Holding

Section 19(20) is a valid statutory provision, but its retrospective operation from 1 January 2007 is unconstitutional and therefore struck down.

Summary

The case concerned dealers who claimed Input Tax Credit (ITC) under the Tamil Nadu Value Added Tax Act, 2006. The dispute arose when the State amended Section 19 by inserting sub‑section (20), which required reversal of ITC if goods were sold at a price lower than the purchase price shown in the tax invoice. The amendment was given retrospective effect from 1 January 2007, affecting transactions up to 19 August 2010. The dealers argued that the provision was unconstitutional, confiscatory and that the price for ITC should be the net purchase price after discount, not the invoice price. The Supreme Court held that while the new sub‑section (20) is a valid legislative concession, it cannot operate retrospectively because it impairs vested rights accrued during the period in question. Consequently, the amendment’s retrospective operation was struck down, but the provision itself was upheld. The appeals were partially allowed and the amendment act was set aside.

Issues considered

Whether sub‑section (20) of Section 19 of the Tamil Nadu VAT Act, 2006 is constitutionally valid.
Whether the retrospective effect of the amendment (effective from 1 January 2007) violates the dealers' vested rights.
Whether the purchase price for computing ITC is the invoice price or the net price after discount.
Whether dealers have an inherent right to claim ITC or only a statutory concession.

Legislation cited

Tamil Nadu Value Added Tax Act, 2006s. 12, s. 14, s. 15, s. 19, s. 19(10), s. 19(20), s. 2(24), s. 2(36), s. 2(41), s. 3, s. 4, s. 5
Tamil Nadu Value Added Tax (Special Provision) Act, 2010

Subjects

Input Tax CreditRetrospective legislationVested rightsVAT ActSection 19Constitutional validityTax concession

Judgment

[2016) 6 S.C.R. 787

JAYAM & CO. A
v.
ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER & ANR.
(Civil Appeal Nos. 8070-8073of2016)
AUGUST 05, 2016 8

[A.K. SIKRI AND R. F. NARIMAN, JJ.)
Tamil Nadu Value Added Tax Act, 2006: s. 19(20) -
Retrospectivity of, validity - Input Tax Credit - Sub-section (20) of
s.19 is altogether new provision introduced for determining the input c
tax in specified situatio1i, i.e., where goods are sold at a lesser price
than the purchase price of goods - ITC is a form of concession
granted by virtue of s.19 - When a concession is given by a statute.
the legislature has power to make the provision stating the form
and manner in which such concession is to be allowed - Sub-section
(20) seeks to achieve that - There is no right inherent or otherwise D
vested with dealers to claim the benefit of ITC: but for s. 19 of the
Act - Therefore, constitutionality of s.19(20) is upheld - However,
amendment giving retro!>pective effect would seek to take away the
vested right accrued in favour of dealers in respect of purchases
and sales made between 1.1.2007 to 19.8.2010 and is, therefore,
E
struck down.
Partly allowing the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1. Section 19 allows grant-of Input Tax Credit (ITC).
However, ITC is not allowed on all kinds of transactions. On
certain types of sales, no ITC is admissible at all. Nature of those F
sales where ITC is inadmissible is stipulated in sub-sections (5)
to (9) of Section 19. From sub-section (10) onwards, provisions
are made to follow the procedure and fulfill the requisite conditions
for availing ITC. Sub-section (10) which is couched in negative
terms, categorically stipulates that such ITC would be admissible
to the registered dealer and he would not be entitled to claim G
this credit 'until the dealer receives an original tax invoice duly
filled, signed and issued by a registered dealer from where the
goods are purchased ••••.•• '. Further, such original tax invoice
should evidence the amount of input tax. So much so, even if the
H
787
788 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 6 S.C.R.

A original tax invoice is lost, the obligation cast on the, registered
dealer is to obtain duplicate or carbon copy of such tax invoice
from the selling dealer and only tlien input tax is allowed. From
the aforesaid scheme of Section 19 following significant aspects
emerge:- (a) ITC is a form of concession provided by the
Legislature. It is not admissible to all kinds of sales and certain
B
specified sales are spedfically excluded. (b) Concession of ITC
is available on certain conditions mentioned in this Section. (c)
One of the most important conditio,n is that in order to enable
the dealer to claim ITC it has to produce original tax invoice,
completed in all respect, evidencing the amount of input tax.
c [Paras 10, 11)(794-G-H; 799-G-H; 800-A-D)
J

2. It is_ a trite law that whenever concession_ is given by
statute or notification etc. the conditions thereof are to be strictly
complied with in order to avail such concession. Thus, it is µot
the right of the 'dealers' to get the benefit of ITC but its a
D concession g-Faftted by virtue of Section 19. Sub-section 10 makes
original tax invoice relevant for the ,purpose of claiming tax.
Therefore, under the scheme of the VAT Act, it is not permissible
for the dealers to argue that the price as indicated in the tax
invoice should not have been taken into consideration but the
net purchase price after discount is to be the basis. When a
E concession is given by a statute, the Legislature has power to
make the _provision stating the form and manner in which such
concession is to be allowed. Sub-section
c
(20) seeks to achieve
that. There was no right, inherent or otherwise, ,vested with
dealers to . claim the benefit of ITC but for Section 19 of.
the VAT
F Act. That apart, there were valid and cogent reasons for inserting
Section 19(20). Main pur~ort was to protect the Revenue against
clandesti,ne transactions resulting in evasion of tax. [Paras 12
, and 13)(800,D-F, H; 801-A)
3. Sub-section (20) of Section 19 is altogether new provision ·
G introduce,(} for determining the input tax· in sp¢cified situation,
i.e., where goods are sold at a lesser price than the purchase
price of goods. The manner of calculation of the ITC was entirelf
different before this amendment. This is a provision which is
· made for the first 'time to the detriment of the dealers. Such a
provision, therefore, cannot ~ave retrospective effect, more so,
H
JAYAM & CO. v. ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER & ANR. . 789 ·

