Holding

The Court held that the two Acts operate in different fields; the award is covered by the rehabilitation scheme and therefore Section 22 of the 1985 Act applies, so the 1993 Act does not prevail over the 1985 Act.

Summary

Jay Engineering Works Ltd., a sick industrial company, was declared sick under the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 and a rehabilitation scheme was approved in 2003. Respondent No.2 (Diamond Wire Industries) claimed interest on delayed payments under the Interest on Delayed Payments to Small Scale and Ancillary Industrial Undertakings Act, 1993 and obtained an award from the Industry Facilitation Council. The appellant argued that the 1993 Act could not apply to a company under a rehabilitation scheme and that the award should be barred by Section 22 of the 1985 Act. The High Court had held that the 1993 Act prevailed, but the Supreme Court applied the rule of harmonious construction, held that the award was included in the scheme as a "dormant creditor" and therefore fell within the protective ambit of Section 22 of the 1985 Act. Consequently, the execution of the award could not proceed, and the earlier judgments were set aside.

Issues considered

The extent to which the Interest on Delayed Payments to Small Scale and Ancillary Industrial Undertakings Act, 1993 overrides the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 when a sick company has a sanctioned rehabilitation scheme.
Whether an award under the 1993 Act, when executed in a civil court, is subject to the suspension of legal proceedings under Section 22 of the 1985 Act.
Whether the award amount is deemed to be part of the rehabilitation scheme and thus protected by the 1985 Act.
Interpretation of overlapping non‑obstante clauses in the two statutes and the applicability of the rule of harmonious construction.

Legislation cited

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996
Interest on Delayed Payments to Small Scale and Ancillary Industrial Undertakings Act, 1993s. 10, s. 6(2)
Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985s. 15, s. 16, s. 17, s. 22, s. 25, s. 32

Subjects

sick companyrehabilitation schemenon-obstante clauseharmonious constructionexecution of awarddormant creditorinterest on delayed paymentsarbitrationSection 221985 Act1993 Act

Judgment

JAY ENGINEERING WORKS LTD. A
v.
INDUSTRY FACILITATION COUNCIL AND ANR.

SEPTEMBER 14, 2006

[S.B. SINHA AND DAL VEER BHANDARI, JJ.] B

Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985-Section 20-
lnterest on Delayed Payments to Small Scale and Ancillary Industrial
Undertakings Act, 1993-C/aim made under 1993 Act against appellant- C
company-Objected on the ground that it is sick company-Bank account of
appellant attached-Dismissal of Writ Petition by appellant on the premise
that 1993 Act would prevail over 1985 Act-Correctness of-Held, not correct-
Both the Acts operate in different fields-Adopting the rule of harmonious
construction, 1993 Act would not prevail over the 1985 Act.
D
Interpretation of statute-Rule of harmonious construction-If a case is
covered by two Acts and question is posed by non obstante clause in both the
Acts then question as to which Act would prevail gets solved by harmonious
construction of the statutes.

RespondentNo.2 sold its products to the appellant-company during E
the period 28.12.1996 and 3.6.2000. As the appellant-company became sick,
reference was made in terms of Section IS of Sick Industrial Companies
(Special Provisions) Act, 1985 on 8.4.1994. It was declared as sick unit by
the BIFR (Board). A rehabilitation scheme was framed by the Board but
it was declared to have failed by an order on 12.7.2001. By reason of the
said order, however, IDBI was appointed as an operating agency. A fresh F
report was submitted by the said operating agency on 20.3.2003, which
was accepted by the Board whereupon a fresh rehabilitation scheme was
sanctioned on 8.4.2003.

Respondent No.2 filed a claim petition before the Council-respondent G
No. I asking interest on delayed payment under the Interest on Delayed
Payments to Small Scale and Ancillary Industrial Undertakings Act, 1993.
Appellant-company objected on the ground that it was a sick company.
It was rejected and respondent No.I passed an award. Execution was filed
in Civil Court. The Bank Account of appellant-company was attached by
189 H
190 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A the Court. Aggrieved appellant-company filed writ petition which was
dismissed on the premise that the 1993 Act would prevail over the 1985
Act. LPA against it was also dismissed.

In appeal to this Court, appellant contended that both the 1985 Act
and 1993 Act operate in different fields hence the 1993 Act could not
B prevail over the 1985 Act.

