to normal errors of observation, normal
.....
-- errors of memory due to lapse of time, due to mental
disposition such as shock and horror at the time of
occurrence and those are always there however honest
F
and truthful a witness may be. Material discrepanci
s are those which are not normal, and not expected of a n
rmal person. Courts have to label the category to which
a discrepancy may be categorized. While normal G
discrepancies do not corrode the credibility of a party's
case, material discrepancies do so. [Para 5] [207-H; 208-
A]
Sohrab s/o Beli Nayata and Anr. v. The State of Madhya H
202 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 3 S.C.R.
.>-
A Pradesh (1972) 3 SCC 751; Ugar Ahir and Ors. v. The State
of Bihar AIR (1965) SC 277; Zwinglee Ariel v. State of Madhya
Pradesh AIR (1954) SC 15; Ba/aka Singh and Ors. v. The
State of Punjab (1975) 4 SCC 511; State of Rajasthan v. Smt
Ka/ki and Anr. (1981) 2 SCC 752; Krishna Machi and Ors. v.
B State of Bihar etc. (2002) 6 SCC 81; Sucha Singh v. State of
Punjab (2003) 7 SCC 643; Zahira H. Sheikh v. State 0 f
Gujarat (2004) 4 SCC 158; Ram Udgar Singh v. State of
Bihar (2004)10 SCC 443; Gorle S. Naidu v. State of Andhra
Pradesh (2003)12 SCC 449; Gubbala Venugopalswamy v.
c State of Andhra Pradesh (2004) 10 SCC 120; Syed Ibrahim
v. State of A.P. (2006) 10 sec 601, relied on.
Case Law Reference:
AIR (1957) SC 366 relied on Para 5
D AIR 1956 SC 460 relied on Para 5
(1972) 3 sec 151 relied on Para 5
AIR (1965) SC 277 relied on Para 5
E AIR (1954) SC 15 relied on Para 5
(1975) 4 sec 511 relied on Para 5
"'
(1981) 2 sec 752 relied on Para 5
(2002) 6 sec 81
F
(2003) 1 sec 643
relied on
relied on
Para 5
Para 5
-
(2004) 4 sec 158 relied on Para 5
(2004)1 o sec 443 relied on Para 5
G
(2003) 12 sec 449 relied on Para 5 t '
(2004) 1o sec 120 relied on Para 5
(2006) 1o sec 601 relied on Para 5
H
JAYASEELAN v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU 203
"'-· CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal A
No.456 of 2002.
From the Judgment and Order dated 15.6.2001 of the High
Court of Judicature in Criminal Appeal No. 44 of 1994.
V.J. Francis, A. Radha Krishnan, Anupam Mishra and B
Vivek Kandari for the Appellant.
S. Thananjayan for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
c
DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. 1. Challenge in this appeal is
to the judgment of a Division Berich of the Madras High Court
allowing the appeal filed by the State. Challenge in the appeal
.. was to the correctness of the judgment of learned Sessions
Judge, Madurai directing acquittal of the present appellant. He D
was charged for commission of offence punishable under
Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code,
1860 (in short the 'IPC'). In fact two persons were tried in the
said Sessions Case. Present appellant is the son of A2. By
the trial court's judgment, A2 was also acquitted. Though State E
had questioned the acquittal of both the accused persons, leave
- ...
was granted by the High Court only in respect of the present
appellant i.e. A 1.
2. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:
F
PW.1 is residing at Paloothu. The deceased Murugan
(hereinafter referred to as the 'deceased') is his sister's son.
PW2 is the younger brother of the deceased. The deceased
was also residing in the same place. PW1 knows the accused.
Al is the son of A2 and they are also residents of the same G
place. The occurrence had taken place on 15.1.1990 around
5.00 p.m. It was a festival day (the day following the festival of
Pongal, which falls on 14.1.1990). On that day, PW 1 went
towards the house of one Chellappa Thevar and he was
H
204 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 3 S.C.R.
A standing there for some time. The house of Chellappa Thevar
is in the middle street of the said village. The deceased was
coming from north to south in that road bringing two bulls. As
already stated, on the day in question, the festival related to
washing the bulls; decorating them; painting the horns and then
B after garlanding the same, they would be taken around the town
in a joyous manner. A2 was coming behind the deceased with
a stick in his hand. He was just swinging the stick around his
body. Al was proceeding from south to north in the same road
and he was armed with a knife. With that knife, he stabbed on
C the left side of the chest of the deceased and ran towards south.