when vested right had accrued in favour of these dealers in \.' A
respect of purchases and sales made between January 01, 2007
to August 19, 2010. Thu·s, while upholding the vires of sub-
section (20) of Section 19, Amendment Act 22 of 2010 is struck
down. whereby this amendment was given retrospective effect
from January 01, 2007. [Para 18](808-C-F)
B
R.C. Tobacco Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India (2005) 7 SCC
725 : 2005 (3) Suppl. SCR 342; Tata Motors Ltd. v.
State of Maharashtra and Ors. (2004) 5 SCC 783 :
2004 (2) Suppl. SCR 452; Commissioner of Income Tax
· (Central)-~ l,.../t{ew Delhi 1•. Vatika Township Private
Limited (2015) 1 sec 1.: 2014 (12) SCR 1037 - c
referred to.
Case Law Reference
2005 (3) Suppl. SCR 342 referred to Para 14
2004 (2) Suppl. SCR 452 referred to Para 1.5 D
2014 (12) SCR 1037 referred to Pal."a 17
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 8070-
8073 of2016.
From the Judgment and Order dated 17.07.2013 of the High Court E
of Judicature at Madras iil W. P. (C) Nos. 25952 to 25955 of 20 I0;
- )
-WITH
C. A. Nos. 8074-75; 8076,'8077-78, 8079-82, 8083-86, 8087-89,
8090-93~ 8094c99, 8100, S105c8114, 8115-116, 8117, 8.118, 8119-22, 8123,
8124, 8125-26, 8127-31, 8132-34, 8135-j8, 8139-8141, 8142, 8143 and F
8144-46of2016. ·
S, K: Bagaria, V. Giri, Sr. Advs., E. R. Kumar, Sameer Paukh,. K.
Ajit Singh,Abhishek vi nod Deshmukh, Aditya Sharma, Aakansha Nehra,
Akash J inda4 Chatanya Safaya, Ms. Shelly Bhasin, Ms. Vasudha Gupta,
Ms. L. Karnath; Mahesh Agarwal, Ms. Sadapurna Mukherjee, E. C. G
Agrawala, F. R. Kumr, Abhishek Vinod Deshmukh, Aditya Sharma,
Aakansha.Nehra, AkastiJindal, Mis. Parekh & Co., K. V. Vijayakumar,
Jayanth Moth Raj, Ms. Malavika J., Sureshan P., Ms. Hemalatha, P.R.
Kovilan, Mrs. Geetha Kovilan_, Sanand Ramakrishrian, S. Nandakumar,
H
790 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2016] 6 S.C.R.

A Parivesh Singh, P. Srinivasan, Prateek Gupta, Ranjeet Singh, Naresh
Kumar, K. K. Mani, Ms. T. Archana, Gautam Narayan, R. A. Iyer,
Shatrajit Banerji, Nikhil Swami, Ms. Divya Swami, Mrs. Prabha Swami,
Anil Kaushik, Anand Padmanabhan, Ms. Amritha Sarajoo, Shashi
Bhushan Kumar, Advs. for the Appellants.
B Subramonium Prasad, Sr. Adv., B. Balaji, Utkarsh Srivastava,
Arvind Athithan, Ram Subramanian, Muthuver Palani, Advs. for the
Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
A.K. SIKRI, J. 1. Leave granted.
c
2. We have heard the matter in detail finally at this stage on all
issues that are raised. We are of the opinion that special leave petitions
need to be granted only on the issue as to whether sub-section (20) of
Section 19 of the Tamil Nadu Value Added Tax Act, 2006 (hereinafter
referred to as 'VAT Act') could be given retrospective effect.
D
3. All these appeals arise out of common judgment dated July 17,
2013 rendered in batch of writ petitions. In the writ petitions filed by the
appellants (hereinafter referred to as 'dealers'), vires of newly inserted
sub-section (20) of Section 19 of the VAT Act, vide amendment brought
by Amendment Act 22of2013 were challenged. This provision though
E came into force on August 19, 2010, by the aforesaid Amendment Act,
was given retrospective effect from January 01, 2007 by Tamil Nadu
Value Added Tax (Special Provision) Act, 20 I 0 (hereinafter referred to
as' Act, 201 O'). The retrospectivity of the provision was also questioned
by the dealers. The dealers had argued that this provision is confiscatory
in nature as well as unreasonable and arbitrary and is, therefore, violative
F
of Article 14 and 19(1 )(g) of the Constitution and repugnant to the general
scheme of the charging provisions of Section 3(2) and 3(3) of the VAT
Act. On b9th the counts, the dealers' challenge has been repelled by the
High Court vide impugned judgment July 17, 2013.
4. We have heard learned counsel for the parties at length. Before
G
us,. Mr. Bagaria, learned senior counsel appearing for the dealers in some
of these appeals had also argued that even if the aforesaid provision
was valid, it was not properly interpreted by the High Court. We have
considered this additional submission as well. We may record, at the
outset, that insofar as this submission based on interpretation of this
H
JAYAM & CO. v. ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER & ANR. 791
[A. K. SIKRI, J.]