Allowing the appeal, the Court

HELD: I. The Board in terms of its order dated 8.4.2003 approved
the rehabilitation scheme. In the said Scheme, the award made in favour
C of the Respondents finds place in the category of 'Dormant Creditors'.
The liabilities of the Appellant vis-a-vis the Respondent No. 2 was,
therefore, indisputably a subject matter of the said Scheme. The High
Court committed an error in proceeding on the premise that the awarded
amount had not been included and could not be included in the sanctioned
D rehabilitation scheme, the same being part of transactions which took place
after 21.11.1997 ignoring the revised scheme made in the year 2003.
(193-F-H; 194-A(

2. I. The Interest on Delayed Payments to Small Scale and Ancillary
Industrial Undertakings Act, 1993 was enacted to provide for and regulate
E the payment of interest on delayed payments to small scale and ancillary
industrial undertakings and for matters connected therewith. The
provisions of the 1993 Act, therefore, do not envisage a situation where
an industrial company becomes sick and requires framing of a scheme for
its revival. (194-F-G(

F 2.2. An award in relation to a claim of a small-scale industry if made
by the Council would be governed by the provisions of the Arbitration
and Conciliation Act, 1996. The award of the Council being an award,
deemed to have been made under the provisions of 1996 Act, indisputably
is being executed before the Civil Court. Execution of an award would
G attract the provisions of Section 22 of the 1985 Act. Whereas an
adjudicatory process of making an award under the 1993 Act may not
come within the purview of the 1985 Act but once an award made is sought
to be executed, it shall come into play. Once the awarded amount has been
included in the Scheme approved by the Board, Section 22 of the 1985
Act would apply. (194-G; 195-F-H)
H
JAY ENGINEERING WORKS LTD.'" INDUSTRY FAGdTATION COUNCIL 191

3. The Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 was A
enacted in public interest. It contains special provisions. The said special
provisions had been made with a view to secure the timely detection of
sick and potentially sick companies owning industrial undertakings, the
speedy determination by a Board of experts for preventive, ameliorative,
remedial and other measures which need to be taken with respect to such B
companies and the expeditious enforcement of the measures so determined
and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. (196-D-EI

Deputy Commercial Tax Officer and Ors. v.Corromandal
Pharmaceuticals and Ors., (1997110 SCC 649 and Maharashtra Tubes Ltd.
v. State Industrial & Investment Corporation of Maharashtra Ltd. and Anr., C
(199312 sec 144,;referred to.

4.1. Both the Acts operate in different fields. If the 1985 Act is
attracted, the question of its giving way of the 1993 Act would not arise.
(197-FJ
D
Allahabad Bank v. Canara Bank and Anr., (20001 4 SCC 406, relied
on.

4.2.. Both the Acts contain non-obstante clauses. Ordinary rule of
construction is that where there are two non-obstante clauses, the latter
shall prevail. But it is equally well-settled that ultimate conclusion E
thereupon would depend upon the limited context of the statute. The
endeavour of the court would, however, always be to adopt a rule of
harmonious construction. (198-A, Ff

Maruti Udyog Ltd. v. Ram Lal and Ors., (20051 2 SCC 638; Shri Sarwan
Singh and Anr. v. Shri Kasturi Lal, (1977) l SCC 750;NGEF Ltd. v. Chandra F
Developers (P) Ltd. and Anr., (2005) 8 SCC 219 and ICICI Bank Ltd. v. Sidco
Leathers "1Jd. and Ors., (2006) 5 SCALE 27; referred to.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 4126 of2006.

From the Judgment and Order dated 13.12.2004 of the High Court of G
Madhya Pradesh, Bench at Indore in L.P.A. No. 232/2003 .
. WITH
Civil Appeal No. 4127 of 2006.