The victim tumbled on his feet in the street. On seeing this,
P.Ws.I and 2 ran towards him and gave their hand of support.
One other person by name Chinnasamy also witnessed the
occurrence and he gave a hot chase to Al. The injured, who by
D then had lost his consciousness, was put on a cart and taken
to the private hospital of one Anbalagan by PWs. 1 and 2. But
the Doctor was not available there and Murugan breathed his
last outside the hospital itself while he was in the cart.
Immediately, PWs. I and 2 reached the police station, taking
the dead body in that cart. PW.6 was the Sub Inspector of
E Police in the Police Station during the relevant time, before
whom, PW 1 gave the complaint. Ex.Pl is that complaint
attested by PW.2 and one Chinnasamy, who accompanied
them. There was an earlier incident regarding the construction
of a house between A2 and the father of the deceased. During
F the occurrence in the present case, the shirt and dhoti of PW.1
became blood stained and the shirt of PW2 also became blood
stained. The personal wearing apparels of PWs. 1 and 2 were
produced at the police station. MOs.I and 2 are the shirt and
dhoti of PW1 and after getting change dress from his house,
G he surrounded them at the police station. M03 is the weapon
of offence in the hands of A1, which he used in inflicting the
fatal injury on the deceased. He was examined during inquest
by the investigating Officer. P.W.2 had also given evidence in
total corroboration to the oral evidence of PW1 on all material
H aspects as referred to above. He stated that, MOs.4 and 5 are
JAYASEELAN v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU 205
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
-~
his shirt and lungi, which he handed over at the Police Station, A
after getting change dress from his house. He was examined
during inquest. PW.3 witnessed the preparation of Ex.P.2/
observation mahazar as well as the recovery of MOs. under Ex
at 7.30 a.m on 16.1.1990.
B
The medical officer was of the opinion that the deceased
appeared to have died on account of the stab wound over the
vital organ, namely heart. The trial court did not accept the
'.
prosecution version and directed acquittal primarily on the
following grounds:
c
(1) There is an inordinate delay in lodging the complaint
with the police:
(2) There are materials to show that the complaint was
~
,, prepared after deliberations and discussions; D
(3) There is delay in sending the material records to the
court;
(4) A 1 had an injury and that had not been explained by
the prosecution, which affects their case in toto. E
The said acquittal was primarily on the ground that there
\ was delay in lodging the FIR, and that the injury on the accused
" was not explained. The High Court found that in view of the
" evidence of PWs 1 & 2 the trial court was not justified in
F
directing acquittal. It was noted that the occurrence had taken
place around 5 PM and immediate concern was to render
medical assistance. The complaint was lodged around 7.30
PM. Further injuries on A 1 were of superficial nature and
' therefore, the trial ccurt was not justified in directing acquittal.
G
~- It was further noted that if there was any delay in the
investigation that was not sufficient to discard credible oral
evidence of P\ Vs. 1 & 2.
Accordingly, the acquittal was set aside and the life
sentence was imposed after recording that the accused was H
206 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 3 S.C.R.
__ ,...-
A guilty of offence punishable under Section 302 IPC.
3. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that there
was unexplained delay in lodging the FIR. The injuries on the
appellant were not explained and in view of the fact that the co-
accused A2 was acquitted on the same set of evidence, the
B
High Court ought not to have allowed the appeal. The evidence
of the eye witnesses cannot be said to be totally without
possibility of false implication. ·<
4. As noted above, there was no delay in lodging the FIR
c as has been rightly noted by the High Court in view of the factual
scenario highlighted. Additionally, the injuries on the accused
were of very minor nature and superficial.
5. Stress was laid by the accused-appellants on the non-
D acceptance of evidence tendered by PW1 to a large extent to
contend about desirability to throw out entire prosecution case.
In essence prayer is to apply the principle of "falsus in uno falsus
in omnibus" (false in one thing, false in everything). This plea
is clearly untenable. Even if major portion of evidence is found
to be deficient, in case residue is sufficient to prove guilt of an
E
accused, his conviction can be maintained. It is the duty of the
Court to separate grain from chaff. Where chaff can be
separated from grain, it would be open to the Court to convict
an accused notwithstanding the fact that evidence has been '
found to be deficient, or to be not wholly credible. Falsity of
F material particular would not ruin it from the beginning to end.