provision as well as challenge laid to the constitutional validity of the said A
provision are concerned, we do not find any merit therein and are of the
opinion that the High Court by a well-reasoned and detailed judgment
rightly rejected these contentions. It is because of this reason that leave
in the special leave petitions is granted only to limited extent as indicated
in the beginning of this order. However, before coming to the issue of
B
retrospectivity, we would delve into these two aspects briefly as that
discussion would be required in order to understand the question of
retrospectivity.
5. The appellants are 'dealers' and registered as such under the
provisions ofVAT Act. For example, the appellant in Civil Appeal No.
24023-26 of 2013 deals in electronic home appliances. It purchases
c
appliances from local registered dealers on payment of VAT under the
VAT invoice issued by the vendors. Thereafter, the appellant re-sells to
consumers under VAT invoice charging appropriate VAT on their selling
price. It had purchased LCD Televisions from M/s. LG Electronics
Private Limited for re-sale. The vendors, i.e., M/s. LG Electronics had D
charged VAT on the selling price, as per the VAT invoice issued by M/s.
LG Electronics to the dealers. Based on the price shown in the invoice,
VAT was paid. Under the scheme of VAT Act, as would be seen
hereinafter, on re-sale when the VAT is paid by the dealer, the dealer is .
entitled to avail Input Tax Credit (for short, 'ITC'), i.e., he is entitled to
get the credit of-the VAT which was paid by the dealer to M/s. LG E
Electronics on purchase of these T.V. sets from the said vendors.
6. It so happened that after the original tax invoice and availing
ITC, the vendor had given discount and purchase credit note was issued
for a lesser price. The dealer took into account the price it paid to Mis.
LG Electronics after adjusting the discount that was subsequently given F
to the dealer to arrive at net cost and adding VAT which was limited to
the vendors by the dealer, the goods were re-sold at a lesser price. This
is illustrated before us in the following manner: ·
" PURCHASE DETAILS
G
S.No. Description Price Vat
(Rs.) (IO%)
.
Rs.)
I. As per Tax Invoice of I 00 IO
the Seller
H
792' SUPREME COURT REPORTS · · [2016) 6 S.C.R.

A
2. Less: Discount 10
actually allowed by
seller under its
i applicable
incentive/discount
B scheme by issuing
·' credit note.
Net purchase pnce 90
after discount

c SALE DETAILS ~.
[ ,.
S. No. Description Amount
(Rs.)
I. Sale Price 95· '
D 2. VAT actually on the sale price 9.50
@!, 10% .

'
7. From the aforesaid, it is clear that the dealer had paid to the
vendor VAT of Rs. 10/-._ However, at the time of re-sale VAT actually
E allowed was Rs. 9.50. That is the effect of sub-section (20) of Section
19, which reads as under:
"S. 19(20) Notwithstanding anything contained in this
section, where any registered dealer has sold goods at a
price lesser than the price of the goods purchased by him,
F the amount of the input tax credit over and above the output
tax of those goods shall be reversed." ·
8. First submission of the dealer was that the price could not have
been taken as per the tax invoice but net price at which it was ultimately
purchased after discount should have been taken. In the given illustration,
G it was Rs. 90/-. On this basis, argument raised on interpretation was
that since the goods were purchased at Rs. 90/- and sold at Rs. 951-,
sub-section (20) of Section 19 had no application at all. Detail submissions
were made with reference to the provisions .of Sale of Goods Act to
buttress the submission that net purchase price would be the "price'1 of
goods. However, according to the Revenue, purchase price had to be
H
JAYAM & CO. v. ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER & ANR. 793
rA. K. SIKRI, J.l

taken as Rs. 100/-, as mentioned in the original tax invoice, without A
deducting the.discount of Rs. 10/- allowed by the issuing of credit note.
On this basis, the Revenue took the decision that since the goods were
purchased at Rs. 100/- but sold at Rs. 95/- (Section 19(20) became
applicable). The High Court has accepted the contention of the Revenue.
As mentioned above, detailed reasons in this behalfare given. Suffice it B
to state that as per the scheme of the VAT Act itself, it is the price as per,
the tax invoice which has to be taken into consideration. In view of this
Specific Statutory Scheme, general principJes laid down in the Sale of
Goods Act would not be applicable. '
9. We may mention that Section 19 deals with ITC and this Section
is to be understood keeping in view the entire scheme of the VAT Act.
c
VAT Act, obviously, deals with payment of value added tax on the goods
sold by the dealers. It is not necessary to go into definitions of various
expressions like 'business', 'dealer', 'goods', 'sale', 'turnover' etc. Since
we are concerned with grant oHTC, we would reproduce the definitions
of those expressions which are relevant for this purpose. These are: D
"S. 2(24) "input tax'' means the tax paid or payable under
this Act by a registered dealer to another registered dealer
on the purchase of goods including capital goods in the
course of his business.
S. 2(36) "tax invoice" means an invoice issued by a E
registered dealer who sells taxable goods to another
registered dealer in the State showing the tax charged
separately and containing such details as may be prescribed.
S. 2(41) "turnover" means the aggregate amount for
which goods are bought or sold, or delivered pr supplied or F
otherwise disposed of in any of the ways referred to in
clause (33), by a dealer either directly or through another,
on his own account or on account of others whether for
cash or for deferred payment or other valuable
consideration, provided that the proceeds of the sale by a G
person of agricultural or horticultural produce, other than
tea and rubber (natural rubber latex and all varieties and
grades ofraw rubber) grown within the State by himself or
on any land in which he has an interest whether as owner,
unsufructuary mortgage, tenant or otherwise, shall be
H
794 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [20 I 6] 6 S.C.R.