S. Ganesh, B. Vijayalakshmi Menon and Anupam for the Appellant. H
192 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2006] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A Sushil Kumar Jain, Punit Jain, H.D. Thanvi. Pratibha Jain, B.S. Banthia
and Diksha Mishra for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

S.B. SINHA, J: Leave grantt:d.
B
The Appellant herein is a public limited company engaged in business
of manufacturing electronic fans and fuel injection equipments. Respondent
No. 2 is a small scale industry. It manufactures copper wires. It supplied its
products to the Appellant herein during the period 28th December, 1996 and
3rd June, 2000. As the Appellant Company became sick, its Board of Directors
C made a reference in terms of Section 15 of the Sick Industrial Companies
(Special Provisions) Act, 1985 (for short "the 1985 Act') on 8.4.1994. The
Appellant Company was declared as sick unit by the Board for Industrial and
Financial Reconstruction (for short ''the Board"). A rehabilitation scheme
was framed by the Board but it was declared to have failed by an order on
.. D 12.7.2001. By reason of the said order, however, Industrial Development
Bank of India (IDBI) was appointed as an operating agency. A fresh report
was submitted by the said operating agency on 20th March, 2003 which was
accepted by the Board whereupon a fresh rehabilitation scheme was sanctioned
on 8.4.2003.

E In the meanwhile, the Respondent No. 2 herein filed a claim petition
before the Industry Facilitation Council (for short "the Council") Respondent
No. I herein in terms of the provisions of the Interest on Delayed Payments
to Small Scale and Ancillary Industrial Undertakings Act, 1993 (for short
"the 1993 Act"). Before the Council, the Appellant herein raised a plea that
it had been .:!eclared to be a sick company by the Board and as such the
F matter should not be proceeded further. The Council, however, opined that
only because the Appellant Company has been declared sick by the Board,
it would not bind the Council to take a decision in the matter. It,. passed an
award directing:

"That upon the submissions made by both the parties in the above
G case and in the light of contentions raised it is prayed that the delay
of two years to four years was caused by the respondents for mdking
the payment to the petitioner, which is enough. Therefore, Council
has passed the order that an amount of Rs. I0, 92,253.00 and one and
half percent interest of PLR of State Bank of India is due to the
H Petitioner Messrs. Diamond Wire Industries, Ratlam, of the Respondent
JAY ENGINEERING WORKS LTD. v. INDUSTRYFACILITATIONCOUNCIL[S.B. SINHA,!] 193

Messrs. Jay Engineering Works Limited, New Delhi." A
The said award of the Council was put in execution. The bank account
of the Appellant was attached by the District Court, Ratlam. A writ petition
was filed by the Appellant herein before the Madhya Pradesh High Court
questioning the same which by reason of the impugned judgment has been
dismissed by a learned Single Judge. A Letters Patent Appeal preferred B
thereagainst was dismissed by the impugned judgment.

The High Court in its impugned judgment proceeded on the premise
that the 1993 Act could prevail over the 1985 Act.

Mr. S. Ganesh, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the C
Appellant, at the outset, drew our attention to the fact that the award made
by the Council in favour of the Respondent had been taken into consideration
in the revised Scheme itself and as such the award of the Council was non-
executable. It was urged that both the 1985 Act and 1993 Act operate in
different fields and in that view of the matter, the question that the 1993 Act D
prevailing over the 1985 Act would not arise in the instant case.

Mr. Sushi! Kumar Jain, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
Respondents, on the other hand, submitted that the Scheme approved by the
Board in 2003 is not applicable to the cas~ of the Respondents. It was
submitted that in any event by reason of the said Scheme the liability of the E
creditors could not be reduced.

It is not in dispute that the award was made by the Council in favour
of the Respondent No. 2. However, it is also not in dispute that the Board
in terms of its order dated 8.4.2003 approved the Scheme which inter a/ia
envisaged the following: F
"(xi) Rs. 462 lakhs for Settlement of"Dormant Trade Creditors" on the
basis of 25% principal amount,

(xii) Rs. 540 lakhs for settlement of current overdues of suppliers to
be paid over a period of 18 months." G
In the said Scheme, the award made in favour of the Respondents finds
place in the category of 'Dormant Creditors'. The liabilities of the Appellant
vis-a-vis the Respondent No. 2 was, therefore, indisputably a subject matter
of the said Scheme. The High Court, in our opinion, committed an error in
proceeding on the premise that the awarded amount had not been included H
194 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2006] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A and could not be included in the sanctioned rehabilitation scheme, the same
being part of transactions which took place after 21.11.1997 ignoring the
revised scheme made in the year 2003.