The maxim "falsus in uno falsus in omnibus" has no application
in India and the witness or witnesses cannot be branded as
liar(s). The maxim "falsus in uno falsus in omnibus" has not
received general acceptance nor has this maxim come to
G occupy the status of rule of law. It is merely a rule of caution.
All that it amounts to. is that in such cases testimony may be
disregarded, and not that it must be disregarded. The doctrine
merely involves the question of weight of evidence which a Court
may apply in a given set of circumstances, but it is not what
H may be called 'a mandatory rule of evidence. (See Nisar Alli
JAYASEELAN v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU 207
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
--~ v. The State of Uttar Pradesh [AIR 1957 SC 366]. In a given A
case, it is always open to a Court to differentiate accused who
had been acquitted from those who were convicted where there
are a number of accused persons. (See Gurucharan Singh
and Anr. v. State of Punjab [AIR 1956 SC 460]. The doctrine
is a dangerous one specially in India for if a whole body of the B
testimony were to be rejected, because witness was evidently
speaking an untruth in some aspect, it is to be feared that
• administration of criminal justice would come to a dead-stop.
~-
Witnesses just cannot help in giving embroidery to a story,
however, true in the main. Therefore, it has to be appraised in c
each case as to what extent the evidence is worthy of
acceptance, and merely because in some respects the Court
considers the same to be insufficient for placing reliance on the
testimony of a witness, it does not necessarily follow as a
._ matter of law that it must be disregarded in all respect as well .
D
The evidence has to be shifted with care. The aforesaid dictum
is not a sound rule for the reason that one hardly comes across
a witness whose evidence does not contain a grain of untruth
or at any rate exaggeration, embroideries or embellishment.
(See Sohrab slo Befi Nayata and Anr. v. The State of Madhya
Pradesh [1972 (3) SCC 751] and Ugar Ahir and Ors. v. The
E
State of Bihar [AIR 1965 SC 277]. An attempt has to be made
~
to, as noted above, in terms of felicitous metaphor, separate
"
"
grain from the chaff, truth from falsehood. Where it is not
feasible to separate truth from falsehood, because grain and
chaff are inextricably mixed up, and in the process of separation F
an absolutely new case has to be reconstructed by divorcing
essential details presented by the prosecution completely from
the context and the background against which they are made,
the only available course to be made is to discard the evidence
in toto. (See Zwinglee Ariel v. State of Madhya Pradesh [AIR G
J. 1954 SC 15] and Ba/aka Singh and Ors. v. The State of
Punjab [1975 (4) SCC 511]. As observed by this Court in State
of Rajasthan v. Smt Kalki and Anr. (1981 (2) SCC 752],
normal discrepancies in evidence are those which are due to
normal errors of observation, normal errors of memory due to H
208 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2009] 3 S.C.R.
A lapse of time, due to mental disposition such as shock and
horror at the time of occurrence and those are always there
however honest and truthful a witness may be. Material
discrepancies are those which are not normal, and not expected
of a normal person. Courts have to label the category to which
B a discrepancy may be categorized. While normal discrepancies
do not corrode the credibility of a party's case, material
discrepancies do so. These aspects were highlighted in
Krishna Machi and Ors. v. State of Bihar etc. [2002 (6) SCC
'
81] and in Sucha Singh v. State of Punjab [2003 (7) SCC 643].
C It was further illuminated in the Zahira H. Sheikh v. State of
Gujarat [2004 (4) SCC 158], Ram Udgar Singh v. State of
Bihar [2004(10) SCC 443], Gor/e S. Naidu v. State of Andhra
Pradesh [2003 (12) SCC 449], Gubbala Venugopalswamy v.
State of Andhra Pradesh [2004 (10) SCC 120] and in Syed
D Ibrahim v. State of A.P. (2006(10)SCC 601).
6. Above being the position, the absolutely confusing
judgment of the trial court has been rightly interfered with by the
High Court. We found no substance in this appeal, which is
accordingly dismissed.
D.G. Appeal dismissed.
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