A excluded from his turnover.
Explanation I: ""Agricultural or horticultural produce'-' shall
not include such produce as has been subjected to any
, .. physical, chemical or other process for being made fit for
consumption, save mere cleaning, grading, sorting or dying;
B
Explanation II: Subject to such conditions and restrictions,
if any, as may be prescribed in this behalf-

(i) the amount for which goods are sold shall include any
sums charged for anything done by the dealer in respect of
the goods sold at the time or, or-before the delivery thereof;
c
(ii) any cash or other discount on the price allowed in respect
of any sale and any amount refunded in respect of articles
returned by customers shall not be included in the turnover;

Explanation Ill: Any amount, realised by a dealer by way
D of sale of his business as a whole, shall notbe included in
the turnover;

Explanation IV: Any amount, charged by a dealer by way
of tax separately without including the same in the price of
the goods sold, shall not be included in the turnover"
E

I 0. After giving th~ definitions of various tenns under Section 2,
Sections 3 to 12 deal with levy of taxes on various kinds of transactions.
For example, Section 3 deals with levy of taxes on sale of goods; Section
4 talks about levy of taxes on transfer of right to make use of any goods
F
for any purpose and Section 5 prescribes the levy of tax on transfer of
goods involved in works contract. From Section I 3 onward, some
concessions! deductions are allowed. Section 13 deals with deduction
of tax at source in works contract. Section 14 is about the reversal of
tax -credit. Likewise, Section 15 deals with those s·ales which are
G exempted from tax. In this scheme of deductions and concessions comes
Section 19 which allows grant of!TC. Pertinently, however, scrutiny of
this provision reveals that ITC is not allowed on all kinds of transactions.
On certain types of sales,. no ITC is admissible at all. Nature of those
sales where ITC is inadmissible is stipulated in sub-sections (5) to (9) of

H
JAYAM & CO. v. ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER & ANR. 795
[A. K. SIKRf, J.]

Section 19. For understanding this pertinent aspect of the scheme, at A
thisjuncture,we reproduce Section 19 in its entirety as under:
"Input tax credit
(I) There shall be input tax creditof:the amount of
tax paid or payable under this ACt, by the registered dealer
to the seller on his purchases of taxable goods specified in B
the First Schedule:
PROVIDED that the registered dealer, who claims input
tax credit, shall establish that the tax due on such purchases
has been paid by him in the manner pres¢ribed.
' ' c
(2) Input tax credit shall be allowed for the purchase
of goods made within the State from a registered dealer
and which are for the purpose of -
(i) re-sale by him within the State; or
(ii) use as input in manufacturing or processing of goods D
in the State; or
(iii) use as containers, labels and other materials for
packing of goods in the State; or
(iv) use as capital goods in the 1ilanufacture of taxable
goods; E

(v) sale in the course of inter-State Tax Act, 1956 (Centt:al
Act 74 of 1956);
(vi) agency transactions by the principal within the State
in the manner as may be prescribed. F ,
3(a) Every registered dealer, in respect of purchases
of capital goods, for use in the manufacture of taxable
~goods, shall be allo~ed input tax credit in the manner
prescribed.
(b) Deduction of such inputtax credit shall be allowed only G
after the commencement of commercial production and
over a period of three years in the manne_r as may be
prescribed. After the expiry of three years, the unavai led
input tax credit shall lapse to Government.
H
796 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 6 S.C.R.

A (c) Input tax credit shall be allowed for the tax paid under
section 12 of the Act, subject to clauses (a) and (b) of this
sub-section.
., (4) Input tax credit shall be allowed on tax paid or payable
in the State on the purchase of goods, in excess of three
8 percent of tax relating to such purchases subject to such
conditions as may be prescribed,-
(i) for transfer to a place outside the Smte otherwise than
by way of sale; or
'
(ii) for use in manufacture of other goods and transfer to a
c place outside the State, otherwise than by way of sale:
PROVIDED that if a dealer has already availed input tax
credit there shal I be reversal of credit against such transfer.
(5) (a) No input tax credit shall be allowed in respect of
D sale of goods exempted under section 15
(b) No input tax credit shal I be allowed on tax paid or payable
in other States or Union Territories on goods brought into
this State from outside the State.
( c) No input tax credit shall be allowed on the purchase of
J
E goods sold as such or used in the manufacture of other
goods and so_ld in the course of inter-State trade or
commerce falling under sub-section (2) of section 8 of the
Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 (Central Act 74 of 1956).
(6) No input tax credit shall be allowed on purchase of capital
F goods, which are used exclusively in the manufacture of
goods exempted under section 15.
Provided that on the purchase of capital goods which are
used in the manufacture of exempted goods and taxable
goods, in put tax credit shall be allowed to the extent of its
G usage in the manufacture of taxable goods in th,e manner
prescribed.
(7) No registered dealer shall be entitled to input tax credit
in respect of-

H
JAYAM & CO. v. ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER & ANR. 797
fA. K. SIKRI, J.l