The High Court furthermore opined that inclusion of the Respondent as
a deferred creditor in the fresh rehabilitation scheme dated 8.4.2003 also did
B not affect the situation in favour of the Appellant presumably on the premise
that the 1993 Act was a special Act.

Before we advert to the contentions raised by the learned counsel for
the parties, we may notice sub-section (2) of Section 6 of the 1993 Act which
reads as under:
c
"(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section {I), any party
to a dispute may make a reference to the Industry Facilitation Council
for acting as an arbitrator or conciliator in respect of the matters
referred to in that sub-section and the provisions of the Arbitration
and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996) shall apply to such disputes
D
as the arbitration or conciliation were pursuant to an arbitration
agreement referred to in sub-section (I) of section 7 of that Act."

We may also notice that Section I0 thereof provides for a non-obstante
clause in the following terms:
E "10. Over-riding ejfect.-The provisions of this Act shall have effect
notwithstanding inything inconsistent therewith contained in any
other law for the time being in force."

The 1993 Act was enacted to provide for and regulate the payment of
F interest on delayed payments to small scale and ancillary industrial undertakings
and for matters connected therewith.

The provisions of the 1993 Act, therefore, do not envisage a situation
where an industrial company becomes sick and requires framing of a scheme
for its revival.
G
It is no doubt true that an award in relation to a claim of a small-scale
industry if made by the Council would be governed by the provisions of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short "the 1996 Act").

The 1985 Act is a complete code by itself. Section 22 of the 1985 Act
H provides for special provisions. Sub-section (I) of Section 22 was amended
JAY ENGINEERING WORKS LTD.1,. INDUSTRYFACILITATIONCOUNCIL[S.B.SINHA,J.J J95

in the year 1994 by Act No. 12 of 1994 which reads as under: A
· "22. Suspension of legal proceedings, contracts, etc.-(1) Where in
respect of an industrial company, an inquiry under section 16 is
pending or any scheme referred to under section 17 is under preparation
or .consideration or a sanctioned scheme is under implementation or
where an appeal under sections 25 relating to an industrial company B
is pending, then, notwithstanding anything contained in the Companies
Act, 1956 (1of1956), or any other law or the memorandum and articles
of association of the industrial company or any other instrument
having effect under the said Act or other law, no proceedings for the
winding up of the industrial company or for execution, distress. or the C
like against any of the properties of the industrial company or for the
appointment of a receiver in respect thereof and no suit for the
recovery of money or for the enforcement of any security against the
industrial company or of any guarantee in respect of any loans or
advance granted to the industrial company shall lie or be proceeded
with further, except with the consent of the Board or, as the case may D
be, the Appellate Authority."

The said provision, thus, mandates that no proceeding inter alia for
execution, distress or the like against any of the properties of the industrial
company and no suit for recovery of money or for the enforcement of any
security, shall lie or be proceeded with further, except with the consent of the E
Board or as the case may be, the Appellate Authority. The said statutory
injunction will operate when an inquiry had been initiated u.nder Section 16
or a scheme referred to under Section 17 is under preparation and/or inter alia
a sanctioned scheme is under implementation. It is not disputed before us that
the amount awarded in favour of the Respondent by the Council finds specific F
mention in the sanctioned scheme which is under implementation.

The award of the Council be.ing an award, deemed to have been made
under the provisions of the 1996 Act, indisputably is being executed before
a Civil Court. Execution ofan award, beyond.any cavil of doubt, would attract
the provisions of Section 22 of the 1985 Act. Whereas an adjudicatory G
process of making an award under the 1993 Act may not come within the .
purview of the 1985 Act but once an award made is sought to be executed,
it shall· come into play. Once the awarded amount has been included in the
Scheme approved by the Board, in our opinion;. Section 22 of the 1985 Act
would apply.
H
196 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [20061SUPP.6 S.C.R.

A If the liabilities of the Appellant are covered by the Scheme framed
under Section 22 of the 1985 Act, the High Comi was clearly in error in
corning to the conclusion that the provisions thereof are not attracted only
because the debt had been incurred after the Company was declared to be
a sick one.

B The 1985 Act also contains a non-obstante clause in sub-section ( 1) of
Section 32 which reads as under:

"32. Effect of the Act on other laws.-(!) The provisions of this Act
and of any rules or schemes made thereunder shall have effect
notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any
c other law except the provisions of the Foreign Exchange Regulation
Act, 1973 (46 of 1973) and the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation)
Act, 1976 (33 of 1976) for the time being in force or in the Memorandum
or Articles of Association of an industrial company or in any other
instrument having effect by virtue of any law other than this Act.''
D The 1985 Act was enacted in public interest. It contains special
provisions. The said special provisions had been made with a view to secure
the timely detection of sick and potentially sick companies owning industrial
undertakings, the speedy determination by a Board of experts for preventive,
ameliorative, remedial and other measures which need to be taken with respect
E to such companies and the expeditious enforcement of the measures so
determined and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto.

The High Court has placed strong reliance on Deputy Commercial Tax
Officer and Ors. v. Corromandal Pharmaceuticals and Ors., [1997] 10 SCC
649 wherein this Court was considering an exceptional situation by reason of
F the fact that ~he liability of the sick company for the first time arose after the
date of sanctioned scheme and the sick industrial unit was enabled to collect
tax due to the Revenue from the exporters thereafter but declined to pay it
over to the Revenue wherefor recovery proceedings had to be taken. This
Court categorically opined that there cannot be any impediment in the
G enforcement of the Scheme. Section 22 of the 1985 Act provides for a safeguard
against impediment that is likely to be caused in the implementation of the
Scheme. Section 22 was also held to be of wide import as regards suspension
of legal proceedings from the moment, the inquiry is started till after the
implementation of the scheme or disposal of the scheme under Section 25 of
the 1985 Act. It was categorically held:
H
JAY ENGINEERING WORKS LTD. v. INDUSTRYFACILITATIONCOUNCIL[S.B. SINHA,J.J J97

" ... it will be reasonable to hold that the bar or embargo envisaged in A
Section 22(1) of the Act can apply only to such of those dues
reckoned or included in· the sanctioned scheme .... "

The ratio laid down in the said decision, therefore, instead of assisting
the Respondent assists the Appellant.
B
In Maharashtra Tubes Ltd. v. State Industrial & Investment Corporation
of Maharashtra Ltd. and Anr., [ 1993] 2 SCC 144 this Court held:

"On the other hand, the 1985 Act was enacted, as its preamble
manifests, with a view to timely detection of sick or potentially sick
companies owning industrial undertakings, the identification of the c
nature of sickness through experts in relevant fields with a view to
devising suitable remedial measures through appropriate schemes and
their expeditious implementation. Here the emphasis is to prevent
sickness and in cases of sick undertakings to prepare schemes for
their rehabilitation by providing financial assistance by way of loans, D
advances or guarantees or by providing reliefs, concessions or
sacrifices from Central or State Governments, scheduled banks, etc.
The basic idea is to revive sick units, if necessary, by extending
further financial assistance after a thorough examination of the units
by experts and only when the unit is found to be no more capable of E
rehabilitiltion, that the option of winding up may be resorted to ... "

Both the Acts operate in different fields. If the 1985 Act is attracted,
the question of its giving way to the 1993 Act would not arise.

In Allahabad Bank v. Canara Bank and Anr., [2000] 4 SCC 406, this F
Court held :

"There can be a situation in law where the same statute is treated as
a special statute vis-a-vis one legislation and again as a general
statute vis-a-vis yet another legislation .... "
G
In that case, it was further opined that although both the Companies
Act, 1956 and the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions
Act, 1993 are special laws, normally the latter shall prevail.

We have noticed hereinbefore that the 1985 Act was amended in 1994.
The 1994 Amending Act was enacted after the coming into force of the 1993 H
Act.
198 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2006] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A Both the Acts contain non-obstante clauses. Ordinary rule of construction
is that where there are two non-obstante clauses. the latter shall prevail. But
it is equally well-settled that ultimate conclusion thereupon would depend
upon the limited context of the statute. [See Allahabad Bank (supra) para 34].