(a) goods purchased and accounted for in business but A
utilised for- the p-urpose of providing facility to the
proprietor or partner or director jncluding employees and
in any residential accommodation; or
(b) purchase of all automobiles including ~ommercial .
vehicles, two wheelers and three wheelers and spare B
parts for repair and maintenance thereof, unless the
registered dealer is in the business of dealing in such
automobiles or spare parts; or
(c) purchase ofair-conditioning units unless the registered
~
dealer is in the business of dedling in such units.
'
c
(8) No input tax credit shall be allowed to any registered
dealer in respect of any goods purchased by him for sale
but given away by him by way -of free sample or gift or
goods consumed for personal use.
(9) No input tax credit shall be available to a registeted D
dealer for tax paid or payable at the time of purchase of
goods, if such-
(i) goods are not sold because of any theft, loss or
destruction, for any reason, including natural, calamity.
If a dealer has already availed input tax credit against E
purchase of such goods, there shall be reversal of tax
credit; or
(ii) inputs destroyed in fire accident or lost while in storage
even before use in the manufacture of final products; or
F
(iii)inputs damaged in transit or destroyed at some
intermediary stage of manufacture.
(I O)(a) The registered dealer shall not claim input tax credit
until the dealer receives an original tax invoice duly filled,
signed and issued by a registered dealer from whom the
goods are purchased, containing such particulars, as· may G
be prescribed, of the sale evi_dencing the amount of input
tax.
(b) If the original tax invoice is lost, input tax credit shall be
allowed only on the basis of duplicate or carbon copy of
H
798 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 6 S.C.R.

A such tax invoice obtained from the selling dealer subject to
such conditions as may be prescribed.
(I I) In case any registered dealer fails to claim input tax
credit in respect of any transaction of taxable purchase in
any month, he shall make the claim before the end of the
B financial year or before ninety days from the date of
purchase, whichever is later.
(12) Where a dealer has availed credit on inputs and when
the finished goods become exempt, credit availed on inputs
used therein, shall be reversed.
c (13) Where a registered dealer without entering into a
transaction of sale, issues an invoice, bill or cash
·memorandum to another registered dealer: with the intention
to defraud the Government revenue, the assessing authority
shall, after making such enquiry as it thinks fit and giving a
D reasonable opportunity of being heard, deny the benefit of
input tax creditto such registered dealer who has claimed
input tax credit based on such invoice, ·bill or cash
memorandum from such date. '
· { 14) Wliere the business of a registered dealer is transferred
E on account of change .in ownership or on account of sale,
merger, amalgamation, lease or transfer of the business to
a joint venture with the specific provision for transfer of
liabilities of such business, then, the registered dealer shall
be entitled to transfer the.input tax credit lying unutilized in
his accounts to such.sold, merged, amalgamated, leased or
F transferred concern. The transfer of foput tax credit shall
be allowed only ifthe stock of inputs, as such, or in process,
or the capital goods is also transferred to the new ownership
on which credit has been availed of are duly accounted for,
subject to the satisfaction of the assessing authority.
G. (15) Where a registered dealer has purchased any taxable
goods from another dealer and has availed input tax credit
in respect ofthe said goods and ifthe registration certificate
of the selling dealer is cancelled by the appropriate
registering authority, such registered dealer, who has availed
by way of input tax credit, 'shall pay the amount availed on
H

',
JAYAM & CO. v. ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER & ANR. 799
[A. K. SIKRI, J.]

the date from which the order of cancellation of the A
registration ce1tificate takes effect. Such dealer shall be
liable to pay, in addition to the amount due, interest at the
rate of two per cent, per month, on the amount of tax so
payable, for the period commencing from the date of claim
of input tax credit by the dealer to the date of its paymept.
B
(I 6)The input tax credit availed by any registered dealer
shall be only provisional and the assessing authority is
empowered to revoke the same if it appears to the assessing
authority to be incorrect, incomplete or otherwise not in
order.
c
(I 7)lf the input tax credit determined by the assessing
authority for a year exceeds tax liability for that year, the
excess may be adjusted against any outstanding tax due
from the dealer.
(I 8)The excess input tax credit, if any, after adjustment D
under sub-sectio1_1 ( 17), shall be carried forward to the next
year or refunded, in the manner, as may be prescribed.
( 19) Where any registered dealer has availed input tax credit
and has goods remaining unsold at the time of stoppage or
closure of business, the amount of tax availed shall be E
reversed on the date of stoppage or closure of such business
· and recovered.
(20)Not withstanding any thing contained in this section,
where any registered dealer has sold goods at a price lesser
than the price of the goods purchased by him, the amount
F
of the input tax credit over and above the output tax of
those goods shall be reversed. "
11. From sub-section ( 10) onwards, provisions are made to follow
the procedure and fulfill the requisite conditions for availing ITC. For
the purposes of this particular issue, sub-section ( 10) is the material
G
provision. This provision, which is couched in negativetenns, categorically
stipulates that such ITC would be admissible to the registered dealer
and he would not be entitled to claim this credit 'until the dealer receives
an original tax invoice duly filled, signed and issued by a registered dealer
from where the goods are purchased ....... '. Further, such original tax
800 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 6 S.C.R.

A invoice should evidence the amount of input tax. So much so, even if
the original tax invoice is lost, the obligation cast on the registered dealer
is to obtain duplicate or carbon copy of such tax invoice from the selling
dealer and only then input tax is allowed.
From the aforesaid scheme of Section 19 following significant
B aspects emerge:-
(a) ITC is a form ofconcession provided by the Legislature. It is
not admissible to all kinds of sales and certain specified sales are
specifically excluded.
(b) Concession of!TC is avai I.able on certain conditions mentioned
c in this Section.
(c) One of the most important condition is that in order to enable
the dealer to claim ITC it has to produce original tax invoice, completed
in ali respect, evidencing the amount of input tax.

D 12. It is a trite law that whenever concession is given by statute
ornotification etc. the conditions thereof are to be strictly complied with ·
in order to avail such concession. Thus, it isnotthe right of the 'dealers'
to get the benefit oflTC but its a concession granted by virtue of Section
19.-As a fortioran, conditions specified in Section 10 must be fulfilled.
In that hue, we find that Section 10 makes original tax invoice relevant
E for the purpose of claiming tax: Therefore, under the scheme of the
VAT Act, it is not permissible for the dealers to argue that the price as
indicated in the tax invoice should not have lleen taken into consideration
but the net purchase price after discount is to be the basis. If we were
dealing with any other aspect do hors the issue oflTC as per the Section
F 19 of the VAT Act, possibly the arguments of Mr. Bagaria would have
assumed some relevance. But, keeping in view the scope of the issue,
such a plea~ is not admissible having regard to the plain language of
sections of the VAT Act, read along with other provisions of the said Act
as referred to above.
1J. For the same reasons given above, challenge to constitutional
·G
validity of sub-section (20) of Section 19 of VAT Act has to-fail. When
a con\:ession is given by a statute, the Legislature has power to make
the provision stating the form and manner in which such concession is to
be allowed. Sub-section (20) seeks to achieve that. There was no right,
inherent or otherwise, vested with dealers to claim the benefit of ITC
H
JAYAM & CO. v. ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER & ANR. 801
, [A. K. SIKRi, J.]
~

but for Section 19 of the VAT Act. That apart, we find that there were A
valid· and cogent reasons for inserting Section 19(20). Main purport was
to protect the Revenue against clandestine transactions resulting in
evasion of tax. High Court has discussed this aspect iri d-etail and our
task would be accomplished in reproducing those paras as we are
concurring with the discussion: ·
B
"64. Let us now- point out the background/reasons for
inserting Section 19(20) by Amendment Act 22 of20 I 0, by
referring to the Chart, the satnple instance ~s detailed in the
<.Chart in paragraph (34). Let us recapitulate the entries in
the Chart, Based on the sale price, i.e., Rs. 36, 780/- in the
tax invoice, an amount ofhiput Tax Credit, i.e., Input Tax
c c
Credit of Rs. 4m597 .SO was available to the petitioner when
he re-sells goods. Based on the Credi~ Note, t!ie same
goods are re-sold within the State at a lesser price than
what was purchased, i.e., Rs. 33, 777.78 (taking into account
discount price; there is a profit margin for the dealer) and D
thereby the output tax payable to the Government is reduced,
leaving excess Input Tax Credit at the hands-of the dealer.
The.said excess credit in the hands of the dealer might be
adjusted to their other liabilities or might claim refund of the
said excess Input Tax Credit. Taking excess Input Tax
G-redit and later in the guise of credit note giving discount E
and, reducing the price of the goods which reduces the
Output tax payable ·to the Government dwindles State .
revenue.' "

65; Learned Advocate General contended thi1t seller and
buyer coalition is issuing purchase invoice at an escalated F
· pril:;e thereby taking benefit of excess Input Tax Credit
·and later in the guise of credit notes giving discount, reduced
the price of the same goods and thereby reducing the output
t~ payable to the Government creates a dent of the State
revenue. Learned Advocate General further submitted that G
excess Input Tax Credit available in the hands of the dealer
is being adjusted to their other·liabilities and the dealer might
also' make a claim of refund of Input Tax C,redit as per
Section 19( 18) of the Act which were ultimately resulted in
creating dent on the State revenue.
H
802 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 6 S.C.R.

A 66. To contend as to how the so called discount and reduction
of sale price caused revenue loss to the Government, the
learned Advocate General has drawn our attention to the
illustration stated in paragraph (6) of the counter which
reads as under:-
B
. Purchase price of I0
Washing Macines ... Rs. 1,00,000/-
Tax paid on purchase at 12.5%
(ITC allowed) ... Rs. 12,500/-
c Sale price after discount ... Rs. 75,000/-
tax payable on sales at 12.5% ... Rs. 9,375/-
Excess ITC available
(Difference between ITC and
Output Tax) ... Rs. 3, 125/-
D Rs. 12,500 - Rs.9,375
Excess ITC Adjusted ... Rs. 3, 125/-"
67. As rightly contended by the learned Advocate General,
the "Input Tax Credit" adjusted in the above illustration
comes to Rs. 3, 125/- in a single transaction and that it
E
would run to several lakhs and crores for a year for a single
dealer. The excess Input Tax Credit earned by the
petitioners is being adjusted against the outstanding tax
due or carried forward to next year or refunded. If this
trend is allowed to continue, th~ concept of VAT that meant
F for payment of tax on every value addition gets defeated.
68. In order to protect the revenue and with a vie to curb
the clandestine transactions resulting in evasion of tax, in
respect of second and subsequent sales, Section l 9(20)was
introduced, where any dealer has sold goods at a price lesser
G than the price of the goods purchased by him, the amount
of "Input Tax Credit" over and above the output tax of
those goods, shall be reversed.
69. Constitutional Validity of fiscal legislation:- When there
is a challenge to the constitutional validity of the provisions
H
JAYAM & CO. v. ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER & ANR. 803
rA. K. SIKRI, J.l