In Maruti Udyog Ltd. v. Ram Lal and Ors., (2005] 2 SCC 638, it was
B observed
.. The interpretation of Section 25-J of the 1947 Act as propounded
by Mr Das also cannot also be accepted inasmuch as in tenns thereof
only the provisions of the said chapter shall have effect notwithstanding
c anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law including
the Standing Orders made under the Industrial Employment (Standing
Orders) Act, but it will have no application in a case where something
different is envisaged in tenns of the statutory scheme. A beneficial
statute, as is well known, may receive liberal construction but the
same cannot be extended beyond the statutory scheme .... "
D
In Shri Sarwan Singh and Anr. v. Shri Kasturi Lal, (1977] I SCC 750.
this Court opined :

" ... When two or more laws operate in the same field and each contains
a non-obstante clause stating that its provisions will override those
E of any other law, stimulating and incisive problems of interpretation
arise. Since statutory interpretation has no conventional protocol,
cases of such conflict have to be decided in reference to the object
and purpose of the laws under consideration .... "

The endeavour of the court would, however, always be to adopt a rule
F of harmonious construction.

In NGEF Ltd. v. Chandra Developers (P) Ltd. and Anr., (2005] 8 SCC
219, interpreting sub-section (4) of Section 20 of SICA, it was held: ~.

"It is difficult to accept the submission of the learned counsel
G
appearing on behalf of the respondents that both the Company Court
and BIFR exercise concurrent jurisdiction. If such a construction is
upheld, there shall be chaos and confusion. A company declared to
be sick in tenns of the provisions of SICA, continues to be sick unless
it is directed to be wound up. Till the company remains a sick company
H having regard to the provisions of sub-section (4) of Section 20, BIFR
alone shall have jurisdiction as regards sale of its assets till an order
. JAY ENGINEERING WORKS LTD. v. INDUSTRY FACILITATION COUNCIL [S.B SINHA,).] J 99

of winding up is passed by a Company Court" A
It was further held :

"Section 32 of SICA contains a non ohstante clause stating that
provisions thereof shall prevail notwithstanding anything inconsistent
with. the provisions of the said Act and .of any rules or schemes made B
thereunder contained in any other law for the time being in force. It
would bear repetition to state that in the ordinary course although the ·
Company Judge may have the jurisdiction to pass an interim order in
exercise of its inherent jurisdiction or otherwise directing execution of
a deed of sale in favour of an applicant by the Company sought to
be wound up, but keeping in view the express provisions contained c
in sub-section (4) of Section 20 of SICA such a power, in our opinion,
in the Company Judge is not available. (See BPL Ltd.)

We may, however, observe that the opinion of the Division Bench
in BPL Ltd. to the effect that the winding-up proceeding in relation
to a matter arising out of the recommendations of BIFR shall commence D
. only on passing of an order of winding up of the (:ompany may not
be correct. It may be true that no formal application is required tci be
filed for initiating a proceeding under Section· 433 of the Companies
Act as the recommendations therefor are made by BIFR or AAIFR, as
the case may be; and, thus, the date on which such recommendations E
are made, the Company JUdge applies its mind to initiate a proceeding
relying on or on the basis thereof, the proceeding for winding up ·
would be deemed to have been started; but there cann,ot be any doubt
whatsoever that having regard to the phraseology used in Section 20
of SICA that BIFR is the authority proprio vigore which continues to
remain as custodian of the assets of the Company tin a winding-up F

.. order is passed by the High Court."

In ICICI Bank Ltd. v. Sidco.Leathers ltd. and Ors., (2006) 5 SCALE 27
the law is stated in the following terms :

"The non-obstante nature of a provision although may be of wide G
amplitude, the interpretative process thereof must be kept confined to
the legislative policy. Only because the dues of the workmen and the
debt due to the secured creditors are treated pari passu with each
other, the same by itself, in our considered view, would not lead· to
the conclusion that the concept of inter se priorities amongst the H
200 SUPREME COURT REPORTS !20061SUPP.6 S.C.R.

A secured creditors had thereby been intended to be given a total go-
by.

A 11011-ubstunte clause must be given effect to, to the extent the
Parliament intended and not beyond the same."

B for the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgment cannot be
sustained. Before parting with this case. however. we may observe that we
have not adverted to the question raised by th.: learned counsel for the
Respondents as to whether the Board while implementing the scheme could
reduce the quantum of the liability of creditors, as we are of the opinion that
such a contention need not be gone into at this stage. It will, therefore, further
C be open to the Respondent No 2 to approach the Board. if any occasion
arises therefor.

The impugned judgments are set aside. The appeals are allowed. No
costs.

D D.G. Appeals allowed.

.