of a Statute, Court exercising power ofjudicial review must A
be conscious of the limitation of judicial review must be
conscious of the limitation of judicial intervention,
particularly, in matters relating to the legitimacy of the
economic or fiscal legislation. While enacting fiscal
legislation, the Legislature is entitled to a great deal of
B
latitude. The Court would interfere only where a clear
infraction of a constitutional provision is established. The
burden is on the person, who attacks Hie constitutional
validity of a statute, to establish clear transgression of
constitutional principle. Observing that the law relating to
economic activities should be viewed with greater latitude c
than laws touching civil rights such as freedom of speech,
religion, etc., in R.K. Garg vs. Union of India [( 1981) 4
SCC 675, this Court held as under:
xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx"
14. With this, let us advert to the issue on retrospectivity. No D
doubt, when it comes to fiscal legislation, the Legislature has power to
make the provision retrospectively. In R.C. Tobacco Pvt. Ltd. V. Union
of I11dia 1, this Court stated broad legal principles while testing a
retrospective statute, in the following manner:
"(i)A law cannot be held to be unreasonable merely because E
it operates retrospectively;
(ii) The unreasonability must lie in some other additional
factors;
(iii) The retrospective operation of a fiscal statute would
F
have to be found to be unduly oppressive and confiscatory
before it can be held to be unreasonable as to violate
constitutional norms;
(iv) Where taxing statute is plainly discriminatory or provides
no procedural machinety for assessment and levy of tax or
G
that is confiscatory, Courts will be justified in striking down
the impugned statute as unconstitutional;
(v) The other factors being period of retrospectivity and
degree of unforseen or unforseeable financial burden
1
(2005) 7 sec 725
H
804 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 6 s.c.R.

A imposed for the past period;
(vi) Length of time is not by itself decisive to affect
retrospectively."
15. At the same time, this Court has also held that retrospective
legislation would be admissible in cases of validation laws, i.e., where
B t.he laws as initially passed was held to be inoperative by the court and
when there is a new provision inserted, it should normally be prospective.
We may refer to the judgment of this Court in Tfttft Motors Ltd. v. Stftte
of Mfthftms/1tm ftntl others1• In that case, the appellant - assessee
company, manufactured motor vehicle chassis and spare parts. It
c procured steel in primary form covered by Entry 6 of Schedule B to the
Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959 for use in the manufacturing process which
resulted also in iron and steel crap which was covered by the said entry.
Therefore, in Assessment Year 1982-83, the appellant therein claimed
set-off ofa certain amount in terms ofRule4 I-E for the quantum of iron
and steel purchased which was converted into iron and steel scrap. The
D claim was allowed. Subsequently, Maharashtra Act 9of1989 was enacted
and by Sections 26 and 27, the benefit of Rule 41-E was denied altogether
for the period 1-7-1981 to 31-3-1988 where the manufactured goods
falling under Schedule B were in the nature of waste goods/scrap goods/
by-products. The validity of such retrospective amendment to Rule 41-
E E was unsuooessfully challenged before the High Court. The High Court
took the view that the impugned amendment of Rule 41-E was clarificatory
to remove the doubts in interpretation. However, by the Bom!my Sales
Tax (Amendment) Rules, 1992 Rule 41-E was amended. That
amendment removed the exclusionary clause of goods manufactured
out of waste or scrap goods or products and restored the position as it
F stood prior to 1981. The appellant's appeal and another connected appeal
were heard simultaneously.
The appellant - assessee contended that retrospective operation
of a provision depriving the assessee of the vested statutory right and
covering a long period (eight years in that case) imposed a prima facie ··
G unreasonable restriction and was;-therefore, unconstitutional. More so,
when the original provision was subsequently reintroduced deleting the
amendments and there was no material to justify the special treatment
given for the said eight years. The respondent State could not meet the

H
2 (2004) s sec 783
JAYAM & CO. v. ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER & ANR. 805
[A. K. SIKRI, J.]

said contention. The assessee company further contended that since A
the CST Act had not been extended to Dadra and Nagar Haveli, where
the assessee's branch office was located, the requirement under Rule
41-D for registration of the assessee under the CST Act in that place
was impossible of performance and should, therefore, be ignored.
16. Though the latter contention was rejected, the first contention B
noted above, touching upon the retrospectivity of the amendment, was
accepted and while allowing the appeal the matter was dealt with in the
following manner:
"I 5. It is no doubt true that the legislature has the powers
to make laws retrospectively including tax laws. Levies can c
be imposed or withdrawn but if a particular levy is sought
to be imposed only for a particular period and not prior or
subsequently it is open to debate whether the statute passes
the test of reasonableness at all. In the present case, the
High Court sustained the enactment by adve1ting to Rai
Ramkrishna case when the benefit of the rule had been D
withdrawn for a specific period. The learned counsel for
the State contended that the amendments had been made
to overcome certain defects arising on account of the
decision of the Tribunal in regard to the modalities of working
out the relief. But, the impugned amendment brought about E
by Section 26 is not for that purpose. Assuming that it was
the legislative policy not to grant set-off in respect of waste
or scrap material generated, it becomes difficult to
appreciate the stand ofthe State in the light of the fact that
the original rule continued to be in operation (with certain
modifications) subsequent to 1-4-1988. The reason for F
withdrawal of the benefit retrospectively for a limited period
is not forthcoming. It is no doubt true that the State has
enormous powers in the matter oflegislation and in enacting
fiscal laws. Great leverage is allowed in the matter of
taxation laws because several fiscal adjustments have to G
be made by the Government depending upon the needs of
the Revenue and the economic circumstances prevailing in
the State. Even so an action taken by the State cannot be
so irratio11al and so arbitrary so as to introduce one set of
rules for one period and another set of rules for another
H
806 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 6 S.C.R.

A period by amending the laws in such a manner as to
withdraw the benefit that had been given earlier resulting
'in higher burdens so far as the assessee is concerned,
without any rea1on. Retrospective withdrawal of the benefit
of set-off only for a particular period should be justified on
some tangible and rational ground, when challensed on the
B
ground of unconstitutionality. Unfortunately, the State could
not succeed in doing so. The view of the High Court that
the impugned amendment of Rule 41-E was of clarificatory
nature to remove the doubts in interpretation cannot be
upheld. In fact, the High Court did not elaborate as to how
c the impugned legislation is merely clarificatory. In that view
of the matter, although we recognise the fact that the State
has enormous powers in the matter of legislation, both
prospectively and retrospectively, and can evolve its own
policy, we do not think that in the present cases any material
has been placed before the Court as to why the amendments
D
were confined only to a period of eight years and not either
before or subsequently and, therefore, we are of the view ·
that the impugned provision, namely, Section 26 deserves
to be quashed by striking down the words "not being waste
goods or scrap goods or by-products" occurring in the said
E Section 26 of Maharashtra Act 9of1989 and the authorities
concerned shall rework assessments as if that law had not
been passed and give appropriate benefits according to law
to the parties concerned."
17. The entire gamut of retrospective operation of fiscal statues
F was revisited by this Court in a Constitution Bench judgment in
Commissioner of Income Tax (Central) - I, New Del/ti v. Vatika
Towns/zip Private Limited3 in the following manner:
"33. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Keshavlal
Jethala/ Shah v. Mohan/a/ Bhagwandas [AIR 1968 SC
.G 1336: (1968) 3 SCR 623], while considering the nature of
amendment to Section 29(2) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel
and Lodging House Rates Control Act as amended by
Gujarat Act 18of1965, observed as follows: (AIR p. 1339,
para 8)
H '(2015) 1 sec 1
JAYAM & CO. v. ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER & ANR. 807
(A. K. SIKRI, J.J.

"8 . ... The amending clause does not seek to explain any A
pre-existing legislation which was ambiguous or defective.
The power of the High Court to entertain a petition for
exercising revisionaljurisdiction was before the amendment
derived from Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
and the legislature has by the amending Act not attempted
B
to explain the meaning of that provision. An explanatory
Act is generally passed to supply an obvious omission or to
clear up doubts as to the meaning of the previous Act."
34. It would also be pertinent to mention that asses'sment
creates a vested r.ight and an assessee cannot be subjected
to reassessment unless a provision to that effect inserted c
by amendment is either expressly or by necessary
implication retrospective. (See CED v. MA. Merchant [ 1989
Supp ( 1) sec 499 : 1989 sec (Tax) 404] .)
35. We would also like to reproduce hereunder the following
observations maae by this Court in Govind Das v. ITO D
[( 1976) I SCC 906 : 1976 SCC (Tax) 133] , while holding
Section 171 (6) of the Income Tax Act to be prospective
and inapplicable for any asses,sment year prior to 1-4-1964,
the date on which the Income Tax Act came into force:
(SCC p. 914, para I l) E
-~

"11. Now it is a well-settled rule of interpretation
hallowed by time and sanctified by judicial decisions that,
unless the terms of a statute expressly so provide or
necessarily require it, retrospective operation should not
be given to a statute so as to take away or impair an F
existing right or create a new obligation or impose a
new liability otherwise than as regards matters of
procedure. The general mle as stated by Halsbury in
Vol. 36 of the 'Laws of England (3rd Edn.) and
reiterated in several decisions of this Court as well as
English courts is that G

'all statutes other than those which are merely
declaratory or which relate on1yto matters of procedure
or of evidence are· prim a facie prospective and
retrospective operation shmdd not be given to a statute
H
808 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 6 S.C.R.

A so as to affect, alter or destroy an existing right or
create a new liability or obligation unless that effect
cannot be avoided without doing violence to the
language of the enactment. If the enactment is
expressed in language which is fairly capable of
either interpretation, it ought to be construed as
B
prospective only."' (emphasis supplied)
18. When we keep in mind the aforesaid parameters laid down by
this Court in testing validity ofretrospective operation of fiscal laws, we
find that the amendment in-question fails to meet these tests. The High
Court has primarily gone by the fact that there was no unforseen or
c unforeseeable financial burden imposed for the past period. That is not
correct. Moreover, as can be seen, sub-section (20) of Section 19 is
altogether new proviSion introduced for determining the input tax in
specified situation, i.e., where goods are sold at a lesser price than the
purchase price of goods. The manner of calculation of the ITC was
D entirely different before this amendment. In the example, which has
been given by us in the earlier pait of the judgment, 'dealer' was entitled
to ITC of Rs. 10/- on re-sale, which was paid by the dealer as VAT
while purchasing the goods from the vendors. However, in view of Section
19(20) inserted by way of amendment, he would, now be entitled to ITC
of Rs. 9.50. This is clearly a provision which is made for the first time to
E the detriment of the dealers. Such a provision, therefore, cannot have
retrospective effect, more so, when vested right had accrued in favour
of these dealers in respect of purchases and sales made between January
0 I, 2007 to August 19, 2010. Thus, while upholding the vires of sub-
section (20) of Section 19, we set aside and strike down Amendment
F Act 22 of20 I 0 whereby this amendment was given retrospective effect
from January 0 I, 2007.
19. Appeals are partially allowed to the aforesaid extent. No
orders as to costs.

G
Devika Gujral Appeals partly allowed.

H